*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBURG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946, VOLUME 17 *** [Cover Illustration] TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL _NUREMBERG_ 14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946 [Illustration] _PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY_ _1948_ This volume is published in accordance with the direction of the International Military Tribunal by the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction of the Allied Control Authority for Germany. VOLUME XVII _OFFICIAL TEXT_ _IN THE_ ENGLISH LANGUAGE _PROCEEDINGS_ 25 June 1946-8 July 1946 CONTENTS One Hundred and Sixty-third Day, Tuesday, 25 June 1946, Morning Session 1 Afternoon Session 37 One Hundred and Sixty-fourth Day, Wednesday, 26 June 1946, Morning Session 79 Afternoon Session 115 One Hundred and Sixty-fifth Day, Thursday, 27 June 1946, Morning Session 149 One Hundred and Sixty-sixth Day, Friday, 28 June 1946, Morning Session 179 Afternoon Session 211 One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Day, Saturday, 29 June 1946, Morning Session 244 One Hundred and Sixty-eighth Day, Monday, 1 July 1946, Morning Session 274 Afternoon Session 308 One Hundred and Sixty-ninth Day, Tuesday, 2 July 1946, Morning Session 339 Afternoon Session 362 One Hundred and Seventieth Day, Wednesday, 3 July 1946, Morning Session 393 Afternoon Session 426 One Hundred and Seventy-first Day, Thursday, 4 July 1946, Morning Session 458 Afternoon Session 496 One Hundred and Seventy-second Day, Friday, 5 July 1946, Morning Session 516 Afternoon Session 546 One Hundred and Seventy-third Day, Monday, 8 July 1946, Morning Session 575 Afternoon Session 614 ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-THIRD DAY Tuesday, 25 June 1946 _Morning Session_ [_The Defendant Von Neurath resumed the stand._] DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, I should like to advise the Tribunal that the first half of the manuscript of my final defense speech in typescript will be ready tomorrow and the second half by next Saturday. I am sorry to say that I personally can furnish only eight copies, six of which are earmarked for the interpreters to facilitate their difficult task. I am sorry that I could not furnish more copies since I personally have no mimeographing machine. I hope the Tribunal will appreciate the fact that after the statement made by the chief prosecutor for the United States on Friday, I cannot make any claims on the technical assistance of the Prosecution. Therefore, I am asking the Tribunal to decide whether it would be worth while, in order to expedite the presentation, to have the translation of my speech put before them. In this event I would request that the necessary arrangements be made. I am prepared to place my manuscript at the disposal of the Tribunal, under the conditions announced by you, Mr. President. What applies for me personally would, so far as I am advised, apply also for the rest, at least for the majority of Defense Counsel. In order to expedite the proceedings and to reduce the time spent on the presentation of the final defense speeches, it is important to have this point clarified. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, if you would hand in the manuscript to which you have referred, the Tribunal will make arrangements to have it translated into the various languages. I think that will meet the position so far as you are concerned. DR. NELTE: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has an announcement upon the subject, which I am about to read. The announcement is this: “In view of the discussion which took place on the 13th of June 1946, on the question of time to be taken by Defense Counsel, the Tribunal has given the matter further consideration. “When the Defense Counsel stated the time they wished to take, the Tribunal observed that some of the defendants required more time than others, and to this extent they did make an apportionment among themselves. The Tribunal feels that the suggested times are much too long and some voluntary restriction should be made. “Except as to a few of the defendants whose cases are of very wide scope, the Tribunal is of the opinion that half a day to each defendant is ample time for the presentation of his defense; and the Tribunal hopes that counsel will condense their arguments and limit themselves voluntarily to this time. The Tribunal, however, will not permit counsel for any defendant to deal with irrelevant matters or to speak for more than one day in any case. Four hours will be allowed at the beginning for argument on the general questions of law and fact, and counsel should co-operate in their arguments in such a way as to avoid needless repetition.” As heretofore stated, the Tribunal would like to have a translation of each argument in French, Russian, and English submitted at the beginning of the argument. Counsel may arrange for the translation themselves if they so desire; but if they will submit copies of their arguments to the translating department as soon as possible and not less than 3 days in advance of delivery, the translation will be made for them and the contents of the copies will not be disclosed. That is all. Yes, Dr. Lüdinghausen. DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Last night we had stopped in our treatment of the various points raised by the Prosecution. I should like to continue now and to put the following question to you, Herr Von Neurath. The Prosecution is charging you with the fact that in the Protectorate Germans had a preferential position as compared with Czechs and that you were responsible for that. Will you please comment on this? CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH (Defendant): The position of Germans in the Protectorate was not a preferential position which was vested with any real preferences and advantages as compared with the Czechs, but it was an entirely different position. The Germans had become citizens of the Reich and, therefore, had the rights of Reich citizens, such as the right to vote in Reichstag elections. The Czechs did not have this right to vote, which is understandable in view of the existing difference—variance between the German people and the Czech people. There were at no time any actual advantages connected with the position of the Germans in the Protectorate. Efforts to have preferential treatment were made, of course, in the chauvinistic Party and in nationalist circles. But I always opposed them vigorously and prevented any practical realization of such efforts. In this connection, however, I should like to stress once more that the Czech people did not consider themselves inferior to the German people in any way. It was a question simply of a different people which had to be treated, politically and culturally, according to its own characteristics. That was also the reason for the maintenance of the so-called autonomy which meant nothing more than the separation of the two nationalities with a view toward securing for the Czechs their own way of living; and it is evident that this autonomy had to be kept within certain limits, dictated by the prevailing necessities of the Reich as a whole, especially in times of war. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, I should like to deal with the individual points raised in the Czech indictment, or rather the points found in the Czech report, which is the basis for this charge. In this report it is asserted that the freedom of the press was suppressed Is that correct and what role did Herr Von Gregory play in the treatment of the press? VON NEURATH: Herr Von Gregory had been the press attaché at the German Legation in Prague and was subordinate to the Propaganda Ministry. Then he came, as chief of my press department, to my administration and controlled the Czech press according to the directives of the Propaganda Ministry in Berlin. The Czech press, of course, was not free—no more than the German press. Control of circulation and other measures, especially censorship measures, were the same. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report further raises the charge that the local Czech administrative offices were in many cases dissolved and then reorganized and key positions filled with officials and town councillors who were German or Czech collaborators. Is that correct? VON NEURATH: These were communities with a considerable German minority, particularly in Moravia. That they should also have a representation in the local administration seemed to me a natural thing. Prague, for instance, had a Czech mayor and a German assistant mayor. This could hardly be objected to. With regard to the attempts of the Germans in the various cities or districts to take a part in the local administration to an extent that did not seem justified by their numerical strength, I intervened and rejected them. In the municipal administrations of purely Czech districts, such as in West Bohemia, there were generally no German representatives at all. But on the other hand, there were German-speaking enclaves, such as the region of Iglau, where the Germans were dominant in numbers and thus, of course, in influence as well. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report accuses you of having—in this way and through the appointment of higher land councillors (Oberlandräte)—germanized the Czech administration, and this report bases its accusations on a statement which you allegedly made to the former Bohemian Landespräsident, Bienert, in which you said, “All that has to be digested in 2 years time.” VON NEURATH: I do not recall having made such a statement. And I cannot imagine having uttered it. Here we are concerned with the co-ordination of the Czechs—of the Czech with the German administration. The Oberlandräte were not appointed by me, but their office was created as a controlling agency by the Reich Government by the decree of 1 September 1939 in connection with the setting up of German administrations and the Security Police. When the Oberlandräte appeared before me to give their reports, I told them time and again that they were not to do any administrative work themselves but were to supervise only. The Czech method of administration was frequently superior to the German, I told them. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: With regard to this I should like to refer to Document Number Neurath-149 of my document book, the decree on the organization of the administration and the German Security Police, dated 1 September 1939. In Paragraphs 5 and 6 the appointment and the duties of these Oberlandräte are described more in detail. A quotation of this document might be redundant. The Czech indictment further contains a statement by Herr Bienert to the effect that on the problem of the co-ordination of the Czech administration you had remarked to him something like: “That must be carried out strictly; after all, this is war.” At the same time Bienert stated in his interrogation that the purpose of this measure, that is, the co-ordination of the Czech and the German administration, had been to assure Germany of a peaceful hinterland during the war. Will you kindly also comment on this. VON NEURATH: It is possible that I told Bienert something along these lines. However, I cannot remember it at this date. But it can be taken for granted that in the sphere of administration, as in every other sphere in the Protectorate also, the necessities of war were the main concern. Restrictions of the autonomy in the Czech national administration have to be considered from this point of view. That it was my constant endeavor to keep the country quiet in the interest of the Reich, and therewith in the interest of all, can hardly be held against me. Apart from that, I should like to remark that the introduction of restrictions on the autonomy was already contained explicitly in the decree setting up the Protectorate. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to the order contained in my document book under Number Neurath-144, Document Book Number 5. The order was issued by the Führer and Reich Chancellor on the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and is dated 16 March 1939. Under Article 11 it was even then stipulated that the Reich could incorporate departments of the administration of the Protectorate into their own administration. The Czech report further refers to a statement made by the former Czech Minister Havelka dealing with the persecution of the members of the Czech Legion of the first World War insofar as they held public office. What can you tell us about this question of the Legionnaires? VON NEURATH: The Czech Legion had been founded in Russia during the first World War. It was composed partially of volunteers, partially of the balance of Czech regiments which had belonged to the old Austro-Hungarian Army and had become prisoners of war in Russia. These Czech Legionnaires enjoyed a certain exceptional position after the founding of the Czech Republic. In part they were filled with strong chauvinistic resentment toward the Reich which dated back to the time of the nationalities fights. This, the so-called Legionnaire mentality, was a catchword in Bohemia; and in times of political unrest it could signify a certain political danger. By the way, this preferential position which the Legionnaires enjoyed was widely attacked in the Protectorate by the Czechs themselves. Therefore an effort was made, and by Frank particularly, to remove the Legionnaires from public office. But this took place only in the crassest cases and only insofar as those Legionnaires had joined the Czech Legion voluntarily, that is, it did not apply to those who were members of the former Austro-Hungarian Army. From the very beginning I tried to make this discrimination, which approximately corresponds to the situation—or corresponds with the distinction—which today is made in Germany between the voluntary members of the SS and the Waffen-SS. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech indictment is further accusing you of having supported the Czech Fascist organization Vlayka. It bases this charge on a memorandum which you yourself wrote concerning a discussion which you had with Hacha, the President of Czechoslovakia, on 26 March 1940. According to this memorandum you told Hacha that the personal and moral qualities of the Vlayka leaders were well known to you; in any case, you had to confirm the fact that this movement, this organization, was the only one which had taken a positive stand toward the Reich and toward collaboration with the Reich. How about that? VON NEURATH: The Vlayka movement was the same as the collaborationists in France. This movement worked to bring about a German-Czech collaboration and, in fact, long before the Protectorate was established. But the leaders of this movement were, in my opinion, rather dubious characters, as I showed in the words to Hacha quoted above. These leaders threatened and slandered President Hacha and members of the Czech Government among others. State Secretary Frank had known these men from former times and he wanted to support them merely in consideration of their former co-operation with him. However, I refused to do this, just as I refused the various applications of these people to visit me. On the other hand, it is possible that Frank supported them from a fund which Hitler had placed at his disposal without my knowledge and about which Frank was under obligation not to tell me anything. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What attitude, now, did you take to the dissolution of parties—of political parties—and of trade unions? VON NEURATH: That was like the control of the press, a necessity which resulted from the system, from the political system of the Reich. In any event, through this step taken by President Hacha and despite the measures taken by Germany, no country suffered less from the war than the Protectorate. The Czech people were the only ones in middle and eastern Europe who could retain their national, cultural, and economic entity almost to its full extent. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to turn to the point raised by the Prosecution which is concerned with an alleged cultural suppression. What can you tell us about the handling of Czech educational affairs? VON NEURATH: The Czech universities and other institutions of higher education, as has been stated before, were closed at Hitler’s order in November 1939. Again and again, at the request of President Hacha and of the Protectorate Government, I appealed directly to Hitler to have these schools reopened. But due to the dominating position of Herr Himmler, I had no success. The consequence of the closing of the universities, of course, was that a large number of young people who otherwise would have become university students now had to look for work of a manual sort. The closing of the institutions of higher learning also had repercussions on the secondary school level. This had already been heavily burdened after the separation of the Sudetenland in the autumn of 1938, for the entire Czech intelligentsia from this region had returned to the Czech-speaking area, or what was later the Protectorate. Hence for the young people from the secondary schools there was hardly any employment left. It was about the same situation which is now prevailing in Germany. Concerning the closing of Czech lower schools and other planned efforts to restrict Czech youth in their cultural freedom and their educational possibilities, I know nothing. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you yourself approve of the closing of Czech institutions of higher learning ordered by Hitler? THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, he said that he tried to intervene and get rid of Hitler’s order. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: If that is sufficient for the Tribunal then he need not answer the question further. THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you think that is sufficient? DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I just wanted to have it expressed once again in a somewhat stronger way; however, if the Tribunal is satisfied with the clarification of this problem, I am completely satisfied. THE PRESIDENT: It would not make it any better if it was said twice. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, if you—but, it is sufficient. [_Turning to the defendant._] Do you know anything about an alleged plan, mentioned in the Czech report, to turn the Czech people into a mass of workers and to rob them of their intellectual elite? VON NEURATH: No. Only a madman could have made a statement like that. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech indictment, or report, asserts that through your agencies, that is, with your consent and endorsement, destruction and plundering of Czech scientific institutions took place. On Page 58 of the German text, Page 55 of the English of this report, USSR-60, it says: “The Germans occupied all universities and scientific institutions. They immediately got hold of the valuable apparatus, instruments, and scientific installations in the occupied institutions. The scientific libraries were plundered systematically and methodically. Scientific books and films were torn up or taken away. The archives of the academic Senate, the highest university authority, were torn up or burned; and the card indexes destroyed and scattered to the four winds.” What can you tell us in regard to this? VON NEURATH: In this connection, I can say only that I never heard of any plundering and destruction of the sort described either in Prague or later. The Czech Hochschulen, or institutions of higher education, were closed together with the universities in the year 1939 at Hitler’s order. The buildings and installations of the Prague Czech University, as far as I know, were partly put at the disposal of the German university which had been closed earlier by the Czechs, since, after the Czech Hochschulen were closed, they could not be used any longer for Czech scientific purposes. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything at all about this... THE PRESIDENT: I did not understand that answer. As I got it, “The buildings, in part, were put at the disposal of German universities which had been closed by the Czechs.” VON NEURATH: In Prague. In Prague was the oldest German university; it had been closed by the Czechs after the last war, and after the establishing of the Protectorate it was reopened; and, as far as I know, some of the equipment and buildings were used for this German university. THE PRESIDENT: Go on. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything else about the removal of scientific equipment, collections, objects of art, and so forth? VON NEURATH: The only case about which I have any knowledge concerned the removal of historically valuable old Gobelins from the Maltese Palace in Prague. These were removed by a member of the Foreign Office in Berlin, allegedly by order of the chief of protocol; and this was done at night, secretly, and without my knowledge or the knowledge of my officials. As soon as I learned of this I contacted the Foreign Office, and I requested immediate restoration. Whether restoration was made, I do not know; that was only in 1941, and meanwhile I had left Prague. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: May I here... VON NEURATH: I know nothing about other incidents. Apart from that, I specifically prohibited the removal of art objects from the Protectorate to the Reich. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, I should like to submit an extract from the interrogation of the former State Secretary Frank, dated 10 June 1945. This is Number Neurath-154 of my Document Book Number 5, and I should like to ask the Tribunal to take notice of this statement. [_Turning to the defendant._] What happened to the objects of art and the furniture, which were Czech State property and with which the Czernin Palace in Prague, which you used as your official residence, was furnished? VON NEURATH: This house was the former official residence of the Czech Foreign Minister, and the partly valuable furnishings belonged to the Czech State. Since there was no inventory of any sort of these items, before moving in in the fall of 1939, I called in the Czech director of the castle administration and the Czech art historian, Professor Strecki; and I had a very exact inventory taken. One copy of this inventory was left in my office and another one was deposited with the administration of the castle. After I left Prague in the autumn of 1941, I had a record made through my former caretaker and again in the presence of a representative of the castle administration, Professor Strecki, that the articles which were mentioned in the inventory were actually still there. THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need details of the inventory, but there is one thing I should like to ask. The translation came through to me that the inventory was made in the fall of 1938. Was that right? VON NEURATH: 1939. I only wanted to mention that naturally I did not take any of these articles. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Another point raised by the Czech indictment deals with the confiscation of the so-called Masaryk houses in various cities and with the destruction of Masaryk monuments and monuments erected to other personalities famous in Czech history. What do you know about that? VON NEURATH: While I was in office, some of these Masaryk houses were closed by the Police because they were centers of agitation against Germany. The destruction or the removal of Masaryk or other Czech national monuments I had specifically prohibited. Apart from that, I expressly permitted the laying of wreaths at the grave of Masaryk at Lanyi, which Frank had prohibited, and this actually took place on a large scale. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: It is further asserted that Czech literature was suppressed and muzzled to a large extent. VON NEURATH: The printing and dissemination of Czech anti-German literature was prohibited of course, just as the further dissemination of English and French works was prohibited in the entire Reich during the war. Aside from that, all this material was treated according to the direct orders of the Propaganda Ministry. However, while I was in office, there were still many Czech book stores and book-publishing concerns which published books by Czech authors in large numbers and disseminated them. The selection of Czech books of every type in the book stores was considerably larger than the selection of German books. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Could you say anything about the suppression of Czech cultural life, of theaters, movies, and so forth, to which the Prosecution refers? VON NEURATH: There was no question at all of a limitation of the cultural autonomy of the Czechs, aside from the university problem. In Prague a great number of large Czech theaters of every description were open all the time, especially the Czech opera and several theaters. On the other hand there was only one permanent German theater with daily performances. There was a constant production of many Czech plays and operas, and the same applied to music. The well-known Czech Philharmonic Orchestra at Prague played Czech music primarily and was absolutely independent regarding its programs. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, we don’t need details. The defendant says that theaters and cinema theaters were allowed and there was only one German theater. We don’t want any further details about it. DR. LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well, Mr. President. I asked about these matters only because they are rather extensively dealt with in the Indictment. [_Turning to the defendant._] And what about the film industry, Herr Von Neurath? VON NEURATH: The same applied to the movie industry. It was even especially active. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, I should like to turn to the alleged suppression of religious freedom, of which you are being accused in the Czech indictment. The Czech indictment speaks of a wave of persecution which inundated the churches and which started immediately when the German troops marched in to occupy the country. What about that? VON NEURATH: A systematic persecution of the churches is quite out of the question. The population was quite free as concerns public worship, and I certainly would not have tolerated any restrictions along this line. The former Under State Secretary Von Burgsdorff has testified to that point here already. It may be true that in individual cases pilgrimages or certain religious processions were prohibited by the Police, even though I personally do not remember it clearly. But that took place only because certain pilgrimages, consisting of many thousands of people, were exploited as political demonstrations at which anti-German speeches were made. At any rate, that had actually occurred several times and had been brought to my knowledge. It is true that a number of clerics were arrested in connection with the action at the beginning of the war, which we have already mentioned here. But these arrests did not take place, because the men were clerics but because they were active political opponents or people who were political suspects. In cases of this nature I made special efforts to have these people released. My personal connections with the archbishop of Prague were absolutely correct and amicable. He and the archbishop of Olmütz specifically thanked me for my intervention on behalf of the Church, as I remember distinctly. I prevented any measure against the public worship of the Jews. Every synagogue was open to the time I left in the autumn of 1941. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In connection with the last point, I should like to put one more question about the position of Jews in the Protectorate. What can you tell us about it? VON NEURATH: The legal position of the Jews had to be co-ordinated with the position of the Jews in the Reich, according to instructions from Berlin. The directives with regard to this had been sent to me already in April of 1939. Through all sorts of inquiries addressed to Berlin, I tried and succeeded in not having the laws go into effect until June 1939, so as to give the Jews the opportunity to prepare themselves for the imminent introduction of these laws. The so-called Nuremberg Laws were introduced into the Protectorate, too, at that time. Thereby the Jews were removed from public life and from leading positions in the economic life. However, arrests on a large scale did not take place. There were also no excesses against Jews, except in a few single instances. The camp at Theresienstadt was not erected until long after my time of office, and I prevented the erection of other concentration camps in the Protectorate, too. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report accuses you of personally carrying through anti-Jewish measures. They maintain that, first of all, you charged the Czech Government, that is to say the autonomous government, with the carrying through of the anti-Jewish laws and that when Ministerpräsident Elias refused to do so, you personally took the necessary steps. VON NEURATH: As I said just now, the introduction of the anti-Jewish laws came about on Hitler’s direct order, that is to say through the competent authorities in Berlin. The representation... THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, why do you want to go over all this again? The defendant has given the evidence that he succeeded in putting off the laws until June 1939 and that then the Nuremberg Laws were introduced. He has given us the various qualifications which he said he made; and then you read him the Czech report and try to get him to go over it all again, it seems to me. It is now quarter past 11. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: All right, then, I shall consider the first question sufficiently answered and we shall not deal with the matter of confiscation either. [_Turning to the defendant._] The Czech report further accuses you of the dissolution of the organizations of the YMCA and YWCA, and the confiscation of their property in favor of German organizations. VON NEURATH: I must admit that I do not recall these confiscations at all. If this dissolution and confiscation took place before I left, it must have been a police measure only. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report further mentions the destruction of Czech economic life and the systematic plundering of Czech stocks of raw materials and accuses you in that regard. What are the facts with regard to that? VON NEURATH: With the establishment of the Protectorate, the Czech economy almost automatically was incorporated into the German economy. The export trade, for which Czech industries had worked to a considerable degree, was stopped for the duration of the war, that is to say, it had to trade with the Reich. The Czech heavy industries, especially the Skoda Works and the arms industry, as direct war industries, were taken over to supplement German armaments production by the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. At the beginning I tried especially to avoid selling out of the Protectorate, which would have been hard on the population. An effective means for that purpose was the maintenance of the customs boundaries which existed between Czechoslovakia and Germany. After heated conflicts with the Berlin economic departments, I succeeded in having the customs barrier maintained up to October 1940, for another year and a half, though it had already been rescinded on 16 March 1939. I believe I am also accused of having been responsible for the removal of raw materials and the like. In that connection I should like to say that the office of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan was the only authority which could take such measures. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to the decree which has already been submitted, the decree dated 16 March 1939, Number Neurath-144 of my Document Book Number 5. In this decree I should like to call special attention to Articles 9 and 10. [_Turning to the defendant._] You are further charged with and accused of the fact that the rate of exchange of Czech kronen to marks was established as 10 to 1, for in this way the buying out of Czechoslovakian goods was said to have been favored. Are you responsible for the establishing of this rate? VON NEURATH: No. In the decree of 16 March 1939 dealing with the establishment of the Protectorate—a decree in the drafting of which I did not take part in any way—it was already stipulated that the rate of exchange would be determined by the Reich Government. As far as I know, the same rate was the customary one at the stock exchange and in trade before the incorporation of the Sudetenland into the Reich as well as afterwards. An official rate had to be determined, of course, and this was done through the decree issued by the authorities in Berlin. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In connection with the decree dated 16 March 1939, which was just mentioned and which is to be found under Number Neurath-144 of my Document Book Number 5, I should like to call your attention especially to Article 10 which sets forth: “The ratio of the two currencies, the Czechoslovakian and the German, to each other will be determined by the Reich Government.” [_Turning to the defendant._] The Czech report further accuses you of the fact that railroad rails allegedly were removed and taken to Germany. Do you know anything about this matter? VON NEURATH: I know nothing about this matter and I think this is certainly an error. I know only that in the year 1940 there were negotiations between the German Reich railroads and the Czech State railroads concerning the borrowing of railroad cars and of engines against remuneration. But the stipulation in this case was that this rolling stock could be spared by the transport system in the Protectorate. Aside from that, the railroads in the Protectorate, were not under my supervision; but they were directly subordinate to the Transportation Ministry in Berlin. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to refer to Article 8 of the decree which I have just mentioned, a decree which is found under Number Neurath-144 of my Document Book 5. [_Turning to the defendant._] It is further asserted that the Reich Commissioner at the Prague National Bank stopped all payments for abroad and confiscated all the stocks of gold and of foreign currencies of the National Bank. Did you have anything to do with this matter? VON NEURATH: I had nothing at all to do with these matters. The Reich Commissioner for the Prague National Bank was appointed directly by the Reichsbank in Berlin, or rather by the Ministry of Finance; and he got his orders from them. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report states further that you are to be blamed, or are to be made co-responsible, for the alleged confiscation of the Czech banks and industrial undertakings by the German economy. VON NEURATH: The German banks, and to an extent the German industries as well, had a real interest in getting a firm foothold in the economic life of the Protectorate. However, this was something which applied long before the establishment of the Protectorate. Therefore it was not strange that the big German banks, in particular, used the opportunity to acquire Czech stocks and securities; and in this way the controlling interest in two Czech banks together with their industrial holdings were transferred to German hands in a manner which was economically quite correct. I believe the Union Bank is mentioned in the Czech report, a bank which was taken over by the Deutsche Bank; and I know in this case quite coincidentally that the initiative did not originate on the German side, but rather from the Czech Union Bank itself. But neither I nor my agencies tried to foster this development in any way. Apart from that all these enterprises had Czech general directors, and in very few cases were German officials taken in. By far the largest part of all industrial enterprises remained purely Czech as before. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the situation with regard to the alleged coercive measures which the Prosecution maintains were used against Czech agriculture? Can you tell something about this and about your attitude and the measures you took? VON NEURATH: This chapter belongs to the whole scheme of plans by the Party and SS, relative to Germanization, which have already been mentioned. The instrument of this German settlement policy was to be the Czech Land Office (Bodenamt), which in itself was a Czech office, which was a survival of the former Czech office for agrarian reform. Himmler first of all assigned to the Land Office an SS Führer as its provisional leader. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not want to know all the details about this. The Czech report apparently alleges coercion in agriculture. The defendant says that it was due, if any, to the Party and the SS; and he had nothing to do with it. What is the object of his giving us all these details about the history of agriculture in Czechoslovakia? You must realize the Tribunal... DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, but I should like to point out one thing only. [_Turning to the defendant._] The Land Office, which was acting in the interests of National Socialism, was restaffed by you with new personnel after a long struggle. I considered it important to clarify this too. Mr. President, I should like to make a general remark. I said yesterday that my examination would last another hour. But yesterday, when I left the session, I found another document book to the indictment which has forced me to deal in greater detail with individual questions here. And for this reason, a reason which I could not foresee, I will have to take additional time. THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal has not taken up the question of time at the moment. Why do you have to go into some questions of—I do not know what the word is, “Amt”—to do with agriculture? Why do you want to go into that? He, the defendant, said he had nothing to do with it. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, in a way he was connected with it, Mr. President, insofar as these agricultural efforts were made through the Land Office. THE PRESIDENT: If he was connected with it let him explain it. I thought he said the Party and the SS did it. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, but via the Land Office, and he prevented this. Perhaps you can tell us briefly about this, Herr Von Neurath. VON NEURATH: I believe that according to the statements of the President of the Court, that is hardly necessary. As a matter of fact, I had no direct connection with the Land Office. I only succeeded in having a rather unpleasant leader of this office, a member of the SS, removed. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: During your period of office as Reich Protector, was there any compulsory transportation of workers to the Reich? VON NEURATH: No. In this connection I shall also be brief. Compulsory labor did not exist at all while I was in the Protectorate. There was an emergency service law which was issued by the Protectorate Government and applied to younger men who were employed in urgently needed work in the public interest in the Protectorate. Compulsory deportations of workers to the Reich did not occur in my time. On the contrary, many young people reported voluntarily for work in Germany, because labor conditions and wages were better in the Reich than in the Protectorate at that time. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How did your resignation from office—and this is my last question—your leaving your office as Reich Protector come about? VON NEURATH: First of all I should like to tell you why I remained as long as I did, in spite of all these occurrences and difficulties. The reason for it was that I was convinced, and I am still convinced today, that I had to stay as long as I could reconcile this with my conscience, in order to prevent this country, which was entrusted to Germany, from coming under the definite domination of the SS. Everything that happened to the country after my departure in 1941 I had actually prevented through my presence; and even if my work was ever so much limited, I believe that by remaining I not only rendered a service to my own country but to the Czech people as well, and under the same circumstances I would not act differently even today. Apart from this I believed that in time of war, especially, I should leave such a difficult and responsible office only in case of the utmost necessity. The crew of a ship does not go below deck and fold their hands in their laps if the ship is in danger. That I could not comply with the wishes of the Czechs 100 percent is something that will be understood by everybody who had to deal with politics in a practical and not merely theoretical way. And so I believe that by my persevering in office I prevented much of the misery which befell the Czech people after I left. This opinion was also shared by a large number of the Czech population, as I could gather from the numerous letters which were addressed to me by the Czech people later on. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And how did it happen that you left, that you resigned from your office? VON NEURATH: On 23 September 1941 I received a telephone call from Hitler asking me to come to headquarters immediately. There he told me that I was being too mild with the Czechs and that this state of affairs could not be continued. He told me that he had decided to adopt severe measures against the Czech resistance movement and that for this purpose the notorious Obergruppenführer Heydrich would be sent to Prague. I did everything in my power to dissuade him from this but was not successful. Thereupon I asked permission to resign, since I could never be responsible for any activity of Heydrich’s in Prague. Hitler refused my resignation but permitted me to go on leave. I flew back to Prague and on the following day I continued my journey home. At the same hour that I left Prague, Heydrich arrived. Then I wrote to Hitler from my home and again asked to resign immediately. When in spite of a reminder I did not receive any answer I repeated my request, and at the same time I explained that under no circumstances would I return to Prague, that I had dissolved my office and I refused to act as Reich Protector from now on. I was not officially relieved from my office until October 1943. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to conclude my examination of the defendant with a brief quotation from the Czech indictment. THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, was your going on leave made public? VON NEURATH: Yes. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I was just going to quote that, Mr. President. In that text of the Czech indictment it says: “When at last in the second half of September the underground Czech revolt committees, with the help of the BBC, began a successful boycott campaign against the German controlled press, the German authorities seized the opportunity to aim a heavy blow at the Czech population. On 27 September 1941 radio station Prague gave out the following report: “‘Reich Minister Baron von Neurath, Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, has found it necessary to ask the Führer for a long leave in order to restore his impaired health.’” Then in conclusion it says: “Under these circumstances the Führer agreed to the request of the Reich Protector and charged SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich with the direction of the office of Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia during the time of the illness of Reich Minister Von Neurath.” With this my examination is ended, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: From September 1941 until October 1943, did you live on your own estates, or what? VON NEURATH: Yes, Mr. President. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: My examination is over. THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn now. [_A recess was taken._] THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask the witness any questions? DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): Is it known to you that immediately before Germany left the League of Nations, Von Papen followed Hitler to Munich to persuade him to remain in the League of Nations? VON NEURATH: Yes, that is known to me. In fact, I myself induced him to do so. DR. KUBUSCHOK: During the time he was Vice Chancellor in 1933 and 1934, did Von Papen protest in the Cabinet against unfriendly acts of the German policy toward Austria, as for instance, the introduction of the 1,000-mark embargo? VON NEURATH: Yes, that line was continuously followed by him and by other ministers and naturally by myself, too. DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Hitler mention to you that this attitude of Papen’s in the Austrian problem induced him to transfer the mission in Vienna to Papen after the murder of Dollfuss? VON NEURATH: Yes, Hitler did speak about that. DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Hitler discuss with you the reasons why he addressed the letter of 26 July 1934 to Papen, announcing that Papen would be sent to Austria? VON NEURATH: Yes, but the way it happened was as follows: When Hitler told me about his intention to send Papen to Vienna, I reminded him that, in order to give the latter any weight, he should first of all, after the events of 30 June, clear up the relationship between himself, Hitler, and Papen, and clear it up publicly. This letter which was read here in Court can be traced to that. DR. KUBUSCHOK: In 1937 you paid a visit to the Austrian Government which led to demonstrations. Were you and Von Papen surprised by these demonstrations, and did you agree with them? VON NEURATH: The demonstrations were a complete surprise to me, especially because of their tremendous size. They certainly did not please me, because they cast a certain shadow on the discussions between Herr Von Schuschnigg and myself. DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then, the last question: Before Schleicher’s Government was formed there was a meeting of the Cabinet on 2 December 1932. The day before Papen had been given orders by Hindenburg to send the Parliament on leave and to form a new government. Is it correct that Papen reported on this matter to the Cabinet and that Schleicher, as Reichswehrminister, made a statement to the effect that this would lead to civil war and that the forces of the Wehrmacht were too weak to cope with such a civil war? VON NEURATH: Yes, I remember this occurrence very accurately. We were all somewhat surprised at Schleicher’s statement. However it was so well founded that we had to accept it as true. DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you. THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions? [_There was no response._] The Prosecution? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): At the time about which Dr. Kubuschok has just been asking you, in the second half of 1932, did you know that President Von Hindenburg, the Defendant Von Papen, and General Von Schleicher were discussing and considering very hard what would be the best method of dealing with the Nazi Party? VON NEURATH: No. As I have already testified, I had no connection in that respect. I knew absolutely nothing about all these negotiations. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to make it clear, I am not suggesting you were in the negotiations. But didn’t you know that the problem as to how to deal with the Nazi Party was exercising the minds of the President and the Defendant Von Papen and General Von Schleicher; that it was a very urgent problem in their minds? VON NEURATH: Yes, I knew that. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And again, do not think, Defendant, I am suggesting that you were in the negotiations. You may take it—well, I will make all the suggestions perfectly clear. You knew that in the end the method which commended itself to President Von Hindenburg, to the Defendant Von Papen, and to General Von Schleicher was that there should be a government with Hitler as Chancellor, but well brigaded by conservative elements, in harness with conservative elements; that was the plan that was ultimately resolved on? You knew that much, I suppose, didn’t you? VON NEURATH: Yes, but the plan was not quite like that. At that time, the time you are talking about, there was only mention of the fact that we were obliged to bring the Nazi Party into the Government. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But eventually, when the Nazi Party came in, on 30 January 1933, the plan was that it would be well harnessed to conservative elements. That was the idea in President Von Hindenburg’s mind, was it not? VON NEURATH: Yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you were one of the conservative and stable elements, if I understand you rightly; isn’t that so? VON NEURATH: Yes. It has been explained here that it was the special wish of President Von Hindenburg that I should remain in the Government. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In order to keep Hitler’s Government peace-loving and respectable. Is that a fair way of putting it? VON NEURATH: Yes, so as to prevent Hitler’s revolutionary movement in general from exercising their methods too much within the Government, too. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, Defendant, you have told us that up to this time you had been a diplomatist. When you became a Minister, did you not think that you had some responsibility for keeping the Government respectable and peace-loving as a Minister of the Reich? VON NEURATH: To be sure, but the question was only how far it was in my power to accomplish this. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t want to go into the workings of your mind too much, I just want to get this clear. You realized that as a Foreign Minister, and as a well-known figure to all the Chancelleries of Europe, that your presence in the Government would be taken throughout Europe, as a sign of your approval and your responsibility for what the Government did, did you not? VON NEURATH: I doubt that very much. Perhaps one might have hoped so. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let’s consider it. Is it your case that up to November of 1937 you were perfectly satisfied with the peace-loving intentions and respectability of the Government? VON NEURATH: I was convinced of the peaceful intentions of the Government. I have already stated that. Whether I was satisfied with the methods... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What about respectability? By “respectability” I mean the general standard of decency that is required by any government, under which its people are going to be reasonably happy and contented. Were you satisfied with that? VON NEURATH: I was by no means in agreement with the methods, above all in connection with the domestic policy. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would just like to look at that for a moment. Did you know about the “Brown Terror” in March of 1933, some 6 weeks after the Government was formed? VON NEURATH: I only knew of the boycott against the Jews, nothing else. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember the affidavit that has been put in evidence here, made by the American Consul, Mr. Geist, Document 1759-PS, Exhibit USA-420? VON NEURATH: May I see it? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just let me remind you. It is a long affidavit, and there are only one or two parts I want to put to you. Mr. Geist gives detailed particulars of the bad treatment, the beating, and assaulting, and insulting, and so on, of Jews as early as March 1933. Did you know about that? VON NEURATH: I know of these occurrences; I do not know this affidavit, I have not seen it, but I do know about the occurrences from complaints made by foreign diplomatic representatives. And according to them—and as concerns my attitude to these events—I repeatedly applied to Hitler and urgently implored him to have them stopped. But I do not know anything more about the details. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just leaving that affidavit for the moment, as Foreign Minister, you would receive—you did receive, did you not, a synopsis or account of what was appearing in the foreign press? VON NEURATH: Yes, that I did but whether I received all of those things I do not know. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let me take an example. You had been Ambassador at the Court of St. James from 1930 to 1932, if my recollection is right; had you not? VON NEURATH: Yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you realized—whether you agreed with what was in them or not—the London _Times_ and the _Manchester Guardian_ were newspapers that had a great deal of influence in England, didn’t you? VON NEURATH: Yes, yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that in April 1933 both these newspapers were full of the most terrible stories of the ill-treatment of Jews, Social Democrats, and Communists in Germany? VON NEURATH: Yes, that is quite possible. I cannot remember it any more now; but those were certainly the very cases which I brought up before Hitler, drawing his attention to the effect that this was having abroad. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just want to consider the extent which these papers were alleging. As early as the 12th of April 1933 the _Manchester Guardian_ was saying: “The inquirer, by digging only an inch below the surface, which to the casual observer may seem tranquil enough, will, in city after city, village after village, discover such an abundance of barbarism committed by the Brown Shirts that modern analogies fail...”—describing them as an instrument—“...of a Terror that although wanton is systematic—wanton in the sense that unlike a revolutionary Terror it is imposed by no outward necessity, and systematic in the sense that it is an organic part of the Hitlerite regime.” Did you know that this and quotations like these were appearing in responsible British papers? My Lord, that is D-911, which is the collection of extracts and, with Mr. Wurm’s affidavit, will be Exhibit GB-512. [_Turning to the defendant._] Did you know that was the line that was being taken, that it was systematic in the sense of being an organic part of the Hitler regime? VON NEURATH: No, in that sense certainly not. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that the British paper, the _Manchester Guardian_, was quoting, “...an eminent German conservative, who is in close touch with the Nationalist members of the German Government, and certainly more sympathetic to the Right than to the Left...” has given the number of victims as 20,000—as many as 20,000 in April? Did you know that the figure was being put that high? VON NEURATH: No, and I do not believe it, either. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let us see what the German press was saying. On the 24th of April 1933 the _Times_ was quoting the _Hamburger Fremdenblatt_, which, in turn, was invoking official sources and stating that there were 18,000 Communists in prison in the Reich and that the 10,000 prisoners in Prussia included many social intellectuals and others. Would the _Hamburger Fremdenblatt_, which had a very long career as a newspaper, if it misquoted official sources under your Government in April 1933, have misrepresented the position? It would not, would it? VON NEURATH: That I do not know, but I do know that a lot of trouble is always being stirred up by means of figures. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But Defendant, here is a figure quoted, as far as I know, by a responsible Hamburg paper, as an official figure, requoted by the London _Times_, which is the principal paper in England. Wasn’t that sufficiently serious for you to bring it up in the Cabinet? VON NEURATH: I am very sorry, but with all respect to the papers—and even the London papers—they do not always tell the truth. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No. That is a perfectly reasonable comment. Newspapers, like everyone else, are misinformed. But when you had a widespread account of terrible conditions giving large numbers, did you not, as one of the respectable elements in this Government, think that it was worthy of bringing it up in Cabinet and finding out whether it was true or not? VON NEURATH: How do you know that I did not do that? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I am asking. Did you bring it up, and what was the result when you did? VON NEURATH: I have already told you before that I always remonstrated about these incidents, with Hitler—not in the Cabinet, but with Hitler. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not what I asked you. You see, Defendant, what I asked you was why you did not bring it up in the Cabinet. Here was a Cabinet established with conservative elements to keep it respectable. Why did you not bring it up in the Cabinet and try and get the support of Herr Von Papen, Herr Hugenberg, and all the other conservative gentlemen in the Cabinet of whom we have heard? Why did you not bring it up? VON NEURATH: For the very simple reason that it seemed to be more effective to tell Hitler directly. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In April 1933, some 2 months after it was formed, are you telling the Tribunal that you did not think it was worth while to bring a matter up in the Reich Cabinet? Within 2 months of Hitler coming into power, it had become so “Führer-principled” that you could not bring it up in the Cabinet? VON NEURATH: I repeat—and after all I alone should be the one to judge—that I considered direct representations made to Hitler more effective. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now, I just want—I do not suppose you were interested, but did you know about the putting into concentration camps of any of the gentlemen that I mentioned to the Defendant Von Papen: Herr Von Ossietzski or Herr Mühsam or Dr. Hermann Dunker, or any of the other left-wing writers and lawyers and politicians? Did you know that they had gone to a concentration camp from which they never returned? VON NEURATH: No. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not know at all? VON NEURATH: No. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, you knew—as your documents have shown—when you went to London in June, you knew very well how, at any rate, foreign opinion had crystallized against Germany because of the treatment of the Jews and the opposition parties, did you not, when you went to the world economic conference in June? VON NEURATH: Yes. That was mentioned by me in a report that was read in Court. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now you say that your reaction was to go to Hitler and protest. I just want to look at what the existing documents show that you did. Now, let us take April, first of all. Would you look at Document D-794? [_The document was handed to the defendant._] My Lord, it is Document Book 12a, Page 8. It will be Exhibit GB-513. Now, this is a letter from you to Hitler dated the 2d of April 1933: “The Italian Ambassador telephoned me last night and informed me that Mussolini had declared himself prepared to deny, through the Italian delegations abroad, all news about the persecution of the Jews in Germany that had been distorted by propaganda, if we should consider this course useful. I thanked Herr Cerruti, also on your behalf, and told him that we would be glad to accept his offer. “I regard this friendly gesture of Mussolini’s as important enough to bring it to your notice.” What did you think had been distorted by propaganda? VON NEURATH: Yes, please read this part. Here it says, “the news had been distorted by propaganda.” That is what it is about. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I was so interested in, Defendant. What did you think had been distorted, and how much knowledge had you, so that you could decide whether the news had been distorted or not? VON NEURATH: That I really cannot tell you any more today. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew that Jews had been beaten, killed, taken away from their families, and put into concentration camps and that their property had been destroyed and was beginning to be sold under value. You knew that all these things were happening, did you not? VON NEURATH: No, certainly not at that time. That they were beaten, yes, that I had heard; but at the time no Jews were murdered or perhaps only once in one individual case. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, so you see that the _Times_ and _Manchester Guardian_ of that date gave the most circumstantial examples of typical murders of Jews? You must have seen that; you must have seen that the foreign press was saying it. Why did you think that it was distorted? What inquiry did you make to discover whether it was distorted? VON NEURATH: Who—who—who—who gave me information about—about—about—murders? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am putting it to you that it was in the foreign press. I have given you the two examples from the press of my own country; and obviously from what Signor Mussolini was saying, it was in the press of other countries. You must have known what they were saying. What inquiries did you make to find out whether it was true or not? VON NEURATH: I used the only way possible for me, namely through the police authorities concerned. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you ask Himmler, or did you ask the Defendant Göring? VON NEURATH: Most certainly not. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What? You asked Himmler? Or did you ask the Defendant Göring? Why not? Why not? He was the head, inventing the Gestapo and the concentration camps at that time. He would have been a very good man to ask, would he not? VON NEURATH: The man who could have given me information was the chief, the supreme head of the Police, and it was in no way personally... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you ask the Defendant Frick? VON NEURATH: In any case, I did not ask him personally. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now... VON NEURATH: Certainly not personally. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May I suggest to you that I do not want to take up time? Why did you not take the trouble to ask Göring or Frick or anyone who could have given you, as I suggest, proper information? Would you look at Document 3893-PS? [_The document was handed to the defendant._] The Tribunal will find it at Page 128 of Document Book 12a. My Lord, that will become Exhibit GB-514. This is the _Völkischer Beobachter_, quoting you on the 17th of September 1933, on the Jewish question: “The Minister had no doubt that the stupid talk abroad about purely internal German affairs, as for example the Jewish problem, will quickly be silenced if one realizes that the necessary cleaning up of public life must temporarily entail individual cases of personal hardship but that nevertheless it served only to establish all the more firmly the authority of justice and law in Germany.” Was that your view in September 1933, of the action against the Jews and against the left-wing sympathizers up to that time, that it was a “necessary cleaning up of public life,” which would, of course, temporarily involve “individual cases” of hardship, and that was necessary “more firmly” to establish “the authority of justice and law in Germany”? Was that your view? VON NEURATH: I told you during—during—during my—I think it was the day before yesterday in answer to the question of what my attitude was toward the Jewish problem, that in view of the inundation and domination of public life in Germany by Jews which occurred after the last war, I thought it absolutely right to have these things either eliminated or restricted. That is what I am referring to here. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that it is right—I mean, you are not running away from what you said on the 17th of September 1933—that you thought the treatment of the Jews in 1933 a “necessary cleaning up of public life” in Germany? Are we to take it that your view then is your view now, and you do not deviate from it at all? Is that right? VON NEURATH: That is still my view today, do you not see, only it should have been carried out by different methods. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right. Well, we will not go into discussions of it. Am I to take it that you knew and approved of the breakdown of political opposition? VON NEURATH: No, that is... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, let us take it by stages. Did you believe in the prescribing, the making illegal of the Communist Party? VON NEURATH: In those days, most certainly, because you have heard, have you not, that we were facing civil war. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well. You agreed with that. Did you agree with the breaking down and making illegal of the trade unions? VON NEURATH: No. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What did you do to protest against the breaking down of the trade unions? VON NEURATH: That was in a sphere—this sphere did not concern me at all. I was Foreign Minister and not Minister of the Interior. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, again, I am not going to argue with you. You thought it was perfectly right as Foreign Minister to remain and give your support and authority to a government which was doing something of which you disapproved, like breaking down the trade union movement. Is that how we are to take it? VON NEURATH: Yes. Did you ever hear that a minister... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now what about... VON NEURATH: I would like to say, did you ever hear that every cabinet minister must leave the cabinet if he does not agree with one particular thing? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Every cabinet minister for whom I have any respect left a cabinet if it did something of which he morally disapproved, and I understood from you that you morally disapproved of the breaking down of the trade union movement. If I am wrong, correct it. If you did not disapprove, say so. VON NEURATH: I did not think that it was immoral. It was a political measure, but not an immoral one. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then let us take Number 3, take the Social Democratic Party, that was a party which had taken a great share in the Government of Germany and of Prussia for the years since the war. Did you think it right, morally right, to make that party illegal and unable to take any further share in the carrying on of the country? VON NEURATH: No, certainly not. But I do not at all know... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us get it clear. Did you think it right or not? VON NEURATH: I just told you “No” but I do not at all know whether you... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What did you do to protest against that? What did you do to protest against the dissolution of the Social Democratic Party? VON NEURATH: The most I could do against this dissolution was to state my objections. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To whom did you state your objection against the dissolution of the Social Democratic Party? VON NEURATH: To Hitler, again and again. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Again and again you didn’t raise the dissolution of the parties, the opposition parties? You never raised that in the Cabinet; that is right, isn’t it? VON NEURATH: I cannot remember whether this question was discussed in the Cabinet; I do not know any more. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. All right. Let us just pass to another aspect and still on 1933. I just want you to have in mind what was happening in 1933. Did you know that after you had announced that Germany was leaving the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, that orders for military preparations to deal with the possibility of war, as consequent on that action had been got out? VON NEURATH: No. In 1932-1933 I knew nothing about it. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In 1933, yes, it started—in Document C-140, Exhibit USA-51—on the 25th of October 1933. Now, Defendant, you were Foreign Minister. Are you telling the Tribunal that neither had Hitler nor Marshal Von Blomberg—I think he was Reichswehrminister—that none of them told you, as a result of this action, “we shall have to have the preparations ready in case sanctions, including military sanctions, are imposed on Germany.” Did none of them tell you that that was to be the result of your move in foreign policy? VON NEURATH: No, nor was there any action to be feared. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now it is rather—you will agree with me—it is rather odd not to inform the Foreign Minister of the possible consequences of his policy in the military preparations you are taking to deal with it; it is rather odd, isn’t it in any system of government, of totalitarian, democratic, or anything you like, it is rather odd not to tell the Foreign Minister what you are doing in the way of military preparations, to deal with his policy, isn’t it? VON NEURATH: I certainly had to decide on the opinion as to whether any danger threatened from our withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, that is, I had to decide whether this might have any probable consequences. The military had their own opinion, and presumably—but I do not know, anyhow, I was not informed; but there were certain discussions amongst the General Staff, I assume. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I just want to sum up for 1933 and I want to do that quickly. May I take it, that up to the end of 1933, despite these matters which I have put to you, that you were perfectly satisfied with the respectability and peace-loving intentions of the Government; is that right? VON NEURATH: Yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just let us turn to 1934. You remember your conversation with Mr. Dodd, the American Ambassador, which you mentioned in your Document Book Number 1, at Page 54. It was on the 28th of May 1934; and Mr. Dodd had told you, apparently, what he had said to Hitler about the way Americans are trying to control profiteering by great financial interests. He said he was glad that—then he says that you said that you were glad that he had informed Hitler and then Mr. Dodd added “that the Chancellor had not agreed with me.” Then he says: “Von Neurath was silent for a moment after my remarks. It was plain that he was entirely of my way of thinking. He begged me to say to Washington that the outbreak was entirely contrary to the German Government purpose, but he did not commit himself on Hitler.” What did you mean by that, “...that the outbreak against Jews was entirely contrary to German Government purpose...”? VON NEURATH: By that I wanted to say that the members of the Cabinet, the majority of them, were against these methods. Apart from that, I can add that I had just asked Mr. Dodd to go and see Hitler personally so as to give backing to the suggestions I was making to Hitler. I took him there. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But did you know, in May 1934, that the German Government was going in for systematic and virulent anti-Semitism, didn’t you know that? VON NEURATH: Anti-Semitic propaganda, I knew mainly from Herr Goebbels’ speeches. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; well, let us pass to something a little more concrete. Had you any reason for disliking General Von Schleicher or General Von Bredow? VON NEURATH: No. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the effect on your mind of these two gentlemen and Frau Von Schleicher being killed in the blood purge of the 30th of June 1934? VON NEURATH: I hardly need to answer that. Of course, I was repulsed by it, that is clear; but then I told you the other day that unfortunately in the case of such a revolt, innocent people always have to suffer as well. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. But just let us get it clear. You told the Tribunal the other day that you thought—and had some reason for thinking—that there was a movement in the SA, that is, a movement led by Röhm and Ernst, and I suppose people that you would consider undesirable, of that sort. What reason had you to suppose that General Von Schleicher and General Von Bredow had been in a conspiracy, if any? VON NEURATH: I had no reason at all, and I do not believe today that they were plotting. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you hear about the unfortunate way in which Herr Von Papen kept on losing secretaries at the same time? You remember, you know. VON NEURATH: Exactly the same. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that Herr Von Bose and Jung were killed, Von Tschirschky was arrested, and two other gentlemen were also arrested? Did you hear about that? VON NEURATH: Yes, I did, through Herr Von Papen. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you regard the blood purge of the 30th of June as just another element in the necessary cleaning up of public life? VON NEURATH: To the extent that it was carried out with all the outrages and murders of innocent people, most certainly not. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you go on in a government that was using murder as an instrument of political action? VON NEURATH: I have already told you twice that in the case of such revolutions such mishaps cannot be avoided, most unfortunately. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now, let us take just another of your 1934 experiences. You knew about the terroristic acts that were going on in Austria in May and June of 1934, did you not? And by “terroristic acts”—don’t let us have any doubt about it—what I mean is causing explosions in Austrian public utilities and railways and things like that. I mean dynamite. I don’t mean anything vague. You knew that such acts were going on in Austria in May and June 1934, did you not? VON NEURATH: Yes, I heard about it, and I always opposed that sort of thing because I knew that it was done by Nazis; and let me say once more, mostly by Austrian Nazis. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What position did Herr Köpke have in your Ministry on the 31st of May 1934? VON NEURATH: He was the Ministerial Director. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Ministerial Director: Quite a responsible position, was it not? VON NEURATH: Yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Herr Köpke reporting to you on the 31st of May 1934, on a visit of Baron von Wächter? VON NEURATH: No, I cannot remember that. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just think; you know. Baron von Wächter was one of the leaders of the Putsch against Dollfuss 6 weeks later on the 25th of July. Don’t you remember Herr Köpke making a report to you and you passing it on to Hitler? VON NEURATH: No, I cannot remember that. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s refresh your memory if you don’t remember it. Would you look at Document D-868? It will become Exhibit GB-515. Just look at it. I will read it over, but just look at the signatories carefully; and if you will be good enough to look at the top, I think you will find on the original, there are your own initials; and on the left hand side there is a note: “The Reich Chancellor has been informed 6/6.” That is on the 6th of June. That is initialed “L” by Lammers—Dr. Lammers. Then there is a note below that: “From the Reich Chancellor on 6th June,” also initialed by Lammers I think. And on the other side you will see there is a note which is certainly initialed “Lammers.” “Habicht is coming today... L 6/6.” And this memorandum comes back from the Reich Chancellor to the Foreign Office on the same day. Now just let’s see what report you were getting from Austria and passing on to Hitler. We will omit, unless you want it particularly, a description of Baron von Wächter’s fresh, youthful appearance in Paragraph 1; but it goes on to say: “His statements were obviously made in full consciousness of serious responsibility. His estimation of the affairs and personalities that came under review was clear and definite. Herr Von Wächter drew up for me, too, a picture of the situation in Austria which was, in some of its colors, even darker and more serious than it had appeared to us here up till now. The extremist tendencies of the National Socialists in Austria were constantly on the increase. Terrorist acts were multiplying. Regardless of who actually undertook the demolitions and other terrorist acts in individual cases, each such act provoked a new wave of extremism and also of desperate acts. As Herr Von Wächter repeatedly and sadly stressed, uniformity of leadership was lacking. The SA did what it wanted and what it, for its part, considered necessary. The political leadership at the same time introduced measures which sometimes meant the exact opposite. Thus the great terrorist action, as the result of which the railway lines leading to Vienna were blown up, was by no means committed by Marxists but by the Austrian SA and indeed against the wishes of the political leadership which, as he believed, did not participate in any way either in the act or its preparation. Such is the picture as a whole. In detail, in individual provinces and districts, the confusion was, if possible, even greater.” Then he says that the main seat of unrest is Carinthia, and where conditions were worst. And then he says: “Herr Von Wächter thought that here improvements must be introduced most speedily, that is, by means of the centralization of all forces active in the interests of National Socialism both in and outside Austria. Personal questions should play no part here. The decisive word in this connection could, of course, be given only by the Führer himself. He, Wächter, was in complete agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters. As far as he knew, Herr Habicht had already succeeded in having a brief conversation with the Reich Chancellor today.” Now just let’s pause there for a moment. Herr Habicht was appointed about that time press attaché at the German Embassy in Vienna. The appointment of Herr Habicht as press attaché would be done either by you or with your approval, would it not? It was under your department? VON NEURATH: Right now I no longer know if Herr Habicht—Herr Habicht was the National Socialist leader (Landesleiter) for Austria in Munich and whether or not he went to Vienna as press attaché I do not know. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you can take it that he went to Vienna as press attaché at this time, at the end of May 1934; and what I am asking you is, was it not either at your order or with your approval that he was given a post which gave him diplomatic immunity in the middle of his plottings? VON NEURATH: If Herr Habicht was really there, this happened neither with my knowledge nor with my approval; but presumably it was arranged by the Ministry of Propaganda to whom these press men were subordinated. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you will agree with me, Defendant, that this is not a very pleasant document; it does not describe a very pleasant state of affairs. Let me remind you, this came, from your Ministerial Director to you and went on to the Führer and came back from Dr. Lammers with a note: “Habicht is coming today.” Surely as... VON NEURATH: To the Führer? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, yes. VON NEURATH: Besides, Mr. Prosecutor, I want to point out to you that here only the Austrian National Socialists are being discussed. With them I had nothing at all to do. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am pointing out to you is that the document, this Foreign Office document goes to the Reich Chancellery; it comes back on the 6th of June with a note from Dr. Lammers saying, “Habicht is coming today.” You must have known all about Habicht on the 6th of June. It is mentioned in this report. VON NEURATH: Not at all. I have this note from Lammers which means that Habicht was coming to see the Reich Chancellor. And this report from my Ministerial Director I immediately passed on to the Reich Chancellor to show him what the conditions were in Austria. That was the reason. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you remember Herr Von Papen giving evidence a few days ago; and when I asked him who were the leading Reich German personalities who influenced the Putsch in Austria in July 1934, he thought for a long time and the only leading Reich German personality that he could remember as influencing the Putsch was this very Herr Habicht? VON NEURATH: Yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well then, what I am putting to you is—and pausing there to get it—that you knew very well, on the 6th of June 1934, that Herr Habicht, this leading Reich personality according to the Defendant Von Papen, was organizing revolution in Austria, didn’t you? VON NEURATH: Whatever makes you suppose a thing like that? Herr Habicht never came to see me. He went to see the Reich Chancellor. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You saw this report. This is a report of your Ministerial Director. I have just read what Von Wächter thought. VON NEURATH: There is not one word about Herr Habicht in it. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I just read that to you. May I remind you: “The decisive word in this connection could of course be given only by the Führer himself. He, Wächter, was in complete agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters.” In other words, what Wächter is putting to the Foreign Office were the views of Habicht no less than himself. VON NEURATH: Yes, that is certainly in there. Well, all these terrorist acts and all these disturbances which are described in this document were brought to the attention of the Reich Chancellor by myself. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look what the report says at the foot of the page: “But when nothing happened in the meantime, and on the other hand the counter measures of the Austrian Government grew more brutal and severe from day to day, the radical elements made themselves felt once more and came forward with the statement that the Chancellor had issued his order only for tactical reasons and was inwardly in agreement with every manly act of opposition and had in view, as his own political aim, merely the weakening of Dollfuss’ hateful system, though in a way which should be as unobtrusive as possible to the outside world. They are now working with this argument.” Listen to the next bit, his suggestion to you, the nearest warning of trouble which any Foreign Minister ever heard of: “One constantly stumbles on this idea during discussions and it is secretly spreading. A change must be made soon and a uniform leadership created. Otherwise, as Herr Von Wächter concluded his impressive description, a disaster may occur any day which would have the worst possible consequences in foreign policy, not only for Austria alone, but above all for Germany herself.” And then, dramatically, in the middle of the conversation, Herr Von Wächter receives a telephone message that he had better not go back to Vienna or he will be arrested on his arrival; and within 6 weeks he had started the Putsch and Chancellor Dollfuss had been shot. Do you remember now? Did you not appreciate, at the beginning of June 1934, that there was the greatest danger of an uprising and trouble in Austria? VON NEURATH: Yes, quite definitely so. That is the very reason why I sent the report to the Chancellor. I could not interfere in Austria. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps you can tell me, on the question on which the Defendant Von Papen was unable to specify, who, in your opinion, were the other prominent Reich German personalities who were behind the Dollfuss Putsch in Austria? You say you were not. Who, in your opinion, were these personalities that Herr Von Papen mentions as being behind the Dollfuss Putsch? VON NEURATH: I know absolutely none. I know only Habicht, and him I knew only as a person against whom I protested to Hitler because of his inflammatory actions. Apart from him I did not know any Reich Germans. The others were all Austrian National Socialists who have been mentioned innumerable times during the Trial but whom I did not know. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not mentioning them. I am mentioning the Defendant Von Papen’s prominent Reich German personalities, and I am trying very hard to find out who they were Are you taking the same line, that the only one you can remember is the press attaché, Herr Habicht? Is that all you can help the Tribunal in this matter? VON NEURATH: I have already said—and that will have to suffice—I do not know anyone. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is it your opinion that your Minister, Dr. Rieth, knew nothing about this, despite what Mr. Messersmith says on that point? Do you think Dr. Rieth knew nothing about the Putsch? VON NEURATH: I cannot tell you to what extent Herr Rieth was informed. You know, however, that when he acted ostentatiously later on that I recalled him right away. Apart from that, I always forbade the ministers to meddle in such matters. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You haven’t any doubt in your own mind that Dr. Rieth knew all about the impending Putsch, have you? VON NEURATH: Oh yes, I have considerable doubts that he knew all about it. I do not believe so because his whole character was not at all like that. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, at any rate, you knew on the 25th of July that the Austrian Nazis had made this Putsch and had murdered Dollfuss? VON NEURATH: That is not exactly a secret. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I know it. A lot of these things were not secrets. What I am interested in was your knowledge—when you found out. VON NEURATH: Afterward, yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But didn’t that give you any qualms about remaining in a government which had extended its policy of murder from at home to abroad, through the Party elements in Austria? VON NEURATH: If I were responsible for every single murderer, for every single German murderer who was active abroad, then I would have had a lot of work to do, would I not? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew, Herr Von Neurath—and I shall remind you how in a moment—you knew that the Austrian NSDAP was in close touch with, and acting under, the orders of Hitler all the time when Hitler was head of your Government; you knew that perfectly well, didn’t you? VON NEURATH: He was the chief of the NSDAP. It is quite natural that they were collaborating with him. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now there is just one other point... VON NEURATH: Yes. I want to tell you another thing: I continuously remonstrated with Hitler, together with Herr Von Papen, about the fact that this Herr Habicht was doing the things he was. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will take that up in a moment. I just want to get one point of fact. Does this accord with your recollection: I have been through all the reports of the Defendant Von Papen; and apart from three personal reports, two dealing with Herr Von Tschirschky and one dealing with abuse of Hitler, which is of no political significance, we have 28 reports. Nineteen of these reports are marked as being copies to the Foreign Office. Is that in accord with your recollection, that three but of four of Herr Von Papen’s reports would come to you to be seen by you? VON NEURATH: That I cannot tell you at this late day. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are quite right, Herr Von Neurath. You wouldn’t know how many went to you, but you say you saw a considerable number of Herr Von Papen’s reports. I think there were 19; I am sure you can take it that they are marked—19 are marked, “Passed the Foreign Office”. VON NEURATH: I do believe you, yes; but the question is how many were submitted to me, for I did not receive every individual report from every ambassador or minister abroad. Otherwise, I would have been drowned in paper. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I quite agree; but what I asked you was, did you receive these from Herr Von Papen, who was supposed to be in a rather special position dealing with a very difficult problem? Did you receive a considerable number of reports from Herr Von Papen to Hitler as passed to you? VON NEURATH: I can tell you only that I received some reports but certainly not all. I cannot tell you more than that today. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, perhaps this would be a convenient time to break off. THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time. [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] _Afternoon Session_ SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to get two or three facts clear about 1935 before I put some questions to you. On the 10th of March Germany announced the establishment of an air force and on the 16th of March I think you, among others, signed the law introducing compulsory military service. You explained all that to us; I don’t want to go over it again, but I just want to ask you about the Secret Reich Defense Law of the 21st of May 1935. Would you look at General Thomas’ comment on it. My Lord, it is at Page 52 of Document Book 12. It is about Page 71 of the German document book. THE PRESIDENT: Number 12a or b? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Number 12, My Lord. That is the original one; Page 52, My Lord. “The Central Directorate of the supreme Reich authorities, ordered in case of war, has influenced the development and the activity of the war economy organization to such an extent that it is necessary to discuss this matter in detail. The foundations had already been laid, for the central organization of the supreme Reich authorities in the event of a war prior to 1933 in many discussions and decrees, but it was radically altered when the National Socialists came into power, and especially by the death of Reich President Von Hindenburg. The latest orders were decreed in the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, supposed to be published only in case of war but already declared valid for carrying out war preparations. As this law fixed the duties of the Armed Forces and the other Reich authorities in case of war, it was also the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization.” (Document 2353-PS) And you will remember that on the same day the Defendant Schacht had been made Plenipotentiary for War Economy. Did you appreciate at the time, Defendant, that that law was the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization? VON NEURATH: Yes, but only in case of a war, that is, in case of mobilization. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see that the point that I am putting to you is that it had already been declared valid for carrying out war preparations. Didn’t you understand that it was a big step forward for war preparations? VON NEURATH: Not at all. It was not a big step forward at all. It was only the establishing of the necessary measures in case of a war. In every country you have to guarantee the co-operation of the various offices in the event of an attack. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is your view. Now, at this time, up to May 1935, is it correct that the German Foreign Office was still staffed by diplomats or Foreign Office officials of the older school and had not yet been invaded by the products of the Bureau Ribbentrop? VON NEURATH: Yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you receive any warnings from your own staff as to the happenings in Austria, or the rearmament, the declaration of the air force, and the conscription? VON NEURATH: I was advised about happenings in Austria, as can be seen from the report which you submitted to me. The re-establishment of the Armed Forces was a decision which was made in the Cabinet, and of course I knew about that. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but—I am sorry, probably I did not put the proper emphasis on the word. When I said warning I meant a real warning from your officials that these happenings were making Germany regarded abroad as being bloodthirsty and warmongering. Did you get any warnings from your officials? VON NEURATH: Certainly not, for that was not the case, and if any assertions like that were being made abroad, they certainly were not true. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you look at Document 3308-PS, the affidavit of the interpreter Paul Schmidt. My Lord, it is Page 68 of Document Book 12a, and it is Page 65 or 66 of the German version, Paragraph 4. [_Turning to the defendant._] Now, just let me read you Paragraphs 4 and 5, as to what Herr Paul Schmidt says: “4. The attempted Putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfuss on 25 July 1934 seriously disturbed the career personnel of the Foreign Office because these events discredited Germany in the eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the Putsch had been engineered by the Party, and the fact that the attempted Putsch followed so closely on the heels of the blood purge within Germany could not help but suggest the similarity of Nazi methods, both in foreign and in domestic policy. This concern over the repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon heightened by a recognition of the fact that these episodes were of influence in leading to the Franco-Soviet Consultative Pact of 5 December 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning by the Nazis.” Defendant, let’s take that. In these three points, is it correct, as Herr Schmidt says, that the attempted Putsch and the murder of Dollfuss seriously disturbed the career personnel in the Foreign Office? VON NEURATH: Not only the career personnel of my office were disquieted over this but I, of course, was also disquieted. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And taking the last sentence: “This concern”—that is the disturbance by the Putsch—“over the repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon heightened by a recognition of the fact that these episodes”—blood purge and the Putsch—“were of influence in leading to the Franco-Soviet Consultative Pact of December 5, 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning...” Is that correct, that among your staff the concern was heightened by recognizing that the blood purge and the Putsch had alarmed France and the Soviet Union as to the position of Germany and led to the consultative pact? VON NEURATH: No, that is a personal opinion of the interpreter Schmidt. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, with respect to you, Defendant, it is not. What interpreter Schmidt is saying is that that was the opinion of your experienced staff in the Foreign Office and that is what I am putting to you. Is he not right in saying that your experienced staff were concerned that these events had had their effect on the consultative pact? VON NEURATH: Not in the least. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, at any rate... VON NEURATH: I can only repeat, the two things had no connection with each other. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is he correct in his last statement that that arrangement was not heeded as a warning by the Nazis? VON NEURATH: That I cannot say; I do not know. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just look at the next paragraph. “The announcement in March of the establishment of a German Air Force and of the introduction of conscription was followed on 2 May 1935 by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between France and the Soviet Union. The career personnel of the Foreign Office regarded this as a further very serious warning as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy, but the Nazi leaders only stiffened their attitude toward the Western Powers, declaring that they were not going to be intimidated. At this time the career officials at least expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath. I do not know whether or not Neurath in turn related these expressions of concern to Hitler.” Now, just let us take that. Did—do you agree that the career personnel of the Foreign Office regarded the Franco-Soviet pact as a further very severe, very serious warning as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy? VON NEURATH: I do not know in the name of which personnel Herr Schmidt is making these statements. But I, at any event, heard nothing to the effect that my career personnel had expressed these opinions. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, here is Herr Schmidt saying, “The career officials, at least, expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath.” That is you. VON NEURATH: Yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you saying that Herr Schmidt, who after all was a career official although he was an interpreter for a great deal of the time—are you saying that Herr Schmidt is not stating what is accurate when he says that your permanent officials expressed their concern to you? VON NEURATH: But quite decidedly. How could Herr Schmidt, who was only an insignificant civil servant at that time, know what my career personnel told me and in addition, how could Schmidt judge this? And I should also like to add that Schmidt said here, before this Court, that this affidavit, or whatever it may be, was submitted to him after a serious illness and that he personally knew absolutely nothing more about the contents. That now... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You may rest assured, the Tribunal will correct me if I am wrong, that I put these paragraphs to Herr Schmidt and he agreed with them when he was giving evidence before this Tribunal. But now just look at one other statement at the end of Paragraph 6. Well, we’ll just—we will read Paragraph 6, because I want to ask you about the end: “The re-entry of the German military forces into the Rhineland was preceded by Nazi diplomatic preparation in February. A German communiqué of 21 February 1936 reaffirmed that the Franco-Soviet Pact of mutual assistance was incompatible with the Locarno Treaties and the League Covenant. On the same day Hitler argued in an interview that no real grounds existed for conflict between Germany and France. Considered against the background statements in _Mein Kampf_, offensive to France, the circumstances were such as to suggest that the stage was being set for justifying some future act. I do not know how far in advance the march into the Rhineland was decided upon. I personally knew about it and discussed it approximately 2 or 3 weeks before it occurred. Considerable fear had been expressed, particularly in military circles, concerning the risk of this undertaking. Similar fears were felt by many in the Foreign Office. It was common knowledge in the Foreign Office, however, that Neurath was the only person in Government circles consulted by Hitler who felt confident that the Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from Britain and France. Neurath’s position throughout this period was one which would induce Hitler to have more faith in Neurath than in the general run of ‘old school’ diplomats, whom he (Hitler) tended to hold in disrespect.” Well, now, if this minor official, of whom you just talked, knew about and discussed the march into the Rhineland some 2 or 3 weeks before it occurred, how much before it occurred had you discussed it? VON NEURATH: Herr Schmidt must have been clairvoyant, for 2 or 3 weeks in advance even I did not know anything about it. I heard of it about 1 week before Hitler’s decision, and if I—if it says here that I—that it was generally known in the Foreign Ministry that I was the only one in the Government circles consulted by Hitler who was confident that the Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from Britain and France, it certainly turned out that I was right. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were right—but is it true that you were the only person in Government circles who thought that it could be occupied without interference by Britain and France? Is that true? VON NEURATH: I am not in a position to say whether I was the only one, but at any rate, I was convinced of this on the basis of my knowledge of international conditions. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And so that at any rate, whatever the limitations of Paul Schmidt, he knew what your position was quite accurately. Was he not right about it in the last sentence, that your position throughout the period was one which would make Hitler look to you rather than to the rest, the other figures of pro-Nazi diplomacy and foreign affairs, because you were the person who was encouraging him? Is that not the position? VON NEURATH: I did not encourage him in any way, but I described the situation to him as I saw it, and it was later proved that I had been right. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I just want you to deal with one other point, which is really 1936, but we will deal with it as I have been dealing with Austria. You have said once or twice that you objected very strongly to the description of the Austrian treaty, the treaty between the Reich and Austria of the 11th of July as being a subterfuge or a façade. That is right; is it not? You objected very strongly to that view? VON NEURATH: Yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that Hitler had given instructions to the Gauleiter of the Austrian NSDAP to carry on the struggle at the same time as the treaty was signed? VON NEURATH: No, I do not know anything about that. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let me remind you. I do not want to put anything that seems unfair. My Lord, it is Document Book 12, Page 97. [_Turning to the defendant._] This is the report of Dr. Rainer, whom the Tribunal has had the advantage of seeing, and if you will look at the end of one paragraph he says: “The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of these two persons.”—That is Defendant Seyss-Inquart and Colonel Glaise-Horstenau—“Papen mentioned Glaise-Horstenau to the Führer as being a trusted person.” Now the next paragraph: “At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders of the Party...” THE PRESIDENT: Sir David. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord. THE PRESIDENT: Do you say 97 of Document Book 12? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did, My Lord, yes. Yes, My Lord; it is the third paragraph and begins, “At that time...” THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, I see it. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please: “At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders of the Party in Austria, in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian National Socialists should do.” (Document Number 812-PS) THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid it was another “at that time” that we were looking at. Could you give us some other indication? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is in the middle. THE PRESIDENT: It is on 98 in ours. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am so sorry, My Lord. The paging must be different. I beg Your Lordship’s pardon. [_Continuing._] “At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders of the Party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austria National Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor...” Mind you, this is the man who is making this statement. “...successor and leader of the Austrian Party. On 16 July 1936 Dr. Rainer and Globocznik visited the Führer at the Obersalzberg, where they received a clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Führer. On 17 July 1936 all illegal Gauleiter met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Rainer on the statement of the Führer and his political instructions for carrying out the fight. At the same conference the Gauleiter received organizational instructions from Globocznik and Hiedler.” Did you not know—did Hitler not tell his Foreign Minister, who had just supervised the conclusion of this treaty, that he intended to give the illegal Gauleiter instructions as to how to carry on the fight? Didn’t he tell you that? VON NEURATH: No, he did not tell me that, but I do remember—I believe it was the same Dr. Rainer who appeared here as a witness—who stated that Hitler summoned him and other Gauleiter and told them that in the future they were to observe strictly the agreements of 1936. By the way, the matter that you just quoted is not mentioned at all in the document which was submitted to me. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that’s not mentioned. What is mentioned is the political instructions for carrying out the fight and the organizational instructions from Globocznik. At any rate, you knew nothing about that? VON NEURATH: No. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, it is rather difficult for you to judge whether the treaty is made sincerely if you do not know the instructions that are given to the illegal Party in Austria by Hitler, is it not? VON NEURATH: Yes, naturally. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let’s deal with one or two other points. I would just like you to look at what Mr. Messersmith says at the end of 1935. You remember this statement—I will give you the reference in a moment—that: “...Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen, and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are ‘diplomats of the old school.’ They are in fact servile instruments of the regime and just because the outside world looks upon them as harmless, they are able to work more effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime.” Now, can you tell us up to the date on which Mr. Messersmith wrote that—on October 10, 1935—of a single instruction of Hitler’s that you had not carried out? VON NEURATH: I did not quite understand. A single instruction... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am sorry; I mislaid the reference. It is Document Book 12, Page 107. That is the reference to it. [_Turning to the defendant._] You see, Mr. Messersmith is there saying that you and the Defendant Von Papen and Von Mackensen are servile instruments of the regime. Now, I am just asking you whether you could tell us up to the date that Mr. Messersmith wrote, on 10 October 1935, any instruction of Hitler’s that you had refused to carry out. VON NEURATH: Not only one, but quite a few. I have testified as to the number of times I contradicted Hitler, and I have expressed myself about what Mr. Messersmith is assuming here again—about the importance of Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I put it this way: Up to October 10, 1935, what did you tell the Tribunal was the most serious thing that Hitler had ordered you to do and you had refused to carry out? What was the most serious—the one that mattered most? VON NEURATH: Well on the spur of the moment, that is a question that I cannot answer. How should I know what the most serious question was which I opposed? I opposed all sorts of things. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you can’t remember what you think is the most serious, I shan’t trouble you with it any more, but I want... VON NEURATH: Well, you are quite welcome to submit it to me, but don’t produce an allegation out of a clear sky without giving me the chance to refute it. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was asking you to tell us, but I will pass on to what another American diplomat put. I would like to ask you about Mr. Bullitt’s report, with which I gather you agree. My Lord, that is L-150, and it is at Page 72 of the Document Book 12. My Lord, I hope that there is no difference of the paging—72 of mine. THE PRESIDENT: Yes; it is 74. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is 74. I am sorry, My Lord. [_Turning to the defendant._] Now, it is the second paragraph there. After saying that he had a talk with you, he says: “Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until ‘the Rhineland had been digested.’ He explained that he meant that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do everything possible to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. ‘As soon as our fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory at will, all those countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies and a new constellation will develop...’” You agree you said that? VON NEURATH: Yes, yes, certainly. Yesterday or the day before I testified in detail about what that was supposed to mean. Moreover, it does not make any difference. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like to see if you agree with the meaning I suggest. That is that as soon as you had got your fortifications in sufficiently good order on your western frontier, you would proceed to try and secure an Anschluss with Austria and to get back the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. Isn’t that what it means? VON NEURATH: No, no, not at all. That is quite clear in the document. What I meant by this and what I expressed was that these countries, particularly Czechoslovakia and France, would change their policy toward Germany, because they could no longer march through Germany so easily. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You appreciate, Defendant, what I am putting to you? I think I made it quite clear—that at the time that you were facing the Western Powers with the remilitarization of Germany and the Rhineland—that is in 1935 and 1936—you were then giving assurances to Austria, which Hitler did in May 1935, and you made this treaty in 1936. As soon as you had digested your first steps, you then turned against Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938. I am suggesting, you see, that you were talking the exact truth and prophesying with a Cassandra-like accuracy. That is what I am suggesting—that you knew very well that these intentions were there. VON NEURATH: What? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say you didn’t? VON NEURATH: Not at all, not at all, not at all! That is an assumption on your part, for which there is absolutely no proof. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will not argue it further because we will come on to just one other point before we proceed to 1937. You have told the Tribunal, not once but many times, that you did not support the Nazi attitude toward the Christian churches, of oppressing the churches. That is I have understood you correctly, have I not? VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, and you say that you resisted and actively intervened against the repression of the Church. Would you just look at Document 3758-PS. My Lord, that will become Exhibit GB-516. My Lord, Your Lordship will find it in Document Book 12a, Page 81. [_Turning to the defendant._] This is an entry which must have been fairly early in 1936 in the diary of the Reich Minister of Justice: “The Reich Foreign Minister transmits, with a personal note for confidential information, a letter from Cardinal State Secretary Pacelli”—that is the present Pope—“to the German Ambassador in the Vatican, in which he urges an act of pardon for Vicar General Seelmeyer. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, remarks to this that after the heavy attacks on German justice by the Holy See in the note of 29 January, there is no reason in his opinion to show any deference to the Vatican. He recommends it, however, since for foreign policy reasons it is to our interest not to let our good personal relations with Pacelli cool off.” Now, Defendant, will you tell me anything that showed the slightest personal interest in the fate of Father Seelmeyer, or were you only concerned with showing a firm front to the Vatican and not losing your good relations with Cardinal Pacelli? DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, the document has just been submitted to me; I have had no opportunity whatsoever to look this document over and inform myself about it. Likewise, I do not know of there having been any talk about a diary of the Reich Minister of Justice up to now in this Trial. Therefore, I am not in a position to judge how the Reich Minister of Justice could have made this entry in his diary at all. Since these notes have apparently been taken out of their context, it is not possible for me to form any kind of a picture of the significance of the entry as a whole, and naturally it is even less possible for the defendant to do so. Therefore, I must protest against the admissibility of this question and against the submission of this document. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is a perfectly good captured document. It is a copy of the original diary of the Reich Minister of Justice, and it is therefore admissible against the defendant. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, you can see the original document. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, actually, I am just told by my American colleagues that this diary has been used before, that extracts were put in in the case against the Defendant Von Schirach. VON NEURATH: Mr. President, I have no objection... THE PRESIDENT: One moment. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I could not understand a word, Mr. President. I am sorry, I could not understand. I can hear now. THE PRESIDENT: When you make an objection, you should see that the instrument is in order. What I said was that you can see the original document. And I am told now that the original document has been used before, and that therefore there is nothing to prevent its being used in cross-examination. It is a captured document, and you can see the original. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I did not know that, Mr. President. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am putting to you, Defendant, is that your statement to the Minister of Justice shows no concern for the individual priest about whom the complaint had been made; it is merely concerned with your relations with the Vatican and with Cardinal Pacelli, as he then was. Is that typical of your interferences? Is this typical of your interferences for the sake of ill-treated priests? VON NEURATH: I naturally cannot remember this case any more, but the way it stands there in the entry I was perfectly justified. According to the entry, I said that we had no reason to show any special consideration after the then Cardinal State Secretary, or Pope had attacked German justice, but that, as Foreign Minister I considered it important not to disturb our relations with Pacelli. I cannot see what conclusions you want to draw from this. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I don’t want to trespass on the ground of my Soviet colleagues, but you know that the Czech report accuses you, with complete impartiality as far as sect is concerned, of your Government ill-treating the Catholics, Protestants, Czech National Church, and even the Greek Church in Czechoslovakia. You know that all these churches suffered during your protectorate—do you agree that all these churches suffered under your protectorate? VON NEURATH: No, not at all. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, I won’t go into the details, but I am suggesting to you that your care about the various religious confessions did not go very deep. VON NEURATH: That is again an assertion on your part which you cannot prove. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would just like to put one thing. You remember telling the Tribunal this morning of the excellent terms that you were on with the archbishop of Prague? VON NEURATH: I said that I had good relations with the archbishop. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would just like you to look at this copy. My Lord, this is a copy, but General Ecer assures me that he can get the original from the Czech Government files. I received it only a half hour ago. General Ecer, who is here from Czechoslovakia, says that he can vouch for the original. I’d like the defendant to look at it. Is that a letter which you received from the archbishop? My Lord, it is Document D-920, and it will be Exhibit GB-517: “Your Excellency, very esteemed Herr Protector of the Reich: “Your last letter has filled me with such sorrow because I could not but gather from it that not even Your Excellency is prepared to believe me—that I lost consciousness and had to call university Professor Dr. Jirasek, who remained beside my sickbed for an hour—he is coming again today, together with the specialist on internal diseases....” And then he gives his name. “Your Excellency may be sure that I shall always do what I can to please you. But please, have mercy on me, too, and do not demand that I should act against the laws of the Church. “Yours, _et cetera_, Karl Cardinal Kaspar, M. P. prince archbishop.” Do you remember that? VON NEURATH: I cannot say what this refers to. I have no idea; there is nothing in it, and I cannot tell you what it referred to. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can’t remember this occasion when the prince archbishop wrote to you and told you the effect, the illness that he had suffered from and beseeched you not to ask him to do something against the laws of the Church? It doesn’t remain in your mind at all, does it? VON NEURATH: No. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, we’ll leave that. Well now, I want you to just tell me this, before we pass on to the later occurrences in 1937. You remember you dealt yesterday with your speech—I think it was to the German Academy of Law. You remember the speech, in August of 1937? I can give you a reference. Would you like to look at it? VON NEURATH: I only need the reference to where I spoke. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember it, I only wanted to save time. Don’t you remember? I will put it to you if you like. It is the speech of the 29th of August 1937, and I will give you the reference in one moment. What I wanted to ask you was this—you said: “The unity of the racial and national will created through Nazism with unprecedented élan has made possible a foreign policy by means of which the chains of the Versailles Treaty were broken.” What did you mean by “the unity of the racial will” produced by Nazism? VON NEURATH: By that I probably meant that all Germans were unified more than ever before. At this date I can no longer tell you what I meant by this, either. But nevertheless I was merely establishing a fact. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Now tell me. That was in August 1937. You told the Tribunal the effect that the words of Hitler, on the 5th of November 1937, had upon you, and your counsel has put in the statement by Baroness von Ritter. After these words... VON NEURATH: In November? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, November of 1937. VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, after these words had had that effect, with whom did you discuss them among the people who had been present at the Hossbach interview? VON NEURATH: This speech was not made at Berchtesgaden at all. That is a mistake; it was at Berlin, this address. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I didn’t say Berchtesgaden; I said at the Hossbach conference. We call it the Hossbach conference because he took the minutes. VON NEURATH: I have already told you yesterday with whom I spoke, General Von Fritsch, and with Beck, who was then Chief of the General Staff; and I also testified that we agreed at that time jointly to oppose Hitler and the tendency which he had revealed in this speech. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you speak about it to Hitler? VON NEURATH: Yes. I testified yesterday in detail that I did not have a chance to speak with Hitler until 14 or 15 January, because he had left Berlin and I could not see him. That was the very reason why I asked for my resignation at that time. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you speak about it to Göring or Raeder? VON NEURATH: No. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to just tell me one word or two about this Secret Cabinet Council to which you were appointed after you left the Foreign Office. Would you look at the first sentences of the report of that meeting on the 5th of November? My Lord, it is Page 81 in the English Document Book 12, and Page 93 of the German document book. It is only the first two sentences, Defendant: “The Führer stated initially that the subject matter of today’s conference was of such importance that its detailed discussion would certainly, in other states, take place before the Cabinet in full session. However, he, the Führer, had decided not to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet because of its importance.” Then, if you will look at the people who were there: There is the Führer; the Minister for War; the three Commanders-in-Chief; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Now, Defendant, supposing that in February or March 1938, Hitler had wanted to discuss Austria before the same Council, the same limited number of people. Just let us see who would have taken the places of the people who were there. Instead of Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch, you would have had the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, and Von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief, would you not? VON NEURATH: Yes, I believe so. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As a matter of fact, Raeder and Göring maintained their positions; the Defendant Von Ribbentrop had taken yours; and you were president of the Secret Cabinet Council. Lammers was secretary of the Cabinet, and Goebbels had become more important as Minister of Propaganda. Well now, I would just like you to look and see who the people were that formed the Secret Cabinet Council. Your Lordship will find that on Page 8 of Document Book 12; and it is Page 7 of the German document book. [_Turning to the defendant._] Now, do you see who they are? There are the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, the Defendant Göring, the Führer’s Deputy, Hess, Dr. Goebbels, and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, Von Brauchitsch, Raeder, and Keitel. You are saying, if I understand you, that this Secret Cabinet Council had no real existence at all. Is that your case? VON NEURATH: Yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why were you receiving special funds for getting diplomatic information as president of the Secret Cabinet Council? VON NEURATH: I did not receive any. I should like to know... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, didn’t you? VON NEURATH: No. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let us just have a look at this. Would you look at Document 3945-PS? My Lord, it is 129 in Document Book 12a. It will be Exhibit GB-518. If you will look at the letter of the 28th of August 1939 from Lammers to you: “In conformity with your request, I have had the sum of 10,000 Reichsmark, which had been placed at your disposal for special expenses in connection with the obtaining of diplomatic information, handed to Amtsrat Köppen. “I enclose the draft of a certificate showing how the money was used, with the request to send me the certificate after execution, at the latest by the end of the financial year.” And if you will turn over to the next page, 131, you will see that at the end of March, which was toward the end of the financial year, you signed a certificate saying: “I have received 10,000 Reichsmark from the Reich Chancellery for special outlays entailed in obtaining diplomatic information.” Now, will you tell us why you were getting special expenses for obtaining diplomatic information? VON NEURATH: Yes, I can tell you that. That is an expression used at the request of Lammers who had the treasury of the Reich Chancellery under him, so that I could meet the expenses of my office; that is, for one typist and for one secretary. And in order to justify this to—I do not know which authority, what this authority is called, to the Finance Ministry—I had no special budget—Herr Lammers asked me to use this expression. That can be seen from a certificate which is also in there. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all right. I am going to refer to the other letters. But why was it necessary that the expenses of your one secretary and one typist should not be audited? As it shows on pages... My Lord, the pages are 134 and 135. VON NEURATH: I just said that... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On Page 134 you will see there is a letter from you to Lammers: “In my bureau there is a need to incur special expenses, to audit which it does not appear to me advisable.” Why wasn’t it advisable to audit the expenses of your typist and secretary? VON NEURATH: I can no longer tell you that just now. But at any rate, I did not use any more money for diplomatic information; but these are merely office expenses which I figured in there. And so at the end of this letter which you have submitted to me there is... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now... VON NEURATH: Please, let me finish my statement. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. VON NEURATH: There is a report here to me, from my—from this secretary, in which he says—no, this is not the letter I thought it was. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, if you are finished, I anticipated you might say it was office expenses. Would you look at Document 3958-PS? My Lord, that will be Exhibit GB-519. [_Turning to the defendant._] I submit, that shows you your office expenses were carried on the ordinary budget, the letter of 8 April 1942 to you. THE PRESIDENT: Is that in the book? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, yes; I am so sorry. It is 140. I beg Your Lordship’s pardon. [_Turning to the defendant._] That is a letter to you which says: “The Reich Minister for Finance has agreed that the budgetary needs announced by you for the financial year 1942 be shown in Special Plan 1. I therefore have no objections to having the necessary expenditure granted—even before the establishment of Special Plan I—within the limits of these amounts, namely: “For personal administrative expenditures, up to 28,500 Reichsmark; for official administrative expenditures, up to 25,500 Reichsmark; total 54,000 Reichsmark.” That was providing for your office and personal expenditures during the same period for which you were getting these additional sums. So I am suggesting to you that if these sums of 10,000 marks which you got every now and then were not for office expenditures, I would like you to tell the Tribunal what they really were for. VON NEURATH: Yes, I would be very pleased if I were also told about this, for I no longer know. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, they are your letters, and you got the money. Can’t you tell the Tribunal what you got it for? VON NEURATH: No, I cannot right now. Perhaps I can tell you afterward. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Possibly it was for obtaining diplomatic information, it says— My Lord, Dr. Von Lüdinghausen makes the point that the letter I put was in 1939. Of course, there were other letters. I have not troubled the Tribunal with each one, but there is another letter in which there is a reference to a payment on the 9th of May 1941, and, of course, another reference to a payment on the 30th of June 1943. My Lord, these are Pages 133 and 134. I am sorry; I did not give the details. Perhaps I ought to have indicated that. THE PRESIDENT: The letter on Page 137, which may have some bearing, is a letter from the man signed “K”—from the man who made the previous applications? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Perhaps would you like to look at that, Defendant? It is Document 3945-PS, a letter of the 14th of July 1943, signed “K”: “When I went into the matter of the special funds, the competent people in the Reich Chancellery showed an entirely understanding attitude in this matter and asked for a written application from Your Excellency. When I replied that I did not wish to produce such an application before success was guaranteed, they asked for a little more time for a further exchange of views. After a few days I was told that I could produce the application without hesitation, upon which I handed over the letter which I had previously withheld. The amount requested has been handed to me today and I have duly entered this sum in my special cashbook as a credit.” VON NEURATH: Yes, but in spite of this... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now does that help you? Can you tell the Tribunal what were the outlays, the special outlays for the obtaining of diplomatic information for which you received this money? VON NEURATH: I am very sorry; I absolutely cannot—I can no longer recall this matter at all. And the remarkable part is that this letter is dated the 14th of July 1943, when I no longer had any functions whatsoever, when I had left altogether. At this moment, I do not know. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is very strange, you know. In a further letter, in Document 3958-PS, on 8 January 1943, and in succeeding letters on the 4th of March and the 20th of April, the end of your occupation of the premises of 23 Rheinbabenallee is explained there and when your expenses ceased when you went to live in the country. I was just going to ask you about that—a little about that house. If you will just look at the affidavit of Mr. Geist, the American consul... My Lord, that is Document 1759-PS, Exhibit USA-420. [_Turning to the defendant._] I referred to this this morning, and the passage that I want you to tell us about is in the middle of a paragraph. My Lord, it is at the foot of Page 11 of the affidavit in the English version. THE PRESIDENT: Do you have the separate document? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, it is at the foot of Page 11. The paragraph begins: “Another instance of the same nature occurred with regard to my landlord...” THE PRESIDENT: Yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, if Your Lordship goes on another 10 lines, after explaining about his landlord having to give up his house to the SS, he says: “I know that on many occasions where it was thought necessary to increase the pressure, the prospective purchaser or his agent would appear accompanied by a uniformed SA or SS man. I know because I lived in the immediate neighborhood and knew the individuals concerned, that Baron von Neurath, one time Foreign Minister of Germany, got his house from a Jew in this manner. Indeed, he was my next-door neighbor in Dahlem. Von Neurath’s house was worth approximately 250,000 dollars.” [_Turning to the defendant._] Was that 23 Rheinbabenallee? VON NEURATH: Yes, yes... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who acquired it for you, so that the president of the nonexistent Secret Cabinet Council could have it as an official residence? Who acquired it? VON NEURATH: I did not understand that. Who did what? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who acquired 23 Rheinbabenallee? Who got it? VON NEURATH: I can tell you about that. In the year 1937, when Hitler was erecting the large buildings for his Reich Chancellery, he told me one day that I would have to move from my apartment, which was situated behind the Foreign Office, because he wanted the garden for his Reich Chancellery, and the house would be torn down. He said that he had given instructions to the Reich Building Administration to find other living quarters for me. The Reich Building Administration offered me various expropriated Jewish residences. But I refused them. But now I had to look for a house myself, and my personal physician, to whom I happened to mention this matter, told me that he knew of a place in Dahlem, that was Number 23 Rheinbabenallee, where he was house physician to the owner. This owner was Lieutenant Colonel Glotz, who was the brother of a close friend of mine. I informed the Reich Building Administration about this and told them that they should get in touch with this gentleman. In the course of the negotiations, which were conducted by the Reich Building Administration, a contract of sale was drawn up for the price quoted by Mr. Geist, and the price was in marks, not in dollars. This sum, at the request of Lieutenant Colonel Glotz, was paid to him in cash, and on his wish I persuaded the Finance Minister to have this money transferred to Switzerland. I might remark that I was still Foreign Minister at the time. Afterward, I remained in this house for the simple reason that I did not find another one, and Herr Von Ribbentrop, my successor, moved into the old Presidential Palace. Then in the year 1943 this house was destroyed. At the moment, therefore, I still cannot explain what these moneys were for and whether they were official payments made by the Reich Treasury. With the best intentions, I cannot tell you. But the statements made by Mr. Geist here are completely wrong as I have just stated. I did not buy or have this house transferred from a Jew, but from the Christian Lieutenant Colonel Glotz. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You tell us that you passed the money on to Switzerland on his account? VON NEURATH: I? Yes. Because Herr—Herr Glotz went to Switzerland. I believe, indeed, his wife was non-Aryan. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. I would just like to put the next sentence and then I will leave this document: “I know too that Alfred Rosenberg, who lived in the same street with me, purloined a house from a Jew in similar fashion.” Do you know anything of that? VON NEURATH: I do not know how Herr Rosenberg acquired his house. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, Defendant, I want you to come now to March of 1938. Perhaps I can take this shortly if I have understood you correctly. You know that the Prosecution complained about your reply to the British Ambassador with regard to the Anschluss. As I understand you, you are not now suggesting that your reply was accurate; but you are saying that that was the best of your information at the time, is that right? VON NEURATH: Yes, that is quite correct. It is true. That was an incorrect statement but I just did not know any better; do you see? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that you did not hear—that neither Hitler nor Göring told you a word about these ultimatums which were given first of all to Herr Von Schuschnigg and secondly to President Miklas; you were told nothing about that? Is that what you are telling? VON NEURATH: No, at that time—at that time I knew nothing. I heard about them later. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am going to leave that. I am not going into that incident in detail—we have been over it several times—in view of the way that the defendant is not contesting the accuracy. THE PRESIDENT: I should like to know when he heard of the true facts. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am much obliged. [_Turning to the defendant._] When did you hear of the true facts of the Anschluss? VON NEURATH: I heard the details for the very first time here, when this report of Legation Counsellor Hewel was submitted to me. Prior to this time I probably heard that there had been pressure exerted on Herr Schuschnigg, but nothing else. I actually learned the exact details for the first time here in Nuremberg. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I only want to get it quite clear. You say that between the 11th of March and your coming to Nuremberg, you never heard anything about the threat of marching into Austria, which had been made by the Defendant Göring, or Keppler, or General Muff on his behalf? You never heard anything about that? VON NEURATH: No, I heard nothing of that sort. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then I do want to ask you about the assurance that you gave to M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin. I would like you to look at Document TC-27 which you will find in Document Book 12, Page 123 of Document Book 12. The passage that I want to ask you about is in the sixth paragraph. After dealing with the conversation with the Defendant Göring about the Czechoslovak mobilization, it goes on: “M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding assurances on this subject”—that is, the Czechoslovak mobilization—“and today”—that is, the 12th of March—“spoke with Baron von Neurath, who, among other things, assured him on behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still considers herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno in October 1925.” Now, you have told the Tribunal—we have had the evidence of Baroness von Ritter—that the meeting on the 5th of November had this very disturbing effect on you and in fact produced a bad heart attack. One of the matters that was discussed at that meeting was attack, not only on Austria but also on Czechoslovakia, to protect the German flank. Why did you think, on the 12th of March, that Hitler would ever consider himself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty which meant that he had to refer any dispute with Czechoslovakia to the Council of the League of Nations or the International Court of Justice? Why on earth did you think that that was even possible, that Hitler would submit a dispute with Czechoslovakia to either of these bodies? VON NEURATH: I can tell you that quite exactly. I already testified yesterday that Hitler had me summoned to him on the 11th for reasons that I cannot explain up to this day and told me that the march into Austria was to take place during the night. In reply to my question, or rather to my remark that that would cause great uneasiness in Czechoslovakia, he said that he had no intentions of any kind at this time against Czechoslovakia and that he was—he even hoped that relations with Czechoslovakia would be considerably improved by the invasion or occupation of Austria. From this sentence and from his promise that nothing would happen, I concluded that matters would remain as they were and that, of course, we were still bound to this treaty of 1925. Therefore, I was able to assure M. Mastny of this with an absolutely clear conscience. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you believe a word that Hitler said on the 12th of March? Did you still believe a word that Hitler said on the 12th of March 1933? VON NEURATH: Yes, still at that time. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought Von Fritsch was a friend of yours; wasn’t he? VON NEURATH: Who? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Colonel General Von Fritsch; he was a friend of yours? VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not believe that he had been guilty of homosexuality did you? VON NEURATH: No, never. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, didn’t they—didn’t you know that he had been subject in January 1938 to a framed-up charge? THE PRESIDENT: Will you please answer instead of shaking your head. VON NEURATH: Yes, I knew that, of course; and I learned of it and the fact that this charge was a fabrication of the Gestapo but not of Hitler, at least in my opinion. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, didn’t you know that those—these unsavory matters concerning Field Marshal Von Blomberg and Colonel General Von Fritsch had been faked up by members of the Nazi gang, who were your colleagues in the Government? VON NEURATH: Yes. The details were unknown to me, of course. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, you remember that at the time of Munich, when you came back to the field—came back into activity for some time, President Beneš did appeal to this German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention and Hitler brushed the appeal to one side. Do you remember that? In September 1938? VON NEURATH: No; that, I do not know, for at that time I was not in office any longer and I did not get to see these matters at all. I do not know about that. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you don’t know; of course, it was in the German press and every other press that he appealed to this treaty and Hitler refused to look at it; but you say that you honestly believed on the 12th of March that Hitler would stand by that Arbitration Treaty; that’s what you said? VON NEURATH: Yes, I had no misgivings. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that might be a convenient moment to break off. [_A recess was taken._] SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you spoke yesterday with regard to the memorandum of Lieutenant General Friderici. Do you remember in that memorandum he referred to a memorandum of yours on how to deal with Czechoslovakia? Well, now, I would like you just to look at Document 3859-PS, so that the Tribunal can see your attitude toward the Czechs from your own words. My Lord, that is at Page 107 of Document Book 12a. [_Turning to the defendant._] I will read first your letter to Lammers of the 31st of August 1940. My Lord, that will be Exhibit GB-520. [_Turning to the defendant._] You say: “Dear Herr Lammers: Enclosed I send you the memorandum which I mentioned in advance in my letter of 13 July 1940 ... about the question of the future organization of the Bohemian-Moravian country. I enclose another memorandum on the same question, which my Secretary of State K. H. Frank has drawn up independently of me and which, in its train of thoughts, leads to the same result”—I ask you to note, the next words—“and with which I fully agree. Please present both memoranda to the Führer and arrange a date for a personal interview for myself and State Secretary Frank. As I have heard from a private source that individual Party and other offices intend to submit proposals to the Führer for separating various parts of the Protectorate under my authority, without my knowing these projects in detail, I should be grateful to you if you would arrange the date for my interview early enough for me, as the competent Reich Protector and one who understands the Czech problem, to have an opportunity, together with my State Secretary, to place our opinions before the Führer before all sorts of plans are suggested to him by other people.” Now, I would just like to take what I hope will be the gist of your own memorandum. If you will turn it over—this is your memorandum—take the first paragraph, Section I: “Any considerations about the future organization of Bohemia and Moravia must be based on the goal which is to be laid down for that territory from a state-political (staatspolitisch) and ethnic-political (volkspolitisch) point of view. “From a state-political standpoint there can be but one aim: total incorporation into the Greater German Reich; from an ethnic-political standpoint to fill this territory with Germans.” And then you say that you point the path; and if you go on to Section II, in the middle of Paragraph 2, you will find a subparagraph beginning— My Lord, it is the top of Page 109, Your Lordship’s copy: “These 7.2 million Czechs, of whom 3.4 millions live in towns and communities of under 2,000 and in the country, are led and influenced by an intelligentsia which is unduly puffed up in proportion to the size of the country. This part of the population also tried, after the alteration of the constitutional situation of this area, more or less openly to sabotage or at any rate postpone necessary measures which were intended to fit the circumstances of the country to the new state of affairs. The remainder of the population, that is small craftsmen, peasants, and workmen, adapted themselves better to the new conditions.” Then, if you go on to Paragraph 3, you say: “But it would be a fatal mistake to conclude from this that the Government and population behaved in this correct manner because they had inwardly accepted the loss of their independent state, and incorporation into Greater Germany. The Germans continue to be looked upon as unwelcome intruders and there is a widespread longing for a return to the old state of affairs, even if the people do not express it openly. “By and large, the population submit to the new conditions but they do so only because they either have the necessary rational insight or else because they fear the consequences of disobedience. They certainly do not do so from conviction. This will be the state of affairs for some time to come. “But”—go on to Section III—“as things are like that, a decision will have to be taken as to what is to be done with the Czech people in order to attain the objective of incorporating the country and filling it with Germans as quickly as possible and as thoroughly as possible. “The most radical and theoretically complete solution to the problem would be to evacuate all Czechs completely from this country and replace them by Germans.” Then you say that that is not possible because there are not sufficient Germans to fill it immediately. Then, if you go on to Paragraph 2, to the second half, you say—My Lord, that is the last six lines of Page 110: “It will, where the Czechs are concerned, rather be a case on the one hand of keeping those Czechs who are suitable for Germanization by individual selective breeding, while on the other hand of expelling those who are not useful from a racial standpoint or are enemies of the Reich, that is, the intelligentsia which has developed in the last 20 years. If we use such a procedure, Germanization can be carried out successfully.” Now, Defendant, you know that in the Indictment in this Trial we are charging you and your fellow defendants, among many other things, with genocide, which we say is the extermination of racial and national groups, or, as it has been put in the well-known book of Professor Lemkin, “a co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.” What you wanted to do was to get rid of the teachers and writers and singers of Czechoslovakia, whom you call the intelligentsia, the people who would hand down the history and traditions of the Czech people to other generations. These were the people that you wanted to destroy by what you say in that memorandum, were they not? VON NEURATH: Not quite. Here there are... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But just before you answer, what did you mean by saying, in the last passage that I read to you, “...expelling those who are not useful from a racial standpoint or are enemies of the Reich, that is, the intelligentsia which has developed in the last 20 years”? Did you mean what you said? Were you speaking the truth when you said it was necessary to expel the intelligentsia? VON NEURATH: To that I can answer only “yes” and “no.” First of all, I should like to say that from this report it becomes apparent that the memorandum was written by Frank. I joined my name to it, and this was on 31 August 1940. The memorandum which I—the memorandum which is referred to in the Friderici report is from a—is dated later I think, although I do not know offhand. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you will find—I will give you, in a moment, the letter from Ziemke, who transmits Hitler’s view, and I think you will find that it is this memorandum that Hitler is dealing with. I will show you Frank’s memorandum in a moment. I am suggesting to you now, as you say to Lammers, that you enclosed your memorandum and you enclosed another memorandum, of which I will read you the essential part in a moment, which is the memorandum of Karl Hermann Frank. But this is a... VON NEURATH: They are both by Frank. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’ll show it—no; but look at your own letter of the 31st of August: “Enclosed I send you the memorandum,” and you go on: “I enclose another memorandum... which my State Secretary K. H. Frank has drawn up independently of me... with which I fully agree.” I am suggesting to you, you know that this is your—this is your memorandum referred to as the—in the Friderici document... My Lord, that is Page 132 of Document Book 12. [_Turning to the defendant._] ...where General Friderici says, “After ample deliberation the Reich Protector expressed his view about the various plans in a memorandum.” I am suggesting to you that this is your memorandum which you sent on to Lammers for submission to the Führer. Are you saying—are you really going to tell the Tribunal that this is not your memorandum? VON NEURATH: No, I do not want to say that at all. At the moment I really do not know any longer. I did not write it, but I agreed with its contents; the letter to Lammers says so. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, if you agreed with its contents, what did you mean by saying that you would have to expel the intelligentsia, except that you were going to break down the Czechs as a national entity and expel the people who would keep going that history and tradition and language? Isn’t that why you wanted to expel the intelligentsia? VON NEURATH: I never mentioned the word “destroy,” but said that the intelligentsia... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said “expel”... VON NEURATH: I see. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...which is your own word. VON NEURATH: The class of the intelligentsia was the greatest obstacle to co-operation between Germans and Czechs. For that reason, if we wanted to achieve this co-operation, and that was still the aim of our policy, then this intelligentsia had to be reduced in some way and principally their influence had to be diminished, and that was the meaning of my explanation. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, you said to achieve your policy, but by achieving your policy you meant to destroy the Czech people as a national entity with their own language, history, and traditions, and assimilate them into the Greater German Reich. That was your policy, wasn’t it? VON NEURATH: My policy was, first of all, to assimilate Czechoslovakia, as far as possible. But in the final analysis that could not have been achieved for generations. The first thing to do was to bring about co-operation so as to have peace and order. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now before I put to you the memorandum of Frank with which you entirely agree, would you look at Paragraph VII of your own memorandum? My Lord, it is Page 113 of Document Book 12a. [_Turning to the defendant._] In Section VII you say: “If one considers the gigantic tasks facing the German nation after a victorious war, the necessity for a careful and rational utilization of Germans will be apparent to everyone. There are so many tasks that have to be tackled at once and simultaneously that a careful, well-thought-out utilization of the Germans who are suitable for carrying out these tasks is necessary. “The Greater German Reich will have to make use of the help of foreigners on a large scale in all spheres and must confine itself to appointing Germans to the key positions and to taking over branches of public administration where the interests of the Reich make it absolutely necessary...” You were, in this memorandum, blueprinting the plans for dealing with the Czechs after the war on the basis of the German victory; that is, that they should disappear as a nation and become assimilated to the German Reich. Wasn’t that what was in your mind? VON NEURATH: To make the Czechs disappear as a nation was altogether impossible. That was not possible at all. But they were to incorporate themselves more closely into the Reich, and that is what I mean by the word “assimilate.” Moreover, it is also stated in this memorandum—earlier, much earlier—that from the racial point of view—if you want to use that unpleasant expression—there was an extraordinarily large number of Germans within Czechoslovakia. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just turn over and see how the—your State Secretary’s memorandum with which you entirely agree—how that runs. My Lord, Your Lordship will find the beginning of that is enclosure Number 2 on Page 115. [_Turning to the defendant._] The State Secretary states his problem. He says, in the second sentence: “The question as to whether the Protectorate, with a Reich Protector as its head, is suitable for settling the Czech problem and should therefore be retained or whether it should now give place to some, other form of government is being raised by various people and is the cause of this memorandum. It will briefly: (A) Indicate the nature of the Czech problem; (B) analyze the present way in which it is being dealt with; (C) examine the proposed alterations from the point of view of their suitability, and finally: (D) express an independent opinion on the whole question.” Well now, I would like you just to look at your State Secretary’s independent opinion with which you entirely agree. THE PRESIDENT: Oughtn’t you to read the last two lines? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh yes, My Lord, I’m sorry. “On a correct decision depends the solution of the Czech problem. We thus bear the responsibility for centuries to come.” Now, My Lord, Frank’s own opinion starts on Page 121 in Section D of the memorandum, and he begins by saying: “The aim of Reich policy in Bohemia and Moravia must be the complete Germanization of area and people. In order to attain this there are two possibilities: “I. The total evacuation of the Czechs from Bohemia and Moravia to a territory outside the Reich and settling Germans in the freed territory; or, “II. If one leaves the majority of the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia the simultaneous application of a great variety of methods working toward Germanization, in accordance with an X-year plan. “Such a Germanization provides for: 1) The changing of the nationality of racially suitable Czechs; 2) the expulsion of racially unassimilable Czechs and of the intelligentsia who are enemies of the Reich, or ‘special treatment’ for these and all destructive elements; 3) the recolonizing of the territory thus freed with fresh German blood.” Now, I want you just to turn to where your State Secretary gets down to concrete suggestions as to this policy of Germanization. Remember that you entirely agree, in your letter to Lammers. If Your Lordship will turn to Page 123, there is a heading “Youth; fundamental change in education; extermination of the Czech historical myth.” [_Turning to the defendant._] That is the first point: Destroy any idea they might have of their history, beginning with the time of St. Wenceslaus, nearly a thousand years ago. That is your first point. “Education toward the Reich idea; no getting on without perfect knowledge of the German language; first doing away with the secondary schools, later also with the elementary schools; never again any Czech universities, only transitionally the _Collegium Bohemicum_ at the German university in Prague; 2 years compulsory labor service. “Large-scale land policy, creation of German strongpoints and German bridges of land, in particular pushing forward of the German national soil from the north to the suburbs of Prague. “Campaign against the Czech language, which is to become merely a dialect as in the 17th and 18th centuries, and which is to disappear completely as an official language. “Marriage policy after previous racial examination. “In attempts at assimilation in the Reich proper, the frontier Gaue must be excluded. “Apart from continuous propaganda for Germanism and the granting of advantages as an inducement, severest police methods, with exile and ‘special treatment’ for all saboteurs. Principle: ‘Zuckerbrot und Peitsche.’”—What is that “Zuckerbrot und Peitsche”? “The employment of all these methods has a chance of success only if a single central Reich authority with one man at its head controls its planning, guiding, and carrying out. The direct subordination of the ‘master in Bohemia’ to the Führer clarifies the political character of the office and the task, and prevents the political problem from sinking down to an administrative problem.” In other words, it was essential to this policy that you should keep your job as Reich Protector and Frank should keep his as State Secretary, and the Gauleiter of the Danube should not be able to interfere and take away Brno as the capital of his Gau. Defendant, do you tell this High Tribunal, as you told Dr. Lammers, that you entirely agree with what I suggest to you are dreadful, callous, and unprincipled proposals? Do you agree with these proposals? VON NEURATH: No, I do not agree in the least. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, why did you tell Lammers you did? Why, when things were going well, did you tell Lammers that you did agree with them? VON NEURATH: Later I made an oral report to the Führer about this. Apart from that, the statements which you just made show quite clearly that this first memorandum was written by Frank, who then added the second memorandum to it, and if you say, as you said at the end just now, that it was my purpose to remain in office as Reich Protector, then I can only tell you that the purpose, if there was a purpose in this connection, was that Frank wanted to become Reich Protector. However, from the point of view of the contents of this memorandum, I can certainly no longer identify myself with them today, nor did I do so on the occasion when I reported to the Führer. This becomes clear from the testimony which I gave yesterday. This testimony... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I’m not concerned with your testimony yesterday; I am concerned with what you wrote in 1940 when you wrote—and I will read the words again; I have read them three times: “I enclose another memorandum on the same question which my State Secretary, K. H. Frank, has drawn up independently of me”—independently of me—“and which in its train of thoughts leads to the same result, and with which I fully agree.” Why did you... VON NEURATH: I have just now told you that I no longer agree with these statements today, and that at the time when I verbally reported to the Führer, I did not support these statements either, but to the contrary, I made the proposals to him which I explained yesterday and to which I received his agreement. THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, are these documents correctly copied? Because you see that in the letter of the 31st of August 1940 there is a reference in the margin, “Enclosure 1; Enclosure 2.” SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. THE PRESIDENT: Therefore, the letter identifies the document. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is so. The one is, as I am suggesting, the defendant’s; the other is Frank’s. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you have mentioned, Defendant, about what—that you dealt with them otherwise to the Führer. I suggest to you that that is not true, that is not true that you dealt with them otherwise to the Führer. I am putting it quite bluntly that it is not true. VON NEURATH: In that case I must regret to say that you are lying. For I—I must know. After all, I must know whether I talked to the Führer. I delivered a verbal report to him in person and Frank was not present. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let us look at the report, at your report. Your Lordship will find it on Page 7. We will see whether it is true or not. THE PRESIDENT: Page what? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 7, My Lord. It is Document D-739 of the same book, 12a; it is Exhibit G-521. Now, this is a memorandum, a secret memorandum of the representative of the Foreign Office in the Office of the Reich Protector, of the 5th of October. [_Turning to the defendant._] You will remember your letter was the 31st of August. It says: “Regarding the reception of the Reich Protector and State Secretary Frank by the Führer, I have learned the following from authentic sources: “To begin with, the Minister of Justice, Gürtner, gave a report on the Czech resistance movement, during the course of which he maintained that the first trial of the four chief ringleaders would shortly take place before the Peoples’ Court. “The Führer objected to this procedure and declared that execution squads were good enough for Czech insurgents and rebels. It was a mistake to create martyrs through legal sentences, as was proved in the case of Andreas Hofer and Schlageter. The Czechs would regard any sentence as an injustice. As this matter had already entered the path of legal procedure it was to be continued with in this form. The trials were to be postponed until after the war, and then amidst the din of the victory celebrations, the proceedings would pass unnoticed. Only death sentences could be pronounced, but would be commuted later on to life imprisonment or deportation. “Regarding the question of the future of the Protectorate, the Führer touched on the following three possibilities: “1. Continuation of Czech autonomy in which the Germans would live in the Protectorate as co-citizens with equal rights. This possibility was, however, out of the question as one had always to reckon with Czech intrigues. “2. The deportation of the Czechs and the Germanization of the Bohemian and Moravian area by German settlers. This possibility was out of the question too, as it would take 100 years. “3. The Germanization of the Bohemian and Moravian area by Germanizing the Czechs, that is, by their assimilation. The latter would be possible with the greater part of the Czech people. Those Czechs against whom there were racial objections or who were anti-German were to be excepted from this assimilation. This category was to be weeded out. “The Führer decided in favor of the third possibility; he gave orders via Reich Minister Lammers, to put a stop to the multitude of plans regarding partition of the Protectorate. The Führer further decided that, in the interests of a uniform policy with regard to the Czechs, a central Reich authority for the whole of the Bohemian and Moravian area should remain at Prague. “The present status of the Protectorate thus continues.” And look at the last sentence: “The Führer’s decision followed the lines of the memoranda submitted by the Protector and State Secretary Frank.” Now, Defendant, although you answered me so sharply a moment ago, that document says that after the reception of the Reich Protector and the State Secretary, the representative of the Foreign Office in your office says that the decision of the Führer followed the lines of the memoranda put forward by you and your State Secretary Frank. Why do you say that I am wrong in saying it is untrue that a different line was followed by the Führer? It is set out in that document. VON NEURATH: To that I have the following reply to give: First of all, the document shows that the Führer touched upon the following three eventualities with reference to the question of the future of the Protectorate. They are the three possibilities which I said yesterday I had proposed. The document also shows, though not directly, that the cause for this Führer conference was primarily quite a different one than merely deciding the question of the Protectorate. On the contrary, the Minister of Justice was present and a legal question in regard to the treatment of the members of the resistance movement was the cause for the discussion and Frank came to Berlin for this reason. I had been to Berlin before that and I talked to the Führer, not about the memorandum, which I had in my hand, but about my misgivings in general and the future of our policy in the Protectorate. My report included those proposals which are mentioned here under 1, 2, and 3. It says there at the end, “The decision followed the lines of the memoranda submitted by the Protector and State Secretary Frank.” That remark was added by Herr Ziemke or whoever had written the document, but what I said yesterday about the policy is correct. And even if I admit that at that time in the letter to Lammers I did identify myself with these enclosures it was nevertheless dropped. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want to remind you that in the passage which I referred to last in your memorandum, as opposed to that of Frank, you were putting forward the organization of the Greater German Reich. I take it in this way, that you envisaged yourself that in the event of a German victory in the war the Czech part of Czechoslovakia would remain part of a Greater German Reich. VON NEURATH: No, I beg your pardon. It had already been incorporated and here it is also expressly stated that it should remain in that condition, as a protectorate but as a special structure. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I just—are you saying that your policy, after this period—this was in the autumn of 1940—that your policy towards the Czechs was sympathetic? VON NEURATH: I do not think it changed except when there were strong resistance movements there. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, why was it that you forbade, in the middle of 1941, any reference of the handling—to the discussion of the handling and treatment of all questions about the German-Czech problem? Why did you forbid its discussion? VON NEURATH: To prevent these problems which were the cause of this memorandum from arising again and again, namely the problem of individual parts of the Protectorate being torn away and added to the lower Danube or the Sudeten country with a general resettlement. That was the purpose of my report to the Führer, as I explained yesterday, so as to put a stop to that discussion once and for all. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you also—you particularly prohibited, did you not, any public statements addressed to the Czech population? Well, let us look at the document. It is Document Number 3862-PS, My Lord. Your Lordship will find it at Page 126 of Document Book 12a. My Lord, it becomes Exhibit GB-522. [_Turning to the defendant._] It is for distribution through your various offices and you say: “For the motive stated I order that in the future, when arrangements and publications of any kind concerning the German-Czech problem are made, the views of the whole population are more than ever to be directed to the war and its requirements while the duty of the Czech nation to carry out the war tasks imposed on it jointly with the Greater German Reich is to be stressed. “Other questions concerning the German-Czech problem are not suitable subjects for public discussion at the present time. I wish to point out that, without detriment to my orders, administrative handling and treatment of all questions about the German-Czech problem are to be in no way alluded to.” Then the last paragraph: “Requisite public statements about the political questions of the Protectorate and in particular those addressed to the Czech population are my business and mine alone and will be published in due time.” Why did you want to prohibit so severely the addressing of any public statements to the Czech population? VON NEURATH: That is addressed not only to the Czech population, but especially to the Germans, and just for this reason—that was some special event which I no longer remember—it says here “for the motive stated I order that”—when there was again a discussion about the future of the Protectorate or something was published. That was the reason and I pointed out that that is why it was forbidden. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I suggest to you about the—your proposals and Frank’s speak for themselves. I want you to help me on one other matter. Do you remember after the closing of the universities that the question arose, what was to happen to the students? There were about 18,000 students who were, of course, out of work because they could not... VON NEURATH: I beg your pardon, I beg your pardon. There were not so many; there were at the most 1,800 in all. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, you got it—with the greatest respect either you are wrong or your office. According to the note from Group X of your office: “According to the data at my disposal the number of students affected by the closure”—I should think that would include high schools as well—“for 3 years of the Czech universities is 18,998. “According to the press communications, dated the 21st of this month only 1,200 persons were arrested in connection with the events of the 15th of this month.” And then your office goes on to say by a process of subtraction that leaves 17,800. You were faced with their occupation. My Lord, it is Page 104, Document 3858-PS. Exhibit GB-523. VON NEURATH: I do not want to deny my official’s statement. He must have known better than I. I am merely surprised that there should have been 18,000 students in two Czech universities, in a country with a population of 7 millions. THE PRESIDENT: Hadn’t you better check that by the original? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I shall. I am much obliged to Your Lordship. Well, My Lord, it is quite clear that both figures—they are in figures, and they are 18,998, and then there is the check below, and you have to take off 1,200; that leaves 17,800. My Lord, if it were only 1,800, the second figure could not arise. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, somewhere there must be an error. That would have been more for two universities in Czechoslovakia than there were in Berlin at the best of times. There was a maximum of 8,000 to 9,000 in Berlin per year and in the case of a nation of only 7 millions there are supposed to be 18,000 students in two universities. This cannot be right. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it may be that there are three age groups. Your Lordship sees that it is “according to the data at my disposal, the number of students affected by the closure for 3 years of the Czech universities is 18,000.” It may be that is the intake for 2 years, in addition to present students. [_Turning to the defendant._] Anyhow, this is the figure; and it is this problem which has been dealt with by your Ministry. It may be that it includes certain high schools, but at any rate, these are your Ministry’s documents, and I want to know what happened. This was the minutes, as I understand it, from Dennler, Dr. Dennler, who was the head of Group X of your office, to Burgsdorff, who had a superior position; and, if I may summarize it, this letter of 21 November 1939 suggests that the students should be taken forcibly from Czechoslovakia to the old Reich and put to work in the old Reich; and then, the next—on 25 November, you will notice that in Paragraph 2 it says—the writer, who is Burgsdorff, is saying that he is dealing with X 119/39, which is Dennler’s memorandum; and Burgsdorff says that he does not want them to go into the Reich because at that time there was some unemployment in the Reich, and suggests that they should be dealt with by compulsory labor on the roads and canals in Czechoslovakia. Now, these were the two proposals from your office. My Lord, the second one is Document 3857-PS, which will be Exhibit GB-524. [_Turning to the defendant._] What happened to the unfortunate students? VON NEURATH: Nothing at all happened to them. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, did either of these proposals of Dr. Dennler for forced labor in the Reich and of Burgsdorff for forced labor in Czechoslovakia, did they come up to you? VON NEURATH: No, none of them. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did they come to you for decision? Did they come to you for decision? VON NEURATH: I think they were submitted to me, but I cannot tell you for certain. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, will you agree with me, or perhaps you will be able to correct my knowledge, that this is the earliest suggestion—you said it was not put into effect—but the earliest suggestion of forced labor came from an officer of your department? Do you know of any other department of the Reich that had suggested forced labor as early as November 1939? VON NEURATH: There is no connection, and, moreover, if you were to look through suggestions made by all your subordinates, then you, too, might find some proposal which you afterward rejected. Suggestions made by an adviser do not mean anything at all. Apart from that, perhaps I can clear up this figure of 18,000. Here it says, “According to the data at my disposal, the number of students who will be affected by closing the Czech universities for 3 years will be 18,000.” It is, therefore, three times 6,000, is it not? Which is approximately 18,000. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I had already put forward that suggestion, Defendant, about 10 minutes ago, but I respectfully agree with you. That is one matter in which we are not in difference. Well now, you understand what I am suggesting. It is that these proposals germinated in your office, because they were quite in keeping with the proposals in the memoranda which I have just read to the Tribunal, that you should not only get rid of Czech higher education, but you should have forced labor. Do you remember that was in the State Secretary’s memorandum? What I am suggesting is that it was in your department—the idea of forced labor—as early as 21 November 1939. Now, Defendant, I have only one other matter, and I hope, as it is a question of fact, that perhaps you will be able to agree with me on reflection. You suggested this morning that the German university in Prague was closed down after the founding of Czechoslovakia in 1919. That is how it came to us. On reflection, do you not know that it continued and that many thousands of students graduated in the German university of Prague between 1919 and 1939? VON NEURATH: As far as I know, it was a department of the Czech university, a German part of the Czech university, as far as I know. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it continued—it continued as a university? VON NEURATH: Yes, it continued, but as a Czech university. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but German students came there and could take their degrees in German? It was a permitted language? I suggest to you that there are thousands of people who went there from Austria and from the old Reich—went there as Germans and took their degrees in German. VON NEURATH: Yes, only the old German university, the so-called Charles University, was closed by the Czechs. But a German department, or whatever one might call it, still remained. The Germans studied and took their examinations there. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think the point is clear. I am not going to argue about the actual thing, but that there was a German university, where German students could study, you will agree. THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution wish to cross-examine further? STATE COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE M. Y. RAGINSKY (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Defendant, tell us please, when you were Minister of Foreign Affairs did Ribbentrop try to intervene in the foreign affairs of Germany? VON NEURATH: Is that a question? MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, that is a question. VON NEURATH: Yes. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Would you please tell us in what form this intervention took place? VON NEURATH: By communicating to the Führer his own ideas on foreign policy, without giving them to me for consideration. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. Yesterday you stated here that in 1936 you had differences of opinion with Hitler and that on 27 of July 1936 you asked to be relieved of your duties as a Minister. This document was cited here yesterday, but did you not write to Hitler then?—and I will read the last sentence of your letter to him: “Even if I am no longer Minister, I shall be constantly at your disposal, if you so desire, with my advice and my years of experience in the field of foreign policy.” Did you write these words in your letter to the Führer? VON NEURATH: Yes indeed; yes indeed. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: And did you fulfill the promises you made to Hitler? Whenever it was necessary to cover by diplomatic manipulations the aggressive actions of Hitler, as for instance at the time of the annexation of the Sudetenland, during the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and so on? Did you help Hitler with your experience? Is that right? VON NEURATH: That is a great mistake. On the contrary, as I have stated here yesterday and today, I was called in by Hitler only once; and that was on the last phase of the Austrian Anschluss. With that my activities came to an end, but in 1938, to be sure, I went to see him of my own accord, to restrain him from starting the war. That was my activity. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: We have already heard this. I would like to ask you another question concerning the memorandum of Friderici without repeating what has already been said here concerning it. You remember this memorandum well, as it was just presented to the Court a short time ago. In the last part of the memorandum of Friderici—it is the last paragraph but one—it is stated: “If the governing of the Protectorate were in reliable hands and guided exclusively by the order of the Führer of the 16th of March 1939, the territory of Bohemia and Moravia would become an integral part of Germany.” It was for this purpose that Hitler chose you to be Protector; is that not so? VON NEURATH: Not a bit; that was not the reason at all. The reason was—I have described it in detail yesterday. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. We shall not repeat the reasons; we spoke about them yesterday. Well, you deny that you were precisely the man who was supposed to carry through the invasion of Czechoslovakia? VON NEURATH: To that I can only answer “no.” MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. Do you admit that you were, in the Protectorate, the only representative of the Führer and of the Government of the Reich, and that you were directly subordinate to Hitler? VON NEURATH: Yes, that is right; that is stated in Hitler’s decree. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, it is stated there. I will not read this decree, which would only delay the interrogation. This decree has already been presented to the Court. Do you acknowledge that all administrative organs and authorities of the Reich in the Protectorate with the exception of the Armed Forces, were subordinate to you? VON NEURATH: No. I am sorry to have to say that that is a mistake. That is also stated in the same decree of 1 September 1939. Apart from that, there were numerous other organizations, that is, Reich authorities, which were not under my jurisdiction; quite apart from the Police. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, as far as the Police are concerned, we will speak about that separately. So you think it is a mistake that the decree does not mention it, or do you interpret the decree otherwise? I shall read the first paragraph of the decree of 1 September 1939. It is stated there: “All the authorities, offices and organizations of the Reich in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, with the exception of the Armed Forces, are under the jurisdiction of the Reich Protector.” It is also stated in Paragraph 2: “The Reich Protector supervises the entire autonomous administration of the Protectorate.” And Paragraph 3: “The office of the Reich Protector is in charge of all administrative branches of the Reich administration with the exception of the Armed Forces.” As you see, it is stated very bluntly and definitely here that all the institutions of the Reich were subordinate to you, while you were subordinate to Hitler. VON NEURATH: I have to tell you again that as to administrative agencies, yes; but there were a number of other authorities, Reich authorities and offices which did not come under my jurisdiction, for instance, the Four Year Plan. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Now let us pass to the question of the Police. Yesterday, in answer to a question of your counsel, you stated to the Tribunal that as to this decree of 1 September, signed by Göring, Frick, and Lammers, Paragraph 13 was not comprehensible to you. Let us examine other paragraphs of the same chapter concerning the Police. Paragraph 11 says: “The organs of the German Security Police in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia have the task of investigating and combating all hostile attempts toward the government and population in the territory of the Protectorate, informing the Reich Protector as well as the subordinate organizations, keeping them currently informed on important events, and advising them as to what to do.” Paragraph 14 of the same decree states: “The Reich Minister of the Interior (the Reichsführer SS, and the Chief of the German Police), with the agreement of the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia releases the legal and administrative directives necessary for carrying out this order.” Thus, according to this decree, the Police and the SS were obliged to let you know about all their measures and, moreover, all their administrative and legal acts and measures had been carried out with your knowledge. Do you acknowledge that? VON NEURATH: No; that is not right. First of all, there was at one time an order that they were to inform me. But that was not carried out and was forbidden by Himmler directly. And the other, the second regulation to the effect that the administrative measures—or whatever it is called—could or should be carried out with my approval, was never applied. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: So you deny it? VON NEURATH: Yes. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I now present to you the testimony of Karl Hermann Frank, of 7 March 1946, on this very question; that is, on the question of the Police and to whom they were subordinated. Mr. President, I present this testimony as Exhibit Number USSR-494. THE PRESIDENT: Is this in the English book as well, do you know? MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: No, Mr. President. This document that I am presenting now is an original, signed by Frank. [_Turning to the defendant._] Karl Hermann Frank, during an interrogation, testified: “According to the order on ‘The Structure of the German Administration in the Protectorate and the German Security Police,’ all German authorities and offices in the Protectorate and thereby the entire Police, too, excepting the Armed Forces are formally subordinated to the Reich Protector and are bound by his directions. Owing to this the Security Police was bound to carry out this basic political policy set forth by the Reich Protector. Orders as to carrying out State Police measures were mainly issued by the Chief of the Security Police with the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin. “If the Reich Protector wanted to carry out some State Police measures, he had to have the permission of the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin; that is, in this case the State Police also submitted each order for reconfirmation to the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin. The same applied also to directives for the carrying out of State Police measures given by the Higher SS and Police Leader to the Chief of the Security Police.” I would like to draw your attention to this paragraph that I am reading now: “This system of channels for issuing directives remained in force during the whole existence of the Protectorate and was used as such by Von Neurath in the Protectorate. In general the Reich Protector could, on his own initiative, issue directives to the State Police through the Chief of the Security Police. The carrying out of such directives was, however, subject to approval by the Reich Security Main Office if State Police measures were concerned. “In regard to the SD (Security Service), which had no executive powers, the authority of the Reich Protector respecting the issuing of directives to the SD was greater and not subject to the approval of the Reich Security Main Office in every case.” Do you confirm this testimony of Frank? VON NEURATH: No. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. VON NEURATH: I refer you to a statement by the same Frank, which I have learned about here, which was made last year, during which he said something quite different. He said that the entire Police were not under the Reich Protector, but came under the Chief of the Police in Berlin, namely, Himmler. It ought to be here somewhere—this statement. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Don’t worry about it; I will come back to this testimony. Tell me, please, who was the political adviser in your service? VON NEURATH: Political adviser? MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, political adviser. VON NEURATH: In general I had various political advisers. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In order not to waste time, I will show you a short document, and I ask you to read it. On 21 July 1939 the Chief of the Security Police wrote a letter to your State Secretary and Higher SS and Police Leader, Karl Hermann Frank. The letter had the following contents: “In an order of 5 May 1939 the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia appointed the SD Leader and Chief of the Security Police as his political adviser. I have ascertained that this order has not yet been published or carried out. Please provide for carrying out this order. “Signed, Dr. Best.” Do you remember your order now? VON NEURATH: I cannot remember that decree at the moment, but I do remember that this was never carried out, because I did not have this SD leader as my political adviser. THE PRESIDENT: This would be a convenient time to break off. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, just one more minute, please, to finish this question, and then we can break off. [_Turning to the defendant._] But did you issue such an order on 5 May? VON NEURATH: I can no longer tell you about that at this date—but it is probably true. I do not want to deny it; I do not know any more. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: But you did issue this order? All right. I thank you, Mr. President. It is possible to adjourn now. I shall require 30 minutes more. [_The Tribunal adjourned until 26 June 1946, at 1000 hours._] ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOURTH DAY Wednesday, 26 June 1946 _Morning Session_ THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit on Thursday, tomorrow afternoon, in open session, but will sit in closed session. That is to say, we will sit tomorrow, Thursday, from 10 till 1 in open session, and we will sit in the afternoon in closed session. On Saturday morning, the Tribunal will sit in open session from 10 till 1. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I am aware that yesterday when I submitted the Document USSR-494, the necessary copies of this document were not submitted to the Tribunal. I am very sorry about this, and I would ask you to accept the necessary copies now which I am going to submit. [_The Defendant Von Neurath resumed the stand._] Let us go back, Defendant, to your warning issued in August 1939. If I understood you correctly, you said here before the Tribunal that this warning was issued in connection with the military situation of the time; is that correct? VON NEURATH: With reference to the military situation nothing had happened at that time; absolutely no political tension had become noticeable in the meantime; therefore, it was not directly in connection with the military situation. There was certainly nothing wrong yet at that time. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: That is regardless of the military situation, all right. Do you acknowledge that by this order of yours, or by this warning, you had introduced a system of hostages? Do you admit that? VON NEURATH: I did not understand the question. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I am going to repeat the question. I am asking you, do you acknowledge that by means of this warning of August 1939—I am submitting this document as evidence under Document Number USSR-490—that by this order you were setting up a system of hostages? Do you admit that? VON NEURATH: I did not understand. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Was it correctly translated to you just now? VON NEURATH: Yes; the translation did not come through on the last question, or rather the last sentence. I did not understand the last sentence. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, I will put it to you that you know the document well. VON NEURATH: Yes; but I did not understand the last sentence of your question. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I shall try to say it in such a way that you will understand it now. In this order of yours, in the penultimate paragraph, it is stated, “The responsibility for all acts of sabotage will be borne not only by the individual perpetrators, but by the entire Czechoslovak population.” This means that not only guilty persons have to be punished, but there were punishments set up for innocent people too. With this order you inaugurated the mass terrorism against the Czech population. VON NEURATH: Not at all. It only meant that the moral responsibility for any possible acts was to be laid to the account of the Czech people. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, in Lidice, was this not applied in practice? Was it only a question of the moral responsibility there? VON NEURATH: Yes, yes. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In this order you state the following: “Those who do not take these necessities into account will be considered enemies of the Reich.” To the enemies of the Reich you applied only the principles of moral responsibility and nothing else? VON NEURATH: Yes, if someone did not obey orders, then naturally he was punished. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: That is exactly what I am trying to determine and that is why I put this question to you, that just by this order of August 1939 you started the general terrorism of a massacre and punishment of innocent people. VON NEURATH: Well, I do not know how you can draw this conclusion from this warning. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: We are going now to the deductions which we can make out of this. In the report of the Czechoslovak Government, submitted as evidence, Document USSR-60, which is a report on the final result of the investigation of the crimes committed by you and your collaborators, all this has been stated. And you just flatly deny all this documentary evidence. I am not going to argue with you regarding this document, but I am going to read into the record some of the testimony by the witnesses; and I would like you to reply whether you corroborate this evidence or whether you deny it. I am going to read into the record an excerpt from the testimony of the former Minister of Finance, Josef Kalfus, of 8 November 1945. The Tribunal will find these excerpts on Page 12 of the English text, Document USSR-60. Kalfus stated: “The economic system introduced by Neurath and after him by the later German regime, was nothing else than systematic, organized robbery. As to the occupation of decisive positions in the Czech industry and finance, it should be pointed out that, together with Neurath, a vast economic machinery was installed, which immediately occupied the chief positions in industry. The Skoda Works, Brno Armament Works, steel works at Vitkovice, important banks—Bohemian Discount Bank, Länder Bank, and Bohemian Union Bank—were occupied as well.” Do you corroborate this evidence? VON NEURATH: I talked about this matter in great detail yesterday, and I refer you to my statement I made yesterday. I have nothing to add. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Thus, you do not corroborate this evidence? VON NEURATH: Not in the least. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: The former, President of Bohemia, Richard Bienert, during the interrogation of 8 November 1945, stated—Mr. President, this excerpt is on Page 13 of the English text of the Document USSR-60: “When we got to know him more closely, we noticed that he, Neurath, was ruthless toward the Czechs. As the Landespräsident of Bohemia I knew that it was Neurath who subjected the political administration in Bohemia and Moravia to German control, both the state administration and the local government as well. I remember also that Neurath caused the abolition of the local school counsellors, and the appointment of German school inspectors in their place. Neurath ordered the dissolution of the regional representative bodies; he caused Czech workers to be sent to the Reich from April 1939 onward in order to work for the war machine of the Reich. He ordered the closing down of the Czech universities and of many Czech secondary and elementary schools. “He abolished the Czech sport clubs and associations, such as Sokol and Orel, and ordered the confiscation of all the property of these gymnastic organizations; he abolished ... the Czech recreation homes and sanatoria for young workmen and students, and ordered the confiscation of their property. The Gestapo carried out the arrests, but on the order of the Reich Protector ... I myself was arrested on 1 September 1939, as well.” Will you still deny this testimony? VON NEURATH: No, no. About all the matters which are listed here, I spoke yesterday in great detail. I do not intend to repeat it all over again now. Moreover, it seems strange to me that Mr. Bienert of all people, who knew perfectly well what I had ordered and what my relations were to the Gestapo and so forth, that Mr. Bienert of all people should say things like that. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well. Let us look at some other testimony. The former Prime Minister of the so-called Protectorate, Dr. Krejci, during the interrogations on 8 November 1945, stated... Mr. President, this excerpt can be found on Page 17 of the English text of the Document USSR-60. Krejci testified: “I know that the gymnastic associations were disbanded and their property confiscated at the order of the Reich Protector, and their funds and equipment handed over to be used by German associations such as SS, SA, Hitler Youth, and so on. On 1 September 1939, when Poland was attacked by the German Army, arrests took place on a large scale, especially arrests of army officers, intellectuals, and important political personalities. The arrests were made by the Gestapo, but it could not be done without the approval of the Reich Protector.” I am reading into the record one more excerpt from the next page of the testimony: “As far as the Jewish problem was concerned, the Government of the Protectorate was forced by the Reich Protector into a campaign against the Jews, and when this pressure had not the desired result, the Germans—or the Reich Protector’s office—started persecuting the Jews according to the German laws. The result was that tens of thousands of Jews were persecuted and lost their lives and property.” Are you going to deny this testimony, too? VON NEURATH: With reference to the order which you mentioned at the beginning, concerning the sport clubs, I have to tell you that that was a police measure which I had not ordered; and I go on to repeat, as I said yesterday, that the arrests at the beginning of the war were carried out by the Gestapo, by direct order from Berlin, without my even having heard about the matter. I did not learn about it until afterward. Finally, with reference to the Jewish problem which is mentioned in the end, the statement which is contained in the Indictment, I think, namely, that I had attempted to get the Government of Czechoslovakia to introduce anti-Jewish laws, is an incorrect statement. I, or rather my State Secretary, talked to Mr. Elias, as far as I know. I myself have never talked to him. I talked to Mr. Hacha only afterward on a later occasion, when there was an attempt to introduce racial laws with reference to the Czechs; Mr. Hacha objected to this and I told him he did not have to do this, as this was my responsibility. The introduction of the anti-Jewish laws was carried out by a decree of mine, to be sure, because as early as the beginning of April 1939, I had received orders to introduce the anti-Jewish legislation in the Protectorate which was not incorporated in the Reich. I delayed this step until July by means of all sorts of inquiries in Berlin, so as to give time to the Jews to prepare themselves in some way or other. These are the actual facts. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Tell me, do you know Dr. Havelka? VON NEURATH: I know Herr Havelka, yes. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: He knew exactly about your conversation with Hacha? VON NEURATH: Well, how much he knew about that, I do not know. Herr Havelka came to see me once or twice. He was Transport Minister, I think. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, that is quite correct. He was the Minister of Transport, but before that, he was the head of the chancellery of Hacha’s office. Havelka, during his interrogation on 9 November last year, gave the following testimony, which can be found on Pages 18 and 19 of the English text of Exhibit USSR-60—I am quoting an excerpt: “He”—Neurath—“was not interested in the Czech nation and interventions of Cabinet members and Dr. Hacha pressing Czech demands were on the whole without any result. “There were the following actions in particular: “Arrests of Czechoslovak officers, intelligentsia, members of the Czechoslovak Legion of the first World War, and politicians. At the time of the attack on Poland by the German Army about six to eight thousand persons were arrested. They were hostages. The Germans themselves called them ‘held in protective custody.’ The majority of those hostages were never interrogated, and all steps taken at the office of the Reich Protector in favor of these unfortunate men remained without any result. “Neurath, as the only representative of the Reich Government in the territory of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, was responsible for the execution of nine students on 17 November 1939. The execution was carried out soon after...” THE PRESIDENT: General Raginsky, would it not be better and perhaps fairer to the defendant to ask him one question at a time? You are reading long passages of these documents which contain many questions. Perhaps you could take these two paragraphs you read now about the arrest of officers and ask him whether he says those are true or untrue, and then go on to the other paragraphs you want. It is very difficult for him to answer a great number of questions at one time. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, he has these documents before him and he is acquainted with the testimonies in question, but I will take into consideration what you have just told me. I will speak about the shooting of the students separately. [_Turning to the defendant._] Do you corroborate this part of the evidence which I have just read into the record regarding the hostages? VON NEURATH: About the arrest of the members of the so-called Vlayka, at the beginning of September 1939, I have spoken earlier, and I spoke in detail about that yesterday. I said that these arrests—I am repeating it once more—were carried out by the Gestapo without my knowledge. Herr Havelka’s statement, that no steps had been taken in the interest of these people, is untrue. He ought to know that I continuously fought for these people and that a large number of them were released through my efforts. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well, let us go over to another question. Here, before this Tribunal, a certain document has already been introduced several times under Document Number USSR-223. This is the diary of Frank. Mr. President, I am not referring to Karl Hermann Frank, who was sentenced to die for his crimes, but it is the Defendant Frank that I am speaking about. This excerpt has already been quoted here, but I should like to put a question to the defendant about it. I shall read it into the record. During an interview with a correspondent of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ in 1942, the Defendant Frank stated as follows: “In Prague, for instance, some red placards were put out saying that seven Czechs were being shot that day. Then I told myself if I had to issue an order for such placards to be put up regarding every seven Poles who were shot, then there would not be enough timber in Poland to manufacture enough paper for such placards.” Please tell me if it is true that such red placards were put up in Prague? VON NEURATH: I mentioned that yesterday. I have already said yesterday that this was the poster where my signature was misused, and that I had not seen it in advance. That is that red poster. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, if you have not seen these posters, will you please look at them. We are going to show it to you right now. VON NEURATH: Yes, I know it very well. THE PRESIDENT: General Raginsky, he did not say he had not seen it. He said it was put up without his knowledge. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I am going to come back to this, but I should like to establish that these were the red posters which were mentioned by Frank in his diary, and I should like to submit this poster under Document Number USSR-489. I should like to read it into the record; it is very short and it will not take much time. The text is as follows: “In spite of repeated serious warnings, a number of Czech intellectuals, in collaboration with _émigré_ circles abroad, are trying to disturb peace and order in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia by committing major or minor acts of resistance. In this connection it was possible to prove that the ringleaders of these resistance acts are especially to be found in the Czech universities. Since on 28 October and 15 November these elements gave way to acts of physical violence against individual Germans, the Czech universities have been closed for the duration of 3 years, nine of the perpetrators have been shot, and a considerable number of the participants have been arrested. “Signed, The Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, Freiherr von Neurath, Prague, 17 November 1939.” You state here that you never signed this warning? Have I understood you rightly? VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed. I have already explained yesterday or the day before how this came about, namely, in my absence. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, you should not repeat what you have already stated. I am going to read into the record a certain statement by Karl Hermann Frank of 26 November 1945, connected with the subject. It can be found on Pages 46 and 47 of the Russian text. The English text will be submitted. Karl Hermann Frank, giving evidence regarding this poster, the text of which I have just read into the record, stated: “This document was dated 17 November 1939 and was signed by Von Neurath who did not object either to the shooting of the nine students...” DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to something connected with this document. The document is neither dated nor is it signed, at least not the copy I have. It does not make it at all clear from whom the document originates, and I should like to take this opportunity to protest against the reading of this document. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, is there not a certificate about the document? DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Not in my copy. THE PRESIDENT: Well... MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, will you permit me to explain this misunderstanding. Dr. Von Lüdinghausen has the full text of the Document USSR-60. The English text was also submitted to the Tribunal. This document was quoted yesterday by Dr. Lüdinghausen. There is a certificate regarding the authenticity of this document signed by the plenipotentiary of the Czechoslovak Government, and there is the date, too. Now, just to facilitate the proceedings, we have submitted another copy of Frank’s testimony to Dr. Lüdinghausen, and it would be very easy to determine that there is a certificate regarding the authenticity of this statement which is dated 17 November... DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to say the following about this point: When I received this long indictment from Colonel Ecer of the Czech Delegation, the document did not have any additions or appendices, except texts of laws. I therefore endeavored to obtain these additions because reference had been made to them. I then received only one annex to an appendix, or supplement “Number 2”; the others I received in the same condition as the one which I have here. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, will you wait a minute? Will you kindly tell us what document it is you are referring to? DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: It is USSR-60. THE PRESIDENT: USSR-60—well, that is the Czech report, is it not? DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: That is the Czech report, which is about this thick [_indicating_] in German; that is the one in question. Annexes have also been issued to this, and these annexes, I repeat, were not made available to me; that is, I made a personal effort to get them, but I received only one which is not identical with this document and which I received much later and in the same condition as that which I hold in my hand now, that is to say, without a heading, without a signature, and without a date, and most certainly without any certificate as to when, where, and by whom this supposed statement of Frank’s was taken down. THE PRESIDENT: Let us hear what General Raginsky has got to say about it. As I understand General Raginsky, he says there is a certificate identifying that document and what is being supplied to you is merely a copy, which may not have the date and may not have the certificate on it, but which is the same as the document which is certified. Is that what you said, General Raginsky? MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: Could you now show Dr. Von Lüdinghausen the certificate and the document which is certified? MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: This certificate can be found on Page 44 of the Russian text in the appendix to Document USSR-60 and it is signed for General Ecer by Colonel of the General Staff Corps, Novack. This certificate was submitted, in due course, by us to the Tribunal. THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to take up the time of the Tribunal about this particular document? It seems to me we are wasting a lot of time. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: After all, it is important. Otherwise I cannot find out whether it is genuine. That is certainly my right. THE PRESIDENT: I was asking General Raginsky whether he wanted to persist in the use of the document. Is it worth while? I do not know what the document is or what it says. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I consider that is not necessary, because this document has already been submitted to the Tribunal a few months ago and accepted by the Tribunal as evidence. I really do not understand the statements by Dr. Von Lüdinghausen. THE PRESIDENT: Why do you not show Dr. Von Lüdinghausen that there is a certificate which applies to the document which you put in his hand? MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, certainly, Mr. President. I am holding in my hand the Russian text of the certificate. I am quoting the Russian text and I can present it to Dr. Von Lüdinghausen so that he can be convinced. The original document has been submitted to the Tribunal and is in the possession of the Tribunal. THE PRESIDENT: Well, is there not a German translation of the certificate and does not the certificate identify the document? Is there a German translation of the certificate? MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Just at the moment I do not have it, but during the intermission I shall be glad to produce the original German document. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, the Tribunal is told that this document was put in before and the certificate of General Ecer was put in at the same time, certifying that this document is a part of the Czech report. In those circumstances, the Tribunal will allow the document to be used. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, then I have another objection to the use of this document. As is known, if any interrogation transcripts or affidavits from witnesses are presented, the Defense have the right to summon these witnesses for an interrogation. The former State Secretary Frank, who has made this statement, is, however, as is known, no longer among the living. Therefore, I also object for this reason to the use of this document. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President... THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, this document was offered and accepted in evidence during the lifetime of this man, K. H. Frank. That is one reason for accepting it. The document is admissible under Article 21 of the Charter and was submitted under that article and there is no such rule as you have stated, that the Defense are entitled to cross-examine every person who makes an affidavit. It is a matter entirely within the discretion of the Tribunal and therefore that objection is rejected. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I do not want to hold you any longer on this matter but I wanted to show that this was an unnecessary delay as Dr. Von Lüdinghausen used the document himself to introduce some extracts from the testimony of Frank in his document book. Now I shall read into the record some statements made by Frank. This document, I repeat, is in connection with the warning dated 17 November 1939 which we just exhibited to this Tribunal, and signed by Von Neurath, who did not raise his voice either against the shooting of the nine students nor as to the number of students who were to be sent to concentration camps, and he did not really request any changes in this legislation. [_Turning to the defendant._] Did you hear the testimony, Defendant? VON NEURATH: Yes, I have read it. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Do you deny this? VON NEURATH: But most definitely. There was no possibility whatever of my doing so because I was not in Prague and consequently I could neither have had any knowledge of it, nor could I have signed it or passed it on. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well. You still insist on stating that the Police never informed you regarding the arrests which were made and other police measures which were taken? Do you state that firmly? VON NEURATH: I did not say that they never informed me, but that they always informed me afterward. My information always came from Czech sources. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Was not the state of affairs such that the Police regularly reported to you regarding the important events which took place? VON NEURATH: Not at all. In particular I never learned anything about what they were planning, at least not until afterward—or if I had learned it from Czech sources and then made inquiries with the Police. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well. I am going to read an extract from the testimony of Karl Hermann Frank, dated 7 March 1946. This testimony was submitted by me to the Tribunal yesterday and it was partially read by me already. Will you give a copy of the testimony, USSR-494, to the defendant, please? Frank states: “The Reich Protector, Von Neurath, regularly received reports on the most important events in the Protectorate which had some bearing on the Security Police, from me, from the State Secretary, as well as from the Chief of the Security Police. For example, Von Neurath was informed in the special case concerning the student demonstrations in November 1939 both by me and by the Chief of the Security Police. This case dealt with Hitler’s direct orders demanding the shootings of all the ringleaders. The number of ringleaders was to be fixed by the Prague Stapo and the Reich Protector was informed about this. In this case an estimate on the number of the ringleaders was left to the discretion of the State Police, or rather to the approval of the Reich Protector. Reich Protector Von Neurath signed the official dispatch announcing the execution of these students, thereby approving this action. It can therefore not be said that in this case the Reich Protector was merely responsible for the carrying out of the general Hitler order which deals with the execution of all ringleaders, but that he is also responsible for the fixing of the number of ringleaders, namely nine. I informed him in detail about the interrogation and he signed the poster. “If this had not met with his approval and had he wished to revise it, as for instance, making it less severe, which he had the right to do, then I should have had to abide by his decision.” Now do you deny these statements? VON NEURATH: Yes; I do not know how many times I have got to tell you that I was not in Prague at all. And besides I do not know under what sort of pressure Frank might have made these statements. It does not give the date, but you just said that he made this statement on 7 April, and therefore a few days before his execution. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I should like the Tribunal to note that the defendant is deliberately distorting the facts. I repeated several times that these statements were made by Frank on 7 March and not on 7 April, or 2 days before the execution, as you are telling me now. The document is before you and you can look at it yourself and see the date. VON NEURATH: All right, then 7 March instead of 7 April. I think I said 7 April because I did not see the date at the top. But as I have said—I think I have already told you three times—I could not have known anything at all about it because I was not there. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well. But you are making too many mistakes. Yesterday when giving testimony you were not very clear as to the number of students, either. VON NEURATH: I cannot remember what I said yesterday, but I could hardly have made so many mistakes; I do not know if there were one or two less. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I would like to remind you. Yesterday, in reply to a question by Sir David, who submitted to you Document 3858-PS, from which it was evident that after the closing of the higher institutions of learning, 18,000 students found themselves out of school... THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go over Sir David’s cross-examination again? Surely we have said that we do not want to go over the same subject twice. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I do not want to go back to the very same thing, and I do not want to add anything to the questions put by Sir David who has carried out a very detailed interrogation. I wanted only to establish the truth. When the defendant stated yesterday that in the document which was submitted by Sir David there was a mistake—that in Prague there existed only two institutions of higher learning and that 12,000 students could not have been arrested, this was not correct. The question was not merely about the closing of two Prague universities, but, on the basis of the order of 17 November 1939, there were closed the Czech university in Prague, the Czech university in Brünn, the Czech Higher Technical School in Brünn, the Czech Higher Technical School in Prague... THE PRESIDENT: We heard all this yesterday, and we do not want to hear it again. We heard all about the closing of the university in Prague. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well, Mr. President. I just wanted to state that not 2 universities were closed, but 10 institutions of higher learning. I have just a few questions left which I should like to put to the defendant. [_Turning to the defendant._] You received many awards from Hitler, as is evident from the documents, and as you yourself stated. For instance, on 22 September 1940 you received the Iron Cross for Military Service. For what kind of services did you receive this award from Hitler? THE PRESIDENT: Surely we went into this yesterday, did we not, in Sir David’s cross-examination, or in the examination-in-chief, I forget which? I think it was the examination-in-chief—all these decorations which were given the defendant. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I do not want to revert to these orders, but I should like to ask the defendant, for what special services he received the Iron Cross from Hitler in 1942. THE PRESIDENT: All right, ask him that. VON NEURATH: Unfortunately, I cannot tell you. I cannot tell you what sort of merits I am supposed to have displayed. The award of this order of merit was made generally to all higher officials who were in service at the time. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well, I am not going to insist on your reply. I just wanted to state here that you received this award in 1940 after the mass terror was applied against the Czechoslovak population. VON NEURATH: I do not know that I am supposed to have carried out a mass terror. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well, if you do not understand, we are not going to argue about this question. In February 1943, in connection with your jubilee, various articles about you were published in many newspapers. I am not going to submit all these papers to the Tribunal or quote these articles, but I should like to read just two excerpts from the newspaper _Fränkischer Kurier_ of 2 February 1943. We shall submit to you one of the copies of this so that you can follow me as I read this document into the record. This newspaper is being submitted to the Tribunal under Document Number USSR-495. In connection with your anniversary, it was stated: “The most outstanding events in the field of foreign policy after Hitler’s coming to power, in which Freiherr von Neurath played a most important role as Reich Foreign Minister and with which his name will always be connected, are: Germany’s leaving the Geneva Disarmament Conference...the reuniting of the Saar to Germany...and the denouncing of the Locarno Pact.” And further on: “Reich Protector Freiherr von Neurath was repeatedly decorated by the Führer for outstanding services in the interest of the people and the Reich. He was decorated with the Golden Party Badge of Honor, received the rank of SS Gruppenführer, was a knight of the Order of the Eagle, and received the Gold Badge of Honor for Faithful Service for his 40 years of diplomatic service. “In appreciation of his outstanding services in the field of military efforts in the post of Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia, the Führer decorated him with the Military Cross, First Class.” Are the facts correctly stated in this article? VON NEURATH: If I had to investigate the correctness of every article written by some journalist or other, I would have had a lot to do. These statements are the opinion of a journalist and nothing more. THE PRESIDENT: That was not the question. The question was whether they were correctly stated, as a matter of fact. You can answer that. VON NEURATH: Yes—no. THE PRESIDENT: Which do you mean, “yes” or “no”? VON NEURATH: The decorations are correctly stated. Apart from that it is not correct. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I have no further questions to put. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, do you wish to re-examine? DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, yesterday afternoon I had the feeling and impression, probably not without reason, that Herr Von Neurath was visibly tired and strained after the previous examination and that he was no longer in a position to do complete justice to the questions which were put to him. This, after all, is not surprising, if one considers that Herr Von Neurath is in his seventy-fourth year and besides that he is also suffering from a fairly serious heart disease. I feel obliged, therefore, to refer back to various points of the cross-examination of yesterday and put a few questions to him. [_Turning to the defendant._] Herr Von Neurath, you stated yesterday that because of the excesses of the SA and other radical groups in 1933 and later, you frequently protested to Hitler. What was the reason why you remonstrated with Hitler directly and did not raise your objections at the Cabinet meetings which were still taking place at that time? VON NEURATH: I had already learned from personal experience that Hitler could not stand contradiction of any kind and that he was not amenable to any kind of petition if it was made before a fairly large group, because then he would always develop the complex that he was facing some sort of opposition against which he had to defend himself. It was different when one confronted him alone. Then, at least during the earlier years, he was accessible, thoroughly amenable to reasonable arguments, and much could be achieved in the way of moderating or weakening radical measures. Moreover, I should like to mention again that just after the excesses mentioned in Mr. Geist’s affidavit there was a meeting of the Cabinet, during which strong protests were raised against the repetition of such occurrences by various ministers including non-Nazi ministers. At that time Hitler thoroughly agreed with these objections, and declared that such excesses would not be allowed to recur. Shortly afterward he also made a speech in which he publicly expressed an assurance to this effect. From then until June 1934 no more excesses took place. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But in April 1933 there was the well-known anti-Jewish boycott, which lasted 24 hours, if I am not mistaken? VON NEURATH: Yes, that was one of Herr Goebbels’ provocations. But actually there were no excesses and acts of violence whatsoever on that occasion. It was confined merely to boycotting. Moreover, the fact that no further disturbances arose in that case was the result of a joint intercession by Herr Von Papen and myself with Hitler and especially with Hindenburg. A perfectly correct description of this episode is to be found, as I recall, in an article of _Time_ for April 1933, which is also contained in my document book. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, it was submitted in my document book, Document Number Neurath-9. [_Turning to the defendant._] In connection with the events that occurred at that time, arrests, and so forth, Sir David yesterday referred particularly to the arrest of the well-known author Ossietzski. Do you recall that this Ossietzski had already been sentenced to a fairly long prison term by a German court even before the seizure of power? VON NEURATH: Yes, I remembered that afterward. I remember which government—Herr Ossietzski had been sentenced by a Reich that even before the seizure of power—I do not know under court to a fairly long term in the penitentiary for high treason, but he had not yet served it, and consequently was arrested again. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to ask you another question with reference to the report submitted by the Prosecution yesterday. It is the letter of Ministerial Director Köpke on 31 May 1934. That is Document D-868. In this report, from the information noted down by Herr Köpke, do you see any proof that the Foreign Office was drawn into the subversive activities of the Austrian Nazis? VON NEURATH: No, not at all. This has to do with a report which Ministerial Director Köpke made to me about a visit by Herr Wächter, whom he described as an Austrian with a sense of responsibility. This Herr Wächter had tried to establish a connection with the Foreign Office and with Hitler in order to draw attention to the dangers arising from the growing radicalism of the Austrian Nazis. The head of the Political Department, Herr Köpke, identifies himself with Wächter regarding these apprehensions and agreed to make an oral report to that effect. I do not think that anyone can doubt that my attitude was not quite the same as that of Herr Köpke and I passed this report on to Hitler in order to draw his attention to the matter. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Prosecution—or rather, Sir David—referred yesterday to reports which deal with the treatment of the Czech problem by you and Frank. This is Document 3859-PS, a letter which you sent to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, on 31 August 1940, for the preparation of your oral report to Hitler. Were these reports, that is, the one drafted by Frank, identical with the memorandum mentioned in the Friderici document of 15 October? VON NEURATH: Yes, apparently these are the same reports. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, during your examination you spoke about the Friderici document, which you said was based on plans of the SS, various Party circles, and the Gauleiter of the Lower Danube district, regarding a deportation of Czechs to the Eastern Territories. You went on to say that in order to stop these plans, which you yourself described as nonsensical, you had Frank prepare this memorandum in which a less radical solution was recommended, which later had also been approved to a certain extent by Hitler; and that in reality nothing happened, which was what you intended, and that the idea of incorporation had practically been buried. Is that right? VON NEURATH: Yes, that is true. This entire affair and the origin of these memoranda are extremely difficult to explain. It can be understood only from the entire domestic political development. The efforts of the Gauleiter of the surrounding districts to divide up the Protectorate had proceeded rather far. They had all submitted memoranda and Herr Himmler backed them up. All these memoranda envisaged a radical solution of these problems; that meant there was reason to fear that Hitler would comply with the wishes of these Gauleiter. In order to stop this I had to make several proposals which I myself had said were impracticable, and I identified myself with them primarily so as to declare them absurd later on. That is the only explanation of the origin of these memoranda. I did not draft the memoranda myself, but that was done in my office, in accordance, to be sure, with instructions given by me. This was, however, and I should like to emphasize this expressly, a purely tactical maneuver to get at Hitler, because I was afraid that he would follow the radical suggestions made by Himmler and his associates. I did actually manage to get Hitler to issue a strict order, which is what I had requested, to the effect that all these plans were no longer to be discussed, but that only the so-called assimilation plan was left, which could be carried out only over a period of years; and, as a matter of fact, nothing more happened, and that was exactly what I was aiming at. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: A decree was submitted by the Prosecution yesterday, which was issued to the German authorities in the Protectorate, regarding the treatment to be given of the German-Czech problem publicly. That is Document 3862-PS, dated 27 June 1941. Is that in any way connected with these memoranda or the discussion you had with Hitler about it? VON NEURATH: Yes, it is most closely interconnected, and I think I said so yesterday. In the following year the same agitation started all over again for this Germanization and partitioning of the Protectorate, and I opposed it, and, once the question was decided, I prohibited it from being reopened. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: A document was submitted yesterday, USSR-487, the Chief of the Security Police, addressed to State Secretary Frank, dated 21 July 1943, that is to say, after you had resigned. From that document the Prosecution are attempting to draw the conclusion that, in accordance with a decree dated 5 May 1939, you appointed the leader of the SA and Security Police in Prague as your political expert. In what way did the latter act in this capacity? Did he act at all? VON NEURATH: No, he did not; that is just it. It is clearly apparent from this letter of reminder, dated 21 July 1943, that he never became at all active in this respect. MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I should like to state here that the question was incorrectly put. This document is not dated in the year 1943 or 1942, but it is dated 21 July 1939. VON NEURATH: May I remark here that it makes no difference, as nothing had happened. I did not appoint any political expert. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What measures followed Documents 3851-PS and 3858-PS, which were introduced yesterday by the Prosecution, and which were proposals submitted by various departments and department heads of your administration regarding the utilization for labor of the students who became unemployed through the closing down of the Czech universities? VON NEURATH: I have already told you yesterday that this apparently concerned a proposal from an adviser which never even reached me, but was rejected by my State Secretary before it got to me. Just how I could possibly be held responsible for the contents of a draft submitted by an adviser, I cannot understand. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to put one more question to you regarding the German-Austrian agreement of July 1936. As is mentioned in a report by Dr. Rainer to Bürckel which the Prosecution have already submitted—I refer to Document 812-PS—is it correct that Hitler, immediately after the signing of that agreement, had personally declared to Dr. Rainer and the Austrian Nazi Leader Globocznik that this agreement of 11 July 1936 was signed by him in all honesty and sincerity, and that the Austrian National Socialists, too, should under all circumstances adhere strictly to this agreement, and that they were to let themselves be guided by him in their conduct toward the Austrian Government? VON NEURATH: Yes, that is correct. As I think I said to you yesterday, I believe I can also remember that Rainer actually confirmed it when he was here on the witness stand. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I would like to put a last question... THE PRESIDENT: He answered these questions perfectly clearly, according to his view, yesterday. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I am all through now. I should like to ask him only one more question in conclusion of the entire examination of my client. [_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution and also Sir David brought the following charge against you yesterday: They charged that although by your own admission you were not in agreement with the Nazi regime and its methods, and although you considered many of the things that occurred reprehensible and immoral and abhorred them, you did not resign, but remained in the Government. Will you please explain that to us once more? VON NEURATH: I have already mentioned in the beginning that I had given my promise to Hindenburg to enter the Government and to remain there as long as it was at all possible for me to follow a course unfavorable to any use of violence and to protect Germany from warlike entanglements. That was my task and nothing else. But it was not only this promise I had given to Hindenburg, but also my sense of duty, and my feeling of responsibility toward the German people, to protect them from warlike entanglements as long as it was at all possible, which bound me to this office. Beside these considerations all my personal wishes, which were quite different, had to take second place. Unfortunately, my power and influence as Foreign Minister did not reach far enough to enable me to prevent pernicious and immoral actions in other spheres, as for instance, that of domestic policy, although I did try in many cases, not least of all in the Jewish question itself. However, I considered that my highest duty was to carry out the work assigned to me and not try to escape it, even if in another sphere where I had no influence, things occurred which hurt me and my opinions very deeply. There may be many people who have different ideas and a different attitude than I. I experienced similar attacks when I placed myself at the disposal of a Social Democrat Cabinet in the year 1919 after the first revolution; at that time, too, the strongest attacks and the most serious accusations were made against me. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yet you yourself have struggled hard with your conscience, you have often told me. VON NEURATH: Yes, of course I have. It is not easy to belong to a government with whose tendencies you do not agree, and for which one is to be made responsible later on. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, this completes my examination. I would suggest we adjourn now and then I might be permitted to begin the examination of my witnesses. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn. [_A recess was taken._] THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you have some questions to ask? DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Mr. President, I ask permission for my client to be absent from the session this afternoon and tomorrow, because I have important questions to discuss with him. THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant Von Ribbentrop? DR. HORN: Von Ribbentrop, yes. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. DR. HORN: Thank you. DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Mr. President, yesterday afternoon General Raginsky asked whether Rosenberg interfered in Neurath’s foreign policy. The interpreter just told me that she translated it wrongly. She translated it “whether Ribbentrop interfered in Neurath’s policy.” This question, therefore, has not been answered yet; consequently, I ask permission to ask Baron von Neurath whether Rosenberg interfered in Neurath’s foreign policy. VON NEURATH: No, in no way. I never talked to Rosenberg about matters of foreign policy. DR. THOMA: Then I ask that the transcript be corrected accordingly, so it should not read “whether Ribbentrop interfered in Neurath’s policies,” but “whether Rosenberg interfered in Neurath’s policies.” THE PRESIDENT: The record will be corrected. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): I want to ask you just a very few questions. You will remember that the Baroness von Ritter said that after the 5th of November 1937 you recognized—I want to read it exactly: “When Herr Von Neurath had to recognize for the first time from Hitler’s statement on 5 November 1937 that the latter wanted to achieve his political aims by using force toward neighboring states, this shook him so severely mentally that he suffered severe heart attacks.” That is a correct description, is it not, of what you then recognized? [_The defendant nodded assent._] THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, you stated that you spoke immediately after that meeting to General Beck and General Von Fritsch. Do you remember? VON NEURATH: Yes. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And I think you said to Sir David that you did not speak to the Defendant Göring. What I am asking you now is whether you spoke of what Hitler had said to anyone else during the next 2 or 3 months. Did you speak to anyone in the Foreign Office? VON NEURATH: I spoke to my State Secretary. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And with whom else from the Foreign Office? VON NEURATH: No one, for Hitler had laid down the condition that silence should be preserved about all these meetings; and for that reason I did not speak with my officials about them. They knew nothing. They had learned nothing from the military men, either. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you speak to the Defendant Von Papen when you saw him next? VON NEURATH: No. I believe I did not see him at all at that time. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And did you discuss it with anybody else before your resignation? VON NEURATH: No. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, I have only one other question. You recognized, did you not, that Himmler would use methods which you would not approve of; is that right? VON NEURATH: Yes, but only gradually; that could not have been foreseen from the beginning. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is just what I wanted to know. When did you first realize that? When did you first begin, just as well as you could tell? About when did you realize what sort of man Himmler was? VON NEURATH: That was very difficult to recognize, because Himmler had two faces; he was a perfect Janus; one could not see immediately what his real thoughts were at all. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am not asking you what he was like. If you would just try to remember, you certainly realized that at some time. Did you know it in 1937? You knew it in 1937 or 1938? Certainly in 1938, did you not? VON NEURATH: Probably in 1938, but it is hard for me to give a date at the moment. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I do not want a specific date. My point is that you knew it before you went to the Protectorate; you knew what Himmler was before you went to the Protectorate, of course? There is no question about that, is there? VON NEURATH: Yes, certainly. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all. THE TRIBUNAL (Major General I. T. Nikitchenko, Member for the U.S.S.R.): Did you ever express yourself openly against the policy of the Hitlerite Government? VON NEURATH: I am sorry, but the translation was not good. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In your explanations made before the Tribunal you stated that you were not in agreement with the policy of Hitler’s Government, either on individual questions or taken as a whole, as well. Is that true? VON NEURATH: Yes. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did you ever express yourself openly with a statement of your disagreement with Hitler’s policy? VON NEURATH: I did so more than once. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In what manner was it, then? I am asking you about your public statements, either in the press or while addressing any meeting? VON NEURATH: No. It was no longer possible either to have a voice in the press, or to hold a meeting. It was quite out of the question. I could only speak to Hitler personally or, at the beginning, in the Cabinet in protest against this policy. There was no freedom of the press any longer, any more than in Russia. In the same way no meeting was possible. Consequently... THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am not asking you about Russia; I am asking you about your expressing your views publicly. In other words, you never expressed them. VON NEURATH: No. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And in that way nobody in Germany could know, or did know, about the fact that you were not in agreement with the policy on the part of Hitler’s Government? VON NEURATH: I always expressed myself quite unmistakably about it, but not in articles, nor in meetings either; but otherwise I always expressed myself clearly about it. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Yes, but only in your _tête-à-tête_ with Hitler, only personally to Hitler. You said so, did you not? VON NEURATH: No; I tell you I said that to everyone who would listen, but I could not do so in public meetings, in speeches, or in articles. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And you remained a member of the Government in spite of the fact that you were not in agreement with the Government’s policy; is that so? VON NEURATH: Yes, for that very reason. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In order to counteract his policy? VON NEURATH: Yes. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Do you know the results of Such counteracting? VON NEURATH: I did not understand that. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What were the results of counteracting the policy of Hitler’s Government? VON NEURATH: Well, I am not in a position to give the details on that. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In particular, as to the question of aggression, were you against the joining of Germany and Austria? VON NEURATH: Yes. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): The German Government, in spite of this, joined Austria to Germany; is that so? VON NEURATH: I believe it has been clearly expressed here that at the last moment Hitler did that. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You were against the seizing of Czechoslovakia? VON NEURATH: Yes. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And the German Government, in spite of this, seized Czechoslovakia? VON NEURATH: I was no longer a member of the Government at that time. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But as a statesman whose opinion should have been considered, you, of course, expressed your opinion against it, did you not? VON NEURATH: Always. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You were against the attack on Poland? VON NEURATH: Yes. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And in spite of that Germany did attack Poland. VON NEURATH: I repeat, I was no longer a member of the Government. I learned of it only at the last moment. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You were against the attack on the U.S.S.R.? VON NEURATH: Yes, more so indeed; I always wanted the exact opposite. I wanted co-operation with the Soviet Union, I said that as early as 19... THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And still Germany attacked the Soviet Union? VON NEURATH: Yes. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Judging from your explanations, Hitler must have known about your political opposition and your disagreement with his policy; is it correct? VON NEURATH: He knew that very well, for I resigned in 1938 for that reason. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Yes. And you know how Hitler made short work of his political opponents? VON NEURATH: In the Reich, yes. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And so far as you were concerned, in spite of the fact that you sided with the opposition, nothing happened; that is true, is it not? VON NEURATH: I did not understand. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): So far as you were concerned, in spite of the fact that you declared yourself for the opposition, nothing of the kind happened? VON NEURATH: No, but I always expected it. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And could you not tell us whether Sir Nevile Henderson, in his book, the _Failure of a Mission_, expressed the facts concerning you personally correctly or not? Do you consider that Sir Nevile Henderson expressed the facts correctly concerning you personally? Does he express them correctly? VON NEURATH: I must admit frankly that I read this book by Sir Nevile Henderson only once, 3 or 4 years ago. I cannot remember now what he said about me. I heard excerpts from it here once or twice but I cannot say what he writes about me. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But I assume that you are familiar enough with the excerpts presented by your defense counsel in his document book? VON NEURATH: Yes. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Now, for instance, that which is expressed in his excerpts so far as you are concerned, is it correct or not? VON NEURATH: I assume so, yes. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): That is to say, it is correct. And is it quite correct what he writes in reference to your membership in the Party? He writes that “Baron von Neurath himself remained in the regime of Hindenburg, and he was not a member of the Nazi Party.” VON NEURATH: Yes, I believe I have said so repeatedly here in the last few days. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And further on he informs us that “he (Neurath) became a member of the Party later.” VON NEURATH: I have already explained how that happened. In 1937 I received a Golden Party Badge without my... THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Yes, we have heard that before, but is it true or not that you became a member of the Nazi Party later, as Sir Nevile Henderson states? VON NEURATH: No, I... THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): So this particular part is not correct, is it? VON NEURATH: I received the Golden Party Badge with Hitler’s statement that this involved no obligations towards the Party. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): We have heard this already. That means that in Sir Nevile Henderson’s statements not everything is true as far as your person is concerned? VON NEURATH: I do not know. With the best intentions I cannot remember what Sir Nevile Henderson wrote about me. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And the last question I have, which is in regard to your memorandum: I did not quite understand the explanations which were given by you to Sir David and later to your defense counsel. Now, in forwarding Frank’s memorandum, in the letter addressed to Lammers, you wrote that you considered this memorandum absolutely correct. Is that true? VON NEURATH: Yes, that is true. I should also like to tell you the reasons. This memorandum... THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You already explained the reasons before. I just wanted to establish the fact that you really wrote this. VON NEURATH: Up to now I have not told the reason why I wrote this to Lammers. The reason why I wrote to Lammers to this effect was that he was the one who submitted this memorandum to the Führer. So I had to write to the same effect. THE PRESIDENT: There are two subjects I want to ask you about and the first relates to the letter that you wrote on the 31st of August 1940. That is the letter which General Nikitchenko has just referred to; you remember that? VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed. THE PRESIDENT: And you remember that you said in that letter that you fully agreed with the memorandum which your Secretary of State Frank had drawn up independently of you. He said that “Germanization provides for the changing of the nationality of racially suitable Czechs; and secondly, the expulsion of racially unassimilable Czechs and of the intelligentsia who are enemies of the Reich or special treatment for these and all destructive elements.” My question is: What did you understand by “special treatment”? VON NEURATH: Well, as far as I read this extract at all at the time, I had in no way ever thought of the term “special treatment” as it has become known here during the Trial. I was certainly not at all in agreement with this attitude of Frank as represented in the report, and I only had the intention of frustrating this whole affair in order to sidetrack it. The content of these reports was only intended to present this to Hitler in Hitler’s language, or in the language of Himmler and others, in order to dissuade him from it later on. THE PRESIDENT: Was it not misleading to write to Herr Lammers with the view that it should be put forward to Hitler, saying that you fully agreed with the memorandum with which you did not agree? VON NEURATH: Mr. President, as things were, I could not write to Lammers. I did not intend to carry out anything which is written in there, but since Lammers was presenting this to Hitler, I first had to tell him I agreed with it. Afterward I reported to Hitler and gave him an explanation in a personal conference during the meeting with Frank and Gürtner which has been mentioned here. THE PRESIDENT: Then your answer is that you do not know what was meant by “special treatment”? VON NEURATH: No; in any case I did not know at the time. THE PRESIDENT: Now, there is one other question that I should like to put to you. You remember when you were called on the 11th of March 1938, at the time of the Anschluss with Austria, and you wrote the letter of the 12th of March 1938, in answer to the memorandum which you received from the British Government through Sir Nevile Henderson. You knew Sir Nevile Henderson quite well, did you not? VON NEURATH: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: And in that letter you said this: “It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to bring about this development; especially the assertion, which was spread later by the former Chancellor, that the German Government had presented the Federal President with a conditional ultimatum, is pure invention. According to the ultimatum, he had to appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor and form a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German Government, otherwise the invasion of Austria by German troops was held in prospect.” And then you go on to say what you allege was the truth of the matter. You know now, do you not, that your statements in that letter were entirely untrue? VON NEURATH: That did not come through. THE PRESIDENT: Have you heard any part of the question that I was putting to you? VON NEURATH: Unfortunately not. THE PRESIDENT: It is a pity that you did not say so earlier. Do you remember the 11th of March 1938 and being called in to represent the Foreign Office, and you have told me just now that you knew Sir Nevile Henderson quite well? VON NEURATH: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: And you remember the letter which you wrote on the 12th of March 1938? VON NEURATH: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: And you admitted to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe that the statements in that letter were untrue? VON NEURATH: Untrue, yes—not entirely. They are presented incorrectly. THE PRESIDENT: What steps did you take to find out whether or not they were true? VON NEURATH: I did not learn of the incorrectness of this presentation until much later. THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to my question. I said, “What steps did you take to find out whether the statement was correct?” VON NEURATH: The statement which Hitler gave me I first simply presumed to be true. I certainly could not check up on it in any way. THE PRESIDENT: Why should you assume it to be true when it was in contradiction of what the British Government had stated? VON NEURATH: I had no other knowledge of the events which had occurred and therefore could only say what I knew. THE PRESIDENT: You had the letter, the protest from the British Government, had you not? VON NEURATH: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: You knew Sir Nevile Henderson perfectly well? VON NEURATH: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: And you then wrote this letter contradicting the statements which had been made on behalf of the British Government; that is right, is it not? VON NEURATH: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: And you took no steps to check the facts which had been stated to you by Hitler? Will you answer that, please? VON NEURATH: Yes. Your Lordship, how was I to do that? There was no one else who knew about it. It was only what Hitler had commissioned me to tell the Foreign Office. The draft of this note was drawn up by the Foreign Office according to the information which I had received from Hitler. I had no other chance to clear this up. THE PRESIDENT: There were all the other persons who were concerned with the matter whom you could have communicated with, but your statement is that you did nothing? VON NEURATH: I can only repeat that I had no opportunity to procure any other information. No one knew about it except Hitler. THE PRESIDENT: Are you telling the Tribunal that Göring did not know about it? VON NEURATH: Perhaps Göring knew about it. THE PRESIDENT: That is all. The defendant can return to the dock. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I ask permission to call the first witness, the former Ministerial Director, and head of the political section in the Foreign Ministry, Dr. Köpke. [_The witness Köpke took the stand._] THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please? GERHARD KÖPKE (Witness): Gerhard Köpke. THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing. [_The witness repeated the oath._] THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Dr. Köpke, how long have you known Herr Von Neurath? KÖPKE: I have known Herr Von Neurath for over 40 years. His career is well known. Therefore I can limit myself to stating that we worked together as vice consuls in London, as legation counsellors in the Foreign Office and later, after Herr Von Neurath became Minister in 1932, until my resignation in 1935. In the meantime Von Neurath was in Copenhagen, Rome, London, and for some time at his home, and finally in Prague. We met only occasionally when I was in Berlin, and we kept up a comparatively lively correspondence with each other as old friends. I myself was employed in the Foreign Office during the entire period. From 1921 on I was director of the Legal Department, and from 1923 I was director of the political, so-called Western Department, which I directed until I left the service. I voluntarily tendered my resignation at the end of 1935. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about the attitude, the fundamental attitude of Herr Von Neurath on domestic and foreign policy, but only on broad lines? KÖPKE: In domestic politics, Herr Von Neurath stood close to the conservative circles but he was never a member of the Conservative Party. From this basic conservative attitude and also because of his outstanding character traits of loyalty to duty and reliability, he had the confidence of Reich President Von Hindenburg, and retained it without interruption until the latter’s death. Herr Von Hindenburg esteemed Von Neurath as a prudent, moderate, reliable diplomat. Men of other party inclinations also had confidence in Von Neurath. I shall mention only the deceased Reich President, Ebert, who recalled Neurath to office during his term. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about Von Neurath’s appointment as Reich Foreign Minister in the summer of 1932? KÖPKE: The appointment of Herr Von Neurath as Reich Foreign Minister was based on a personal wish of President Von Hindenburg. Neurath did not become Foreign Minister within the Von Papen Cabinet, but became Foreign Minister as the special confidant of President Von Hindenburg. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then how did it happen that Von Neurath remained Foreign Minister in the new Hitler Government also? KÖPKE: Von Neurath did not participate so far as I know in the negotiations with Hitler about the assumption of power. If I can rely only on my memory, he was sick abed with a heart disease during the decisive days, but he remained Foreign Minister, again at the special wish of Von Hindenburg. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Can you tell us anything about the attitude, the relationship of Neurath to Hitler? KÖPKE: I should like to remark by way of introduction that I cannot testify on this subject from my own immediate observation. I was never present at conferences which Herr Von Neurath held with Hitler. I myself never had any official conversation with Hitler whatsoever. But, according to Neurath’s own description, and according to the information which I received from other important personalities in the course of time, I had the impression that, especially in the first years, Hitler treated Herr Von Neurath carefully and politely. To what extent this was out of respect for the Reich President, whose regard for Von Neurath was, of course, known to Hitler, I cannot say. In any case, Neurath was never actually in the confidence of Hitler and was not in the small circle close to Hitler, the powerful men of the Party. After the death of President Von Hindenburg, Von Neurath remained because he had promised the Reich President to do so. During the following period also, Neurath repeatedly attempted to exercise his moderating and calming influence on the Party. However, I know that as disappointments and differences of opinion multiplied, Herr Von Neurath tried many times to separate from Hitler. In this connection I can recall two occasions on which he offered his resignation, and one of these appeals he showed me. It was in writing and must have been dated from the beginning of the year 1936. For at that time I had already resigned and visited Herr Von Neurath as a friend in a purely private capacity. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now can you also give us a brief picture of Neurath’s attitude toward the National Socialist Party? KÖPKE: At first Herr Von Neurath adopted an attitude of reserve toward the Party and in particular its leading men. To my knowledge he was personally acquainted with hardly any of these men, since, indeed, he had lived most of the time abroad. Neurath was convinced that by reason of his years of experience as an old diplomat and supported by his confidential position with the Reich President, and the latter’s moderating influence, he would succeed in working in accordance with his policy, which was directed toward compromise and understanding. Before me, and I believe also before his other colleagues, Neurath frequently referred to experiences of this sort which he had had with Fascism in Rome. He occasionally said that such revolutionary elements should just be allowed to develop and that these hotheads would come to their senses if they were given time and opportunity to gather experience themselves in responsible positions. By the way, Neurath also shared the opinions of State Secretary Von Bülow in this respect. He retained this State Secretary of Reich Chancellor Brüning, and also protected him until his death against repeated attempts of the Party to get rid of him. Moreover, I should like to mention a small detail which was very valuable to us in the office at the time. When State Secretary Von Bülow, who was generally popular, died suddenly, Neurath managed to get Hitler to attend the funeral at the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church. The old officials of the Foreign Office saw in that a gratifying and reassuring sign for the strong position of our Minister in relation to the Party. This event, which in itself is perhaps unimportant, happened exactly 10 years ago today. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: As head of the Political Department of the Foreign Office, you were one of Neurath’s foremost co-workers, and can surely tell us what was the dominant tendency of Neurath’s foreign policy. KÖPKE: Neurath’s political attitude on the whole was, in accordance with his whole character and his years of experience in politics, inclined toward compromise, waiting, negotiation. Measures backed up by ultimatums and attempts at solution by violence did not suit Von Neurath’s temperament. Neurath was neither a gambler nor a fighter by nature. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I come to individual important foreign political events which occurred during the period in which you worked under Herr Von Neurath and were head of the political section. In October 1933 Germany left the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. Now, I should like to ask you whether this step of Germany’s, leaving the Conference and the League of Nations, was based on any aggressive or belligerent tendencies for the moment or for the future? KÖPKE: No. As far as the picture of the events mentioned by defendant’s counsel was clear to us, the experts, it was as follows: No one of us in the Foreign Office thought of warlike plans or preparations for war. It was only done to proclaim as impressively as possible that Germany would no longer allow herself to be considered a nation without the same rights and obligations as other peoples. In the same way the militarization of the Rhineland was not based on any aggressive intention, either for the moment or for the future. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In the next few years, in 1935, Germany’s military sovereignty was reintroduced, and a year later, the demilitarized Rhineland zone was remilitarized. I should like to read you one sentence from the affidavit of the former minister and interpreter Paul Schmidt of the Foreign Office. He says the following with regard to the events in the spring of 1935: “The conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance between France and Russia on 2 May 1935 followed the proclamation of the establishment of a German Air Force and the introduction of general compulsory military service in March 1935.” Will you please give us a brief review of the historical development of these matters which led to the reintroduction of military sovereignty in 1935 and to the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936? KÖPKE: I believe... THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, we have had the historical development of these matters over and over again. Surely we do not want it from this witness. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Only very briefly, only the dates, in proper order, Mr. President; no explanations about it. I should only like to emphasize strongly once more how the individual events are connected with each other. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have the dates in their minds. We really have had these dates in our minds for some months. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well. If the Court believes that it does not need to be informed about it, I must, of course, dispense with it. Then I come to a last... THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can put any question you really want to put about it, but you said, “Will you give us the historical developments from the 2d of May 1935?” We have heard that over and over again. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, Mr. President. I was interested only in the following: From this affidavit of Herr Schmidt which I have just quoted, one could directly follow... THE PRESIDENT: Ask the question, whatever you want to ask about this affidavit. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then I shall formulate the question as follows: [_Turning to the witness._] I have just read this sentence by Herr Schmidt, and I have also told you what can be read from it; namely, that the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Pact of 2 May 1935 was the result of the restoration of military sovereignty. Is that true or what was the case? KÖPKE: That question is difficult to answer if one merely considers these two events in chronological order. The conclusion of the Franco-Russian Pact was on 2 May 1935; the restoration of military sovereignty was already in March 1935. However, the negotiations for this treaty of assistance go back much farther, and I should like to recall the fact that the critical stage, into which these negotiations had entered before the restoration of military sovereignty, is shown very clearly in the report of the French Military Committee’s reporter in which the latter speaks quite openly of a close entente between the two nations. That was on 23 November 1934. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I come to another question and should like to ask you whether you know the opinions and attitude of Von Neurath concerning the Austrian question, at least during your time? KÖPKE: I have known Herr Von Neurath’s attitude toward the Austrian question for a much longer time than the period when we worked together during his term as Minister, for as a southern German he was always particularly interested in the problem and I recall many conversations which I had with him even when I was still a vice consul. His attitude and intentions had always been to make the relations between Germany and Austria closer in the economic sphere, chiefly in the interests of Austria, and politically to guarantee a similar policy by treaties, but otherwise not to encroach on Austria’s independence; that is what we in the Foreign Office had already learned several years before he became Minister, from our experience with the customs union, which at that time was actually intended only in an economic sense. The fact that this attempt was quite generally considered as a political union gave pause for thought and should have warned everyone who had resolved to touch this hot iron again. Therefore, Neurath, during his period of office, whenever he discussed the problem with me and worked on it, thought along just these lines. I should like to add here that the critical time on the Austrian question was probably after I left office. Moreover, even Hitler originally shared Neurath’s moderate conception, as was shown in his conversation with Mussolini in Venice in the summer of 1934. Especially interesting, however, are the remarks which Hitler made on the Anschluss problem to Sir John Simon during the negotiations in Berlin in March 1935. At that time Hitler expressed himself to the English statesman about that as follows: If the people in London knew Austria as well as he did, they would believe his assurance that he could not want to increase our economic troubles by adding another field of economic difficulties. Germany did not want to interfere in this country at all. He was perfectly aware that any interference in Austrian affairs, even if it meant carrying out the wish of the Austrian people themselves for an Anschluss, could not be legalized. That was Hitler’s opinion at that time. Neurath also rejected all interference in Austrian internal affairs and strongly condemned the attempts which could be noticed in Party circles to give direct support to the Austrian National Socialists. During my time Neurath did everything he could to keep the Foreign Office out of the internal political struggle in Austria. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Still one more question. Up to the time of your resignation at the beginning of 1936, was there ever any talk in the Foreign Office of attacking Czechoslovakia or not observing existent treaties with Czechoslovakia? KÖPKE: Never, neither the one nor the other. Our economic and political relations with Czechoslovakia were, as long as I was in office, very good. We had no occasion whatsoever to change them, not even the slightest. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And now my last question. Can you tell us anything about Herr Von Neurath’s attitude toward the race question? KÖPKE: On this question Neurath was completely opposed to the Party attitude. In this connection I should like to recall an experience which Neurath told me personally. When the Jewish legislation was about to be proclaimed the Reich Minister of Justice Gürtner came to him in great excitement and told Von Neurath that he, Gürtner, had warned Hitler in vain against proclaiming these quite impossible laws. He strongly urged Herr Von Neurath as Foreign Minister to point out the enormous dangers which this madness could set loose abroad. Neurath told me that he did this immediately, but that all his efforts had been in vain. Neurath’s personal attitude on the Jewish problem was thoroughly conciliatory and reasonable, in keeping with his generally kind personality and his religious attitude. Among many examples I should like to refer here to only one, which is the following: During the time when we were in London together, the Jewish doctor at the Embassy was also one of the closest friends of the Neurath family. When he had to leave London during the World War and was homeless and without employment, Neurath immediately took active steps to help his old friend. As Reich Foreign Minister also, Von Neurath always helped non-Aryan colleagues, although that brought him often under attack from the Party circles and was not always easy. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to the witness. THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any question? [_There was no response._] Do the Prosecution wish to ask any questions? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Tribunal will, of course, not consider that the Prosecution are accepting every statement of the witness; but I do not think that it would be a useful appropriation of time to cross-examine him. Therefore, I shall ask no questions. THE PRESIDENT: One moment, Sir David. Sir David, would it be convenient to you and to the members of the defendants’ counsel to discuss the questions of supplementary applications for witnesses and documents at 2 o’clock? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord, it would be very convenient to me. I do not think there are many serious matters about which there will be serious dispute. THE PRESIDENT: No, I thought there were not. Very well, we will do that then. The witness can retire. Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, call your next witness and then we can have him sworn before the adjournment. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: May I ask that Dr. Dieckhoff be allowed to follow Dr. Köpke? [_The witness Dieckhoff took the stand._] THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name please? HANS HEINRICH DIECKHOFF (Witness): Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff. THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing. [_The witness repeated the oath._] THE PRESIDENT: Now the Tribunal will adjourn. [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] _Afternoon Session_ SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, My Lord, the first application is on behalf of the Defendant Von Neurath with regard to M. François-Poncet. That has been dealt with; that is covered. Then, My Lord, the next is an application from Dr. Marx on behalf of the Defendant Streicher to put in an affidavit by the publisher, Herr Gassner of _Der Stürmer_. My Lord, the publisher is intended to deal with the question of the rise and the circulation of Der Stürmer during the years 1933 to 1935. The Prosecution have already submitted to the Tribunal that they did not think that that was relevant when an application was made to call Herr Gassner as a witness. The Prosecution still take the same position. My Lord, it is for an affidavit, and we leave to the Tribunal as to whether they would like the affidavit, but the Prosecution fail to see the relevance of that evidence. THE PRESIDENT: Would Dr. Marx like to say something about that now? DR. HANNS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): Mr. President, I have just discussed this matter with Defendant Streicher; and he tells me that the witness, Herr Gassner, whom I have proposed to call and from whom an affidavit had been proposed, would only be in a position to speak about the publication figures of Der Stürmer from the year 1941 onwards. That, of course, is of no interest whatever to the defense. I shall, therefore, forego the affidavit and rely on what the witness Hiemer has said in that respect. Therefore, it will not be necessary at all to procure the affidavit. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next application is by Dr. Kranzbühler on behalf of the Defendant Dönitz for further consideration and admission of the affidavit of the former fleet judge, Jäckel, by reason of the course of the cross-examination. My Lord, I think the most convenient course would be if the Prosecution do not object to the application at this time but reserve the right, when Dr. Kranzbühler makes the use that he desires of the affidavit, to consider whether we shall then object. THE PRESIDENT: This is really evidence in rebuttal, is it? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, in rebuttal of the points raised in the cross-examination. It is very difficult to decide whether one should make a final objection until one knows what use Dr. Kranzbühler is going to make of it. I suggest that we do not object at this stage. THE PRESIDENT: Well, these applications and the Tribunal’s orders granting the witnesses are always subject to that provision. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, then the Prosecution makes no further objection. My Lord, then there are two applications on behalf of the Defendant Von Neurath, a request for minutes from the interrogatory of the... THE PRESIDENT: They have both been withdrawn, have they not? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, they have? I was not certain. My Lord, then Dr. Thoma makes application on behalf of the Defendant Rosenberg for three matters: The exchange of letters between Dr. Ley and the defendant; the entry of Dr. Strauber 27 May 1944; and third, a note of the Ministerialrat, Dr. Beil. My Lord, the Prosecution feel that these documents are cumulative, and they leave it to the Tribunal with that suggestion—that the case is already well covered. I do not know if Dr. Thoma wishes to say anything further. DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I should like to refer to it quite briefly, as apparently there is an error in the matter of Dr. Beil. It is a question here of the interrogatory. I have sent to Beil an interrogatory which has not yet been returned. Otherwise, there is nothing that I know about this matter; but I have made an application which has not been mentioned yet. I applied for some of Rosenberg’s writings, _Tradition und Gegenwart_, new speeches and translations, to be included in the document book, for these deal with questions which were discussed on the occasion of Gau educational meetings and discussions and which also deal with such questions as the peaceful living together of the nations of Europe, religious tolerance, his advocacy of an ideal humanity, and similar writings. I request that these articles be admitted. Apart from that, I have no further applications to make; and for the rest I leave the decision, of course, to the Tribunal. THE PRESIDENT: If I understand what you said aright, Dr. Thoma, you were not referring to any of the applications which are before us. The applications which are before us are an exchange of letters between Dr. Ley and the defendant in the autumn of 1944; another is an entry which Dr. Strauber made; and the third is a note of Dr. Beil; you have not referred to them, have you? DR. THOMA: Yes, that is right. I have to confess that these applications are completely new to me. These applications must have been made by Rosenberg on his own initiative, because I cannot find any trace of them. Or perhaps an error was made in the memorandum to the Tribunal. I do not know the applications. THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma, the copies of the applications are before us, and they appear to be signed both by the Defendant Rosenberg and by yourself. DR. THOMA: In that case, this must have happened months ago. I cannot remember; this is from 3 June. THE PRESIDENT: At any rate, you do not want them? DR. THOMA: Application Number 3 is settled. I have re-read the applications just now, and I do remember them. I ask you to make a decision favorable to the defendant. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next applications are for a number of documents on behalf of the Defendant Von Papen, and the Prosecution have no objection to this. THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, a good many of them—certainly Numbers 3, 5, and 13—have either been admitted or rejected, I think. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is so, My Lord. I had a note opposite 13. I really think they have been dealt with, My Lord; they are in the books, and I do not think any further discussion is required. THE PRESIDENT: Are they all in the book? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think so, My Lord. I do not know if—Dr. Kubuschok says he agrees with me. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, the next is an application on behalf of the Defendant Bormann, a request for a decree of Hitler’s and a decree issued by Bormann in 1944. My Lord, the Prosecution have no objection to these. THE PRESIDENT: I do not quite understand the meaning of the last one. Can you tell me what it means? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I took it myself that it was “to” the SD, instead of “of” the SD—the appertaining of members of the head office of the National Socialist Party of the SD. I am afraid that that guess on my part does not meet with approval. DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann): My Lord, this concerns a decree from Bormann in which he prohibits members of the Party Chancellery belonging to the SD. It is a decree of Bormann’s applying to the Party Chancellery. THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the remaining applications are on behalf of the Defendant Göring, the admission of an affidavit by Baron von Gersdorff, and a book by Joseph Chapski. My Lord, my Soviet colleague has dealt with that by submission in writing, dated 20 June. I did not propose to say anything further about that, My Lord. Colonel Pokrovsky is here if Your Lordship would like to hear him further. THE PRESIDENT: I thought we had already made an order with reference to this. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Lordship has. THE PRESIDENT: We made the order on 9 June, apparently, that for the Defendant Göring three witnesses could be produced either personally... Perhaps we had better hear from Dr. Stahmer about this. DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Mr. President, that is the way I understood the decision of the Tribunal. I had applied for five witnesses. The Tribunal ordered that I could produce only three out of the five witnesses. THE PRESIDENT: That is right. DR. STAHMER: Then with reference to the affidavit nothing was said, as far as I can remember, in that particular decision, so that I had assumed that I would be free to ask for admission of affidavits insofar as the Tribunal considers them necessary. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, after the Tribunal had made that order about limiting the number of witnesses to three, did you not receive a communication, to which you have replied, I think, suggesting that possibly you might be able to dispense with actual oral witnesses and do that whole part of the case by affidavits? DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President, I received that communication; and I have already negotiated about the matter with the Russian Prosecution. We did not quite reach an agreement, however; and therefore I made a written application to the Tribunal a few days ago. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but was not the agreement which you were trying to arrive at an agreement that only three affidavits should be produced on either side? Or was it more than three? DR. STAHMER: No. The question which remains and which we have not agreed upon is whether I will be given the opportunity to read a few of the affidavits here. THE PRESIDENT: I see. Dr. Stahmer, I think the position is, then, that unless you are able to arrive at an agreement with the Soviet Prosecution, we shall have to abide by our previous order. DR. STAHMER: Very well. THE PRESIDENT: You will make further efforts to achieve an agreement with the Soviet Prosecution and let the Tribunal know. DR. STAHMER: I will. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wonder if your Lordship will grant me the indulgence of mentioning three exhibits. They all refer to the diary of Admiral Assmann, My Lord, which was introduced during the cases of the Defendants Dönitz and Raeder. There are three exhibits concerned. The first is Document D-879. We thought that would be more complete if a connecting page was put in to make the continuity of the exhibit. For that purpose, My Lord, the Prosecution asks that Exhibit GB-482 be withdrawn and that there be submitted the two pages which were originally in it with a connecting page. That is merely adding a connecting page, My Lord. The second is Document D-881... THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to that on the part of the Defense? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not think so, My Lord; I have not heard of any. THE PRESIDENT: What do the documents relate to, did you say? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The diary of Admiral Assmann, who was on the staff of the Defendant Raeder. THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is only a question of putting the exhibit in proper form. The second document, My Lord, is D-881, which is another passage from the same diary, on 23 February 1940. I promised Your Lordship that I should put in an exhibit when I dealt with the diary in cross-examination; and, My Lord, the exhibit has been prepared, and I want to put it in under the Number GB-475. That is, Document D-881 will become Exhibit GB-475. The third, which is in the same position as the second, is Document D-892. That exhibit has now been prepared and will become Exhibit GB-476. Copies are available for the defendants and will be given to them after the approval of the Court is given. THE PRESIDENT: And copies, of course, will be supplied to the Court as well? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, My Lord. They are just awaiting the formal approval of the Court, and they will be submitted. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David, that is all right. Then, Sir David, we will consider the other matter. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please. THE PRESIDENT; Very well. Yes, Dr. Thoma. DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I just wanted to use this opportunity to submit to the Tribunal the affidavit of Robert Scholz, the Chief of Special Staff Rosenberg. It has been translated into English and French, and I should now like to submit it under Exhibit Number 41 to the Tribunal. I have already shown it to Mr. Dodd, and he has not objected. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Mr. President, I wanted to ascertain whether and up to what date after this session we may submit affidavits and documents. The reason is that during recent days I have received two affidavits and a document, the relevance of which we have not yet definitely decided upon. THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal would like to know when the Counsel for the Prosecution and Counsel for the Defense think would be the best time to deal with these matters which are outstanding and with any evidence which either the Defense or the Prosecution may wish to bring in rebuttal. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I have not had the chance of discussing it with any of the Counsel for the Defense; but I should have thought at the end of the evidence. One might reasonably hope that the evidence will finish this week. It might be possible to deal with it on Saturday morning or on Monday, and suit the Counsel for the Defense, and, of course, as the Tribunal decides. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Tribunal, I think, will expect the Defense Counsel and the Prosecution to be ready, directly when the end of the evidence comes, to deal with all these additional questions which are outstanding and also with any applications that they may have with reference to rebuttal. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, yes. THE PRESIDENT: I wanted that to be clearly understood, that it will be expected that it is to be done immediately the evidence closes. That, I think, answers Dr. Kraus’ point about the affidavits and documents. That would be the most appropriate time. Sir David, have you got any ideas as to how long that would take? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I think a very short time. I should have thought that 2 days or thereabouts would see it through. I have discussed it with Mr. Dodd, and that was the view we took. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. In about 2 days at the outside? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At the outside, My Lord, yes. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please. [_The witness Dieckhoff resumed the stand._] DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, since what date do you know Herr Von Neurath? DIECKHOFF: Since 1913; I met him when I joined the Foreign Office. He was legation counsellor in the Foreign Office at that time. I then met him again in Constantinople, and there I had contact with him. Then I did not meet him again until 1930. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In what capacity did you have dealings with Herr Von Neurath beginning with 1930? DIECKHOFF: Herr Von Neurath was then, from 1930 till 1932, Ambassador to London; and I was head of the Department “England-America” in the Foreign Office. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How was the co-operation during that time between the Foreign Office—that is, yourself—and Herr Von Neurath, who was then Ambassador to London? DIECKHOFF: The co-operation was excellent. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Herr Von Neurath’s appointment to the position of Reich Foreign Minister? DIECKHOFF: I remember that most of the leading officials of the Foreign Office were greatly upset by the sudden departure of Brüning, whose steady and moderate policy we approved at the time. We submitted to the change in the person of the Foreign Minister only because Neurath replaced Brüning and we knew that Herr Von Neurath was a man of high standards and an experienced diplomat. Furthermore, we knew that he had represented Brüning’s policy in London; and we expected that as Foreign Minister he would continue Brüning’s policy. I welcomed Herr Von Neurath, I think it was on 2 June, at the station in Berlin when he arrived in Germany. From conversations with him I gathered the impression that he very much disliked to leave London and to take over the Foreign Ministry. But he said to me, “I do not think I shall be able to refuse the wish of the old gentleman.” That, of course, was Reich President Von Hindenburg. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What position did you hold yourself during the time when you worked under Herr Von Neurath in the Foreign Ministry? DIECKHOFF: At first, I remained at the head of the England-America Department until 1936. Afterward, in April 1936, I took over the re-established political department. In June State Secretary Von Bülow died, and in August 1936 I was appointed acting State Secretary in the Foreign Office. I remained in that provisional position until March 1937, and then I became Ambassador to Washington. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath, as Foreign Minister, retain the old officials of the Foreign Office? DIECKHOFF: He retained the old officials in practically all the leading positions of both the domestic and the foreign service. The State Secretary Von Bülow for instance remained for 4 years, until his death, in the same position in the Foreign Office. He sent Ambassador Von Hoesch to London as his successor, and he sent Ambassador Von Hassell to Rome, and Ambassador Köster to Paris—all of these were old diplomatic officials. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Can you tell us from your own experience during your activities what the aims of Neurath’s foreign policy were? DIECKHOFF: It was the aim of Herr Von Neurath to maintain good relations with all states and thereby to re-establish gradually Germany’s status of equal rights which we had lost in 1919. This was the same policy that had been pursued by Stresemann and Brüning. Herr Von Neurath was aware of the difficulties of Germany’s position. He talked to me about it repeatedly. He was under no misapprehension about it. He saw things realistically. His tendency was to exercise moderation. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about Herr Von Neurath’s entry into Hitler’s Government, which was formed on 30 January 1933? DIECKHOFF: I know about this only what I was told by State Secretary Von Bülow when I returned to Berlin from leave at the beginning of February 1933. According to this, Herr Von Neurath had no part in the formation of the new Cabinet, that is, Hitler’s Cabinet. Apart from that, he was sick during that time. He heard of the plan of making Hitler Reich Chancellor and of forming a new government. He wanted to discuss it with Reich President Von Hindenburg in order to obtain certain reservations for himself; but he came too late and could not obtain these reservations. In spite of this, he retained the Foreign Ministry in the new Cabinet because he did not want to refuse the wish of the Reich President. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Herr Von Neurath’s attitude toward the National Socialist domestic policy? DIECKHOFF: I know that Herr Von Neurath, soon after 30 January 1933 viewed the domestic policy with some anxiety, chiefly because he felt that it strongly affected our foreign policy. When, in June 1933, I visited him in London, where he attended a conference as head of the German delegation, he told me about his anxieties; but he thought that these things would die down and that developments would be similar to those in Fascist Italy, where things had been very wild in the beginning, but had settled down afterward. He was hoping that the same would happen in Germany. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I am coming now to the year 1936. One of the principal questions which dominated that year was the Austrian problem. Can you tell us what Herr Von Neurath’s attitude was toward the repeated interferences of German circles in the internal affairs of Austria? DIECKHOFF: Yes. Herr Von Neurath considered such German interference in the internal affairs of Austria not only inadmissible but damaging. He told me so repeatedly. He was striving for an improvement of the economic relations with Austria and thereby trying to improve gradually the political relations also. He wanted to leave the sovereignty of Austria untouched. This was also the aim of the agreement of 11 July 1936 between Germany and Austria, that is, the economic strengthening of Austria and thereby the re-establishment of good political relations between the two countries. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you hear anything before March of 1938 that Hitler had the intention to incorporate Austria into Germany, if necessary, with force? DIECKHOFF: No. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you ever hear anything before 1938 that Hitler had intended to solve the Sudeten problem by force or even to attack Czechoslovakia? DIECKHOFF: No. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether Hitler was in full agreement until November 1937 with the peaceful policy which Herr Von Neurath pursued with regard to both Austria and Czechoslovakia and also with regard to the other European countries? DIECKHOFF: Until Herr Von Neurath’s resignation in February 1938, I always presumed that Hitler agreed with the peaceful policy pursued by Herr Von Neurath; and I never heard or learned anything to the contrary. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know what the thoughts, the considerations of Herr Von Neurath in 1935 were regarding the question of rearmament, that is to say, the re-establishment of Germany’s military sovereignty? DIECKHOFF: I know that Herr Von Neurath held the view that Germany, by the declaration of the Western Powers on 11 December 1932, had been granted equality of rights; and he considered her to have the indisputable right to rearm after all disarmament efforts had failed. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to put the same question to you, with regard to the considerations and attitude of Herr Von Neurath, with reference to the remilitarization of the demilitarized Rhineland. DIECKHOFF: I know that Herr Von Neurath was aware of the seriousness of this problem, for he knew that the problem of the remilitarization of the Rhineland was interconnected with the Locarno Pact; but I know that he saw a breach of the Locarno Pact in the Franco-Russian Agreement of Mutual Assistance concluded in May 1935 and that as a result of the ratification of this pact, or its going into effect, he firmly believed that Germany had the right to re-establish military sovereignty in the Rhineland. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the general political situation in those days? Taking it into consideration, was it not justified to assume that sooner or later a peaceful solution of this Rhineland problem would be arrived at in any case? DIECKHOFF: At any rate, the actual development after 7 March 1936 showed that the Western Powers, though they did not agree to the remilitarization of the Rhineland, nevertheless very quickly acquiesced in the _fait accompli_. I was at that time, during the second half of March 1936, for 2 weeks in London on behalf of the Reich Government; and I had the opportunity to discuss this matter with many Englishmen; and the view I found in the widest circles was that as Germany had been granted equality of rights one could not deny her the right to remilitarize the Rhineland. In some circles I even found the view that it was a relief that the remilitarization of the Rhineland, which was due sooner or later in any case, was carried out so quickly and comparatively painlessly. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And now one last question. What do you know about Herr Von Neurath’s resignation from the position of Reich Foreign Minister in February 1938? DIECKHOFF: I was Ambassador to Washington at that time and I was completely surprised by Foreign Minister Von Neurath’s sudden departure. I did know that there were many things he did not agree with and that he had asked several times to be allowed to resign. I also knew that he was ill; he suffered from a neurotic heart. I also knew that he had passed his sixty-fifth birthday, which gave him the right to retire. But I was surprised all the same, particularly as I did not know the details at that time. I regretted the resignation of the Foreign Minister, in whose peace policy I had confidence, very much. I remember that the official circles in Washington also regretted the departure of Herr Von Neurath very much, for Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles approached me a few days after this event and told me that the American Government regretted the departure of this man who had pursued a moderate policy. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions to this witness. THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask him any questions? DR. KUBUSCHOK: One single question, Witness. You said that if Von Neurath assumed the office of Foreign Minister, you had expected that he would continue Stresemann’s and Brüning’s policy. According to your knowledge did he actually continue this policy of Brüning’s after he became Foreign Minister? DIECKHOFF: Yes. DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, on the same basis I intimated with regard to the last witness, the Prosecution do not desire to take up time by asking any questions. THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I then have your permission to call my third and last witness, Dr. Völkers, into the witness stand. [_The witness Völkers took the stand._] THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please? HANS HERMANN VÖLKERS (Witness): Hans Hermann Völkers. THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing. [_The witness repeated the oath._] THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, you were twice the personal adviser to Herr Von Neurath; first in his position as Foreign Minister and later in his position as Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia; is that correct? VÖLKERS: Yes; since 1920 I was a member of the Foreign Office, and I spent all my time abroad. Under Stresemann I spent 4 years in Geneva as Consul General and as the permanent German representative to the League of Nations; and in 1932 I was called to the Foreign Office and became personal adviser to the newly, appointed Foreign Minister, Herr Von Neurath. I remained in that position for a year; and then, upon my own request, I was sent to Madrid as Embassy Counsellor, and later I became Minister to Havana. In 1939 I was called back to the Foreign Office to act as personal adviser with the title of chief of the office of Herr Von Neurath, who in the meantime had been appointed Reich Protector in Prague. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did this appointment as personal adviser to Herr Von Neurath in Prague take place on the basis of any personal relations or merely for professional reasons? VÖLKERS: Only for professional reasons. Until I was his attaché in Berlin I did not know Herr Von Neurath. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the attitude of the officials of the Foreign Ministry toward Herr Von Neurath’s appointment as Foreign Minister? VÖLKERS: I had the impression that the officials of the Foreign Office were generally most satisfied that in view of the difficult internal political situation an old professional diplomat and expert minister took over the direction of the Foreign Ministry, because they saw in that a guarantee for a steady foreign political course; all the more so as it was known that Herr Von Neurath had the special confidence of Reich President Von Hindenburg and because he enjoyed, due to his entire personality and his equanimity, the special recognition and veneration of all the officials of the Foreign Office. When Hitler came to power I had the impression that he was skeptical and reserved toward him. He did not belong to the circle of the closer associates of Hitler, and during the time I was with him he never attended these evening conferences which Hitler held in the Reich Chancellery in those days. Gradually, however, the pressure on the Foreign Office increased more and more. The Auslands-Organisation was created and the office of Ribbentrop started a competitive enterprise into which were called all sorts of people who had been abroad. They made all sorts of reports which went directly to the Führer without being controlled by the Foreign Office. And then later on the head of the Auslands-Organisation was installed as commissioner in the Foreign Office while Prince Waldeck was transferred into the personnel department of the Foreign Office. At that stage the pressure became so strong that finally one could not fight against it any more. But the fact that the Foreign Office had isolated itself for so long and that it was still evading the pressure of the Party, that, I think, is certainly the merit of the then Foreign Minister and his State Secretary Von Bülow. When the Jewish laws were then introduced into the Foreign Office, too, I know that Herr Von Neurath protected, as far as that was possible, his officials. I was in Stockholm during the last 2 years of the war and met there two former colleagues of mine with whom I am close friends. One is Ministerial Director Richard Meier who used to be in charge of the Eastern department and who had to leave quite soon and who often told me in Stockholm how grateful he was to Herr Von Neurath for not only having enabled him to take with him his family and his furniture and everything when he went abroad but also that Herr Von Neurath, until the collapse, continued to pay him his monthly pensions in Swedish kroner. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was your position and your activity in Prague in the Government of the Protectorate? VÖLKERS: My position in Prague with the Government of the Protectorate was approximately the same as the one I had 7 years earlier when I had been personal adviser to the Foreign Minister in the Foreign Office in Berlin, with the exception that in the Foreign Office there is a special protocol department and a chief of protocol, whereas in Prague I was also in charge of all protocols and ceremonial affairs, and that was really my chief occupation. I was head of the so-called Office of the Reich Protector, not to be confused with the principal authority, with which I had nothing to do. When I came to Prague in the summer of 1939 the office already had been functioning for several months. My predecessor was one Legation Counsellor Von Kessel from the Foreign Office. Apart from myself two other officials from the Foreign Office, who were subordinated to me, belonged to the Office of the Reich Protector, also one Count Waldburg, whose mother was a Czech and who was engaged by the Reich Protector because he was hoping to establish, especially through him, good relations with the Czechs. The office was responsible, apart from the general and usual routine matters, for dealing with the private correspondence and the handling of personal petitions. In the course of time we had to set up a special department, because later on, when the many arrests took place, we received so many petitions, most of which were addressed to the Reich Protector personally... THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, surely this is very remote from anything we have got to consider, and all the previous evidence this witness has given has been cumulative evidence which has not been cross-examined upon before; and now what he is saying is all very remote to anything we have to consider. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In fact, I have already come to an end, Mr. President. I merely wanted to show that he is in a position to answer the following questions from his own knowledge. [_Turning to the witness._] What can you tell us from your own observations and experiences about the attitude of Herr Von Neurath toward the Czechs? VÖLKERS: I can give you only general impressions. As I have already told you, I had nothing to do with the actual activities of the office but was attached to Herr Von Neurath personally only for his private affairs and all ceremonial matters. But I do know, and he told me, that when he took over his position as Reich Protector, he did so with the intention of treating the Czech population as justly and decently as possible in order to create, by smoothing out the differences, a healthy basis for a peaceful living, side by side, of the two nations. He told me frequently that he was appointed Reich Protector, that is, protector of the Czechs; and we knew that the last German Ambassador in Prague, Dr. Eisenlohr, had often reported that the last Czechoslovakian Government, for their part, had been prepared to effect an Anschluss with Germany. He was an opponent of using military measures, and Herr Von Neurath told me when I came to Prague—I think it was in September 1938—that he had expressed himself very strongly against their use and that he together with Göring had visited Hitler in Munich in order to dissuade him from that. In my office I experienced again and again that Herr Von Neurath—shall I go on—was very open-handed toward the Czechs with regard to petitions. He had a lot of sympathy and understanding; he examined each individual case, and that was very well known among the Czechs. And as we in this office had the possibility of submitting each single request and petition of Czech individuals directly to the highest chief, the Czech petitioners very frequently and gladly used this channel because the prospects for a positive action on their private requests and petitions through the highest local chief promised to be much more favorable than if they were quickly processed by the authorities concerned in the Government. Particularly this practice brought us in conflict with the State Secretary... THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, this witness is simply making speeches, you know. You are not asking him any questions at all. He is simply going on... DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, what do you know about the personal and official relationship between Von Neurath and the President of State Hacha? VÖLKERS: According to my observations, the personal and official relationship between the Reich Protector and the President of State Hacha was excellent; and I believe that this was not merely a matter of form, but I had the impression that Herr Von Neurath really and sincerely liked the President of State because he considered him a very decent and upright man who, under the existing circumstances... THE PRESIDENT: Witness, when you see your counsel has heard enough of your answer, surely you can stop... VÖLKERS: Very well. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the relationship between Herr Von Neurath and the State Secretary attached to him, Frank? VÖLKERS: That was a very bad one. Herr Von Neurath told me already at the time when I assumed my office that he had had considerable difficulties with him because of his definite anti-Czech attitude, as a Sudeten German—an attitude which a Reich German could not easily understand. He had always hoped, however, that Frank, who was not a civil servant but an outsider, would gradually follow his policy and adapt himself to the civil service staff. But unfortunately this was not possible. I do not know when... DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, can you describe to us briefly what the actual official powers of Herr Von Neurath and Frank were in relation to each other? VÖLKERS: Herr Von Neurath was the superior of the State Secretary. The State Secretary was in charge of the entire internal administration, which was a very large one. Under State Secretary Von Burgsdorff, who I think has been examined already before this High Tribunal, worked under him. Besides being State Secretary, Frank was also the Higher Police and SS Leader. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, did Herr Von Neurath have a certain influence on this part of Frank’s activities, that is to say, in his capacity as Higher SS and Police Leader? VÖLKERS: The way conditions were he had practically no influence. I do not know whether in the beginning the matter had already been legally settled. In practice, however, the Police and the State Secretary were completely independent from Herr Von Neurath regarding police measures. This had some connection with the situation in the Reich, where Himmler, too, led the entire Police and SS, having taken the police powers away from the Ministry of the Interior. As far as I can remember, the matter was legally settled in the autumn of 1939 to the effect that the Police was independent and that Herr Von Neurath was to be informed afterward of all measures taken. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You mean by that the decree regarding the organization of the administration and the German Security Police in the Protectorate, under date of 1 September 1939? VÖLKERS: Yes, I think that is the one. The first part referred to the administration and the second part to the Police. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I remind you that the wording of this decree is contained in my document book under Number Neurath-149. THE PRESIDENT: It has been submitted as evidence? DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I merely wanted to remind you that I have presented it. [_Turning to the witness._] Was Herr Von Neurath at least informed afterward, in accordance with the instructions, of the police actions which Frank carried out independently? VÖLKERS: The Chief of the Police was an SS man by the name of Böhme. He used to report to the Reich Protector several times each week. I do not believe that he informed him in advance of intended police actions. We never heard anything like that. Whether he reported such actions afterward and in their entirety is something which I cannot say. The rule was that the Reich Protector sent to him, for comment, the various petitions from the next of kin of Czechs who had been arrested and that Böhme would bring them along when he came to report. That was generally the way the Reich Protector was afterward informed. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Well then, when Herr Von Neurath was later on informed of such police measures, no matter in which way, did he make attempts for the suspension of arrests or for any limitation and mitigation of such police measures? VÖLKERS: As I have already told you, we had set up in the small office of the Reich Protector a special department for the purpose of receiving such applications. This department, which of course was directly under the jurisdiction of the Reich Protector, did everything possible in order to reassure the next of kin and to bring about the releases of the detained persons. The work was particularly difficult because these local departments, the local police chief and also State Secretary Frank, usually took a negative attitude. Again and again the Reich Protector would then appeal directly to Himmler and very often to the Führer himself. I know and remember that there was a very excited correspondence with Himmler and that Herr Von Neurath repeatedly complained to the Führer about this. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, can you judge, or can you tell us how far Herr Von Neurath, as Reich Protector, apart from the Police and police measures, was free and independent in his political and economic measures and orders, or how far he was depending on Berlin when giving those? VÖLKERS: When I came to Prague there were all sorts of other offices beside that of the Reich Protector. For instance, there was a Reich Commissioner for Economy who, as far as I can remember and as I heard at the time, had already begun to exercise his functions when the Office of the Reich Protector had not yet been established. Then there was a Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan and there was the Armed Forces Plenipotentiary who had a large staff. Even the Party agencies were not centrally organized. Prague and the north belonged to the Sudetengau under Gauleiter Henlein; the whole of Moravia belonged to the Niederdonau Gau, under Gauleiter Dr. Jury; and the west belonged to a third Gau. All these Gauleiter tried, in turn, on their part... THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, this is all detail, is it not, and quite unnecessary detail? DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Von Neurath’s attitude toward numerous plans of germanizing the Czechs? VÖLKERS: No, I know nothing about that. I remember only that, right at the beginning of the war, Herr Von Neurath told me that the whole structure of the Protectorate was regarded by him as a temporary solution and that the peace would have to decide the ultimate fate of Czechoslovakia. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Well, then, as you probably remember, in the autumn of 1939 there were the first demonstrations in Prague on the occasion of the Independence Day of Czechoslovakia, on 28 October 1939. VÖLKERS: Well, I cannot remember the details. There were demonstrations on a Czech national holiday in October. As far as I can remember, they took place on the Wenzel Platz, and the Národni-ulice. I, personally, did... DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about the consequences of new demonstrations particularly on the part of the students at Prague when a wounded student died and was buried on 15 November? What do you know about these demonstrations and what happened immediately in the wake of these demonstrations? VÖLKERS: Previous to the second demonstration, as far as I remember, the instruction was given to exercise restraint. The demonstrations were generally, as I was told later, not particularly alarming. In spite of this, Frank had reported to Berlin about it. At any rate, the Reich Protector and Frank and General Friderici were called to Berlin for a conference with Hitler in the Reich Chancellery. I accompanied the Reich Protector at the time. Chvalkovsky, the Czech Minister in Berlin, was also invited. I was present when Hitler, in a very excited and rude manner, reproached the Minister because of the events, for which he was holding the Czech Government responsible. Whether the closing of universities was discussed on that occasion, I cannot remember, nor can I remember having heard him threaten the shooting or arrest of students. The manner in which Hitler treated the Minister was most embarrassing to us. The Minister then left the room without saying a single further word. As far as I can remember, the subject was then mentioned no further. We had lunch, and when saying goodby, Hitler said to Frank that he wanted to talk with him some more. Herr Von Neurath was not asked to stay and I remember that while walking home with him he was very angry about it. On the following day, I traveled back with Herr Von Neurath while Frank had already left the same night for Prague. I remember that when I came into the office in Prague, I saw a red poster declaring that because of the demonstrations, the shooting of the leaders and the arrest of students and the closing of universities had been ordered; that poster carried Neurath’s signature. As I did not know what had happened in Prague in the meantime, I was utterly surprised, because I had heard nothing about these measures in Berlin; and I suspected an intrigue on Frank’s part and went to report the matter to Neurath. I had the impression that Herr Von Neurath was deeply upset and just as unpleasantly surprised as I was and that he had known nothing at all about this previously. Soon afterward Frank passed through my room going into Neurath’s room, carrying that red poster under his arm. I do not know whether Von Neurath had sent for him or whether he came on his own initiative. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath afterwards, at least after this unfortunate matter had occurred, use his influence for the release of these students who had been arrested? VÖLKERS: Yes. He immediately used his influence, but he did not even succeed in getting hold of the list of names of the arrested students. Only after urging the Czechs for a long time did we receive from the Czech Government an incomplete list of names. In spite of this, Herr Von Neurath immediately worked for their release; and he did, in fact, have excellent results in that connection as time went by. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about what was done to accommodate or employ those students who, on account of these demonstrations and the subsequent closing of the universities, had more or less become idle? VÖLKERS: No, I know nothing about that, and I had nothing to do with that matter. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But do you know whether Herr Von Neurath repeatedly urged Hitler to reopen the universities? VÖLKERS: Yes, I remember that the chancellor, named Rosny, of the Czech University, whom I knew well, had asked me once for that and I reported it to Herr Von Neurath and Herr Von Neurath again made efforts at the time; but as far as I know, as long as we were in Prague the universities were not reopened. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you remember a Czech Fascist organization, Vlayka? I do not know whether I pronounce the name correctly. VÖLKERS: Yes, I do, but I know very little about it. I only know that we received in the office a number of pledges of loyalty sent to us by members of the movement, and I also know that we had been informed by Czech sources that these people were partly criminal and generally not worth much. Herr Von Neurath adopted quite generally the view that this was an internal affair of the Czechs and that, after all, these were people who wanted to work together with us. But he, on his part, refused any collaboration; and such letters and pledges were never answered, I believe, by our office. But I know... DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath was also, besides being Reich Protector, president of the Secret Cabinet Council. Did you, since you partly handled his correspondence of a more personal nature, notice anything indicating that Herr Von Neurath became active in this capacity as president of the Secret Cabinet Council? VÖLKERS: No. As long as I was in Prague, Herr Von Neurath was never active. On the contrary, on one occasion he told me that Hitler, when he appointed him, had told him that he should not think that he would ever call a meeting of the Cabinet Council. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath was also a member of the so-called Defense Council. Did he ever have anything to do in this capacity in Prague? VÖLKERS: No, I did not know that he was a member of the Defense Council. The fundamental decrees from Berlin concerning the Protectorate were frequently signed by the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich—I believe that was the name—but Neurath had never signed or countersigned them. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath was appointed, as is well known, an honorary Gruppenführer of the SS and later, honorary Obergruppenführer of the SS. Did Herr Von Neurath at that time, when he was in Prague, ever wear that uniform? VÖLKERS: As a rule, he wore his Reich Minister uniform. A portrait was also once made of him in that uniform. He used to wear civilian clothes a great deal. It may be that he once wore the black uniform of the SS, on the occasion of a parade of the SS; but I do not know for certain now. Otherwise, he never wore it. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about the circumstances and reasons concerning Herr Von Neurath’s departure from Prague in September 1941? VÖLKERS: When Herr Von Neurath was ordered to come to headquarters that September, he was accompanied by his military adjutant. I met him at the airfield; and in the car he told me that Hitler had been furious because of the acts of sabotage in the Protectorate and wanted to send Heydrich to do some exemplary punishing. He, Neurath, had stated that he did not want to have anything to do with that and had asked for his release. Hitler then had ordered that he should first of all go on leave, and so he did. He departed on one of the following days. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions. Mr. President, may I make one request at the end of my case. I have not yet been able to submit all documents because I have not yet received all the translations. May I reserve myself the right to submit the few remaining documents, perhaps at the end of the case of my colleague, Dr. Fritz? THE PRESIDENT: You need not wait for the translation. You can offer the documents in evidence now. Put in a list with the numbers. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have not got them with me, I am afraid. Perhaps, if I may, I could do so tomorrow or the day after when Dr. Fritz is finished. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions? [_There was no response._] Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution do not wish to cross-examine, on the same basis. My Lord, may I refer to one collection of documents that are in our Document Book 12b, the collection of the anti-Jewish decrees in the Protectorate. They are all from the _Verordnungsblatt_ for the Protectorate, and the Prosecution ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of them as being an official publication. The collection is merely for convenience and access of the Tribunal. THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. Then that closes your case for the present, Dr. Lüdinghausen. The Tribunal will now adjourn. [_A recess was taken._] THE PRESIDENT: I call on counsel for the Defendant Fritzsche. DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): Mr. President, I intend to present the case of the Defendant Fritzsche as follows: First, I should like to call the Defendant Fritzsche to the witness stand and then the witness Von Schirmeister. In the course of these two examinations I intend to present to the Tribunal a few affidavits and to refer to these and to the rest of the contents of my two document books. In its decision of 8 March 1946 the Tribunal granted as witnesses for my case: First, Herr Von Schirmeister, second Dr. Krieg; and as documents: The text of all radio speeches of the Defendant Fritzsche from 1932 to 1945 and the archives of Deutscher Schnelldienst (fast official news service) of the Propaganda Ministry. Of all the evidence, in spite of the efforts of the General Secretary, unfortunately only the witness Von Schirmeister could be brought here. Therefore, I had to rearrange my case and ask for the indulgence of the Tribunal if I go into a somewhat greater detail than originally intended in examining the Defendant Fritzsche and the witness Von Schirmeister. With the approval of the Tribunal I shall now call the Defendant Fritzsche to the witness stand. [_The Defendant Fritzsche took the stand._] THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please? HANS FRITZSCHE (Defendant): Hans Fritzsche. THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing. [_The defendant repeated the oath._] THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. DR. FRITZ: Herr Fritzsche, will you please describe briefly your career up to the year 1933? FRITZSCHE: As to that, may I refer to my affidavit, Document 3469-PS, Points 1 and 3 to 8? In addition I can limit myself now to a broad outline. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, I should like to remark at the beginning of the examination that my document books, of which I have two, have not yet been completely translated. This affidavit, which the defendant has just mentioned, is also contained in the document book for the Prosecution. I do not know whether the Tribunal now has this document book. THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can go on. FRITZSCHE: I was born on 21 April 1900. My father was a civil servant. I attended the gymnasium to study classics. Then I was a soldier in the first World War, returned to school, and afterward, studied philosophy, history, and national economics at various universities. After the first World War my life and my work were determined by the distress of my people. We called this distress “Versailles.” Enough has been said here as to the Versailles Treaty. I need add nothing to what has already been said. DR. FRITZ: You were striving then in your journalistic work before 1933 for a change of the Versailles Treaty? FRITZSCHE: Yes, of course. DR. FRITZ: Did you seek this change through war? FRITZSCHE: No, I sought it through the means of law, of politics, and economic common sense, which were at that time all on the German side. Along with this, certain restoration of the power of the German Reich would have been desirable because I saw in the weakness of the Reich a potential danger of war. But to change the Treaty of Versailles by means of war did not seem to me to be possible, expedient, nor desirable. The same sentiment prevailed later under the Hitler Government. Adolf Hitler gave two assurances on just this point which, for me and for millions of other Germans, were especially impressive. The first was the assurance: “I myself was a simple soldier and therefore know what war means.” The second was the statement: “In all the bloody wars of the last thousand years not even the victors gained as much as they had sacrificed in the war.” These two assurances sounded to German ears like holy and binding oaths. Whatever in Hitler’s policy should have violated these two assurances was a betrayal of the German people. DR. FRITZ: When, how, and why did you come to the NSDAP? FRITZSCHE: After my entry into the Propaganda Ministry I joined the Party. I refer again to my affidavit, 3469-PS, to Points 9 to 13. I did not join the NSDAP on account of the Party program, nor through Hitler’s book _Mein Kampf_; nor did I join because of the personality of Hitler, whose suggestive power, which has frequently been mentioned here, escaped me entirely. I rejected the harsh radicalism of the methods of the Party. This harsh radicalism was contrary to the habits of my whole life and my personal principles. Due to this coarse practice I even came into a conflict with the Party in 1932. I joined the Party when it had, without doubt, won over the majority of the German people. This Party had overcome, at the time, the disunion of the German people and brought it unity after Brüning’s great attempt at recovery on a democratic basis had failed on account of the foreign political opposition, not because of the resistance of the German people. After the cabinets also had failed to find a footing among the people, the appointment of Hitler, as Reich Chancellor, meant a return to democratic principles. Much has been said here about these matters. I ask for permission to cite one circumstance which, to my knowledge, has not yet been mentioned here and which does have a certain significance. When I joined the NSDAP I did not believe I was really joining a party in the true sense of the word, for the NSDAP did not have a party theory similar to those of the Marxist parties which had a developed and mature theory; all theorists of the Party were disputed. The theoretical writings of Gottfried Feder had been prohibited. The theorist Rosenberg was disputed in the Party to the very end. The lack of a theory for the Party was so great that even the printing of the bare Party program was forbidden for the German papers. The German papers were even forbidden a few years after 1933 to quote arbitrarily any part of Hitler’s _Mein Kampf_. At that time, then, I did not believe that I was joining a narrowly defined party but I thought I was joining a movement, a movement which united in itself contrasts such as those between Ley and Funk, between Rosenberg and the Reich bishop; a movement which was variable in its choice of methods; which at one time prohibited the labor of women and at some other time solicited this same labor of women. I believed I was joining such a movement because one group within the NSDAP saw in the swastika flag nothing but a new combination, a new form for the colors black, white, and red, while another group saw in this banner the red flag with a swastika. It is a fact that there were whole groups of the former German Nationalist Party in the NSDAP or of former Communists in the NSDAP. Thus, I hoped to find in this wide-flung Movement a forum for intellectual discussions which would no longer be carried on with the murderous animosity which had previously ruled in Germany but which could be carried on with a certain discipline dominated by nationalist and socialist conceptions. For this reason and by making constant compromises, I put aside my own wishes, my own misgivings, my own political beliefs. In many conversations I advised my friends to do the same when they complained that they and their interests were not given proper consideration during the time of the Nazification. I came to the conviction that millions of Germans had joined the Party only for this reason and in this expectation. They thought they were serving a good cause. Out of pure idealism they were willing to sacrifice everything to this cause, everything except their honor. Meanwhile, I had to realize that the leader of this cause accepted the sacrifice of these idealists, that he squandered it, and that, besides, he stained their honor with a senseless and inhuman murder, unique in history—a murder which no war necessity could have justified, for which one could not even find any reason in any necessity of war. DR. FRITZ: Now, the Prosecution accuses you of having—and I quote, “...sworn the customary oath of unconditional loyalty to Hitler” in 1933. For whatever reason you did this, the fact that you took this oath is true, is it not? FRITZSCHE: Yes, I also swore, twice, an oath to the Weimar Constitution, in 1933 and 1938. Let me add something. It was always and it still is my conviction that no oath relieves a man of his general duties to humanity. No one is made an irresponsible tool by an oath. My oath would never have made me carry out an order if I had recognized it to be criminal. Never in my life did I obey anyone blindly. For that reason, I do not refer for any of my actions to my duty to obey. DR. FRITZ: Did you keep the oath which you took? FRITZSCHE: Yes. No actions were expected of me which I could have considered criminal or a violation of written or unwritten laws. Moreover, I kept the oath which I took, not to Hitler, but to the German people. DR. FRITZ: How long did you keep the oath? FRITZSCHE: I kept it to the end. Then, it is true, I remained in Berlin, in violation of the order which I was given. When Hitler and his entourage took the way of suicide or fled toward the West, I was, to my knowledge, the only higher official to remain in Berlin. At that time I gathered together the employees of the highest Reich authorities, who had been left to their fate, in the ruins of my office. Hitler had left behind an order to fight on. The commander of Berlin could not be found. Therefore, as a civilian, I felt obliged to offer to the Russian Marshal Zhukov the capitulation. As I was sending off the emissaries who were to go across the battleline, the last military adjutant of Hitler appeared—General Burgdorf—and was going to shoot me in compliance with Hitler’s order. Nevertheless, we capitulated, even though it was signed by the commander, who had been found in the meantime. Thus, I believe I kept my oath, the oath which I had taken to the German people in the person of Hitler. DR. FRITZ: Did you hold an office in the Party? FRITZSCHE: No. DR. FRITZ: Were you a political leader? FRITZSCHE: No. DR. FRITZ: Were you in the SA or the SS or any one of the other organizations which are accused here? FRITZSCHE: No. DR. FRITZ: Did you ever take part in a Party rally? FRITZSCHE: No. DR. FRITZ: In one of the celebrations of 9 November in Munich? FRITZSCHE: No. DR. FRITZ: Then, please describe briefly your position and your work from 1933 to 1945. FRITZSCHE: Here, again, I may refer to my affidavit, 3469-PS, that is, to the rest of the affidavit. Thus I may again limit myself to a very brief presentation to supplement what is said in the affidavit. At the seizure of power by National Socialism, I remained what I had been previously, Chief Editor of Drahtloser Dienst. That was the name of the German radio news service. I held that position for 5 more years. In May 1933 this wireless service, which had been a part of the Reich Radio Company, was incorporated into the press section of the Propaganda Ministry. As I was a specialist in journalistic news service, I soon was entrusted with the news agencies, first the smaller ones such as Transozean or Europapress or Eildienst. Later I was entrusted with the big Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (German news service). At that time, I had no power to issue orders to the agencies, for I was still an employee of the Ministry and not yet an official. I also had no right to determine the contents of the news. I had only the organizational supervision, but I believe that my advice was respected at the time. In those days I also gave other advice of a journalistic nature. Then in December 1938 I became head of the German Press Section. I became Ministerial Director. As an official I still felt like the journalist I had been for decades previously. I continued to direct the German Press Section until the spring of 1942. At that time I did not agree, among other things, with the colored press reports of my superior, Reich Press Chief Dr. Dietrich. For that reason, I became a soldier and went to the Eastern Front. In the fall of 1942 I was called back by Dr. Goebbels. Dr. Goebbels approved my previous criticism, of which he knew. He offered me the direction of the Radio Section of his Ministry. I answered that I could return to the Propaganda Ministry only if I had the certainty that a termination of the war by political means would be sought and that total military victory would not be striven after, which from the first day of the war I had considered impossible. I told Dr. Goebbels at that time literally, “I am not going to participate as a propagandist in a fight of self—destruction such as was fought by the Goths at Mount Vesuvius.” Dr. Goebbels answered that Hitler and he, also, were seeking a termination of the war by diplomatic means on the basis of reaching some sort of understanding. He promised me that he would inform me in time if he noticed that the Führer was changing these intentions. Dr. Goebbels repeated this promise at intervals of a few months, up to the end of the war; and each time that he repeated it, he always gave me substantiated indications about the political efforts in progress at the moment. Today I have the feeling that he broke his promise. Well, at that time I took over the Radio Section of the Propaganda Ministry, and I became Ministerial Director. DR. FRITZ: Those were your official positions. But they were less known to the public. Better known were your radio speeches. What about them? FRITZSCHE: Since 1932 I spoke once a week, for 10 to 15 minutes, on some German stations and on the Deutschlandsender (radio station for foreign broadcasts). At the beginning of the war I spoke daily on all the stations, I believe for 3 or 4 months. Then I spoke three times a week, then twice a week, and finally once a week again. At first these radio speeches were just reviews of newspaper articles; that is, a collection of quotations from domestic and foreign newspapers. After the beginning of the war, however, these speeches, of course, became a polemic on the basis of quotations mostly from foreign papers and foreign radio stations. DR. FRITZ: Did your speeches have an official character? The Prosecution says that they were, of course, under the control of the Propaganda Ministry. FRITZSCHE: That is not correct in that form. The speeches were not official. At the beginning they were purely personal elaborations. Of course, I could not prevent, as time went on, the private speeches of a man holding a position in the Propaganda Ministry being no longer considered as personal, but semi-official. DR. FRITZ: You just said “personal elaborations,” which was later considered “semi-official.” For clarification I ask, could one criticize these speeches, or was one arrested for so doing? FRITZSCHE: Criticism was not only allowed, but actually it was done. I had an extensive correspondence with my critics, although only with those who signed their names. There were of course also anonymous critics, but I may add that the anonymous critics had only general complaints. After the outbreak of the war a South German office of public prosecution and later the Ministry of Justice, offered me a certain protection for my publications, apparently on the assumption that they were official or semi-official. It was suggested to me to appear as co-plaintiff in possible libel actions. I categorically refused this, stating, as I have often done both privately and publicly, that people must be allowed to grumble about something. If they are forbidden to criticize the State and the Government, then they must be allowed at least to criticize the press, the radio, and me. DR. FRITZ: How did you prepare these speeches? Were they put down in writing and censored beforehand? FRITZSCHE: I always refused to let them be censored beforehand. The material was gathered very carefully. It was kept in the so-called “Archiv-Schnelldienst” which had been applied for and approved by the Tribunal to be brought here but which could not be found. The material consisted of clippings from papers, reports of news agencies, and reports from foreign broadcasts. The investigation of doubtful matters was done by a special official. A rough draft of the speech was then dictated and then delivered freely. Therefore, this procedure was different to that of writing an article; not every sentence had to be polished, because in a written matter every word counts, whereas in a speech it is more the total impression which is decisive. DR. FRITZ: Now, you worked in the Propaganda Ministry; Dr. Goebbels was the Minister. His name has been mentioned here frequently in connection with his various positions as Reich Minister for Propaganda, Reich Propaganda Director of the NSDAP, Delegate for Total War Effort, and Gauleiter of Berlin. In which of these capacities did you deal with Dr. Goebbels? FRITZSCHE: Exclusively in his capacity as Propaganda Minister. DR. FRITZ: Were you his representative there? FRITZSCHE: No. In the last 2½ years I was his commissioner for radio broadcasting and, in addition, head of one of the 12 departments of his Ministry. Dr. Goebbels’ representatives were his state secretaries. The last one was Dr. Naumann who was his successor for one day. DR. FRITZ: Was Dr. Goebbels your only and direct superior? FRITZSCHE: No. There were many offices between him and me at first, and still a few later on. This is the first time, here in the dock, that I am without official superiors. DR. FRITZ: By the way, whom of the defendants did you know or with whom did you have official or personal relations? FRITZSCHE: I had two or three official conversations, shortly after 1933, with Funk, who was then State Secretary in the Propaganda Ministry, mainly dealing with economic and organizational matters. I discussed with him the financial plans for the reorganization of the news service. Then, I once had a talk with Grossadmiral Dönitz on a technical matter. I called on Seyss-Inquart in The Hague, and on Papen in Istanbul. I knew all the others only by sight and first made their personal acquaintance during the Trial. DR. FRITZ: How about Hitler? FRITZSCHE: I never had a conversation with him. In the course of 12 years, however, I saw him, of course, several times at the Reichstag on big occasions or receptions. Once I was at his headquarters and was invited to dinner with a large number of other people. Otherwise, I received instructions from Hitler only through Dr. Dietrich or his representative or through Dr. Goebbels and his various representatives. DR. FRITZ: What were your relations with Dr. Goebbels? Were you on friendly terms with him? Did you meet with him frequently? FRITZSCHE: One can by no means say that we were friends. The relationship was on an official basis, reserved and to a certain extent formal. I was personally even less frequently with him than other assistants of Dr. Goebbels of my rank. But I believed I observed that he treated me with more respect than any other of his co-workers. To that extent, I occupied a certain special position. I valued Dr. Goebbels’ intelligence and his ability, at least sometimes, to change his own opinion in favor of a better argument. I saw him about twice a year during the first 5 years. When I was head of a department I saw him perhaps once a month. After the outbreak of war I saw him daily in the course of a conference with 30 to 50 fellow employees; and in addition, about once a week I had a conference on special subjects with him. DR. FRITZ: Now we come to the subject of propaganda. Can you sketch the propaganda system in the Third Reich? FRITZSCHE: I shall try it. There were three types of propaganda. The first was the unorganized agitation of the radical fanatics in the Party. It was present in all fields, in the fields of religion, racial policy, art, general policy, and the conduct of the war. As time went by Martin Bormann became more and more the leader of this unorganized agitation. The second type of propaganda was under the Reich Propaganda Directorate of the NSDAP. The head of this was Dr. Goebbels. It attempted to put the agitation of the radicals on a more presentable basis. The third type was the state organization of the Reich Propaganda Ministry. DR. FRITZ: The Prosecution contended at the beginning that you had been also head of the Radio Section of the Propaganda Directorate of the NSDAP. How about that? FRITZSCHE: The Prosecution have withdrawn that assertion. They said that they had no proof. It would have been more correct to say that this statement has been proved to be false. I refer to my affidavit, 3469-PS, Point 37. There I state that I was not—in contrast to all of my predecessors, as far as I know—head of the Radio Section of the Ministry and at the same time head of the Radio Section of the Party. Today I supplement this statement by saying that I held no office whatever in the Party. DR. FRITZ: You have been accused of having helped Dr. Goebbels plunge the world into the blood-bath of aggressive war. Is that true? Did Dr. Goebbels ever speak with you about aggressive plans? FRITZSCHE: No; I never heard of any intention to wage aggressive war, either from Dr. Goebbels or from anyone else. DR. FRITZ: In the course of this Trial some conferences have been mentioned here several times at which, it was said, various aggressive plans were discussed; for example, before the attack on Czechoslovakia, before the attack on Poland, and on Norway, and on Russia. Did you participate in these conferences? Did you hear of them? FRITZSCHE: I did not participate in a single one of these conferences. I heard of them for the first time here in the courtroom. DR. FRITZ: Now, in case no plans for an attack were discussed in these conferences, was there any talk at all about war or the possibility of war? FRITZSCHE: No; but the danger of war was mentioned as early as 1933—the danger of war due to the one-sided disarmament of one state in the midst of other states which were highly armed. This disproportion between armament and nonarmament had to be considered as enticing an attack. German propaganda after 1933 underlined this consideration and this contention as one of the main reasons, first, for the demand for disarmament of the other powers and afterwards for the German demand for equality of armament. That seemed completely logical to me. But never was the danger of war mentioned without, at the same time, making a reference to the German will for peace. That seemed to me honest. In the summer of 1939, when the danger of war became more and more imminent, I saw Dr. Goebbels more often than ever before. I gave Dr. Goebbels a number of little memoranda as, so to speak, a contribution from my field of work, the news service. They were analyses of public opinion in western countries, and they repeatedly indicated that England was determined to go to war in case of a conflict with Poland. I recall that Dr. Goebbels was deeply impressed when I once again gave him one of these memoranda. He expressed his concern and decided immediately to fly to Hitler. He said to me, literally, “Believe me, we did not work successfully for 6 years in order to risk everything in a war now.” Furthermore, in the summer of 1939, I knew of some serious gaps in German armament which have already been mentioned in part here in the courtroom. Therefore I was convinced of the honesty of the peaceful intentions in Hitler’s policy. If documents have been submitted during this Trial which indicate that Hitler secretly thought differently or acted differently, then I am at a loss to form a judgment, since the documents of the opposite side have not yet been published. But if it should be, as the documents submitted here say, I must state that I was deceived about the aims of German policy. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, at the beginning of my case I had stated that we were unable to produce here the radio speeches of the Defendant Fritzsche. I tried to obtain them from German radio stations and succeeded in getting at least a small part from the years 1939 and 1940. I have selected a few of these speeches which I should like to submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number Fritzsche-1. To support what the defendant has just said, I should like to quote only one sentence from the radio speech of Fritzsche of 15 November 1939: “The sole reason for war, which a nation that as a whole never longs for war, may have at all—the sole reason for war which is also morally justifiable is the threat to the existence, to the life of that nation.” And this line emphasized by the Defendant Fritzsche at the beginning of the war, was adhered to by him during the war as well. As proof of this, I should like to quote another passage from the same document, from a radio speech of Fritzsche of 23 July 1940: “We Germans have experienced in the course of our history, and especially 30 years ago, enough blood and tears and death to face things honestly now. We knew what war meant, and therefore we did not want war. And because the Führer knows it so well and had experienced it himself, he offered on 6 October and 19 July to make peace.” DR. FRITZ: Did you in any way have anything to do with war preparations of an intellectual or organizational kind? FRITZSCHE: Not directly, but perhaps indirectly. I demanded the disarmament of the others, and then equality of armament; and I advocated the arming (Wehrhaftmachung) of the German people. The expression “Wehrhaftmachung” is liable to be misunderstood, at any rate, to be easily misinterpreted. I should like to define it expressly as the ability to fight in self-defense. The German people were promised again and again, often by me, that the restoration of military sovereignty would be for defensive purposes only. DR. FRITZ: How and where did you propagate this idea? FRITZSCHE: In the modest sphere of my weekly radio speeches, while making casual remarks. I was a patriot; but I feel myself to be free from chauvinism, that is, exaggerated nationalism. To me, as a historian, it was at that time already clear that, especially in the narrow confines of Europe, the old nationalism was an anachronism and that it was incompatible with modern communications and weapons. At that time I believed I saw in Hitler’s doctrine also certain elements for a new type of mutual understanding among peoples. It was particularly the constantly repeated thesis that only the nationalism of one people can understand the nationalism of another people. Only today have I realized ideologically—but particularly, of course materially—through the further development of arms, that the time of nationalism is past, if mankind does not want to commit suicide, and that the period of internationalism has come, for good or evil. At that time, however, nationalism was not considered a crime. Everyone advocated it. It can be seen that it is still advocated today, and I also advocated it. DR. FRITZ: Now, the Prosecution points out that before every attack a press campaign was launched in Germany, the aim of which was to weaken the victim of a planned attack and to prepare the German people psychologically for the new drive. Although this is stated by the Prosecution without as yet actually referring to you personally and even though later no direct charge is made that you organized these press campaigns, the Prosecution, nevertheless, stress very strongly your connection with this practice. Now, what facts do you have to state about your role in these journalistic polemics? FRITZSCHE: First, I can only point out that I described the propagandistic actions in detail in my affidavit, Document Number 3469-PS, Points 23 to 33, starting with the Rhineland occupation up to the attack on the Soviet Union. These descriptions also contain information about the type and extent of my participation in these actions. Beyond that, I may emphasize that any reference is missing in the description made in my affidavit as to the question of the right in each case. All attempts at political justification are lacking. I should like to emphasize explicitly that in each case, in each action, I believed I represented a good and just cause. It would be leading too far if I were to explain that here for each case, inasmuch as many of these cases have already been discussed here. I assume, or rather I hope, that the Prosecution will ask questions on this subject for I assert that, no matter what the facts may have been in the individual cases, at every moment from the Anschluss of Austria on to the attack on Russia, information given to me and through me to the German public left no doubt of the legality or the urgent necessity of the German action; and I, as the only surviving informer of the German public, consider it my duty to be available here for any investigation of the correctness of this statement of mine, which is of especial importance for the German public. DR. FRITZ: Some newspaper headlines are mentioned in your affidavit which are considered typical for the various states of tension prior to the individual action. What have you to say to that? FRITZSCHE: The headlines are taken without exception from the _Völkischer Beobachter_. These headlines were submitted to me and, of course, I had to confirm their truth; but I may emphasize that the _Völkischer Beobachter_ was not typical for the result of my press policy. The _Völkischer Beobachter_ generally had its own direct connections to headquarters and to Hitler. Typical products of my press policy were papers such as the _Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, the _Münchener Neueste Nachrichten_, and the _Hamburger Fremdenblatt_, to name only a few. DR. FRITZ: But the Prosecution is of the opinion that you also incited to war by your domestic propaganda insofar as you tried to arouse hostile feelings in the German people toward other peoples of Europe and the world. In Captain Sprecher’s trial brief it is said, for instance, that terms like “antagonism against the peoples of the Soviet Union” and “an atmosphere of senselessness and hatred” were created by you or that you had incited the Germans to blind hatred. Did you do that? FRITZSCHE: No, I did not do that. Never did I attempt to arouse hatred against the English, French, Americans, or Russians, _et cetera_. There is not a single word of this type in perhaps a thousand speeches which I made before the microphone. I did speak strongly against governments, members of governments, governmental systems; but I never preached hatred generally or attempted to awaken it indirectly as was the case—and I ask your pardon for my taking an example from the courtroom—at the moment when a film was presented here and the words were spoken, “Here you see Germans laughing over hanged Yugoslavs.” Never did I try to awaken hatred in this general form and I may point out that for years many anti-National Socialist statements from certain countries, which were still neutral at that time, remained unanswered. DR. FRITZ: Did your superiors demand that you mark your propaganda with the stamp of antagonism or to stimulate hatred? FRITZSCHE: Yes, that happened frequently, but it was not demanded that antagonism or hatred should be stirred up against peoples. That was expressly forbidden because we wanted to win these peoples over to our side, but again and again I was requested to arouse hatred against individuals and against systems. DR. FRITZ: Who requested you to do this? FRITZSCHE: Dr. Goebbels, Dr. Dietrich, and both of them frequently on the direct orders of Adolf Hitler. The reproach was repeatedly made that the German press and the German radio did not arouse hatred at all against Roosevelt, Churchill, or Stalin but that they made these three personalities popular as efficient men. For that reason, for years the German press was forbidden to mention these three names at all unless, in an individual case, permission was given with exact instructions. DR. FRITZ: Do you mean to say that you refused the request to change your propaganda to incite antagonism and to arouse hatred and did not carry it out? FRITZSCHE: I should like to outline exactly what I did. When the reproaches of Dr. Goebbels and Dr. Dietrich accumulated, I had all caricatures from the first and second World War collected—from England, the United States of America, France, and a few from Russia. In addition, I had all anti-German propaganda films which I could lay my hands on, collected. Then in five to six demonstrations of several hours each, I presented these caricatures and these films to German journalists and German radio speakers. I, myself, spoke only 2 or 3 minutes in introduction. It is quite possible that I created hatred through these showings, but I should like to leave the judgment of this means of producing hatred in the midst of war to the Tribunal. In any case, Dr. Goebbels said later that he was dissatisfied and we were “bunglers.” I may add one statement. I would have had a means of carrying out my orders of arousing real hatred, that is, not one means but a whole group of methods; that would have been, to give only one example, a German edition of the last two volumes of the Tarzan series, an adventure series which was very popular in Germany at that time and of which the last two volumes were strongly anti-German. I need not describe them here. I never pointed out such early products of anti-German propaganda. I always deliberately ignored such methods. DR. FRITZ: If you say that you dispensed with hatred and antagonism in your propaganda, what means did you use in your propaganda during the war? FRITZSCHE: During the war I conducted the propaganda almost exclusively with the concept of the necessity and the obligation to fight. I repeatedly painted the results of defeat very dark and systematically I gave quotations from the press and the radio of the enemy countries. I quoted repeatedly the enemy demands for unconditional surrender. I used the expression of the “super-Versailles” frequently and did—I emphasize that—describe the consequences of a lost war very pessimistically. It does not behoove me today to make a comparison with reality. DR. FRITZ: But could you not learn from the broadcasts of the enemy that the fight of the Allies was not directed against the German people but only against its leaders? Did you keep that from the German people? FRITZSCHE: On the contrary, I did not keep it from them, but repeatedly quoted it. However, I called it “incredible.” For example, I once used the trick of quoting the wording of a medieval declaration of war in which it had already been said that a war was declared only on the King of France but that one wanted to bring freedom to the French people. THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off? [_The Tribunal adjourned until 27 June 1946 at 1000 hours._] ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIFTH DAY Thursday, 27 June 1946 _Morning Session_ [_The Defendant Fritzsche resumed the stand._] MARSHAL (Lieutenant Colonel James R. Gifford): If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that Defendant Ribbentrop is absent. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, first a very brief explanation: Yesterday I repeatedly mentioned the Indictment and intend to do so in the course of the examination. Thereby I mean the presentation of Fritzsche’s case by Captain Sprecher in the morning session of 23 January 1946. Herr Fritzsche, yesterday you spoke of your radio speeches concerning the Allied propaganda—my last question: Did you attempt to split the front of the Allies by your propaganda? FRITZSCHE: Of course I attempted to do that. I elaborated on all ideological and all practical political contrasts or differences between the individual Allied nations. I considered that a permissible method of waging war. At that time I wanted a split between the Allies just as much as today I wish their unity, since Germany would be the first victim of any conflict. DR. FRITZ: Now, you are accused of assisting in establishing Nazi control throughout Germany. Did you agitate against democracy? FRITZSCHE: I never agitated against democracy as such. I attacked the democracy of the 36 parties, the democracy which had prevailed in Germany previously, the democracy under which even strong groups such as the two Marxist parties, for example, were powerless. I criticized foreign democracy only on two points: First, the elements which limited the basic concept of democracy—I believe it is superfluous and perhaps it would be misunderstood to enumerate them today. Secondly, I criticized the demands of the foreign democracies to force their form of government on us. According to my knowledge and information at that time, it seemed unjustified to me. DR. FRITZ: Well, did you consider dictatorship a better form of government? FRITZSCHE: I should like to emphasize that at that time, under the existing conditions and only for a temporary emergency period, I did; today, of course, no. After the totalitarian form of government has brought about the catastrophe of the murder of 5 millions, I consider this form of government wrong even in times of emergency. I believe any kind of democratic control, even a restricted democratic control, would have made such a catastrophe impossible. DR. FRITZ: You are accused, furthermore, of having spread the doctrine of the “master race.” The Prosecution makes this charge indirectly against you. How about that? FRITZSCHE: I never set up or voiced the theory of the “master race.” I even avoided this term. I expressly prohibited this term being used by the German press and the German radio when I was in charge of one or the other. I believe that the term “master race” played a greater role in the anti-National Socialist propaganda than in Germany proper. I do not know who invented this term. To my knowledge it was publicly mentioned only by men like Dr. Ley, for example, men—and I must explain this frankly and expressly—who were not taken seriously by anyone in this connection. It is true, however, that this term played a great role, without being expressed openly, among the SS because of its racial exclusiveness; but people of intelligence, tact and insight, and with some knowledge of the world, very carefully avoided the use of this word. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, at this opportunity, I should like to offer an affidavit to the Tribunal by Dr. Scharping of 17 May 1946. Dr. Scharping was Government Counsellor in the Propaganda Ministry up to the end. From this affidavit I shall now quote only one sentence from Page 13. I quote: “In this connection it can be explained that Fritzsche always opposed the term ‘the master race.’ He even expressly prohibited the use of this word on the radio.” [_Turning to the defendant._] But the Prosecution has quoted a passage from one of your radio speeches to prove this assertion. FRITZSCHE: The quotation is correct, but I ask you just to read it carefully. The term “master race” is rejected in this quotation for the Jewish and for the German people. The quotation cannot be misunderstood. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, that is in Captain Sprecher’s speech for the Prosecution, English text, Pages 31 and 32. [_Turning to the defendant._] But you carried on propaganda not only in Germany, but also abroad. What was the difference? FRITZSCHE: In my radio speeches there was no difference. Before the outbreak of war I made a slight difference in the speeches for Germany and those for other countries simply because the audience was different, and because I had to presuppose a different level of knowledge. During the war my speeches on the Reich German radio were simply transmitted over the short-wave stations. What was said for Germany or for other countries could be controlled by both sides. Moreover in the 12 years during which I spoke on the German radio, I never permitted my speeches to be translated, since that always involved a differentiation in emphasis. Written articles can be translated, perhaps official speeches also, but not rather light and half-improvised chats. DR. FRITZ: Were your broadcasts abroad criticized internationally? FRITZSCHE: Yes, very frequently. During the war there was often daily criticism from some country or other. I had these criticisms collected. I asked for them as documents, but my application was refused by the Court. As far as I know, I am not accused of inciting war in these criticisms. DR. FRITZ: Now you not only acted as a mouthpiece for propaganda, but also as an organizer of it. You are accused of having helped to create an important instrument for the alleged conspiracy. The Prosecution says that for 13 years you aided in the creation of the propaganda machine which the conspiracy was able to put to such good use. Did you create the press organization of the National Socialist State? FRITZSCHE: No, I did not create this organization nor did I have any part in its creation. It was created by Dr. Goebbels, Dr. Dietrich, and Reichsleiter Amann. When, in the winter of 1938, I became head of the so-called German Press Section, I attempted to loosen the bonds which had been imposed on the German press. I attempted that in the material and personnel field. For example, I called back to their work with the press hundreds of editors of other parties who had been dismissed in 1933 and 1934. Today they will be angry with me. I had the best intentions at that time. In addition to the official press conferences which were very strictly controlled, also as far as their records were concerned, by my superiors, I also arranged the so-called supplementary conferences in which I met the representatives of the 50 or 60 most important papers and discussed more freely the possibilities of their work. I coined the slogan which was often used there: “You may write any criticism you like in the German papers provided such criticism is not shown in big headlines but is buried somewhere in the text in an elegant form.” Very many German journalists made use of this possibility in the past 12 years. I should be glad if this work, which was hidden work, would be honored in some way today in the interest of these people who, in part, returned to their profession as journalists only out of personal confidence in me. Of course, I must add that the possibility of criticizing was not unlimited. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, on this occasion, with the approval of the Prosecution, I offer the Tribunal a document as Document Number Fritzsche-4. It is an excerpt from a letter of the German Lieutenant General Dittmar, who frequently commented on the military situation on the German radio during the war and who is in British captivity. The well-known English radio commentator, Mr. Liddell-Hart, has sent an excerpt from the letter to the British Prosecution. I should like to quote briefly this memorandum which was sent to me. May I quote this passage? THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may. DR. FRITZ: Dittmar writes that the possibility of retaining the critical attitude in his radio commentary is due primarily to the silent approval and the protection of Hans Fritzsche, the director of the political radio. He believes that Fritzsche was a secret opponent of the regime and that he was glad of the opportunity to have found a commentator who discreetly expressed ideas which resembled his own and which insidiously would tend to reduce confidence in the regime. Following this quotation, there is another quotation from the affidavit of Dr. Scharping, which I have already submitted as Document Number Fritzsche-2. It is on Page 11 of this affidavit. I quote: “The radio men and the journalists knew Fritzsche’s tolerance quite well. It repeatedly happened that, for example, Fritzsche at his conference had a copy of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ in his hand and commented ironically on an anti-Jewish article. I recall that once he expressed his criticism in about the following words: “‘A Berlin paper’—then he held up the _Völkischer Beobachter_ so that everyone could see it—‘has once more, in an editorial, made more than two blunders. Perhaps the publisher may yet succeed in hitting the right tune.’ “With such ironical remarks, Fritzsche always had the approval of his listeners, but there was some danger for him, for Goebbels daily read the records of these press conferences.” Herr Fritzsche, following the statement of Lieutenant General Dittmar, one question: Did you feel yourself to be an enemy of the system, or how does General Dittmar come to this statement? FRITZSCHE: I was not an enemy of the system. It would be ridiculous and unworthy to try to assert that today. But I was definitely an opponent of all misuse of the system. The obvious one which I noticed the most, because it was in my field of work, was whitewashing of news during the war. The aim of all my news policy was realism, and apparently that is what General Dittmar means in the part of his statement which has been read here. I met General Dittmar in December 1942 or January 1943 at the moment when the German 6th Army at Stalingrad was already surrounded, but when this fact was still being kept secret from the German people. Together with General Dittmar, in face of the prohibition, I publicly announced the fact that the 6th Army was surrounded at Stalingrad. This caused a great sensation at the time. In the following months and years I always defended General Dittmar and his realistic presentation of the military situation against all attacks, especially against the attacks of the Party, but also against the attacks of the Foreign Office, which repeatedly pointed out that these sober presentations of Dittmar had a bad effect on Germany’s allies. In connection with this struggle for realistic news service, later—and I ask permission to mention this briefly—I waged a desperate battle against the irresponsible propaganda of miracle weapons. Only 1 year after Dr. Goebbels had mentioned the future miracle weapons did I mention a new type of weapon for the first time. Speer has mentioned SS Standartenführer Berg, who is said to have carried on secret propaganda for the miracle weapon in connection with the Propaganda Ministry. He wrote an article in _Das Reich_ which attracted much attention, with the sensational and very promising heading, “We, the Bearers of Secrets.” I had to fight against things like that. Another especially striking example was this: Another member of the SS, Hernau, wrote, at the moment when the invasion had succeeded, an article in which he presented the situation as if the evacuation of France had been a very secret trick of the German Command, which offered the possibility for a particularly strong counterblow. I prohibited this article in my field, and I repeatedly had to oppose the irresponsible rumors which were spread in secret about mysterious weapons. I did so publicly, and I plainly stated my point of view on the radio against this propaganda. On the other hand I may point out that at every moment of the war my superiors always made well-founded promises to me, first, of some military offensive which was just being prepared; for instance, a thrust from East Prussia toward the south, a thrust from Upper Silesia to the Vistula, a thrust from Alsace toward the north, and so forth. Hand in hand with these promises, which were thoroughly detailed, were the political promises which were mentioned briefly yesterday, that is, the descriptions given by Dr. Goebbels that foreign political negotiations were in progress with the enemy on one or the other side. DR. FRITZ: Another question: Who was in charge of press policy? FRITZSCHE: Reich Press Chief Dr. Dietrich. He gave very specialized instructions, mostly in a precise wording, the so-called “slogan of the day of the Reich Press Chief.” Generally he even gave the wording of the commentaries which were to be added in the press conference. For the most part, Dr. Dietrich was at the Führer’s headquarters and received his instructions directly from Hitler. Dr. Dietrich’s representatives were Sündermann and Lorenz. The second factor decisive for German press policy was Reichsleiter Amann who was at the head of the organization of publishers. The third factor was Dr. Goebbels as Reich Propaganda Minister. Dietrich and Amann were nominally subordinate to him; actually, both had the same authority as he had and I always had to adjust differences or co-ordinate among these three authorities. DR. FRITZ: Did you create the organization of the journalistic news service? FRITZSCHE: Yes, I did create this organization. In principle, it originated with me. I may refer to my affidavit, 3469-PS, Point 17. I was in charge of the journalistic news service from about 1934 to 1938. I was proud of the fact that at the beginning of the war even the enemy recognized the good functioning of this news machine. However, at that time I was no longer the head of the so-called news service department. As an expert I created this organization in peacetime without thinking of the possibility of using it during war. The conclusion of the Prosecution that I also determined the contents of the news service is not correct. DR. FRITZ: The Prosecution has said that the Propaganda Ministry was the most fabulous lie factory of all times. What do you have to say about this? FRITZSCHE: First, for myself personally, I should like to make the following quite clear. I state under oath: On really serious questions of policy and the conduct of war I did not commit a single falsification and did not consciously use a single lie. How often I myself became the victim of a falsehood or a lie I cannot say after the revelations of this Trial. The same is true, as far as I know, of all my fellow workers, but I do not by any means want to deny that I and my fellow workers selected news and quotations following a certain tendency. It is the curse of propaganda during war that one works only with black and white. Only a few great minds remain independent. I believe that this painting in black and white is a luxury which also cannot be afforded any longer. As to the Propaganda Ministry itself, as such, I must say that I can only judge of the one-twelfth, that is the one section of which I was in charge at any time. But to my knowledge it is a mistake to believe that in the Propaganda Ministry thousands of little lies were hatched out. In details we worked quite cleanly and honestly, technically even perfectly. If we had lied on a thousand small things, the enemy would have been able to deal with us more easily than was the case. But decisive for such a news machine is not the detail but the final fundamental basis on which propaganda is built. Decisive is the belief in the incorruptibility of the leaders of the state, on which every journalist must rely and this basis is shaken by what has become known today of mass murders, of senseless atrocities, and it is shaken by the doubt in the honesty of Hitler’s protestations for peace, the factual details of which I am not in a position to judge. DR. FRITZ: In this Trial it has been pointed out that there are no regulations in international law on the methods of propaganda in war and peace. FRITZSCHE: I know very well that international law places no restrictions on propaganda, especially propaganda during war. I also know very well that only in a very few individual treaties between states are there regulations about the use of propaganda; for example in the German-Polish treaty and in the German-Soviet Union treaty. But in all my life as a journalist I have emphasized that the lack of international regulations as to propaganda is no excuse for lies. I always emphasized the moral responsibility of the journalist and newsman. I did so long before the war in an international discussion with Radio Luxembourg but it would lead too far afield to go into that here. If last May I did not seek death, one of the reasons for this was my wish—I wanted to render an account of where, in that system, there were the pure idealism and the heroic sacrifices of millions, and where there were lies and the brutality which did not shrink from committing crimes. DR. FRITZ: Please give us examples of cases wherein you felt you were deceived. FRITZSCHE: During this Trial the news was discussed which circulated at the beginning of the Polish war about the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station. At that time I firmly believed in the truth of the official German news. I need say nothing about this case. Then, in December of last year, here in the prison in Nuremberg, I realized from a talk with Grand Admiral Raeder that it was actually a German submarine which sank the _Athenia_. Up to that time I had firmly believed in the truth of the official German report that there had been no German submarine in the neighborhood. I have asked my lawyer to pick out the most caustic statements I made in my radio speeches about the _Athenia_ case and include them in my document book. They are utterances which would really speak against me but which, on the other hand, show that I worked not alone on the basis of the official German news, but that I also collected the news which supported the official German version; for example, the fact which was not at first made public and therefore was suspicious, that the wreck of the _Athenia_, one day after the catastrophe, was sunk by being shelled by British destroyers, which is a matter of course in the interest of shipping but which at the time seemed to me to be an occasion for suspicion. I also used American news on the same subject. But the most impressive false news of which I was a victim was given out in the last few days of the war. I must describe it for the sake of clearing up matters. In the days when Berlin was surrounded by the Russian Army the people of Berlin were told that a relief army, the army of General Wenk, was marching on Berlin; that there was no more fighting on the Western Front. The news was given out that Ribbentrop had gone to the Western Front and had concluded a treaty there, and handbills were printed in Berlin which contained approximately this text: “Soldiers of the Wenk army, we Berliners know that you are as far as Potsdam. Hurry, come quickly, help us.” These handbills were printed at a time when the Wenk army no longer existed and had already been captured. These handbills were apparently dropped over Berlin inadvertently and were to give the inhabitants of Berlin new courage. That happened in the days when Hitler, according to Speer’s testimony, had already told his entourage that there was no use trying to do anything for the rest of the German people. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, the two radio speeches which the Defendant Fritzsche has mentioned dealing with the Athenia case are in the Document Number Fritzsche-1, which I submitted yesterday. I refer only to the contents of these radio speeches. [_Turning to the defendant._] Please give examples of untruths which you knew and which you did not consider lies. FRITZSCHE: One example is the so-called “V” drive. Colonel Britton, a British colonel, proclaimed this “V” drive, this “Victory” drive on the British radio. On the same evening I stood before a German microphone and said, apparently harmlessly, “We will have a ‘V’ drive; the ‘V’ stands for ‘Victoria.’” Then Colonel Britton said that I had stolen the “V” from him. I said that was not the case, that I thought of it first. DR. FRITZ: If you thought you were operating only with the truth, why your sharp language, why the prohibition against listening on the radio to foreign stations? FRITZSCHE: I have already emphasized in my affidavit that in my opinion the sharpness of my language was always less than that of my opponents. The prohibition against listening to foreign radio stations was issued decidedly against my will. This prohibition was only a hindrance for me in my discussions with my foreign opponents in the various countries. Due to this prohibition my enemy was, so to speak, half in shadow; I could not speak to him officially, but, on the other hand, I knew that many of my listeners had heard him. May I mention here that I always advocated a mild judgment on the violators of this prohibition against listening to foreign radio stations. Legal authorities often consulted me as an expert. I may emphasize that, particularly after Stalingrad, I established my own listening service for the Russian radio in order to learn the names of German soldiers captured at Stalingrad which were mentioned on the Russian radio and report them to the relatives, because it seemed cruel to me to deprive the relatives of such a source of information about the fate of their people. Moreover, there was only one alternative with regard to the prohibition of listening to the radio. That was either to confiscate all radios and stop the whole German radio system—the Party often demanded this—or the prohibition against listening to foreign stations, which seemed to me the lesser of the two evils. Finally, we were in a war, and the enemy was not too particular in his methods. I should like to give an example. That was the station Gustav Siegfried 2, which at the beginning of its work gained listeners in Germany with stories that I do not want to characterize more precisely but which caused me to prohibit my own listening station from receiving this broadcast. DR. FRITZ: You have been charged with urging a policy of ruthless exploitation of the occupied territories. Do you acknowledge such a policy? FRITZSCHE: No. The aim of all my propaganda work in Europe was, and had to be, to win over the peoples of Europe to the German cause. Anything else would have been illogical. All the radio broadcasts in all European languages, which were made under my direction, had for years only one aim: That was to win the voluntary co-operation, especially of the occupied territories, for the fight of the Reich. DR. FRITZ: Were you of the opinion that the German administration in the occupied territories recruited voluntary co-operation? FRITZSCHE: At the beginning, certainly, with one single exception. That was Koch in the Ukraine. Otherwise, as far as I could see, all administrations of occupied territories sought this collaboration more or less skillfully. I saw the gigantic efforts which the Allies made to interfere with this German collaboration policy, which was very dangerous for them. I saw that in these efforts the Allies were at first using their means of propaganda. This alone would not have worked. Then I saw that they used other means in these efforts, that is, outrages and sabotage. These latter efforts had great success. Outrages always called for reprisals and reprisals always called forth new outrages. I hope I will not be misunderstood, and this is not meant cynically, if I say the following: I, as a propagandist, considered for example the murder of Heydrich a minor success. The destruction of Lidice, carried out by the Germans, however, was a tremendous success for the Allies. In other words, I always was and had to be an opponent of reprisals of all kinds. DR. FRITZ: Did you know of the reprisals? How did you deal with them in your propaganda? FRITZSCHE: I learned of Lidice, which I just mentioned, only after months, because at that time I was at the Eastern Front. I learned—and this is significant—only of the destruction of the houses of Lidice and the driving out of the inhabitants. I learned only here in the courtroom of the killing of a part of the inhabitants. I learned that hostages were taken, but not that they were killed. The killing of hostages was made public only in the occupied territories. If shootings occurred anywhere, I was told that they had been of persons condemned to death on account of outrages or conspiracy. The Night and Fog Decree was also unknown to me. On the other hand, I frequently learned of fines which had been imposed on towns or districts. In our propaganda, we always referred to the causes of such reprisals. DR. FRITZ: And how did you describe the work of the German administrations in your propaganda? FRITZSCHE: I always referred to the constructive work which, in spite of all difficulties and all resistance, was being done in the various occupied territories, especially and far ahead, the work for the intensification of agriculture; then that to increase industrial production. I had references made to the supplying of the occupied territories with food, often, as I should like to emphasize, from scant German stocks. I had reports made of the creation of schools, and I received at times very impressive reports and had them worked on, for example, on the supplying of cities such as Paris, in spite of sabotage by the enemy against railroad lines or other supply channels. I had such reports collected in permanent files and had speeches and whole series of speeches made on them. There were many such reports. I must emphasize that, as far as I know, in not a single German-occupied territory was there an infant mortality of 80 percent, and in none were there fields lying fallow, and it is simply not true, as the Prosecution said here once, although in a moment of excitement, that Germany and the Germans were well fed and happy during the war while the occupied territories starved. That is not true. DR. FRITZ: What did you know about bad conditions in the occupied territories? FRITZSCHE: Above all, the failure to call on the population for their own administration and the lack of decisive political concessions to the countries which administered themselves. Immediately after the French campaign, I had repeatedly demanded the establishment of a Magna Charta for Europe, laying down the basic rights of the European peoples. I prepared many memoranda on this subject which were accepted by Dr. Goebbels and taken to Hitler; and when in the autumn of 1942 I decided to return to the Propaganda Ministry, one of the promises which Dr. Goebbels gave me was that now finally that Magna Charta for Europe would be proclaimed. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, on this occasion I should like to quote a passage from the Scharping affidavit, Document Number Fritzsche-2, Page 13 of the affidavit: “After the occupation of various European countries, Fritzsche issued directives for news releases to the effect that the peoples of Europe were to form a league of states on the basis of equality with Germany. He told me to work out a series of speeches to this effect in which this point of view was to play the decisive role and which at the same time should give the authorities hints for a healthy reconstruction in the occupied territories.” [_Turning to the defendant._] Did you know what has been said here by the Prosecution about the activity of the Police in the occupied territories? FRITZSCHE: No. DR. FRITZ: At this point I should like to interpolate a question: I have already asked the witness Paulus about your conduct after you learned of the Commissar Order. How about that? FRITZSCHE: I learned of the order to shoot captured Soviet commissars at the beginning of May 1942 when I came to the 6th Army. I immediately opposed it. Whether it was carried out or not, I do not know. Field Marshal Paulus, no doubt, is correct when he said that he had already prevented in his army the execution of this order. At any rate, I made it my business to have the order as such rescinded, and I achieved this. The 6th Army, at my advice, gave certain information to the High Command of the Wehrmacht or to the Armed Forces Operations Staff. I am convinced, moreover, that many army leaders acted in the same way as the leader of the 6th Army and simply did not carry out the order. At any rate, it was expressly rescinded afterward. DR. FRITZ: The Prosecution quotes two paragraphs from your radio speech of 5 July 1941. Mr. President, that is in the English record of Captain Sprecher, Pages 32 and 33. [_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution concludes from this presentation that you had agitated for ruthless measures against the population of the Soviet Union. You are said to have vilified the people of the Soviet Union. THE PRESIDENT: We cannot find it here. What is the PS number? DR. FRITZ: It is in the transcript, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: We have not got the transcript here. We have the document book. The document book does not contain 32 and 33 pages. It contains only 32 or 31 and a little bit... DR. FRITZ: I can give the document number which is 3064-PS, Exhibit USA-723 and... THE PRESIDENT: It is Page 14 in our book. Well, did you say 5 July? DR. FRITZ: 5 July 1941. THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have got the 7th and 10th of July but not the 5th. What page in the shorthand notes was it? You know it? DR. FRITZ: On Page 32, Page 33 in the English transcript. I have the English transcript here. THE PRESIDENT: Well, you had better read it then. DR. FRITZ: This quotation from Captain Sprecher’s speech for the Prosecution reads: “Letters from the front, film reporters, propaganda companies attached to the German Army wherever it advanced, P. K. reporters, and soldiers on leave confirm: In this battle in the East it is not one ideology fighting against another, not one political system against another, but culture, civilization, and human dignity have revolted against devilish principles of an underworld.” FRITZSCHE: I should like to state the following: With this statement I was neither calling for ruthless measures against the population of the Soviet Union, nor did I want to vilify the people of the Soviet Union. I refer to the full text of the speech of 5 July. I do not wish to read this speech, but I should like permission to sum it up briefly. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, in my Document Book 1—I do not know whether the Tribunal already has it—I have all the radio speeches... THE PRESIDENT: No, we haven’t got it. DR. FRITZ: I have all these radio speeches of the Defendant Fritzsche from which the Prosecution quoted passages against him in my document book in their full text. THE PRESIDENT: It has just been handed up to me. What page is it? DR. FRITZ: Pages 8 to 13, the radio speech of 5 July 1941. [_Turning to the defendant._] Will you continue? FRITZSCHE: I ask for permission to sum up the contents very briefly. I spoke of the reports which the German public received about what German soldiers had seen in their advance in the Soviet Union, especially in connection with prisoners in the prisons in various cities. I did not describe these things once more; I only recalled them from the reports which had been given out at the time. From them I drew the conclusion that now one saw how necessary the fight was against a system under which such atrocities were possible. For the peoples of the Soviet Union I expressly used words of compassion and sympathy. DR. FRITZ: In the same connection, and with the same tendency, the Prosecution then quotes a sentence from a paragraph of your radio speech of 10 July 1941. Mr. President, that is in Document Book 1—the speech of 10 July 1941—also in its full text, on Pages 14 to 19. [_Turning to the defendant._] What do you have to say to this charge? FRITZSCHE: What I just said becomes even clearer in this quotation, and in this whole speech. I referred once more to the reports just mentioned. I also referred to the descriptions coming from foreign correspondents. I then quite frankly reported Moscow’s attitude toward these events and I said, quite honestly, “Radio Moscow says that these atrocities are facts, but it maintains that these atrocities were not committed by Russians but by Germans.” In view of this attitude of Moscow, I, so to speak, took the public into my confidence. I called upon millions of German soldiers as witnesses; I called upon their mothers and fathers and wives as witnesses. I formally called as witnesses the inhabitants of the occupied territories in which Germans were in power at the time, and in which, as I said, they were subordinated only to the moral laws in their own breasts. Then I drew the conclusion: These German soldiers cannot have committed the atrocities which were described by Berlin and Moscow in the same way. The Prosecution asserted that this attempt to ascribe German atrocities to the Russians was ridiculous. I do not consider it ridiculous; I consider it tragic. It shows clearly, as I understand it, the absolute cleanliness and honesty of the whole German conduct of the war. I still believe today that murder and violence and Sonderkommandos only clung like a foreign body, like a boil, to the morally sound body of the German people and their Armed Forces. DR. FRITZ: Finally, the Prosecution quotes a passage from your speech of 9 October 1941, another quotation from which was brought out elsewhere. Mr. President, this is in the Fritzsche Document Book Number 1; the speech in its full text is on Pages 20 to 25. The quotations of the Prosecution are summed up in a document in the Fritzsche document book of the Prosecution. I think the Tribunal can easily compare it. [_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution concludes from this quotation that you had approved of the policy of the Nazi conspirators in their ruthless exploitation of the occupied territories. What have you to say to that? FRITZSCHE: There is no question of ruthlessness either in the quotation given by the Prosecution or in the rest of the text of the speech of 9 October 1941. I refer to my affidavit 3469-PS, Paragraph 39, a paragraph which the Prosecution very fairly quoted in this connection. In addition, may I once more sum up, very briefly, the sense of this speech. That was the time when German soldiers were stationed from the Black Sea to the Bay of Biscay. I spoke of the possibility of exploiting the resources of this enormous territory. I said, “The possibilities of this continent are so considerable that they can cover any need for war and for peace.” I said, in this connection, that a starving-out by blockade, such as was attempted in 1914-18, was now out of the question. I spoke of the possibilities of the organization of Europe which could begin in the midst of the war... DR. FRITZ: In the midst of war? FRITZSCHE: ...in the midst of war, and I meant the organization of European nations with equal rights. It is beyond all doubt that at that time I was not thinking of ruthless exploitation of the occupied territories, but only of winning them over politically and economically after the storms of war had blown by. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, I now come to another subject, so perhaps this would be a good time to break off. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. DR. THOMA: I have a request, Mr. President. I would like to have my client excused for the rest of the day because I want to talk to him. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. [_A recess was taken._] DR. FRITZ: What did you know about the removal of Jews from occupied countries? FRITZSCHE: I did not know anything of their removal, but I heard that certain individuals were being arrested, Jews and non-Jews. DR. FRITZ: What did you know about the topic, which we discussed here, of slave labor? FRITZSCHE: I knew that millions of foreign workers were working in the Reich. I did not consider them slaves, for I saw them daily walking about free on the streets of all the cities. DR. FRITZ: What did you know about their treatment, about their living conditions, and their wages? FRITZSCHE: Reports about these things were sent to me or to my co-workers from the office of Sauckel and the German Labor Front. From these reports, among other things, I remember the fact that the foreign workers were given the same treatment as the German workers in every respect. I further recall having heard that the initial inferior treatment accorded to Eastern Workers had been done away with. I received many reports from listeners complaining about the fact that foreign workers were allegedly in better position than German workers; and in this connection, I remember a reference to the fact that the foreign workers were permitted to send home money in the form of foreign exchange. I also talked with foreign workers many times. I did not hear any special complaints. On the other hand, in the Propaganda Ministry, through official channels, I heard a great deal about the care given to foreign workers even along cultural lines. Frequently I was approached by Sauckel or the German Labor Front—I do not remember which it was—with the request to have radio broadcasts sent to one or another group of foreign workers. I was approached also with the request for turning over receiving sets to camps of foreign workers, _et cetera_. DR. FRITZ: Did you know that most of them did not come to Germany voluntarily? FRITZSCHE: That was exactly what I did not know. Here in this proceeding it was mentioned that Sauckel in one meeting or another made a statement about the fact that only a small percentage had come voluntarily. That was unknown to me. I did hear the following complaints: First of all, that extravagant promises were made at the time of recruitment of the foreign workers, which could not be kept afterward. In the interest of my propaganda I had objections raised against that through the propaganda department of my Ministry when I heard about it. Then, I remember having heard complaints from Poland dealing with the fact that employers were “pirating” Polish workers from one another. DR. FRITZ: Sauckel testified that in this connection he co-operated with the Propaganda Ministry and that he had many discussions with the Propaganda Ministry. Did you participate in such discussions? FRITZSCHE: No, I did not participate in these conferences. I thought that I met Sauckel here for the first time. He reminded me of our meeting in the spring of 1945 at the home of Dr. Goebbels when some evening gathering took place. DR. FRITZ: Did you have anything to do with the propaganda used in the recruitment of foreign workers in occupied countries? FRITZSCHE: No. DR. FRITZ: What did you have to do with the propaganda which was disseminated in the occupied countries? FRITZSCHE: This propaganda, as it applied to occupied countries, was not subordinate to me, not even in the branches of the press or radio. This propaganda was under the direction and supervision of the local Reich commissioner, military commander, or governor. However, I did exert influence on this propaganda in the occupied countries on two, three, or four occasions when this propaganda in the occupied countries was contrary to the directives which applied to the Reich. I usually gathered this from the echo abroad. I remember one special case which received general attention. A certain man by the name of Friedrich attacked the Pope over the German radio in Paris. I had this man Friedrich replaced. That was the extent of my influence. Dr. Goebbels, however, exerted much more influence on the propaganda in the occupied countries, especially through his foreign section or his Foreign Press Department or through his liaison officer to the OKW. DR. FRITZ: Did you not make any radio broadcasts in the occupied countries? FRITZSCHE: Yes, broadcasts of two types. An example of the first type is as follows: At the time of the occupation, Radio Paris was under German influence. Despite that, I retained the old German broadcast in the French language via Radio Stuttgart. I wanted to have it understood quite specifically that the occupation was an abnormal and a temporary situation, and anything that was taking place during the period of occupation did not have anything to do with that part of, let us say, German-French conversations, which was being carried on by the two mother countries. The second example is as follows: It concerns German broadcasts in the Spanish and Portuguese languages. I had them transmitted through three stations in southern France, for it was easier to receive these transmissions in the Pyrenees peninsula. The basis for my work in this connection was a contract which we had with these stations and the payment of regular charges. Negotiations for this contract were carried out through the Foreign Office. DR. FRITZ: I shall now turn to a different topic. You are accused of making anti-Semitic statements. Were you anti-Semitic, and in what way did you participate in anti-Semitic propaganda? FRITZSCHE: I was not anti-Semitic in the idea of a noisy anti-Semitism. The Prosecution has asserted that all defendants—that is, including myself—had shouted, “Germany awake and Judaism shall die.” I will state under oath that I never raised this cry or one similar. I was not anti-Semitic in the sense of either the radical theories or methods beginning with Theodor Fritsch to Julius Streicher. The Prosecution has stated that even the Defendant Streicher, the main anti-Jewish agitator of all times, could hardly have excelled Fritzsche when it came to libels against the Jews. I protest against this statement. I do not believe that I deserve any such accusation. Never did I give out any propaganda dealing with ritual murders, cabala, and the so-called secrets of the Elders of Zion. At all times of my life I considered them machinations of a rather primitive agitation. For humanitarian reasons, I regret that I have to make a further statement, but I cannot refrain from making this statement in the interests of truth. My co-workers and I, in the press and on the radio, without exception I would say, rejected _Der Stürmer_ radically. I personally, during a period of 13 years of regular newspaper comments, never quoted this paper. _Der Stürmer_ was not quoted in the German press either. The editors did not belong to the journalists’ union and the publisher did not belong to the publishers’ organization during my term of office. How things were later on, I do not know. As I have already stated in my affidavit, I tried twice to ban _Der Stürmer_. However, I did not succeed. Then it was proposed that I censor _Der Stürmer_. However, I declined the offer. I wanted to prohibit the publishing of _Der Stürmer_, not just because the mere verbatim reproduction of a page of the newspaper _Der Stürmer_ was the most effective anti-German propaganda which ever existed, but I wanted to ban _Der Stürmer_ simply for reasons of good taste. I wanted to prohibit it as a source of radicalism against which I fought wherever I met it. The great secret for the sudden increase in the circulation of _Der Stürmer_ after 1933 to half a million, already referred to in this Court, lay in the same cause as the secret of the sudden increase of such organizations as the SA. The Party in 1933 had blocked the influx of new members, and a great many people tried to get in somehow, if not directly with the Party, then with some organization connected with the Party, such as, perhaps, the SA. Or they tried to show sympathy with National Socialist ideas by subscribing to _Der Stürmer_ and displaying it. Therefore, in that sense, I was not anti-Semitic. But I was anti-Semitic in this sense: I wanted a restriction of the predominant influence of Jewry in German politics, economy, and culture, such as was manifested after the first World War. I wanted a restriction based on the ratio of Jews to Germans. I proclaimed publicly this view of mine on occasions, but I did not exploit these views in extensive systematic propaganda. Those anti-Semitic statements with which I am charged by the Prosecution have a different connection. The facts are as follows: After the outbreak of the war I referred frequently to the fact that Jewish emigrants immediately after 1933, were the first ones to emphasize that a war against the National Socialist German State was necessary; for instance, Emil Ludwig or George Bernhard or the _Pariser Tageblatt_. As far as I recall, this was the only connection in which I made anti-Semitic statements of any kind. I cannot say this without asking to be permitted to emphasize one more point. Only in these proceedings here did I learn that in the autumn of 1939 there was more at stake than just one city and a road through the Corridor; that in truth and in fact, a new partition of Poland had already been prepared at least, and only here in these proceedings did I learn that Hitler had confirmed in a dreadful manner the warnings of the Jews against him by an order to murder them. If I had known both of these things at that time, then I would have pictured the role of Jewish propaganda before the outbreak of the war quite differently. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to refer to the document which has already been submitted, Document Number Fritzsche-2, the affidavit by Dr. Scharping, with reference to Pages 9 to 11. This document is found in my Document Book Number 2; however, I do not know whether this document book has been submitted to the High Tribunal. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it has. DR. FRITZ: Pages 9 to 11. I refer to the contents of this document. [_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution has quoted a passage from the book by Müller, dealing with the Propaganda Ministry. According to this, among other things, it was the task of this Ministry to enlighten the population about the Jewish question. According to the picture drawn by the Prosecution, matters stood as though you were the one charged with the task of this enlightenment; is that correct? FRITZSCHE: No. The “Jewry” department was a branch of the propaganda department which carried on this so-called active propaganda in opposition to the specialized or administrative departments. I never directed this department of propaganda. DR. FRITZ: I should like to interpolate a question. The Defendant Streicher, on 29 April, stated that the Propaganda Ministry published a _National Socialist Correspondence_ which was sent to _Der Stürmer_ as well and which contained in each issue several anti-Semitic articles. Is that true? FRITZSCHE: No. The _National Socialist Correspondence_ was not published by the Propaganda Ministry, but by the Reichspressestelle (Reich Press Office) of the NSDAP; however, I did not have the impression that the particular policy followed by _Der Stürmer_ took its character from these articles. On the other hand, _Der Stürmer_ may have published one or the other article which was given out by the NSK. DR. FRITZ: The Prosecution quoted a passage from a speech which you made over the radio on 18 December 1941. This speech will be found in full in my Document Book Number 1, Pages 26 to 32. In this instance, you said that the fate of Jewry in Europe had been rather unpleasant and that this fate in all probability would stretch over to the New World as well. The Prosecution holds the view that this was a proclamation of further actions in the persecution of Jews. What can you tell us about this? FRITZSCHE: In this quotation, I discussed the unpleasant fate of Jewry in Europe. According to the things that we know today, this must appear as though I meant the murder of the Jews. But in this connection, I should like to state that at that time I did not know about these murders; therefore I could not have meant it. I did not even mean the evacuation of Jews, for even this was not carried out in Berlin at least until a year or two later. What I meant was simply the elimination of Jews from politics and economic life. The expression “unpleasant” hints at this; otherwise the inoffensiveness of this term could not be explained. And now to the question of why I spoke about the Jews in America in this connection. The sentence quoted by the Prosecution is inextricably connected with a communication preceding it, stating that a Jewish National Council had submitted to President Roosevelt their wish to enter the war. Not even this association of ideas, which is perhaps understandable now, was used by me without good reason. The largest part of the speech in question, perhaps nine-tenths of it, in fact, deals with the investigation commission set up in the United States to investigate the causes of Pearl Harbor. THE PRESIDENT: There are a lot of pages in this. DR. FRITZ: The Document Book Number 1, Mr. President, Pages 26 to 32. THE PRESIDENT: Yes; I wanted to know whether first of all we are on Page 31. DR. FRITZ: He is referring in his statements which he is making now to the entire contents of the speech, Mr. President. The Prosecution had quoted only the very last paragraph of this speech. [_Turning to the defendant.]_ Please continue. FRITZSCHE: In this polemic address I not only suggested investigating whether the guards of the U. S. Navy had been careless but I also advised checking into American politics, as to whether someone might not have been interested in the outbreak of the war. In this connection, I recalled that an investigating committee of the American Senate, 20 years after the first World War, had investigated the causes for entry of the United States in the war in 1917. I said verbatim, “This Senate committee proved that Wilson, when entering the war, knew that he was the victim of a few warmongers.” I deplored... THE PRESIDENT: The investigation committee of the Americans about the entry into the last war? Isn’t he going rather far back? DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, I believe that the defendant can stop at this point. He only wanted to show that the quotation of the last paragraph cited by the Prosecution in order to incriminate him was, torn from its contents. That is the fact he wanted to show, Mr. President. [_Turning to the defendant._] The second quotation used by the Prosecution is an excerpt from your radio speech of 18 March 1941. The Prosecution was of the opinion that this was also an incitement for the persecution of Jews, and they said, further, that it was proof of your propaganda with the term “master race.” Mr. President, this speech of 18 March 1941 may be found in my Document Book Number 1, Pages 2 to 7. [_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution quoted only one paragraph from this speech. What can you tell us in this connection? FRITZSCHE: I do not wish to read this quotation. I rather ask that you read it carefully yourself, and after you have read it you will see that I completely agreed with Mr. Roosevelt when he said that there was no master race. I endorsed the correctness of this sentence not only as it applied to the German people, but to Jewry as well. The Prosecution concluded from this sentence that it was a justification for acts committed in Jewish persecutions in the past and that it was a foreboding of more persecutions to come. I do not understand this conclusion; it has no basis whatsoever. THE PRESIDENT: In our copy there is no date at the top of Page 2 of your Volume I—yes, I see it is in the index. Which page of it is the passage that the Prosecution quotes? DR. FRITZ: On Page 5 under Point 5, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Very well. DR. FRITZ: It begins with the words, “But the crown...” and so forth. That is the quotation used by the Prosecution. [_Turning to the defendant._] The third quotation used by the Prosecution is a passage from the speech which you made on 9 October 1941. Mr. President, the whole speech is to be found in Document Book Number 1, Pages 20 to 25. [_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution quoted only one paragraph from this speech as well. In this paragraph, you, Herr Fritzsche, are speaking about a new wave of international Jewish-democratic-bolshevistic agitation. What can you tell us about this? FRITZSCHE: I have very little to say in this connection. This speech was made in those days of the autumn of 1941 when the Reich Press Chief had announced that German victory in the East had been decisive. I had warned the entire German press about taking this slogan without reservations. I did not believe in this decision which supposedly had already taken place. I suggested to all German newspapers that they speak about a prolonged duration of the war. In this speech of mine I wanted to weaken the impression of the official victory bulletin. Therefore, in this speech, and perhaps for the first time in Germany, I mentioned those three factors which, in fact, later on determined the war in the East against Germany: First of all, the partisans; secondly, the international help in the way of arms and munitions; and thirdly, propaganda. This last part alone was quoted by the Prosecution. As I have already said, this last part is quite in accord with the knowledge and opinion I held at that time. DR. FRITZ: The next quotation used by the Prosecution is an extract from a speech which you made on 8 January 1944. The complete speech, Mr. President, may be found in my Document Book Number 1. It is speech Number 7, to be found on Pages 40 to 45. [_Turning to the defendant._] In this speech you are stating that it was not a new form of government or a new form of socialism which had brought about the war, but rather the agitation of Jews and plutocrats was responsible for this. How did you come to make that statement? FRITZSCHE: To justify it, I should like to refer here, too, to everything that I have already said, and beyond that, I should like to emphasize that this rather heated accusation was not made by me just out of the blue or just because I wanted to agitate. This is proven by the context. If I may be permitted to do so, I should like to state briefly the connection in this case. The topic of this speech was the differences of opinion which existed at that time between the Polish Exile Government in Moscow—rather, in London—and the Soviet Government in Moscow. There was a matter of territorial demands which they disagreed on, and on this occasion I quoted the London _Times_ word for word. The London _Times_ said that “the relinquishing of Polish regions, as demanded by Russia, was only a small and modest price for the absolute and reliable guarantee to Poland of help through the Soviet Union.” This statement made by the London Times I used as a matter of course in a polemic statement in which I said, “Well, if the _Times_ had written in such a strain in August of 1939, that it was only about a city or a road, then surely there would not have been any war,” and so forth. On this occasion I should like to state that all of these quotations, almost without exception, show only the combination of the concept Jew, Plutocrat, Bolshevik. The question of race was not the primary one, but the thing that was primary was the ideological struggle as it seemed, to my mind, to be taking place. DR. FRITZ: The next quotations used by the Prosecution are some excerpts from your speech of 13 January 1945. Mr. President, this is speech Number 8, contained in full in Document Book Number 1, to be found on Pages 46 to 51. The Prosecution in this case is quoting only two paragraphs, one on Page 50 of my document book, Paragraph 2. [_Turning to the defendant._] In these passages you mention Jewish influence on British policies. How could you make those statements? What were your reasons? FRITZSCHE: The Prosecution assumes from this quotation that it was the introduction to further persecution of the Jews and to their complete extermination. This conclusion, however, is justified neither in the words nor in the sense nor when seen in the light of the context... I shall forego giving you in this case a picture of the connections, not even in a brief summary. It can be gathered when you read the speech in question. However, I cannot see where an appeal for the extermination of the Jews is to be found. DR. FRITZ: Forming a part of the general crimes against humanity you are accused of incitive libel against the Jews, the logical result of which is said to have been further persecutions. Therefore, I want to ask you about the murder of Jews. Did you know of Hitler’s decree, as testified by the witness Hoess, a decree according to which the Jews were to be murdered? FRITZSCHE: I should like to state under my oath that I did not know of this order by Hitler. If I had known it, I would not have served that person who had given this order for another hour. I should like to state further that evidently this decree, as well as this entire action, was concealed with specific care from me and my co-workers, because once I almost discovered its existence. DR. FRITZ: Did you receive at any time an indication about the killing of a large number of innocent people? FRITZSCHE: Yes. In February or March 1942 I received a letter from a medium-ranking SS leader of the Ukraine. I do not recall this man’s name. The contents of the letter were to the effect that the author was the commander of an SS unit, that he had received an order to kill the Jews and the Ukrainian intelligentsia of his area. Upon receipt of this order, he had suffered a nervous breakdown and he was now in a hospital. It seemed to him that a complaint along official channels was quite impossible for him. He said he did not know me but had confidence in me; perhaps I could help in some way. He asked me not to mention his name as he was bound to silence at the cost of his life. Without much hesitation and immediately upon receipt of this letter I called Heydrich, the Obergruppenführer, then leader of the RSHA or the Gestapo. I hardly knew him personally, but he declared himself quite willing to receive me immediately. I visited him and asked him pointblank, “Is your SS there for the purpose of committing mass murders?” Heydrich was quite indignant at this question, and said that larger or smaller SS units had been assigned by him for police purposes to various ministers, Reich commissioners, and so forth. These special details of SS men had been misused on various occasions, and he thought this might apply to the unit which had been placed at the disposal of Gauleiter Koch. He told me that he would have an investigation started immediately. Next noon he called me, from headquarters as he said, and let me know that this action had actually been attempted on the order of Koch. Koch, for his part, had referred to the Führer. The Führer, however, had not answered as yet. Heydrich said I would receive further details. Two days later Heydrich asked me to come and visit him and said Hitler had expressly declared that he had not given this order; Koch now said that there was a misunderstanding. I was further told that an investigation of Koch had been started. At any rate, Heydrich promised me that this action would not be carried through. I remember particularly well one sentence which was used in this discussion, words used by Heydrich: “Believe me, Herr Fritzsche, anyone who has the reputation of being cruel does not have to be cruel; he can act humanely.” Shortly thereafter, I was made a soldier and asked to be sent to the 6th Army and was sent to the Ukraine. DR. FRITZ: Did you... THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I did not understand that last sentence. Heydrich said, “Believe me, Herr Fritzsche...” and then... FRITZSCHE: May I repeat: “...anyone who has the reputation of being cruel does not have to be cruel; he can act humanely.” THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but then you went on about going to the 6th Army? FRITZSCHE: Yes, shortly thereafter I became a soldier... DR. FRITZ: He added, Mr. President, that shortly after this meeting with Heydrich, he himself, that is the Defendant Fritzsche, became a soldier and he specifically asked to be detailed to the 6th Army which at that time was stationed in the Ukraine. THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of this incident? FRITZSCHE: February-March 1942. DR. FRITZ: When you were a soldier in the Ukraine, did you try to check the statements of Heydrich as to their correctness? FRITZSCHE: I had no official authority to do this, but as an old journalist I made investigations on my own, of course. First of all, I investigated in Kiev, with the local German radio station. The answer was: Yes, several shootings actually did take place, specifically after the blowing up of certain blocks of houses in Kiev, on which occasion many German soldiers lost their lives. However, they were shootings according to sentences imposed by courts-martial. Then, for 3 days I traveled in all directions between Kiev and Poltava. Mostly I traveled alone. I found the population in utmost peace; there were no signs of terror whatsoever, and by the way, I was received very well myself. At Poltava I checked with officers and soldiers. On these occasions as well, I was told, “Yes, there were some court-martial sentences. The reason for these sentences was sabotage.” Then, in Kharkov itself, I visited the SS command stationed there, and I spoke with the Sturmführer Rexlach. He denied any shooting actions. He showed me the prison and there were perhaps 50 inmates, no more. I asked him about camps and he stated that there were none. Then I visited a Ukrainian family; I questioned a German agricultural leader at Bielgorod, and I met with the same result in every case: no shooting actions took place. I certainly assumed from that that it had been an attempted individual action which had not been carried through. DR. FRITZ: Before this letter which the SS leader had sent you, did you not already have suspicions, perhaps from Allied radio broadcasts to which you had access? FRITZSCHE: These radio broadcasts were accessible to me. I had reports on atrocities specially gathered at that time and selected from the great number of enemy broadcasts which we received every day, and then I had these reports investigated and checked. DR. FRITZ: And who concerned himself with this checking? FRITZSCHE: The competent specialist, Oberregierungsrat Körber, in charge of the Schnelldienst office of the Press Department, or one of his co-workers, or I myself. DR. FRITZ: Where was this checked? FRITZSCHE: We inquired of the RSHA, for in most of these reports of atrocities the SS or Gestapo were mentioned as the ones who had perpetrated the murders. DR. FRITZ: At which of the many branches of this office did you inquire? FRITZSCHE: We inquired at the various competent offices, and I do not doubt that we inquired of Eichmann, who has been mentioned in these proceedings here. Apart from that, we inquired of Sturmbannführer Spengler or his deputy Von Kielpinsky, both of them members of that office which, at that time or later, was taken over by Ohlendorf who has also appeared here as a witness. Frequently we inquired of the branch offices of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, the so-called state police control offices as well, especially if there were reports from a special area. DR. FRITZ: What were the answers you received? FRITZSCHE: We always received the answer that the report in question was either completely wrong and was an invention, or that the report had this or that legal basis. Frequently figures and details were reported which in effect were quite disarming. DR. FRITZ: Are there any records of this? FRITZSCHE: Yes. The more important questions and answers were noted and were even reproduced and sent to the various offices within and outside the Propaganda Ministry. All the material was collected in the archives called “Schnelldienst,” for which I applied here and which was granted to me but not found. DR. FRITZ: And you just believed these answers? FRITZSCHE: Yes, I did believe them, for after all this was information which was given to me by official sources and furthermore I had experienced on numerous occasions that the authenticity of such reports from these sources had been proved very drastically. DR. FRITZ: What do you mean by that? FRITZSCHE: Perhaps I might give you an example. The first propaganda action of the war was the report given out by Warsaw about the destruction of the picture of the “Black Madonna” of Czestochowa. This report was transmitted around the world. We took German and foreign journalists to Czestochowa, who could assure themselves that this report was not true. But I must be quite honest here and say that I really wanted to cite another example in reply to this question put by my counsel, another report which really had its surprising after-effects for me in this courtroom some 2 or 3 days ago. The British newspaper _News Chronicle_, on 24 September 1939, printed the report that the German... THE PRESIDENT: What is the evidential value of the _News Chronicle_ in 1939? DR. FRITZ: The defendant wants to prove to the High Tribunal that he found that many reports from abroad, dealing with German atrocities, actually were false, so that... THE PRESIDENT: Well, we do not need details about that. No doubt there were frequent reports which were not accurate. We do not want you to go into details. FRITZSCHE: I wanted to prove with just one news item how at that time something which the world believed could be denied and then, in the shadow of this denial, quite unnoticed by the German public, something did take place, such as a larger wave of arrests or a similar matter. THE PRESIDENT: He can state the facts, but he need not go into detail about a particular issue of the newspaper. DR. FRITZ: Was it only once, Herr Fritzsche, that you learned of the falsehood of such foreign broadcasts? FRITZSCHE: No, that took place quite frequently. DR. FRITZ: Please be very brief, Herr Fritzsche. FRITZSCHE: One of my co-workers gathered the necessary material for an article entitled, “In 8 Weeks of War 107 Lies.” I should like to say only one thing about this. The compilation of such false reports given out by our enemy gave me a sense of moral superiority over that type of reporting, and this feeling was the basis of my later work, which could not be explained without this feeling. DR. FRITZ: Did it not strike you that such false reports occurred only in the beginning of the war? FRITZSCHE: No, that thought never occurred to me. The reports were so numerous in the beginning and I could also notice them in later years. Some affected me personally. DR. FRITZ: How far did they affect you personally? Can you sketch it in a few brief words? FRITZSCHE: Just one of many statements: An enemy front propaganda bulletin accused me of the fact that 600,000 Swedish kroner... THE PRESIDENT: What is he going to now? What is the purpose of this? DR. FRITZ: He wants to give an example of how a false statement applied to him personally. He wanted to state that briefly. THE PRESIDENT: Well, as I said already, there were, no doubt, erroneous statements made in the foreign press and every press. We cannot investigate those sorts of matters. DR. FRITZ: Then I shall pass on to another question. [_Turning to the defendant._] Did you not, as an experienced journalist in the news service, have the feeling that where there is smoke there is fire? Did you not believe that at least something must be true of the enemy reports about murders and so forth in the areas under German domination? FRITZSCHE: Precisely because I was a professional newsman I did not have this feeling. Again and again I thought—and I repeatedly reminded the public—of one erroneous bit of reporting of the first World War. I beg the Tribunal to grant me permission to mention it quite briefly because it is also a part of the fundamentals of the propaganda which I carried on. THE PRESIDENT: No, I have already pointed out that we assume that there are a variety of errors. We do not want to go into detail. DR. FRITZ: Then I shall turn to another question. [_Turning to the defendant._] But surely you knew that the Jews had been evacuated from the Reich; you must have noticed that they disappeared from the streets? FRITZSCHE: Yes, I did notice that even though this occurred very gradually. Beyond that I heard Dr. Goebbels say on the occasion of a ministerial conference that as Gauleiter in Berlin he had demanded the evacuation of Jews. DR. FRITZ: Where were these Jews taken in your opinion and what were you told about these things? FRITZSCHE: Dr. Goebbels told me that they were taken to reservations in Poland. The suspicion that they were taken to concentration camps, or that they were even being murdered, never arose. DR. FRITZ: Did you inquire about these reservations into which the Jews were allegedly being taken? FRITZSCHE: Of course I did that. For instance, I learned of various things from a former co-worker of mine who had been transferred into the administration of the Government General and who had an administrative position in the region Biala-Podlaska. He said that the area under his control had become a Jewish area, and he repeatedly pictured the arrival and the housing of these transportees. He also mentioned the difficulties and the employment of Jews as workers or on plantations. His entire description bore witness to his humane point of view. He told me that under him the Jews fared better than they had in the Reich. DR. FRITZ: What was the name of this man? FRITZSCHE: Oberregierungsrat Hubert Kühl. DR. FRITZ: Did you hear unfavorable reports about these deported Jews? FRITZSCHE: Yes. Sturmbannführer Radke of the staff of the Reichsführer SS reported, perhaps in the winter of 1942, that the mortality rate of the Jews in the eastern ghettos was abnormally high due to the changeover from mental work to manual labor. He mentioned there were even some isolated cases of typhus. Apart from that, Dr. Tauber, who was head of the section dealing with Jewish questions in the propaganda department, told me in 1941, if I remember correctly, that there had been pogroms during the occupation of Lvov and Kovno, but they were carried out by the local population. He assured me at the same time that the German authorities had taken steps against these pogroms. Nevertheless the references to such things caused me to criticize matters severely, even though these things today look almost insignificant compared with what we know of today. My criticism was directed against my superiors, particularly Dr. Goebbels, and also against co-workers and members of the Gestapo and of the Party. I referred repeatedly to the legal, political, and moral necessity of protecting these Jews, who, after all, had been entrusted to our care. DR. FRITZ: Did you learn anything else about the fate of these Jews? FRITZSCHE: On several occasions Jews or relatives or friends of Jews appealed to me because of discrimination or arrests. A large number of non-Jews also did this as my name had become well-known to the public. Without exception, I made their pleas my own and I tried to help through various offices such as the RSHA, through the personnel section of my Ministry, through individual ministers and Gauleiter, _et cetera_. DR. FRITZ: Why did you turn to so many different authorities and offices? FRITZSCHE: Very many requests were involved, and if my name had appeared too often at the same office its effectiveness would have been exhausted very quickly. DR. FRITZ: Did you on occasion turn down these requests? FRITZSCHE: No, not in one single instance, and I should like to emphasize that particularly because a letter addressed to me in this prison here was not handed over to me but was published in the press. It was a letter in which a woman asserted that I had turned down a request for pardon. I remember this case specifically and I should like to emphasize briefly that in this case I had expressly called on the Reich Minister of Justice... THE PRESIDENT: It is sufficient for him to say that he did not turn them down. We do not want one instance of somebody who wrote to him. How long are you going to be, Dr. Fritz? DR. FRITZ: I believe I shall be able to conclude the entire Fritzsche case tomorrow morning. Mr. President, I have heard that there is no open session this afternoon... THE PRESIDENT: Yes. DR. FRITZ: ...otherwise I would have been able to conclude the entire Fritzsche case today. However, I hope to be able to conclude my examination of the defendant in his own case and that of the witness Von Schirmeister. I hope that tomorrow noon I shall be able to conclude. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hopes so too, because, as I have pointed out to you, we do not want you to go into such elaborate detail. You have been going, in the opinion of the Tribunal, far too much into detail, and we want the matter dealt with more generally. [_The Tribunal adjourned until 28 June 1946 at 1000 hours._] ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SIXTH DAY Friday, 28 June 1946 _Morning Session_ [_The Defendant Fritzsche resumed the stand._] DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Bench, the Defendant Fritzsche, toward the end of yesterday morning’s session, testified as to how he tried to aid persecuted persons, within the scope of his limited opportunities. In order to conclude this subject, and with the approval of the Prosecution, I submit Document Number Fritzsche-6, an affidavit of Count Westarp, which is to be found in my Document Book Number 2 on Pages 23 to 25, dated 15 June 1946. I beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the contents of this document. Furthermore, as another piece of evidence, I should like to offer another affidavit, made by a Frau Krüger, Berlin, which is to be Document Number Fritzsche-8. This affidavit has not yet been included in my document book. However, the original was made by Frau Krüger in German as well as in English and both copies have been affirmed and sworn to. I should like to refer to the contents of this affidavit, especially to the last two paragraphs. From the last paragraph but one we can see that apart from individual cases Frau Krüger has a general knowledge of the defendant’s activities. And the last paragraph is quite interesting; it deals with the manner of life led by the Defendant Fritzsche. Apart from that, I also refer here to the entire contents of this article and I ask the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. Finally, in this connection, I should like to refer to an affidavit made by Dr. Scharping which has been frequently quoted, Document Number Fritzsche-2, which is to be found in the Fritzsche Document Book Number 2, Pages 6 to 15. I refer particularly to Page 13 at the bottom of the page, and the top of Page 14. Herr Fritzsche, I should like to put two more general questions to you on this topic. During the last period of the war, did you not try to find out something about the final fate of the Jews? FRITZSCHE: Yes. I made the most of an opportunity to which I will refer briefly later on. I asked a colleague of Obergruppenführer Glücks, in Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen, about the Jews. Briefly summarized, his answer was as follows: The Jews were under the special protection of the Reichsführer SS who wished to make a political deal with them. He looked upon them as a kind of hostages and he did not wish a single hair from their heads to be harmed. DR. FRITZ: Some of the Prosecution’s Witnesses have asserted during this Trial that the German public knew about these murders. Now I just want to ask you, as a journalist who worked in the National Socialist State, what was, as far as you know, the attitude of the broad mass of the German people to the Jews? Did the people know about the murder of the Jews? Please be brief. FRITZSCHE: Leaving out all those matters which have already been mentioned at this Trial, I should like to mention only a few observations which to me seem important. I shall omit the period shortly after the first World War, which has already been described, during which certain anti-Semitic feelings were popular in Germany. I should like to state only that in 1933 at the time of the Jewish boycott, which was organized by the NSDAP, the sympathies of the German people clearly turned again in favor of the Jews. For a number of years the Party tried hard to prevent the public from buying in Jewish stores. Finally they even had to resort to threats. A profound and decisive factor in this development was the promulgating of the Nuremberg Laws. As a result of these the fight against the Jews was taken for the first time out of the sphere of pure agitation, that is, the kind of agitation from which one could remain aloof, and shifted to the field of State Police. At that time a deep feeling of fear ran through the German people, for now dissension spread even to individual families. At that time many human tragedies resulted, tragedies which were obvious to many, probably to everyone, and there was only one justification for these racial laws. There was only one excuse for them and one explanation; that was the assertion and the hope: Well, now that the separation of the two peoples is being carried out, although painfully, there will at last be an end to the wild and unbridled agitation; and due to this separation there will be peace where formerly only unrest reigned. When the Jews were forced to wear the emblem of a star and when, for instance, in Berlin they were prohibited from occupying seats on streetcars, the German people openly took sides with the Jews and it happened again and again that Jews were ostentatiously offered seats. In this connection I heard several declarations by Dr. Goebbels, who was extremely bitter about this undesired effect of the marking of the Jews. I, as a journalist who worked during that period, am firmly convinced that the German people were unaware of the mass murders of the Jews and assertions to that effect were considered rumors; and reports which reached the German people from outside were officially denied again and again. As these documents are not in my possession, I cannot quote from memory individual cases of denial; but one case I do remember with particular clearness. That was the moment when the Russians, after they recaptured Kharkov, started legal proceedings during which killing by gas was mentioned for the first time. I ran to Dr. Goebbels with these reports and asked him about the facts. He stated he would have the matter investigated and would discuss it with Himmler and with Hitler. The next day he sent me notice of denial. This denial was not made public; and the reason stated was that in German legal proceedings it is necessary to state in a much plainer manner matters that need clarification. However, Dr. Goebbels explicitly informed me that the gas vans mentioned in the Russian legal proceeding were pure invention and that there was no actual proof to support it. It was not without reason that the people who operated these vans were put under the ban of strictest secrecy. If the German people had learned of these mass murders, they would certainly no longer have supported Hitler. They would probably have sacrificed 5 million for a victory, but never would the German people have wished to bring about victory by the murder of 5 million people. I should like to state further that this murder decree of Hitler’s seems to me the end of every race theory, every race philosophy, every kind of race propaganda, for after this catastrophe any further advocacy of race theory would be equivalent to approval in theory of further murder. An ideology in the name of which 5 million people were murdered is a theory which cannot continue to exist. DR. FRITZ: Now I shall turn to a different topic. You are accused by the Prosecution of having incited atrocities, and that the results of your propaganda covered every phase of the conspiracy, including abnormal and inhuman treatment and behavior. In this connection I shall, therefore, have to ask you about the whole question of concentration camps. Did you know that the concentration camps existed? FRITZSCHE: Yes, the fact of their creation was announced publicly, I believe in 1933; and the concentration camps were mentioned later in official communiqués. DR. FRITZ: What was the purpose of these camps in your opinion at that time? FRITZSCHE: As far as I can recollect, the persons to be taken to these camps were those who could not be restrained from taking an active part against the new State. It was stated that the reason for the establishment of these camps was the abnormal internal political situation prevailing at that time: A weak center party and two strong extreme parties, one of which had now assumed power. Steps were taken to put matters on a proper legal basis. Only later was it mentioned that habitual criminals were also to be brought to the concentration camps to prevent them from reverting to crime. DR. FRITZ: Did you know anything about the number of concentration camps which were established in the course of time? FRITZSCHE: Before the war I had heard about three camps. During the war I suspected there were five to six; and the chart of a large number of camps which was exhibited here, was quite a surprise to me. DR. FRITZ: Did you know anything about the number of prisoners in these camps? FRITZSCHE: Nothing definite. At the beginning of the war, foreign reports mentioned millions of prisoners. At that time, together with a few journalists, I asked Obergruppenführer Heydrich to arrange an interview with members of the local and foreign press in order to discuss the matter. He did so. As far as I can recollect, he did not give any definite figures; but rather he compared them with the number of inmates at the prisons and penitentiaries in former days. This comparison did not seem to be disquieting. That was in the winter of 1940 or 1941. DR. FRITZ: Did you not have any doubts as to the accuracy of those figures? FRITZSCHE: Not at that time. DR. FRITZ: Did you know anything about the conditions in the concentration camps? Did you speak to anyone who had ever been in a concentration camp? FRITZSCHE: Yes. Even as early as 1933 or 1934 I spoke to a journalist who had been interned for a few weeks in the Oranienburg concentration camp, which was the old Oranienburg camp. He informed me that he himself had not been tortured but that he had seen and heard how others had been beaten and how their fingers had deliberately been squeezed in a door. DR. FRITZ: Did you just accept these reports and do nothing about them? FRITZSCHE: Quite the contrary! I made quite a row. This journalist—I believe his name was Stolzenberg, as far as I remember—did not wish to have his name mentioned. I wrote three letters, one to Dr. Goebbels—and he informed me that he would look into the matter—another letter to Frick as Minister of the Interior, and one to Göring as Prussian Prime Minister. Senior officials from both these offices rang me up and told me that an investigation was being carried out. A short time afterwards, I heard that this old camp Oranienburg had been dissolved and that the commander had been sentenced to death. This was a report given to me by a Herr Von Lützow, who was press reporter for Diels or Diehl, who at that time was chief of the State Police. DR. FRITZ: After this first successful protest against ill-treatment, did you receive any further reports about atrocities in concentration camps? FRITZSCHE: No. I received no further reports about ill-treatment. On the contrary, I frequently made individual inquiries of members of the Gestapo or of the press section of the Reichsführer SS. All of the individuals whom I asked declared the following: Beastliness in the concentration camps only occurred in 1933 or at the beginning of 1934 at the time when these camps were guarded by members of the SA, who had no profession—that is to say, by those members of the SA who had the whole day at their disposal, and some of them were far from being the best type of men. In this connection I was told further that the 30th of June signified that a purge had taken place. The 30th of June had removed those Gauleiter and those SA leaders who had abused their power. They declared finally that the concentration camps were now being guarded by the SS, who had engaged professional guards, professional administrators and officials expert in dealing with criminal matters, and prison control officials. I was told that this would be a guarantee against abuses. DR. FRITZ: Did you inquire about certain individuals who were in concentration camps? FRITZSCHE: Of course, I inquired about well-known personalities such as Parson Niemöller or Schuschnigg, also about Leipkins, Hess’ private secretary who had been arrested; and in each case I received information which was reassuring. DR. FRITZ: They, of course, may have been exceptions because they were well known and were prominent people. Did you not try to speak to other people who had been in concentration camps? FRITZSCHE: Yes. In April of 1942 I met a former official of the Communist Party, whose name was Reintgen. We had been soldiers together for 6 months; and therefore he reported quite frankly to me, without keeping anything back. He said that he had been ill-treated in 1933, having had lashes on his back, but not afterwards. This information fully coincided with my observations. DR. FRITZ: Did you yourself visit concentration camps? FRITZSCHE: No, I have never been inside the compound of a concentration camp. However, during the winter of 1944-45 I was frequently in the administration building near the Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen camp. Apart from that, I spoke to prisoners as often as I was able to do so, if I happened to see them either on the march or at work. DR. FRITZ: With whom did you speak at Oranienburg? FRITZSCHE: With a colleague of Obergruppenführer Glücks and twice also with him personally. They told me that the foreign reports regarding cruel treatment were false. They said that the treatment was not only humane but decidedly good, as after all, the prisoners were valuable laborers. I spoke at some length about the working hours, for at that time a rather silly decree had been issued about a general extension of working hours. The attitude taken by Glücks was very reasonable, namely, that longer working hours would not necessarily result in greater output. Therefore the working hours of 8 to 10 hours a day remained as, before. He did not mention anything about extermination through overwork. That is something I heard about for the first time in Court. DR. FRITZ: And how about your questions which you put to the prisoners direct? FRITZSCHE: Well, first of all, there was always a guard present, and quite naturally the prisoners were suspicious; but eventually I always received positive replies to positive questions. Briefly, the gist of these replies was always the same, that they had been unjustly arrested. Their food was really better than in prison and I frequently heard this phrase: “Well, anyway we are not soldiers here.” The weapons carried by the guards were only rifles or revolvers; I did not see any truncheons. DR. FRITZ: Did you not become more and more suspicious about these concentration camps, after listening to foreign radio reports? FRITZSCHE: Not for a long time, for the reasons which I gave yesterday. Reports from English members of Parliament regarding the Buchenwald case were first mentioned in April 1945. But this case is so very recent that for brevity’s sake I do not need to describe particulars of the incidents that occurred in the Ministry of Propaganda. DR. FRITZ: How can you explain the fact that crimes and ill-treatment of the worst kind undoubtedly took place in concentration camps? FRITZSCHE: I am on the horns of a frightful dilemma, since I heard the first reliable reports about these things here in prison. Only a part of these terrible conditions, which were found to exist, can be explained through the stoppage of traffic and communications at the end of the war. The rest is more than enough. Obviously, the decree for the secret murder of masses of people had brutalized to a terrible extent those people who were entrusted with the execution of this decree. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not know whether this explanation is of any value to us as evidence. We have already heard all about this matter. He has given us his explanation as to why he says he did not know. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, I have but two more questions I should like to put to the defendant. Herr Fritzsche, it has been said here in Court that conditions in concentration camps were generally known to the German people. As a journalist, will you give us your opinion and the reasons on which it is based? THE PRESIDENT: Has he not given us that already? DR. FRITZ: No, I beg your pardon, Mr. President. He gave his opinion when it was a question of the ill-treatment and extermination of Jews, but on the topic of the extermination of Jews, I asked him... THE PRESIDENT: Well, you are asking him what his opinion as a journalist was. I do not see that that is of any importance to us. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, I should be grateful if you would allow me to put the question, as this is my last question but one. I expect an answer from the defendant, an answer which would assist the Tribunal in arriving at a judgment. THE PRESIDENT: On what matter do you want his opinion as a journalist? DR. FRITZ: The Defendant Fritzsche would like to repeat a few statements such as some made, for instance, by Dr. Goebbels. THE PRESIDENT: All right, you may ask the question. [_Turning to the defendant._] Did you understand the question? FRITZSCHE: I believe a confusion has arisen, inasmuch as I do not wish to quote Dr. Goebbels on this subject but rather in relation to our last series of questions which seem to me more important than the question you have just put to me now. DR. FRITZ: In any event, I should like you to give me a brief answer to my question. Shall I repeat the question? FRITZSCHE: Thank you, no. In this connection I should like to refer briefly to the statements which I already made about the murders; that there were many rumors but those rumors were denied. Undoubtedly an iron ring of silence surrounded these terrible events and the only thing I observed in the course of my work, and which appears to me to be important, is that in the RSHA and some of its branches there must have existed groups who worked systematically with the view of concealing these atrocities by issuing reassuring statements and denials to the offices which represented the public. DR. FRITZ: Now I should like to put a last comprehensive question. In the course of your examination by me, you made statements about Hitler and his policies which were entirely different from those you made long ago in your radio broadcasts, _et cetera_. Can you tell us briefly the date and the reason for your change of opinion? FRITZSCHE: I would like to answer this question very precisely. The first milestone on the road to this realization was not due to the German defeat, for right or wrong is independent of victory or defeat. The fact was that Hitler tried to use this defeat for the extermination of the German people, as Speer has now horribly confirmed and as I was able to observe during the last phase of the conflict in Berlin when, through deceit by raising false hopes, boys of 15, 14, 13, and 12 years of age were equipped with small arms to fight against tanks and called into battle, boys who otherwise might have been the hope for future reconstruction. Hitler found escape in death, leaving behind him the order to keep on fighting. He also left behind him the official report that he had died in battle. I learned that he had committed suicide; and thus my last public statement, on 2 May 1945, was to let everybody know of this suicide, for I wanted to kill a Hitler legend in the bud. Then, while in prison, I heard from a fellow prisoner, a German major named Sforner, that he had been arrested by the Gestapo, that he had been tortured in order to make him confess, and that in his presence, his wife had been beaten. That was the second milestone. The third stage concerned another coprisoner, the world-famous geographer, General Niedermeier, who proved to me that the reasons given by Hitler for the attack on Russia were false, at least on one important point. After he had talked with the interpreter, he could tell me that in the decisive discussion between Molotov and Ribbentrop in 1941, Molotov had not put forth any new demands but that, rather, he demanded that the assurances which had been given in 1939 should be effective. Therefore, a part of the reasons given—and I stress this point—that our attack on Russia was to anticipate a Russian attack, was no longer valid. The fourth factor was the proof submitted in Court here of the murder of 5 million Jews. I have already spoken about this matter. I consider it only my duty to testify to still another statement, a statement which Dr. Goebbels made in my presence on Saturday, 21 April 1945. Dr. Goebbels, who was in a great state of utmost excitement, speaking about the last decisive break-through of the Russians near Berlin, said, “After all, the German people did not want it otherwise. The German people by a great majority decided through a plebiscite on the withdrawal from the League of Nations and against a policy of yielding and chose, instead, a policy of courage and honor; thereby”—concluded Dr. Goebbels—“the German people themselves chose the war which they have now lost.” These were the last words which I heard from Dr. Goebbels and these words are untrue. I declare under oath: Dr. Goebbels had never previously given such significance to that plebiscite. Never had he given it that interpretation. The exact opposite was the case. At the time of this plebiscite, the German people were explicitly given once again a solemn assurance of the will for peace on the part of Hitler and his associates. Therefore, I am convinced that Hitler and at least some of his colleagues had deliberately lied to the people on decisive points, right from the beginning of their political career; and, something that is not so important to history, I personally felt deceived on these points, too. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to the Defendant Fritzsche. THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions? DR. STAHMER: Witness, did you ever hear or ascertain, at the beginning when the concentration camps were being organized, that in addition to the regular camps other so-called “wildcat camps” existed which had been established by the SA leaders without the knowledge of the competent authorities? FRITZSCHE: No. I heard nothing about it at that time. I heard about this distinction in the concentration camps for the first time here in Court. DR. STAHMER: On the basis of your present-day knowledge, can you assert whether the abuses which you described occurred in these “wildcat” concentration camps? FRITZSCHE: I can give you a very precise answer to that question. These abuses about which I learned occurred in the old camp Oranienburg, a camp situated in the Berliner Strasse. I do not know to which category that camp belonged. However, these abuses were stopped; and I emphasized in my testimony that, almost immediately after I sent my letter to the Prussian Prime Minister, I was called in by a ministerial counsellor or Ministerialdirektor, and I was assured that an investigation would be made—a promise which was kept—but in any case I do not remember whether a final report was sent me from this office. DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions. DR. KUBUSCHOK: In June 1934 the publication of Von Papen’s Marburg speech was forbidden. Is it correct to say that from that time onward, any statement on the part of the Defendant Von Papen could be published only with the previous approval of the Ministry of Propaganda? FRITZSCHE: That is correct, and in even a closer sense. Confiscation of the Marburg speech, as I remember distinctly, was carried out at the instigation of Berndt, who later became Ministerialdirektor. This man drew Dr. Goebbels’ attention to the speech. With regard to any other of Papen’s announcements, the principle was that not even the Ministry of Propaganda had the right to release them for publication but, rather, that they had to be forwarded either to the Minister personally or to the Führer. DR. KUBUSCHOK: In your testimony you mentioned that you had known the Defendant Von Papen for some time and that you got to know him when you visited Turkey. Just when did you visit Turkey? FRITZSCHE: In January, I believe it was 1944. DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the purpose of your visit? FRITZSCHE: I delivered a speech to the German colony in Istanbul and Ankara on the occasion of the 30th of January. DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen have anything to do with this speech and with this festivity? FRITZSCHE: No, less than nothing. I received an official request from Berlin to see to it that Herr Von Papen would not ostensibly depart before the celebration of the 30th of January, as he wanted to do. I did not attempt to persuade Herr Von Papen to stay and so he left his office in time to go skiing. DR. KUBUSCHOK: That is all. DR. THEODOR KLEFISCH (Counsel for SA): Witness, you just now said that it had been reported to you that at the end of the year 1933 and at the beginning of 1934 unemployed SA men were guarding certain concentration camps and that abuses were probably to be traced back to that fact. I have but one question: Who reported that to you? Who was the author of that report? FRITZSCHE: The then press chief or press expert of Reichsführer SS Himmler, whose name was Gerhard Ratke. DR. KLEFISCH: Thank you very much. DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Funk): Witness, the day before yesterday you stated that the Defendant Funk was not concerned with propaganda in the Propaganda Ministry but that in the main he was concerned with organizational and financial matters. Now I should like to ask you to answer several questions regarding the activities of the Defendant Funk in the Propaganda Ministry. You know, Witness, that at the beginning there was a Press Department of the Reich Government and that it was a State institution. How long did this Press Department exist, and what became of it? FRITZSCHE: It had existed for quite some time, at least up until March 1933, when it was a branch of the Foreign Office. From then on it became a branch of the Propaganda Ministry, and it had a dual mission to carry on: First of all to be the Press Department of this Ministry and secondly, to continue functioning as the Press Department for the Reich Government. DR. SAUTER: Witness, can you tell me who, beginning with March of 1933—that is, from the incorporation of the Press Department into the Propaganda Ministry—was the chief of this Press Department and, for all practical purposes, was the chief of the press system? Was that Funk or was it someone else? FRITZSCHE: No, that was Ministerial Counsellor Jahnke, successor to Ministerial Director Berndt. This Press Department was then divided into three sections: German press... DR. SAUTER: I am not interested in that, Witness, I am interested only in knowing whether the chief of this department was the Defendant Funk or whether it is correct to say that he had nothing to do with these matters. FRITZSCHE: Nominally, of course, he was the chief, but with the practical operation he had nothing to do. That was taken care of by Dr. Goebbels, Hahnke, and Jahnke. DR. SAUTER: And later Berndt? FRITZSCHE: Yes. DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have another question. Who had the management of the press policy in the Propaganda Ministry? I am still referring to the State organ. Did the Defendant Funk have anything to do with it, or just who was it? Who directed the press policy? FRITZSCHE: At that time Dr. Goebbels himself exercised that function. Later on it was the Reich Press Chief, Dr. Dietrich. DR. SAUTER: The Defendant Funk was State Secretary in the Propaganda Ministry, or at least he had the title of State Secretary. Now, looking at this matter rather generally, I would be interested in knowing this: Did he, in fact, have the position of a State Secretary and exercise authority as such, or did another official exercise the function of State Secretary as the regular deputy of the Minister? FRITZSCHE: As a matter of course, naturally, he had the position, the power, the prestige, and the salary of a State Secretary; but the practical work was distributed a little differently. DR. SAUTER: Just how was it handled? FRITZSCHE: I have already mentioned that. Practically, Funk concerned himself with organization and finance as they applied to the gigantic cultural concern which was being developed at that time; whereas the actual policy was set up by Dr. Goebbels with the chief of his ministerial office, Hahnke, who was the successor of Funk as State Secretary. DR. SAUTER: I have one final question, Witness, which refers to another topic. Do you know what Minister Dr. Goebbels, in November of 1938 or later, said about the Jewish pogroms of 9 November 1938, with regard to Defendant Funk? FRITZSCHE: Much later Dr. Goebbels stated in my presence that sometimes radical measures would just simply have to be taken, for instance, when Funk had constantly declared that the Jews could not be eliminated from economic life; but he, Dr. Goebbels, had to prove to Funk that it could be done by organizing the riots of 8 November. DR. SAUTER: In this connection did he say anything about the fact that this Jewish action, for which Dr. Goebbels was responsible, was also instigated with the purpose of discrediting Dr. Funk and confronting him with a _fait accompli_? Did he state anything like that? FRITZSCHE: That was the sense of the answer that I just gave you. DR. SAUTER: I have no further questions; Mr. President. DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Herr Fritzsche, in this Court we have heard what grave accusations are made against the Defendant Raeder because of an article in the newspaper _Völkischer Beobachter_. The article I refer to is “Churchill Sinks the _Athenia_,” which was published on 23 October 1939. Mr. President, this is Document 3260-PS, or Exhibit GB-218. I should like to put a few questions pertaining to the _Athenia_ case. Herr Fritzsche, when did the Propaganda Ministry receive the report about the torpedoing of the _Athenia_, and through what channels? FRITZSCHE: I cannot give you the date from memory, but I do know that we received this report by wireless; that is, we listened in to a foreign broadcast. DR. SIEMERS: This wireless report came in shortly after the sinking of the _Athenia_, is that right? FRITZSCHE: Without doubt. DR. SIEMERS: Did the Propaganda Ministry get in touch with the High Command of the Navy in order to learn the details of this matter? FRITZSCHE: Yes, I personally did that because I happened to have a liaison officer from the Navy High Command in my office for censorship advice. DR. SIEMERS: Whom did you get in touch with in the High Command of the Navy, and what did you learn? FRITZSCHE: First of all, I spoke to the officer who was with me, whom I have just mentioned, Kapitänleutnant Hahn. Then he telephoned, and in all probability I phoned, too, to the OKM (the High Command of the Navy). As far as I recall, I spoke to Korvettenkapitän Wolf. DR. SIEMERS: And what did Korvettenkapitän Wolf tell you? FRITZSCHE: He told me already at this early stage that no German U-boat was in the area in question. DR. SIEMERS: I should like to remind you that the _Athenia_ was sunk on 4 September 1939. What did the Propaganda Ministry do after the High Command of the Navy had stated that it was not a German U-boat which had sunk the ship? FRITZSCHE: Then this report was announced. DR. SIEMERS: Herr Fritzsche, how did it happen that about 6 to 7 weeks later the article, “Churchill Sinks the _Athenia_,” appeared, which was published on 23 October 1939? Shall I show you the article? FRITZSCHE: Thank you, no. I remember this incident especially well, as I have checked my memory about it since this case was mentioned again for the first time here in the Court. I know that Hitler himself ordered this article to be written, giving detailed instructions. The order to write the article came through two different channels: First, through a telephone call by the Reich Press Chief, Dr. Dietrich; and secondly through a telephone call by Dr. Goebbels or one of his officials—I am not able to tell you which of the two. This order was to be transmitted to the _Völkischer Beobachter._ Now we come to the circumstances on account of which I remember the details. When I told one of my co-workers to inform the _Völkischer Beobachter_, he came back to me with the report that it would not be necessary because the _Völkischer Beobachter_ had already heard the necessary details directly from the Führer’s headquarters. DR. SIEMERS: When was this order given by Hitler, or rather, Goebbels? FRITZSCHE: The day before it appeared, I assume. DR. SIEMERS: Did any office in the High Command of the Navy have any connection with this article? FRITZSCHE: According to my knowledge, no. DR. SIEMERS: Before this article was published, did you speak with Grossadmiral Raeder about this article, or did you advise him of the order given by Hitler in this direction? FRITZSCHE: No, I believe that the High Command of the Navy had no knowledge of the article at all. The article originated in the manner that I have just described to you. DR. SIEMERS: Did you at any time speak with anyone in the High Command of the Navy, or with Grossadmiral Raeder about this case? FRITZSCHE: Only here in the prison. DR. SIEMERS: Herr Fritzsche, is it correct that in September of 1939 the _Times_ claimed that in Czechoslovakia Germans had murdered 10,000 Czechs at Prague, including the Lord Mayor? FRITZSCHE: I do not know whether that was published in the Times, but at any rate it was published in the _News Chronicle_. DR. SIEMERS: What did the Propaganda Ministry undertake to do thereupon? FRITZSCHE: German and foreign journalists were taken to Prague. If I am not mistaken, one of the foreign journalists who went along to Prague on that trip is present in this courtroom. DR. SIEMERS: What did these foreign journalists find out? FRITZSCHE: They had an interview with the Lord Mayor of Prague, who allegedly had been killed; they traveled about the country, and they reported accordingly. DR. SIEMERS: According to that, the report was clearly untrue? FRITZSCHE: At that time this report was shown to be quite false. However, I must add that since Monday of this week, since the testimony given by Herr Von Neurath, it has become quite clear to me that under cover of this great and effective denial an action of arrests was actually carried out in Czechoslovakia. I must add this; I have to clarify this. And if... THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, how does this affect Raeder? DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe that in a certain way it is a parallel case to the article in the _Völkischer Beobachter_, which the Prosecution is stressing for reasons not quite clear to me. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the evidence is not competent. DR. SIEMERS: Herr Fritzsche, do you know what Dr. Goebbels’ attitude was to Grossadmiral Raeder? FRITZSCHE: From the few statements which Goebbels made about Grossadmiral Raeder it could be seen that he had an adverse attitude toward him. His reason, frequently expressed, was Raeder’s negative attitude toward the Party and the Party’s wishes and his positive attitude on Church matters, including the protection which he accorded Navy clergymen who were subject to attacks on the part of the Party. DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I have no further questions. DR. HORN: Witness, you stated that a General Niedermeier was present at the conference which took place between Molotov and Ribbentrop. Just where did you get your information? FRITZSCHE: There is a mistake contained in your question. I did not say that General Niedermeier participated in this conference. What I did say was—and I shall be a little more explicit—that during my imprisonment I ran into this General Niedermeier who, for weeks or months just before that time, had shared a cell with the interpreter who had the task of interpreting the discussion of Molotov and Ribbentrop. DR. HORN: Did General Niedermeier give you the name of this interpreter? FRITZSCHE: Without doubt, but I did not try to remember it. DR. HORN: I have one more question. After the last discussion on 30 August 1939 between the British Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson and the then Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, in which the conditions for negotiating with Poland were made public, these conditions were published the next day in the _Daily Telegraph_; and allegedly this issue of the paper was recalled. What do you know about this article? FRITZSCHE: First of all, I should like to correct another error which has found its way into your question. On the following morning in question, the _Daily Telegraph_ did not publish the conditions or the note, but only published a report that during the preceding night the British Government had been in consultation on the German demands to Poland, conditions which had been transmitted to them by their Ambassador in Berlin. Therefore it could be seen from this article—at any rate, it could not be interpreted in any other way—that these conditions were known in London. DR. HORN: Thank you very much. DR. THOMA: Herr Fritzsche, you stated yesterday that the _Völkischer Beobachter_ was in direct contact with the Führer and with the Führer’s headquarters throughout the war. What individual members on the staff of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ were you referring to? FRITZSCHE: I was not especially referring to people in the _Völkischer Beobachter_; I was thinking mainly of people at the Führer’s headquarters. So, Dr. Dietrich and his delegates made it their business always to call the _Völkischer Beobachter_ directly. DR. THOMA: You know that Rosenberg was no longer the chief editor of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ after 1937? FRITZSCHE: I am of the conviction that even before that time he held that position in name only. DR. THOMA: Witness, can you tell the Court, as far as the so-called actions of the Party were concerned—for instance the burning of the books, the boycott in April of 1933, the pogrom in November of 1938—who the driving force in all of these actions was? FRITZSCHE: Today I am of the firm conviction that it was Dr. Goebbels. DR. THOMA: Witness, do you know that Goebbels, whenever Hitler was in Berlin, always was Hitler’s guest? FRITZSCHE: That does not hold quite true. Years before the war Dr. Goebbels saw Hitler, without doubt, only rarely. DR. THOMA: I have another question. Do you know that Goebbels had a direct telephone line to Hitler? FRITZSCHE: That is news to me. This is the first time I heard of it. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, this has nothing to do with Rosenberg, has it, the fact that Goebbels had a direct line to Hitler? DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I wanted only to ask Fritzsche by that whether Rosenberg had the same connection with Hitler as Goebbels. FRITZSCHE: I do not know what telephone lines Rosenberg had, but I know and I have heard frequently that Rosenberg seldom visited Hitler. DR. THOMA: Thank you very much. THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other defendant’s counsel who wants to ask questions? [_There was no response._] THE PRESIDENT: Then we will recess. [_A recess was taken._] THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): I should like to begin the cross-examination in determining the role which German propaganda played in the criminal activity of the Hitler Government. Tell me, do you admit that German propaganda disseminated racial theories and introduced into the minds of the German people the ideas of the superiority of the German race—that means, the idea of the “master race”? Do you admit that? FRITZSCHE: The question touches upon two problems. May I reply to both of them? I admit that German propaganda spread the racial theory, but I deny that German propaganda spread the theory of the “master race.” GEN. RUDENKO: You do not admit it? FRITZSCHE: No. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. You admit that the German propaganda incited in the German people racial hatred toward the Jews and propagated the necessity of their extermination? FRITZSCHE: Once again two problems are contained in this question. May I answer to both? GEN. RUDENKO: I beg your pardon, you do not have to emphasize this. Just answer the question; if there are two, answer two. FRITZSCHE: I admit, as I have done in my answer to your first question, that German propaganda spread the racial theory but I deny most emphatically that German propaganda had made preparations for, or had called for, the mass murder of Jews. GEN. RUDENKO: But you do not deny that German propaganda preached to the German people racial hatred toward Jews? You do not deny that? FRITZSCHE: I cannot even affirm that without reserve. That is the reason why, in my answer to the second question, I made a slight distinction. German propaganda, and under that I understand official German propaganda, did not even preach racial hatred. It only spoke about racial distinctions, and that is something quite different; but I will admit that there was a certain type of German propaganda which went beyond that and which did preach the clear-cut and primitive racial hatred. GEN. RUDENKO: You will admit that the activity of German propaganda was also directed against the Church? FRITZSCHE: No, even that I have to deny. GEN. RUDENKO: Will you pretend that the German propaganda was not directed toward the persecution of the Church? FRITZSCHE: That is exactly what I wanted to say. The official German propaganda did not persecute the churches. On the other hand, in order to clear up this point for you, here again there was an unofficial, illegal propaganda which preached against the Church. However, the State and its organizations, during the time of the struggle with the Church, made many utterances and declarations which might have created an impression as if they had participated in the struggle against the churches. By this I mean the trials against clergymen which were given sensational importance. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. You will admit that the propaganda conducted by the Hitlerite Government in connection with the so-called problem of the expansion of the Lebensraum of Germany, cultivated and developed in the German nation militaristic tendencies. FRITZSCHE: I deny that, too, and most emphatically. GEN. RUDENKO: Do you admit that German propaganda used provocative methods, lies, and slander in order to camouflage the aggressive plans of the Hitlerite Government? FRITZSCHE: Mr. Prosecutor, it is most difficult for me to answer that question after all I have voluntarily testified to in this courtroom yesterday. If I am to make the attempt to summarize very briefly, then I shall have to say this: I maintain that the German propaganda gave the German nation in the case of every individual action which was carried out, from the occupation of the Rhineland to the attack against the Soviet Union, a picture of the events which, among the Germans, must have created the impression that we were in the right. On the other hand, however, I myself—and I explained already when this happened—had recognized that the structure of these arguments had a basis which was shaky in various respects. GEN. RUDENKO: That is to say, on the basis of lies and slander? FRITZSCHE: No. Please let me apologize, but your way of putting it does not appear to be quite factual enough. GEN. RUDENKO: You will persist then in denying that German propaganda used methods of slander and lies; you do deny this? FRITZSCHE: Yes, certainly, I deny it, based on my thorough knowledge of German propaganda; and I should like you to permit me to give you a very brief explanation in this connection. GEN. RUDENKO: Please, will you give an explanation, but directly, to my question? FRITZSCHE: But of course. Looking at it today, it was the misfortune of the German people that its propaganda, particularly with regard to those details which can be checked and controlled, was so clean that it was completely overlooked that in its three basic principles there were three fundamental mistakes. I cannot be more explicit. GEN. RUDENKO: What kind of mistakes are you speaking about? FRITZSCHE: The first, the trust in Adolf Hitler’s humaneness, which was destroyed by the order to murder 5 million people; the second, the trust in the ethical purity of the system, which was destroyed by the orders to apply torture; and the third, the absolute trust in Adolf Hitler’s peaceful intentions, shaken by what has been brought up in this courtroom. GEN. RUDENKO: Well, we shall revert to these questions later when we speak about your personal participation in the conducting of the German propaganda. I should like to ask you now the following: Of course you were aware that in the OKW there was a special section for propaganda, which was subordinate directly to Defendant Jodl? FRITZSCHE: That was known to me, but you are mistaken if you are under the impression that that department was under Defendant Jodl. It was under the jurisdiction of General Von Wedel and he was succeeded by Standartenführer Gunter d’Alquen. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I do not wish to deal with this subject any longer, at the moment. I am interested in something else; what were the relations between the Ministry of Propaganda and the OKW? FRITZSCHE: I cannot tell you what they were between the Ministry of Propaganda and the OKW in general, but I can give you detailed information about the relationship between the Ministry of Propaganda and the Propaganda Department of the OKW which you have just mentioned. A permanent representative from that department worked in the ministerial office of Dr. Goebbels. He participated daily in the ministry conferences which I have already mentioned once, he who was really always to be found in close proximity to Dr. Goebbels. GEN. RUDENKO: Who gave the propaganda tasks and the directives to the OKW? FRITZSCHE: I can only imagine that the propaganda tasks of the OKW were drawn up according to Dr. Goebbels’ wishes and to the instructions of the Chief of the OKW, which was Keitel or Jodl. GEN. RUDENKO: How was the general German propaganda applied with regard to the propaganda tasks and measures taken by the OKW? FRITZSCHE: I am afraid I do not quite understand the meaning of your question. GEN. RUDENKO: How was the general German propaganda brought into line with the propaganda measures taken by the OKW? FRITZSCHE: Very probably it was just fitted into the propaganda measures adopted by the OKW, because Dr. Goebbels was so strong a personality that he would not have tolerated any disregard of his propagandist principles. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I would like to have your answer to the following question: What relations existed between the Ministry of Propaganda and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? FRITZSCHE: Sometimes relations were a bit tense, but during the later years of the war a representative from the Foreign Ministry participated always in the ministry conferences of the Propaganda Ministry. GEN. RUDENKO: What part did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs play in the carrying out of propaganda measures especially in connection with the preparation and execution of aggressive wars? FRITZSCHE: May I say the following to this: At the very beginning of an action of war, a representative from the Foreign Office used to appear with a completed document book, a _White Book_. I know nothing about the origin of these _White Books_. At any rate, they were not prepared in the Ministry of Propaganda. In a few cases I later received some knowledge of their compilation in the Foreign Office. GEN. RUDENKO: Would it be correct to make the following deduction: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs participated directly and actively in the preparation of propaganda tasks and directives; is that correct? FRITZSCHE: No doubt that is true because the Foreign Minister reserved for himself the decisive word with reference to propaganda which was connected with foreign policy or any propaganda which went abroad. GEN. RUDENKO: Did you have in mind Defendant Ribbentrop when you just replied and when you spoke about the role of the Foreign Minister? FRITZSCHE: Of course. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. You acknowledge and maintain that Defendant Ribbentrop personally gave out the propaganda orders for explaining the attack on the Soviet Union as a preventive war? FRITZSCHE: That question cannot be answered with “yes” or “no” but with a very brief description of the facts. The then Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop received, in the early morning hours of the day when the Russian campaign started, the foreign press correspondents and the German press. He put a _White Book_ before them and he went on to explain in a speech what the situation was and concluded with the following emphatic statement: “For all these reasons Germany was forced to begin this attack against the Soviet Union in order to forestall a Soviet attack. I ask you, gentlemen of the press, to please present the facts in this manner.” GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to determine by this that the propaganda tasks were given by Defendant Ribbentrop himself. Do you admit it? FRITZSCHE: I beg to apologize, but I have admitted exactly what I have said. Your last question is a conclusion based on what I have said, and to that I do not want to agree. GEN. RUDENKO: However, replying to my previous question you spoke about the decisive role of Defendant Ribbentrop in questions concerning the carrying out of the foreign policy propaganda; is that correct? FRITZSCHE: Perfectly correct. GEN. RUDENKO: Well. It is enough; let us skip that question. Tell me now what were the relations between the Ministry of Propaganda and the so-called Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories? Please explain to me in this connection how these two Ministries collaborated and what the relations were between them? FRITZSCHE: There was a permanent liaison officer who was a member both of the Eastern Ministry and the Ministry of Propaganda; and beyond that, there was an institution which had been founded by both Ministries jointly and which was jointly administrated by them. It was the institution called “Vineta,” which dealt with the entire propaganda in the East. GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I understand. By what order—or who prepared the propaganda slogans, as you called them in Germany, which were intended for the occupied territories? Who planned and prepared them? FRITZSCHE: I cannot tell you under oath, because I am not sure about it, but it is my assumption that they were developed based on the existing principles of general propaganda by Dr. Tauber who was mentioned, and his associates, in this Vineta institute. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. But apparently you are aware of the fact and will confirm that the leading influence of the Ministry of Propaganda has been maintained in all these measures. FRITZSCHE: Quite definitely. Indubitably the Ministry of Propaganda had the superior initiative here and the greater influence. GEN. RUDENKO: That is clear. Now tell me, what kind of influence did the Defendant Bormann have on German propaganda? What role did he play in this respect? FRITZSCHE: That role was unusually great. I know that it is somewhat frowned upon when statements are made here about a man who presumably is dead. In the interests of the historic truth, however, I shall nevertheless have to tell you the following ... GEN. RUDENKO: We do not know yet whether Bormann is dead. We know only that he is not present on the defendants’ bench; but he is, however, one of the defendants. Go on, please. FRITZSCHE: The influence of the Defendant Bormann was unusually strong not only in all the other fields but also in the propaganda sector. It became apparent in the following: First, in the general type of Party agitation which I mentioned yesterday, that of the most radical trend. A teleprint message from Bormann to Dr. Goebbels with, shall we say, the following contents: I heard complaints from Party circles regarding this, that, or the other, would always be the cause of a rapid acceleration of Dr. Goebbels’ entire machinery. Second—and this is something which I cannot express under oath in other words—Dr. Goebbels was quite clearly afraid of Martin Bormann. And he always tried scrupulously to justify in Bormann’s eyes any actions of his which might have been misinterpreted by radical elements in the Party. GEN. RUDENKO: Perhaps you will tell us who else of the defendants who were not named here during my cross-examination actively participated in the propaganda activities, and in what way. Maybe you would rather not tell us anything about the defendants who are present here. FRITZSCHE: I certainly would rather not, but I shall answer. GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, please. FRITZSCHE: By the way, a very favorable influence on propaganda was exercised by one of the offices of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. Whether he was responsible for it in person I do not know, but here are the facts: During the struggle for realistic news service which I mentioned yesterday, I repeatedly met with resistance from the Party and the Foreign Office; but I found the support of a department of the RSHA, the name of which I have forgotten, most useful. This department used to issue reports about the general frame of mind or temper of the German people, and these reports were distributed to various supreme authorities in the Reich. In these reports showing the mood of the people there was frequent praise for realistic news, the very thing which had been combated by the other two parties which I have mentioned. GEN. RUDENKO: You just mentioned the office of Defendant Kaltenbrunner. Who else of the defendants could you name? FRITZSCHE: None of the others played a part in German propaganda. GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Hess is not present here, but did he have any influence or not? FRITZSCHE: Most unfortunately not. GEN. RUDENKO: Why do you say “unfortunately”? FRITZSCHE: During the period when he was still in office, he fulfilled a very beneficial task. He was, shall we say, the “complaint department” for all shortcomings in the Party and the State. I wish he could have continued... GEN. RUDENKO: Well, there is no use to speak about it in detail. Now, let us go into the explanation of your personal participation and your personal role in the field of German propaganda. I should like you to state exactly what relations you had with Dr. Goebbels. Yesterday you spoke about it in detail, but here I should like you to state it briefly. FRITZSCHE: The briefest formula is this: Personally, little relationship; officially, in the course of time, more and more relationship. GEN. RUDENKO: Yes. Do you know the name of General Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner? FRITZSCHE: Yes, I know the name. GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to read into the record an extract from his testimony. Mr. President, I am submitting this document (USSR-472) as Exhibit USSR-472. [_Turning to the defendant._] We are going to hand you this document in a minute. In order to facilitate the reading of it, the paragraphs which I am going to read here are underlined in red pencil. I am going to read the first excerpt; will you please follow the text—I quote: “Everybody, including myself, was aware that Fritzsche was not only a close associate of Goebbels, but was also a favorite of his. He gained Goebbels’ sympathy by frequently copying him in his political activities and quoting Goebbels in his speeches. Goebbels, in his printed and verbal speeches, referred to the conclusions and prognoses made by Fritzsche as having the force of official declarations.” Please tell me, Defendant Fritzsche, is that in accordance with reality? FRITZSCHE: May I ask you which quotation you have been reading, 1, 2, or 3? GEN. RUDENKO: I have already told you, it is quotation Number 1. FRITZSCHE: According to my text, the first one says: “Everybody, including myself, was aware that Fritzsche was not only a close associate of Goebbels, but was also, a favorite of his.” GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, that is quite correct. That is exactly what I quoted. I am asking you, is that in accordance with reality? FRITZSCHE: I should not have expressed it like that, and I think it is a question of taste. This statement... GEN. RUDENKO: I understand. FRITZSCHE: Just a moment. I have something to add. The expression “close associate of Goebbels” is wrong, objectively seen, and “favorite”—well, I do not think so. GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, very well. Let us go further. You enjoyed the complete confidence of Goebbels and you carried out your duties in the Ministry of Propaganda entrusted with fullest powers. Do you admit that? FRITZSCHE: Absolutely. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Thus, enjoying the confidence and disposing of full powers, in your utterances you fully mirrored the demands of the Hitler Government which were made tasks of German propaganda; is that correct? FRITZSCHE: Yes, to the exact extent which I described yesterday. GEN. RUDENKO: Now, I should like to read into the record some extracts from your testimony of 12 September 1945. I am submitting this document (USSR-474) as Exhibit USSR-474. I am going to read into the record Excerpt Number 1. FRITZSCHE: May I have the document? GEN. RUDENKO: Certainly, it will be handed to you immediately. Will you please follow my quotation of Excerpt Number 1. It is underlined in red pencil. I am reading: “During a long time I was one of the leaders of German propaganda.” I skip a few lines and further read: “I must say that Goebbels valued me as a convinced National Socialist and a capable journalist so that I was considered his confidential aid in the German propaganda machine.” Is that correct? FRITZSCHE: Mr. Prosecutor, that is not correct. I know that I have signed this report but at the very moment when I signed it in Moscow I stated: “You can do what you like with that record. If you publish it, then nobody in Germany will believe it and no intelligent person in other countries either because this is not my language.” I state that not a single one of the questions contained in this report was put to me in that same form and I go on to declare that not a single one of the answers in that record was given by me in that form and I signed it for reasons which I will explain to you in detail if you want me to. GEN. RUDENKO: You therefore do not confirm these statements? FRITZSCHE: No, only the signature is true. GEN. RUDENKO: All right, let us say only the signature is true. Well, we want to bear in mind that in this quotation which I just read and which you deny, it is said that Goebbels valued you as a National Socialist and a capable journalist and that therefore you were a trustworthy person in the German propaganda machine. This is the essence of the quotation; is that right? Do you deny this? Just a minute please. I am going to remind you... FRITZSCHE: Yes, General, I admit that, I admit these facts. GEN. RUDENKO: Well, then the quotation was correct, was it not? FRITZSCHE: Yes. GEN. RUDENKO: Well then, what else are we speaking about? That means you do corroborate this statement? FRITZSCHE: I am talking about the record which has been put before me in its entirety. GEN. RUDENKO: At present I am questioning you with particular reference to this quotation which I just read into the record. You are not going to deny it? You admit it? FRITZSCHE: I will not confirm the quotation but I will confirm once more the contents which you have just summarized again. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. The sense is not different from the actual quotation, but results from it. I should like to remind you of an excerpt... THE PRESIDENT: One moment. What is it you are saying, Defendant? Are you saying that you did not sign this document or that you did? FRITZSCHE: Mr. President, I signed the document, although its contents did not correspond with my own statements. THE PRESIDENT: Why did you do that? FRITZSCHE: I gave that signature after very severe solitary confinement which had lasted for several months; and I wrote that signature because one of my fellow prisoners, with whom I came into contact once, had told me that once every month a court was pronouncing sentences based merely on such records and without interrogation; and I hoped that in this manner I would at least achieve being sentenced and thus terminate my confinement. So as not to be misunderstood I should like to emphasize that no force was used and that I was treated very humanely, even if my detention was very severe. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Of course, you never thought, Defendant Fritzsche, that after all you had done you would be sent to a sanatorium? It is obvious that you had to land in a prison and a prison is always a prison. This was just an aside, however. I should like to ask you about the following: You stated that in 1945 you signed this because of a very strict regime to which you were subjected; very well—when you arrived in Nuremberg you were interrogated on 3 November 1945 here in Nuremberg by General Alexandrov; is that correct? FRITZSCHE: Yes. GEN. RUDENKO: So that is correct? Very well. I should like to remind you of some of your answers. You were put the following question—on 12 November 1945 questions were put to you and you replied. Do you remember these statements? You answered, “I have very often been interrogated and I do not know what statements and testimony are in question now.” Thereupon, General Alexandrov submitted to you your testimony of 12 September and you answered him, “I am fully aware of this document.” You were asked, “I should like you to peruse this document. Do you remember these statements?” You said, “Of course, there is no doubt about it.” And further: “Do you corroborate this document, which you perused and which was signed by you?” And you replied, “Of course.” Do you remember these statements which you made in Nuremberg? FRITZSCHE: In the statement which you have quoted, all those passages are missing where I stated again and again that the record was put before me complete and finished for the purpose of obtaining my signature. I wished to make 20 or 30 alterations. Some of them were granted but passages were missing wherein I said in Nuremberg that some of the answers in that protocol contained a certain amount of truth but that none of them actually do represent my own answers. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I should now like to remind you of an extract from your statement of 7 January 1946. Your Honors, this is Document 3469-PS. It is not in my book of documents as it was submitted by the Counsel for the Defense. I am going to quote from that document; it is a very short passage. [_Turning to the defendant._] This is Paragraph 39 of your statement: “Once Goebbels tried to coerce me into submitting my texts for perusal. I refused this request and explained that usually I dictated a short résumé of my speech immediately before my broadcast and consequently, so to say, improvised my speeches. He said it was all right but on condition that if he would wish it, I should at least speak on specific, given themes.” Is that right? FRITZSCHE: Yes. GEN. RUDENKO: Does that not indicate the confidence Goebbels had in you? Is that not right? FRITZSCHE: No doubt he had a great deal of confidence in me, and I did not deny it. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Let us proceed. In this very same document, which I have just mentioned to you, that is to say, in your statement of 7 January 1946, in Paragraph 35 there is the following sentence—I think it was written by your own hand. It was in reply to some of the questions put by your counsel. You say, “More and more I became the only official authority in the Ministry in the field of radio communication.” Is that right? FRITZSCHE: Unfortunately I did not hear the end of your question but you have quoted the passage correctly and I have written it. GEN. RUDENKO: So, it does correspond to facts? FRITZSCHE: Yes, absolutely. GEN. RUDENKO: Well, you therefore will admit that in the German propaganda machinery you occupied the most prominent position after Goebbels? FRITZSCHE: No, my previous answer does not contain such a statement. GEN. RUDENKO: I am asking you that now. FRITZSCHE: I will admit that I had a most influential position in German radio, of which I was the head. If you now put a new question, asking who held the second position in the entire set-up of propaganda after Dr. Goebbels, I will reply: Dr. Dietrich, the State Secretary, or Dr. Naumann, the ... GEN. RUDENKO: Excuse me just a minute, please. I did not say the second position; I only said the most influential position. Are you going to deny this? FRITZSCHE: I have no objection to your use of the word “influential,” but it does not change my answer. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, “influential position,” if you like. That is still stronger. Let us proceed, however. In the same statement of 7 January you wrote—it is contained in Paragraph 15: “During the entire period from 1933 to 1945 the task of the ‘German Press Department’ was the supervision of the local press and supplying it with directives... More than 2,300 German newspapers were thus supervised.” And then: “In the execution of this task given to me by Dr. Goebbels, in accordance with instructions of the Ministry of Propaganda, my activity encompassed the entire news and information system of the German press and radio.” Is that correct? FRITZSCHE: I do not know whether you have quoted the last sentence correctly, but I have certainly fully recognized the first sentences. It is my affidavit Document 3469-PS. That corresponds word for word with the truth. SEN. RUDENKO: Quite correct. Please tell me this: You organized in the German Press Department, the head of which you were, the Schnelldienst, the so-called speed service, which supplied the German press with provocative material. Do you admit that? FRITZSCHE: If you will eliminate the word “provocative” and replace it with the word “propaganda” material, then I will admit it. GEN. RUDENKO: All right. The Tribunal will consider this. We are not going to argue about it. Now, the last question from this group of questions: Tell me, were your broadcasts on the radio, which were presented with “Hans Fritzsche Speaks,” considered official Government broadcasts? FRITZSCHE: I explained this subject to you yesterday. Actually, they were a private work of my own; but the private work, publicly audible, of a Ministerialdirektor of the Ministry of Propaganda and the head of the German radio system will, of course, be regarded as semi-official, though not fully official; and this fact I had to consider, and I did consider it. GEN. RUDENKO: All right. Now, I should like again to revert to the testimony of Ferdinand Schörner, which I have already submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit USSR-472. I should like to quote Paragraph Number 2. Do you find it, Defendant Fritzsche? FRITZSCHE: Yes. GEN. RUDENKO: I am going to read it into the record. THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, the Tribunal would like to see the whole of this document, or at any rate would like to see the questions to which these are answers. GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this document has been submitted to you in full. THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see. You mean that what we have in English here are only the parts that have been translated into English? GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, that is quite correct. I am going to read into the record Extract Number 2: “I am fully aware that Fritzsche was a prominent collaborator of the Ministry of Propaganda and that he was extremely popular in National Socialist circles and among the German people. He gained great popularity, especially by his weekly war political radio commentaries on the international situation. I often heard Fritzsche’s broadcasts in peacetime as well as during the war; and I perceived his broadcasts, which were filled with fanatical devotion to the Führer, as directives from the Party and the Government.” Do you agree with this evaluation? FRITZSCHE: I cannot raise any objection to this quotation, but beyond that... THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, is the document sworn? GEN. RUDENKO: This document was put into official form in accordance with the processes which are in use in the Soviet Union. THE PRESIDENT: Where was it taken? GEN. RUDENKO: In Moscow. THE PRESIDENT: The man who made the statement—was he free or was he in prison? GEN. RUDENKO: He was at the time a prisoner of war. THE PRESIDENT: Did the man who is alleged to have made the statement sign it? GEN. RUDENKO: Of course, it was signed by him. THE PRESIDENT: Go on. GEN. RUDENKO: Thank you. And so you... FRITZSCHE: May I add that it is known to me that on distant battle fronts or, for example, with German colonies abroad, my radio speeches were considered, shall we say, as a political compass. GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I understand. I should like to put to you another document which I will ask you to peruse. Your Honors, I am submitting as Exhibit USSR-471 the testimony of Hans Voss. Defendant Fritzsche, do you know this name, Vice Admiral Hans Voss? FRITZSCHE: I know the name, but not the man personally. DR. FRITZ: I apologize, Mr. President. It may be that the statement of General Field Marshal Schörner does not deserve too much attention, but at any rate I am unable to ascertain from the document the place where it was taken. THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko says that it was taken at Moscow. DR. FRITZ: But the record, the protocol itself, does not show that; and then I have noticed also that the photostatic copy which I have here does not show the signature of the Field Marshal. It just says “signed.” Later on in the right margin a handwritten signature has been affixed, but I do not know whether this document is admissible from a legal point of view. THE PRESIDENT: You can see the original and compare it. GEN. RUDENKO: I am speaking about the Document USSR-471, which is a written statement by Hans Voss. Please look at the Excerpt Number 1, which is underlined; I quote: “Fully devoted to Hitler and the National Socialist Party, Fritzsche rendered priceless services in helping to spread National Socialism throughout Germany.” Is that in accordance with reality? FRITZSCHE: Well, at least I will not object. GEN. RUDENKO: In other words, you are in accord with it? FRITZSCHE: As I told you, I do not object, but I do not want to say by that that I concur. GEN. RUDENKO: On the other hand, you do not deny this? FRITZSCHE: No, I say for the third time that I do not raise any objection. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I should now like to question you regarding your attitude toward the racial theory. You gave yesterday a detailed explanation in this connection to your counsel, so that I am going to put to you only two or three questions, and I should like you to reply briefly. Did you agree with this racial theory? FRITZSCHE: Yes, and precisely to the extent which I described to you yesterday. GEN. RUDENKO: All right. In a radio broadcast on 6 April 1940 you spoke about Poland. Your Honors, this is Document USSR-496. I am not going to read this document as I do not want to propagate the views contained in it, but I should like the defendant to peruse this document. Please will you look at Excerpt Number 1 of this document. It is underlined in red pencil. This refers to your evaluation of the Polish nation. I simply should like to ask you about this speech of yours. FRITZSCHE: It is impossible for me to recognize a radio speech of mine when I see an extract of only 20 lines, considering that I have spoken about a thousand times, as I said yesterday. In that case, you will have to let me have the full speech so that I can recognize my line of thought at the time. GEN. RUDENKO: Did you not examine the document? This is a full text of your utterance which took place on 6 February 1940 on radio station, Deutschland Sender. FRITZSCHE: General, there are 20 lines here. They begin with the words, “Considerable effort was necessary to...” GEN. RUDENKO: That is enough, all right. There is no need in further quoting. That is the document to which I am referring. I am asking you, is that your speech? FRITZSCHE: It is quite possible, but if you give me only 20 lines of that speech, I can only confirm that: At the time when I had seen the official German documents dealing with the atrocities committed against Germans in Poland I talked about that with great disgust on the radio, talked about what I saw in those documents. THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now? GEN. RUDENKO: All right, Mr. President. DR. THOMA: I ask you to grant leave for Defendant Rosenberg to be absent from the Court this afternoon because I have an important conference to hold with him. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] _Afternoon Session_ GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Fritzsche, extracts from your speech dated 5 July 1941 will be handed to you. They concern the opposition which the German Fascist troops encountered while entering Soviet territory. My Lord, this Document Number 3064-PS has already been submitted by the Defense. Will you look at Paragraph 7, the last paragraph? I do not intend to read it. FRITZSCHE: Yes, I have noted it. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Do you admit having used those very expressions? FRITZSCHE: Yes, I admit that and I should like to emphasize, without quoting it, in what connection this statement was made. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I merely want to ask you the following: When, in your speeches you insult the Polish and Russian peoples by calling them “subhumans” do you not consider that these are expressions of misanthropic theories? FRITZSCHE: Mr. Prosecutor, I should like to state that I never called the Russian people or the Polish people subhumans. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I do not intend to argue with you; the documents speak for themselves. I would like to turn again to the statement of Hans Voss. This is Document USSR-471. It has already been submitted. Will you pay attention to Excerpt Number 2? It is underlined. It is just a short excerpt, and I will read it: “...and he”—Fritzsche—“understood how to influence the German mind when he tried to convince them that they, the Germans, were the superior race and therefore had to rule over other peoples as their slaves.” Does that agree with the facts? FRITZSCHE: No, it does not agree with the facts; rather, it contradicts the facts in all points. GEN. RUDENKO: Let us say it contradicts your assertions. Very well, I will put another question to you. Do you know the name Lieutenant General Rainer Stahel, who was the former commander of the city of Warsaw? FRITZSCHE: I am not familiar with that name. GEN. RUDENKO: You are not familiar with that name? Very well. You will be handed a document. Mr. President, this is Document USSR-473, and it is the testimony of Rainer Stahel, dated 15 September 1941. The passage is underlined in your copy. I will read the first excerpt: “Goebbels and Fritzsche took every measure in order to popularize the racial theory among the Germans and to convince them that the Germans were a master race and that other peoples, as inferior races, must be subordinated to the German ‘master race.’ “In order to convince the Germans of this and to compel them to believe in this theory, the Ministry of Propaganda, run by Goebbels and Fritzsche, made a large number of films before the war and during the war and published books, pamphlets, periodicals, and other literature in which the authors attempted to prove the ‘superiority’ of the Germans over other nations. “It can be said that as a result of the energetic activity of Goebbels and Fritzsche the racial theory gained a firm hold on the minds of large numbers of the German people. This contributed to the fact that during the war the German soldiers and officers, having assimilated the teaching of the leaders of German propaganda, committed bestial crimes against peaceful populations.” Tell me, did Rainer Stahel correctly describe the part played by you in the propagation of racial theory? FRITZSCHE: No, I should like to add that the level of this statement is even lower than that of the other statements submitted to me. I should be happy if just one of those people whose testimony has been submitted to me in this form, could appear here in person in order to testify as to the documentary basis of his statement. GEN. RUDENKO: I believe that during the 6 months that the Trial has lasted, you have heard enough testimony. Well, let us go on. FRITZSCHE: No, I have to make this observation: I have not been confronted with any testimony of witnesses dealing with the subject matter discussed here. GEN. RUDENKO: You remember, I hope, the testimony of the witness Hoess regarding the extermination of millions of persons. [_There was no response._] GEN. RUDENKO: I say that you, I hope, remember the testimony of Hoess, the commander of the concentration camp in Auschwitz, concerning the extermination of millions of people. FRITZSCHE: I did not forget this testimony, and not for a minute did it escape my memory. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I merely wanted to remind you. I do not intend questioning you on this matter. I am passing on to questions connected with the propaganda regarding the preparation for aggressive war by Hitler Germany. In order to shorten the cross-examination, I shall quote a few of your own statements, dated 12 September 1945, which have already been submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit USSR-474. Please look at the second excerpt. It is underlined. FRITZSCHE: I object to the reading of this quotation in the same way as I objected to the submission of the entire minutes of the interrogation, and I refer you to what I testified a few hours ago as to the origin of this record. GEN. RUDENKO: You already gave an explanation to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal will consider your explanation. This document is submitted, and I intend to cite this part of the testimony. Please follow me—Excerpt Number 2: “In order to justify this aggressive action, Goebbels summoned me to him and gave me instructions to conduct a hostile campaign against Austria. Among other things he instructed me to dig out old documents in the archives which in any way incriminated the Austrian Government and to publish them in the press. Goebbels stressed that the documents to be published must first of all show that the Austrian people wished to unite themselves with the German nation and that the Austrians adhering to these ideas were being persecuted by the Austrian Government. Furthermore, Goebbels said that the German press had to show that the Germans living in Austria were being systematically persecuted by the Austrian Government which even went to the length of carrying out mass reprisals against them.” And further on: “When Germany occupied Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Poland, Belgium, Norway, and the Balkan countries, acting on the instructions of Goebbels, I organized a similar calumnious propaganda.” THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, surely it would be better to ask him with reference to one of these paragraphs: Did he say that?—rather than to put to him the whole document at once. GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I have only one paragraph left, and I intended to read it and then to put the question to him. THE PRESIDENT: I am not objecting to that. I am only suggesting that it would be better if you put to him each paragraph in turn, and not put three or four paragraphs all in one question. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, Mr. President; I will deal with it in this way. I am asking you, Defendant Fritzsche, do you admit the paragraph read by me concerning the Anschluss? FRITZSCHE: No; and I maintain that that is not what I testified. That extract contains rather the thoughts which the interrogating Russian officer entertained in respect to my testimony. After it had been drawn up, the record was submitted to me for my signature. THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute! What do you deny in it? Take the first paragraph. FRITZSCHE: Mr. President, I am protesting against everything, particularly against the expressions applied here which I have never used. During my interrogations in Moscow I stated exactly the same things as I stated here in this Trial yesterday, the day before yesterday and today or as I have set down in my affidavit. THE PRESIDENT: Take the first paragraph. The first paragraph has just been read to you: “In order to justify this aggressive action...” Were you asked any question about that, and did you make any answer? FRITZSCHE: Yes, indeed. In many interrogations which were held late at night, I was asked such questions, and to the subjects condensed in this one question I answered as follows: I do not recall the date, but when the Austrian action was about to take place I was summoned to Dr. Goebbels. Dr. Goebbels told me that the Austrian Government of Schuschnigg had plans of such and such a nature—they have been described in sufficient detail here—that a government crisis had developed, that Seyss-Inquart had taken over the Government, that a call for help had come from Austria, and that now the march into Austria would take place. THE PRESIDENT: Are you now telling us what you told the Russian interrogator, or are you telling us what actually happened in Germany at the time of the Anschluss? FRITZSCHE: I am telling what I told the interrogating Russian officer, and that is exactly what took place in the Propaganda Ministry on the day in question. THE PRESIDENT: You are saying, then, that this first paragraph is entirely made up, are you? FRITZSCHE: No; I should not like to use the expression “made up,” but I should like to say—and I beg permission to do so—which parts in this paragraph are correct. First of all, there is the point that there was a hostile campaign against the Schuschnigg Government; such a campaign actually was instigated in the German press; whether at the moment of his resignation or just before his resignation I do not remember now. Furthermore, it is correct, as set down in this paragraph, that it was proposed to show, by quoting individual cases as far as possible, that under the Schuschnigg Government those who were sympathetic toward Germany were persecuted. These are the points that are correct. GEN. RUDENKO: Strictly speaking, this means that you have now corroborated what I have just read. FRITZSCHE: No, no, sir. There is an essential difference. GEN. RUDENKO: From your point of view. But I believe that you will not deny the fact that you conducted propaganda directed against the Austrian Government. This is the main point of this question. FRITZSCHE: I must deny that as well. This propaganda was not conducted by me, but by my predecessor, as chief of the German Press Department. GEN. RUDENKO: Do I understand correctly that you deny having participated personally in this propaganda, but do not deny the fact that there was such propaganda? FRITZSCHE: You understand me correctly if by the term “propaganda” in this case you mean the enumeration of those measures used by the Schuschnigg Government against German interests as a whole. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I should like to read the following paragraph of the same testimony which says: “When Germany occupied Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Denmark, Poland, Norway, and the Balkan countries, acting on the instructions of Goebbels, I organized a similar calumnious propaganda. In every such case I dug out every old document from the archives which incriminated the Governments of these countries as far as Germany was concerned, added my commentary to these documents and attempted in this way to justify this or that aggressive action on the part of Germany.” Do you also deny this? FRITZSCHE: Yes, in that form I deny that as well. GEN. RUDENKO: But you will not deny that propaganda for the purpose of aggression was conducted against all the countries enumerated in this testimony? FRITZSCHE: I contest your last remark. I admit the fact of the propaganda, and I have described in detail the individual actions and my participation in them in my affidavit, Document 3469-PS. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well; I do not intend questioning you further, as this has been quite adequately explained in your statements dated 7 January 1946, Document 3469-PS, and which, in fact, do not contradict what has been stated. Is that right? FRITZSCHE: I see an essential difference. But this Document 3469-PS is absolutely correct. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, I should like as a supplement to this, to read the testimony of Ferdinand Schörner, which is Document USSR-72 and which has already been submitted to the Tribunal; I mean Extract Number 3. He says in his statement, I read: “Fritzsche’s political activity in his function as official radio commentator, in the same way as the activity of the war correspondent, General Dittmar, was subordinated to the main aim of National Socialism, the unleashing of the world war against democratic countries and the contributing by all possible means to the victory of German arms. Fritzsche’s principal method, applied during the several years of his activity, consisted in, as I later realized, the deliberate deception of the German people. I mention that because during the last years we soldiers felt this deception especially keenly since in spite of Fritzsche’s false lamentations we knew the actual conditions on the front and the actual situation. The main guilt of people such as Fritzsche is that they did know the actual state of things, but despite this, proceeding according to the criminal intentions of the Hitler Government, consciously fed the people with lies or, to use a German expression, ‘threw sand in their eyes.’” Tell me, Defendant Fritzsche, does this characterization of German propaganda correspond to the truth? FRITZSCHE: That is utter nonsense and it happens that I can partly prove that. Herr Schörner says part of the activity of the war correspondent General Dittmar was the starting of aggressive wars. General Dittmar spoke over the radio for the first time in the winter of 1942-43. That is one point. The second point is the following: I have never seen Herr Schörner. I do not know him and I have never spoken to him. I should be very surprised if he were in a position to judge whether I deliberately or unconsciously at any time ever said anything that was not true. However—and this is something I must add—during the last few days in Berlin I received indirectly, through State Secretary Dr. Naumann, a report from General Field Marshal Schörner with the instruction that it was left to my discretion to make use of it. It reported that he was in Bohemia with an army which was intact and that he could, if he wanted to, hold this territory for an unlimited period. We in Berlin should not lose courage; he could even come to our aid. I do not know whether Schörner actually made this statement but I think it would be worth while to call General Field Marshal Schörner here as a witness, in order to ask him on what he based his judgment. GEN. RUDENKO: The fact that you do not know Ferdinand Schörner does not disprove this testimony, for you have yourself stated before this Tribunal that although very many people knew you as an official representative of the Government, you could, of course, not know everybody; is that right? FRITZSCHE: If you will permit me, sir, I should like to call your attention to something illogical. Even without knowing me, it is very easy for anyone to give an opinion about the things I said, but it is impossible for anyone to judge whether I made those statements in good faith or in bad faith. I am sure that you yourself realize this distinction. GEN. RUDENKO: You are speaking again of your personal participation, but you do not deny the lying character of the German propaganda? FRITZSCHE: Again I cannot answer “yes” to the question in the way that you put it. This morning I gave you a basis for questions which can be put to me. I contributed my share to a historical clarification by trying to show what was pure idealism and what were false assumptions; these things are now being confused. GEN. RUDENKO: I am not putting questions on the basis which you pretend you gave me, but upon the basis of documents which are at the disposal of the Prosecution. Let us go on. I should like to ask you: Did you know the documents about the “Case Green” against Czechoslovakia, about the documents concerning the aggression against Poland, the aggression against Yugoslavia—and about the propaganda which had to be conducted in this respect? FRITZSCHE: I heard for the first time here the documentary data for Case Green. But as you are now again trying to tie this up with propaganda measures, it is very hard for me to keep both of these matters separate. Perhaps it will serve your purpose if I answer that neither in the case of Czechoslovakia nor in the case of Poland nor in any other case did I know about the German attacks until an hour or an hour and a half before they were announced to the German public. GEN. RUDENKO: Did you say an hour or an hour and a half? FRITZSCHE: I do not wish to commit myself to an hour or an hour and a half. I do recall that in the case of Russia I had advance knowledge through Dr. Goebbels perhaps 5 or 6 hours beforehand. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. You will now be handed Document USSR-493. It is your radio speech in connection with the aggression against Poland. This speech was made on 29 August. Its purpose was to explain beforehand the reasons for the German attack on Poland and it was made on 29 August. I do not intend reading it, but the gist of this speech is that on 29 August you spoke of a series of unexpected events which were imminent. Have you acquainted yourself with this document? FRITZSCHE: Yes, indeed. GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny that on 29 August 1939 you made this speech? FRITZSCHE: No, I do not deny that. I should just like to refer to the fact... GEN. RUDENKO: Excuse me. Please answer my question first and give your explanations later. This was on 29 August? You do not deny it. I am asking you, did you yourself believe in these explanations of unavoidable war with Poland? Did you yourself believe this at that moment? FRITZSCHE: Whether at that moment I considered a war unavoidable, that I am not in a position to tell you. But I am able to tell you one thing: I did not believe that Germany was to blame. That if this tension should lead to a war... GEN. RUDENKO: That is enough. FRITZSCHE: I ask to be allowed to add... GEN. RUDENKO: But please be brief. THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, let the man answer. GEN. RUDENKO: If you please. FRITZSCHE: At that time it was a matter of great satisfaction to me that in the weeks that followed I could see from the Soviet press that Soviet Russia and its Government shared the German opinion of the question of war guilt in this case. GEN. RUDENKO: I believe it is not the time to discuss this now nor did I ask you for explanations on this subject. You did not answer my question, but let us pass on to another question. On 9 April 1940 you made a speech concerning the reasons for a possible occupation of Norway. You will now be handed an extract from this speech. Mr. President, this is Document Number USSR-496. You have that document, Defendant Fritzsche. It is Excerpt Number 4. FRITZSCHE: No, I do not have it. Yes, I have found it. It is Page 4. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Yes, it is Excerpt Number 4. I will read a short passage: “The fact that German soldiers had to carry out their duty because the English violated Norwegian neutrality did not end in a warlike but in a peaceful action. No one was injured, not a single house was destroyed; life took its daily course.” This was a lie. Do you admit it or will you deny it? FRITZSCHE: No, that was not a lie, for I had just been in Norway myself and I had seen these things. And everything will be quite clear if you will permit me to read the next sentence, which says—the next sentence reads as follows... GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Fritzsche, wait a minute. You will read it later. THE PRESIDENT: But, General Rudenko, you must let the man explain. He wants to read the next sentence in order to explain this sentence. FRITZSCHE: The next sentence reads: “Even there, where Norwegian troops, instigated by the misguided former Norwegian Government, put up resistance, the civilian population was hardly affected by this, for the Norwegians fought outside the cities and villages....” GEN. RUDENKO: Well. Now I will show you a document, “An Official Report of the Norwegian Government,” which has already been submitted to the Tribunal by the French Prosecution as Exhibit RF-72. Mr. President, in my document book this document is wrongly numbered Exhibit USSR-78. It is Document 1800-PS and it has been submitted by the French Prosecution as Exhibit RF-72. [_Turning to the defendant._] Listen, Defendant Fritzsche, how correctly you described the situation in Norway; listen what the “Official Report of the Norwegian Government” says about it. I quote: “The German attack on Norway on the 9th of April 1940 brought war to Norway for the first time in 126 years. For 2 months war raged throughout the country, causing destruction to the amount of 250 million kroner. More than 40,000 houses were damaged or destroyed and about 1,000 civilians were killed.” And that describes the situation as it really was. Do you admit that your speech on 2 May 1940 was full of the usual lies? FRITZSCHE: No, I do not admit that, but I assert that you, sir, in submitting this extract, are not taking into consideration the fact that I, in my introduction, reported that I wanted to describe what I had seen myself, when I made a journey into the Gulbran valley and which I remember took me nearly as far as Atta. It does not in any way prove my description to be incorrect, if, according to the facts ascertained by the Norwegian Government, such loss and damage actually did occur in connection with this undertaking. GEN. RUDENKO: I believe that the Norwegian people and the Norwegian Government had sufficient experience of the weight of the German occupation, and the government report states actual facts and not the sort of facts which you stated in your propaganda. This document has been submitted in accordance with Article 21 as indisputable evidence, and I do not intend to argue with you. The Tribunal will take note of it. I have a few more questions to put to you in connection with a matter which has already been dealt with in detail here. It is the _Athenia_ case. I will not question you in detail on this matter, as it has already been ascertained with sufficient accuracy. I am simply asking you: Do you admit now that Fascist propaganda gave out to the public slanderous and false information about the _Athenia_ case? FRITZSCHE: Whether this was done by Fascist propaganda in Italy, that I do not know. National Socialist propaganda did it in good faith, as I have clearly described. GEN. RUDENKO: I have already been speaking for nearly an hour about what occurred here and what has been ascertained. Do you agree that this speech was a slanderous one or do you still deny it? FRITZSCHE: No, I have already admitted that and I also showed clearly how these statements came about. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I am interested only in the personal part you played in this matter. Why did you take such an active part in this matter, and why were you the first man to spread this slander? FRITZSCHE: I do not believe that I was the first one to bring this matter before the public. However, it is a fact that I spoke very frequently about the case of the _Athenia_, on the basis of official reports which I believed. I spoke about this case because I happened to be the very man who, at the beginning of the war, spoke on the radio in the evenings. GEN. RUDENKO: Are you trying to assert that the first report on the _Athenia_ appeared in the _Völkischer Beobachter_ in October, 1939? FRITZSCHE: I never claimed that. GEN. RUDENKO: Well. Then I will remind you that you dealt with the _Athenia_ as early as September 1939; is that right? FRITZSCHE: Yes, of course, the question of the _Athenia_... GEN. RUDENKO: And you spoke about it before the report was published in the _Völkischer Beobachter_? FRITZSCHE: Many weeks before that, yes. GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore, you were the first to spread those slanderous assertions? FRITZSCHE: No, I cannot confirm that, but rather... GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. In this connection I will put only one other question to you. You will not deny that in 1940 you still spread this version? I will repeat the question. I am asking you, you will not deny that even in 1940 you continued to propagate this slander? FRITZSCHE: It is the essence of every form of propaganda that it repeats good and effective things as frequently and for as long a time as possible. I have explained already that in December of 1945, here in the prison only, I heard from Grossadmiral Raeder for the first time that it was really a German U-boat that had stink the _Athenia_. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I will pass on to a group of questions regarding your participation in the carrying out of propaganda connected with the preparation of aggression against the Soviet Union. You assert that you had no knowledge of the preparation of aggression against the Soviet Union until 5 o’clock on the morning of 22 June 1941—that is to say, when the German troops had already entered Soviet territory—and when you were called by Ribbentrop to the Foreign Office, where a press conference was being held. Did I correctly understand your testimony? FRITZSCHE: No. Several hours before that, on the evening of the day preceding the entry, Dr. Goebbels had called some of the departmental chiefs of the Ministry to his house at Wannsee and told them these facts and forbade them to leave or to telephone. That was the first real knowledge that I had of this fact. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. You also claim that you got to know of Germany’s aggressive aims with regard to the Soviet Union only in 1942, and this according to your own observations, is that right? FRITZSCHE: I do not know what you mean by that. I tried this morning to make it clear that I began to have doubts as to the truth of the official German reasons given for this attack only when I was in prison. I explained that this morning. A second point, which I emphasized earlier in Moscow when I was interrogated, was that I observed in 1942—it may have been in 1941—after the war with the Soviet Union had broken out, that preparations of all kinds must have been going on for quite some time before 22 June. GEN. RUDENKO: I will recall to your memory an excerpt from your statement, a document which you confirm in full. It is Number 3469-PS. In Paragraph 42 we read: “At the beginning of 1942 I was a soldier in the eastern theater of war. I saw the extensive preparations which had been made for the occupation and administration of territories extending as far as the Crimea. On the basis of my personal observations, I came to the conclusion that the war against the Soviet Union had been planned a long time before it broke out.” Is that statement right? FRITZSCHE: Yes, certainly. GEN. RUDENKO: Well, then, I have no further questions to put to you regarding this matter. I would like to recall to your memory two further documents connected with the carrying out of propaganda, in view of the preparation of war and the actual attack against the Soviet Union. I am referring to the minutes of a conference held by Hitler dated 16 July 1941. This document, Mr. President, is Number L-221 and has already been submitted. [_Turning to the defendant._] This document will be handed to you and I will quote one or two paragraphs on the first page. I quote: “Now it is essential that we do not disclose our aims to the whole world. There is also no need for that; the main thing is that we ourselves know what we want. But on no account should we render our task more difficult by making superfluous declarations. Such declarations are superfluous for within the reach of our power we can do everything, and what is beyond our power we will not be able to do anyway.” And further: “What we tell the world about our motives for our actions must be governed by tactical considerations. We must act here in exactly the same way as we did in the case of Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. In those cases, too, we did not say anything about our aims, and we shall have the prudence to adhere to this method in the future.” Did you have any knowledge of such directives of Hitler? FRITZSCHE: No, I did not know of any such directive, but the fact that such statements and directives have been submitted in this courtroom has made me realize, I have said, that some of the premises of our propaganda have no foundation. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. You also had no knowledge either of the instructions issued by the OKW and signed by the Defendant Jodl regarding the carrying out of propaganda in the “Case Barbarossa”? FRITZSCHE: I cannot say that without seeing these documents; the Case Barbarossa as such meant nothing to me until this Trial. GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this is Document Number C-26 and has already been submitted to the Tribunal. I will deal with it only in connection with the matter of propaganda. It is Exhibit USSR-477 in your document book, Mr. President, Document C-26. [_Turning to the defendant._] I will quote one excerpt, Defendant. These instructions say: “Propaganda directed toward the dismemberment of the Soviet Union into single states is not to be used for the time being. In the various parts of the Soviet Union German propaganda must use that language which is most spoken. But this should not be done in such a way that the various propaganda texts might give the impression that it is intended to dismember the Soviet Union at an early date.” Were you acquainted with these directives? FRITZSCHE: I knew neither the document nor the contents of the directive which you have just read. GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, but I hope you will not deny that this was the spirit in which the propaganda was carried on. FRITZSCHE: No. As far as I could observe, the propaganda which was carried on in the Soviet Union had just the reverse tendency. It tried to educate the various nationalities, such as the Ukraine, White Russia, Baltic States, and so forth, for independence. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I would like to ask you now: When did you meet the Defendant Rosenberg for the first time, and when did you get his information concerning the tasks of German propaganda in the East? FRITZSCHE: I doubt whether before this Trial I ever spoke with Herr Rosenberg, but I do believe I met him socially. However, never in my life have I had an official conversation with him. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. You will be handed Document Number 1039-PS. This is Rosenberg’s report on the preparatory work concerning matters connected with the eastern countries. This document has already been submitted to the Defendant Rosenberg and he did not deny it, but confirmed it. I would like you to turn to the second quotation which is marked. In order to shorten this cross-examination, I will not read the whole quotation. This report states: “Apart from these negotiations”—about which we spoke before—“I received the responsible representatives of the entire propaganda organization, namely Ministerial Director Fritzsche, Minister Schmidt, Reich Superintendent of Broadcasting Glasmeier, Dr. Grothe for the OKW, and others. Without going into details as to political objectives, I instructed the above-mentioned persons in confidence about the necessary attitude, with the request to tone down the whole terminology of the press on uniform lines, without issuing any statements. “The schemes for dealing substantially with questions concerning the eastern countries, which were prepared a long time ago, have now been issued by my office and I have passed them on to the propaganda representatives.” Did Defendant Rosenberg correctly describe these events which occurred in 1941, before the attack against the Soviet Union? FRITZSCHE: No. I do not recall ever having been received by Rosenberg. In any case I never received before 22 June, from Rosenberg or from any of his colleagues, any report about the planned attack on the Soviet Union. On the other hand, and this perhaps may clarify matters, I do recall that a colleague of Rosenberg’s frequently came to see me or my colleagues. I even recall his name; he was chief of a press group, Major Kranz, formerly an editor of the _Völkischer Beobachter_. This man frequently came to see me and my colleagues and transmitted certain wishes of Rosenberg’s pertaining to press propaganda. But in any case this was not before 22 June. GEN. RUDENKO: This means that as far as you are concerned what Rosenberg writes in his report is not true? FRITZSCHE: Untrue would be saying too much. It may be that this information of which he talks refers to a later period of time. I cannot judge that, as I have not read the entire document. It may also be that Rosenberg, in this report, was not quite accurate when he mentions the reception of the responsible representatives of the entire propaganda organization. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. In this connection I would like to put two questions to you. First of all, I would like to refer to the written testimony of Hans Voss, which is Document USSR-471, and which you already have. It is Excerpt Number 3 of Document USSR-471. Have you found it? FRITZSCHE: Yes, I have found it. GEN. RUDENKO: I quote: “After the defeat of the German troops at Stalingrad and after the start of the general Soviet offensive on the whole Eastern Front, Goebbels and Fritzsche took great pains to shape German propaganda in such a way as to help Hitler very effectively in mastering the situation at the front. This propaganda was based on the hope that the Germans would succeed in holding out for a long time. There was an attempt to frighten the German population by disseminating calumnious reports of the brutal acts of the Russian soldiers and the intention of the Soviet Union to annihilate the German nation. “In the last stage of the war the propaganda conducted by Goebbels and Fritzsche made one last attempt to serve Hitler and to organize resistance to Soviet troops.” Is that correct? FRITZSCHE: It is not only incorrect, it is nonsense. GEN. RUDENKO: You frequently used such terminology. Obviously it is a sign of a professional practice. All right, I do not intend to enter into polemics with you. I would like you to take a look at your testimony of 12 September 1945. It is the third excerpt of the Document USSR-474. Have you found that passage? I will quote your explanations concerning this question. FRITZSCHE: All of them are not my statements. What passage are you referring to, sir? GEN. RUDENKO: I mean marked Excerpt Number 3, which begins with the words, “The military aggression against the Soviet Union.” FRITZSCHE: Yes. GEN. RUDENKO: Please pay attention: “Since we had a treaty with the Soviet Union the military attack on the Soviet Union was prepared by Germany in secret. Therefore, during the period of preparation for war against the Soviet Union, no propaganda was carried on. Accordingly, the German propaganda authorities did not begin active anti-Soviet propaganda until after the war started on the Eastern Front. “It must be added that the main task to which Goebbels set the whole propaganda machinery was to justify Germany’s expansionist policy toward the Soviet Union. “From this point of view, as chief of the German press and radio, I organized a vast campaign of anti-Soviet propaganda, attempting to convince the public at large that the Soviet Union and not Germany was the guilty party in this war. I must, however, state that we had no documentary basis for accusing the Soviet Union of preparing an armed attack on Germany. “In my radio talks I tried especially to instill fear of the horrors of Bolshevism in the hearts of the peoples of Europe and the German population. Thus I asserted that only Fascist Germany was the protective barrier for the European countries against Anglo-American ‘plutocracy’ and ‘Red imperialism.’” Do you admit this? FRITZSCHE: Here again actual statements made by me have been distorted. If I may, I want to give you the factual basis briefly for the various points. It is correct to say that I stated in Moscow that the war against the Soviet Union had not been prepared for by propaganda, because this war came very suddenly and as a surprise. Furthermore, it is correct to say that after the attack on the Soviet Union it was the main task of German propaganda to justify the necessity of this attack; therefore we had to emphasize again and again that we had merely forestalled a Soviet attack. Further, it is correct that I said that the next task for propaganda was to show that not Germany but Russia was guilty of this war, which amounts to practically the same thing. Unfortunately the most important argument which I quoted is omitted from this record, namely, that I and with me millions of Germans believed the official communiqués given out by the German Government because it would have seemed to us nonsensical and crazy if in the middle of a war which had not yet been decided in the West, we wantonly and willfully risked another war in the East. I continue. It is also correct that the evidence given in the _White Book_ published by the Foreign Office at the time was rather meager and it is furthermore correct to say that German propaganda wanted to make Europe afraid of Bolshevism. It is finally correct that German propaganda again and again emphasized the fact that Germany was the only bulwark against the Soviet world revolution. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I would now like to draw your attention to Excerpt Number 4 of the same document, which is in your possession, in connection with propaganda to keep alive the spirit of resistance in the German people, notwithstanding all evidence of Germany’s obvious defeat. I would like to read this very short Excerpt Number 4 from the same document Number USSR-474. I quote: “Beginning in 1943 I tried my best to assert through German radio propaganda that Germany was in possession of weapons which would shake the power of our enemies. For this I used invented data regarding the output of the German war industry which had been given me by the Reich Minister for Munitions, Speer.” Is that right? FRITZSCHE: One part is wrong and the other part that is correct has been wrongly stated. To begin with the latter part: It is correct that I received figures from the Ministry for Armaments and War Production which gave me great hopes for progress. I received, for instance, figures dealing with monthly aircraft production, figures dealing with new and especially effective fighter planes. In the meantime, through direct questioning of Speer himself, I have ascertained that the figures which I received were quite correct at the time and that the airplanes either were used wrongly, as, for instance, in the Ardennes offensive instead of for the protection of the home country, or that they could not be used because of the gasoline shortage. The first half however... GEN. RUDENKO: You are going too much into details, Defendant Fritzsche. You are going into a lot of details which have already been dealt with here and which have nothing to do with you. I would like to submit to you the testimony of Speer, who was interrogated by the Soviet prosecutor here in Nuremberg on 14 November 1945. I submit this document as USSR-492. I would like to read into the record only that part of the document which deals with the carrying out of propaganda during this particular period. I quote: “In September 1944 I wrote a letter to Dr. Goebbels...In this letter I warned Goebbels that it was wrong to keep on giving out propaganda about new V-weapons, for in this way he would merely arouse vain hopes in the German people. This was secret propaganda which was carried out by Dr. Goebbels in order to inspire in the German people the hope of a favorable outcome of the war.” Is that correct? FRITZSCHE: Only partially. It is a fact that Dr. Goebbels, more than a year before the use of the first V-weapon, himself made propaganda with it. On the other hand, Speer in the meantime has stated in his testimony here that he now knows the actual source of the propaganda dealing with “miracle weapons,” namely Standartenführer Schwarz van Berk. Finally, Dr. Goebbels in the last months of 1944, likewise tried to stifle this “miracle weapon” propaganda which he himself had once instigated. GEN. RUDENKO: Now, I would like to remind you of the part you played in this propaganda. You propagandized these new weapons to instill in the hearts of the German people the hope of a successful resistance. I submit to you Document USSR-496. You already have it. It is your radio speech of 1 July 1944. THE PRESIDENT: General, are you going to finish very soon or shall we adjourn now? GEN. RUDENKO: I believe we should adjourn now, Mr. President, because I will still need about half an hour. [_A recess was taken._] GEN. RUDENKO: Well, Excerpt Number 6 from Document USSR-496 has been submitted to you. It is your speech, dated 1 July 1944. I am going to read it into the record: “We Germans have been very reserved in our reports on the effect of the new weapons. We could afford this reserve, knowing that sometime or other Britain would break the silence with which she tried at first to gloss over the effect of the V-1. We were right about it. Reports from Britain during the last few days, and especially today, prove that the effects of the first thrusts with the new weapon are becoming all too obvious. It is completely beside the point for the British to complain now about the wave of hatred which is supposed to surge from Germany against the British Isles. In the fifth year of the war it is useless to talk about feelings, although much could be said about this.” Do you admit, Defendant Fritzsche, that by means of such propaganda you duped the German people and incited them to senseless resistance? FRITZSCHE: On the contrary, in this case I spoke much more reservedly and much more modestly than, for instance, the German press did about the results of the V-1. For that matter the very next sentence following your quotation reads, “We can only repeat that for us the V-1 is the means with which we can break the enemy terror.” GEN. RUDENKO: Now I should like to remind you, Defendant Fritzsche, of your testimony of 12 September 1945 with regard to the activity of the Werewolf organization. This document is Exhibit USSR-474, Excerpt Number 5. Have you found it? FRITZSCHE: Yes, I have found it. GEN. RUDENKO: I am going to read it: “At the end of February 1945 the State Secretary in the German Ministry of Propaganda, Dr. Naumann, sent on to me instructions from Goebbels to work out a plan for the organization of a secret broadcasting station. In reply to my question as to why this broadcasting station was needed, Naumann explained that the German Government had made the decision to transfer members of the NSDAP to an illegal secret organization called ‘Werewolf.’ Naumann also revealed that all these illegal Werewolf groups would be directed by means of this broadcasting station, which I was to establish.” As can be seen by your testimony you were opposed to the organization of this radio station and you spoke about it with Goebbels. In spite of this, the station was created, and the former chief of the Reich Propaganda Office, Schlesinger, was given the task of directing the broadcasts. Is that correct? FRITZSCHE: No. Two things have been mixed up here. Firstly, the plan described in the paragraph which you have read for the creation of a Werewolf broadcasting station was a plan for a mobile station and that mobile station was not built. On the other hand—incidentally, it happened during my absence—on 1 April 1945, by direct order from Dr. Goebbels, the so-called “Old German Broadcasting Station” was opened as a Werewolf station. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I do not want to argue with you about it and I should like to submit to you your own speech broadcast on 7 April 1945. It is the same Document USSR-496, Excerpt Number 7. Have you found it? FRITZSCHE: Yes. GEN. RUDENKO: At that time you broadcasted as follows: “However, as a result of superiority in manpower and material reserves, the enemy has now penetrated deep into German territory, and at this moment is about to carry out his program of extermination directed against us.” I am skipping a few lines: “Let no one be surprised if this desire of strong hearts to avenge oppressed human beings does not even need a short respite for temporary recovery, but leaps suddenly and unexpectedly into flame and becomes active. Let no one be surprised if here and there in unoccupied areas civilians take part in the fight or even if, after the occupation has been carried out, the fight is continued by civilians, that is to say, if without preparation and without organization, there comes into being, springing from the pure instinct of self-preservation, that phenomenon which we call the ‘Werewolf.’” Well, what can you tell us now? FRITZSCHE: Although this quotation also has been torn from its context, I recognize it very well. Unfortunately the passage is missing in which I spoke of right and said, “Right is a sensitive concept which has its roots in tradition and ethical consciousness.” At present... GEN. RUDENKO: Excuse me if I interrupt you, Defendant. I did not ask you for such detailed explanations. I just wanted to determine the fact that you not only explained what the organization was, but also did your utmost to foster the Werewolf organization. Is that correct? FRITZSCHE: That is absolutely incorrect. This is certainly not propaganda for the Werewolf; it is in apology for cases of Werewolf activity. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Let us drop that subject. I should like to ask you, do you know who the head of the Werewolf organization was? FRITZSCHE: That has already been stated here. At the very head of it was Bormann. Under him there was a Higher SS Leader whose name I tried in vain to remember during my interrogations in Moscow. I knew one of his associates, however, and that was Gunter d’Alquen. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Before putting the last few questions to you, I should like to ask you, is it not a fact that Rosenberg and Streicher had great influence on German propaganda? FRITZSCHE: Their influence was negligible. Streicher had no influence at all on official German propaganda and Rosenberg only to an extent which was not noticeable to me. GEN. RUDENKO: All right. I still have a few questions to put to you. You told the High Tribunal that had you known Hitler’s decrees for the murdering of people you would never have followed Hitler. Did I understand you correctly? FRITZSCHE: You have understood me perfectly correctly. GEN. RUDENKO: Now, in other words, I understand you to say that you would have gone against Hitler? FRITZSCHE: It is hard to say what I would have done. Of course, this is a question about which I have now thought a great deal. GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to ask you, if, as you stated here to the High Tribunal, at the beginning of 1942 you received information that in one of the regions in the Ukraine, which was at the time occupied by the Germans, an extermination of the Jews and the Ukraine intelligentsia was being prepared, simply because they were Jews and members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia? Did you receive such information? Is that correct? FRITZSCHE: That is correct. GEN. RUDENKO: That was in the beginning. In May of 1942 you were with the 6th Army, and in the 6th Army you learned about the existence of an order to shoot the Soviet commissars; is that right? FRITZSCHE: Yes. GEN. RUDENKO: You considered that this bloody order should not be applied? Is that right? FRITZSCHE: That is right. GEN. RUDENKO: You knew that this order emanated from Hitler? FRITZSCHE: Yes, I could imagine that. GEN. RUDENKO: That is to say, in 1942 you knew already that Hitler’s order to murder existed and yet you followed him? FRITZSCHE: You are comparing two things which are not comparable. There is quite a difference, not treating commissars as prisoners of war and giving an order for the killing of 5 million Jews. GEN. RUDENKO: Then, if I understand you correctly, the fact that you did not go against Hitler, meant that you considered such an order to be permissible in the conduct of the war by the German Army? FRITZSCHE: No; I considered it was an impossible order; and that is why I opposed it, and not only passively as others did. GEN. RUDENKO: But you continued to support Hitler? FRITZSCHE: Yes. GEN. RUDENKO: Here is the last question. Tell me, during the war, did you ever concern yourself with the question of preparations for biological warfare? FRITZSCHE: Never. GEN. RUDENKO: Did you ever hear the name of a certain Major Von Passavant? FRITZSCHE: Yes, I know that name. GEN. RUDENKO: He was the representative of the OKW in the Ministry of Propaganda, was he not? FRITZSCHE: No, he was not. He was a radio expert in the Propaganda Department of the OKW. GEN. RUDENKO: A copy of a letter of 19 October 1944 will be submitted to you. This letter bears your facsimile signature, and it is directed to Major Von Passavant of the OKW. This is a short document, and I am going to read it to you: “To the Chief of Broadcasting, Major Von Passavant, OKW: “A listener, factory owner Gustav Otto, Reichenberg, has sent me the enclosed sketch with the proposal to carry out biological warfare. I am submitting this to you with the request that you forward it to the proper office. “Heil Hitler. Fritzsche.” Do you remember this document? FRITZSCHE: Of course I do not remember it. At the same time I want to state that I have no doubt that it is genuine. GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I should like to put the last question to you: This shows that you were in favor of the planning and the carrying through by Germany of biological warfare, is that correct? I have finished, Mr. President. FRITZSCHE: But I must have an opportunity to answer the last question. I wish to state that I was by no means in favor of biological warfare, but the situation was merely this: Every day piles of letters came in from listeners and these were passed on by one of the departments to the office competent to deal with the matter concerned and the accompanying letter, which consisted of two or three lines, was submitted to me for signature. As a rule I did not read the contents of the letters. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Fritz, do you want to re-examine? DR. FRITZ: Herr Fritzsche, just now during General Rudenko’s cross-examination you were asked about the radio speech of 2 May 1940 in which you spoke about your journey to Norway. Can you tell me more exactly when you went on that trip? FRITZSCHE: I am afraid I cannot tell you the date exactly, but if I am not mistaken it was at the end of April. DR. FRITZ: The official report of the Norwegian Government on war damage after Norway’s occupation by the Germans was put to you. Here it is said that the fighting which had caused this damage could not have taken place until after you had already completed your journey. Is that true? FRITZSCHE: That is quite possible, but I should like to say this: In the extract which the Russian prosecutor has read without quoting the beginning, I described precisely what I had seen in clearly stated places; Lillehammer and Godenthal are a few names which occur to me now. To compare these statements now with the statements made by the Norwegian Government regarding the total damage is nothing less than the attempt to measure a liquid with a yard measure or vice versa. DR. FRITZ: I have one other question in this connection. Was this journey of yours carried out before the British landing in Norway or afterward? FRITZSCHE: I myself had an opportunity to watch a fight with British troops. I think it was just south of a place called Ottar in the Buldrenthal. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, General Rudenko, during his cross-examination, submitted three interrogation records. One was from Voss, USSR-471, one from Schörner, USSR-472, and one from Stahel, USSR-473. In the meantime I have looked through these three records and I should like to ask the High Tribunal also to compare these three records. I have ascertained that in these three records, of the statements of three different persons, parts of the answers are repeated; and they tally, word for word. It says, for example... THE PRESIDENT: You are not getting this from the witness; you are making an argument to us, and you must do that at some other time. DR. FRITZ: I just wanted to make an application, Mr. President. If these three records are used for the findings, then I wish to make an application that at least one of these persons who were interrogated be brought here in person for the purpose of cross-examination. THE PRESIDENT: Were you meaning that you should see, or that we should examine, the whole of those three affidavits, or were you meaning that you wanted one of the people who made the affidavits to come here in order to give evidence and be cross-examined? Which do you mean? DR. FRITZ: The latter, Mr. President. I should merely like to request that all three be summoned. FRITZSCHE: All three. I can only ask to have all three called. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider your application. DR. FRITZ: Apart from this, Mr. President, I do not wish to carry out any further redirect examination. THE PRESIDENT: There is one thing, Defendant. You referred to the Commissar Decree, or order, and you spoke of it as though it were an order not to treat commissars as prisoners of war. That was not the order, was it? The order was to kill them. FRITZSCHE: The order which I got to know about in the 6th Army was an order saying that commissars who had been captured should be shot. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is a very different thing from not being treated as prisoners of war. The answer you gave was that you imagined the Commissar Order came from Hitler, but it is a very different thing, an order not to treat commissars as ordinary prisoners of war and to kill 5 million Jews. That was not a fair comparison at all, was it? FRITZSCHE: In this case I must admit that my way of expressing myself with reference to these commissars was not correct. THE PRESIDENT: There is one other thing I want to ask you. In October 1939 this untruthful statement about the _Athenia_ was published in a German newspaper. That is right, is it not? FRITZSCHE: In October 1939? During the whole of September and October untruthful statements about the _Athenia_ were made in the German press as well as on the German radio. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. But on the 23d of October 1939 a particularly untruthful statement attributing the sinking of the _Athenia_ to Mr. Winston Churchill was made in a German newspaper. You told us about it. FRITZSCHE: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: And you continued to broadcast referring to those alleged facts for some time, did you not? FRITZSCHE: Of course, because at the time I was still under the impression that they were true and my... THE PRESIDENT: That is what I wanted to ask you about. You had a naval liaison officer in your office? FRITZSCHE: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: What inquiries did you make? FRITZSCHE: This naval officer was not actually the liaison officer between us and the High Command of the Navy. He was censorship officer for the entire Armed Forces. Nevertheless I naturally called on his services in connection with naval matters. And several times I ordered him, or rather, requested him to find out from the High Command of the Navy how the investigation of the Athenia case stood. The answer was always the same: “The position still is that no German submarine was near the place of the catastrophe.” THE PRESIDENT: And are you saying that that liaison officer of the Navy told you that after the 23d of October 1939? FRITZSCHE: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: Did he continue to tell you that? FRITZSCHE: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: That is all. He may return to the dock. Yes, Dr. Fritz? DR. FRITZ: Now, with the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to call the witness Herr Von Schirmeister. [_The witness Von Schirmeister took the stand._] THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please? MORITZ VON SCHIRMEISTER (Witness): Moritz von Schirmeister. THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing. [_The witness repeated the oath._] THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. DR. FRITZ: Witness, before beginning your examination, I should like to ask you to make your answers quite general and as brief as possible. Will you please give the Tribunal very briefly some particulars of your career, so that the Tribunal may know more about you. VON SCHIRMEISTER: I come from a family of officers and civil servants; studied theology for three terms; 10 years as a banking official, 5 of them in South America; then editor until my appointment in Berlin; on 1 October 1931 I became a member of the Party; SS Hauptsturmführer in the Allgemeine SS; during the war four times a soldier; the last time from 31 July 1944 on; on 22 September 1944 prisoner of war in British hands; since then I have been in Great Britain. DR. FRITZ: When I discussed the subject of your examination with you a few days ago, you told me that your former positive attitude toward National Socialism would not prevent you in any way from making truthful statements here, is that true? VON SCHIRMEISTER: I have already told you that I believed in this cause, that I have sacrificed everything to it, that I have lost everything through it. It was very bitter for me. But today I know that I have served a bad cause. I have freed myself entirely of it. In my last camp in England I was permitted to assist in the re-education of my comrades. There I was allowed to edit the camp newspaper. And if I only could, then I would help today to rebuild a democratic Germany. DR. FRITZ: When did you become acquainted with the Defendant Fritzsche? VON SCHIRMEISTER: On 1 July 1938. DR. FRITZ: What were you at the time? What position were you to occupy? VON SCHIRMEISTER: I was an editor in Braunschweig and I was called to the Ministry of Propaganda in order to become Dr. Goebbels’ personal press expert. DR. FRITZ: What position did you actually occupy in the Ministry of Propaganda? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Up to 1 July 1943 I was Dr. Goebbels’ personal press expert; then I was personal expert to State Secretary Dr. Gutterer until 1 April 1944; then I went with him for 3 months to the UFI which was the controlling company of all film companies. Then, on 31 July 1944, I went to the front. DR. FRITZ: Did you have daily contact with Dr. Goebbels? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Yes, since the outbreak of the war. Let me describe briefly what my main activities were. DR. FRITZ: Very briefly, please. VON SCHIRMEISTER: During the war I had to look through all the news and propaganda material coming in from enemy broadcasting stations and regularly submit extracts from it to Goebbels. These extracts formed the basis for Dr. Goebbels’ propaganda instructions which he himself issued every morning. In the afternoon and evening I had to telephone them to the press section and radio section. So that during the war, except when my deputies took my place, I was with Dr. Goebbels in his apartment, I took my meals with him, slept in his house, accompanied him on journeys, and so on. DR. FRITZ: What position did Fritzsche occupy at the time? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Herr Fritzsche in those days was the deputy chief in the department Home Press. DR. FRITZ: Will you please describe the nature and importance of Fritzsche’s position in the Propaganda Ministry also during the period which followed. Very briefly, please. VON SCHIRMEISTER: I was to get acquainted with the work of the department Home Press. Conditions there were as bad as they could be. The chief, Herr Berndt, adopted undisguised table-thumping tactics. He went about barking out commands and sacking editors en masse. In ability and knowledge the officials in charge were inferior to the average editor. The only steadying influence was Herr Fritzsche; he was the only expert. He knew the needs and requirements of the press. On the one hand he had to mend the china which Herr Berndt was constantly smashing and on the other hand he tried to replace inefficient officials in the organization with better ones. DR. FRITZ: Would it be correct to say, therefore, that Defendant Fritzsche was not appointed as an exponent of the Party, but as an expert? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Only as an expert. The extremist Party men in the Ministry did not give Fritzsche his full due. But as an expert he was then and later the good spirit of the press. DR. FRITZ: Was Fritzsche one of those collaborators in the Ministry who had regular conferences with Goebbels? VON SCHIRMEISTER: These regular conferences had not yet begun to be held in those days, and Fritzsche did not partake in them in any case. DR. FRITZ: So that he was not consulted until he became a department chief? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Yes; only as far as such conferences were taking place, but actually only since the outbreak of war. DR. FRITZ: In what way did Dr. Goebbels confer with his associates? VON SCHIRMEISTER: After the war broke out there were daily conferences at 1100 hours, which were presided over by Dr. Goebbels personally and at which he gave all necessary propaganda instructions. DR. FRITZ: How many people attended these 11 o’clock meetings? VON SCHIRMEISTER: At the beginning, that is to say, up to the beginning of the Russian campaign, about 20 people. Later the circle grew to about 50 people. DR. FRITZ: Were there discussions during these conferences or was it more or less the giving out of orders? VON SCHIRMEISTER: There was no discussion during these conferences. First of all, the liaison officer from the OKW would give a survey of the military situation and then Dr. Goebbels would give his instructions regarding propaganda, mostly for the press, the radio, and the newsreels. DR. FRITZ: Who presided over the conferences when Dr. Goebbels was not present? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Normally the State Secretary. DR. FRITZ: And who presided when the State Secretary was not there either? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Usually Herr Fritzsche, sometimes also the head of the foreign press department or the foreign department, but mostly Herr Fritzsche. DR. FRITZ: Did Fritzsche in these cases give the daily propaganda instructions on his own initiative or how was that done? VON SCHIRMEISTER: No; if the Minister was not in Berlin, he was kept informed about news material coming in from abroad. He would then give the instructions to me or to one of my deputies in the same way as he did during the conferences. I had to pass on these instructions by telephone. In Berlin they were taken down by stenographers and then read out during the conference verbatim as instructions coming from the Minister. By the way, this must be seen by the minutes of the meetings. They were always called “Instructions from the Minister.” DR. FRITZ: If Fritzsche used written instructions such as you have described, given by Dr. Goebbels, did he not try to clear up questions which Goebbels had not dealt with, by bringing them up for discussion? VON SCHIRMEISTER: When Dr. Goebbels was farther away from Berlin, it might happen that the latest news did not reach him in time. In these cases Herr Fritzsche would bring things up for discussion, consider the pros and cons and then give instructions on his own initiative. That was then put down in writing; the Minister read it afterward and he either approved it or altered it. DR. FRITZ: But then, surely apart from the big conferences with 30 or 50 people present at which Goebbels gave his instructions there must have been more confidential conferences as well. VON SCHIRMEISTER: In the course of the morning, naturally, individual department chiefs also came for official discussions with the Minister. DR. FRITZ: Was Fritzsche also called to these more confidential conferences? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Generally, no. The Minister used the conferences at which all departments were represented to summarize whatever he had to say for the press, radio, and newsreels. The heads of those departments whose special functions were not of interest to the others, came for individual conferences. DR. FRITZ: How often was Herr Fritzsche consulted as compared with, say, the state secretaries—Hahnke, Gutterer, and Dr. Naumann? VON SCHIRMEISTER: The state secretaries could always be present during these individual conferences and so could the personal advisers who were always there. Herr Fritzsche was very rarely present at these individual conferences. DR. FRITZ: What was the position of the 12 department heads of the Ministry of Propaganda, one of whom was the Defendant Fritzsche? VON SCHIRMEISTER: These department heads can be classified into experts on the one side, such as, for instance, the head of the budget department, Dr. Ott, and confirmed Party men on the other side as, for instance, Herr Berndt. Officially they had not a particle of the authority which was normally exercised by a department head in a ministry. It was generally known that the Minister was using them as tools and that when he did not need them any more he would throw them out. That did not apply to the department heads only. I remember the unworthy manner in which he threw out State Secretary Gutterer when he had enough of him. DR. FRITZ: The Indictment accuses Fritzsche of having made of Germany’s news agencies, radio, and press an instrument that played an important part in the hands of the so-called conspirators in carrying out their plans. Was Fritzsche responsible for the organization of the press in the National Socialist State and what can you say to this charge? VON SCHIRMEISTER: When Herr Fritzsche entered the Ministry, this press department had been set up and organized for some time. Moreover, I can also say that even Dr. Goebbels himself cannot be regarded as belonging to this circle of conspirators as defined by the Indictment; for, after all, he did not want to drive us into war, but always advocated the conquest of countries without bloodshed. DR. FRITZ: So that the organization was already set up when Fritzsche took over the department German Press in the winter of 1938-39? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Yes, already completely organized. DR. FRITZ: As the head of that department was Fritzsche independent? If not, who was his superior? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Unfortunately Fritzsche was not only subordinate as department chief to Dr. Goebbels, but he also stood between two fires. On the other side there was the Reich Press Chief, Dr. Dietrich, and the entire German press knew about this discord between the two. Although Reich Press Chief, as State Secretary, was a staff member of the Ministry of Propaganda, nevertheless he demanded the right to be able to give orders independently in his capacity of Reich Press Chief. If, therefore, the Minister and the Reich Press Chief did not agree on a certain point, then it was the unfortunate chief of the department German Press who bore the brunt of this. DR. FRITZ: In what way was Fritzsche active in the press organization? Did he tighten the fetters or did he try to loosen them? VON SCHIRMEISTER: I have already said that Herr Fritzsche was the only real expert of any caliber who worked in the press department. He knew the needs, the worries, and the requirements of the press. He knew that an editor could work only if you give him a certain amount of freedom, and thus always and at every opportunity he fought to have the fetters loosened. He did much more than was apparent to the outside world, for the Minister would make such and such a decision and the outside world would come to know only what the Minister wanted. THE PRESIDENT: Do you think he has answered the question? DR. FRITZ: Did Dr. Goebbels have any objections to the way the press worked? Was it not aggressive enough for him? Please be very brief. VON SCHIRMEISTER: No, it was not aggressive and not obdurate enough for him. DR. FRITZ: And how did Fritzsche react to such demands both with reference to individual journalists and with reference to the newspapers as a whole? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Again and again, at every opportunity, both during the conferences presided over by the Minister and at private meetings with the Minister, he spoke on behalf of the press and the journalists and tried to represent their point of view to the Minister. DR. FRITZ: Can you mention a few names of journalists or papers whom Fritzsche tried to protect in the manner described? THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Fritz, why should he give the names of individual journalists and papers? Isn’t it too detailed to go into that? DR. FRITZ: Very well; but Mr. President, may I, in that case, at least offer an affidavit in connection with this question as Document Number Fritzsche-5. It is in my Document Book Number 2 on Page 22. It comes from the editor of the _Frankfurter Zeitung_, Dr. Wendelin Hecht, and I should like to quote it very briefly: “I herewith make the following affidavit for submission to the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg: “1. It is true that the Defendant Hans Fritzsche also helped to protect the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ for several years against a ban by withholding copies of the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ from the Führer’s headquarters. “2. In the numerous attacks directed against the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ because of its political attitude the Defendant Hans Fritzsche repeatedly intervened in favor of the continued publication of the _Frankfurter Zeitung_. “Leutkirch, 6 March 1946. Dr. Wendelin Hecht.” What other influential persons, apart from Dr. Goebbels, were there in the Ministry of Propaganda? VON SCHIRMEISTER: After State Secretary Hahnke’s departure there was only one man in the Ministry of Propaganda who had any real influence on the Minister, only one man with whom Dr. Goebbels had some personal relations, and that was his first personal adviser, Dr. Naumann, who later became his state secretary. DR. FRITZ: Did Fritzsche come to you frequently to learn more about the Minister’s views because the Minister did not inform Defendant Fritzsche? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Very often, because Herr Fritzsche knew that I also had many private conversations with the Minister and he always complained that he was left in suspense and all at sea, and he asked me if I could not tell him the Minister’s view about this or that matter. I did succeed in helping him by occasionally arranging for him to be invited by Dr. Goebbels to private meetings in which I spoke openly about Herr Fritzsche’s needs. DR. FRITZ: Did Goebbels keep the radio strictly under his own control? VON SCHIRMEISTER: During the war the radio was for Dr. Goebbels the most important instrument of propaganda. He did not keep such a strict watch on any department as he did on the radio department. At meetings over which he presided he personally decided the most minute details of the artistic program... DR. FRITZ: That is enough, Witness. Was Fritzsche really the leading man of German broadcasting, as he appeared to the outside world? VON SCHIRMEISTER: By no means. The leading man was Dr. Goebbels himself. Apart from that, Fritzsche here again was between two stools, because on the other side demands came in from the Foreign Office with reference to foreign broadcasts. DR. FRITZ: Was Fritzsche in his radio speeches perhaps too halfhearted for Dr. Goebbels? VON SCHIRMEISTER: I myself, by order of the Minister, repeatedly had to reprimand Fritzsche, because the former claimed that his broadcasts were much too weak. DR. FRITZ: Did Goebbels also praise him? And if so in what manner? VON SCHIRMEISTER: If, as was often the case, the Minister did praise Fritzsche... THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t any interest in whether Goebbels praised him. DR. FRITZ: Then another question: Did Defendant Fritzsche ever contradict the Minister? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Herr Fritzsche was one of the few people in the Ministry of Propaganda who did contradict the Minister, both during conferences and in his apartment. He was always calm and determined and often it had a certain effect. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, may I have your permission to draw your attention at this point to a document, an affidavit by Scharping, Document Number Fritzsche-2, which has already been mentioned frequently. It is at the end of Page 7 and the beginning of Page 8 in my Document Book Number 2. Might I perhaps quote one short sentence: “At the so-called ministerial conferences it was Fritzsche alone who contradicted Goebbels on political questions.” Witness, who was responsible for the definitely false or exaggerated news in the German press during the Sudeten crisis? VON SCHIRMEISTER: That was Alfred Ingemar Berndt, the head of the department. At that time he spent whole nights pouring over General Staff maps, directories, and lists of names, using them to fabricate atrocity reports from the Sudetenland. Herr Fritzsche watched this with anxiety. He came to me once and asked me, “What are we drifting into? Are we not drifting into war? If only we knew what they really want at the top and what is behind it all.” DR. FRITZ: And then another question on the same subject. Did Goebbels, in connection with any military or political actions, which were being carried out or were to be carried out, ever consult beforehand with the Defendant Fritzsche? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Not only did he not consult with Herr Fritzsche, but with nobody at all. The Minister never had any such consultations. DR. FRITZ: Fritzsche asserts that he did not hear of Dr. Goebbels’ instigation of the anti-Semitic excesses in November 1938 until much later, a remark made by Dr. Goebbels himself. That does not sound very credible, because, after all, Defendant Fritzsche was a close associate of Dr. Goebbels. Can you give us an explanation? VON SCHIRMEISTER: In 1938 certainly none of us in the Ministry realized that Dr. Goebbels was the instigator. During the night in question Dr. Goebbels was not in Berlin. As far as I remember, just before that he had been to see the Führer and he was still in southern Germany. The conversation which you have just mentioned did not take place until the middle of the war. It took place at Lanke, where the Minister had a house and it was on an occasion when Herr Fritzsche had also been invited. Someone put the direct question to the Minister as to the cause of these excesses of November 1938. Thereupon Dr. Goebbels said that the National Socialist economic leadership had come to the conclusion that the elimination of Jewry from Germany’s economy could not be carried out further... DR. FRITZ: Witness, excuse me, that is enough. We have heard about it already today. Did Fritzsche later on—I believe it is supposed to have been in June 1944—talk to you about his general attitude toward the Jewish problem? VON SCHIRMEISTER: In May or June 1944 I talked to Fritzsche in his apartment about the fact that on the day of these outrages he had said to me, “Schirmeister, can one participate in this sort of thing and still be a decent human being?” And then Herr Fritzsche said to me, “You know, I have really always been an anti-Semitic, but only in the sense that some of the Jews themselves also were.” And he mentioned a Jewish newspaper, I believe the _C. V. Zeitung_... DR. FRITZ: That is enough, Witness. Then how do you explain Fritzsche’s anti-Semitic statements in various of his radio speeches? VON SCHIRMEISTER: They had been ordered by the Minister. We had seen from the British press that a certain anti-Semitic current in Britain was growing, but a law in England stopped this from appearing in the British press. Now the Minister tried to find a common factor against which our propaganda abroad could be directed. This common factor was the Jew. To give support to the foreign propaganda by the Reich, Herr Fritzsche received orders that in Germany, too, he should touch upon this subject in some of his broadcasts. THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you will be in concluding the case of the Defendant Fritzsche? DR. FRITZ: I think three-quarters of an hour at the most, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Well then, after that the Tribunal will continue the case of the Defendant Bormann until 1 o’clock tomorrow. [_The Tribunal adjourned until 29 June 1946 at 1000 hours._] ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SEVENTH DAY Saturday, 29 June 1946 _Morning Session_ THE PRESIDENT: I will deal with the supplementary applications for documents. The first application on this list was on behalf of the Defendant Von Neurath, and that has been dealt with. The second was on behalf of the Defendant Streicher. That was withdrawn. The third was on behalf of the Defendant Dönitz for an affidavit of former Fleet Judge Jäckel. That application is granted. The next two, 4 and 5, were on behalf of the Defendant Von Neurath. Those have been withdrawn. The next three, 6, 7, and 8, on behalf of the Defendant Rosenberg, are denied. The next, on behalf of the Defendant Von Papen, have all been dealt with during the presentation of the defense on behalf of Von Papen. The next two, on behalf of the Defendant Bormann, are granted. The last three, 12, 13, and 14, on behalf of the Defendant Göring, are subject to the possibility of agreement being reached upon the question of whether affidavits are to be presented or witnesses called, and therefore that application is postponed. That is all. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, before the Tribunal goes on with the business of the day, I should like to inform the Tribunal of the results of my inquiries as to outstanding witnesses and perhaps these could be supplemented by any of the learned counsel who can. My Lord, as far as I can see, there are the witnesses whom Your Lordship has just mentioned of the Defendant Göring, dealing with the question of Katyn. My Lord, the next witnesses that were outstanding were three that the Tribunal allowed to be called for cross-examination if desired in respect to the case of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. I have just had a word with Dr. Kauffmann, and he says that he will not require the witnesses Tiefenbacher, Steinbauer, and Strupp for cross-examination. As far as my information goes, the next is Admiral Böhm in the case of the Defendant Raeder. THE PRESIDENT: Before you get to that, Sir David, on the list that I have there was a witness called Strupp for Kaltenbrunner. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, there are three, Tiefenbacher, Steinbauer, and Strupp. Dr. Kauffmann tells me he does not want these. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then you were speaking about the Defendant Raeder. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there is the question of Admiral Böhm. Dr. Siemers was going to let the Prosecution see an affidavit, and I have not seen it yet; but, My Lord, I do not anticipate that the Prosecution will require that witness unless the affidavit is in very different form from what I expect. My Lord, the only other witnesses that I know about are the three for which application was made by Dr. Fritz yesterday in the present case. The Tribunal is considering that. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that, as far as I can see, is the full extent of the outstanding witnesses, unless I have missed some. THE PRESIDENT: Was there an application for witnesses from the Defendant Bormann on the 26th of June? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I asked Bergold this morning. He has only got one witness that he is calling, he told me, who unfortunately is not here today. THE PRESIDENT: Well, I am told he has just now arrived. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Your Lordship’s information is later than mine. THE PRESIDENT: It has only this moment come through. But so far as the others are concerned, there is only the one that Dr. Bergold wants to call now? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So Dr. Bergold informed me this morning. DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Court, only one witness has arrived. But I have put in several more requests which have not been decided on, and I cannot say whether these witnesses will ever arrive or whether they can be found. The Bormann case is characterized by the fact that not only the defendant cannot be found but almost all the witnesses cannot be found either. In the course of today’s proceedings on the Bormann case I should like to put a special application before the High Tribunal which I do not wish to do just now. THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Will you tell us exactly which witnesses you are referring to? In your letter of the 29th of June you withdraw your application for Fräulein Christians. DR. BERGOLD: Yes, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Klöpfer is the witness who just arrived in Nuremberg. DR. BERGOLD: Yes. Then there are the witnesses Kupfer and Rattenhuber who are still not here and also the witness Christians. THE PRESIDENT: Well, Helmut Friedrich has not been located? DR. BERGOLD: No, he has not been found. THE PRESIDENT: Are you wanting to call Fräulein Christians? DR. BERGOLD: She has not yet arrived either. She was at Camp Oberursel. She received leave and while on leave disappeared—obviously she has fled. THE PRESIDENT: Have you got your application of 26 June or did you make an application of 26 June? DR. BERGOLD: Yes, I did make an application. THE PRESIDENT: Whom did you ask for then? DR. BERGOLD: Just a minute, I have to consult my secretary. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Fräulein Christians and Dr. Helmut Friedrich. THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Klöpfer and Friedrich. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, and Fräulein Christians, My Lord. DR. BERGOLD: On 26 June I applied for the witnesses Falkenhorst, Rattenhuber, and Kempka. I could dispense with Falkenhorst if I might have Dr. Klöpfer instead. THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Klöpfer is the only one who has arrived, as I understand it. DR. BERGOLD: Yes, the only one who has arrived, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: What the Tribunal wants to know is how many you want to call now, and with reference to the others you had better withdraw them if you cannot find them. DR. BERGOLD: Very well, Your Lordship, I wanted to put in an application for postponement. The witness Dr. Klöpfer has only just arrived. Up to now I have not had a chance to talk to him and I consider it unjust for him to have to testify here for the first time. Moreover, he is not prepared, he does not know the documents which have been presented by the Prosecution, and I myself do not know whether he has any knowledge about the things on which I want to question him. Therefore, I should like to apply for the proceedings in the case of Bormann to be postponed until 10 o’clock on Monday to give me the opportunity to hear my one chief witness and to discuss the case with him. I do not even know whether I want to have the witness interrogated for he may possibly make statements that are quite irrelevant. It is not my fault that I have not heard him until now. I applied many months ago to have him brought here and I would not have found him even today if at the last moment I had not had the very kind assistance of the American Prosecution. I believe—I have also spoken to Sir Maxwell-Fyfe—a postponement until Monday at 10 o’clock would be quite proper for my case in order to give me at least time to prepare; if not—my defendant has not been here and my witnesses have not been here and I have not been able to prepare anything. THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Bergold, you have had many months in which to prepare your case and the Tribunal has put the matter back for you already for a very long time and this witness is now here. You can see him immediately and the Tribunal thinks you ought to go on. You must have known that the case would come on, in the same way every other case has come on, in its proper place, subject to the license which has been allowed to you to have your case put back to the end and all your applications for witnesses and documents put back to the very latest possible moment; and the witness is here and we still have some time to deal with the witnesses for Fritzsche and documents. The Tribunal thinks in those circumstances you ought to go on. DR. BERGOLD: Mr. President, it is quite correct I have had months at my disposal; but if I can obtain no witnesses and no information—I ask the Tribunal to put themselves in my place. What is the use to me of waiting many months in vain, months during which I could do nothing. The witnesses were not here, nobody could tell me where the witness Klöpfer could be found. He was only found at the very last moment. I cannot discuss the entire case with him in 15 minutes. I am just asking for a very short postponement until Monday morning. The Tribunal will lose only a very few hours through that. It is not my fault that I have been assigned such an unusual defendant, one who is not present. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Bergold, the only thing you propose to prove by this witness is the alleged fact that Bormann is dead and any evidence he can give about that. That is what the application says. DR. BERGOLD: No, may it please the Court, that is a mistake. The witness Klöpfer cannot testify as to that. He can only give his opinion as to the rest of the Indictment, namely whether Bormann is guilty or not. Only the witnesses Christians, Lueger, and Rattenhuber can give evidence as to the death of the Defendant Bormann. But the witness Klöpfer can only testify concerning the Indictment itself. THE PRESIDENT: Where is the application for Klöpfer? Where is your application? DR. BERGOLD: It is my application of 26 May. THE PRESIDENT: Let me see it. Have you got it there? Dr. Bergold, do you not have anything else at all in the way of documents or evidence that you can continue with without calling this witness Klöpfer? DR. BERGOLD: My Lord, what I have is so small and meager that I myself do not know whether it is relevant until I have questioned the witness. Up to this point I have been dependent on pure supposition. I have not been able to receive or obtain any effective data. They are all legal constructions which can be made untenable by one word from the witness. MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): Mr. President, I have an objection to any postponement for this case. As the Court has pointed out, counsel has had months and he had every co-operation from our office, both for his documents and for his seeking out of his witnesses; and if he would stop talking and go out and talk with his witness, who is here now, I think he might be prepared to go on with his case. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Bergold, the Tribunal will go on with the case against the Defendant Fritzsche now, and in the meantime, you will have an opportunity of seeing this witness Klöpfer; and if after seeing him you wish to make further application, you may do so; but the Tribunal hopes that, if you can ascertain what the nature of his evidence is, that you will be able to go on with it. I now have your—I had it only in German before—but I now have in English your application for the witness Klöpfer, and a summary of it is that he was head of Section III in the Party Chancellery and he can deal with questions relating to the drafting and elaboration of laws and that he is to testify that the activity of Bormann in the proclamation of laws and ordinances was an entirely subordinate one. That is the only reason why you allege that you want to call him in your application. DR. BERGOLD: That is my supposition. There is the possibility that the witness, of course, really knows much more, for he was one of the chief collaborators. I drew up my applications very carefully, because as a lawyer I did not want to submit a fantasy to the Court. THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have said what you can do with reference to Klöpfer, and are you still asking to call a witness called Falkenhorst? DR. BERGOLD: I can only decide on that after I have talked with the witness Klöpfer. In all probability I shall forego the calling of this witness Falkenhorst. THE PRESIDENT: Well, you heard what I said, Dr. Bergold. You can now see Dr. Klöpfer. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I only wanted the Tribunal to know that that was the position as to witnesses; and when Your Lordship asked me, I said that the process of finishing off witnesses might take 2 days. My Lord, subject to the Katyn witnesses, it might take much shorter than that, as I am at present advised. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. And when shall we be informed what the position is with reference to the Katyn witnesses, as to whether there is an agreement as to using affidavits or calling witnesses? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I will make inquiries and try to let Your Lordship know at the end of the session. THE PRESIDENT: I take it that we shall not be able to go into that this morning. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not think so. Apart from that, there are certain outstanding interrogatories which Counsel for the Defense may want to refer the Tribunal to; but that is the only other matter I know. From the point of view of the Prosecution, there may be a few documents which will be put in more or less to clarify points that have arisen during the case, rather than formal evidence and rebuttal. They will be quite small in number and Will not take any time. THE PRESIDENT: Were there any documents on behalf of the Defendant Von Neurath which have got to be dealt with? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My recollection is that there were one or two interrogatories, but apart from that I do not know of any others. THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps those matters had better be gone into on Monday morning. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal hopes that counsel for the defendants understand that the Tribunal will expect them to be prepared to go on with their speeches on behalf of the defendants directly the evidence is finished. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is to try to give some indication of the time that I ventured to intervene this morning. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As I understand it, the proposal is that Professor Jahrreiss will make his general speech first. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I understand the professor is ready to do that and I thought it would be useful if it were known that that might occur even on Monday. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Then, now, Dr. Fritz, perhaps you will continue with your witness. [_The witness Von Schirmeister resumed the stand._] DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I beg to be permitted to continue with the examination of the witness Von Schirmeister. Witness, yesterday, at the end of the session, we stopped at the point dealing with the anti-Semitism expressed by the Defendant Fritzsche in his radio speeches; in connection with that point, I have a further question. According to the statement made by Dr. Goebbels, to where were the Jews evacuated? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Up to the first year of the Russian campaign, Dr. Goebbels in the conferences over which he presided, repeatedly mentioned the Madagascar plan. Later he changed this and said that a new Jewish state was to be formed in the East, to which the Jews were to be taken. DR. FRITZ: Do you know whether, in dealing with reports from abroad concerning alleged German atrocities, not only towards the Jews but towards other peoples as well, Fritzsche always had inquiries made at the RSHA or other authorities concerned? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Yes. Not only with regard to atrocity reports but all propaganda reports from abroad which were embarrassing to us. He made inquiries sometimes at the office of Müller, at the RSHA in Berlin, and sometimes he inquired of the authorities that were directly concerned in these matters. DR. FRITZ: And what other agencies were concerned besides the RSHA where he might have made inquiries? VON SCHIRMEISTER: For example, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, the Armament Ministry, the OKW; it all depended. DR. FRITZ: Do you know whether in reply to such inquiries a clear and completely plausible denial was given, or how was a matter of this sort handled? VON SCHIRMEISTER: There were not always denials, not at all; very frequently we had quite precise answers. For example, if it was asserted that there had been a strike in Bohemia-Moravia, then the answer was: Yes, in such and such a factory a strike took place. But always and without exception, there was a very definite denial of concentration camp atrocities and so forth. That is precisely why these denials were so widely believed. I must emphasize that this was our only possibility of getting information. These pieces of information were not intended for the public, but for the minister, and again and again the answer came: “No, there is no word of truth in this.” Even today I do not know by what other means we could have obtained information. DR. FRITZ: Can you say anything about Fritzsche’s attitude on church questions? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Herr Fritzsche adopted the views taken by the minister during the war. At the beginning of the war, the minister demanded complete cessation of the strife regarding this question, for anything which could have brought dissension among the German people would have had a disturbing influence. I do not know whether I should go into further details. DR. FRITZ: No, I shall turn to another very important topic. Do you know what reasons Goebbels gave to his assistants for the various military actions of Germany? VON SCHIRMEISTER: He gave no reasons of his own at all. He only added his comments to the announcements coming from the Führer. DR. FRITZ: To quote some examples, can you say briefly whether the Defendant Fritzsche knew in advance that a military attack was being planned on first, Poland; second, Belgium and Holland; third, Yugoslavia? VON SCHIRMEISTER: In the case of Poland, we knew of course that the question of Danzig and the Corridor was awaiting a decision. But Dr. Goebbels himself repeatedly assured us, and he himself believed, that this question would not lead to war because, completely mistaken in his view of the attitude of the Western Powers, he was convinced that they were only bluffing and that Poland would not risk a war without the military support of the Western Powers. DR. FRITZ: What about Belgium and Holland? VON SCHIRMEISTER: On the day before the attack on Belgium and Holland events were overshadowed by the state visit of the Italian Minister Pavolini. In the evening there was a performance at the theater and afterwards a reception in the House of the Airmen. At night Dr. Goebbels went with me to the ministry where he occasionally spent the night. During the night I had to telephone to several gentlemen; and in the morning the minister, in my presence, presented to Herr Fritzsche the two announcements which were then broadcast, the first containing the military reasons and the second containing the secret service reasons. Herr Fritzsche did not even have time to look at these announcements; moreover, he had a sore throat and I had to read the second broadcast, with the secret service reasons; I also had not seen these announcements beforehand. DR. FRITZ: What about Yugoslavia? VON SCHIRMEISTER: The same thing happened. In the evening the minister had dismissed his adjutant, had given him leave. During the night I had to call the various gentlemen over the phone and ask them to assemble; and early in the morning the statement, which up to that time had been completely unknown to us, was read to us over the radio. DR. FRITZ: And what happened in the case of the attack on the Soviet Union? VON SCHIRMEISTER: That was even more preposterous. Before the attack on the Soviet Union, the minister, for purposes of camouflage, had lied to his own department chiefs. Around the beginning of May he selected 10 of his colleagues out of the 20 who ordinarily participated in the conferences, and he told them: “Gentlemen, I know that some of you think that we are going to fight Russia, but I must tell you today that we are going to fight England; the invasion is imminent. Please adapt your work accordingly. You, Dr. Glasmeier, will launch a new propaganda campaign against England...” These were impudent lies told to his own department chiefs for purposes of camouflage. DR. FRITZ: Are you implying that no one in the Propaganda Ministry knew of the imminent campaign against Russia? VON SCHIRMEISTER: No. The following gentlemen in the Propaganda Ministry knew about the Russian campaign—if I may presume, a letter to Dr. Goebbels from Lammers offered a clue for it, for in it Lammers told the minister in confidence that the Führer intended to appoint Herr Rosenberg to be Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories; the letter also asked Dr. Goebbels to name a liaison man from our ministry to Herr Rosenberg personally, and that, of course, gave away the secret. The people who knew of this were the minister; Herr Hadamowsky, as his provisional personal representative; Dr. Tauber, the liaison man to be appointed; I, myself, because by accident I had read this letter; and the head of the foreign press department, Dr. Böhme. Dr. Böhme, and this is very important, told me on the day before his arrest in the presence of Prince Schaumburg-Lippe that he had received this information from Rosenberg’s circle, that is—and I want to emphasize this—not from our ministry or from our minister. Otherwise, as heads of two parallel departments, both would, of course, have been informed. If Böhme did not know it from the minister, then Herr Fritzsche could not have known it either. As a result of a careless remark on this subject, Böhme was arrested on the following day and later killed in action. DR. FRITZ: Now I want to summarize this part of my examination in the following general question: Did you ever notice that before important political or military actions of the Government or the NSDAP, Goebbels exchanged ideas about future plans with the Defendant Fritzsche? VON SCHIRMEISTER: It is quite impossible that that occurred; it would have been in complete contradiction to the minister’s principles. Not only did he not exchange ideas on future plans but he did not even inform anyone. DR. FRITZ: Now we shall turn to a different subject. The Prosecution charges the Defendant Fritzsche with having influenced the German people in the idea of the master race and thus with having incited hatred against other nations. Did Fritzsche ever receive instructions at all to conduct a propaganda campaign on behalf of the theory of the master race? VON SCHIRMEISTER: No, under no circumstances. In this connection, one must know that Dr. Goebbels could not at all use this Party dogma and myth. These are not things which attract the masses. To him the Party was a large reservoir in which as many different sections of the German people as possible should be united; and particularly this idea of the master race, perhaps on account of his own physical disability, he ridiculed and rejected completely; it did not appeal to him. Shall I answer the question of hatred now? You also asked me about that. DR. FRITZ: Yes. VON SCHIRMEISTER: A propaganda of hatred against other nations was quite contrary to the propaganda line as set out by Dr. Goebbels, for he hoped, and to the end he clung to this hope like a _fata morgana_, that one day he could change from the policy of “against England” and “against America” to the policy of “with England” and “with America.” And if one wants to do that one cannot foster hatred against a nation. He wanted to be in line with the nations, not against them. DR. FRITZ: Against whom then was this propaganda in the press and on the radio directed? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Primarily, against systems; it was Dr. Goebbels who established the concept “plutocracy” in the sense in which the whole world knows it today, later the concept “Bolshevism” was added from the other side. Sometimes his propaganda was directed against some of the men in power; but he could not get the full co-operation of the German press on that point. That annoyed him; and in a conference he once said, “Gentlemen, if I could put 10 Jews in your place, I could get it done.” But later he stopped these attacks on personalities such as Churchill; he was afraid that these men would become too popular as a result of his counterpropaganda. Apart from that he did not hate Churchill personally at all, secretly he actually admired him; just as, for example, throughout the war he had a picture of the Duke of Windsor on his desk. Therefore the propaganda of hatred was directed temporarily against individual men but always against systems. DR. FRITZ: Witness, before answering the next question, will you check your memory very carefully, and particularly remember your oath. Was it the aim of this propaganda for which Fritzsche received orders and which he carried out, to arouse unrestrained passions tantamount to incitement to murder and violence, or what was its purpose? VON SCHIRMEISTER: No. The minister could not use passions at all in his propaganda, for passions flare up and die down again. What the minister did need was a steady and constant line, steadfastness even in hard times. Stirring up of passions, inciting to hatred, or even murder would not have appealed to the German people nor could Dr. Goebbels use anything like that. DR. FRITZ: Did German propaganda abroad, especially in Russia, come under the direction of the Propaganda Ministry at all? VON SCHIRMEISTER: I must differentiate here. I do not know whether I should go into the well-known differences between Dr. Goebbels and Ribbentrop. At the beginning of the war the Foreign Office had demanded charge of all foreign propaganda, namely, propaganda in foreign countries, radio propaganda broadcasts to foreign countries, and, propaganda directed towards foreigners living in Germany. Very disagreeable controversies resulted; the problem was put to the Führer himself, but finally both sides interpreted his decision in their own favor. DR. FRITZ: Witness, would you, perhaps, be a little more brief? VON SCHIRMEISTER: Very well, I can leave that. The differences between the two men are well known. However, in regard to Russia, I must add that there both press and propaganda came under the jurisdiction of Herr Rosenberg up to about March of 1944. And in this sphere as well, Dr. Goebbels... THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, wait a minute. What has this Russian propaganda got to do with the defendant? DR. FRITZ: No; the German propaganda in Russian territory—that is what I asked him about. He is only going to say one sentence about it; in fact, he has already said it. VON SCHIRMEISTER: Up to 1944, Rosenberg—to the great concern of Dr. Goebbels who believed that the Russian campaign could have been won in the field of propaganda. DR. FRITZ: I have one more question to put to you. Yesterday, when Herr Fritzsche was being cross-examined, the Prosecution submitted several interrogation records; among them, for example, that of Field Marshal Schörner, in which the testimony is unanimous in saying that Fritzsche was the permanent deputy of Goebbels as Propaganda Minister. Is that correct? VON SCHIRMEISTER: That is bare nonsense. I cannot imagine how a statement like that came to be made. There is not a word of truth in it. DR. FRITZ: Thank you. Mr. President, I have no further questions. THE PRESIDENT: Does any of the other defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions of the witness? [_There was no response._] Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, the Prosecution do not intend to question this witness; but this does not mean that we accept without objection the testimony which he has given here. THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, I should like to point out and request the Tribunal to take judicial notice also of the documents which are contained in both my document books but which I did not quote. In my Document Book Number 2 there is another affidavit deposed by Dr. Scharping, a document which I offer to the Tribunal as Document Number Fritzsche-3, Pages 16 to 19. This affidavit deals with the attitude of the Defendant Fritzsche on measures which Hitler had planned after the large-scale air attacks on the city of Dresden. May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the entire contents of this affidavit, on Page 16 and the following pages, Document Book Number 2. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Fritz, the Tribunal observe that in Exhibit 3, which you have just presented to us, there is a statement by the person making the affidavit that after the bombing of German cities in the fall of 1944, “Dr. Goebbels stated that there was no longer any objection to handing over crew members of crashed airplanes to the wrath of the people.” The Tribunal would like to have the Defendant Fritzsche back in the witness box and to question him about that. Did you ask any questions of the Defendant Fritzsche in reference to this matter in your examination of him? DR. FRITZ: No, Mr. President, I expected—I wanted to say at the conclusion of my case that I had expected a statement on this subject from the representative of the protecting power, the Swiss Ambassador in Berlin. This statement has, however, not yet reached me. I wanted to ask permission to submit it later if it arrives in time. THE PRESIDENT: Is that another interrogatory or affidavit that you mean? DR. FRITZ: Yes, it is a statement which deals with this subject. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. DR. FRITZ: And if I may be permitted to add this, Mr. President, I also expect a statement from a British radio commentator, Clifton Delmar. That statement has not yet arrived. May I perhaps submit that? THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, you may. But what the Tribunal is concerned with at the moment is that they think it material that they should know... DR. FRITZ: Yes, I quite understand, Mr. President. [_The Defendant Fritzsche resumed the stand._] THE PRESIDENT: You are still under oath. You may sit down. You have read this affidavit? FRITZSCHE: But I no longer remember it in detail. THE PRESIDENT: We did not hear the answer to that. FRITZSCHE: I no longer recall in detail this affidavit which my counsel has just submitted to the Tribunal. I know that it exists, however. THE PRESIDENT: The statement that the Tribunal wished you to be asked about was this: “Beginning in the fall of 1944, Dr. Goebbels also spoke about this frequently during his so-called conferences of ministers...” I’ll begin before that: “The increasing effect of English and American air bombardments on German cities caused Hitler and his more intimate advisers to seek drastic measures of reprisal. Beginning in the fall of 1944, Dr. Goebbels also spoke about this frequently during his so-called conferences of ministers, to which numerous officials and technicians of his ministry were convened and which, as a rule, I also attended.” That is Franz Scharping? FRITZSCHE: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: “On such occasions Dr. Goebbels stated that there was no longer any objection to handing over crew members of crashed planes to the wrath of the people.” As you know, there has been a great deal of evidence about that before this Tribunal. Did you in your propaganda speeches make any references to this subject? FRITZSCHE: No, I never advocated in my propaganda speeches that the crews of aircraft which had been shot down should be killed. On the other hand, I know that Dr. Goebbels, for reasons of intimidation, ordered reports to be sent abroad already in the fall of 1944, reports to the effect that, to quote an example, an Anglo-Saxon airplane which had machine-gunned church-goers in the street on a Sunday had been shot down and the members of the crew had been lynched by the people. Actually this report had no factual basis; it hardly could have been true, since it is quite improbable that an airplane is shot down at just such a moment. I know that Dr. Goebbels, through a circular letter addressed to the Gau Propaganda Offices, asked that details of such incidents, if they actually occurred, should be transmitted to him; but to my knowledge he did not receive any factual details of this sort. That was also the time in which he had an article on this subject written in Reich; I cannot recall the title of this article at the moment. In any event, this campaign, having died down in January or February, flared up again in the days after the air attack on Dresden, and the following incident occurred. Dr. Goebbels announced in the “11 o’clock morning conference,” which has been mentioned quite frequently in this courtroom, that in the Dresden attack 40,000 people had been killed. It was not known then that the actual figure was a considerably higher one. Dr. Goebbels added that in one way or another an end would now have to be put to this terror; and Hitler was firmly determined to have English, American, and Russian flyers shot in Dresden in numbers equal to the figure of Dresden inhabitants who had lost their lives in this air attack. Then he turned to me and asked me to prepare and announce this action. There followed an incident: I jumped up and refused to do this. Dr. Goebbels broke off the conference, asked me to come to his room, and there a very heated discussion developed between us. Finally I had persuaded him at least to the point where he promised me to use his influence with Hitler himself, so that this plan would not be carried through. I then spoke to Ambassador Rühle, the liaison man of the Foreign Office and asked him to enlist the aid of his minister to the same end. I also requested State Secretary Naumann to speak along the same lines with Bormann, whose predominant influence was well known. Following that, I had a discussion—under the existing regulations this was not really permitted—with the representative of the protecting power. In confidence, I gave him certain indications about the plan of which I had heard and asked him whether he could suggest or supply me with some argument or some means for countering this plan more intensively. He said he would attend to the matter with the utmost speed and he called me up on the following morning. We had a second discussion, and he told me that in the meantime a prospect for an exchange of prisoners had been held out to him—that is, an exchange of German and English prisoners—to comprise, I believe, 50,000 men. I asked him to have this matter go through the normal diplomatic channels, but to permit me to discuss this possibility of an exchange of prisoners of war with Dr. Goebbels, Naumann, and Bormann. I did so, and since just at that time the leaders were obviously especially interested in returning prisoners of war who could perhaps still be used at the front, this prospective offer... THE PRESIDENT: How did you think that this possible exchange of prisoners was going to affect the question of whether 40,000 English and American, and Russian fliers would be killed as a reprisal? FRITZSCHE: It appeared to me that at a time when we had the opportunity of effecting an exchange of prisoners of war, all thought of an action which was quite outside all human laws had to be repressed; that is, if there was talk about an exchange of prisoners of war, the idea of a gigantic shooting of prisoners had to be shunted into the background. I conclude briefly. This plan was discussed. I told Dr. Goebbels about it; and it was discussed in the evening with Hitler, according to concurring reports which I had from two different sources. By some strange accident the offer itself ran aground somewhere along the bureaucratic channels many days after the settlement of this exciting incident. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Can you hear now? I am asking you when you heard about Hitler’s order, not with respect to these prisoners, but with respect to the fliers who had landed? When did you first hear of that? You said that in the fall Goebbels had sent abroad some propaganda with respect to that order. Did you know about it then? FRITZSCHE: Yes. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): In the autumn of 1944 you knew about that order? FRITZSCHE: No. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When did you? FRITZSCHE: I cannot say exactly, but in the autumn of 1944 I did not know this order. I have to be extremely careful since I am under oath. I believe I heard of the order only here in this courtroom, but that is somewhat confused in my memory with the campaign of Dr. Goebbels which I have just described. I cannot clearly... THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Surely in that meeting in February that order was discussed when they were discussing the killing of 40,000 prisoners, was it not? FRITZSCHE: No, on that occasion not at all. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You had no doubt that Hitler wished to have those prisoners killed, did you? FRITZSCHE: Yes, at the time when Dr. Goebbels related the plan, I believed that Hitler wished to carry through this action. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then the answer is “yes.” Now, you had no doubt that Goebbels wanted them killed, did you? FRITZSCHE: The 40,000 in Dresden? THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes. FRITZSCHE: In general, yes. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes. FRITZSCHE: Yes, I had no doubt that Goebbels also approved it. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And which other of the leaders wished them killed? It was apparently discussed a good deal; who else in the Government was in favor of this policy? FRITZSCHE: I cannot say with certainty whether Bormann was in favor of it; he was the only other concerned. I do know, however, that Von Ribbentrop, through Ambassador Rühle, made an attempt to dissuade Hitler from this step. He opposed Hitler’s plan. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Ribbentrop was working in this particular problem of killing the prisoners? I am not clear about that. Did Ribbentrop know about it? FRITZSCHE: At that time I told Ambassador Rühle about this affair and asked him to inform Ribbentrop and to enlist his aid. A day or two later Rühle told me—we had frequent excited telephone conversations on this matter—that Ribbentrop was... THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I do not need the details. The answer is that the Foreign Office knew, even if Ribbentrop may not have known personally. Is that right? FRITZSCHE: Ribbentrop was informed personally. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all I want to know. FRITZSCHE: Yes. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know what attitude Bormann took in this matter? FRITZSCHE: According to the accounts that I heard, he at first supported Hitler’s plan to shoot those 40,000; but afterwards, under the influence of Goebbels and Naumann, he took the opposite view and co-operated in dissuading Hitler from his intention. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were they only consulted in the matter as far as the commanders of the Wehrmacht were concerned? FRITZSCHE: I know nothing about that. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): It is suggested that I should also ask you this: Do you know what attitude Ribbentrop took on the shooting of these prisoners? FRITZSCHE: Yes. After Ambassador Rühle’s report to him, he used his influence to prevent the execution of Hitler’s plan; in what way, I do not know. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Fritz, do you wish to ask the defendant any question? DR. FRITZ: No, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution wish to ask any questions arising out of the questions that the Tribunal has asked? GEN. RUDENKO: No, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to the dock. DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, this brings me to the end of the evidence in the case of the Defendant Fritzsche. THE PRESIDENT: Are you offering in evidence all of the documents in your two document books, each one of them? DR. FRITZ: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: Are they marked with exhibit numbers? DR. FRITZ: Yes, I submitted all the originals. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Have you not got two Exhibits 1; Exhibit 1 in one book and Exhibit 1 in the other book? DR. FRITZ: No, there are no Fritzsche exhibits at all in my Document Book 1, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Oh! I see. Very well. Well, that concludes the case of Fritzsche? DR. FRITZ: Yes, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. [_A recess was taken._] DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, first of all I want to say that I can also dispense with the witness Dr. Klöpfer, since he worked in close contact with Bormann only after 1942, since he cannot testify on most of the documents on which the Prosecution based its case, and since he only directed the constitutional law department in the Party Chancellery. Mr. President, I want to begin my case by making a very brief basic statement. The Defendant Bormann is absent; his associates, generally speaking, are not at my disposal either. For that reason, I can only attempt, on the basis of the documents presented by the Prosecution, to submit some little evidence to prove that the defendant did not play the large, legendary part which is now, after the collapse, attributed to him. As a lawyer it has always been much against my will to build something out of nothing; and I beg the High Tribunal to take this into consideration when weighing my evidence, which must, therefore, be extremely small in quantity. It is not negligence on my part that I present so little, but it is the inability to find anything positive from the available documents without the assistance of the defendant. First of all, then, I come to the question of whether the case against Bormann can be tried at all. I have offered evidence to show that it is most likely that the Defendant Bormann died on 1 May 1945, during an attempted escape from the Reich Chancellery. As my first witness who could testify on this, I named the witness Else Krüger, and my application for her was granted by the Tribunal. In my application of 26 June, I stated that I would waive the examining of this witness if the High Tribunal would permit me to submit instead an affidavit containing her testimony. I have not yet received an answer to this application; but I presume, since I heard from Dr. Kempner that the Prosecution will agree to this, that the High Tribunal also will not raise any objection. THE PRESIDENT: I thought the application was withdrawn with reference to the witness Krüger. DR. BERGOLD: I stated that I would dispense with the witness provided that I could submit her affidavit. There appears to be a misunderstanding. The Prosecution informed me that it has no objection. MR. DODD: We have said we had no objection, Mr. President, to the use of the affidavit since he was waiving the calling of the witness. DR. BERGOLD: I submit the affidavit as Document Number Bormann-12. Then, I named three other witnesses who could testify that Bormann had died. First, the witness Kempka, who for many years was Hitler’s chauffeur and who was present when the attempted escape from the Reich Chancellery failed. This witness is not here. According to information which I have, he was interned at the camp at Freising in December 1945 in the hands of the American authorities; but unfortunately he has not yet been produced. I also named the witness Rattenhuber, who was also present when Bormann died and who, according to the information which I have, is said to be in the hands of the U.S.S.R. The woman witness, Christians, who had been, granted me, could not be located. She was interned in the camp at Oberursel; from there she was given leave of which she took advantage to vanish. Apart from the affidavit of the witness Krüger, therefore, I have no proof for my statement that Bormann is dead. I regret very much indeed that I am not in a position to present clear evidence on this point and that the members of the Prosecution were not able to give me more support, for in this way the formation of legends will be considerably strengthened. Indeed, a sort of false Demetrius, false Martin Bormann, have already made their appearance and are sending me letters which are signed Martin Bormann but which cannot possibly have been written by him. I believe that a service would have been rendered to the German nation, to the Allies, and to the world generally if I had been in a position to furnish this proof for which I had asked. I come now to my documents. THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal would like to hear this affidavit of Krüger read. DR. BERGOLD: The text is as follows: “Fräulein Else Krüger, born 9 February 1915, at Hamburg-Altona; secretary, at present residing at Hamburg (39), Hansenweg 1... From approximately the end of 1942 was one of several secretaries of the Defendant Martin Bormann; there were, roughly, 30 to 40 secretaries. I can no longer give accurate figures and names. I occupied this position until the end and after Hitler’s death. “On 1 May 1945 I saw and talked to Bormann in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery for the last time; but I was then no longer working for him, since at that time he was writing his own orders and wireless messages by hand. All I had to do in those days in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery was to prepare myself mentally for my death. The last words he spoke to me, when he met me accidentally in the bunker, were, ‘Well, then, farewell. There is not much sense in it now, but I will try to get through. Very probably I shall not succeed.’ These approximately, were his last words, I can no longer recollect them literally. “Later in the course of the evening when I thought that the Russians had come very close to the shelter of the Reich Chancellery I, together with a group of about 20 people, mostly soldiers, fled from the shelter through subterranean passages, then through an exit in one of the walls of the Chancellery, across the Wilhelmsplatz into the entrance of the underground station Kaiserhof. From there we fled through more subterranean passages to the Friedrichstrasse, and then through a number of streets, debris of houses, and so on; I can no longer remember the exact details on account of the confusion and excitement of those days. Eventually, in the course of the following morning, we reached another shelter; I no longer recollect where it was; it might have been the shelter at Humboldthain.” THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Bergold, does not the affidavit deal with the Defendant Bormann at all? DR. BERGOLD: Oh yes, I am now coming to that: “After some time the SS-Gruppenführer Rattenhuber appeared there quite suddenly. He had been severely wounded in the leg and was put on a camp bed. Other people asked him where he had come from; and he said, in my presence, that he, together with Bormann and others, had fled by car through the Friedrichstrasse. Presumably everybody was dead; there had been masses of bodies. I gathered from his statement that he believed Bormann was dead. This also appeared probable to me because, according to reports I heard from some soldiers whom I did not know, all people who had left the shelter after us had been taken under strong Russian fire and hundreds of dead were said to have been left behind on the Weidendammer Bridge.” I omit one unimportant sentence. “I remember reading afterwards in a British paper that Hitler’s driver for many years, Kempka, made a statement somewhere that Bormann, with whom apparently he fled, was dead.” That is all I am able to submit, Mr. President; the real witnesses have unfortunately not been found. I now come to the documents. In order to shorten my evidence, may I refer to the document book which I have submitted. All these documents contain orders of Bormann which were collected and have appeared in a body of laws called _Orders of the Deputy of the Führer_. I request that the Tribunal take judicial notice of these official orders. I shall bring up the legal argument arising from these documents in my final speech. I merely want to refer now briefly to Order Number 23/36; it is the order under the figure 8. THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean PS? DR. BERGOLD: No, it is order Number 8 in my document book, Mr. President. I particularly want to draw the Tribunal’s attention to it without quoting from it. I now turn to the document book submitted by the Prosecution, and I should like to read a short passage from 098-PS, on Page 4, the second paragraph at the top. THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 098-PS? DR. BERGOLD: Yes, Document 098-PS, Bormann’s letter dated 22 February 1940 and addressed to Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg. THE PRESIDENT: Page 4? DR. BERGOLD: Page 4. It is the letter in which Bormann rails against the Christian religion. Nevertheless, he writes as follows, Page 4: “With regard to religious instruction in schools it seems to me that the existing conditions need not be changed. No National Socialist teacher, according to the clear-cut directives of the Deputy of the Führer, must be accused in any way, if he is prepared to teach the Christian religion in the schools.” I omit one sentence. “In the circular of the Deputy of the Führer Number 3/39, of 4 January 1939, it is expressly stated that teachers of religion are not by any means to make their own choice of Biblical material for religious instruction but are obliged to give instruction on all the Biblical subjects. They are to abstain from all reinterpreting, analyzing, or paraphrasing of this directive; attempts of this sort have been made several times by certain church groups.” This is a reference to the so-called German Christians. I then quote from Document 113-PS, document book of the Prosecution. It is Directive Number 104/38, I quote: “The neutrality of the Party with respect to the Church, which has been emphasized from the beginning, demands that any possible friction be avoided. Clergymen, as political leaders or as leaders or section leaders in the Party and its affiliated organizations, do not possess the required freedom of decision in this dual obligation, as has been shown by experience; moreover, there is the danger that owing to their church office they will make use of the Movement for their purposes in the church struggle. The Deputy of the Führer has therefore ordered: “1. Clergymen holding positions in the Party are to be immediately relieved of their Party functions.” I then quote from Document 099-PS, in which Bormann, in a letter of 19 January 1940, addressed to the Reich Minister of Finance, criticizes the low contributions of the Church toward the war. I quote from the second paragraph: “The assessment of so low a contribution has surprised me. I gather from numerous reports that the political communities have to raise so high a war contribution that the carrying out of their own tasks, which are often very important, as for instance their work in public welfare, is in jeopardy.” I omit one sentence. “I understand that the assessment of so low a contribution is partly explained by the fact that only the churches of the old Reich which are entitled to raise taxes are called upon to make their contribution to the war, whereas the sections of the Protestant and Catholic Church, which are entitled to demand church dues in Austria and the Sudetenland, are exempted...” I omit the rest of the sentence. “This differentiation in the treatment of individual sections of the churches and church organizations is, in my opinion, quite unjustified.” I then quote from Document 117-PS, a letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, dated 28 January 1939. I quote from the second paragraph: “The Party has repeatedly in recent years had to explain its attitude on the plan for a State Church or for some other measure establishing closer connection between the State and the Church. The Party has always emphatically rejected such plans for two reasons. First, a connection between the State and the Church, as the organization of a religious community which does not in all fields aim at the practical application of National Socialist principles, would not fulfill the ideological demands of National Socialism. Second, purely practical and political considerations speak against such a formal union.” I then refer to Document L-22, which deals with a conference in the Führer’s headquarters on 16 July 1941, at which Hitler, Rosenberg, Lammers, Keitel, Göring, and Bormann were present. THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell us in what part of the book this is and what is the number? DR. BERGOLD: L-22. It is approximately in the middle of the book. Bormann acted as secretary of the conference and wrote the minutes. The Prosecution stated that Bormann’s incidental remarks showed that he had participated in the discussion, at that conference, of plans for the incorporation of Russian territory into the Reich. I shall therefore have to read this incidental remark which he made. THE PRESIDENT: This is L-221, not L-22. DR. BERGOLD: The first incidental remark is in the 14th paragraph and reads as follows: “Incidentally, does an educated class still exist in the Ukraine, or are the Ukrainians of a higher class to be found only as emigrants outside Russia?” THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Bergold, could you not tell us what original page it is? In our document book there are headings “original page” so and so. DR. BERGOLD: Yes, they are there, but—one moment, please, I shall have to look for it again. The translation which I have received has a different type of division—Page 4. THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. “We have to create a garden of Eden....” The first part of Page 4 is, “We have to create a garden of Eden....” DR. BERGOLD: Yes, yes, yes, the second paragraph, the third paragraph, no, after each one—it is the third paragraph. THE PRESIDENT: Go on, then. DR. BERGOLD: Have you got it, Mr. President? THE PRESIDENT: I shall not know until you tell me how it begins. DR. BERGOLD: It begins, “Incidentally, does an educated class still exist in the Ukraine...?” THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have got that, yes. Page 3. DR. BERGOLD: It is on Page 3. THE PRESIDENT: I think it is on Page 4. It goes like this: “Is there still anything like an educated class in the Ukraine?” DR. BERGOLD: According to the document book which has just been submitted to me, it is on Page 3, but it may be Page 4. THE PRESIDENT: The original is Page 4. DR. BERGOLD: Then on Page 5, Page 4, no, it is Page 3, Your Lordship. Page 4 has a very similar remark which reads: “It has frequently become apparent that Rosenberg has a great deal of liking for the Ukrainians. He wants to enlarge the old Ukraine considerably.” And then the last remark on Page 8—Page 5 in the English text, third paragraph from the end, a note for Party member Klöpfer: “Please ask Dr. Meyer as soon as possible for the data on the proposed organization and the filling of the positions.” Then at the end, Page 6 of your original, last paragraph: “Incidentally, the Führer emphasized that activity of the churches was out of the question. Papen had already submitted to him through the Foreign Office a long memorandum stating that now the right moment for re-establishing the churches had arrived. But that was definitely out of the question.” This refers to a statement by Hitler. Then I come to Document 1520-PS. I want first of all to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that in this record, which Lammers wrote, Bormann is not at all mentioned at the beginning among those present, apparently because his activity as secretary was considered a matter of course. I should now like to read from Page 2 of your original, from the paragraph beginning, “Then the discussion turned to the question of freedom of religion...” I shall begin on the eighth line of the fourth paragraph: “Bormann agreed with this attitude absolutely but said that the only question was whether the Reich Minister for the East, who after all had a name in Germany, would not through such a law create too far-reaching obligations which would then have repercussions in the Reich. The churches themselves were going to define what was meant by ‘religious freedom,’ and he predicted that such a law would result in hundreds of new letters and complaints on the part of the churches within the Reich.” I omit one sentence. “Finally it was agreed that the entire question should not be settled by me”—that is, Lammers—“in the form of a law but that the Reich Commissioners should take the existing religious freedom for granted and should issue the necessary directives.” Then Document 072-PS, a letter from Bormann to Rosenberg; of that I should like to read the third paragraph: “The Führer emphasized that in the Balkans the use of your experts would not be necessary, since there were no art objects to be confiscated. In Belgrade there was only the collection of Prince Paul which would be returned to him intact. The remaining material of the lodges, _et cetera_, would be taken care of by the representatives of Gruppenführer Heydrich.” From Document 062-PS I should like to read the introduction, in which the Defendant Hess deals with the orders he had issued for the treatment of airmen. I quote: “The French civilian population received official instructions by radio and otherwise on what they were to do at landings of German aircraft.” From Document 205-PS I should like to read the opening words of Bormann, the second paragraph. THE PRESIDENT: What, is the date of 062-PS? [_The interpreter wrongly translated this as 205-PS._] DR. BERGOLD: 5th of May 1943, circular letter Number 70/43. THE PRESIDENT: I think I have got it now. THE INTERPRETER: You have 205, My Lord. DR. BERGOLD: 5th of May 1943. THE PRESIDENT: No, but I wanted to know the date of 062-PS. It appears to be 13 March 1940. DR. BERGOLD: 062-PS? Yes, the date of that is 13 March 1940. That is the one I read before. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not understand why you read the document in view of Paragraph 4 of it which is as follows: “Likewise, enemy parachutists are immediately to be arrested or liquidated.” DR. BERGOLD: I shall return to that in my final speech, Mr. President. I can present my arguments now if the Tribunal so desires, but I do not think the argument is wanted now. THE PRESIDENT: No, no; I thought you might have another paragraph in the document which you wish to refer to. DR. BERGOLD: No. I referred to the introduction, which was the reason for this document, namely, the statement of the Defendant Hess preceding Bormann’s document. I come then to Document 205-PS, dated 5 May 1943, circular letter Number 70/43. I shall quote the following sentence: “I request that along the lines set out in the attached copy the necessity for a firm but just treatment of the foreign workers be made clear in a suitable manner to members of the Party and the population.” This circular letter itself was issued by the Defendant Sauckel. I now come to Document 025-PS, of 4 September 1942 and I read... THE PRESIDENT: Which number are you going to now? DR. BERGOLD: 025-PS, dated 4 September 1942. I shall quote the last sentence of the second paragraph: “Therefore, and this is also the opinion of the Reich Marshal and of Reichsleiter Bormann, the problem of domestic workers must be solved in a way different from that mentioned above.” And then I quote from Paragraph 3, starting with the second sentence: “In connection with this”—namely, the employment in Germany of women workers from the East—“Reichsleiter Bormann also agrees that members of the Armed Forces or other agencies who have brought female domestic workers into the Reich illegally will have their action subsequently approved; approval of such action in the future will not be withheld, regardless of the official recruiting scheme. The determining factor in the recruiting of Ukrainian female workers is the specific wish of the Führer that only girls whose conduct and appearance permit a permanent stay in Germany should be brought into the Reich.” Then I shall read from Figure 1, almost the last paragraph on Page 3 of your document book: “Recruiting, especially in the case of domestic servants, must be on a voluntary basis and must in practice be carried out with the help of the offices of the Reichsführer SS.” This concludes my quotations from the document book of the Prosecution, and I should like now to refer only to the Russian Document USSR-172 and to Document Dönitz-91, of which I shall make use in my final speech. This, then, brings me to the end of the presentation of my evidence. MR. DODD: Mr. President, may I suggest that if this witness Kempka can be located, counsel might submit an affidavit or an interrogatory to any persons who have knowledge of the alleged death of Defendant Bormann. We certainly would have no objection to it. DR. BERGOLD: I have no objection either. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Bergold, have you any information as to what this witness Kempka can tell us about the death of Bormann? DR. BERGOLD: According to the affidavit, which I read to the Tribunal, he is said to have been present when Bormann was killed by a tank explosion. He would, therefore, be an eye witness of Bormann’s death, like the witness Rattenhuber, from whom the witness Krüger obtained her information. If the witnesses Kempka and Rattenhuber were found, I would be satisfied with affidavits and interrogatories. MR. DODD: Mr. President, I have seen this statement by Kempka some time ago, which is in affidavit form and which has come to our attention. But my recollection is that he does not state positively that he saw him die. But I again suggest we might make further efforts to get an affidavit from him, or an interrogatory, or carefully question him about the circumstances of the death. THE PRESIDENT: A statement was made to the Tribunal at one time by the Prosecution suggesting that Bormann had escaped from the Chancellery in a tank and then the tank had been stopped or blown up on a bridge and that two of the persons inside the tank had last seen Bormann wounded, or something of that sort. MR. DODD: Yes, I think that is the best information. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, if the Prosecution has any material in the shape of affidavits or anything of that sort, the Tribunal would like to have them placed before them. MR. DODD: Yes, Sir. I am sure we do not have an affidavit. As I recall, it was last fall when someone sent down here what purported to be a narrative account by Kempka of the last days in Berlin. Now, I will try to look that up and present it to you. THE PRESIDENT: If you can go into the matter, then possibly they might be located through the investigations which you would make. MR. DODD: Very well. THE PRESIDENT: Then interrogatories or affidavits could be obtained. MR. DODD: Very well, Sir. THE PRESIDENT: Then that concludes your presentation of evidence on behalf of Bormann? DR. BERGOLD: That is all I have, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you. Colonel Pokrovsky, is there anything you wish to say? I beg your pardon. Dr. Bergold, you have offered in evidence all the exhibits that you want to offer and have given them exhibit numbers, have you? DR. BERGOLD: Yes, in my document book. THE PRESIDENT: You are intending to offer your document book as evidence? DR. BERGOLD: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: It has exhibit numbers on each document, has it? DR. BERGOLD: Yes, each document has a number. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal would like to know whether you have arrived at any agreement with Dr. Stahmer on behalf of the Defendant Göring with reference to affidavit evidence or witnesses, with reference to the Katyn matter. COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): My Lord, we have had three conferences with the Defense Counsel. After the second meeting I told the Tribunal that, in order to shorten the proceedings, the Soviet Prosecution was willing to read into the record only a part of the evidence submitted. About 15 minutes ago I had a meeting with Dr. Exner and Dr. Stahmer, and they told me that their understanding of the Tribunal’s ruling was that the old decision for the summoning of two witnesses was still in force and that only additional documents were now under discussion. In view of this interpretation of the Tribunal’s ruling, I do not think that we shall be able to come to an agreement with the Defense. As I see it, the decision in this matter must now rest in the hands of the Tribunal. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal orders that, unless an agreement is arrived at, the evidence shall not be given entirely by affidavits and that the three witnesses on either side shall be called first thing on Monday morning at 10 o’clock, unless you can arrive at an agreement before that, that the evidence is to be offered in affidavits. DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I say something on this subject? A number of counsel who are interested in the Katyn case had a conference this morning; among them were Professor Exner and Dr. Stahmer. We agreed to ask the Tribunal to allow two witnesses to be examined here in person by the Defense. These witnesses would be Colonel Ahrens and First Lieutenant Von Eichborn. We also agreed to dispense with the hearing of the third witness but decided to request that an affidavit of this witness, and in addition two other affidavits, be submitted. I believe this to be a suggestion which both satisfies us and saves the most time: Two witnesses would be heard and three affidavits submitted. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal sees no objection to there being two witnesses called and one affidavit. But their order was that three witnesses on either side—that the evidence should be limited to three witnesses on either side; and they, therefore, are not prepared to allow further affidavits to be given. The evidence must be confined to the evidence of three persons on either side. They may give their evidence either by oral evidence or by affidavit. DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, as far as I was informed, the original decision stated that three witnesses were allowed but did not mention affidavits. That was the reason why Dr. Stahmer and Professor Exner assumed that, regardless of the witnesses, certain individual points could be proved by means of affidavits. I think that the hearing of two witnesses and three affidavits would be quicker than the examination of three witnesses. THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid Dr. Stahmer and Dr. Exner drew a wrong inference from the order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal intended and intends that the evidence should be limited to the evidence of three witnesses on either side, and whether they give their evidence orally or by affidavit does not matter. We left it to the Soviet Prosecution and to defendant’s counsel to see whether they could agree that it should be given by affidavit in order to save time. But that was not intended to extend the number of witnesses who might give evidence. DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that case, I should be grateful if Dr. Stahmer and Professor Exner would be heard. I myself have not been in Nuremberg recently; I was therefore not present when these details were discussed and it is difficult for me—I see that Dr. Stahmer is now—perhaps Dr. Stahmer himself could speak about it. DR. STAHMER: I have just heard Dr. Siemers’ report, at least a part of it. I mentioned already during the last discussion, Mr. President, that Professor Exner and I had understood the decision to mean that besides the three witnesses we were also allowed to submit affidavits. Indeed, the original decision granted us five witnesses, though it made the reservation that only three of them could give evidence here in Court. We assumed, therefore, that we could submit affidavits of those witnesses out of the five who had been originally granted us but who would not give evidence in Court. The original decision granted us five witnesses, and then a later decision of the Tribunal... THE PRESIDENT: Listen, that is not the recollection of the Tribunal; and if you say so, you must produce written evidence that that was the decision. The Tribunal’s recollection is not that five witnesses were allowed. DR. STAHMER: Yes, yes, yes. I shall submit written evidence of these decisions to the Tribunal. I cannot remember offhand when they were made, but originally five witnesses were granted; then I named another witness, who was also granted, and it was only afterwards that the decision to allow only three witnesses to give evidence in Court was announced. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, when the order was made limiting it to three out of five, there was no reference in that order to affidavits, as far as I know. DR. STAHMER: No, affidavits were not mentioned then. THE PRESIDENT: What I am telling you is that the Tribunal in making that order of limitation intended to limit the whole of the evidence to three witnesses on either side, because the matter is only a subsidiary allegation of fact; and the Tribunal thinks that at this stage of the proceedings such an allegation of fact ought not to be investigated by a great number of witnesses, and three witnesses are quite sufficient on either side. Therefore the Tribunal does not desire to hear and did not intend that it should have to hear any evidence except the evidence of three witnesses, either orally or by affidavit. The Tribunal will now adjourn. [_The Tribunal adjourned until Monday 1 July at 1000 hours._] ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHTH DAY Monday, 1 July 1946 _Morning Session_ THE PRESIDENT: I have an announcement to make. The Tribunal orders that any of the evidence taken on commission which the Defense Counsel or the Prosecution wish to use shall be offered in evidence by them. This evidence will then become a part of the record, subject to any objections. Counsel for the organizations should begin to make up their document books as soon as possible and put in their requests for translations. That is all. Dr. Stahmer. DR. STAHMER: With reference to the events at Katyn, the Indictment contains only the remark: “In September 1941, 11,000 Polish officers, prisoners of war, were killed in the Katyn woods near Smolensk.” The Russian Prosecution only submitted the details at the session of 14 February 1946. Document USSR-54 was then submitted to the Tribunal. This document is an official report by the Extraordinary State Commission, which was officially authorized to investigate the Katyn case. This commission, after questioning the witnesses... THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal are aware of the document and they only want you to call your evidence; that is all. DR. STAHMER: I wanted only to add, Mr. President, that according to this document, there are two accusations: One, that the period of the shooting of the Polish prisoners of war was the autumn of 1941; and the second assertion is, that the killing was carried out by some German military authority, camouflaged under the name of “Staff of Engineer Battalion 537.” THE PRESIDENT: That is all in the document, is it not? I have just told you we know the document. We only want you to call your evidence. DR. STAHMER: Then, as my first witness for the Defense, I shall call Colonel Friedrich Ahrens to the witness stand. DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I have a request to make before the evidence is heard in the Katyn case. The Tribunal decided that three witnesses should be heard, and it hinted that in the interests of equality, the Prosecution could also produce only three witnesses, either by means of direct examination or by means of an affidavit. In the interests of that same principled equality, I should be grateful if the Soviet Delegation, in the same way as the Defense, would state the names of their witnesses before the hearing of the evidence. The Defense submitted the names of their witnesses weeks ago. Unfortunately, up to now, I note that in the interests of equality and with regard to the treatment of the Defense and the Prosecution, the Soviet Delegation has so far not given the names of the witnesses. THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, were you going to give me the names of the witnesses? GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, Mr. President. Today we notified the General Secretary of the Tribunal that the Soviet Prosecution intends to call three witnesses to the stand: Professor Prosorovski, who is the Chief of the Medico-Legal Experts Commission; the Bulgarian subject, Professor of Legal Medicine at Sofia University Markov, who at the same time was a member of the so-called International Commission created by the Germans; and Professor Bazilevsky, who was the deputy mayor of Smolensk during the time of the German occupation. [_The witness Ahrens took the stand._] THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? FRIEDRICH AHRENS (Witness): Friedrich Ahrens. THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing. [_The witness repeated the oath._] THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. DR. STAHMER: Witness, did you, as a professional officer in the German Armed Forces, participate in the second World War? AHRENS: Yes, of course; as a professional officer I participated in the second World War. DR. STAHMER: What rank did you hold finally? AHRENS: At the end as colonel. DR. STAHMER: Were you stationed in the eastern theater of war? AHRENS: Yes. DR. STAHMER: In what capacity? AHRENS: I was the commanding officer of a signal regiment of an army group. DR. STAHMER: What were the tasks of your regiment? AHRENS: The signal regiment of an army group had the task of setting up and maintaining communications between the army group and the neighboring units and subordinate units, as well as preparing the necessary lines of communication for new operations. DR. STAHMER: Did your regiment have any special tasks apart from that? AHRENS: No, with the exception of the duty of defending themselves, of taking all measures to hinder a sudden attack and of holding themselves in readiness to defend themselves with the forces at their disposal, so as to prevent the capture of the regimental battle headquarters. This was particularly important for an army group signal regiment and its battle headquarters because we had to keep a lot of highly secret material in our staff. DR. STAHMER: Your regiment was the Signal Regiment 537. Was there also an Engineer Battalion 537, the same number? AHRENS: During the time when I was in the Army Group Center I heard of no unit with the same number, nor do I believe that there was such a unit. DR. STAHMER: And to whom were you subordinated? AHRENS: I was directly subordinated to the staff of the Army Group Center, and that was the case during the entire period when I was with the army group. My superior was General Oberhäuser. With regard to defense, the signal staff of the regiment with its first battalion, which was in close touch with the regimental staff, was at times subordinated to the commander of Smolensk; all orders which I received from that last-named command came via General Oberhäuser, who either approved or refused to allow the regiment to be employed for a particular purpose. In other words, I received my orders exclusively from General Oberhäuser. DR. STAHMER: Where was your staff accommodated? AHRENS: I prepared a sketch of the position of the staff headquarters west of Smolensk. DR. STAHMER: I am having the sketch shown to you. Please tell us whether that is your sketch. AHRENS: That sketch was drawn by me from memory. DR. STAHMER: I am now going to have a second sketch shown to you. Will you please have a look at that one also, and will you tell me whether it presents a correct picture of the situation? AHRENS: May I briefly explain this sketch to you? At the right-hand margin, that large red spot is the town of Smolensk. West of Smolensk, and on either side of the road to Vitebsk, the staff of the army group was situated together with the Air Force corps, that is south of Krasnibor. On my sketch I have marked the actual area occupied by the Army Group Center. That part of my sketch which has a dark line around it was very densely occupied by troops who came directly under the army group; there was hardly a house empty in that area. The regimental staff of my regiment was in the so-called little Katyn wood. That is the white spot which is indicated on the sketch; it measures about 1 square kilometer of the large forest and is a part of the entire forest around Katyn. On the southern edge of this small wood there lay the so-called Dnieper Castle, which was the regimental staff headquarters. Two and a half kilometers to the east of the staff headquarters of the regiment there was the first company of the regiment, which was the operating company, which did teleprinting and telephone work for the army group. About 3 kilometers west of the regimental staff headquarters there was the wireless company. There were no buildings within the radius of about 1 kilometer of the regimental staff headquarters. This house was a large two-story building with about 14 to 15 rooms, several bath installations, a cinema, a rifle range, garages, Sauna (steam baths) and so on, and was most suitable for accommodating the regimental staff. Our regiment permanently retained this battle headquarters. DR. STAHMER: Were there also any other high-ranking staff headquarters nearby? AHRENS: As higher staff headquarters there was the army group, which I have already mentioned, then a corps staff from the Air Force, and several battalion staffs. Then there was the delegate of the railway for the army group, who was at Gnesdovo in a special train. DR. STAHMER: It has been stated in this Trial that certain events which have taken place in your neighborhood had been most secret and most suspicious. Will you please, therefore, answer the following questions with particular care? How many Germans were there in the staff personnel, and what positions did they fill? AHRENS: I had 3 officers on my staff to begin with, and then 2, and approximately 18 to 20 noncommissioned officers and men; that is to say, as few as I could have in my regimental staff, and every man in the staff was fully occupied. DR. STAHMER: Did you have Russian personnel in your staff? AHRENS: Yes, we had four auxiliary volunteers and some female personnel living in the immediate vicinity of the regimental staff quarters. The auxiliary volunteers remained permanently with the regimental staff, whereas the female personnel changed from time to time. Some of these women also came from Smolensk and they lived in a separate building near the regimental staff. DR. STAHMER: Did this Russian personnel receive special instructions from you about their conduct? AHRENS: I issued general instructions on conduct for the regimental headquarters, which did not solely apply to the Russian personnel. I have already mentioned the importance of secrecy with reference to this regimental headquarters, which not only kept the records of the position of the army group, but also that of its neighboring units, and on which the intentions of the army group were clearly recognizable. Therefore, it was my duty to keep this material particularly secret. Consequently, I had the rooms containing this material barred to ordinary access. Only those persons were admitted—generally officers—who had been passed by me, but also a few noncommissioned officers and other ranks who were put under special oath. DR. STAHMER: To which rooms did this “no admission” order refer? AHRENS: In the first place, it referred to the telephone expert’s room, it also referred to my own room and partly, although to a smaller degree, to the adjutant’s room. All remaining rooms in the house and on the site were not off limits. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, how is this evidence about the actual conditions in these staff headquarters relevant to this question? DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, in the Russian document the allegation is contained that events of a particularly secret nature had taken place in this staff building and that a ban of silence had been imposed on the Russian personnel by Colonel Ahrens, that the rooms had been locked, and that one was only permitted to enter the rooms when accompanied by guards. I have put the questions in this connection in order to clear up the case and to prove that these events have a perfectly natural explanation on account of the tasks entrusted to the regiment and which necessitated quite obviously, a certain amount of secrecy. For that reason, I have put these questions. May I be permitted... THE PRESIDENT: Very well. DR. STAHMER: I have almost finished with these questions. [_Turning to the witness._] Was the Katyn wood cordoned off, and especially strictly guarded by soldiers? Mr. President, may I remark with reference to this question that here also it had been alleged that this cordon had only been introduced by the regiment. Previously, there had been free access to the woods, and from this conclusions are drawn which are detrimental to the regiment. AHRENS: In order to secure antiaircraft cover for the regimental staff headquarters, I stopped any timber from being cut for fuel in the immediate vicinity of the regimental staff headquarters. During this winter the situation was such that the units cut wood wherever they could get it. On 22 January, there was a fairly heavy air attack on my position during which half a house was torn away. It was quite impossible to find any other accommodation because of the overcrowding of the area, and I therefore took additional precautions to make sure that this already fairly thin wood would be preserved so as to serve as cover. Since, on the other hand, I am against the putting up of prohibition signs, I asked the other troop units by way of verses to leave us our trees as antiaircraft cover. The wood was not closed off at all, particularly as the road had to be kept open for heavy traffic, and I only sent sentries now and then into the wood to see whether our trees were left intact. DR. STAHMER: The Prosecution... THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, at a time that is convenient to you, you will, of course, draw our attention to the necessary dates, the date at which this unit took over its headquarters and the date at which it left. DR. STAHMER: Very well. [_Turning to the witness._] When did your unit, your regiment, move into this Dnieper Castle? AHRENS: As far as I know, this house was taken over immediately after the combat troops had left that area in August 1941, and it was confiscated together with the other army group accommodations, and was occupied by advance parties. It was then permanently occupied by the regimental headquarters as long as I was there up to August 1943. DR. STAHMER: So, if I understand you correctly, it was first of all in August 1941 that an advance party took it over? AHRENS: Yes, as far as I know. DR. STAHMER: When did the staff actually arrive? AHRENS: A few weeks later. DR. STAHMER: Who was the regimental commander at that time? AHRENS: My predecessor was Colonel Bedenck. DR. STAHMER: When did you take over the regiment? AHRENS: I joined the army group during the second half of November 1941, and after getting thoroughly acquainted with all details I took over the command of the regiment, at the end of November, if I remember rightly, on 30 November. DR. STAHMER: Was there a proper handing over from Bedenck to you? AHRENS: A very careful, detailed, and lengthy transfer took place, on account of the very considerable tasks entrusted to this regiment. Added to that, my superior, General Oberhäuser, was an extraordinarily painstaking superior, and he took great pains to convince himself personally whether, by the transfer negotiations and the instructions which I had received, I was fully capable of taking over the responsibilities of the regiment. DR. STAHMER: The Prosecution further alleges and claims that it was suspicious that shots were often fired in the forest. Is that true, and to what would you attribute that? AHRENS: I have already mentioned that it was one of the main tasks of the regiment to take all the necessary measures to defend themselves against sudden attack. Considering the small number of men which I had in my regimental staff, I had to organize and take the necessary steps to enable me to obtain replacements in the shortest time possible. This was arranged through wireless communication with the regimental headquarters. I ordered that defensive maneuvers should be carried out and that defense works should be prepared around the regimental headquarters sector and that there should be maneuvers and exercises in these works together with the members of the regimental headquarters. I personally participated in these maneuvers at times and, of course, shots were fired, particularly since we were preparing ourselves for night fighting. DR. STAHMER: There is supposed to have been a very lively and rather suspicious traffic to and around your staff building. Will you please tell us quite briefly what this traffic signified? AHRENS: There was an extraordinary lively traffic around staff headquarters which still increased in the spring of 1941 as I was having the house rebuilt. I think I mentioned that it had been destroyed through air attacks. But, of course, the traffic increased also through the maneuvers which were held nearby. The battalions in the front area operating at 300 and 400 kilometers distance had to, and could perform their job only by maintaining personal contact with the regiment and its staff headquarters. DR. STAHMER: There is supposed to have been considerable truck traffic which has been described as suspicious. AHRENS: Besides our supplies, which were relatively small, the Kommandos, as I have just mentioned, were brought in by trucks; but so was, of course, all the building material which I required. Apart from that, the traffic was not unusually heavy. DR. STAHMER: Do you know that about 25 kilometers west of Smolensk there were three Russian prisoner-of-war camps, which had originally been inhabited by Poles and which had been abandoned by the Russians when the German troops approached in July 1941? AHRENS: At that time I had not yet arrived. But never during the entire period I served in Russia did I see a single Pole; nor did I hear of Poles. DR. STAHMER: It has been alleged that an order had been issued from Berlin according to which Polish prisoners of war were to be shot. Did you know of such an order? AHRENS: No. I have never heard of such an order. DR. STAHMER: Did you possibly receive such an order from any other office? AHRENS: I told you already that I never heard of such an order and I therefore did not receive it, either. DR. STAHMER: Were any Poles shot on your instructions, your direct instructions? AHRENS: No Poles were shot on my instructions. Nobody at all was ever shot upon my order. I have never given such an order in all my life. DR. STAHMER: Well, you did not arrive until November 1941. Have you heard anything about your predecessor, Colonel Bedenck, having given any similar orders? AHRENS: I have not heard anything about it. With my regimental staff, with whom I lived closely together for 21 months, I had such close connections, I knew my people so well, and they also knew me, that I am perfectly convinced that this deed was not perpetrated by my predecessor nor by any member of my former regiment. I would undoubtedly have heard rumors of it at the very least. THE PRESIDENT: This is argument, you know, Dr. Stahmer. This is not evidence; it is argument. He is telling you what he thinks might have been the case. DR. STAHMER: I asked whether he had heard of it from members of his regiment. THE PRESIDENT: The answer to that would be “no,” I suppose, that he had not heard—not that he was convinced that he had not done it. DR. STAHMER: Very well. [_Turning to the witness._] After your arrival at Katyn, did you notice that there was a grave mound in the woods at Katyn? AHRENS: Shortly after I arrived—the ground was covered by snow—one of my soldiers pointed out to me that at a certain spot there was some sort of a mound, which one could hardly describe as such, on which there was a birch cross. I have seen that birch cross. In the course of 1942 my soldiers kept telling me that here in our woods shootings were supposed to have taken place, but at first I did not pay any attention to it. However, in the summer of 1942 this topic was referred to in an order of the army group later commanded by General Von Harsdorff. He told me that he had also heard about it. DR. STAHMER: Did these stories prove true later on? AHRENS: Yes, they did turn out to be true and I was able to confirm, quite by accident, that there was actually a grave here. During the winter of 1943—I think either January or February—quite accidentally I saw a wolf in this wood and at first I did not believe that it was a wolf; when I followed the tracks with an expert, we saw that there were traces of scratchings on the mound with the cross. I had investigations made as to what kind of bones these were. The doctors told me “human bones.” Thereupon I informed the officer responsible for war graves in the area of this fact, because I believed that it was a soldier’s grave, as there were a number of such graves in our immediate vicinity. DR. STAHMER: Then, how did the exhumation take place? AHRENS: I do not know about all the details. Professor Dr. Butz arrived one day on orders from the army group, and informed me that following the rumors in my little wood, he had to make exhumations, and that he had to inform me that these exhumations would take place in my wood. DR. STAHMER: Did Professor Butz later give you details of the result of his exhumations? AHRENS: Yes, he did occasionally give me details and I remember that he told me that he had conclusive evidence regarding the date of the shootings. Among other things, he showed me letters, of which I cannot remember much now; but I do remember some sort of a diary which he passed over to me in which there were dates followed by some notes which I could not read because they were written in Polish. In this connection he explained to me that these notes had been made by a Polish officer regarding events of the past months, and that at the end—the diary ended with the spring of 1940—the fear was expressed in these notes that something horrible was going to happen. I am giving only a broad outline of the meaning. DR. STAHMER: Did he give you any further indication regarding the period he assumed the shooting had taken place? AHRENS: Professor Butz, on the basis of the proofs which he had found, was convinced that the shootings had taken place in the spring of 1940 and I often heard him express these convictions in my presence, and also later on, when commissions visited the grave and I had to place my house at the disposal of these commissions to accommodate them. I personally did not have anything to do whatsoever with the exhumations or with the commissions. All I had to do was to place the house at their disposal and act as host. DR. STAHMER: It was alleged that in March 1943 lorries had transported bodies to Katyn from outside and these bodies were buried in the little wood. Do you know anything about that? AHRENS: No, I know nothing about that. DR. STAHMER: Would you have had to take notice of it? AHRENS: I would have had to take notice of it—at least my officers would have reported it to me, because my officers were constantly at the regimental battle headquarters, whereas I, as a regimental commander, was of course, frequently on the way. The officer who in those days was there constantly was First Lieutenant Hodt, whose address I got to know last night from a letter. DR. STAHMER: Were Russian prisoners of war used for these exhumations? AHRENS: As far as I remember, yes. DR. STAHMER: Can you tell us the number? AHRENS: I cannot say exactly as I did not concern myself any further with these exhumations on account of the dreadful and revolting stench around our house, but I should estimate the number as being about 40 to 50 men. DR. STAHMER: It has been alleged that they were shot afterward; have you any knowledge of that? AHRENS: I have no knowledge of that and I also never heard of it. DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions, Mr. President. FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): Colonel, did you yourself ever discuss the events of 1940 with any of the local inhabitants? AHRENS: Yes. At the beginning of 1943 a Russian married couple were living near my regimental headquarters; they lived 800 meters away and they were beekeepers. I, too, kept bees, and I came into close contact with this married couple. When the exhumations had been completed, approximately in May 1943, I told them that, after all, they ought to know when these shootings had taken place, since they were living in close proximity to the graves. Thereupon, these people told me it had occurred in the spring of 1940, and that at the Gnesdovo station more than 200 Poles in uniform had arrived in railway trucks of 50 tons each and were then taken to the woods in lorries. They had heard lots of shots and screams, too. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the wood off limits to the local inhabitants at the time? AHRENS: We have... THE PRESIDENT: That is a leading question. I do not think you should ask leading questions. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know whether the local inhabitants could enter the woods at the time? AHRENS: There was a fence around the wood and according to the statements of the local inhabitants, civilians could not enter it during the time the Russians were there. The remains of the fence were still visible when I was there, and this fence is indicated on my sketch and is marked with a black line. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When you moved into Dnieper Castle did you make inquiries as to who the former owners were? AHRENS: Yes, I did make inquiries because I was interested. The house was built in a rather peculiar way. It had a cinema installation and its own rifle range and of course that interested me; but I failed to ascertain anything definite during the whole time I was there. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Apart from mass graves in the neighborhood of the castle, were there any other graves found? AHRENS: I have indicated by a few dots on my sketch, that in the vicinity of the castle there were found a number of other small graves which contained decayed bodies; that is to say, skeletons which had disintegrated. These graves contained perhaps six, eight, or a few more male and female skeletons. Even I, a layman, could recognize that very clearly, because most of them had rubber shoes on which were in good condition, and there were also remains of handbags. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How long had these skeletons been in the ground? AHRENS: That I cannot tell you. I know only that they were decayed and had disintegrated. The bones were preserved, but the skeleton structure was no longer intact. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you, that is all. DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): Mr. President... THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you know the Tribunal’s ruling. DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Sir. THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have no right to ask any questions of the witness here. DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I just wanted to ask you, in this unusual case, to allow me to put questions... THE PRESIDENT: I said to you that you know the Tribunal’s ruling and the Tribunal will not hear you. We have already ruled upon this once or twice in consequence of your objections and the Tribunal will not hear you. DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the Katyn case is one of the most serious accusations raised against the group. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is perfectly well aware of the nature of the allegations about Katyn and the Tribunal does not propose to make any exceptional rule in that case and it therefore will not hear you and you will kindly sit down. DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I wish to state that on account of this ruling I feel myself unduly handicapped in my defense. THE PRESIDENT: As Dr. Laternser knows perfectly well, he is entitled to apply to the Commission to call any witness who is called here, if his evidence bears upon the case of the particular organizations for which Dr. Laternser appears. I do not want to hear anything further. DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the channel you point out to me is of no practical importance. I cannot have every witness who appears here called by the Commission. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you are appearing for the Defendant Dönitz, or is it Raeder? DR. SIEMERS: Defendant Raeder. THE PRESIDENT: Well, unless the questions you are going to ask particularly refer to the case of the Defendant Raeder, the Tribunal is not prepared to hear any further examination. The matter has been generally covered by Dr. Stahmer and also by Dr. Kranzbühler. Therefore, unless the questions which you want to ask have some particular reference to the case of Raeder, the Tribunal will not hear you. DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I had merely assumed that there were two reasons on the strength of which I could put a few questions: First, because the Tribunal itself has stated that within the framework of the conspiracy all defendants had been participants; and second, that according to the statements by the Prosecution Grossadmiral Raeder, too, is considered a member of the alleged criminal organizations, the General Staff and the OKW. It was for that reason I wanted to ask one or two supplementary questions. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, if there were any allegations that in any way bore on the case against Defendant Raeder, the Tribunal would of course allow you to ask questions; but there is no allegation which in any way connects the Defendant Raeder with the allegations about the Katyn woods. DR. SIEMERS: I am grateful to the Tribunal for that statement, Mr. President. DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I be allowed to ask something else? May I have the question put to the Prosecution, who is to be made responsible for the Katyn case? THE PRESIDENT: I do not propose to answer questions of that sort. The Prosecution may now cross-examine if they want to. CHIEF COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE L. N. SMIRNOV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Please tell me, Witness, since when, exactly, have you been in the Smolensk district territory? AHRENS: I have already answered that question: since the second half of November 1941. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer me further, where were you prior to the second part of 1941? Did you in any way have anything to do with Katyn or Smolensk or this district in general? Were you there personally in September and October 1941? AHRENS: No, I was not there. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is to say that you were not there, either in September or in October 1941, and therefore do not know what happened at that time in the Katyn forest? AHRENS: I was not there at that time, but I mentioned earlier on that... MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, I am actually only interested in a short question. Were you there personally or not? Were you able to see for yourself what was happening there or not? THE PRESIDENT: He says he was not there. AHRENS: No, I was not there. THE PRESIDENT: He said he was not there in September or October 1941. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thank you, Mr. President. [_Turning to the witness._] Maybe you recall the family names of the Russian women workers who were employed at the country house in the woods? AHRENS: Those female workers were not working in different houses. They merely worked as auxiliary kitchen personnel in our Dnieper Castle. I have not known their names at all. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means that the Russian women workers were employed only in the villa situated in Katyn forest where the staff headquarters were located? AHRENS: I believe that question was not translated well. I did not understand it. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I asked you whether the Russian women workers were employed exclusively in the villa in Kosig Gory where the staff headquarters were located? Is that right? AHRENS: The women workers worked for the regimental headquarters as kitchen help, and as kitchen helpers they worked on our premises; and by our premises I mean this particular house with the adjoining houses—for instance, the stables, the garage, the cellars, the boiler room. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will mention a few names of German military employees. Will you please tell me whether they belonged to your unit? First Lieutenant Rex? AHRENS: First Lieutenant Rex was my regimental adjutant. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please tell me, was he already assigned to that unit before your arrival at Katyn? AHRENS: Yes, he was there before I came. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: He was your adjutant, was he not? AHRENS: Yes, he was my adjutant. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Lieutenant Hodt? Hodt or Hoth? AHRENS: Lieutenant Hodt is right; but what question are you putting about Lieutenant Hodt? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am only questioning you about whether he belonged to your unit or not. AHRENS: Lieutenant Hodt was a member of the regiment. Whether... MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is what I was asking. He belonged to the regiment which you commanded, to your army unit? AHRENS: I did not say by that that he was a member of the regimental staff, but that he belonged to the regiment. The regiment consisted of three units. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But he lived in the same villa, did he not? AHRENS: That I do not know. When I arrived he was not there. I ordered him to report to me there for the first time. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will enumerate a few other names. Corporal Rose, Private Giesecken, Oberfeldwebel Krimmenski, Feldwebel Lummert, a cook named Gustav. Were these members of the Armed Forces who were billeted in the villa? AHRENS: May I ask you to mention the names individually once again, and I will answer you individually. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Feldwebel Lummert? AHRENS: Yes. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Corporal Rose? AHRENS: Yes. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And I believe, if my memory serves me correctly, Storekeeper Giesecke. AHRENS: That man’s name was Giesecken. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is right. I did not pronounce this name quite correctly. These were all your people or at least they belonged to your unit, did they not? AHRENS: Yes. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And you assert that you did not know what these people were doing in September and October 1941? AHRENS: As I was not there, I cannot tell you for certain. THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. [_A recess was taken._] MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I continue? Mr. President, since the witness has stated that he cannot give any testimony concerning the period of September to October 1941, I will limit myself to very short questions. [_Turning to the witness._] Witness, would you please point out the location of the villa and the forest with respect to the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway? Did the estate cover a large area? AHRENS: My sketch is on a scale of 1 to 100,000 and is drawn from memory. I estimate, therefore, that the graves were situated 200 to 300 meters directly west of the road to our Dnieper Castle, and 200 to 300 meters south of the Smolensk-Vitebsk road so that the Dnieper Castle lay a further 600 meters away. THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat that? AHRENS: South of the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway, approximately 15 kilometers west of Smolensk. According to the scale 1 to 100,000, as far as one is able to draw such a sketch accurately from memory, the site of these graves was 200 to 300 meters to the south, and a further 600 meters to the south, directly on the northern bend of the Dnieper, was situated our regimental staff quarters, the Dnieper Castle. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, the villa was approximately 600 meters away from the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway? AHRENS: No, that is not correct. What I said... MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please give a more or less exact figure. What was the distance between the highway and the villa, please? AHRENS: I just mentioned it in my testimony, that is to say, the graves were about 200 to 300 meters away, and there were a further 600 meters to the castle, therefore, in all about 900 to 1,000 meters. It might have been 800 meters, but that is the approximate distance as can also be seen by this sketch. THE PRESIDENT: I am not following this. Your question, Colonel Smirnov, was: How far was it from the road to what you called the country house? Was it not? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Mr. President, I asked how far was the villa from the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway. THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by the “Villa”? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The headquarters of the unit commanded by the witness in 1941 was quartered in a villa, and this villa was situated not far from the Dnieper River, at a distance of about 900 meters from the highroad. The graves were nearer to the highway. I would like to know how far away were the headquarters from the highway, and how far away from the highway were the graves in Katyn forest. THE PRESIDENT: What you want to know is: How far was the house in which the headquarters was situated from the highway? Is that right? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is exactly what I wanted to know, Mr. President. AHRENS: You put two questions to me: first of all, how far were the graves from the highway; and secondly, how far was the house from the highway. I will repeat the answer once more, the house was 800 to 1,000 meters south of the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One minute, please. I asked you primarily only about the house. Your answer concerning the graves was given on your own initiative. Now I will ask you about the graves, how far were these mass graves from the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway? AHRENS: From 200 to 300 meters. It might also have been 350 meters. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, the graves were 200 or 300 meters from the main road which connected two important centers? Is that right? AHRENS: Yes, indeed. They were at a distance of 200 to 300 meters south of this, and I may say that at my time this was the most frequented road I ever saw in Russia. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That was just what I was asking you. Now, please tell me: Was the Katyn wood a real forest, or was it, rather, a park or a grove? AHRENS: Up to now I have only spoken about the wood of Katyn. This wood of Katyn is the fenced-in wooded area of about 1 square kilometer, which I drew in my sketch. This wood is of mixed growth, of older and younger trees. There were many birch trees in this little wood. However, there were clearings in this wood, and I should say that from 30 to 40 percent was cleared. One could see this from the stumps of newly felled trees. Under no circumstances could you describe this wood as a park; at any rate one could not come to such a conclusion. Fighting had taken place in this wood, as one could still see trenches and fox holes. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but anyway, you would not call Katyn wood a real forest since it was relatively a small grove in the immediate vicinity of the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway. Is that right? AHRENS: No, that is not right. It was a forest. The entire Katyn forest was a regular forest which began near our grove and extended far beyond that. Of this Katyn forest, which was a mixed forest, part of it had been fenced in, and this part, extending over 1 square kilometer, was what we called the little Katyn wood, but it did belong to this entire wooded region south of the highway. The forest began with our little wood and extended to the west. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am not interested in the general characteristics of the wood. I would like you to answer the following short question: Were the mass graves located in this grove? AHRENS: The mass graves were situated directly west of our entrance drive in a clearing in the wood, where there was a growth of young trees. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but this clearing, this growth of young trees, was located inside this small grove, near the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway, is that correct? AHRENS: It was 200 to 300 meters south of the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway, and directly west of the entrance drive leading from this road to the Dnieper Castle. I have marked this spot on my sketch with a fairly large white dot. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One more question. As far as you know did the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway exist before the German occupation of Smolensk, or was it constructed only after the occupation? AHRENS: When I arrived in Russia at the end of November 1941, everything was covered with snow. Later I got the impression that this was an old road, whereas the road Minsk-Moscow was newer. That was my impression. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand. Now tell me, under what circumstances, or rather, when did you first discover the cross in the grove? AHRENS: I cannot tell the exact date. My soldiers told me about it, and on one occasion when I was going past there, about the beginning of January 1942—it could also have been at the end of December 1941—I saw this cross rising above the snow. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This means you saw it already in 1941 or at the latest the beginning of 1942? AHRENS: That is what I have just testified. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, certainly. Now, please be more specific concerning the date when a wolf brought you to this cross. Was it in winter or summer and what year? AHRENS: It was the beginning of 1943. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In 1943? And around the cross you saw bones, did you not? AHRENS: No. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No? AHRENS: No, at first I did not see them. In order to find out whether I had not been mistaken about seeing a wolf, for it seemed rather impossible that a wolf should be so near to Smolensk, I examined the tracks together with a gamekeeper and found traces of scratching on the ground. However, the ground was frozen hard, there was snow on the ground and I did not see anything further there. Only later on, after it had been thawing my men found various bones. However, this was months later and then, at a suitable opportunity I showed these bones to a doctor and he said that these were human bones. Thereupon I said, “Then most likely it is a grave, left as a result of the fighting which has taken place here,” and that the war graves registration officer would have to take care of the graves in the same way in which we were taking care of other graves of fallen soldiers. That was the reason why I spoke to this gentleman—but only after the snow had melted. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: By the way, did you personally see the Katyn graves? AHRENS: Open or before they were opened? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Open, yes. AHRENS: When they were open I had constantly to drive past these graves, as generally they were approximately 30 meters away from the entrance drive. Therefore, I could hardly go past without taking any notice of them. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am interested in the following: Do you remember what the depth of the layer of earth was, which covered the mass of human bodies in these graves? AHRENS: That I do not know. I have already said that I was so nauseated by the stench which we had to put up with for several weeks, that when I drove past I closed the windows of my car and rushed through as fast as I could. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: However, even if you only casually glanced at those graves, perhaps you noticed whether the layer of earth covering the corpses was deep or shallow? Was it several centimeters or several meters deep? Maybe Professor Butz told you something about it? AHRENS: As commander of a signal regiment I was concerned with a region which was almost half as large as Greater Germany and I was on the road a great deal. My work was not entirely carried out at the regimental battle headquarters. Therefore, in general, from Monday or Tuesday until Saturday I was with my units. For that reason, when I drove through, I did cast an occasional glance at these graves; but I was not especially interested in the details and I did not speak to Professor Butz about such details. For this reason I have only a faint recollection of this matter. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: According to the material submitted to the High Tribunal by the Soviet Prosecution, it has been established that the bodies were buried at a depth of 1½ to 2 meters. I wonder where you met a wolf who could scratch the ground up to a depth of 2 meters. AHRENS: I did not meet this wolf, but I saw it. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me please, why you started the exhumation on these mass graves in March 1943 only, after having discovered the cross and learned about the mass graves already in 1941? AHRENS: That was not my concern, but a matter for the army group. I have already told you that in the course of 1942 the stories became more substantial. I frequently heard about them and spoke about it to Colonel Von Gersdorff, Chief of Intelligence, Army Group Center, who intimated to me that he knew all about this matter and with that my obligation ended. I had reported what I had seen and heard. Apart from that, all this matter did not concern me and I did not concern myself with it. I had enough worries of my own. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And now the last question. Please tell me who were these two persons with whom you had this conversation, and maybe you can recollect the names of the couple who told you about the shootings in the Katyn woods? AHRENS: This couple lived in a small house about 800 to 1,000 meters north of the entrance to our drive leading to the Vitebsk road. I do not recall their names. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you do not remember the names of this couple? AHRENS: No, I do not recall the names. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you heard about the Katyn events from a couple whose names you do not remember, and you did not hear anything about it from other local inhabitants? AHRENS: Please repeat the question for me. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, you heard about these Katyn events only from this couple, whose names you do not remember? From none of the other local inhabitants did you hear anything about the events in Katyn? AHRENS: I personally heard the facts only from this couple, whereas my soldiers told me the stories current among the other inhabitants. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you know that during the investigation of the Katyn affair, or rather of the Katyn provocation, posters were placarded by the German Police in the streets of Smolensk, promising a reward to anyone giving any information in connection with the Katyn event? It was signed by Lieutenant Voss. AHRENS: I personally did not see that poster. Lieutenant Voss is known to me by name only. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And the very last question. Do you know of the report of the Extraordinary State Commission concerning Katyn? AHRENS: Do you mean the Russian _White Paper_ when you mention this report? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, I mean the report of the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission, concerning Katyn, the Soviet report. AHRENS: Yes, I read that report. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Therefore, you are acquainted with the fact that the Extraordinary State Commission names you as being one of the persons responsible for the crimes committed in Katyn? AHRENS: It mentions a Lieutenant Colonel Arnes. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, do you wish to re-examine? DR. STAHMER: Witness, just a little while ago you said that you did not know when First Lieutenant Hodt joined your staff. Do you know when he joined the regiment? AHRENS: I know that he belonged to the regiment during the Russian campaign and actually right from the beginning. DR. STAHMER: That is, he belonged to the regiment from the beginning? AHRENS: Yes. He belonged to this regiment ever since the beginning of the Russian campaign. DR. STAHMER: Just one more question dealing with your discussion with Professor Butz. Did Professor Butz mention anything about the last dates on the letters which he found? AHRENS: He told me about the spring of 1940. He also showed me this diary and I looked at it and I also saw the dates, but I do not recall in detail just which date or dates they were. But they ended with the spring of 1940. DR. STAHMER: Therefore no documents were found of a later date? AHRENS: Professor Butz told me that no documents or notes were found which might have given indications of a later date, and he expressed his conviction that these shootings must have taken place in the spring of 1940. DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to the witness. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Witness, can you not remember exactly when Professor Butz discussed with you the date at which the corpses were buried in the mass graves? AHRENS: May I ask to have the question repeated? THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): When did Professor Butz speak to you about the mass graves and assert that the burial of the corpses must have taken place in the spring of 1940? AHRENS: I cannot tell you the date exactly, but it was in the spring of 1943, before these exhumations had started—I beg your pardon—he told me that he had been instructed to undertake the exhumation and during the exhumations he was with me from time to time; therefore it may have been in May or the end of April. In the middle of May he gave me details of his exhumations and told me among other things that which I have testified here. I cannot now tell you exactly on which days Professor Butz visited me. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): So far as I can remember, you stated that Professor Butz arrived in Katyn. When did he actually arrive there? AHRENS: In the spring of 1940 Professor Butz came to me and told me that on instructions of the army group, he was to undertake exhumations in my woods. The exhumations were started, and in the course of... THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You say 1940? Or perhaps the translation is wrong? AHRENS: 1943, in the spring of 1943. A few weeks after the beginning of the exhumations, Professor Butz visited me, when I happened to be there, and informed me; or, rather, he discussed this matter with me, and he told me that to which I have testified here. It may have been the middle of May 1943. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): According to your testimony, I understood you to say in answer to a question put by the defense counsel, that Professor Butz asserted that the shootings had taken place in the spring of 1940 before the arrival of the commission for the exhumations. Is that correct? AHRENS: May I repeat once more that Professor Butz... THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): It is not necessary to repeat what you have already said. I am only asking you, is it correct or not? Maybe the translation was incorrect, or maybe your testimony was incorrect at the beginning. AHRENS: I did not understand the question just put to me. That is the reason why I wanted to explain this once more. I do not know just what is meant by this last question. May I ask this question be repeated? THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): At the beginning, when you were interrogated by the defense counsel, I understood you to say that Professor Butz told you that the shooting had taken place in the spring of 1940, that is before the arrival of the commission for the exhumations. AHRENS: No, that has not been understood correctly. I testified that Professor Butz came to me and told me that he was to make exhumations since it concerned my woods. These exhumations then took place, and approximately 6 to 8 weeks later Professor Butz came to me—of course, he visited me on other occasions as well—but approximately 6 to 8 weeks later he came to me and told me that he was convinced that, as a result of his discoveries, he was now able to fix the date of the shootings. This statement which he made to me, refers approximately to the middle of May. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Were you present when the diary and the other documents which were shown to you by Professor Butz were found? AHRENS: No. THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You do not know where he found the diary and other documents? AHRENS: No, that I do not know. THE PRESIDENT: When did you first report to superior authority the fact that you suspected that there was a grave there? AHRENS: At first, I was not suspicious. I have already mentioned that fighting had taken place there; and at first I did not attach any importance to the stories told to me and did not give this matter any credence. I believed that it was a question of soldiers who had been killed there—of war graves, like several in the vicinity. THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering my question. I am asking you, when did you first report to superior authority that there was a grave there? AHRENS: In the course of the summer 1942 I spoke to Colonel Von Gersdorff about these stories which had come to my knowledge. Gersdorff told me that he had heard that too, and that ended my conversation with Von Gersdorff. He did not believe it to be true; in any case he was not thoroughly convinced. That I do not know, however. Then in the spring of 1943, when the snow had melted, the bones which had been found there were brought to me, and I then telephoned to the officer in charge of war graves and told him that apparently there were some soldiers’ graves here. That was before Professor Butz had visited me. THE PRESIDENT: Did you make any report in writing? AHRENS: No, I did not do that. THE PRESIDENT: Never? AHRENS: No, I was not in any way concerned with this matter. THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. DR. STAHMER: Then, as another witness, I should like to call Lieutenant Reinhard von Eichborn. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. [_The witness Von Eichborn took the stand._] Will you state your full name please. REINHARD VON EICHBORN (Witness): Reinhard von Eichborn. THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing. [_The witness repeated the oath._] THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. DR. STAHMER: Witness, what is your occupation? VON EICHBORN: Assistant judge. DR. STAHMER: Were you called up for service in the German Armed Forces during this war? VON EICHBORN: Yes, in August 1939. DR. STAHMER: And what was your unit? VON EICHBORN: Army Group Signal Regiment 537. DR. STAHMER: And what was your rank? VON EICHBORN: At the outbreak of the war, platoon leader and lieutenant. DR. STAHMER: And at the end? VON EICHBORN: First lieutenant. DR. STAHMER: Were you on the Eastern Front during the war? VON EICHBORN: Yes, from the beginning. DR. STAHMER: With your regiment? VON EICHBORN: No, from 1940 onward, on the staff of Army Group Center. DR. STAHMER: Apart from this Regiment 537, was there an Engineer Battalion 537? VON EICHBORN: In the sphere of the Army Group Center there was no Engineer Battalion 537. DR. STAHMER: When did you arrive with your unit in the vicinity of Katyn? VON EICHBORN: About 20 September the staff of Army Group Center transferred its headquarters to Smolensk, that is to say in the Smolensk region. DR. STAHMER: Where had you been stationed before? VON EICHBORN: How am I to understand this question? DR. STAHMER: Where did you come from? VON EICHBORN: We came from Borisov. THE PRESIDENT: One moment. The witness said 20 September. That does not identify the year. DR. STAHMER: In what year was this 20 September? VON EICHBORN: 20 September 1941. DR. STAHMER: Was Regiment 537 already there at that time? VON EICHBORN: The staff of Regiment 537 was transferred at about the same time together with the staff of the army group to the place where the headquarters of the army group was. Advance units had already been stationed there previously, in order to set up communication facilities. DR. STAHMER: And where was this staff accommodated? VON EICHBORN: The staff of Army Group Signal Regiment 537 was accommodated in the so-called Dnieper Castle. DR. STAHMER: Where was the advance unit? VON EICHBORN: The advance unit may have occupied this building, too—or at least a part of this advance unit did—to safeguard this building for the regimental staff. DR. STAHMER: Do you know who was in command of this advance unit? VON EICHBORN: Lieutenant Hodt was in command of this advance unit. DR. STAHMER: When did this advance unit come to Katyn? VON EICHBORN: Smolensk fell on about 17 July 1941. The army group had planned to put up its headquarters in the immediate vicinity of Smolensk, and, after this group had selected its quarters, this region was seized immediately after the fall of the city. The advance unit arrived at the same time as this area was seized, and that was probably in the second half of July of 1941. DR. STAHMER: Therefore the advance unit was there from July of 1941 until 20 September 1941? VON EICHBORN: Yes. DR. STAHMER: And the entire staff was there from 20 September 1941? VON EICHBORN: Yes. It may be that part of the staff arrived somewhat later, but the majority of the staff arrived on 20 September. THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of the staff of the army group or the staff of the signal regiment? VON EICHBORN: I am speaking of both staffs, because the moving of large staffs such as that of an army group could not be undertaken in 1 day; usually 2 to 3 days were needed for that. The operations of the signal corps had to be assured, and therefore the regiment had to leave some of the staff behind until the entire staff had been moved. DR. STAHMER: Where was the advance unit accommodated? VON EICHBORN: At least part of the advance unit was accommodated in the Dnieper Castle. Some of the others were in the neighborhood of those places where later on the companies were billeted. The reason for that was to keep the billets ready for this regiment until the bulk of it had been moved. DR. STAHMER: How about the Regimental Staff 537? VON EICHBORN: That was in the Dnieper Castle. DR. STAHMER: Can you give us the names of the officers who belonged to the regimental staff? VON EICHBORN: At that time there was Lieutenant Colonel Bedenck, the commanding officer; Lieutenant Rex, adjutant; Lieutenant Hodt, orderly officer; and a Captain Schäfer, who was a telephone expert. It may be that one or two others were there as well, but I can no longer remember their names. DR. STAHMER: The preceding witness has already told us about the tasks of the regimental staff. How were the activities of the regimental staff controlled? VON EICHBORN: The regiment, which consisted of 10 to 12 companies, had to give an exact report each evening as to what work had been allotted to the various companies. This was necessary as we had to know what forces were available in case of emergency, for undertaking any new tasks. DR. STAHMER: How far away from the Dnieper Castle were you billeted? VON EICHBORN: Approximately 4 to 5 kilometers. I cannot give you the exact distance as I always made it by car, but it would be about 4 to 5 kilometers. DR. STAHMER: Did you frequently go to Dnieper Castle? VON EICHBORN: Very frequently when I was off duty, as I had belonged to this regiment and knew most of the officers, with whom I was on friendly terms. DR. STAHMER: Can you tell us about the kind and extent of the traffic to the Dnieper Castle? VON EICHBORN: In order to judge this you have to differentiate between persons and things. So far as people were concerned, the traffic was very lively because the regiment had to be very centrally organized in order to be equal to its tasks. Therefore, many couriers came and commanders of the various companies frequently came to visit the regimental staff. On the other hand there was a heavy traffic of trucks and passenger cars, because the regiment tried to improve its billets there; and since we remained there for some time all sorts of building alterations were carried out in the house. DR. STAHMER: Did you hear anything about there being three Russian camps with captured Polish officers, 25 to 45 kilometers west of Smolensk, which had allegedly fallen into German hands? VON EICHBORN: I never heard anything about any kind of Polish officers’ camps or Polish prisoner-of-war camps. DR. STAHMER: Did your army group receive reports about the capture of such Polish officers? VON EICHBORN: No. I would have noticed that, since the number of prisoners, and especially the number of officers, was always submitted to me in the evening reports of the armies which took these prisoners. It was our responsibility to receive these signal reports and we therefore saw them every evening. DR. STAHMER: You did not receive a report to that effect? VON EICHBORN: I neither saw such a report from an army, which would have issued it, nor did I ever receive a report from an army group which would have had to transmit this report in their evening bulletin to the High Command of the Army (OKH). DR. STAHMER: Could a report like that have been handed in from another source or been sent to another office? VON EICHBORN: The official channel in the Army was very stringent, and the staffs saw to it that official channels were strictly adhered to. In any case the armies were always required to make the detailed reports, following the lines stipulated in the form sheets and this applied especially to the figures concerning prisoners. Therefore, it is quite out of the question that if such a number of officers had fallen into the hands of an army, it would not have reported the matter through the appropriate channel. DR. STAHMER: You said, just a little while ago, that you were in particularly close relationship with the officers of this regiment. Did you ever hear that Polish prisoners of war, officers, were shot at some time or other in the Katyn forest at the instigation of Regiment 537 under Colonel Bedenck or under Colonel Ahrens? VON EICHBORN: I knew nearly all the officers of the regiment, as I myself had been over a year with the regiment, and I was on such familiar terms with most of the officers that they told me everything that took place, even anything of an unofficial nature. Therefore, it is quite out of the question that such an important matter should not have come to my knowledge. From the nature of the whole character moulding in the regiment, it is quite impossible that there should not have been at least one who would have come to tell me about it immediately. DR. STAHMER: Were all the operational orders for Regiment 537 officially known to you? VON EICHBORN: The operational orders for this army group signal regiment were twofold: The orders which concerned only the wireless company and those which applied to the nine telephone companies. Since I was a telephone expert, it was quite natural for me to draft these orders and submit them to my superior, General Oberhäuser. Therefore, each order which was issued had either been drafted by me or I had seen it beforehand. DR. STAHMER: Was there ever at any time an order given out by your office to shoot Polish prisoners of war? VON EICHBORN: Such an order was neither given to the regiment by our office nor by any other office. Neither did we receive a report to this effect, nor did we hear about things like that through any other channel. DR. STAHMER: If an order like that came through official channels, it could come only through you? VON EICHBORN: This order would have necessitated a great many members of the regiment being taken away from their own duties, which were to safeguard the system of communications. As we were very short of signallers, we had to know what almost every man in the regiment was doing. It would have been quite out of the question for any member of the regiment to have been taken away from such a duty without our knowledge. DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, whom are you appearing on behalf of? FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: For Grossadmiral Dönitz, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: There is no charge made against Grossadmiral Dönitz in connection with this offense at all. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, the exhumations and the propaganda connected with them occurred during the period when Grossadmiral Dönitz was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The Prosecution alleges that at that time Grossadmiral Dönitz was a member of the Cabinet and had participated in all acts taken by the Government. Therefore, I must consider him as being implicated in all the problems arising out of the Katyn case. THE PRESIDENT: That would mean that we should have to hear examination from everybody who was connected with the Government. And the Tribunal has already pointed out, with reference to Admiral Raeder, that his case was not connected with this matter. It is only when a case is directly connected with the matter that counsel for the individual defendants are allowed to cross-examine, in addition to the defendant’s counsel who calls the witness. If there is any suggestion that you want to make to the counsel who is calling the witness, you can make it to him, but you are not entitled... FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: But I am asking your permission to put two or three questions to this witness. THE PRESIDENT: If you have any special questions to put, you may suggest them to Dr. Stahmer, and Dr. Stahmer will put them. Dr. Kranzbühler, if you want to put any questions, you may put them to Dr. Stahmer, and he will put them to the witness. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I did not quite understand. Shall I propose to Dr. Stahmer to put the questions or... THE PRESIDENT: If you cannot do it verbally, you may do it in writing, and you may do it later on. But I really do not think there can be any questions which are so difficult to suggest to Dr. Stahmer as all that. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: They can also be put through Dr. Stahmer. I was only thinking that I would save some time by putting the questions myself. THE PRESIDENT: I told you if you wish to ask any questions, you must ask them through Dr. Stahmer. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: In the meantime, the Tribunal will go on with the cross-examination, and any questions which you wish to put can be put in re-examination. Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, I am interested to know your exact function in the army. Were you in charge of teleprinter communications at the headquarters of Army Group Center or were you a wireless expert? VON EICHBORN: No, Mr. Prosecutor, you are wrong. I was the telephone expert of Army Group Center, not the wireless expert. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is exactly what I am asking you. The translation was evidently incorrect. So you were in charge of telephone communications, were you not? VON EICHBORN: Yes; you are right. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Ordinary telegrams, or ciphered telegrams? VON EICHBORN: The task of a telephone expert connected with an army group consisted in keeping the telephone lines intact... MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, I am not interested in the tasks in a general way. I would like to know whether these were secret ciphered telegrams or the ordinary army mail, army communications which were not secret. VON EICHBORN: There were two kinds of telegrams, open and secret. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were secret telegrams transmitted by you, too? VON EICHBORN: Both came through me. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, all communications between the Wehrmacht, between Army units and the highest police authorities also passed through you; is that correct? VON EICHBORN: The most important telegrams, and especially the secret ones were submitted to the telephone expert. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes. Consequently, the correspondence between the police authorities and the Armed Forces units passed through you; is that correct? I am asking you this question for a second time. VON EICHBORN: I must answer with the reservation that the messages did not pass through the telephone expert, but only the most important secret teletype matters were submitted to him—not the whole correspondence, because that went also through the mail as well as by courier service. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is clear. Do you know in this case that in September and October 1941 there were special detachments in Smolensk whose duty, in close co-operation with the Army, was to carry out the so-called purge of the prisoner-of-war camps and the extermination of prisoners of war? DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I must decisively object to this questioning of the witness. This questioning can have only the purpose of determining the relations between the General Staff and the OKW and any commands of the Security Service. Therefore, they are accusing the General Staff and the OKW; and if I, Mr. President, as defense counsel for the General Staff and the OKW am not permitted to put questions, then on the basis of equal treatment, the same rules must apply to the Prosecution as well. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I, Mr. President, make a short statement? THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, the question is competent. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I beg your pardon. THE PRESIDENT: I said the question was competent. You may ask the question. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like to ask you the following question, Witness. Since all secret teletypes passed through you, did you ever encounter among these telegrams any from the so-called 1st Einsatzgruppe “B”—that was the so-called first command—or from the Special Command “Moscow” which at that time was located at Smolensk and kept in reserve in anticipation of better times? The latter had the order to perpetrate mass murders in Moscow. Both commands were located at Smolensk at that time. VON EICHBORN: No such reports came into my hands. I can fully explain this to you, Mr. Prosecutor. When any detachments of this sort had been established in the area of Army Group Center, these detachments had their own wireless stations. It was only later on in the course of the Russian campaign that these posts had teletype facilities as well; then they used the army group network. However, that only happened later. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, the telegrams of those special units which, by order of high police authorities, were assigned to carry out special actions in co-operation with military units, did not pass through your hands in September and October of 1941? VON EICHBORN: That is correct. At that time, there were no teletype facilities and offices for such special units, even if they were in that area at all. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, this document was already presented to the Court together with the Extraordinary State Commission Report, Document Number USSR-3. If the High Tribunal will permit it, I should like to present to the Tribunal and to the Defense photostatic copies of one of the documents which was attached to the report of the Extraordinary State Commission. If the Tribunal will look at Page 2 of this document, it will see that the Special Command “Moscow” and the Einsatzgruppe “B” were both located in Smolensk. It says on the first page that these detachments together with units of the Armed Forces, were assigned to carry out mass killings in the camps. If the Tribunal will permit me, I shall submit this document now... THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, that is a matter of argument. We shall take judicial notice of it, of course, of everything which is in the Soviet Government’s publication. And I understand you to say that this document is a part of the Soviet Government communication or Soviet Government report. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President; but I would like to ask permission to present an original German document, a secret document, which states that in the Smolensk area there were two large special commands whose duties were to carry out mass murders in the camps, and that these actions had to be carried out together with the Armed Forces units which had to co-operate with them. THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, is this document which you have just handed up to us a part of the report USSR-3? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President, it is a part of the report, Document USSR-3, called “Special Directives of the Hitler Government Concerning the Annihilation of Prisoners of War.” I would like to ask the Tribunal to allow me to present one of the original documents even if the report, USSR-3, has been already submitted in full. It says there that these special units were located in Smolensk and were assigned together with the Armed Forces units to carry out mass killings in the camps. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Smirnov. This document is already in evidence, if the Tribunal understands correctly. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thank you, Mr. President. [_Turning to the witness._] Consequently, we may consider it as an established fact that the correspondence, the telegraphic messages of these special detachments did not pass through your hands; is that correct? THE PRESIDENT: He has said that twice already. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Excuse me, Mr. President. [_Turning to the witness._] Why did you assert with such certainty that there were no reports about the killing of the Poles? You know that the killing of the Polish prisoners of war was a special action, and any report about this action would have to pass through your hands? Is that correct? VON EICHBORN: I answered the prosecutor—rather, I answered Dr. Stahmer—that if in the area of Army Group Signal Regiment 537 killings of that sort had taken place, I would undoubtedly have known about them. I did not state what the prosecutor is now trying to ascribe to me. THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, the Tribunal think you had better read this passage from this document, which is in the German language, to the Tribunal so that it will go into the record. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In this document, Mr. President, it is stated... THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Colonel Smirnov. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thank you, Mr. President. This document is dated “Berlin, 29 October 1941.” It is headed, “The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service.” It has a classification, “Top Secret; Urgent letter; Operational Order Number-14.” Reference is made to decrees of 17 July and 12 September 1941. I shall now read a few short sentences, and I shall begin with the first sentence: “In the appendix, I am sending directions for the evacuation of Soviet civilian prisoners and prisoners of war out of permanent prisoner-of-war camps and transit camps in the rear of the Army... “These directives have been worked out in collaboration with the Army High Command. The Army High. Command has notified the commanders of the armies in the rear as well as the local commanders of the prisoner-of-war camps and of the transit camps. “The task force groups, depending on the size of the camp in their territory, are setting up special commands in sufficient strength under the leadership of an SS leader. The commands are instructed immediately to start work in the camps.” I break off here, and will continue reading the last paragraph: “I emphasize especially that Operational Orders Number 8 and 14 as well as the appendix are to be destroyed immediately in the case of immediate danger.” I shall finish my reading and now I shall only mention the distribution list. On Page 2 I quote the part concerning Smolensk. It says here that in Smolensk the Einsatzgruppe “B” was located, consisting of Special Commands 7a, 7b, 8, and 9; and in addition to this, there was already located in Smolensk a special command, which had been rather prematurely named “Moscow” by its organizers. These are the contents of the document, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal directs that the whole document shall be translated. We will now recess until 5 minutes past 2 o’clock. [_The Tribunal recessed until 1405 hours._] _Afternoon Session_ MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I have no more questions to put to this witness. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer. DR. STAHMER: Witness, do you know who owned that little castle near the Dnieper before the occupation by German troops? Who owned it, who lived there? VON EICHBORN: I cannot say that for certain. We noticed that the little castle was astonishingly well furnished. It was very well laid out. It had two bathrooms, a rifle range, and a cinema. We drew certain conclusions therefrom, when the facts became known, but I do not know anything about the previous owner. DR. STAHMER: The Russian Prosecutor submitted to you a document dated 29 October 1941, “Directives to the Chief of the Sipo for the Detachments in the Stalags.” With reference to that document, I want to ask you whether you had an opportunity personally to ascertain the attitude of Field Marshal Kluge, your commander of Army Group Center, regarding the shooting of prisoners of war? VON EICHBORN: By chance I became the ear-witness of a conversation between the Commanders Bock and Kluge. That conversation took place about 3 or 4 weeks before the beginning of the Russian campaign. I cannot tell you the exact time. At the time Field Marshal Von Bock was the commander of Army Group Center, and Field Marshal Von Kluge was commander of the 4th Army. The army group was in Posen and the 4th Army at Warsaw. One day I was called by the aide-de-camp of Field Marshal Von Beck, who was Lieutenant Colonel Count Hardenberg. He gave me the order... THE PRESIDENT: These details are entirely irrelevant, aren’t they. All you want to ask him is: What was the attitude of Von Kluge? That is all. DR. STAHMER: The answer did not come through. I did not understand what you said, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: What I said was that all these details about the particular place where Von Kluge met some other army group commander are utterly irrelevant. All you are trying to ask him is: What was Von Kluge’s attitude toward the murder of war prisoners? Isn’t that all? DR. STAHMER: Yes. [_Turning to the witness._] Will you answer the question briefly, Witness. Please just tell us what Von Kluge said. VON EICHBORN: Von Kluge told Von Bock, during a telephone conversation, that the order for the shooting of certain prisoners of war was an impossibility and could not be carried out, with regard to the discipline of the troops. Von Bock shared this point of view and both these gentlemen talked for half an hour about the measures which they wanted to adopt against this order. DR. STAHMER: According to the allegations of the Prosecution, the shooting of these 11,000 Polish officers is supposed to have been carried out sometime in September 1941. The question now is: Do you consider it possible, in view of local conditions, that such mass shootings and burials could have been carried out next door to the regimental headquarters without you yourself having heard about it? VON EICHBORN: We were very busy in preparation for the move of the army group to Smolensk. We had assigned a great number of signal troops for setting up perfect installations. On the entire site there was a constant going and coming of troops laying cables and telephone lines. It is out of the question that anything of this kind could have occurred in that particular area without the regiment and I getting knowledge of it. DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions to put to the witness, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, before calling my third witness, Lieutenant General Oberhäuser, may I ask your permission to make the following remarks? The Prosecution has up to now only alleged that Regiment Number 537 was the one which had carried out these shootings and that under Colonel Ahrens’ command. Today again, Colonel Ahrens has been named by the Prosecution as being the perpetrator. Apparently this allegation has been dropped and it has been said that if it was not Ahrens then it must have been his predecessor, Colonel Bedenck; and if Colonel Bedenck did not do it, then apparently—and this seems to be the third version—it was done by the SD. The Defense had taken the position solely that Colonel Ahrens was accused as the perpetrator and it has refuted that allegation. Considering the changed situation and the attitude adopted by the Prosecution, I shall have to name a fourth witness in addition. That is First Lieutenant Hodt, who has been mentioned today as the perpetrator and who was with the regimental staff right from the beginning and who was, as we have told, the senior of the advance party which arrived at the Dnieper Castle in July. I got the address of First Lieutenant Hodt by chance yesterday. He is at Glücksburg near Flensburg; and I, therefore, ask to be allowed to name as a witness First Lieutenant Hodt, who will give evidence that during the time between July and September such shootings did not occur. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal will consider your application, when they adjourn at half past 3, with reference to this extra witness. DR. STAHMER: Yes, Sir. Then I shall now call Lieutenant General Oberhäuser as witness. [_The witness Oberhäuser took the stand._] THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please? EUGEN OBERHÄUSER (Witness): Eugen Oberhäuser. THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing. [_The witness repeated the oath._] THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. DR. STAHMER: General, what position did you hold during the war? OBERHÄUSER: I was the signal commander in an army group, first of all during the Polish campaign, in Army Group North; then, in the Western campaign Army Group B; and then in Russia, Army Group Center. DR. STAHMER: When did you and your staff reach the neighborhood of Katyn? OBERHÄUSER: Sometime during September 1941. DR. STAHMER: Where was your staff located? OBERHÄUSER: My staff was located in the immediate vicinity of the commander of the army group; that is to say, about 12 kilometers west of Smolensk, near the railroad station of Krasnibor. DR. STAHMER: Was Regiment Number 537 under your command? OBERHÄUSER: Regiment 537 was directly under my command. DR. STAHMER: What task did that regiment have? OBERHÄUSER: That regiment had the task of establishing both telegraph and wireless communications between the command of the army group and the various armies and other units which were directly under its command. DR. STAHMER: Was the staff of the regiment stationed near you? OBERHÄUSER: The staff of that regiment was located about 3, perhaps 4 kilometers west from my own position. DR. STAHMER: Can you give us more detailed information regarding the exact location of the staff headquarters of Number 537? OBERHÄUSER: The staff headquarters of 537 was in a very nice Russian timber house. Commissars were supposed to have been living there before. It was on the steep bank of the Dnieper River. It was somewhat off the road, perhaps 400 to 500 meters away. It was, from my place, 4 kilometers west of the main highway Smolensk to Vitebsk. DR. STAHMER: Who was the commanding officer of the regiment after the capture of Smolensk? OBERHÄUSER: After the capture of Smolensk, Colonel Bedenck was the commander of the regiment. DR. STAHMER: For how long? OBERHÄUSER: Until about November 1941. DR. STAHMER: Who was his successor? OBERHÄUSER: His successor was Colonel Ahrens. DR. STAHMER: How long? OBERHÄUSER: Approximately until September—it may have been August—1943. DR. STAHMER: Were you near Katyn as long as that, too? OBERHÄUSER: I was there until the command of the army group transferred its headquarters farther west. DR. STAHMER: What were your relations with the commanders of this regiment? OBERHÄUSER: My relations with the regimental commanders were most hearty, both officially and privately, which is due to the fact that I had been the first commander of that regiment. I myself had formed the regiment and I was most attached to it. DR. STAHMER: Did you personally visit the little Dnieper Castle frequently? OBERHÄUSER: I went to the Dnieper Castle frequently; I can well say in normal times once or twice a week. DR. STAHMER: Did the commanders visit you in the meantime? OBERHÄUSER: The commanders came to see me more frequently than I went to see them. DR. STAHMER: Did you know anything about the fact that near Smolensk, about 25 to 45 kilometers to the west, there were three Russian camps which contained Polish prisoners of war... OBERHÄUSER: I knew nothing of that. DR. STAHMER: ...who had fallen into the hands of the Germans? OBERHÄUSER: I never heard anything about it. DR. STAHMER: Was there an order, which is supposed to have come from Berlin, that Polish officers who were prisoners of war were to be shot? OBERHÄUSER: No, such an order was never issued. DR. STAHMER: Did you yourself ever give such an order? OBERHÄUSER: I have never given such an order. DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether Colonel Bedenck or Colonel Ahrens ever caused such shootings to be carried out? OBERHÄUSER: I am not informed, but I consider it absolutely impossible. DR. STAHMER: Why? OBERHÄUSER: First, because such a decisive order would necessarily have gone through me, for I was the direct superior of the regiment; and second, because if such an order had been given, for a reason which I could not understand, and transmitted to the regiment through some obscure channel, then the commanders would most certainly have rung me up or they would have come to see me and said, “General, they are asking something here which we cannot understand.” DR. STAHMER: Do you know First Lieutenant Hodt? OBERHÄUSER: Yes, I know him. DR. STAHMER: What position did he have in Regiment 537? OBERHÄUSER: Hodt held various posts in the regiment. Usually, he was sent ahead because he was a particularly qualified officer—especially in regard to technical qualifications—in order to make preparations when headquarters was being changed. He was therefore used as advance party of the so-called technical company in order to establish the new command posts; and then he was the regimental expert for the telephone system, dealing with all matters relating to the telephone and teletype system with the command headquarters of the army group. In my staff he was occasionally detailed to fill the positions of any of my officers when they were on leave. DR. STAHMER: Was he also in charge of the advance party during the advance on Katyn? OBERHÄUSER: That I cannot say. I can only say that I personally heard from my staff signal commander that he had sent an officer ahead, after it had been ascertained how the headquarters were to be laid out, that this officer was acting on my behalf, as at the time I still remained in the old quarters, and he was preparing things in the way I wanted them from the point of view of the signal commander. I do not know who was in charge of that advance party at the time, but it is quite possible that it was First Lieutenant Hodt. DR. STAHMER: Were you in Katyn or the vicinity during the period after the capture of Smolensk, which was, I believe, on or about 20 July 1941, and up to the transfer of your staff to Katyn on 20 September? OBERHÄUSER: I was in the vicinity. I was where the headquarters of the army group wanted to settle down; that is, in the woods west of Smolensk, where Katyn is located. DR. STAHMER: Were you frequently there during that time? OBERHÄUSER: I should say three or four times. DR. STAHMER: Did you talk to Hodt on those occasions? OBERHÄUSER: If he was the officer in charge of the advance party, which I cannot say today, then I must certainly have talked to him. At any rate, I did talk to the officer whom I had sent ahead and also to the one from my regiment. DR. STAHMER: Did you hear anything about shootings occurring during that time? OBERHÄUSER: I heard nothing, nor did I hear anything at all except in 1943, when the graves were opened. DR. STAHMER: Did you or Regiment 537 have the necessary technical means, pistols, ammunition, and so on, at your disposal which would have made it possible to carry out shootings on such a scale? OBERHÄUSER: The regiment, being a signal regiment in the rear area, was not equipped with weapons and ammunition as well as the actual fighting troops. Such a task, however, would have been something unusual for the regiment; first, because a signal regiment has completely different tasks, and secondly it would not have been in a position technically to carry out such mass executions. DR. STAHMER: Do you know the place where these graves were discovered later on? OBERHÄUSER: I know the site because I drove past it a great deal. DR. STAHMER: Can you describe it more accurately? OBERHÄUSER: Taking the main road Smolensk-Vitebsk, a path led through wooded undulating ground. There were sandy spaces, which were, however, covered with scrub and heather, and along that narrow path one got to the Dnieper Castle from the main road. DR. STAHMER: Were the places where these graves were later discovered already overgrown when you got there? OBERHÄUSER: They were overgrown just like the surrounding ground, and there was no difference between them and the rest of the surroundings. DR. STAHMER: In view of your knowledge of the place, would you consider it possible that 11,000 Poles could have been buried at that spot, people who may have been shot between June and September 1941? OBERHÄUSER: I consider that it is out of the question, for the mere reason that if the commander had known it at the time he would certainly never have chosen this spot for his headquarters, next to 11,000 dead. DR. STAHMER: Can you tell me how the graves were discovered? OBERHÄUSER: Officially I had nothing to do with that. I only heard that through local inhabitants or somebody else it had become known that large-scale executions had taken place there years ago. DR. STAHMER: From whom did you hear that? OBERHÄUSER: Quite probably from the commander himself, who, because he was located on the spot, had heard more about it than I had. But I cannot remember exactly now. DR. STAHMER: So you did not receive official notice about the discovery of the graves, did you? OBERHÄUSER: No, I never did. DR. STAHMER: After the opening of the graves, did you talk to the German or foreign members of the commission? OBERHÄUSER: I have never talked to any members of that commission. DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, you arrived in the region of Katyn in September 1943? OBERHÄUSER: 1941, not 1943. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Excuse me, I meant September 1941. Is that correct? OBERHÄUSER: Yes, September 1941. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And you contend that you did not know anything either about the camps for Polish prisoners of war or the prisoners in the hands of the German troops, is that so? OBERHÄUSER: I have never heard anything about Polish prisoners of war being in the hands of German troops. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand that this had no relation to your official activity as the commander of a signal regiment. But in spite of this you may perhaps have witnessed that various German troops combed the woods in the vicinity of the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway to capture Polish prisoners of war who had escaped from the camps? OBERHÄUSER: I never heard anything about troops going there in order to, shall we say, recapture escaped Polish prisoners of war. I am hearing this here for the first time. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer me. Have you perhaps seen German military units escorting Polish prisoners of war who were captured in the woods? OBERHÄUSER: I have not seen that. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the following question: You were on good terms with Colonel Ahrens, were you not? OBERHÄUSER: I have had good relations with all commanders of the regiment. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And in addition to that, you were his immediate superior? OBERHÄUSER: Right. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Colonel Ahrens found out about the mass graves at the end of 1941 or at the beginning of 1942. Did he tell you anything about his discovery? OBERHÄUSER: I cannot believe that Colonel Ahrens could have discovered the graves in 1941. I cannot imagine that—I especially cannot imagine that he would tell me nothing about it. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In any case do you contend that neither in 1942 nor in 1943 did Colonel Ahrens report to you in regard to this affair? OBERHÄUSER: Colonel Ahrens never told me anything about it, and he would have told me if he had known. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am interested in the following answer which you gave to a question by defense counsel. You remarked that the signal regiment had not enough weapons to carry out shootings. What do you mean by that? How many, and what kind of weapons did the regiment possess? OBERHÄUSER: The signal regiment were mostly equipped with pistols and with carbines. They had no automatic arms. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Pistols? Of what caliber? OBERHÄUSER: They were Parabellum pistols. The caliber, I think, was 7.65, but I cannot remember for certain. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Parabellum pistols, 7.65, or were there Mauser pistols or any other kind of weapons? OBERHÄUSER: That varied. Noncommissioned officers, as far as I know, had the smaller Mauser pistols. Actually, only noncommissioned officers were equipped with pistols. The majority of the men had carbines. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to tell us some more about the pistols. You say that they were 7.65 caliber pistols, is that so? OBERHÄUSER: I cannot now, at the moment, give you exact information about the caliber. I only know that the Parabellum pistol was 7.65 or some such caliber. I think the Mauser pistol had a somewhat smaller caliber. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And Walter pistols? OBERHÄUSER: There were also Walters. I think they had the same caliber as the Mauser. It is a smaller, black pistol; and it is better than the somewhat cumbersome Parabellum pistol which is heavier. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is quite correct. Please tell me whether in this regiment the noncommissioned officers possessed those small pistols. OBERHÄUSER: As a rule, noncommissioned officers had pistols but not carbines. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I see. Perhaps you can tell us about how many pistols this signal regiment possessed? OBERHÄUSER: Of course I cannot tell you that now. Let us assume that every noncommissioned officer had a pistol... MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And how many noncommissioned officers were there? How many pistols in all were there in your regiment if you consider that every noncommissioned officer had a pistol? OBERHÄUSER: Assuming that every noncommissioned officer in the regiment had a pistol that would amount to 15 per company, a total of 150. However, to give a definite statement about that figure retrospectively now is impossible. I can only give you clues. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Why do you consider that 150 pistols would be insufficient to carry out these mass killings which went on over a period of time? What makes you so positive about that? OBERHÄUSER: Because a signal regiment of an army group deployed over a large area as in the case of Army Group Center is never together as a unit. The regiment was spread out from Kolodov as far as Vitebsk, and there were small detachments everywhere, and in the headquarters of the regiment there were comparatively few people; in other words, there were never 150 pistols in one and the same place. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The main part of the signal regiment was located in the Katyn woods, was it not? OBERHÄUSER: I did not understand your question. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The main portions of your regiment were located in the Katyn woods, were they not? OBERHÄUSER: The first company was mainly located between the regimental staff quarters and the actual command post of the army group. That was the company which was handling the communications, the telephone and teleprinted communications for the army group. It was the company, therefore, which was nearest. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One more question. The officers of your regiment were obviously armed with pistols and not with carbines? OBERHÄUSER: Officers had pistols only, and as a rule they only had small ones. Possibly one or the other may have had a Parabellum pistol. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is to say either a Walter or a Mauser? OBERHÄUSER: Yes. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did you frequently visit the villa where the headquarters of Regiment 537 was located? OBERHÄUSER: Yes, I was there at least once, sometimes twice, a week. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you ever interested as to why soldiers from other military units visited the villa in Kozy Gory and why special beds were prepared for them as well as drinks and food? OBERHÄUSER: I cannot imagine that there were any large-scale visits of other soldiers or members of other units. I do not know anything about that. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am not speaking about a great number. I am speaking of 20 or sometimes 25 men. OBERHÄUSER: If the regimental commander summoned his company and detachment commanders for an officers’ meeting, then, of course, there would be a few dozen of such officers who normally would not be seen there. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, I am not talking about officers who belonged to the unit. I would like to ask you another somewhat different question. Would the number 537 appear on the shoulder straps of the soldiers belonging to that regiment? OBERHÄUSER: As far as I recollect the number was on the shoulder straps, but at the beginning of the war it could be concealed by a camouflage flap. I cannot remember whether during that particular period these covers were used or not. At any rate at the street entrance to the regimental headquarters there was a black-yellow-black flag, which bore the number 537. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am speaking of soldiers who came to the villa in Kozy Gory, and who did not have the number 537 on their shoulder straps. Were you ever interested in finding out what those soldiers did there in September and October of 1941? Did the commander of the unit report to you about this? OBERHÄUSER: May I ask what year this was supposed to be, 1941? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, 1941, that is the year which is concerned. OBERHÄUSER: I do not think that at that time there was much coming and going of outsiders at staff headquarters because during that period everything was in course of construction and I cannot imagine that other units, even small groups of 20 or 25 people should have been there. I personally, as I have told you, was there only once or twice weekly, and not before September or October. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Beginning with what date of September did you start visiting there? You said it was in September but not from what date. OBERHÄUSER: I cannot tell you. The commander of the army group moved at the end of September from Borossilov, shortly before the battle of Vyazma, which was on 2 October, into that district. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, you could start visiting this villa for instance only at the end of September or the beginning of October 1941? OBERHÄUSER: It was only then that the little castle was finally occupied, for the regiment did not arrive much earlier than we from the command of the army group. THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, is it necessary to go into this detail? Have you any particular purpose in going into so much detail? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I ask this question for the following reasons: Later we shall interrogate witnesses for the Soviet Prosecution on the same point and particularly the chief of the medico-legal investigation. That is why I would like to ask the permission of the Court to clarify this point concerning the time when the witness visited the villa. That will be my last question to this point. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. Do not go into greater detail than you find absolutely necessary. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, at the beginning of September and the first part of October 1941 you were not in the villa of Katyn woods and you could not be there at the time, is that true? OBERHÄUSER: I cannot remember that exactly. The regimental commander had spotted the little castle and set it up for his staff headquarters. When exactly he moved in I cannot know, because I had other jobs to do. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, I asked whether you personally could not have been in the villa during the first part of September. Could you not possibly have been there before 20 September? OBERHÄUSER: I do not think so. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to re-examine, Dr. Stahmer? DR. STAHMER: Unfortunately, Mr. President, I shall have to come back to the question of time because it was not brought out too clearly during these last questions. When did Regiment 537 move into the castle? OBERHÄUSER: I assume it was during September. DR. STAHMER: Beginning or end of September? OBERHÄUSER: Probably rather more toward the end of September. DR. STAHMER: Until then only the advance party was there, or... OBERHÄUSER: The advance party of the regiment was there and my officers whom I had sent ahead. DR. STAHMER: How many noncommissioned officers were with the advance party? OBERHÄUSER: I cannot tell you exactly how many the regiment sent. I personally had sent one officer. Generally the regiment could not have sent very many. As a rule, as is always the case, the regiment was still operating at the old command post in Borossilov and simultaneously it had to set up the new post. Consequently, during this period of regrouping, on the point of moving a command of an army group, there is always a considerable shortage of men. The old headquarters still has to be looked after, the new post requires men for its construction, so that as always during this period there were certainly too few people. DR. STAHMER: Can you not even give us an estimate of the figure of that advance party? OBERHÄUSER: There were 30, 40, or 50 men. DR. STAHMER: How many noncommissioned officers? OBERHÄUSER: Probably one or two officers, a few noncommissioned officers, and some men. DR. STAHMER: The regiment was very widely spread out, was it not? OBERHÄUSER: Yes. DR. STAHMER: How far, approximately? OBERHÄUSER: In the entire area of Army Group Center, shall we say between Orel and Vitebsk—in that entire area they were widely dispersed. DR. STAHMER: How many kilometers was that, approximately? OBERHÄUSER: More than 500 kilometers. DR. STAHMER: Do you know Judge Advocate General Dr. Konrad of Army Group Center? OBERHÄUSER: Yes. DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether, in 1943, he interrogated the local inhabitants under oath about the date when the Polish officers were supposed to have been shot in the woods of Katyn? OBERHÄUSER: No, I do not know. DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Were there any Einsatzkommandos in the Katyn area during the time that you were there? OBERHÄUSER: Nothing has ever come to my knowledge about that. THE PRESIDENT: Did you ever hear of an order to shoot Soviet commissars? OBERHÄUSER: I only knew of that by hearsay. THE PRESIDENT: When? OBERHÄUSER: Probably at the beginning of the Russian campaign, I think. THE PRESIDENT: Before the campaign started or after? OBERHÄUSER: I cannot remember having heard anything like that before the beginning of the campaign. THE PRESIDENT: Who was to carry out that order? OBERHÄUSER: Strictly speaking, signal troops are not really fighting troops. Therefore, they really had nothing to do with that at all, and therefore we were in no way affected by the order. THE PRESIDENT: I did not ask you that. I asked you who had to carry out the order. OBERHÄUSER: Those who came into contact with these people, presumably. THE PRESIDENT: Anybody who came in contact with Russian commissars had to kill them; is that it? OBERHÄUSER: No, I assume that it was the troops, the fighting troops, the actual fighting troops at the front who first met the enemy. That could only have applied to the army group. The signal regiment never came into a position to meet commissars. That is probably why they were not mentioned in the order or affected by it in any way. THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I ask permission to call as witness the former deputy mayor of the city of Smolensk during the German occupation, Professor of Astronomy, Boris Bazilevsky. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, let him come in then. [_The witness Bazilevsky took the stand._] Will you state your full name, please? BORIS BAZILEVSKY (Witness): Boris Bazilevsky. THE PRESIDENT: Will you make this form of oath: I, a citizen of the USSR—called as a witness in this case—solemnly promise and swear before the High Tribunal—to say all that I know about this case—and to add or to withhold nothing. [_The witness repeated the oath._] THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: With the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to start with my interrogation, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please tell us, Witness, what your activity was before the German occupation of the city and district of Smolensk and where you were living in Smolensk. BAZILEVSKY: Before the occupation of Smolensk and the surrounding region... MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please speak slowly. BAZILEVSKY: ...I lived in the city of Smolensk and was professor first at the Smolensk University and then of the Smolensk Pedagogical Institute, and at the same time I was director of the Smolensk Astronomical Observatory. For 10 years I was the dean of the physics and mathematics faculty, and in the last years I was deputy to the director of the scientific department of the Institute. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How many years did you live in Smolensk previous to the German occupation? BAZILEVSKY: From 1919. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you know what the so-called Katyn wood was? BAZILEVSKY: Yes. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please speak slowly. BAZILEVSKY: Actually, it was a grove. It was the favorite resort of the inhabitants of Smolensk who spent their holidays and vacations there. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was this wood before the war a special reservation which was fenced or guarded by armed patrols, by watch dogs? BAZILEVSKY: During the many years that I lived in Smolensk, this place was never fenced; and no restrictions were ever placed on access to it. I personally used to go there very frequently. The last time I was there was in 1940 and in the spring of 1941. In this wood there was also a camp for engineers. Thus, there was free access to this place for everybody. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please tell me in what year there was an engineer camp? BAZILEVSKY: As far as I know, it was there for many years. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please speak slowly. THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Professor, will you wait a minute, please? When you see that yellow light go on, it means that you are going too fast; and when you are asked a question, will you pause before you answer it? Do you understand? BAZILEVSKY: Yes. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please repeat your answer, and very slowly, if you please. BAZILEVSKY: The last time I know that the engineer camp was in the area of the Katyn wood was in 1941. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, if I understand you correctly, in 1940 and 1941 before the beginning of the war at any rate—and you speak of the spring of 1941—the Katyn wood was not a special reservation and was accessible to everybody? BAZILEVSKY: Yes. I say that that was the situation. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you say this as an eyewitness or from hearsay? BAZILEVSKY: No, I say it as an eyewitness who used to go there frequently. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please tell the Tribunal under what circumstances you became the first deputy mayor of Smolensk during the period of the German occupation. Please speak slowly. BAZILEVSKY: I was an administration official; and I did not have an opportunity of leaving the place in time, because I was busy in saving the particularly precious library of the Institute and the very valuable equipment. In the circumstances I could not try to escape before the evening of the 15th, but then I did not succeed in catching the train. I therefore decided to leave the city on 16 July in the morning, but during the night of 15 to 16 the city was unexpectedly occupied by German troops. All the bridges across the Dnieper were blown up, and I found myself in captivity. After some time, on 20 July, a group of German soldiers came to the observatory of which I was the director. They took down that I was the director and that I was living there and that there was also a professor of physics, Efimov, living in the same building. In the evening of 20 July two German officers came to me and brought me to the headquarters of the unit which had occupied Smolensk. After checking my _personalia_ and after a short conversation, they suggested that I become mayor of the city. I refused, basing my refusal on the fact that I was a professor of astronomy and that, as I had no experience in such matters, I could not undertake this post. They then declared categorically and with threats, “We are going to force the Russian intelligentsia to work.” MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thus, if I understand you correctly, the Germans forced you by threats to become the deputy mayor of Smolensk? BAZILEVSKY: That is not all. They told me also that in a few days I would be summoned to the Kommandantur. On 25 July a man in civilian clothes appeared at my apartment, accompanied by a German policeman, and represented himself as a lawyer, Menschagin. He declared that he came by order of the military headquarters and that I should accompany him immediately to headquarters. THE PRESIDENT: You are spending a lot of time on how he came to be mayor of Smolensk. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please allow me to pass to other questions, Mr. President? Thank you for your observations. [_Turning to the witness._] Who was your immediate superior? Who was the mayor of Smolensk? BAZILEVSKY: Menschagin. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What were the relations between this man and the German administration and particularly with the German Kommandantur? BAZILEVSKY: These relations were very good and became closer and closer every day. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Is it correct to say that Menschagin was the trustee of the German administration and that they even gave him secret information? BAZILEVSKY: Yes. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you know that in the vicinity of Smolensk there were Polish prisoners of war? BAZILEVSKY: Yes, I do very well. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you know what they were doing? THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what this is going to prove. You presumably do, but can you not come nearer to the point? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: He said that he knew there were Polish prisoners of war in Smolensk; and, with the permission of the Tribunal, I would like to ask the witness what these prisoners of war were doing. THE PRESIDENT: Very well; go on. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer. What were the Polish prisoners of war doing in the vicinity of Smolensk, and at what time? BAZILEVSKY: In the spring of 1941 and at the beginning of the summer they were working on the restoration of the roads, Moscow-Minsk and Smolensk-Vitebsk. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What do you know about the further fate of the Polish prisoners of war? Z BAZILEVSKY: Thanks to the position that I occupied, I learned very early about the fate of the Polish prisoners of war. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please tell the Tribunal what you know about it. BAZILEVSKY: In the camp for Russian prisoners of war known as “Dulag 126” there prevailed such a severe regime that prisoners of war were dying by the hundreds every day; for this reason I tried to free all those from this camp for whose release a reason could be given. I learned that in this camp there was also a very well-known pedagogue named Zhiglinski. I asked Menschagin to make representations to the German Kommandantur of Smolensk, and in particular to Von Schwetz, and to plead for the release of Zhiglinski from this camp. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please do not go into detail and do not waste time, but tell the Tribunal about your conversation with Menschagin. What did he tell you? BAZILEVSKY: Menschagin answered my request with, “What is the use? We can save one, but hundreds will die.” However, I insisted; and Menschagin, after some hesitation, agreed to put this request to the German Kommandantur. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please be short and tell us what Menschagin told you when he came back from the German Kommandantur. BAZILEVSKY: Two days later he told me that he was in a very difficult situation on account of my demand. Von Schwetz had refused the request by referring to an instruction from Berlin saying that a very severe regime should prevail with respect to prisoners of war. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What did he tell you about Polish prisoners of war? BAZILEVSKY: As to Polish prisoners of war, he told me that Russians would at least be allowed to die in the camps while there were proposals to exterminate the Poles. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What else was said? BAZILEVSKY: I replied, “What do you mean? What do you want to say? How do you understand this?” And Menschagin answered, “You should understand this in the very literal sense of these words.” He asked me not to tell anybody about it, since it was a great secret. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When did this conversation of yours take place with Menschagin? In what month, and on what day? BAZILEVSKY: This conversation took place at the beginning of September. I cannot remember the exact date. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But you remember it was the beginning of September? BAZILEVSKY: Yes. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did you ever come back again to the fate of Polish prisoners of war in your further conversations with Menschagin? BAZILEVSKY: Yes. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Can you tell us when? BAZILEVSKY: Two weeks later—that is to say, at the end of September—I could not help asking him, “What was the fate of the Polish prisoners of war?” At first Menschagin hesitated, and then he told me haltingly, “They have already died. It is all over for them.” MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did he tell you where they were killed? BAZILEVSKY: He told me that they had been shot in the vicinity of Smolensk, as Von Schwetz told him. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did he mention the exact place? BAZILEVSKY: No, he did not mention the exact place. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me this. Did you, in turn, tell anybody about the extermination, by Hitlerites, of the Polish prisoners of war near Smolensk? BAZILEVSKY: I talked about this to Professor Efimov, who was living in the same house with me. Besides him, a few days later I had a conversation about it with Dr. Nikolski, who was the medical officer of the city. However, I found out that Nikolski knew about this crime already from some other source. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did Menschagin tell you why these shootings took place? BAZILEVSKY: Yes. When he told me that the prisoners of war had been killed, he emphasized once more the necessity of keeping it strictly secret in order to avoid disagreeable consequences. He started to explain to me the reasons for the German behavior with respect to the Polish prisoners of war. He pointed out that this was only one measure of the general system of treating Polish prisoners of war. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did you hear anything about the extermination of the Poles from the employees of the German Kommandantur? BAZILEVSKY: Yes, 2 or 3 days later. THE PRESIDENT: You are both going too fast, and you are not pausing enough. You are putting your questions whilst the answers are coming through. You must have longer pauses, and go slower. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thank you, Mr. President. [_Turning to the witness._] Please continue, but slowly. BAZILEVSKY: I do not know where I was. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I asked you whether any of the employees of the German Kommandantur told you anything about the extermination of the Poles. BAZILEVSKY: Two or three days later, when I visited the office of Menschagin, I met there an interpreter, the Sonderführer of the 7th Division of the German Kommandantur who was in charge of the Russian administration and who had a conversation with Menschagin concerning the Poles. He came from the Baltic region. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you can tell us briefly what he said. BAZILEVSKY: When I entered the room he was saying, “The Poles are a useless people, and exterminated they may serve as fertilizer and for the enlargement of living space for the German nation.” THE PRESIDENT: You are doing exactly what I said just now. You are asking the questions before the translation comes through. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Excuse me, Mr. President, I will try to speak more slowly. [_Turning to the witness._] Did you learn from Menschagin anything definite about the shooting of Polish prisoners of war? BAZILEVSKY: When I entered the room I heard the conversation with Hirschfeld. I missed the beginning, but from the context of the conversation it was clear that they spoke about this event. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did Menschagin, when telling you about the shooting of Polish prisoners of war, refer to Von Schwetz? BAZILEVSKY: Yes; I had the impression that he referred to Von Schwetz. But evidently—and this is my firm belief—he also spoke about it with private persons in the Kommandantur. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When did Menschagin tell you that Polish prisoners of war were killed near Smolensk? BAZILEVSKY: It was at the end of September. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions to put to this witness, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [_A recess was taken._] MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Hess is absent. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer. DR. STAHMER: Witness, in your testimony, just before recess, you read out your testimony, if I observed correctly. Will you tell me whether that was so or not? BAZILEVSKY: I was not reading anything. I have only a plan of the courtroom in my hand. DR. STAHMER: It looked to me as though you were reading out your answers. How can you explain the fact that the interpreter already had your answer in his hands? BAZILEVSKY: I do not know how the interpreters could have had my answers beforehand. The testimony which I am giving was, however, known to the Commission beforehand—that is, my testimony during the preliminary examination. DR. STAHMER: Do you know the little castle on the Dnieper, the little villa? Did you not understand me or hear me? Do you know the little castle on the Dnieper, the little villa on the Dnieper? BAZILEVSKY: I do not know which villa you mean. There were quite a number of villas on the Dnieper. DR. STAHMER: The house which was near the Katyn wood on the steep bank of the Dnieper River. BAZILEVSKY: I still do not quite understand which house you mean. The banks of the Dnieper are long, and therefore your question is quite incomprehensible to me. DR. STAHMER: Do you know where the graves of Katyn were found, in which 11,000 Polish officers were buried? BAZILEVSKY: I was not there. I did not see the Katyn burial grounds. DR. STAHMER: Had you never been in the Katyn wood? BAZILEVSKY: As I already said, I was there not once but many times. DR. STAHMER: Do you know where this mass burial site was located? BAZILEVSKY: How can I know where the burial grounds were situated when I could not go there since the occupation? DR. STAHMER: How do you know that the little wood was not fenced in? BAZILEVSKY: Before the occupation of the Smolensk district by the German troops, the entire area, as I already stated, was not surrounded by any barrier; but according to hearsay I knew that after the occupation access to this wood was prohibited by the German local command. DR. STAHMER: Therefore you have no knowledge of the fact that here in the Katyn wood a sanitarium or a convalescent home of the GPU was located? BAZILEVSKY: I know very well; that was known to all the citizens of Smolensk. DR. STAHMER: Then, of course, you also know exactly which house I referred to in my question? BAZILEVSKY: I, myself, had never been in that house. In general, access to that house was only allowed to the families of the employees of the Ministry of the Interior. As to other persons, there was no need and no facility for them to go there. DR. STAHMER: The house, therefore, was closed off? BAZILEVSKY: No, the house was not forbidden to strangers; but why should people go there if they had no business there or were not in the sanitarium? The garden, of course, was open to the public. DR. STAHMER: Were there not guards stationed there? BAZILEVSKY: I have never seen any. DR. STAHMER: Is this Russian witness who reported to you about the matter concerning the Polish officers, is this witness still alive? BAZILEVSKY: Mr. Counsel, you probably mean Mayor Menschagin, if I understand you rightly? DR. STAHMER: When you read your testimony off, it was not easy for me to follow. What was the mayor’s name? Menschagin? Is he still alive? BAZILEVSKY: Menschagin went away together with the German troops during their retreat, and I remained, and Menschagin’s fate is unknown to me. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, you are not entitled to say to the witness, “when you read your testimony off,” just now, because he denied that he read his testimony off and there is no evidence that he has read it off. DR. STAHMER: Did this Russian witness tell you that the Polish officers had come from the camp at Kosielsk? BAZILEVSKY: Do you mean the camp at Kosielsk? Yes? DR. STAHMER: Yes. BAZILEVSKY: The witness did not say that. DR. STAHMER: Do you know that place and locality? BAZILEVSKY: Do you mean Kosielsk? I do, yes. In 1940, in the month of August—at the end of August—I spent my leave there with my wife. DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether there were Polish officers at that place in a Russian prisoner-of-war camp? BAZILEVSKY: Yes, I know that. DR. STAHMER: Until what time did these prisoners of war remain there? BAZILEVSKY: I do not know that for sure but at the end of August 1940 they were there. I am quite sure about that. DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether this camp, together with its inmates, fell into German hands? BAZILEVSKY: Personally, that is, from my own observation, I do not know it; but according to rumors, it appears to have been the case. That is, of course, not my own testimony; I myself did not see it, but I heard about it only. DR. STAHMER: Did you hear what happened to these prisoners? BAZILEVSKY: Yes, I heard, of course, that they remained there and could not be evacuated. DR. STAHMER: Did you hear what became of them? BAZILEVSKY: I have already testified in my answers to the prosecutor that they were shot on the order of the German Command. DR. STAHMER: And where did these shootings take place? BAZILEVSKY: Mr. Defense Counsel, you have apparently not heard my answers. I already testified that Mayor Menschagin said that they were shot in the neighborhood of Smolensk, but where he did not tell me. DR. STAHMER: How many prisoners were involved? BAZILEVSKY: Do you mean to say, how many were mentioned in the conversation with Menschagin? I do not understand your question. Do you mean to say according to the reports of Menschagin? DR. STAHMER: What was the figure given to you by Menschagin? BAZILEVSKY: Menschagin did not tell me any number. I repeat that this conversation took place on the last days of September 1941. DR. STAHMER: Can you give us the name of an eyewitness who was present at this shooting or anyone who saw this shooting? BAZILEVSKY: I believe that these executions were carried out under such circumstances that I think it scarcely possible that any Russian witnesses could be present. THE PRESIDENT: Witness, you should answer the question directly. You were asked, “Can you give the names of anybody who was there?” You can answer that “yes” or “no” and then you can add any explanations necessary. BAZILEVSKY: I will follow your instructions, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Can you give the name of anybody who saw the executions? BAZILEVSKY: No, I cannot name any eyewitness. DR. STAHMER: What German unit is supposed to have carried out the shootings? BAZILEVSKY: I cannot answer that exactly. It is logical to assume that it was the construction battalion which was stationed there; but of course I could not know the exact organization of the German troops. DR. STAHMER: Did the Poles involved here come from the camp at Kosielsk? BAZILEVSKY: In general, this was not mentioned in the conversations of that time, but I certainly do not know that; besides these might have been any other Polish prisoners of war who had not been at Kosielsk previously. DR. STAHMER: Did you yourself see Polish officers? BAZILEVSKY: I did not see them myself, but my students saw them, and they told me that they had seen them in 1941. DR. STAHMER: And where did they see them? BAZILEVSKY: On the road where they were doing repair work at the beginning of summer, 1941. DR. STAHMER: In what general area or location? BAZILEVSKY: In the district of the Moscow-Minsk highway, somewhat to the west of Smolensk. DR. STAHMER: Can you testify whether the Russian Army Command had a report to the effect that Polish prisoners at the camp at Kosielsk had fallen into the hands of the Germans? BAZILEVSKY: No, I have no knowledge of that. DR. STAHMER: What is the name of the German official or employee with whom you talked at the Kommandantur? BAZILEVSKY: Not in the Kommandantur, but in Menschagin’s office. His name was Hirschfeld. DR. STAHMER: What was his position? BAZILEVSKY: He was Sonderführer of the 7th Detachment of the German Kommandantur in the town of Smolensk. DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions, Mr. President—just another question or two, Mr. President. [_Turning to the witness._] Were you punished by the Russian Government on account of your collaboration with the German authorities? BAZILEVSKY: No, I was not. DR. STAHMER: Are you at liberty? BAZILEVSKY: Not only am I at liberty; but, as I have already stated, I am still professor at two universities. DR. STAHMER: Therefore, you are back in office. BAZILEVSKY: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, do you wish to re-examine? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to the witness. THE PRESIDENT: Witness, do you know whether the man, whose name I understand to be Menschagin, was told about these matters or whether he himself had any direct knowledge of them? BAZILEVSKY: From Menschagin’s own words, I understood quite definitely that he had heard those things himself at the Kommandantur, particularly from Von Schwetz, who was the commander from the beginning of the occupation. THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I beg the Tribunal to allow me to call as witness Marko Antonov Markov, a Bulgarian citizen, professor at the University of Sofia. [_The interpreter Valev and the witness Markov took the stand._] THE PRESIDENT: Are you the interpreter? LUDOMIR VALEV (Interpreter): Yes, Sir. THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us your full name? VALEV: Ludomir Valev. THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear before God and the Law—that I will interpret truthfully and to the best of my skill—the evidence to be given by the witness. [_The interpreter repeated the oath._] THE PRESIDENT: [_To the witness._] Will you give us your full name, please? DR. MARKO ANTONOV MARKOV (Witness): Dr. Marko Antonov Markov. THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear—as a witness in this case—that I will speak only the truth—being aware of my responsibility before God and the Law—and that I will withhold and add nothing. [_The witness repeated the oath._] THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. MR. DODD: Mr. President, before this witness is examined, I would like to call to the attention of the Tribunal the fact that Dr. Stahmer asked the preceding witness a question which I understood went: How did it happen that the interpreters had the questions and the answers to your questions if you didn’t have them before you? Now that question implied that Dr. Stahmer had some information that the interpreters did have the answers to the questions, and I sent a note up to the interpreters, and I have the answer from the lieutenant in charge that no one there had any answers or questions, and I think it should be made clear on the record. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think so, too. DR. STAHMER: I was advised of this fact outside the courtroom. If it is not a fact, I wish to withdraw my statement. I was informed outside the courtroom from a trustworthy source. I do not recall the name of the person who told me, I shall have to ascertain it. THE PRESIDENT: Such statements ought not be made by counsel until they have verified them. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I begin the examination of this witness, Mr. President? THE PRESIDENT: The examination, yes. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, I beg you to tell us briefly, without taking up the time of the Tribunal with too many details, under what conditions you were included in the so-called International Medical Commission set up by the Germans in the month of April 1943 for the examination of the graves of Polish officers in the Katyn woods. I beg you, when answering me, to pause between the question I put to you and your own answer. MARKOV: This occurred at the end of April 1943. While working in the Medico-Legal Institute, where I am still working, I was called to the telephone by Dr. Guerow. THE PRESIDENT: The witness must stop before the interpreter begins. Otherwise, the voices come over the microphone together. So the interpreter must wait until the witness has finished his answer before he repeats it. Now, the witness has said—at least this is what I heard—that in April 1943 he was called on the telephone. MARKOV: I was called to the telephone by Dr. Guerow, the secretary of Dr. Filoff who was then Prime Minister of Bulgaria. I was told that I was to take part, as representative of the Bulgarian Government, in the work of an international medical commission which had to examine the corpses of Polish officers discovered in the Katyn wood. Not wishing to go, I answered that I had to replace the director of my Institute who was away in the country. Dr. Guerow told me that according to an instruction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had sent the telegram, it was precisely in order to replace him that I would have to go there. Guerow told me to come to the Ministry. There I asked him if I could refuse to comply with this order. He answered that we were in a state of war and that the Government could send anybody wherever and whenever they deemed it necessary. Guerow took me to the first secretary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Schuchmanov. Schuchmanov repeated this order and told me that we were to examine the corpses of thousands of Polish officers. I answered that to examine thousands of corpses would take several months, but Schuchmanov said that the Germans had already exhumed a great number of these corpses and that I would have to go, together with other members of the commission, in order to see what had already been done and in order to sign, as Bulgarian representative, the report of the proceedings which had already been drafted. After that, I was taken to the German Legation, to Counsellor Mormann, who arranged all the technical details of the trip. This was on Saturday; and on Monday morning, 26 April, I flew to Berlin. There I was met by an official of the Bulgarian Legation and I was lodged at the Hotel Adlon. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the next question: Who took part in this so-called International Commission, and when did they leave for Katyn? MARKOV: On the next day, 27 April, we stayed in Berlin and the other members of the commission arrived there too. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Who were they? MARKOV: They were the following, besides myself: Dr. Birkle, chief doctor of the Ministry of Justice and first assistant of the Institute of Forensic Medicine and Criminology at Bucharest; Dr. Miloslavich, professor of forensic medicine and criminology at Zagreb University, who was representative for Croatia; Professor Palmieri, who was professor for forensic medicine and criminology at Naples; Dr. Orsos, professor of forensic medicine and criminology at Budapest; Dr. Subik, professor of pathological anatomy at the University of Bratislava and chief of the State Department for Health for Slovakia; Dr. Hajek, professor for forensic medicine and criminology at Prague, who represented the so-called Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia; Professor Naville, professor of forensic medicine at the University of Geneva, representative for Switzerland; Dr. Speleers, professor for ophthalmology at Ghent University, who represented Belgium; Dr. De Burlett, professor of anatomy at the University of Groningen, representing Holland; Dr. Tramsen, vice chancellor of the Institute for forensic medicine at Copenhagen University, representing Denmark; Dr. Saxen, who was professor for pathological anatomy at Helsinki University, Finland. During the investigations of the commission, a Dr. Costeduat was missing; he declared that he could attend only as a personal representative of President Laval. Professor Piga from Madrid also arrived, an elderly gentleman who did not take any part in the work of the commission. It was stated later that he was ill as a result of the long journey. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were all these persons flown to Katyn? MARKOV: All these persons arrived at Katyn with the exception of Professor Piga. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Who besides the members of the commission left for Katyn with you? MARKOV: On the 28th we took off from Tempelhof Airdrome, Berlin, for Katyn. We took off in two airplanes which carried about 15 to 20 persons each. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Maybe you can tell us briefly who was there? MARKOV: Together with us was Director Dietz, who met us and accompanied us. He represented the Ministry of Public Health. There were also press representatives, and two representatives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I beg you to stop with these details and to tell me when the commission arrived in Katyn? MARKOV: The commission arrived in Smolensk on 28 April, in the evening. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How many work days did the commission stay in Smolensk? I stress work days. MARKOV: We stayed in Smolensk 2 days only, 29 and 30 April 1943, and on 1 May, in the morning, we left Smolensk. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How many times did the members of the commission personally visit the mass graves in the Katyn wood? MARKOV: We were twice in the Katyn wood, that is, in the forenoon of 29 and 30 April. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I mean, how many hours did you spend each time at the mass graves? MARKOV: I consider not more than 3 or 4 hours each time. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were the members of the commission present at least once during the opening of one of the graves? MARKOV: No new graves were opened in our presence. We were shown only several graves which had already been opened before we arrived. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Therefore, you were shown already opened graves, near which the corpses were already laid out, is that right? MARKOV: Quite right. Near these opened graves were exhumed corpses already laid out there. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were the necessary conditions for an objective and comprehensive scientific examination of the corpses given to the members of the commission? MARKOV: The only part of our activity which could be characterized as a scientific, medico-legal examination were the autopsies carried out by certain members of the commission who were themselves medico-legal experts; but there were only seven or eight of us who could lay claim to that qualification, and as far as I recall only eight corpses were opened. Each of us operated on one corpse, except Professor Hajek, who dissected two corpses. Our further activity during these 2 days consisted of a hasty inspection under the guidance of Germans. It was like a tourists’ walk during which we saw the open graves; and we were shown a peasant’s house, a few kilometers distant from the Katyn wood, where in showcases papers and objects of various sorts were kept. We were told that these papers and objects had been found in the clothes of the corpses which had been exhumed. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you actually present when these papers were taken from the corpses or were they shown to you when they were already under glass in display cabinets? MARKOV: The documents which we saw in the glass cases had already been removed from the bodies before we arrived. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you allowed to investigate these documents, to examine these documents, for instance, to see whether the papers were impregnated with any acids which had developed by the decay of the corpses, or to carry out any other kind of scientific examination? MARKOV: We did not carry out any scientific examination of these papers. As I have already told you, these papers were exhibited in glass cases and we did not even touch them. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But I would like you nevertheless to answer me briefly with “yes” or “no,” a question which I have already put to you. Were the members of the commission given facilities for an objective examination? MARKOV: In my opinion these working conditions can in no way be qualified as adequate for a complete and objective scientific examination. The only thing which bore the character of the scientific nature was the autopsy which I carried out. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But did I rightly understand you, that from the 11,000 corpses which were discovered only 8 were dissected by members of the commission. MARKOV: Quite right. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the next question. In what condition were these corpses? I would like you to describe the state in which they were and also the state of the inner organs, the tissues, et cetera. MARKOV: As to the condition of the corpses in the Katyn graves, I can only judge according to the state of the corpse which I myself dissected. The condition of this corpse was, as far as I could ascertain, the same as that of all the other corpses. The skin was still well preserved, was in part leathery, of a brown-red color and on some parts there were blue markings from the clothes. The nails and hair, mostly, had already fallen out. In the head of the corpse I dissected there was a small hole, a bullet wound in the back of the head. Only pulpy substance remained of the brain. The muscles were still so well preserved that one could even see the fibers of the sinews of heart muscles and valves. The inner organs were also mainly in a good state of preservation. But of course they were dried up, displaced, and of a dark color. The stomach showed traces of some sort of contents. A part of the fat had turned into wax. We were impressed by the fact that even when pulled with brute force, no limbs had detached themselves. I dictated a report, on the spot, on the result of my investigation. A similar report was dictated by the other members of the commission who examined corpses. This report was published by the Germans, under Number 827, in the book which they published. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to answer the following question. Did the medico-legal investigations testify to the fact that the corpses had been in the graves already for 3 years? MARKOV: As to that question I could judge only from the corpse on which I myself had held a post mortem. The condition of this corpse, as I have already stated, was typical of the average condition of the Katyn corpses. These corpses were far removed from the stage of disintegration of the soft parts, since the fat was only beginning to turn into wax. In my opinion these corpses were buried for a shorter period of time than 3 years. I considered that the corpse which I dissected had been buried for not more than 1 year or 18 months. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Therefore, applying the criteria of the facts which you ascertained to your experiences in Bulgaria—that is, in a country of a more southern climate than Smolensk and where decay, therefore, is more rapid—one must come to the conclusion that the corpses that were exhumed in the Katyn forest had been lying under the earth for not more than a year and a half? Did I understand you correctly? MARKOV: Yes, quite right. I had the impression that they had been buried for not more than a year and a half. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. [_The Tribunal adjourned until 2 July 1946 at 1000 hours._] ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-NINTH DAY Tuesday, 2 July 1946 _Morning Session_ [_The witness Markov resumed the stand._] MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, when did you, together with the other members of the commission, perform the autopsies of these eight corpses? What date was it exactly? MARKOV: That was on 30 April, early in the day. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And, on the basis of your personal observations, you decided that the corpses were in the ground 1 year or 18 months at the most? MARKOV: That is correct. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Before putting the next question to you, I should like you to give me a brief answer to the following question: Is it correct that in the practice of Bulgarian medical jurisprudence the protocol about the autopsy contains two parts, a description and the deductions? MARKOV: Yes. In our practice, as well as in the practice of other countries, so far as I know, it is done in the following way: First of all, we give a description and then the deduction. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was a deduction contained in the record you made regarding the autopsy? MARKOV: My record of the autopsy contained only a description without any conclusion. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Why? MARKOV: Because from the papers which were given to us there I understood that they wanted us to say that the corpses had been in the ground for 3 years. This could be deduced from the papers which were shown to us in the little peasant hut about which I have already spoken. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: By the way, were these papers shown to you before the autopsy or afterward? MARKOV: Yes, the papers were given us 1 day before the autopsy. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you were... THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, you are interrupting the interpreter all the time. Before the interpreter has finished the answer, you have put another question. It is very difficult for us to hear the interpreter. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thank you for your indication, Mr. President. MARKOV: Inasmuch as the objective deduction regarding the autopsy I performed was in contradiction with this version, I did not make any deductions. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently you did not make any deduction because the objective data of the autopsy testified to the fact that the corpses had been in the ground, not 3 years, but only 18 months? THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, you must remember that it is a double translation, and unless you pause more than you are pausing, your voice comes in upon the interpreter’s and we cannot hear the interpreter. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well, Mr. President. MARKOV: Yes, that is quite correct. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was there unanimity among the members of the commission regarding the time the corpses had been in the graves? MARKOV: Most of the members of the delegation who performed the autopsies in the Katyn wood made their deductions without answering the essential question regarding the time the corpses had been buried. Some of them, as for instance, Professor Hajek, spoke about immaterial things; as for instance, that one of the killed had had pleurisy. Some of the others, as for instance, Professor Birkle from Bucharest, cut off some hair from a corpse in order to determine the age of the corpse. In my opinion that was quite immaterial. Professor Palmieri, on the basis of the autopsy that he performed, said that the corpse had been in the ground over a year but he did not determine exactly how long. The only one who gave a definite statement in regard to the time the corpses had been buried was Professor Miloslavich from Zagreb, and he said it was 3 years. However, when the German book regarding Katyn was published, I read the result of his impartial statement regarding the corpse on which he had performed the autopsy. I had the impression that the corpse on which he had performed the autopsy did not differ in its stage of decomposition from the other corpses. This led me to think that his statement that the corpses had been in the ground for 3 years did not coincide with the facts of his description. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like to ask you to reply to the following question. Were there many skulls found by the members of the commission with signs of so-called _pseudocallus_? By the way, inasmuch as this term is not known in the usual books on medical jurisprudence and in general criminalistic terminology, I should like you to give us an exact explanation of what Professor Orsos, of Budapest, means by the term _pseudocallus_. THE PRESIDENT: Would you repeat that question? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were there many skulls with signs of so-called _pseudocallus_ which were submitted to the members of the commission? Inasmuch as this term is not known in the usual books on medical jurisprudence, I should like you to give us a detailed explanation of what Professor Orsos means by the term _pseudocallus_. THE PRESIDENT: What are you saying the skulls had? You asked if there were many skulls with something or other. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I see this term for the first time, myself, Mr. President. It is _pseudocallus_. It seems to be a Latin term of some sort of corn which is formed on the outer surface of the cerebral substance. THE PRESIDENT: Can you spell the word in Latin? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President. [_The prosecutor submitted a paper to the President._] THE PRESIDENT: What you have written here is p-s-e-r-d-o. Do you mean p-s-e-u-d-o, which means false? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is right, pseudo. THE PRESIDENT: Now then, put your question again, and try to put it shortly. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes. [Turning to the witness.] Were there many skulls with signs of so-called _pseudocallus_ shown to the members of the commission? Will you please give an exact explanation of this term of Professor Orsos’. MARKOV: Professor Orsos spoke to us regarding _pseudocallus_ at a general conference of the delegates. That took place on 30 April, in the afternoon, in the building where the field laboratory of Dr. Butz in Smolensk was located. Professor Orsos described the term _pseudocallus_ as meaning some sediment of indissoluble salt, of calcium, and other salts on the inside of the cranium. Professor Orsos stated that, according to his observations in Hungary, this happened if the corpses have been in the ground for at least 3 years. When Professor Orsos stated this at the scientific conference, none of the delegates said anything either for or against it. I deduced from that that this term _pseudocallus_ was as unknown to the other delegates as it was to me. At the same conference Professor Orsos showed us such a _pseudocallus_ on one of the skulls. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like you to answer the following question: What number did the corpse have from which this skull with signs of _pseudocallus_ was taken? MARKOV: The corpse from which the skull was taken and which was noted in the book bore the Number 526. From this I deduced that this corpse was exhumed before our arrival at Katyn, inasmuch as all the other corpses on which we performed autopsies on 30 April had numbers which ran above 800. It was explained to us that as soon as a corpse was exhumed it immediately received a consecutive number. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me this, please. Did you notice any _pseudocallus_ on the skulls of the corpses on which you and your colleagues performed autopsies? MARKOV: On the skull of the corpse on which I performed an autopsy, there was some sort of pulpy substance in place of the brain, but I never noticed any sign of _pseudocallus_. The other delegates—after the explanation of Professor Orsos—likewise did not state that they had found any _pseudocallus_ in the other skulls. Even Butz and his co-workers, who had examined the corpses before our arrival, did not mention any sign of _pseudocallus_. Later on, in a book which was published by the Germans and which contained the report of Butz, I noticed that Butz referred to _pseudocallus_ in order to give more weight to his statement that the corpses had been in the ground for 3 years. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is to say, that of the 11,000 corpses only one skull was submitted to you which had _pseudocallus_? MARKOV: That is quite correct. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like you to describe to the Tribunal in detail the state of the clothing which you found on the corpses. MARKOV: In general the clothing was well preserved, but of course it was damp due to the decomposition of the corpses. When we pulled off the clothing to undress the corpses, or when we tried to take off the shoes, the clothing did not tear nor did the shoes fall apart at the seams. I even had the impression that this clothing could have been used again, after having been cleaned. There were some papers found in the pockets of the clothing of the corpse on which I performed the autopsy, and these papers were also impregnated with the dampness of the corpse. Some of the Germans who were present when I was performing the autopsy asked me to describe those papers and their contents; but I refused to do it, thinking that this was not the duty of a doctor. In fact I had already noticed the previous day that with the help of the dates contained in those papers, they were trying to make us think that the corpses had remained in the ground for 3 years. Therefore, I wanted to base my deductions only on the actual condition of the corpses. Some of the other delegates who performed autopsies also found some papers in the clothing of the corpses. The papers which had been found in the clothing of the corpse on which I performed the autopsy were put into a cover which bore the same number as the corpse, Number 827. Later on, in the book which was published by the Germans, I perceived that some of the delegates described the contents of the papers which were found on the corpses. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to ask you to reply to the following question. On what impartial medico-judicial data did the commission base the deduction that the corpses had remained in the earth not less than 3 years? THE PRESIDENT: Will you put the question again? I did not understand the question. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I asked on what impartial medico-judicial data were the deductions of the protocol of the International Medical Commission based, which stated that the corpses had remained in the ground not less than 3 years? THE PRESIDENT: Has he said that that was the deduction he made—not less than 3 years? THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): He has not said that. THE PRESIDENT: He has not said that at all. He never said that he made the deduction that the corpses remained in the ground not less than 3 years. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: He did not make this deduction; but Professor Markov, together with the other members of the commission, signed a report of the International Commission. THE PRESIDENT: I know; but that is why I ask you to repeat your question. The question that was translated to us was: On what grounds did you make your deduction that the corpses had remained, in the ground not less than 3 years—which is the opposite of what he said. Now will you put the question again? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well. [_Turning to the witness._] I am not asking you about your personal minutes, Witness, but about the general record of the entire commission. I am asking you on what impartial medico-judicial data were the deductions of the entire commission based, that the corpses had remained in the earth not less than 3 years. On the record of the deductions your signature figures among those of the other members of the commission. THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Now, then, Colonel Smirnov, will you put the question again. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President. [_Turning to the witness._] I was asking you on what impartial medico-judicial data were the deductions of the commission based—not the individual report of Dr. Markov, in which there are no deductions—but the deductions of the entire commission, that the corpses had remained not less than 3 years in the ground? MARKOV: The collective protocol of the commission which was signed by all the delegates was very scant regarding the real medico-judicial data. Concerning the condition of the corpses, only one sentence in the report was stated, namely that the corpses were in various stages of decomposition, but there was no description of the real extent of decomposition. Thus, in my opinion, this deduction was based on the papers found on the corpses and on testimony of the witnesses, but not on the actual medico-judicial data. As far as medical jurisprudence is concerned, they tried to support this deduction by the statement of Professor Orsos regarding the finding of _pseudocallus_ in the skull of corpse Number 526. But, according to my conviction, since this skull was the only one with signs of _pseudocallus_, it was wrong to arrive at a definite conclusion regarding the stage of decomposition of thousands of corpses which were contained in the Katyn graves. Besides, the observation of Professor Orsos regarding _pseudocallus_ was made in Hungary; that is to say, under quite different soil and climatic conditions, and withal in individual graves and not in mass graves, as was the case in Katyn. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You spoke about the testimony of witnesses. Did the members of the commission have the opportunity personally to interrogate those witnesses, especially the Russian witnesses? MARKOV: We did not have the opportunity of having any contact with the indigenous population. On the contrary, immediately upon our arrival at the hotel in Smolensk, Butz told us that we were in a military zone, and that we did not have the right to walk around in the city without being accompanied by a member of the German Army, or to speak with the inhabitants of the place, or to make photographs. In reality, during the time we were there, we did not have any contact with the local inhabitants. On the first day of our arrival in the Katyn wood, that is to say, on 29 April, in the morning, several Russian civilians were brought under German escort to the graves. Immediately upon our arrival at Smolensk some of the depositions of the local witnesses were submitted to us. The depositions were typed. When these witnesses were brought to the Katyn wood, we were told that these witnesses were the ones who gave the testimonies which had been submitted to us. There was no regular interrogation of the witnesses which could have been recorded, or were recorded. Professor Orsos started the conversation with the witnesses and told us that he could speak Russian because he had been a prisoner of war in Russia during the first World War. He began to speak with a man, an elderly man whose name, so far as I can remember, was Kiselov. Then he spoke to a second witness, whose last name so far as I can remember was Andrejev. All the conversation lasted a few minutes only. As our Bulgarian language is rather similar to the Russian, I tried also to speak to some of the witnesses... THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you think that should be left to cross-examination? Can’t these details be left to cross-examination? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President. I would ask you, Witness, to interrupt the reply to this question and to answer the following one: At the time you signed this general report of the commission, was it quite clear to you that the murders were perpetrated in Katyn not earlier than the last quarter of 1941, and that 1940, in any case, was excluded? MARKOV: Yes, this was absolutely clear to me and that is why I did not make any deductions in the minutes which I made on my findings in the Katyn wood. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Why did you sign then this general report, which was incorrect in your opinion? MARKOV: In order to make it quite clear under what conditions I signed this report, I should like to say a few words on how it was made up and how it was signed. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Excuse me, I would like to put a question to you which defines more accurately this matter. Was this report actually signed on 30 April 1941 in the town of Smolensk or was it signed on another date and at another place? MARKOV: It was not signed in Smolensk on 30 April but was signed on 1 May at noon, at the airport which was called Bela. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please tell the Tribunal under what conditions it was signed. MARKOV: The compilation of this record was to be done at the same conference which I already mentioned and which took place in the laboratory of Butz in the afternoon of 30 April. Present at this conference were all the delegates and all the Germans who had arrived with us from Berlin: Butz and his assistants, General Staff Physician Holm, the chief physician of the Smolensk sector, and also other German Army officials who were unknown to me. Butz stated that the Germans were only present as hosts, but actually the conference was presided over by General Staff Physician Holm and the work was performed under the direction of Butz. The secretary of the conference was the personal lady secretary of Butz who took down the report. However, I never saw these minutes. Butz and Orsos came with a prepared draft to this conference, a sort of protocol; but I never learned who ordered them to draw up such a protocol. This protocol was read by Butz and then a question was raised regarding the state and the age of the young pines which were in the clearings of the Katyn wood. Butz was of the opinion that in these clearings there were graves too. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Excuse me for interrupting you. Did you have any evidence that any graves were actually found in these clearings? MARKOV: No. During the time we were there, no new graves were opened. As some of the delegates said they were not competent to express their opinion regarding the age of these trees, General Holm gave an order to bring a German who was an expert on forestry. He showed us the cut of the trunk of a small tree and from the number of circles in this trunk, he deduced the trees were 5 years old. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Excuse me; I interrupt you again. You, yourself—can you state here that this tree was actually cut down from the grave and not from any other place in the clearing? MARKOV: I can say only that in the Katyn wood there were some clearings with small trees and that, while driving back to Smolensk, we took a little tree with us in the bus, but I do not know whether there were any graves where these trees were standing. As I have already stated, no graves were laid open in our presence. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would request you to continue your reply, but very briefly and not to detain the attention of the Tribunal with unnecessary details. MARKOV: Some editorial notes were made in connection with this protocol, but I do not remember what they were. Then Orsos and Butz were entrusted with the final drafting of the record. The signing of the record was intended to take place on the same night at a banquet which was organized in a German Army hospital. At this banquet Butz arrived with the minutes and he started reading them, but the actual signing did not take place for reasons which are still not clear to me. It was stated that this record would have to be rewritten, so the banquet lasted until 3 or 4 o’clock in the morning. Then Professor Palmieri told me that the Germans were not pleased with the contents of the protocol and that they were carrying on telephone conversations with Berlin and that perhaps there would not even be a protocol at all. Indeed, having spent the night in Smolensk without having signed the record, we took off from Smolensk on the morning of 1 May. I personally had the impression that no protocol at all would be issued and I was very pleased about that. On the way to Smolensk, as well as on our way back, some of the delegates asked to stop in Warsaw in order to see the city, but we were told that it was impossible because of military reasons. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This has nothing to do with the subject. Please keep to the facts. MARKOV: Around noon we arrived at the airport which was called Bela. The airport was apparently a military airfield because of the temporary military barracks I saw there. We had dinner there and immediately after dinner, notwithstanding the fact that we were not told that the signing of the minutes would take place on the way to Berlin, we were submitted copies of the protocol for signature. During the signing a number of military persons were present, as there were no other people except military personnel on this airfield. I was rather struck by the fact that on the one hand the records were already completed in Smolensk but were not submitted to us for signing there, and on the other hand that they did not wait till we arrived in Berlin a few hours later. They were submitted to us for signing at this isolated military airfield. This was the reason why I signed the report, in spite of the conviction I had acquired during the autopsy which I had performed at Smolensk. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is to say, the date and the locality which are shown in the protocol are incorrect? MARKOV: Yes, that is so. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And you signed it because you felt yourself compelled to? THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, I don’t think it is proper for you to put leading questions to him. He has stated the fact. It is useless to go on stating conclusions about it. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well, Mr. President. I have no further questions to put to the witness. THE PRESIDENT: Does anyone want to cross-examine him? DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I should like to ask a question concerning the legal proceedings first. Each side was to call three witnesses before the Court. This witness, as I understand it, has not only testified to facts but has also made statements which can be called an expert judgment. He has not only expressed himself as an expert witness, as we say in German law, but also as an expert. If the Court is to listen to these statements made by the witness as an expert, I should like to have the opportunity for the Defense also to call in an expert. THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal will not hear more than three witnesses on either side. You could have called any expert you wanted or any member of the experts who made the German examination. It was your privilege to call any of them. DR. STAHMER: Witness, how long have you been active in the field of medical jurisprudence? MARKOV: I have been working in the field of medical jurisprudence since the beginning of 1927 in the faculty for medical jurisprudence of the University in Sofia, first as an assistant and now I am professor of medical jurisprudence. I am not a staff professor at the university. My position can be designated by the German word “Ausserordentlicher Professor” (university lecturer). DR. STAHMER: Before your visit to Katyn did your government tell you that you were to participate in a political action without consideration of your scientific qualification? MARKOV: I was not told so literally, but in the press the Katyn question was discussed as a political subject. DR. STAHMER: Did you feel free in regard to your scientific “conscience” at that time? MARKOV: At what time? DR. STAHMER: At the time when you went to Katyn? MARKOV: The question is not quite clear to me; I should like you to explain it. DR. STAHMER: Did you consider the task you had to carry out there a political one or a scientific one? MARKOV: I understood this task from the very first moment as a political one and therefore I tried to evade it. DR. STAHMER: Did you realize the outstanding political importance of this task? MARKOV: Yes; from everything I read in the press. DR. STAHMER: In your examination yesterday you said that when you arrived at Katyn the graves had already been opened and certain corpses had been carefully laid out. Do you mean to say that these corpses were not taken from the graves at all? MARKOV: No, I should not say that, inasmuch as it was obvious that corpses were taken out of these graves and besides I saw that some corpses were still in the graves. DR. STAHMER: Then, in order to state this positively, you had no reason to think that the corpses inspected by the commission were not taken from these mass graves? THE PRESIDENT: He did not know where they came from, did he? MARKOV: Evidently from the graves which were open. DR. STAHMER: You have already made statements to the effect that, as a result of the medico-judicial examination by this International Commission, a protocol, a record was taken down. You have furthermore stated that you signed this protocol. Mr. President, this protocol is contained in its full text in the official data published by the German Government on this incident. I ask that this evidence, this so-called _White Book_, be admitted as evidence. I will submit it to the Court later. THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. [_A recess was taken._] THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal rules that you may cross-examine this witness upon the report, and the protocol will be admitted in evidence, if you offer it in evidence, under Article 19 of the Charter. That, of course, involves that we do not take judicial notice of the report under Article 21 of the Charter but that it is offered under Article 19 of the Charter and therefore it will either come through the earphones in cross-examination or such parts of the protocol as you wish to have translated. DR. STAHMER: Witness, was the protocol or the record signed by you and the other experts compiled in the same way in which it is included in the German _White Book_? MARKOV: Yes, the record of the protocol which is included in the German _White Book_ is the same protocol which I compiled. A long time after my return to Sofia I was sent two copies of the protocol by Director Dietz. These two copies were typewritten, and I was requested to make necessary corrections and additions if I deemed it necessary, but I left it without corrections and it was printed without any comments on my part. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Just a moment Dr. Stahmer... Mr. President, I believe that there is a slight confusion here. The witness is answering in regard to the individual protocol, whereas Dr. Stahmer is questioning him on the general record. Thus the witness does not answer the proper question. DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I would have cleared this matter up on my own account. [_Turning to the witness._] Do you mean your autopsy protocol? MARKOV: I mean the protocol I compiled myself and not the general record. DR. STAHMER: Now, what about this general protocol or record? When did you receive a copy of it? MARKOV: I received a copy of the general record in Berlin where as many copies were signed as there were delegates present. DR. STAHMER: Just a little while ago you stated that Russian witnesses had been taken before the commission in the wood of Katyn, but that, however, there had been no opportunity afforded the experts to talk with these witnesses concerning the question at hand. Now, in this protocol, in this record, the following remark is found, and I quote: “The commission interrogated several indigenous Russian witnesses personally. Among other things, these witnesses confirmed that in the months of March and April 1940 large shipments of Polish officers arrived almost daily at the railroad station Gnjesdova near Katyn. These trains were emptied, the inmates were taken in lorries to the wood of Katyn and never seen again. Furthermore, official notice was taken of the proofs and statements, and the documents containing the evidence were inspected.” MARKOV: As I already stated during the questioning, two witnesses were interrogated on the spot by Orsos. They actually said that they saw how Polish officers were brought to the station of Gnjesdova and that later they did not see them again. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal thinks the witness ought to be given an opportunity of seeing the report when you put passages in it to him. DR. STAHMER: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: Haven’t you got another copy of it? DR. STAHMER: I am sorry, Mr. President, I have no second copy; no. THE PRESIDENT: Can the witness read German? MARKOV: No, but anyhow I can understand the contents of the record. THE PRESIDENT: You mean you can read it? MARKOV: Yes, I can also read it. THE PRESIDENT: Can the witness read German, do you mean? MARKOV: Yes, I can read German. DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, may I make a suggestion? THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, if you have only got one copy, I think you had better have it back. You can’t have the book passing to and fro like that. DR. STAHMER: I should like to make the suggestion that the cross-examination be interrupted and the other witness be called, and I will have this material typed in the meantime. That would be a solution. But there are only a few sentences... THE PRESIDENT: You can read it. Take the book back. DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I propose to read only a few short sentences. [_Turning to the witness._] Yesterday you testified, Witness, that the experts restricted or limited themselves to making an autopsy on one corpse only. In this report the following is set down—I quote: “The members of the commission personally performed an autopsy on nine corpses and numerous selected cases were submitted for post-mortem examination.” Is that right? MARKOV: That is right. Those of the members of the commission who were medical experts, with the exception of Professor Naville, performed each an autopsy on a corpse. Hajek made two autopsies. DR. STAHMER: In this instance we are not interested in the autopsy, but in the post-mortem examination. MARKOV: The corpses were examined but only superficially during an inspection which we carried out very hastily on the first day. No individual autopsy was carried out, but the corpses were merely looked at as they lay side by side. DR. STAHMER: I should like to ask you now what is meant in medical science by the concept “post-mortem examination.” MARKOV: We differentiate between an exterior inspection, when the corpse has to be undressed and minutely examined externally, and an internal inspection, when the inner organs of the corpse are examined. This was not done with the hundreds of bodies at Katyn, as it was not physically possible. We were there only one forenoon. Therefore, I consider that there was no actual medico-judicial expert examination of these corpses in the real sense of the word. DR. STAHMER: A little while ago you talked about the trees that were growing there on these graves, and you said that an expert explained the age of the trees by the rings counted on a trunk. In the protocol and the report the following is set down. I quote: “According to the opinion of the members of the commission and the testimony of forest ranger Von Herff, who was called in as an expert on forestry, they were small pine trees of at least 5 years of age, badly developed because they had been standing in the shade of large trees and had been transplanted to this spot about 3 years ago.” Now, I would like to ask you, is it correct that you undertook a local inspection and that you convinced yourself on the spot whether the statements made by the forestry expert were actually correct? MARKOV: Our personal impression and my personal conviction in this question only refer to the fact that in the wood of Katyn there were clearings where small trees were growing and that the afore-mentioned expert showed us a cross section of a tree with its circles. But I do not consider myself competent and cannot give an opinion as to whether the deductions which are set forth in the record are correct or not. Precisely for that reason it was judged necessary to call in a forestry expert, for we doctors were not competent to decide this question. Therefore, these conclusions are merely the conclusions of a competent German expert. DR. STAHMER: But after having had a first-hand view, did you doubt the truth of these statements? MARKOV: After the German expert had expressed his opinion at the conference of the delegates, neither I nor the other delegates expressed any opinion as to whether his conclusions were correct or not. These conclusions are set down in the record in the form in which the expert expressed himself. DR. STAHMER: According to your autopsy report the corpse of the Polish officer which you dissected was clothed and you described the clothing in detail. Was this winter or summer clothing that you found? MARKOV: It was winter clothing including an overcoat and a woolen shawl around the neck. DR. STAHMER: In the protocol it says further and I quote: “Furthermore, Polish cigarettes and matchboxes were found with the dead; in some cases tobacco containers and cigarette holders, and ‘Kosielsk’ was inscribed thereon.” The question is, did you see these objects? MARKOV: We actually saw these tobacco boxes with the name “Kosielsk” engraved thereon. They were exhibited to us in the glass case which was shown to us in the peasant hut not far from the Katyn wood. I remember them because Butz drew our attention to them. DR. STAHMER: In your autopsy report, Witness, there is the following remark, and I quote: “In the clothing documents were found and they were put in the folder Number 827.” Now, I should like to ask you: How did you discover these documents? Did you personally take them out of the pockets? MARKOV: These papers were in the pockets of the overcoat and of the jacket. As far as I can remember they were taken out by a German who was undressing the corpse in my presence. DR. STAHMER: At that time were the documents already in the envelope? MARKOV: They were not yet in the envelope, but after they had been taken out of the pockets they were put into an envelope which bore the number of the corpse. We were told that this was the usual method of procedure. DR. STAHMER: What was the nature of the documents? MARKOV: I did not examine them at all, as I have already said, and I refused to do so, but according to the size, I believe that they were certificates of identity. I could distinguish individual letters, but I do not know whether one could read the inscription, for I did not attempt to do so. DR. STAHMER: In the protocol the following statement is made, and I quote: “The documents found with the corpses (diaries, letters, and newspapers) were dated from the fall of 1939 until March and April 1940. The latest date which could be ascertained was the date of a Russian newspaper of 22 April 1940.” Now, I should like to ask you if this statement is correct and whether it is in accordance with the findings that you made? MARKOV: Such letters and newspapers were indeed in the glass cases and were shown to us. Some such papers were found by members of the commission who were dissecting the bodies, and if I remember rightly, they described the contents of these documents, but I did not do so. DR. STAHMER: In your examination just a little while ago you stated that only a few scientific details were contained in this protocol and that this was probably done intentionally. I should like to quote from this record as follows: “Various degrees and types of decomposition were caused by the position of the bodies to one another in the grave. Aside from some mummification on the surface and around the edges of the mass of corpses, some damp maceration was found among the center corpses. The sticking together of the adjacent corpses and the soldering together of corpses through cadaverous acids and fluids which had thickened, and particularly the deformations that obtained from the pressure among the corpses, show that the corpses were buried there right from the beginning. “Among the corpses, insects or remains of insects which might date back to the time of burial are entirely lacking, and from this it may be gathered that the shooting and the burial took place at a season which was cold and free from insects.” Now, I should like to ask you if these statements are correct and if they are in line with your findings. MARKOV: I stated that little was said on the condition of the corpses, and indeed as can be judged by the quotation which I had in mind, only a general phraseology is used concerning the various degrees of decomposition of the corpses, but no concrete or detailed description of the condition of the corpses is made. As to the insects and their larvae, the assertion of the general report that none were discovered is in flagrant contradiction to the conclusions of Professor Palmieri, which are recorded in his personal minutes concerning the corpse which he himself dissected. In this protocol, which is published in the same German White Book, it is said that there were traces of remains of insects and their larvae in the mouths of the corpses. DR. STAHMER: Just a little while ago you spoke of the scientific examination of skulls undertaken by Professor Orsos. The record also refers to this matter, and I quote: “A large number of skulls were examined with respect to the changes they had undergone, which, according to the background and experience of Professor Orsos, would be of great value in fixing the date of death. In this connection, we are concerned with stratified encrustations on the surface of the mush found in the skull as a residue of the brain. These symptoms are not to be found among corpses which have been in their graves for less than 3 years. Such a condition, among other things, was found in a very decided form in the skull of corpse Number 526, which was found near the surface of a large mass grave.” I should like to ask you now if it is correct that, according to the report of Professor Orsos, such a condition was discovered not only as is said here on the skull of one corpse, but among other corpses also. MARKOV: I can answer this question quite categorically. We were shown only one skull, the one precisely mentioned in the record under the Number 526. I do not know that other skulls were examined, as the record seems to imply. I am of the opinion that Professor Orsos had no possibility of examining many corpses in the Katyn wood, for he came with us and left with us. That means he stayed in the Katyn wood just as long as I and all the other members of the commission did. DR. STAHMER: Finally, I should like to quote the conclusion of the summarizing expert opinion, in which it is stated: “From statements made by witnesses, from the letters and correspondence, diaries, newspapers, and so forth, found on the corpses, it may be seen that the shootings took place in the months of March and April 1940. The following are in complete agreement with the findings made with regard to the mass graves and the individual corpses of the Polish officers, as described in the report.” Is this statement actually correct? THE PRESIDENT: I did not quite understand the statement. As I heard you read it, it was something like this: From the statements of witnesses, letters, and so forth ... DR. STAHMER: “...in complete agreement with the findings made with regard to the mass graves and the individual corpses of the Polish officers and described in the report.” That is the end of the quotation. THE PRESIDENT: It doesn’t say that the following persons are in complete agreement, but that the following facts are in complete agreement. Is that right? DR. STAHMER: No. My question is: “Is this statement approved by you? Do you agree with it?” THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, but you read out certain words, which were these: “The following are in complete agreement.” What I want to know is whether that means that the following persons are in complete agreement, or whether the following facts are in complete agreement. DR. STAHMER: Special facts had been set down, and this is a summarizing expert opinion signed by all the members of the commission. Therefore, we have here a scientific explanation of the real facts. THE PRESIDENT: Would you just listen to what I read out from what I took down? “From the statements of witnesses, letters, and other documents, it may be seen that the shooting took place in the months of March and April 1940. The following are in complete agreement.” What I am asking you is this— [_Dr. Stahmer attempted to interrupt._] Just a moment, Dr. Stahmer, listen to what I say. What I am asking you is: Does the statement mean that the following persons are in complete agreement, or that the following facts are in complete agreement? DR. STAHMER: No, no. The following people testify that this fact, the fact that the shootings took place in the months of March and April 1940, agrees with the results of their investigations of the mass graves and of individual corpses. That is what is meant and that is the conclusion. What has been found here is in agreement with that which has been set down and determined scientifically. That is the meaning. THE PRESIDENT: Go on. DR. STAHMER: Is this final deduction in accord with your scientific conviction? MARKOV: I have already indicated that this statement regarding the condition of the corpses is based on the date resulting from testimony by the witnesses and from the available documents, but it is in contradiction to the observations I made on the corpse which I dissected. That means I did not consider that the results of the autopsies corroborated the presumable date of death to be taken from the testimony or the documents. If I had been convinced that the condition of the corpses did indeed correspond to the date of decease mentioned by the Germans, I would have given such a statement in my individual protocol. When I saw the signed protocol I became suspicious as to the last sentence of the record—the sentence which precedes the signatures. I always had doubts whether this sentence was contained in that draft of the protocol which we saw at the conference in Smolensk. As far as I could understand, the draft of the protocol which had been elaborated in Smolensk only stated that we actually were shown papers and that we heard witnesses; and this was supposed to prove that the killings were carried out in March or April of 1940. I was of the opinion that the fact that the conclusion was not based on medical opinion and not supported absolutely by medical reports and examination, was the reason why the signing of the protocol was postponed and why the record was not signed in Smolensk. DR. STAHMER: Witness, at the beginning of my examination you stated that you were fully aware of the political significance of your task. Why, then, did you desist from protesting against this report which was not in accord with your scientific conviction? MARKOV: I have already said that I signed the protocol as I was convinced that the circumstances at this isolated military airfield offered no other possibility, and therefore I could not make any objections. DR. STAHMER: Why did you not take steps later on? MARKOV: My conduct after the signing of the protocol corresponds fully to what I am stating here, I repeat. I was not convinced of the truth of the German version. I was invited many times to Berlin by Director Dietz. I was also invited to Sofia by the German Embassy. And in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Foreign Office also invited me to make a public statement over the radio and to the press; and I was requested to say what conclusions we had come to during our investigation. However, I did not do so, and I always refused to do so. Because of the political situation in which we found ourselves at that moment, I could not make a public statement declaring the German version was wrong. Concerning that matter there were quite sharp words exchanged between me and the German Embassy in Sofia. And when, a few months later, another Bulgarian representative was asked to be sent as a member of a similar commission for the investigation of the corpses in Vinnitza in the Ukraine, the German Ambassador Beckerly stated quite openly to the Bulgarian Foreign Office that the Germans did not wish me to be sent to Vinnitza. That indicated that the Germans very well understood my behavior and my opinion on that matter. Concerning this question, Minister Plenipotentiary Saratov, of our Foreign Office, still has shorthand records about conversations which, if the Honored Tribunal considers it necessary, can be sent here from Bulgaria. Therefore, all my refusals, after I had signed the protocol, to carry on any activity for the purpose of propaganda, fully correspond to what I said here, namely that the conclusions laid down in the collective protocol do not answer my personal conviction. And I will repeat that if I had been convinced that the corpses were buried for 3 years, I would have testified this after having dissected a corpse. But I have left my personal protocol incomplete and this is a quite unusual thing in the case of medico-judicial examination. DR. STAHMER: The protocol was not signed by you alone, but on the contrary it carries the signatures of 11 representatives of science, whose names you gave yesterday, some of them of world renown. Among these men we find a scientist of a neutral country, Professor Naville. Did you take the opportunity to get in touch with one of these experts in the meantime with a view of reaching a rectification of the report? MARKOV: I cannot say on what considerations the other delegates signed the protocol. But they also signed it under the same circumstances as I did. However, when I read the individual protocols, I notice that they also refrained from stating the precise date of the killing of the man whose corpse they had dissected. There was one exception only, as I have already said. That was Professor Miloslavich, who was the only one who asserted that the corpse which he had dissected was that of a man buried for at least 3 years. After the signing of the protocol, I did not have any contact with any of the persons who had signed the collective protocol. DR. STAHMER: Witness, you gave two versions, one in the protocol which we have just discussed, and another here before the Court. Which version is the correct one? MARKOV: I do not understand which two versions you are speaking about. Will you please explain it? DR. STAHMER: In the first version, in the protocol, it is set forth that according to the conclusion which had been made, the shooting must have taken place 3 years ago. Today you testified that the findings were not correct, and between the shooting and the time of your investigations there could only be a space of perhaps 18 months. MARKOV: I stated that the conclusions of the collective protocol do not correspond with my personal conviction. DR. STAHMER: “Did not correspond” or “do not correspond with your conviction”? MARKOV: It did not and it does not correspond with my opinion then and now. DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to this witness. THE PRESIDENT: Witness, were any of the bodies which were examined by the members of this delegation exhumed from the ground in your presence? MARKOV: The corpses which we dissected were selected among the top layers of the graves which had been already exhumed. They were taken out of the graves and given to us for dissection. THE PRESIDENT: Was there anything to indicate, in your opinion, that the corpses had not been buried in those graves? MARKOV: As far as traces are concerned, and as far as the layers of corpses were preserved, they were stuck to each other; so that if they had been transferred, I do not believe that this could have been done recently. This could not have been done immediately before our arrival. THE PRESIDENT: You mean that you think the corpses had been buried in those graves? MARKOV: I cannot say whether they were put into those graves immediately after death had come, as I have no data to confirm this, but they did not look as if they had just been put there. THE PRESIDENT: Is it possible, in your opinion as an expert, to fix the date of March or April or such a short period as that, 3 years before the examination which you have made? MARKOV: I believe that if one relies exclusively on medical data, that is to say, on the state and condition of the corpses, it is impossible, when it is a question of years, to determine the date with such precision and say accurately whether they were killed in March or in April. Therefore, apparently the months of March and April were not based on the medical data, for that would be impossible, but on the testimony of the witnesses and on the documents which were shown us. THE PRESIDENT: When you got back to Sofia, you said that the protocol was sent to you for your observations and for your corrections and that you made none. Why was that? MARKOV: We are concerned with the individual protocol which I compiled. I did not supplement it by making any conclusion, I did not add any conclusion because it was sent to me by the Germans and because in general at that time the political situation in our country was such that I could not declare publicly that the German version was not a true one. THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that your personal protocol alone was sent to you at Sofia? MARKOV: Yes, only my personal protocol was sent to Sofia. As to the collective protocol, I brought that back myself to Sofia and handed it over to our Foreign Minister. THE PRESIDENT: Is your personal protocol, in the words that you drew it up, incorporated in the whole protocol and signed by all the delegates? MARKOV: In my personal protocol there is only a description of the corpse and of the clothing of the corpse which I dissected. THE PRESIDENT: That is not the question I asked. MARKOV: In the general protocol a rough description only is made, concerning the clothing and the degree of decomposition. THE PRESIDENT: Well, do you mean that your personal protocol... MARKOV: I consider that the personal protocols are more accurate regarding the condition of the corpses, because they were compiled during the dissection and were dictated on the spot to the stenographers. THE PRESIDENT: Just listen to the question, please. Is your personal protocol, in the words in which you drew it up, incorporated in the collective protocol in the same words? MARKOV: My own protocol is not included in the general record, but it is included in the _White Book_ which the Germans published together with the general record. THE PRESIDENT: It is there, then, in the report, is it? It is in the _White Book_? MARKOV: Yes, quite right. It is included in this book. THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. Yes, Colonel Smirnov, do you have another witness? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President. I beg you to allow me to call as a witness, Professor of Medical Jurisprudence Prosorovski. [_The witness Prosorovski took the stand._] THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please. VICTOR IL’ICH PROSOROVSKI (Witness): Prosorovski, Victor Il’ich. THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I, citizen of the U.S.S.R.—called as a witness in this case—solemnly promise and swear before the High Tribunal—to say all that I know about this case—and to add and withhold nothing. [_The witness repeated the oath._] THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, just before questioning you, I beg you to adhere to the following order. After my question, please pause in order to allow the interpreters to make the translation, and speak as slowly as possible. Will you give the Tribunal very briefly some information about your scientific activity, and your past work as a medico-judicial doctor. PROSOROVSKI: I am a doctor by profession; professor of medical jurisprudence and a doctor of medical science. I am the Chief Medical Expert of the Ministry of Public Health of the Soviet Union. I am the Director of the Scientific Research Institute for Medical Jurisprudence at the Ministry of Public Health of the U.S.S.R.; my business is mainly of a scientific nature; I am President of the Medico-Judicial Commission of the Scientific Medical Council of the Ministry of Public Health of the U.S.S.R. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How long did you practice as a medico-judicial expert? PROSOROVSKI: I practiced for 17 years in that sphere. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What kind of participation was yours in the investigation of the mass crimes of the Hitlerites against the Polish officers in Katyn? PROSOROVSKI: The President of the Special Commission for investigation and ascertaining of the circumstances of the shootings by the German Fascist aggressors of Polish officers, Academician Nicolai Ilych Burdenko, offered me in the beginning of January 1944 the chairmanship of the Medico-Judicial Commission of experts. Apart from this organizational activity, I participated personally in the exhumations and examination of these corpses. THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, perhaps that would be a good time to break off. [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] _Afternoon Session_ THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the Defendants Hess, Fritzsche, and Von Ribbentrop are absent. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I continue the examination of this witness, Mr. President? THE PRESIDENT: Yes. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please tell me, how far from the town of Smolensk were the burial grounds where the corpses were discovered? PROSOROVSKI: A commission of medico-legal experts, together with members of the special commission, Academician Burdenko, Academician Potemkin, Academician Tolstoy, and other members of this commission, betook themselves on 14 January 1944 to the burial grounds of the Polish officers in the so-called Katyn wood. This spot is located about 15 kilometers from the town of Smolensk. These burial grounds were situated on a slope at a distance of about 200 meters from the Vitebsk high road. One of these graves was about 60 meters long and 60 meters wide; the other one, situated a small distance from this first grave, was about 7 meters long and 6 meters wide. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How many corpses were exhumed by the commission you headed? PROSOROVSKI: In the Katyn wood the commission of medical experts exhumed and examined, from various graves and from various depths, altogether 925 corpses. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How was the work of exhumation done and how many assistants were employed by you on this work? PROSOROVSKI: Specialists and medico-legal experts participated in the work of this commission. In September and October 1943 they had exhumed and examined the corpses of the victims shot by the Germans... MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Where was the examination of the corpses performed? PROSOROVSKI: They examined them in the town and the neighborhood of Smolensk. Among the members of this commission were Professor Prosorovski; Professor Smolianinov; the eldest and most learned collaborator of the Medico-Legal Research Institute, Dr. Semenovski; Professor of Pathological Anatomy Voropaev; Professor of Legal Chemistry Schwaikova, who was invited for consultations on chemico-legal subjects. To assist this commission, they called also medico-legal experts from the forces. Among them were the medical student Nikolski, Dr. Soubbotin... MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I doubt whether the Tribunal is interested in all these names. I ask you to answer the following question: What method of examination was chosen by you? What I mean is, did you strip the corpses of their clothes and were you satisfied with the customary post mortem examination or was every single one of these 925 corpses thoroughly examined? PROSOROVSKI: After exhumation of the corpses, they were thoroughly searched, particularly their clothing. Then an exterior examination was carried out and then they were subjected to a complete medico-legal dissection of all three parts of the body; that is to say, the skull, the chest, and the abdomen, as well as all the inner organs of these corpses. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please tell me whether the corpses exhumed from these burial grounds bore traces of a previous medical examination? PROSOROVSKI: Out of the 925 corpses which we examined, only three had already been dissected; and that was a partial examination of the skulls only. On all the others no traces of previous medical examination could be ascertained. They were clothed; and the jackets, trousers, and shirts were buttoned, the belts were strapped, and the knots of ties had not been undone. Neither on the head nor on the body were there any traces of cuts or other traces of medico-legal examination. Therefore this excludes the possibility of their having been subjected to any previous medico-legal examination. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: During the medico-legal examination which was carried out by your commission, did you open the skulls? PROSOROVSKI: Of course. At the examination of quite a number of corpses the skull was opened and the contents of the skull were examined. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Are you acquainted with the expression “pseudocallus?” PROSOROVSKI: I heard of it when I received a book in 1945 in the Institute of Medico-Legal Science. Before that not a single medical legal expert observed any similar phenomena in the Soviet Union. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Among the 925 skulls which you examined, were there many cases of _pseudocallus_? PROSOROVSKI: Not one of the medico-legal experts who were examining these 925 corpses observed lime deposits on the inner side of the cranium or on any other part of the skull. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Therefore, there was no sign of _pseudocallus_ on any of the skulls. PROSOROVSKI: No. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was the clothing also examined? PROSOROVSKI: As already stated, the clothing was thoroughly examined. Upon the request of the Special Commission, and in the presence of its members and of the Metropolitan Nikolai, Academician Burdenko, and others, the medico-legal experts examined the clothing, the pockets of the trousers, of the coats, and of the overcoats. As a rule, the pockets were either turned, torn open, or cut open, and this testified to the fact that they had already been searched. The clothing itself, the overcoats, the jackets, and the trousers as well as the shirts, were moist with corpse liquids. This clothing could not be torn asunder, in spite of violent effort. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Therefore, the tissue of the clothing was solid? PROSOROVSKI: Yes, the tissue was very solid, and of course, it was besmeared with earth. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: During the examination, did you look into the pockets of the clothing and did you find any documents in them? PROSOROVSKI: As I said, most of the pockets were turned out or cut; but some of them remained intact. In these pockets, and also under the lining of the overcoats and of the trousers we discovered, for instance, notes, pamphlets, papers, closed and open letters and postcards, cigarette paper, cigarette holders, pipes, and so forth, and even valuables were found, such as ingots of gold and gold coins. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: These details are not very relevant, and therefore I beg you to refrain from giving them. I would like you to answer the following question: Did you discover in the clothing documents dated the end of 1940 and also dated 1941? PROSOROVSKI: Yes. I discovered such documents, and my colleagues also found some. Professor Smolianinov, for instance, discovered on one of the corpses a letter written in Russian, and it was sent by Sophie Zigon, addressed to the Red Cross in Moscow, with the request to communicate to her the address of her husband, Thomas Zigon. The date of this letter was 12 September 1940. Besides the envelope bore the stamp of a post office in Warsaw of September 1940, and also the stamp of the Moscow post office, dated 28 September 1940. Another document of the same sort was discovered. It was a postcard sent from Tarnopol, with the post office cancellation: “Tarnopol, 12 September 1940.” Then we discovered receipts with dates, one in particular with the name—if I am not mistaken—of Orashkevitch, certifying to the receipt of money with the date of 6 April 1941, and another receipt in his name, also referring to a money deposit, was dated 5 May 1941. Then, I myself discovered a letter with the date 20 June 1941, with the name of Irene Tutchinski, as well as other documents of the same sort. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: During the medico-legal examination of the corpses, were any bullets or cartridge cases discovered? Please tell us what was the mark on these cartridge cases? Were they of Soviet make or of foreign make; and if they were foreign make, which one, and what was the caliber? PROSOROVSKI: The cause of death of the Polish officers was bullet wounds in the nape of the neck. In the tissue of the brain or in the bone of the skull we discovered bullets which were more or less deformed. As to cartridge cases, we did indeed discover, during the exhumation, cartridge cases of German origin, for on their bases we found the mark G-e-c-o, Geco. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One minute, Witness. I will now read an original German document and I beg the permission of the Tribunal to submit a series of documents which have been offered us by our American colleagues, Document Number 402-PS, Exhibit USSR-507. It concerns German correspondence and telegrams on Katyn, and these telegrams are sent by an official of the Government General, Heinrich, to the Government of the Government General. I submit the original document to the Court. I am only going to read one document, a very short one, in connection with the cartridge cases discovered in the mass graves. The telegram is addressed to the Government of the Government General, care of First Administrative Counsellor Weirauch in Kraków. It is marked: “Urgent, to be delivered at once, secret. “Part of the Polish Red Cross returned yesterday from Katyn. The employees of the Polish Red Cross have brought with them the cartridge cases which were used in shooting the victims of Katyn. It appears that these are German munitions. The caliber is 7.65. They are from the firm Geco. Letter follows.” signed—“Heinrich.” [_Turning to the witness._] Were the cartridge cases and cartridges which were discovered by you of the same caliber and did they bear the mark of the same firm? PROSOROVSKI: As I have already stated, the bullets discovered in the bullet wounds were 7.65 caliber. The cases discovered during the exhumation did indeed bear the trademark of the firm Geco. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I now ask you to describe in detail the condition of the body tissues and of the inner organs of the corpses exhumed from the graves of Katyn. PROSOROVSKI: The skin and the inner organs of the corpses were well preserved. The muscles of the body and of the limbs had kept their structure. The muscles of the heart had also kept their characteristic structure. The substance of the brain was, in some cases, putrified; but in most cases, it had kept its structural characteristics quite definitely, showing a clear distinction between the gray and white matters. Changes in the inner organs were mainly a sagging and shrinking. The hair from the head could be easily pulled out. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: From the examination of the corpses, to what conclusion did you come as to the date of death and date of burial? PROSOROVSKI: On the basis of the experience I have gained and on the experiences of Smolianinov, Semenovski, and other members of the commission... MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One moment, Witness. I would like you to tell the Tribunal briefly what these experiences were and how many corpses were exhumed. Did you personally exhume them or were they exhumed in your presence? PROSOROVSKI: In the course of the great War, I was often medico-legal expert during the exhumation and the examination of corpses of victims who were shot by the Germans. These executions occurred in the town of Krasnodar and its neighborhood, in the town of Kharkov and its neighborhood, in the town of Smolensk and its neighborhood, in the so-called extermination camp of Maidanek, near Lublin, so that all told more than 5,000 corpses were exhumed and examined with my personal co-operation. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Considering your experience and your objective observations, to what conclusions did you arrive as to the date of the death and the burial of the victims of Katyn? PROSOROVSKI: What I have just said applies to me as well as to many of my colleagues who participated in this work. The commission came to the unanimous conclusion that the burial of the Polish officers in the Katyn graves was carried out about 2 years before, if you count from January, the month of January 1944—that is to say that the date was autumn 1941. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did the condition of the corpses allow the conclusion that they were buried in 1940, objectively speaking? PROSOROVSKI: The medico-legal examination of the corpses buried in the Katyn wood, when compared with the modifications and changes which were noticed by us during former exhumations on many occasions and also material evidence, allowed us to come to the conclusion that the time of the burial could not have been previous to the autumn of 1941. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Therefore, the year 1940 is out of question? PROSOROVSKI: Yes, it is completely excluded. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If I understood you rightly you were also medico-legal expert in the case of other shootings in the district of Smolensk? PROSOROVSKI: In the district of Smolensk and its environs I have exhumed and examined together with my assistants another 1,173 corpses, besides those of Katyn. They were exhumed from 87 graves. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How did the Germans camouflage the common graves of the victims which they had shot? PROSOROVSKI: In the district of Smolensk, in Gadeonovka, the following method was used: The top layer of earth on these graves was covered with turf, and in some cases, as in Gadeonovka, young trees were planted as well as bushes; all this with a view to camouflaging. Besides, in the so-called Engineers’ Garden of the town of Smolensk, the graves were covered with bricks and paths were laid out. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you exhumed more than 5,000 corpses in various parts of the Soviet Union. PROSOROVSKI: Yes. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What were the causes of death of the victims in most cases? PROSOROVSKI: In most cases the cause of death was a bullet wound in the head, or in the nape of the neck. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were the causes of death at Katyn similar to those met with in other parts of the Soviet Union? I am speaking of mass-shootings. PROSOROVSKI: All shootings were carried out by one and the same method, namely, a shot in the nape of the neck, at pointblank range. The exit hole was usually on the forehead or in the face. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will read the last paragraph of your account on Katyn, mentioned in the report of the Extraordinary Soviet State Commission: “The commission of the experts emphasizes the absolute uniformity of the method of shooting the Polish prisoners of war with that used for the shootings of Soviet prisoners of war and Soviet civilians. Such shootings were carried out on a vast scale by the German Fascist authorities during the temporary occupation of territories of the U.S.S.R., for instance, in the towns of Smolensk, Orel, Kharkov, Krasnodar and Voroneszh.” Do you corroborate this conclusion? PROSOROVSKI: Yes, this is the typical method used by the Germans to exterminate peace-loving citizens. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions to put to this witness, Mr. President. DR. STAHMER: Where is your permanent residence, Witness? PROSOROVSKI: I was born in Moscow and have my domicile there. DR. STAHMER: How long have you been in the Commissariat for Health? PROSOROVSKI: I have been working in institutions for public health since 1931 and am at present in the Ministry of Public Health. Before that I was a candidate for the chair of forensic medicine at Moscow University. DR. STAHMER: In this commission were there also foreign scientists? PROSOROVSKI: In this commission there were no foreign medico-legal experts, but the exhumation and examination of these corpses could be attended by anybody who was interested. Foreign journalists, I believe 12 in number, came to the burial grounds and I showed them the corpses, the graves, the clothing, and so on—in short everything they were interested in. DR. STAHMER: Were there any foreign scientists present? PROSOROVSKI: I repeat again that no one was present apart from Soviet experts of the medico-legal commission. DR. STAHMER: Can you give the names of the members of the press? THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, he was giving a long list of names before and he was stopped by his counsel. Why do you shake your head? DR. STAHMER: I did not understand, Mr. President, the one list of names. He gave a list of names of the members of the commission. My question is that: The witness has just said that members of the foreign press were present and that the results of the investigation were presented to them. I am now asking for the names of these members of the foreign press. THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on. DR. STAHMER: Will you please give me the names of the members of the press, or at least the names of those who were present and to whom you presented the results of the examination? PROSOROVSKI: Unhappily I cannot give you those names now here; but I believe that if it is necessary, I would be able to find them. I shall ascertain the names of all those foreign correspondents who were present at the exhumation of the corpses. DR. STAHMER: The statement about the number of corpses exhumed and examined by you seems to have changed somewhat according to my notes, but I may have misunderstood. Once you mentioned 5,000 and another time 925. Which figure is the correct one? PROSOROVSKI: You did not hear properly. I said that 925 corpses had been exhumed in the Katyn wood, but in general I personally exhumed or was present at the exhumation of over 5,000 in many towns of the Soviet Union after the liberation of the territories from the Germans. DR. STAHMER: Were you actually present at the exhumation? PROSOROVSKI: Yes. DR. STAHMER: How long did you work at these exhumations? PROSOROVSKI: As I told you, on 14 January a group of medico-legal experts left for the site of the burial grounds together with the members of a special commission. THE PRESIDENT: Can you not just say how long it took—the whole exhumation? In other words, to shorten it, can you not say how long it took? PROSOROVSKI: Very well. The exhumation and part of the examination of the corpses lasted from 16 to 23 January 1944. DR. STAHMER: Did you find only Polish officers? PROSOROVSKI: All the corpses, with the exception of two which were found in civilian clothing, were in Polish uniforms and were therefore members of the Polish Army. DR. STAHMER: Did you try to determine from what camp these Polish officers came originally? PROSOROVSKI: That was not one of my duties. I was concerned only with the medico-legal examination of the corpses. DR. STAHMER: You did not learn in any other way from what camp they came? PROSOROVSKI: In the receipts which were found, dated 1941, it was stated that the money was received in camp 10-N. It can therefore be assumed that the camp number was obviously of particular importance. DR. STAHMER: Did you know of the Kosielsk Camp? PROSOROVSKI: Only from hearsay. I have not been there. DR. STAHMER: Do you know that Polish officers were kept prisoners there? PROSOROVSKI: I can say only what I heard. I heard that Polish officers were there, but I have not seen them myself nor have I been anywhere near there. DR. STAHMER: Did you learn anything about the fate of these officers? PROSOROVSKI: Since I did not make the investigations, I cannot say anything about the fate of these officers. About the fate of the officers, whose corpses were discovered in the graves of Katyn, I have already spoken. DR. STAHMER: How many officers did you find altogether in the burial grounds at Katyn? PROSOROVSKI: We did not separate the corpses according to their rank; but, in all, there were 925 corpses exhumed and examined. DR. STAHMER: Was that the majority? PROSOROVSKI: The coats and tunics of many corpses bore shoulder straps with insignia indicating officers’ rank. But even today I could not distinguish the insignia of rank of the Polish officers. DR. STAHMER: What happened to the documents which were found on the Polish prisoners? PROSOROVSKI: By order of the special commission the searching of the clothing was done by the medico-legal experts. When these experts discovered documents they looked them through, examined them, and handed them over to the members of the special commission, either to Academician Burdenko or Academician Tolstoy, Potemkin, or any other members of the commission. Obviously these documents are in the archives of the Extraordinary State Commission. DR. STAHMER: Are you of the opinion that from the medical findings regarding the corpses the time when they were killed can be determined with certainty? PROSOROVSKI: In determining the date on which these corpses had presumably been buried, we were guided by the experience which we had gathered in numerous previous exhumations and also found support by material evidence discovered by the medico-legal experts. Thus we were able to establish beyond doubt that the Polish officers were buried in the fall of 1941. DR. STAHMER: I asked whether from the medical findings you could determine this definitely and whether you did so. PROSOROVSKI: I can again confirm what I have already said. Since we had great experience in mass exhumations, we came to that conclusion, in corroboration of which we also had much material evidence, which enabled us to determine the autumn of 1941 as the time of the burial of the Polish officers. DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions to put to this witness. Mr. President, an explanation regarding the document which was just submitted; I have here only a copy signed by Heinrich; I have not seen the original. THE PRESIDENT: I imagine the original is there. DR. STAHMER: Thank you, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Smirnov, do you want to re-examine? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to this witness; but with the permission of the Tribunal, I would like to make a brief statement. We were allowed to choose from among the 120 witnesses whom we interrogated in the case of Katyn, only three. If the Tribunal is interested in hearing any other witnesses named in the reports of the Extraordinary State Commission, we have, in the majority of cases, adequate affidavits which we can submit at the Tribunal’s request. Moreover, any one of these persons can be called to this Court if the Tribunal so desires. That is all I have to say upon this matter. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer? DR. STAHMER: I have no objection to the further presentation of evidence as long as it is on an equal basis; that is, if I, too, have the opportunity to offer further evidence. I am also in a position to call further witnesses and experts for the Court. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already made its order; it does not propose to hear further evidence. DR. STAHMER: Thank you. THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. The Tribunal wishes to hear Dr. Bergold with reference to finishing the case of the Defendant Bormann, and the Tribunal also understands that counsel for the Defendant Von Neurath has some documents which he wishes to present. Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, have you some documents for Von Neurath? DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: Will you present them now? DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have here two types of documents. One type includes the documents which I have already offered in presenting my evidence, and to which I have called the attention of the Court. They are all in the document books which have been submitted to the Court, and I believe it will be sufficient to hand these documents to the General Secretary. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, you have already offered them in evidence and they all have numbers, have they not? DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then I have a number of documents, probably 12 or 15, which have also been included in my document books, in translation. However, I have not yet mentioned these documents in my presentation recently, and have not yet asked the Court to take judicial notice of them. If I may refer to them briefly, they are as follows: A letter from Von Neurath to Hitler of 19 June 1933. A copy of the minutes of the withdrawal of the Inter-Allied Military Commission in 1926. A speech... THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly give them the exhibit numbers which they are to have as you offer them in evidence? DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: The first one is a letter to Hitler of 19 June 1933. What number will that letter have? DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: That is Number 12. Number 32, minutes on the withdrawal of the Inter-Allied Military Commission. Number 50, a speech of Prime Minister MacDonald of 16 March 1933. Number 51, an article of Von Neurath on the League of Nations, in the periodical _Der Völkerbund_ of 11 May 1933. Number 52, Hitler’s speech of 17 May 1933, the so-called “Peace Speech.” Number 53, a statement of the German Ambassador Nadolny, in Geneva, of 19 May 1933. Number 54, a statement of the American representative, Norman Davies, at the Disarmament Conference, of 22 May 1933. Number 55, a statement of the German Ambassador Nadolny, at the Disarmament Conference of 27 May 1935. Number 81, a speech by the then Minister Beneš of 2 July 1934. Number 82, an excerpt from the speech of Marshal Pétain of 22 July 1934. Number 83, the communiqué of the Reich Government of 26 July 1934. Number 85, the communiqué of the Reich Government of 10 September 1934. Number 86, a speech of Herr Von Neurath of 17 September 1934. Number 88, excerpts from the speech of Marshal Smuts of 12 November 1934. Number 119, a statement of the British Minister in the House of Commons of 20 July 1936. Those are the documents which I had not yet named, but which are already contained in my document books. Mr. President, may I take this opportunity to submit the following application, namely: The Court... THE PRESIDENT: Those documents have all been translated, have they not, Dr. Lüdinghausen? DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, they are all included, in translation, in the document books which have been submitted. Mr. President, may I now make an application to the Court? It is to the effect that the Court should permit me to call again the Defendant Von Neurath to the witness stand, for the following reason. As may be recalled, in the course of cross-examination Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe presented Document 3859-PS to the defendant, which document was a photostatic copy of a letter from the defendant, dated 31 August 1940, to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, with two enclosures. In this letter the defendant asked Lammers to submit the two enclosures to Hitler and to arrange, if possible, a personal conference or an interview on the question of alleged Germanization mentioned therein. The two enclosures of this letter to Lammers are reports and suggestions on the future form of the Protectorate and concern the assimilation or possible Germanization of the Czech people. The Court will recall that the presentation of this rather extensive document—it has 30 or 40 pages in this photostatic form if not more—surprised the defendant, and at that moment he could not recall the matter clearly enough to give positive and exhaustive information about these documents immediately. Nevertheless, in cross-examination, after a very brief look at these reports, he expressed doubts as to whether these reports, as presented here in photostatic form, were actually identical with the reports which were enclosed, according to his instructions, in the letter to Lammers to be submitted to Hitler. A careful examination of these photostatic copies was not possible in the course of cross-examination; and, of course, I myself, since I did not know the documents, was not able to comment upon them. Since Herr Von Neurath was obviously overtired and exhausted after the cross-examination it was not possible for me to examine the question and discuss it with him on the same day; that was possible only on the following day. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, the defendant may be recalled for the purpose of being questioned about these two documents; but, of course, it is an exceptional license which is allowed on this occasion, because the object of re-examination is to enable counsel to elucidate such matters as this. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: You may call him. [_The Defendant Von Neurath resumed the stand._] You are still under oath, of course. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath, do you recall the reason for your letter to Dr. Lammers of 31 August 1940 and your request for him to arrange a conference, an interview with Hitler? VON NEURATH: Yes. As I said during my examination, in the course of the summer of 1940 I learned that various Reich and Party agencies, among others particularly the Gauleiter of the neighboring Gaue and Himmler, had sent more or less radical reports and suggestions to Hitler. I knew that Himmler, particularly, made quite extreme suggestions regarding a partition of the Protectorate area and complete annihilation of the Czech folkdom and people. These agencies were urging Hitler to put these plans into effect as quickly as possible. Since, as I have already emphasized, I was opposed to such plans and, on the contrary, wanted to preserve the Czech people and folkdom and protect them against the intentions of Himmler and his companions to destroy them, I decided to make an attempt to induce Hitler not to carry out any Germanization plans but to forbid them and to send a categorical order to this effect to the Party and its agencies. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you recall how these two reports came about, which were to be included in your letter to Lammers? VON NEURATH: As far as I can recall, things developed as follows: Either I myself dictated a report or one of my officials drew it up according to my instructions; I believe the latter was the case. But I recall definitely that this report was much briefer than the one submitted here in photostatic copy. I remember, furthermore, that the conclusions drawn in it were similar but much sharper and that the whole problem had to be considered very carefully. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, tell us how and why the second report of Frank came to be made. VON NEURATH: From the various discussions which I had with Frank, I knew that he, too, was opposed to this partition of the Protectorate territory and the evacuation of the Czech population as proposed by Himmler and that he shared my opinions, at least to that extent. Therefore I considered it expedient, since Hitler had assigned Frank to me as State Secretary because he knew the Czech country and people very well, to point out to Hitler that this man, too, was opposed to Himmler’s plans and advised Hitler against accepting them. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But for what reason did you especially emphasize in your letter to Lammers that you shared the opinions expressed in Frank’s report? VON NEURATH: I considered it right to do this because Frank was a member of the SS and a subordinate and confidant of Himmler. On the other hand, I knew already at that time that Hitler was prejudiced against me, because of my attitude toward the Czech people, which he considered much too mild and lenient; and I was, therefore, convinced that together with Frank I would be more likely to be successful in influencing Hitler to my way of thinking than if I went to him alone. That was the reason why I suggested that Frank should participate in the report. For the same reason I did not write directly to Hitler, as I did usually, but to Lammers. According to previous experience, I had to assume that if I had written directly to Hitler, who on top of it was not in Berlin at the time, he would either not read the report at all or would refer it to Himmler. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How was this letter to Lammers and its enclosures handled in your office? VON NEURATH: I had the draft of the report of Frank submitted to me. Then I dictated my letter to Lammers, and I sent it with my report and Frank’s draft back to Frank’s office for a final review of the Frank report and for the dispatch of the letter to Lammers together with both versions. I did not see the letter to Lammers and the two reports again before they were sent out nor did I see them, by the way, in Berlin at the conference with Hitler. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The last question. How did you reach the conviction that the photostatic copies, submitted here, of the two reports could not be identical with the reports which were enclosed in the letter to Lammers, according to your instructions? VON NEURATH: As for the first report which I prepared, I have already stated that according to my recollection it was much shorter than the one submitted here in photostatic copy. Furthermore, this photostatic copy does not bear my signature, not even my initials. But it is out of the question that the final copy of this report, which was enclosed at my office in the letter to Lammers, would not have been signed or at least initialed by me; and the certificate of correctness, which, remarkably enough, is contained in this report and which was prepared by an SS Obersturmbannführer, is not signed. The photostatic copy which is said to have been enclosed in the letter to Lammers does not even bear my initials. The most noticeable thing, however, is the certificate of correctness on the photostatic copy. This can have a meaning only if the document enclosed in the letter to Lammers, in spite of not bearing my signature, was enclosed in the letter nevertheless. But since the final copy which my office sent to State Secretary Frank’s office with the letter to Lammers was certainly signed by me, this certificate proves that it was not the report signed by me which was enclosed in the letter sent to Lammers but another one drafted by Frank or by officials in his office. As for Frank’s own report, the text of the photostatic copy here, to my recollection, is not identical with the text of the report which I approved and which I then sent on together with my report to Lammers... THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, we have heard the explanation more than once, I think, that the enclosure which was in the letter was not the same as the one which he drew up. It does not get any more convincing by getting told over again. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I only wanted to express it again. But if the Tribunal believes that that explanation has been made previously, I may dispense with it. VON NEURATH: Mr. President, may I be permitted to make another statement as to how I imagine—of course, I can only imagine—these things took place? I am firmly convinced that if the two photostatic copies submitted here were actually enclosed in the letter to Lammers, they were prepared in Frank’s office, and enclosed without my knowledge. Another possibility would be, of course, that Czech... THE PRESIDENT: We are quite as able to imagine possibilities as you are. The fact is that the letter was signed in his name, was it not? The letter itself was signed? DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: And he refers expressly to the enclosure? DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: Very well; we understand it. DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I wanted it to be made clear to the Court. For, as I have said, I could not thoroughly examine the remarkable characteristics of these two reports, the outer form and the text at the moment of cross-examination. I have no further questions, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to the dock. Do you want to ask any questions, Sir David? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I do not think so. If the Court would just allow me, I should like to look at the document while the Court is recessed and see whether there is any point that I might like to question on. THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now. [_A recess was taken._] SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have considered the matter; and I think it is really in the stage of argument and not cross-examination; but, My Lord, I should like Your Lordship just to observe, as the matter has been raised, that there is a certificate, given by Captain Hochwald on behalf of General Ecer, which states that the exhibit which was put in is a photostat taken from the original of a document found in the archives of the Reich Protector’s office in Prague, so that that theory appears, from the certificate and the exhibit, that the copy-letter to Dr. Lammers and the two memoranda were preserved and found in the office of the Reich Protector. I do not want to say anything further in the matter. THE PRESIDENT: Let the defendant come back to the witness box. Oh—no he need not come back. Dr. Bergold. Dr. Bergold? FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, since Dr. Bergold is absent at present, I should like to ask whether I may submit the three documents in my case which are still outstanding. THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Kranzbühler. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am offering as Exhibit Dönitz-100, the affidavit subscribed by the chief of the American Navy, Admiral Nimitz, as to American U-boat war against the Japanese Navy. The Tribunal already knows what I wish to prove with this. I need not read anything now because in the final presentation of my argument I shall have to come back to this point. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to have the document read, Dr. Kranzbühler. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have the original text in English, Mr. President, and I shall therefore have to read in English: “At the request of the International Military Tribunal, the following interrogatories were on this date, 11 May 1940, put to Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz...” THE PRESIDENT: You must have given the wrong date—1946, is it not? FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: 11 May 1946. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: “...put to Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy, by Lieutenant Commander Joseph L. Broderick, United States Naval Reserve, of the International Law Section, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., who recorded verbatim the testimony of the witness. Admiral Nimitz was duly sworn by Lieutenant Commander Broderick and interrogated as follows: “Q: ‘What is your name, rank, and present station?’ “A: ‘Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, United States Navy, Chief of Naval Operations of the United States Navy.’ “1. Q: ‘What positions in the U.S. Navy did you hold from December 1941 until May 1945?’ “A: ‘Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.’ “2. Q: ‘Did the U.S.A. in her sea warfare against Japan announce certain waters to be areas of operation, blockade, danger, restriction, warning, or the like?’ “A: ‘Yes. For the purpose of command of operations against Japan the Pacific Ocean areas were declared a theater of operations.’ “3. Q: ‘If yes, was it customary in such areas for submarines to attack merchantmen without warning, with the exception of her own and those of her Allies?’ “A: ‘Yes, with the exception of hospital ships and other vessels under “safe conduct” voyages for humanitarian purposes.’ “4. Q: ‘Were you under orders to do so?’ “A: ‘The Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941 ordered unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan.’ “5. Q: ‘Was it customary for the submarines to attack Japanese merchantmen without warning—outside of announced operation or similar areas since the outbreak of the war?’ “A: ‘The reply to this interrogatory involves matters outside the limits of my command during the war; therefore I make no reply thereto.’ “6. Q: ‘Were you under orders to do so?’ “A: ‘The reply to this interrogatory involves matters outside the limits of my command during the war; therefore I make no reply thereto.’ “7. Q: ‘If the practice of attacking without warning did not exist since the outbreak of the war, did it exist from a later date on? From what date on?’ “A: ‘The practice existed from 7 December 1941 in the declared zone of operations.’ “8. Q: ‘Did this practice correspond to issued orders?’ “A: ‘Yes.’ “9. Q: ‘Did it become known to the U.S. naval authorities that Japanese merchantmen were under orders to report any sighted U.S. submarine to the Japanese Armed Forces by radio? If yes, when did it become known?’ “A: ‘During the course of the war, it became known to the U.S. naval authorities that Japanese merchantmen in fact reported by radio to Japanese Armed Forces any information regarding sighting of U.S. submarines.’ “10. Q: ‘Did the U.S. submarines thereupon receive the order to attack without warning Japanese merchantmen, if this order did not exist already before? If yes, when?’ “A: ‘The order existed from 7 December 1941.’ “11. Q: ‘Did it become known to the U.S. naval authorities that the Japanese merchantmen were under orders to attack any U.S. submarine in any way suitable according to the situation; for instance, by ramming, gunfire, or by depth charges? If yes, when did it become known?’ “A: ‘Japanese merchantmen were usually armed and always attacked by any available means when feasible.’ “12. Q: ‘Did the U.S. submarines thereupon receive the order of attacking without warning Japanese merchantmen, if this order did not already exist before. If yes, when?’ “A: ‘The order existed from 7 December 1941.’ “13. Q: ‘Were, by order or on general principles, the U.S. submarines prohibited from carrying out rescue measures toward passengers and crews of ships sunk without warning in those cases where by doing so the safety of their own boat was endangered?’ “A: ‘On general principles, the U.S. submarines did not rescue enemy survivors if undue additional hazard to the submarine resulted or the submarine would thereby be prevented from accomplishing its further mission. U.S. submarines were limited in rescue measures by small passenger-carrying facilities combined with the known desperate and suicidal character of the enemy. Therefore, it was unsafe to pick up many survivors. Frequently survivors were given rubber boats and/or provisions. Almost invariably survivors did not come aboard the submarine voluntarily, and it was necessary to take them prisoner by force.’ “14. Q: ‘If such an order or principle did not exist, did the U.S. submarine actually carry out rescue measures in the above-mentioned cases?’ “A: ‘In numerous cases enemy survivors were rescued by U.S. submarines.’ “15. Q: ‘In answering the above question, does the expression “merchantmen” mean any other kind of ships than those which were not warships?’ “A: ‘No. By “merchantmen” I mean all types of ships which were not combatant ships. Used in this sense, it includes fishing boats, et cetera.’ “16. Q: ‘If yes, what kind of ships?’ “A: ‘The last answer covers this question.’ “17. Q: ‘Has any order of the U.S. naval authorities mentioned in the above questionnaire concerning the tactics of U.S. submarines toward Japanese merchantmen been based on the grounds of reprisal? If yes, what orders?’ “A: ‘The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered on 7 December 1941 resulted from the recognition of Japanese tactics revealed on that date. No further orders to U.S. submarines concerning tactics toward Japanese merchantmen throughout the war were based on reprisal, although specific instances of Japanese submarines committing atrocities toward U.S. merchant marine survivors became known and would have justified such a course.’ “18. Q: ‘Has this order or have these orders of the Japanese Government been announced as reprisals?’ “A: ‘The question is not clear. Therefore I make no reply thereto.’ “19. Q: ‘On the basis of what Japanese tactics was reprisal considered justified?’ “A: ‘The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered by the Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941 was justified by the Japanese attacks on that date on U.S. bases and on both armed and unarmed ships and nationals without warning or declaration of war.’ “The above record of testimony has been examined by me on this date and is in all respects accurate and true.”—signed—“Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy.” This document bears the number Dönitz-100. As my next document I submit an expert opinion given by the former naval judge, Jäckel, on the jurisdiction of the naval courts for the protection of the native population against encroachments by marines. This document has been admitted by the Tribunal and is available in translation and therefore I do not need to read it. THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the number? FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Dönitz-49, Mr. President. Then, Mr. President, some weeks back I made application to admit extracts from the records of a war crimes court at Oslo. These had been used by the Prosecution on the occasion of the cross-examination of Grossadmiral Dönitz. At that time they were not numbered. From these records I selected some extracts which prove that torpedo boat Number 345, whose crew were shot by reason of the Commando Order, was a boat which was charged with sabotage acts. Due to this fact the High Command of the Navy and also Admiral Dönitz were not informed about the treatment meted out to these prisoners, and this question was settled directly by means of discussions between Gauleiter Terboven and the Führer’s headquarters. I ask that the High Tribunal admit this document as evidence, since this document was used by the Prosecution. It would receive the Number Dönitz-107. COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): My Lord, I do not know if the Tribunal has before it the answer which the Prosecution have put into this application. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we have just looked at it now. COL. PHILLIMORE: Broadly speaking, it comes to this, that we are quite prepared to put in the whole proceedings, but we should object to extracts being put in; that is, amongst the affidavits and the evidence of some of the witnesses, material to support the points for which counsel for Defendant Dönitz contends. There is, on the other hand, a body of evidence the other way on all those points. That is why, My Lord... THE PRESIDENT: Would it not save translation if you put in the passages in the document upon which you rely? COL. PHILLIMORE: If that would be more convenient, My Lord, we can do that. THE PRESIDENT: I do not know how long the document is. It may be very long indeed. COL. PHILLIMORE: The whole proceedings are very long. The trial lasted for 4 days. THE PRESIDENT: Then it would be appropriate that you should pick out the parts on which you rely and Dr. Kranzbühler can put in... COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is put in the answer that the document against this defendant, which was proved in the defendant’s case, was an affidavit by the Judge Advocate, who set out the effect of the evidence accepted by the court. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal follows that, but it thinks that it is desirable that you should put in the passages upon which you as well as the defense counsel rely. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: May I submit this document, Mr. President? THE PRESIDENT: What is the number again, please? FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Number Dönitz-107, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: And it contains extracts from these proceedings, does it? FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, extracts. THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will put in their extracts and we will consider them both. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, then I have another question dealing with the documents of the case which we have just dealt with, the case of Katyn. The witness, Professor Markov, mentioned the expert opinion given by the Italian expert, Professor Palmieri, which is in the German _White Book_. I should also like to submit this opinion as evidence, for the reason that there is no mention of insects being found on the corpses as Professor Markov asserted, but rather, “larvae.” To me the difference appears to be that insects fly about during the summer whereas larvae conceal themselves during the winter months, Mr. President, may I submit this document? MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I should like to make just one factual remark. In Professor Palmieri’s report it was indicated that the “larvae” were discovered in the throats of the corpses. I cannot imagine that “insects” were ever found in the throat of a corpse. That is why I do not think that the presentation of the document by defendant’s counsel serves a purpose. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, you are specifying a particular document referred to in the _White Book_, is that right? FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: And you mean the whole of the document? FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That document is about one page, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Then you may put it in, subject to its being translated. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well, Mr. President. MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, we are talking about a document which is an account on the dissection of a corpse performed by Professor Palmieri. It is no report but merely an account of an autopsy carried out by Professor Palmieri himself. THE PRESIDENT: Is it referred to in the conclusions or not? FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It is put in the general record to the same extent as the record of Professor Markov. It is the findings on the autopsy which Professor Palmieri performed. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I have still another document in the case of Katyn, which I received from Polish sources just a few days ago. This is a document which was written in English and appeared in London in 1946. The title is, _Report on the Massacre of Polish Officers in the Katyn Wood_. In this document Polish sources are used, and I should like to offer this document to the Tribunal as evidence. However, before I present certain lines of evidence, I would like to ask that the High Tribunal examine this document, for there may be doubts whether it can be used as evidence. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, this document is printed for private circulation only. It has no printer’s name on it, and it is entirely anonymous. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President, these were the doubts which I entertained. I submitted this document as I assumed that in view of the importance of this case, the Tribunal would nevertheless want to take official notice of the contents. THE PRESIDENT: No, the Tribunal thinks it would be improper to look at a document of this nature. GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I should just like to make one remark, as in fact the Tribunal has already indicated its decision. The statement of the defendant’s counsel that this document was received from the Polish Delegation astounds me to say the least. I should like to know from what Polish Delegation he received this document, because the Polish Delegation represented here could not possibly produce such a Fascist propaganda document as this. THE PRESIDENT: I think General Rudenko misunderstood what Dr. Kranzbühler said. DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, four interrogatories were granted to me on behalf of the Defendant Funk. When I presented my case, I could not yet submit these affidavits because they had not been translated. In the meantime, I have received these translations; and they have been submitted to the Tribunal. I ask to be permitted to present them briefly to the Tribunal at this point. One of them, in Document Book Walter Funk, Supplement Number 2, will be numbered Exhibit Number Funk-16. This is the very comprehensive interrogation of the witness Landfried who held the position of state secretary in the Ministry of the Defendant Funk. This witness—I do not believe I need to read this record in detail—in answer to the first question, deals with the economic policy of the Defendant Funk in the occupied countries. He describes it in exactly the same way as it was presented by Funk. In answer to the second question, he deals similarly with the directions given by the Defendant Funk to the military commanders and to the Reich Commissioners of the occupied countries. Under Question 4, the witness deals with the question of the plundering of the occupied territories. He confirms the fact that the Defendant Funk always opposed such plundering, that he fought the black markets, that he opposed devaluation of the currency, that he tried to maintain currency in the occupied territory on the original level. In reply to Question 5, the witness describes in detail how the Defendant Funk tried to prevent financial overburdening of the occupied countries, especially to lower the costs of occupation as far as possible. Then in the other questions, in Part 2, particularly in reply to Question 11, the witness discusses the activities of the Defendant Funk in the Ministry of Economics, with regard to German preparations in the event of a war. Then, in reply to Question 12, the witness examines the position of the Plenipotentiary General for Economy and he concludes that in practice it was the position of a figurehead only. However, I do not wish to read these detailed statements and take up too much of the time of the Tribunal, for in the main these are only repetitions of statements that have already been made. In the last two questions, Numbers 14 and 15, the witness Landfried, who, as I have already said, was for years the defendant’s deputy, describes the defendant’s attitude toward the policy of terror and his fundamental attitude in regard to the use of foreign workers and similar matters. I ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of this very detailed testimony and that these brief statements will suffice. The next interrogatory comes from the witness Emil Puhl. This is the same witness who was interrogated in this courtroom about other questions, namely the question of gold teeth, _et cetera_. This is the interrogatory and the answers of the witness Emil Puhl, Document Book Funk, Supplement Number 3, Exhibit Funk-17. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, has this interrogatory been granted? DR. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: He gave his evidence. We do not generally allow interrogatories to witnesses who have given their evidence. DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the matter was like this: As far back as December I had applied for this interrogatory and repeatedly asked for it, but it did not arrive. And only after 2 days of cross-examining, was this witness Emil Puhl suddenly questioned by the Prosecution on entirely different subjects, that is the matter of gold deposits made by the SS, rather of gold teeth. This interrogation by the Prosecution did not refer to the interrogatory, which I believe was granted by you in February. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, what I mean is this: Supposing the Tribunal is asked to grant an interrogatory and it grants the interrogatory, and then the witness is subsequently called to give evidence. When he is called to give evidence, he ought to be questioned upon all the matters which are relevant to the Trial. The Tribunal does not want to have to read his evidence in one place and then his interrogatory in some other place. Is there any objection, Mr. Dodd, to accepting it in this case? MR. DODD: No, I have no objection, Mr. President. That is the situation. It was granted before Puhl was called. He was called here for cross-examination and I do not recall offhand whether or not counsel inquired concerning these matters that are contained therein. We have no objections. It may be some annoyance to the Tribunal, which we regret. DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the witness Puhl, during his examination in the French camp, also had the questions of the cross-examination submitted to him which the Prosecution asked for and they were answered by him. Thus he was interrogated not only about the points which I raised, but also about the questions put in the cross-examination by the Prosecution. Therefore, I take the liberty of submitting this document, which is an interrogatory of Emil Puhl, Document Book Number 3, Supplement Number 3, and to which is assigned Exhibit Number Funk-17. This witness Puhl, who was the vice president of the Reichsbank, in this interrogatory deals solely with matters entirely different from the subjects dealt with here in his examination, namely, the preparations which the Reichsbank President, Dr. Funk, made in the event of war; that is Question Number 1, concerning the handling of the clearing debts, and Question Number 2, about the higher valuation of the Danish currency... THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks you need not read the interrogatory but the Tribunal will allow it to go in in this case. DR. SAUTER: Thank you, Mr. President. I wanted only to sketch the contents of this testimony briefly. Then I submit additional testimony, given by a witness, which has been granted by the Tribunal. It is the testimony given by the witness Heinz Kallus, to be found in Document Book Walter Funk, Supplement 4, and is assigned Exhibit Number Funk-18. I also submit this testimony to the General Secretary and I should like to ask, in order to save time, that the Tribunal take judicial notice of its contents. As my fourth and last document there is an affidavit subscribed by Mr. Messersmith, a supplement to a previous statement which has already been submitted to the Tribunal. This is very brief, in fact it is but one sentence and it may be found in the Document Book Walter Funk, Supplement Number 5, with Exhibit Number Funk-19. I also submit this document. And now I have arrived at the conclusion of my report, Mr. President. Thank you very much. DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I should like to submit to the Tribunal the testimony of the witness Dr. Beil. Up to now I had received this testimony only in English. I have fetched it again from the Translation Division so that I could submit it as Exhibit Number Rosenberg-50. In this connection I have another request. This interrogatory contains important questions dealing with the attitude adopted by the East Ministry in the matter of allocation of labor and it is of such importance that I ask the permission of the Tribunal to have it read. Since I am not entirely conversant with the English language, I should like to ask to have an interpreter read this interrogatory. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, has this document been offered in evidence before: It was granted by the Tribunal, was it not, this interrogatory? DR. THOMA: Yes, it has already been granted by the Tribunal. THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to read it? Can you not submit it in evidence and the Tribunal will consider it? DR. THOMA: I leave that, of course, to the Tribunal to decide. I wanted to point out only that this is very important and decisive testimony in regard to the question of manpower allocation in the East Ministry. However, I shall leave that to the judgment of the Tribunal. THE PRESIDENT: Can you not summarize it? DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I have received only an English translation, and I do not wish to attempt to do anything with it. But I believe there are only 2 pages—the interpreter will read that in no time at all. THE PRESIDENT: Let the interpreter read it then. INTERPRETER: Exhibit Number Rosenberg-50: “Copy. Completed interrogatory of Ministerialrat Dr. Beil, on behalf of Rosenberg. “The witness, having been duly sworn, states: “Q: ‘Were you the permanent official (Sachbearbeiter) in the East Ministry (Ost Ministerium) in charge of the questions of labor and social policy?’ “A: ‘Yes, I was one of 10 permanent officials; we originally started with 52, but as the East Front receded the staff was finally reduced to 10. I was in charge of the administration side of the labor and social policy. The head of the department was Landesbauernführer Peukert.’ “Q: ‘Was the East Ministry in favor of voluntary recruiting of workers in the East?’ “A: ‘Yes, of voluntary recruiting only, my instructions being that it should only be carried out on this basis.’ “Q: ‘Are any results known?’ “A: ‘Yes, but the results were not as great as anticipated, only some 300,000 to 400,000 volunteered and most of these were from the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Estonia.’ “Q: ‘Were there any negotiations about decreasing the quotas ordered by the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor (GBA)?’ “A: ‘Yes, negotiations for decreasing the quotas took place but broke down owing to Sauckel demanding something like a million workers to be transferred to the interior.’ “Q: ‘Who was responsible for the care and control of the East Workers (Ostarbeiter) in the Reich?’ “A: ‘The German Labor Front (Arbeitsfront) and the Reich Food Estate (Reichsnährstand) were responsible for the care of the East Workers, the former for workers in munitions and heavy industry and the latter for agricultural workers.’ “Q: ‘What was the point of view of the Department ASO...’” DR. THOMA: ASO, if I may interrupt, is the Labor, Social, and Political Department of the East Ministry. INTERPRETER: [_continuing._] “Q: ‘What was the point of view of the Department ASO concerning the treatment of the East Workers in the Reich?’ “A: ‘The view of my Department ASO was that the voluntary recruiting of workers on a free movement basis, thus taking them out of the barbed-wire-enclosed factories, would be the best method of treatment; we also advocated the removal of the arm badges, worn originally on the arm and later over the left breast, which carried the word “East” so as to distinguish them from workers from the West, who never at any time wore badges. The wording being later changed to “Greater Russia,” “White Russia,” and “Ukraine,” the people from the Baltic States did not wear the arm badge. Certain Russians, small groups of Cossacks, Tartars, and one or two others were not compelled to wear the arm band, as they were anti-Bolshevistic and pro-German; and a certain proportion of these were eventually called up into the German Army. Some 7,000 youths of Ruthenia were called up by ASO and these were apprenticed at Junkers Works.’ “Q: ‘Is the Central Office (Zentralstelle) for the eastern people (Ostvölker) at the East Ministry known to you? How was this organized?’ “A: ‘Yes, it was considered to be a consulate for the East; members of the staff were partly Germans and partly local employees from the East, who were considered suitable for such employment. Some of the foreign employees were placed at the disposal of the country offices to look after the interests of their fellow countrymen working in the countries. At the Central Office were instituted offices for each of the eastern states, each office being controlled by a German, some of whom had originally come from these states. There was also a welfare branch which was run by persons from these eastern states, to look after the comfort, _et cetera_, of their individual countrymen; there was also a religious branch which was run by clergy from these countries, but this branch was not very successful as there was an insufficiency of priests.’ “Q: ‘Now, with the help of the DAF, were the complaints followed up?’ “A: ‘The interests of foreign workers were always looked after; missions were sent to the various concentrations of East Workers to find out how they were progressing and what kind of treatment they were receiving. These missions dealt with complaints submitted to them on their visits, but the Central Office had to deal also with written complaints received through the post.’ “Q: ‘Is a printed circular to the authorities in the country known to you, that ordered a just treatment? Details? What was the story about the families who were evacuated by the Army Group Center and about the children 10-14 years old?’ “A: ‘Yes, there was a circular issued, dealing with this question, and it gave details at great length for the just treatment of the East Workers. This circular was issued at the request of the Ministry of the East, through Sauckel. A second circular was issued by Rosenberg dealing with the just treatment of workers from the East only. I have no knowledge of this story, as this was dealt with entirely by the Army Group Center.’ “Q: ‘Does the witness know the pamphlet issued by the East Ministry to the managers of enterprises concerning the nations of eastern Europe and the attitude towards them?’” THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, that affidavit does not seem to be short at all. It all seems to be cumulative. Every word of it is what we have heard before and heard not only once, but over and over again. INTERPRETER: Dr. Thoma has just said that the last sentence is coming up. DR. THOMA: There are two more short sentences. INTERPRETER: “A: ‘There were two pamphlets issued; one issued by Sauckel, and the other issued in conjunction with DAF and Sauckel and the Ministry for the East.’ “Q: ‘Has he one handy?’ “A: ‘I have not got a copy of this pamphlet.’ “(Signed) Beil.” THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the Tribunal rely on counsel, you know; and when you tell us that this is an important affidavit, we rely on what you tell us. In the opinion of the Tribunal, the reading of the affidavit was an absolute waste of the Tribunal’s time. DR. THOMA: I should like to put another request to the Tribunal. I have asked that I be granted an interrogatory for the Reichshauptstellenleiter Dr. Oeppert, of the office of the Delegate of the Führer for the supervision of the entire ideological and mental relation of the NSDAP under Rosenberg’s office. This affidavit has not been granted to me, but I already have it on hand. THE PRESIDENT: Has the Prosecution seen it? DR. THOMA: No, Mr. President, I do not think so. I submitted an application to the General Secretary. Whether this request has already been transmitted to the Prosecution, I do not know. THE PRESIDENT: Well, the only application that we have got, as far as I can see, is an interrogatory to Dr. Köppen in lieu of Dr. Stellbrecht. Is that the one that you are speaking about now? DR. THOMA: No. Mr. President, I was granted permission to interrogate Dr. Köppen instead of Dr. Stellbrecht, and the interrogatory has already been sent off. This, however, is a new application regarding Dr. Oeppert and has not yet been decided upon. THE PRESIDENT: You had better submit it to the Prosecution and see whether they have any comment to make on it, and we can take it up tomorrow. DR. THOMA: Thank you very much, Mr. President. DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the case of Papen there are six interrogatories which have not been disposed of. Three of them have been returned in the last few days and are in the stage of being translated. I asked, when I received my last interrogatory, to be allowed to submit all six at one time to the Tribunal. Then, without my taking any steps to get it, I received an affidavit 3 days ago from a foreign journalist, Rademacher von Unna, from Milan, Italy. This affidavit is being translated at present. I submitted it to the British prosecutor, and he does not object. I ask to be allowed to submit this affidavit later with the remainder of my documents. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly you may submit it. We shall then pass an opinion upon it as to its admissibility. DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you, Mr. President. DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendants Frank and Hess): Mr. President, I ask permission to submit the answers to the interrogatories from the witnesses which have not yet been submitted. As Exhibit Frank-19 I submit the answers to the interrogatory given by the witness Dr. Ernst Böpple. Böpple was State Secretary in the Government General, and he has answered 41 questions in all. As Number Frank-20, I submit the answers to an interrogatory given by the witness Max Meidinger. Meidinger was chief of the chancellery of the Government General. He has answered 43 questions. This interrogatory, as well as the first interrogatory by Böpple, as far as I could make out, has not been translated yet, although I handed these interrogatories in to be translated about 10 days ago. But attached to the interrogatory there is an English translation which was made during the interrogation. As Number Frank-21 I submit the answers given by the witness Gassner, who answered 49 questions. Gassner was press chief in the Government General. Number Frank-22 will be the interrogatory deposed by the witness Dr. Stepp, who in the end was president of the Court of Appeals (Oberlandesgericht). He deals mainly with the efforts made by the Defendant Frank in the years 1933 and 1934, in his capacity as Bavarian Minister of Justice, for the dissolution of the concentration camp at Dachau. I should also like to take this opportunity, Mr. President, of pointing out an error of translation which does not refer to the documents of Frank but to a document which was submitted on behalf of the Defendant Hess. Although it was not used by the Prosecution with regard to the personal responsibility of Rudolf Hess, it is found in the document book, and the document concerned is Exhibit USA-696, Document 062-PS. That is a directive of 13 March 1940, the same directive which was mentioned last Saturday in the case of the Defendant Bormann, on which occasion the President himself read Figure 4 of this directive, which was submitted as an appendix to this directive of 13 March. There is a very serious error in translation, which completely distorts the sense of the directive and which, I must say, can have very dangerous consequences. Under Figure 4 the words “unschädlich gemacht” (made harmless) were translated as “liquidated.” THE PRESIDENT: If there is an error in the translation, you had better apply to the General Secretary; and he will have the matter gone into by the Translation Division. DR. SEIDL: Yes, Mr. President, but the matter does not seem to be as simple as that. The translator obviously had the feeling himself that his translation was not reproducing the sense quite accurately, because in parentheses he added “unschädlich gemacht.” In my opinion this sentence must be translated as follows: “Likewise, enemy parachutists are immediately to be arrested or made harmless.” The sense was obviously that the parachutists... THE PRESIDENT: I dare say, Dr. Seidl, but we do not have the document before us and we do not all of us understand the German language. Therefore, it had better be referred to the Translation Division. It is no good referring it to us. DR. SEIDL: Then I shall put a written application to the General Secretary, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Have the Prosecution any objection to these interrogatories which Dr. Seidl has been dealing with? Have the Prosecution had the opportunity of putting cross-interrogatories if they wanted to do so? COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I am told that we think so, with the possible exception of the last one. Perhaps I could look into it overnight. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. COL. PHILLIMORE: I will look into that point and let the Tribunal know. My Lord, the Prosecution have a few documents to put in. I have eight, and I think my friend Mr. Dodd has three. I could do it very quickly, but it might be more convenient to do it tomorrow morning. THE PRESIDENT: We will go into all these documents tomorrow morning. There will be some others on behalf of some of the other defendants. We will also hear the witnesses Kempka and Walkenhorst, I believe it is, whom Dr. Bergold wishes to call. The Tribunal desires Dr. Bergold to be here tomorrow morning in order to be able to examine these witnesses. The Tribunal will now adjourn. [_The Tribunal adjourned until 3 July 1946 at 1000 hours._] ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTIETH DAY Wednesday, 3 July 1946 _Morning Session_ THE PRESIDENT: Has Dr. Bergold asked any of the defendants’ counsel to represent him? [_There was no response._] Has the Marshal been able to get in touch with Dr. Bergold? MARSHAL: No, Sir. DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, Dr. Bergold was advised yesterday that his presence would be required in the courtroom today. As far as I have heard—and I have only heard this—the General Secretary also got in touch with him regarding this matter. I am sorry I cannot tell you any more about it. As far as I know, he did not ask anyone to represent him in Court today. THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Dr. Stahmer. DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I shall look into this matter immediately, to see whether he has arrived or whether I can contact him. THE PRESIDENT: Very good; and Dr. Stahmer, I think the best course would be for the Tribunal to consider the various applications with reference to interrogatories and documents, which I think you and other counsel wish to offer in evidence, and the Tribunal will then examine these witnesses if Dr. Bergold is not here by that time. The Tribunal, of course, expect him to be here if it is possible. Perhaps you will communicate with him, and the Marshal should also communicate with Dr. Bergold. DR. STAHMER: Yes. MARSHAL: Yes, Sir. PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Mr. President, I have learned that the son of Dr. Bergold returned yesterday unexpectedly and suddenly from a prisoner-of-war camp. Therefore, Dr. Bergold went to his home, a short distance from Nuremberg. I asked his secretary to go to Dr. Bergold’s home and to bring him here and I assume he will be here within approximately half an hour. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, you have some interrogatories, I think, which you want to offer in evidence, have you not? DR. STAHMER: Yes, Sir. At the end of my presentation I still had some interrogatories which I had been permitted to present but which had not arrived. First of all, I shall turn to the interrogatory of Kammhuber, who was a general in the Air Force. He submitted an organizational study for 1950, which was completed on 2 May 1938. He was questioned about the purpose and significance of this study and he stated—I will give a short summary—that a part of it, which came under the heading of “long term objective” was a tentative sketch based on theoretical assumptions. Then there was a second part which gave the deadline of 1942, and the interim solution for 1 October 1938. This was a positive proposal for the organization of the Luftwaffe. This study was compiled by the author on his own initiative. The witness does not know whether it was actually submitted to Göring. He considers it improbable, but he does assume that he did suggest the positive proposal for the organization of the Luftwaffe to Göring. That is the substance of this interrogatory which will be called Exhibit Number Göring-54. I have another interrogatory which I should like to submit, which originates from General Kurt Student. This deals with the air attack on Rotterdam in May of 1940. It is an explanation... THE PRESIDENT: Have you got copies of these affidavits, I mean these interrogatories? We have got this one you are now offering of Student, but we have not got the one of Kammhuber. DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I submitted this material to the Translation Division and I asked that the translations should be ready. I shall look into the matter and see what has become of it. At any rate, I did submit the originals to the Translation Division. THE PRESIDENT: Yes; the General Secretary will look into it. And this one of Student, has that been applied for and granted? It is not on my list. DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President, it has been granted, and the Prosecution has submitted a counterinterrogatory to this one. I believe... THE PRESIDENT: Very well. DR. STAHMER: If I am not mistaken, this interrogatory of Student’s was granted on 14 February, if I remember rightly. Student deals with the air attack on Rotterdam in May 1940. He gives the necessary explanation as to how it came about that during capitulation negotiations bombs were still being dropped on Rotterdam. Here, too, I believe, I can refer to this interrogatory. The facts were that capitulation negotiations were in progress when an air attack had been planned and the squadron which was being employed could not be advised in time by wireless. Then the ground troops gave signals, which were misunderstood by one group... THE PRESIDENT: It appears that it covers the same ground that has already been covered in evidence; does it not? DR. STAHMER: It has been dealt with in the examination; yes, that is correct, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Then it should not be read under any circumstances now. DR. STAHMER: Then I shall submit this document... THE PRESIDENT: Yes, offer it in evidence. But I mean, you need not read it in detail. DR. STAHMER: Very well, Mr. President. This will be Exhibit Number Göring-53. Then, Mr. President, I have another interrogatory by a general of the Air Force, Koller, which I should like to submit. This will be submitted as Exhibit Number Göring-55. Mr. President, I ask the permission of the High Tribunal to read these questions, for there is a special significance connected with the testimony given by this witness in relation to the defendant in this proceeding: “Question 1: Did the former Reich Marshal Göring at any time issue an order that enemy airmen who had been shot down should be handed over to the Police, the SD, or that they should be shot without a trial? “Answer: As far as I know, no. In any case, I know of no such order issued by the Reich Marshal. “Question 2: Did the former Reich Marshal Göring help to formulate an order on the strength of which the British flying officers who escaped from Stalag III at Sagan in March 1944 were shot by the Police or SD? “Answer: General Korten told me that the Luftwaffe, the Air Force—meaning the Reich Marshal and he, Korten, himself—had no part in the issuing of this order. “Question 3: Did the former Reich Marshal Göring learn of the fact contained in Question 2 only after the order given by Hitler had been carried out? “Answer: General Korten told me that he and the Reich Marshal did not get to know of it until later. “Question 4: On what day was this order issued by Hitler? “Answer: I do not know. “Question 5: On what day, or on what days, was this order carried out? “Answer: I do not know. “Question 6: Do you know whether the former Reich Marshal Göring very strongly condemned the shooting of these 50 British Air Force officers? “Answer: General Korten told me that the Reich Marshal was very angry about this shooting. “Question 7: Have you any knowledge as to whether the former Reich Marshal Göring and his deputy for the Air Force, the Chief of the General Staff, repeatedly remonstrated with Hitler about the measures which Hitler had ordered to be taken against the enemy terror-fliers who had been shot down? “Answer: According to statements which General Korten made to me in June of 1944, that is correct. I remember too that some time afterward it was reported to me that the Reich Marshal had complained to the Führer about the action taken by Party organizations and individuals among the population against so-called terror-fliers, for the reason that some of our own air crews had come to harm. “In March of 1945 he flatly turned down the order given by the Führer that all enemy crews which had been shot down and which would be shot down in the future should be turned over to the SD. “Replying to Questions 1 to 7, I should like to state in explanation and in supplement: During the period which is covered by the report I was Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff. In February 1944 the Führer’s headquarters transferred to Berchtesgaden the High Command of the Armed Forces, the Reich Marshal with his personal entourage and the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force, General Korten, together with two or three ordnance officers. I had to stay with the High Command of the Luftwaffe, that is, with the whole working staff known as Robinson, in East Prussia, as it was expected that the Führer’s headquarters would have to be moved back quickly. The whole signal apparatus and the apparatus for the issuing of orders for Luftwaffe supplies was to be under the control of Robinson. “Due to the separation of the High Command of the Luftwaffe on the one hand and the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of General Staff on the other hand, a separation which was prolonged from week to week, we in East Prussia did not have knowledge about many things which were being handled directly in Berchtesgaden. Often we received no knowledge at all of important Führer directives, or if we did, we received the information very late. It was not until the beginning of June—I believe it was the week after Whitsun—that I, together with some assistant officers, was transferred to Berchtesgaden. From February until that time, I think I had attended only one conference at Berchtesgaden. “As to Questions 2 to 6, which deal with Sagan, it was from General Korten that I learned, and I believe Colonel Christian informed me almost at the same time, that the airmen who had escaped from Sagan had been shot by order of the Führer. I rather think I heard about it first from General Korten, who, if I remember rightly, told me about it during one of the rather long telephone conversations which we had every evening. Korten made it quite clear that he disapproved of this, for the reasons which I mentioned in reply to Questions 2, 3, and 6. The conversation must have taken place at the end of March or the beginning of April. However, I cannot give the exact date. “In reply to Questions 1 and 7, concerning the terror-fliers, it was approximately the beginning of June 1944—at first I thought that it was in July, but I think now that it must have been June—when General Korten advised me that the Führer intended to order that terror-fliers be left to the fury of the people. “We discussed this matter repeatedly and we all agreed in our opposition. We had always considered the direct attacks by low-flying enemy aircraft on the civilian population, on women and children, gatherings of civilians, civilian passenger trains, hospitals, school children who were out for a walk, our own crews who were parachuting to earth, and farmers who were tilling their fields, cruel and contrary to international law, but we did not consider the decree which the Führer intended to issue to be the proper way to solve this very difficult problem. Our reasons for this refusal were articles of war, international law, it was against fundamental soldierly principles, and it would lead to many misunderstandings inflicting harm not only to enemy fliers, but also to our own men and affecting the morale of our own crews...” THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, is this not really going into argument and not dealing with facts? It really is not necessary for you to read all this witness’ arguments about it. He is not really dealing with facts at all now and it is in detail... DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, these are the facts which he discussed with General Korten, the facts which decided them to reject the Führer’s order. These were the reasons which he and Korten discussed... THE PRESIDENT: Some of what you have read no doubt is a matter of fact, but what you are now reading is a matter of argument. DR. STAHMER: No, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, surely you can summarize the rest of this. DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, this document is of great importance to the defendant because it deals with just those points with which he is accused and which distress him most and... THE PRESIDENT: I heard you say it is of great importance and therefore you have been reading it and insofar as it is statement of fact, it seems to me that there is some excuse for reading it in detail. But when you come to matters of argument, it seems to me there is no excuse for reading it, because argument by a particular witness is not really relevant for the Tribunal’s consideration at all. Summarize the argument, if you like. I mean, you have read the factual part. Summarize the rest which—maybe you can tell us, if you like, what the argument is. DR. STAHMER: Very well, Mr. President. General Korten further stated that all the documents which are relevant to the question of terror-fliers and the shooting of the Royal Air Force officers have been submitted to him and after perusing them he arrived at the conclusion that the contents of these documents is proof of the fact that the High Command of the Armed Forces as well as the Reich Marshal opposed this action and did everything in their power to prevent the measure intended by Hitler from being put into effect. He particularly points out that in one of these letters there is a marginal note to the effect that it was not possible to get a reply from the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, and he concludes from that that the Reich Marshal personally opposed any final decision of this matter. Then there is a further incident dealt with in: “Question 8: Did the Führer, for the reason stated under Figure 5, on the occasion of a situation discussion and in the presence of all who attended it, excitedly accuse the German Luftwaffe of having made a mutual coward’s agreement with the Allied Air Forces? “Answer: During the first half of March 1945, Bormann showed the Führer a note taken from a correspondent’s report in the Allied press. The gist of this note was: The crew of an American fighter plane, which shortly before had been shot down over Germany, had been picked up by advancing American troops. The crew had testified that the enraged civilians had mishandled them, had threatened them with death, and in all probability they would have been lynched if it had not been for the German soldiers who had liberated them and protected them. Bormann pointed out to Hitler in a few words that this confirmed the fact that German soldiers, in instances such as this, were going against their own countrymen; and he concluded his remarks somewhat as follows: ‘My Führer, that is the way your orders are being carried out.’ Thereupon in the presence of all who attended the situation discussion the Führer made some very excited statements and among other things the Führer said to me, ‘If my orders are not being carried out it is due to the cowardice of the Luftwaffe because the men in the Luftwaffe are cowards and they are afraid that something might happen to them, too, some day. The whole business is nothing but a cowards’ agreement between the German Luftwaffe and the English and American airmen.’ I reported this to the Reich Marshal. “Whether Hitler made the same remark to the Reich Marshal personally, that I am not able to say; but I consider it quite probable, because when making reproaches of this kind, especially if they applied to the Luftwaffe, he often repeated himself and used the same expressions. “Question 9: On what day did this discussion take place? “Answer: I cannot give the date.” Now we come to: “Question 10: Did the Führer repeatedly order the former Reich Marshal to divulge the name of the officer of the Luftwaffe who, in May of 1944, protected an Allied airman who had been shot down in Munich from being lynched by the population? But despite repeated inquiries on the part of the Führer, the Reich Marshal gave no instructions to find out the name of this officer and to make it known to the Führer?” I can summarize the answer. He says he cannot state this from his own experience; it had only been reported to him that an officer of the Luftwaffe and an Ortsgruppenleiter had interfered on behalf of this American crew; that the Ortsgruppenleiter, who was known, was shot on Hitler’s order; that Hitler then demanded to have the name of the Luftwaffe officer given to him and that he had not been told the name. He said further that if the Reich Marshal had actually wanted to find out the name of this Luftwaffe officer, he could easily have done so. “Question 11: At the end of the war did the Luftwaffe ever receive orders to destroy Dachau Concentration Camp with bombs at the approach of the enemy? In particular, was an order to that effect given by the Gauleiter in Munich under the code word ‘Wolke’? Could a Gauleiter give such instructions to the Luftwaffe?” Here again I can summarize the answer. The witness says, “I do not recall any order to that effect,” and especially he does not know whether the Gauleiter in Munich gave such an order. The Gauleiter was not competent to give an order of this kind and he does not believe that a senior officer of the Luftwaffe would have been willing to carry out such an order. “Question 12: What do you know about the attitude of the Reich Marshal and his Luftwaffe to enemy airmen who had been shot down? “Answer: Notwithstanding occasional expressions of displeasure, the attitude of the Reich Marshal was always correct and chivalrous, which was in line with the Air Force tradition which he learned in the first World War and to which he frequently referred. “Of course, in his anxiety about the great difficulties of air defense and pressed by the Führer, perhaps on occasion he used harsh words. These words, however, were soon forgotten and I do not know of a single case where the Reich Marshal followed up these spontaneous utterances by incorrect or harsh measures or orders against members of foreign air forces. The conduct of the entire Luftwaffe was always correct and humane. To fight in a chivalrous manner was a matter of honor with the German airmen. To quote only a few examples of many: Although the enemy crews shot at German airmen who were parachuting to earth, and these practices were bitterly resented by our airmen and some...” THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Stahmer. Again, what you are now reading is all comment; it is not statement of facts, it is comment and argument. DR. STAHMER: Now Mr. President, he is coming to an example in which he reports about those things. THE PRESIDENT: Well, let us come to it. DR. STAHMER: Yes. The sea rescue services of the Luftwaffe from the Bay of Heligoland through the English Channel as far as Brest, in the Bay of Biscay, in the Atlantic, and in the Mediterranean, was put into use for the enemy in the same way as for the Germans. The rescue service fliers and the rescue service boats made untiring efforts and showed exemplary self-sacrifice in going to the rescue of friend and foe in distress. Even when... THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Stahmer, these were not particular instances. These were not particular facts. They are just general statements which are really comments and argument about the chivalry of the German Air Force; that is all. DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, by this he is trying to prove the chivalry of the German Air Force. THE PRESIDENT: But he does not prove it by making a general statement. DR. STAHMER: No. Later on he comes—he will go on to say how many they have rescued, how many of those were enemies and how many were their own people. I believe these facts, Mr. President, are important when judging the attitude of the Luftwaffe. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, as I said just now, if you will get down to the facts, if you have got the numbers, well then, no doubt that will be a matter of fact. DR. STAHMER: Of the thousands who were rescued from the sea by the German Luftwaffe Rescue Service the great majority belonged to the enemy—members of enemy air crews, crews of enemy ships. Without being able to give exact figures at the moment, I would estimate—according to my memory I would say that the proportion of enemy rescued was from 70 to 80 percent. And he continues: “If, when we went out to rescue our own people or to make reconnaissance flights for them or were engaged on other work, we saw that crews, also enemy crews, were in distress off the enemy coast or beyond the range of our own rescue services, we immediately signaled to the enemy and called upon him to go to the rescue.” Then there are several questions put by the Prosecution. The first question is: “What had Kaltenbrunner to do with...” THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, it is for the Prosecution to read their questions if they want to read them. DR. STAHMER: I am not interested in these questions, Mr. President. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Prosecution do not want the questions read. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will read them. Do you mean you want to put them in—put them in evidence? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will put them in, but we do not want them read. THE PRESIDENT: Right. DR. STAHMER: I have already stated that this is Exhibit Göring-55. Then I have one more interrogatory, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, you realize that the Tribunal proposes to read all the evidence and therefore these interrogatories will be read and considered even though they are not read now in open court. You have offered them in evidence, so the Tribunal will be grateful if you will cut short the reading of these affidavits and interrogatories as far as possible. DR. STAHMER: I shall proceed accordingly, Mr. President. Now, we turn to the interrogatory of Hammerstein which I shall submit as Exhibit Number Göring-52. Mr. President, this interrogatory is not at my disposal in the original. I can only submit an attested copy. It has been submitted to the Prosecution; it has been translated but it cannot be found at the moment. But I assume I shall find the original very soon; I have advised Sir David of this. The British Prosecution has already had it and this document has been translated. THE PRESIDENT: You mean the original has been mislaid or something. DR. STAHMER: It has been mislaid, Mr. President, and I am unable to find it at the moment. Anyhow, it has been submitted. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there is no objection to this affidavit. I have a copy in front of me. It is general in its terms and, if I may say so, I thought it would serve its purpose admirably if Dr. Stahmer put it in and the Tribunal consider it in due course. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. DR. STAHMER: The original will be submitted in the next few days. It is an interrogatory of the Judge Advocate of the Air Force, Dr. Von Hammerstein. For several years he was the Supreme Judge of the Air Force and in that capacity he reported once a month to the Defendant Göring. Thus he was in a position to judge the attitude of Göring as supreme legal authority and he now describes in detail how seriously the Defendant Göring took his duties as supreme legal authority. He further describes how the Reich Marshal Göring reserved to himself the right to decide the more important matters; how he took great care in dealing with all matters, how he insisted that the soldiers under his command must maintain strict discipline. He particularly saw to it that the soldiers under his command were punished most severely if they committed illegal acts against the civilian population and especially against the civilian population in the occupied countries. Then he further describes how Reich Marshal Göring demanded severe punishment particularly when it was a question of violating the honor of women and how in the many decrees he always insisted that due respect to the honor of women was the first duty of a soldier; how in serious cases of rape, he always demanded the death penalty, no matter what the nationality of the woman was. In two cases, for instance, he rescinded the sentences because they were too lenient and he confirmed the sentence only after the death penalty had been pronounced. THE PRESIDENT: Well, surely, what you have said, Dr. Stahmer, has given us the substance of the affidavit. You said that this man was the Judge Advocate for the Air Force and that the law with reference to offenses in the Air Force was strictly carried out. I am sure that is all you want to say in summarizing it. DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President. What I wanted to bring out was that it did not matter what the nationality of the woman involved was. In one case against a Russian woman, he... THE PRESIDENT: That is exactly what I have said, that the law was strictly carried out. It is only an illustration of how the law was strictly carried out. DR. STAHMER: Very well, Mr. President, I have given the substance. I shall dispense with all further explanation and submit this document. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal thinks that their time is being wasted, and unless Counsel for the Defense can do what the Tribunal desires them to do, which is to offer these affidavits and interrogatories in evidence, giving the shortest possible summary or description of the affidavits or interrogatories, the Tribunal will have to order that the interrogatories and affidavits shall be simply offered in evidence, and they will hear no comment whatever on them. The time is approaching immediately when the defense counsel are going, to make their speeches, and if there is anything in these affidavits or interrogatories of real importance, they will have the opportunity then of commenting upon it. And also, the Tribunal itself proposes to read not only the oral evidence, but the documentary evidence in this case. DR. STAHMER: Then, Mr. President, I should like to submit this document under Exhibit Number Göring-52. THE PRESIDENT: Now then, the counsel for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, Dr. Horn, you have no affidavits or interrogatories to put in, have you, that have been approved by the Tribunal? DR. HORN: Mr. President, I ask to be permitted to submit four affidavits to the Tribunal. We are concerned here with the affidavit of Legation Counsellor Dr. Eberhardt von Thadden. Legation Counsellor Von Thadden was in the Information Office Number 14 of the Foreign Office, which was a branch which dealt with the Jewish problem and with the co-ordination of anti-Semitic propaganda in foreign countries with other German agencies. It was... THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, have you applied for these documents? DR. HORN: I applied to the General Secretary in writing and I asked that these affidavits be accepted. This morning I received confirmation that these affidavits had been given to the Prosecution and to the Translation Division. Therefore, I beg to submit this document as Exhibit Number Ribbentrop-319. A further affidavit which I am submitting, and I have applied to the General Secretary in writing for its acceptance, is the affidavit of Dr. Werner Best, the former Reich plenipotentiary. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, but I was telling Dr. Horn that we have not had copies of these yet; they have not reached us so far. THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have before me a list of four affidavits, Thadden, Best, Ribbentrop and Schulze, and it is stated that they are not approved by the Tribunal. Therefore... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Dr. Horn mentioned them to me a day or two ago and asked me whether I should object to their being translated, and I said “no,” that I should not object to their being translated. Of course, I have not had a chance to see them. THE PRESIDENT: Would not the best course, as they have gone to the Translation Division, be for them to be offered in evidence now, as I understand Dr. Horn is intending to do, subject, of course, to any question which may arise as to their admissibility? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you will just give us the numbers then. DR. HORN: The affidavit signed by Best I should like to submit as Exhibit Ribbentrop-320. I should like to give a brief explanation of the reason for this affidavit. In cross-examination, my client was confronted with Document 2375-PS. This document is an affidavit of a colonel of the Police, Dr. Rudolf Mildner. A passage from this affidavit which dealt with the handling of the Jewish question in Denmark was quoted to my client. I examined this document and have ascertained that two documents bear the Number 2375-PS. One document is a statement made by Dr. Mildner which was not made under oath. This statement which was not made under oath contained that passage which was put to my client in cross-examination. Under the same number there is an affidavit which has been sworn and is also by Dr. Mildner. The passage about the attitude of Ribbentrop to the Jewish question is not contained in this affidavit. For this reason, I have got Dr. Best, who had been instructed by Ribbentrop to handle the Jewish question and, according to Dr. Mildner, did do so, to give this affidavit, Document Number Ribbentrop-320, which I am now submitting to the Tribunal. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. DR. HORN: Apart from that my client was confronted in cross-examination with a series of documents to which he could make only brief statements as they were lengthy documents, most of which he had not seen before. I should like to ask the Tribunal to permit me to submit a few brief explanations on behalf of my client in the form of an affidavit, which I shall call Exhibit Number Ribbentrop-321. Then, I should like to be permitted to define my attitude on Document TC-75. TC-75 represents a note sent by Ribbentrop to Hitler. This was submitted by the Prosecution in a very abbreviated form. When I had this document given to me in the original for the first time, the photo copy tallied with the copy submitted by the Prosecution. When I had this same document given to me a second time, I received a photostatic copy of nine pages. In my final speech I should like to refer to this document. Therefore, in order to save the Tribunal’s time I ask for permission to submit this complete Document TC-75. I have no further applications, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you did not give a number to that last affidavit. DR. HORN: TC-75 will become Exhibit Number Ribbentrop-322. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, with the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to deal with those points of my examination which have not yet been dealt with. First of all we are concerned with the witness who has been allowed me by the Tribunal, Generaladmiral Böhm. The Tribunal will recall that I was permitted to examine this witness at the end of the presentation of evidence. In the meantime, after consultation with Mr. Elwyn Jones and Sir David, I have obtained an affidavit from Generaladmiral Böhm in Hamburg, so that I could perhaps dispense with calling him as a witness. I submitted this affidavit to Sir David and to Mr. Elwyn Jones and Mr. Jones told me yesterday afternoon that Sir David agreed, and that he would dispense with the cross-examination, and at the same time I agreed not to insist on an examination, but to be satisfied with the submitting and the reading of the affidavit. I believe Sir David agrees. I should like to submit this affidavit of Generaladmiral Böhm’s as Exhibit Number Raeder-129. This was sworn to on 13 June this year in the presence of notary Dr. Sieveking at Hamburg. THE PRESIDENT: It is not necessary to read it now, is it? DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I should be very grateful if I might be permitted to read this affidavit, as it deals with a portion of evidence which is quite significant. The Tribunal will, I am sure, recall the fact... THE PRESIDENT: But I have already told you, Dr. Siemers—you can certainly confine yourself to the really important part of it and summarize anything that is really not so important. We cannot have all these documents read out to us. DR. SIEMERS: The Tribunal will agree with me that as far as my other documents are concerned, I read remarkably little. My reason for wanting to read a part of it was because the British Delegation, at the close of the cross-examination, submitted two very lengthy summaries, GB-464 and GB-465. These are summaries about the key documents of the 22d. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, surely you can tell us what the subject matter of the affidavit is. We will then know the general subject matter of it, and then I should have thought you could direct your attention to the particular matters which are of special importance here. It only takes up time if you are going to tell us what the Prosecution have done. DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. Mr. President, if I have been misunderstood. It was my intention to do that. I shall not read from “I” of the affidavit. I shall only summarize it. It is a discussion between Raeder and Generaladmiral Böhm in the summer of 1939, on which occasion Böhm told Raeder that he was worried about the political developments. He then asked Raeder whether he had called Hitler’s attention to the great dangers and to the fact that the German Navy would not be in a position to carry on a war at sea: “Grossadmiral Raeder replied to me”—and these are his words—“that he had put this up to Hitler more than once, and that he had concluded his exposition to Hitler with the fundamental sentence: ‘In such a case the Navy could not do anything but die gloriously.’” Number II of the affidavit of Generaladmiral Böhm: “On 22 August 1939 Hitler made a speech to the top leaders of the Armed Forces at the Obersalzberg. I was present during the entire speech, which lasted 2 to 2½ hours. The speech was delivered in Hitler’s office.” I am omitting the next few points and continue: “The speech”—which was submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number Raeder-27—“has been set down by me with great accuracy, and I can state under oath that the speech was delivered in the way in which I have set it down. In particular I can confirm that my account contains all the important ideas and words. “The versions submitted by the Prosecution, Documents Number 798-PS and 1014-PS, have been submitted to me by Dr. Siemers. I have now compared my version with these two versions.” I am again skipping a paragraph. “I declare under oath that some of the expressions used in these documents were not used by Hitler at all, while others were used by Hitler partly in another sense and partly in another form. “As to Document 798-PS, the following numbers of the pages and lines agree with the version which I have just received, and which was submitted by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe.” I should like to remind the Tribunal that this is the 10-page summary, GB-464. In this version you will find the sentence: “‘Afterward we shall discuss military details.’ “Comment: This sentence was not used. Military details did not follow in 798-PS either. “Page 1, Lines 7 to 10: ‘I made this decision already in the spring, but I thought that first of all, in a few years’ time, I should turn against the West, and only afterward against the East.’ “Comment: The account as set down by me, on Page 1, Lines 5 to 8, is absolutely true. In any case Hitler never used the words that he would first of all turn against the West. “Page 1, Lines 12 to 14: ‘First of all I wanted to bring about satisfactory relations with Poland so that I could first of all fight against the West.’ “Comment: This sentence was never used, and what I have just said applies here, too. Hitler never voiced the intention that he wanted to fight against the West.” Now I shall omit the next point and on Lines 15 to 18 on Page 2 it says: “‘It is easy for us to make decisions. We have nothing to lose, only to gain. Our economic situation, due to our limited resources, is such that we can hold out only a few more years.’ “Comment: As to the attitude taken here—the version in my statement, Page 2, Lines 21 to 26, is absolutely correct. Above all the sentence, ‘We have nothing...’” THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, does it not come to this? There are two or three versions of this particular speech and this admiral is saying that his version is correct. That is all it comes to. I mean, he does not think the other versions are correct. Well, the Tribunal will no doubt have to compare the three versions and compare it with this affidavit. But what is the purpose or use of reading it to us at this stage I do not know. DR. SIEMERS: Very well, Mr. President. Thank you very much. Then I ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of the further statements, as set out therein. I should like to refer only to the fact that Generaladmiral Böhm expressly asserts and declares under oath that the sentence which has been quoted several times: “I am afraid that at the last moment some dirty dog will submit to me a plan for mediation”——was not uttered by Hitler. Referring to Document 1014-PS, I should like to read a sentence which has been brought up by the Prosecution six or seven times: “The destruction of Poland is in the foreground and the aim is the elimination of Polish vitality, not the reaching of a certain line.” In this connection Böhm says: “There was never any talk of destroying Poland or of eliminating the vitality of the Polish people. What was discussed was the breaking of the military forces.” And I should like the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these very carefully set down statements for it seems to me that this is important in assessing the evidence value of the documents presented by the Prosecution. Then under “III” Generaladmiral Böhm describes that period during which he was commanding admiral in Norway. I should like the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this. This statement chiefly concerns the struggle carried on by Raeder and Böhm against Terboven, against the German civilian administration, and the attempts to make peace with Norway. Mr. President, after many weeks the interrogatory of Albrecht has reached me in its final form. I sent it to the Translation Division several days ago and have not yet received the translation. This interrogatory has been approved and I put it in as Exhibit Number Raeder-128. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this interrogatory. I should like to mention that Generaladmiral Albrecht was for many years one of Raeder’s closest co-workers. He resigned in October 1939. He knows the attitude taken by Raeder and he knows the High Command of the Navy before 1933 and up to 1938. He, too, confirms the fact that Raeder constantly warned Hitler of complications, and that Hitler always stated, “I have matters under control and I will not let it come to war.” As regards all the other points, I ask, Mr. President, that the Tribunal take judicial notice of these. Then I should like to refer to the following: One interrogatory by Generaladmiral Schulze has not yet come to hand. My efforts to obtain this interrogatory date back to March 1946. I have given his address. The witness is in retirement and lives in Hamburg-Blankenese. Unfortunately until now the interrogatory has not arrived in Hamburg. I should be very grateful to the Tribunal if it would give me permission to submit this interrogatory at a later date, as I myself have no means of expediting it. I do not know when it will come in, as in the meantime it has been sent to Washington for reasons I do not understand, but I certainly hope that it will be returned at some future date. Finally, Mr. President... THE PRESIDENT: Excuse me. What do you mean by it having been sent to Washington? Did you say Washington? DR. SIEMERS: I was informed by the General Secretary that this interrogatory had been sent to Washington in order to locate the witness there. But the witness resides in Hamburg-Blankenese. I am sorry that I have no means of using my influence even though I have been trying for 3 months. THE PRESIDENT: Well, no doubt the General Secretary is making every effort to have the witness found. If he is found, then—what are the dates? You say that 3 months ago you submitted this interrogatory? Was it sent to Hamburg or where was it sent? DR. SIEMERS: I have... THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Siemers, you ought to know. You have been in touch all these 3 months with the General Secretary and you are stating that he sent it to Washington. You ought to know. Have you given him any address in Hamburg? What is your complaint? DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, you have misunderstood. I was not complaining. I was just stating the facts in order to show why the interrogatory is not here, and I ask that when the interrogatory arrives I may be permitted to submit it then, though by that time the evidence... THE PRESIDENT: I know you say that, but the Tribunal wants to know where the interrogatory was first sent and why it was sent to Washington, and why it was not sent to Hamburg and what you know about the fact—the alleged fact—that the person who was to make the interrogatory was at Hamburg? DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I am from Hamburg myself and last November I talked with the witness, and I gave his address when I put in my first application to the General Secretary. Perhaps some misunderstanding arose with the other offices which transmitted the interrogatory. Perhaps they looked for a witness by the name of Schulze in some other place. The name of the Generaladmiral is Otto Schulze and it is quite possible that they looked up someone else with this rather common name. The only answer I received was that the witness was being looked for, to which I replied that it was not necessary to look for the witness. MR. DODD: I think the Tribunal might be interested in knowing that Dr. Siemers himself returned from Hamburg a few days ago, and I think he has been there two or three times since he asked for this interrogatory. Now, if he knows where this witness is, all he had to do while he was up there was to go to a Military Government officer, submit his questions, get them answered, and bring them back; and I think it is a little bit unfair to blame the General Secretary under these circumstances. DR. SIEMERS: I regret very much that Mr. Dodd considers it necessary to reproach me with unfairness. I was told that an interrogatory could not be given to the witness by me. The interrogatory for Admiral Albrecht I brought back with me from Hamburg at the request of the General Secretary because the formula of the oath had been omitted. In a case of this kind I consider it quite natural that I should co-operate with the General Secretary. However, I have submitted this interrogatory and I cannot understand how Mr. Dodd could blame me if I have not brought the interrogatory back with me. THE PRESIDENT: Well, this seems to me a waste of time. We had better get a report from the General Secretary. DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe that I still have not been understood. I am not accusing anyone. I am just asking for permission to submit my interrogatory subsequently. THE PRESIDENT: Well. We will consider that. We will not make any decision until we have heard a report from the General Secretary upon the circumstances. DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, then I should like to point out that two of my applications were granted, which were not carried out completely. One was the application concerning the files of the British Admiralty containing the Allies’ plans regarding Scandinavia and Finland. Purely as a matter of form I should like to say that the answer from the Foreign Office, which is known to the Tribunal, is available, and the Tribunal had approved the submission of these files, but the request was turned down by the Foreign Office. As this matter has not been dealt with before I should like it to be made absolutely clear. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, I think, has the communication from the Foreign Office. DR. SIEMERS: But I did not submit it, Mr. President. Therefore, I did not know under what number, what exhibit number it can be found in the files of the Tribunal. Would it be possible, Mr. President... THE PRESIDENT: You can give it a number, certainly. Give it whatever number you think right. What is the number you want? DR. SIEMERS: May I submit this document as Exhibit Number Raeder-130 either this afternoon or at the latest tomorrow morning? THE PRESIDENT: Yes. DR. SIEMERS: Then, Mr. President, I made the request that the first edition of Hitler’s book _Mein Kampf_ be placed at my disposal. In this case as well, I should like to point out that according to information received the General Secretary has made every effort, for which I am grateful, but he has not been successful in providing me with this first edition. I should like to remind you of the fact that the edition used by the Prosecution is from the year 1933 and therefore it cannot be used as a basis for the argument put by the Prosecution concerning the period before 1933. THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of argument. DR. SIEMERS: Yes indeed. During my absence four documents were submitted by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe. As far as I was able to ascertain, these documents, which all come from Admiral Assmann, were submitted with the remark that Admiral Assmann belonged to the Staff of Grossadmiral Raeder. This fact was also mentioned several times in preceding records. For the sake of order, I should like to clear up this error. Assmann was in the historical section and he was in no way concerned with the staff of Raeder. In this connection... THE PRESIDENT: Have you got any evidence of the facts you are stating, or do the Prosecution accept them? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We accept, I am sure. My Lord, we have had it in evidence and we accept the fact that he was in the Naval Historical Section of the German Admiralty. My Lord, when I said “staff” I was speaking generally. I did not mean the Operations Staff. THE PRESIDENT: Then we need not waste further time about that. DR. SIEMERS: I should like to refer to one point, Mr. President, concerning these four documents: D-879, D-881, D-892, and D-854. I hope that in this matter as well Sir David will agree with me. All the English translations bear the heading “Diary”... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is simply a point of how the compilation of Admiral Assmann should be described. I am quite prepared that it should be described as it is in the original. THE PRESIDENT: Well... SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dr. Siemers objected to its being described as a “diary” and said that it should have been described as an index. My Lord, I do not mind what it is described as. THE PRESIDENT: What does it matter? Let us call it an index then. Is that all your points? DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, this is important insofar as here in this courtroom many “Tagebücher” have been submitted under the designation of a “diary,” and these were really entries made at the time. THE PRESIDENT: Sir David says that he will withdraw the word “diary” and you may call it anything else you like. Really, it is only a waste of our time to make this sort of technical point. Sir David agrees with you, and he is prepared to withdraw the word “diary.” DR. SIEMERS: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: Very well then, let us not say anything more about it. DR. SIEMERS: I quite agree, Mr. President. Mr. President, I do not wish to take up the time of the Tribunal with all the other and very numerous errors in translation. My final speech will show how important this point was in connection with the Assmann document. As suggested by the Tribunal I have brought the other errors in translation to the notice of the General Secretary only. THE PRESIDENT: If there are any errors in translation, that matter can be taken up through the General Secretary with the Translation Division. Dr. Siemers, it is very improper for counsel in your position to make statements of that sort for which you have no proof at all. You know perfectly well that when there have been any alleged mistranslations, the matter has always been referred through the General Secretary to the Translation Division and then they have been corrected; and for you to get up at this stage of the Trial and say that there are many mistranslations, without any proof of it at all, simply upon your own word, is a most improper thing for counsel to do, and that is the view of the Tribunal. DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I beg to apologize, but I think I probably did not express myself correctly. I am not making an accusation, but with so many documents it is not surprising that these errors did occur. I myself make mistakes. I am sorry if my remarks should have been misunderstood. THE PRESIDENT: Everybody makes mistakes, and everybody is capable of having different opinions as to translations, but you and every other member of the defendants’ counsel know that those mistakes, if they are mistakes, will be corrected, if it is possible, and they know the way that it can be done, and, therefore, as I said before, it is very improper for you to get up and allege that there are a lot of mistranslations. I do not want to hear anything more about it. The Tribunal will adjourn. [_A recess was taken._] THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, have you any documents that you wish to offer in evidence? DR. NELTE: Mr. President, with a letter dated 1 July 1946, I put in three affidavits, after having submitted them previously to the Prosecution. Those three documents will become Documents Keitel-23, Keitel-24, and Keitel-25. I beg the Tribunal to receive them, since the Prosecution, as Sir David has told me, does not object to their being offered in evidence. THE PRESIDENT: And they are at present being translated, or have they been translated? DR. NELTE: They are in the process of being translated. I have merely submitted the originals to the Tribunal. THE PRESIDENT: Very well then, we will receive them in evidence and consider them. DR. NELTE: Thank you. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann? DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President, I have a few interrogatories which have been granted to me by the Tribunal. I have the originals here with me; they have been numbered, and I should like to submit them. The Translation Division has informed me that the translations are not yet at the disposal of the Tribunal, but I assume they will be in the hands of the Tribunal in the next few days. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. DR. KAUFFMANN: I should like to state, in a few short sentences, what the contents of the documents are, if the Tribunal wishes me to do so. There are three documents which refer to the same subject: The testimony given by the President of the Red Cross at Geneva, Professor Burckhardt; the testimony given by Dr. Bachmann, who was the delegate of the Red Cross; and then there is Dr. Meyer’s testimony, and he too was an official representative of the Red Cross. In these documents these witnesses deal with the discussions during March and April 1945 which they had with the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. They also show that agreements were reached on the strength of these discussions which made it possible for thousands of French, Belgian, and Dutch women and children to be returned to their home countries. Prisoners of war were also released under these agreements and internees from concentration camps were allowed to return. Another result was that Kaltenbrunner gave permission to visit the Jewish camp at Theresienstadt and took pains that other camps received medical supplies, food, _et cetera_. All that is contained in detail in these three documents. THE PRESIDENT: What numbers are you giving them? DR. KAUFFMANN: The Professor Burckhardt document will be Number Kaltenbrunner-3; Dr. Meyer and Dr. Bachmann, Numbers Kaltenbrunner-4 and 5. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. DR. KAUFFMANN: A further document is the interrogatory supplied by the former Gauleiter in Upper Austria, Eigruber. That is Exhibit Number Kaltenbrunner-6. Here again I should like to draw attention to one point. Among other things, this witness states that the concentration camp at Mauthausen was not set up by Kaltenbrunner, as has been alleged by the Prosecution and that he was not responsible for the life there or the presence of the internees at the camp. That is stated here in detail and I do not propose to read it. The next document is the interrogatory of Freiherr von Eberstein, which is Number Kaltenbrunner-7. Again, I shall not read from it, but perhaps I may say, in just one sentence, that this witness is testifying that he knows that the concentration camp at Dachau and the two auxiliary camps belonging to Dachau were not, as has been alleged by the Prosecution, to be exterminated during the last months or weeks of the war, but that such a plan had been contemplated exclusively by the Gauleiter of Munich, Giessler. Then there is a further interrogatory, which is the testimony of the witness Wanneck. That will be Exhibit Kaltenbrunner-8. I should like to draw the attention of the Tribunal particularly to this document. It is a lengthy document, and I shall not read from it. However, I believe I can say that this man was particularly well acquainted with the defendant and the whole of his official activities in the course of many years. This witness held for years a leading position in the Foreign Intelligence Service. He knows Kaltenbrunner’s attitude regarding the executive and he confirms the fact that Kaltenbrunner agreed with Himmler at the time, that he, Himmler, would retain the executive powers while Kaltenbrunner would work mostly in the sector of the Intelligence Service as a whole. Finally, Mr. President, there are two documents which have not yet been discussed. Therefore, first of all, the Tribunal would have to decide as to the relevancy of the documents, and as to whether I shall be entitled to submit the documents. They are two short letters which I have received. One is a letter from the mayor of the town of Dachau, dated 4 April 1946. The Tribunal may possibly remember that during the taking of evidence by the Prosecution it was frequently mentioned that the population in the vicinity had knowledge of the abuses. This man, who has now been instated by the American authorities, confirms his own experiences. In my opinion they do not bear out the thesis of the Prosecution. Immediately connected with this is the second letter, which is from the well-known Pastor Niemöller, and which is dated 17 April 1946. Niemöller had spent some time in Dachau. MR. DODD: Mr. President, would it not be best if we were heard on the first affidavit before the Niemöller affidavit is taken up? We have objected to this affidavit by the mayor of Dachau for the reason that it is simply a letter. We have had no opportunity to file any cross-questions or to ask any questions of the man at all. These letters come in here. If we are going to submit all the letters that come in—we have bales of them, actually. We do not like to object on purely technical grounds, if there is anything here that would really be helpful to the Tribunal. On the other hand, we do not feel that we should deny ourselves the opportunity to make clear the entire story by cross-questions of some kind. THE PRESIDENT: That is with reference to Schwalber? MR. DODD: Yes, Sir. DR. KAUFFMANN: I did not quite understand what you said, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: What Mr. Dodd said was that they objected to this document from Schwalber because they have not had any opportunity to put any questions to him, either by way of having him called as a witness or by a cross-interrogatory. Therefore, they object to the introduction of the document in its present form. DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, I understand. I know this is somewhat problematical, but the Tribunal will be able to assess the evidence value of the letters according to their own opinion. Perhaps I may submit these two short documents to the Tribunal. So far as I know, the Prosecution is acquainted with these two documents, because they have been in the Translation Division, and some time ago a representative of the Prosecution told me that very probably objections would be raised. That was why, at the beginning, I told the Tribunal it would first have to decide as to the relevancy of the documents. THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Kauffmann, the best way will be for the Tribunal to read the document and to consider it. We will do that. DR. KAUFFMANN: Very well, Mr. President. Thank you. MR. DODD: I should also like to indicate to the Tribunal that we take the same position with respect to the Niemöller letter. THE PRESIDENT: You consider them both, then? You are objecting also to the Niemöller letter? MR. DODD: Yes, on the same grounds. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): Mr. President, the reply to the Messersmith interrogatory has not yet been submitted. The reply has been received in the meantime, and has been translated, too. I believe, however, that the Tribunal has probably not yet received it. THE PRESIDENT: Can you offer it in evidence and give it a number? DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, Sir; I was going to. But I did not expect that it would come up today, and I have not the number which I shall give to the exhibit. May I be permitted to furnish the number later? Yes—I have it here, Mr. President, and I shall now submit it as Exhibit Number Frick-14. This is the reply to an interrogatory. The replies are in the same form as those which Mr. Messersmith gave in the interrogatories concerning other defendants. I shall refer to this interrogatory in detail during my final speech. Therefore I need not read it now. Then there is still one reply outstanding in an interrogatory of Konrad, and I beg to be permitted to submit it as soon as I receive it. THE PRESIDENT: That has been granted, has it? And it is now before the witness? DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. DR. PANNENBECKER: Thank you. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius. DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Mr. President, several interrogatories have still to be submitted. First of all, I submit Exhibit Number Sauckel-15 to the Tribunal. That is a Darré interrogatory. THE PRESIDENT: Whose interrogatory was that? Whose interrogatory? DR. SERVATIUS: Darré, the Minister for Food and Agriculture. This interrogatory deals with matters which have in part already come up at this Trial. I should like to draw your attention to a few points. There is the question of what was Sauckel’s general attitude, particularly toward Himmler’s views; and the witness stresses the fact there was considerable controversy between Himmler and Sauckel in this respect. He mentions one particular instance which he himself witnessed. He speaks about a factory in Thuringia which was directly under Sauckel’s control and says that the workers there were so free that they hired themselves out to farmers during the day, which was rather too much of a good thing. He then talked about a clash between Sauckel and Himmler in the presence of the Führer about the question of treatment, and he says that Himmler stated, “I am subordinate to the Führer only, and for my official business I am under the Reich Marshal; and I do not have to justify myself to you.” Then there is an interrogatory from Minister of Labor Seldte, which has been allowed by the Tribunal and which I shall submit as Exhibit Number Sauckel-16. I should like to bring out just a few points. The witness talks about Sauckel’s functions and the functions of Dr. Ley, and he says that Sauckel carried out the functions of the state while Ley looked after the social welfare and social supervision. Then he goes on to talk about inspections and control, and he says that the offices for accident insurance, health, and factory inspection were in existence before and had continued to function under the responsibility of the Ministry of Labor. Then comes the interrogatory of Dr. Voss, which I submit as Exhibit Number Sauckel-17. I shall submit the original later. I am afraid I cannot find it at the moment. This doctor was medical officer in a camp, and he speaks of the conditions in the camps, particularly after air attacks, and about the activities and care of the Labor Front. He not only deals with the camps in which he was working but he knows a great deal generally about conditions in other camps. His statement is in contradiction to the testimony given by Dr. Jäger. In the same way the following document, which I shall submit as Exhibit Number Sauckel-18 and which comes from Dr. Ludwig Scharmann, although dealing with another sector, contains similar statements, too, which are also in direct contrast to the testimony given by Dr. Jäger. That completes the interrogatories which have been granted me. Now I have still another number of documents for which I have applied, but on which a decision has not yet been given. I do not know whether I should now submit them to the Tribunal. They are mostly concerned with laws and decrees and I would like to submit them in addition to what I have already submitted. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Servatius, the Tribunal would like you to submit them now, because the Tribunal wishes to deal with the evidence on behalf of the Defense finally, now and today. DR. SERVATIUS: There is a decree by Sauckel dealing with the return of sick foreign workers to their homes. It shows that workers who had fallen sick were sent back and that Red Cross employees had to accompany them. The actual decree is in the official collection of laws and decrees which has already been submitted. I shall ascertain my exhibit number presently. It will be Number Sauckel-99 in the supplementary document book. Then there is Document Number Sauckel-100, which comes from the _Reichsarbeitsblatt_, 1943, which has already been offered in evidence, too. This deals with the investigation of sanitary measures in camps, and it concerns the accusations which have been made with reference to these accommodation problems. Then there is Document Number Sauckel-101 which is a memorandum for French prisoners of war on leave regarding their improved status under the so-called “transformation.” I shall submit it and give the exhibit a number. For the moment it is Document Number Sauckel-101. Then come Documents 102 and 103. Both are laws contained in the official _Reichsgesetzblatt_. They are “German Instructions Regarding Compulsory Labor Service.” It is the Emergency Services Order which I submit as Document Number Sauckel-102. Then there is the Compulsory Labor Decree which will be Document Number Sauckel-103, in the supplement. Then I find that Document 4006-PS contains a number of important regulations, but I am told that the Prosecution is going to read them, and therefore I assume that I need not do so. Then I have received an affidavit from Count Spreti, who, from the beginning of the Eastern campaign, was active as a recruiting officer in the East. It deals with conditions, and it states particularly that Sauckel’s activity had brought about a basic change in the general attitude. It is short and I consider that it is of particular importance, because up to now no recruiting officer has been heard on the subject. Then I was proposing to submit Document Number Sauckel-109, which will be a list... COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, with regard to that affidavit I am told, the Prosecution having not seen it at all, that that should be accepted with the same reservations as have been made in the previous cases. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. Was that affidavit you spoke of by Count von Spreti, S-p-r-e-t-i? DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord. DR. SERVATIUS: Then I was going to submit a list of all of Sauckel’s decrees as Document Number Sauckel-109 which will give an idea of the great care he took of all kinds of matters. This list will give the titles only. THE PRESIDENT: Very well, you did not give a number to the affidavit of Count von Spreti. DR. SERVATIUS: It will be given Number Sauckel-108 in my document book and then I shall give it an exhibit number later when I submit the numbers for the other documents. Then as Document Number Sauckel-110, 111, and 112... THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, are you not giving us exhibit numbers now? DR. SERVATIUS: I cannot do so at the moment because I have not got the originals with me and part of these are official records which have been submitted already. THE PRESIDENT: But you see in the case of the Defendant Sauckel, as in the case of every other defendant, the exhibits put in on his behalf, the exhibits offered in evidence on his behalf should have a consecutive series of numbers and that is a consecutive series which is settled by the counsel himself who offers the documents in evidence. It does not depend upon whether he has the original before him. DR. SERVATIUS: In that case I can give them exhibit numbers. Document Number-108 will be Exhibit Number Sauckel-18. THE PRESIDENT: Which is that? DR. SERVATIUS: Exhibit Number 18. THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the most convenient way would be if you would carefully go through your exhibits and give the list to the General Secretary, giving the exact exhibit number of each document. DR. SERVATIUS: Very well. Then Documents Number 110, 111, and 112, contained in the supplement, are three laws which deal with the position of the Reich Defense Commissioner who was mentioned in connection with the allocation of labor. The Reich Defense Commissioner is, of course, the Gauleiter who was mentioned during the case of Speer in connection with the armament industry. These are merely the basic laws, so as to have them at hand. After the case of Speer had been heard, I received an affidavit from the witnesses Hildebrandt and Stothfang, who had been examined here in Court. It deals with the question of how far Sauckel had to obey Speer’s instructions and what the relations were between the two offices. The Prosecution have not yet defined their attitude and I think perhaps it would be best if... MR. DODD: We will be glad to have this affidavit submitted, Mr. President. We have no objection whatever to it. As a matter of fact, if it was not submitted by Dr. Servatius, we intended to offer it ourselves. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Of course the Tribunal thinks it is irregular, really, that a witness who has been called and has given evidence, has been cross-examined—has been re-examined and cross-examined by any other counsel for the defense who want to—that he should be entitled to give any other evidence, but if you are both agreed that it is convenient in this case, as a special circumstance, we will admit it. MR. DODD: I think—Mr. President, I, of course, recognize at once the Court’s observation about submitting affidavits of witnesses who have been before the Tribunal. What happened here was that some rather material matters were not gone into when he was here, and I think the Tribunal will find them quite helpful in clearing up the situation about Sauckel and Speer with respect to their relative and individual responsibilities for this slave labor program. Other than that, I, of course, would not urge it at all. I think the Court will find it helpful. DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER (Counsel for Defendant Speer): Mr. President, I would not make a formal objection against the admission of such an affidavit if I were not convinced, in this particular case, that with the admission of such an affidavit a series of questions will be opened up which will, in turn, necessitate further arguments. I saw the wording of this affidavit only this morning and I am convinced that at least further investigation of its contents will be necessary. I believe, therefore, that if this Trial is to be shortened, in the case before us as well, one ought not to depart from the general rule that affidavits from witnesses who have already appeared before the Tribunal should not be permitted. In this particular case, where there are references to the publication with which the affidavit deals, the case could be made quite clear if these publications were submitted and, therefore, the affidavit is not at all necessary. THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to say anything in answer to that objection? DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, this affidavit is, in fact, a supplementation of the instructions contained in Document 4006, which the Prosecution is proposing to submit; but I did not know that this was proposed. What we are actually concerned with here is a question which was opened up by Speer’s examination, namely, the significance of Speer’s Ministry as compared to Sauckel’s office: Who, of the two, was the more powerful? Who could give orders? Who had to obey? I think the documents will make that clear. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but you and the Prosecution had the opportunity of cross-examining Speer when he was in the witness box and you could then have elucidated anything you wanted to elucidate at that time. DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, only the circumstances were not known to me at that moment. MR. DODD: Mr. President, I do not wish to press this at all, and if the Tribunal has any doubt about it at all I will withdraw my position. I thought it might be helpful, but it really is not important and if there is any question I think it is better we let it go. THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal think it is irregular to introduce new evidence by affidavits from a person who has already been called as a witness, and in view of the objection on behalf of the Defendant Speer, they cannot accept the evidence. DR. SERVATIUS: In that case, I will withdraw it. That completes my statement of evidence. The only thing that is still outstanding is the witness Letsch’s interrogatory, which has been granted, and the interrogatory of the witness Bichenbach. I have no hope of still receiving them. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer? DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Mr. President, I have four documents which I beg to submit and which I have received through the General Secretary. The Tribunal has allowed them and the Prosecution know of them. Unfortunately, however, the translations have not yet been completed. The first document contains questions and answers from Director Dirk Hannema, director of the Bovymans Museum in Rotterdam, about the alleged plundering of art treasures. I shall give this document the Number Seyss-Inquart-108. I shall submit the English text and the Dutch original. The next document is an edition of the newspaper _Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant_, dated 17 May 1942, of which I have the original and a German translation. It contains a warning regarding the shooting of hostages. This document I shall submit in the original under Document Number Seyss-Inquart-109. The following document is also an edition of the same newspaper; it is dated 10 August 1942, and it also contains an announcement regarding the shooting of hostages. In connection with this document I should like to draw your attention to the fact that this announcement was the result of an order from the Military Commander in Holland, General Christiansen, and that the Senior SS and Police Leader, Rauter, signed it. I shall give it Document Number Seyss-Inquart-110. The next document I received only yesterday from the General Secretariat, and it is a copy of the interrogatory of General of the Cavalry Von Kleffel. From 27 March 1945 until 8 April 1945, he was Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the 25th Army in Holland. He confirms that Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart, in a letter to the Führer, had requested that the fighting should cease, in order to save the country from being heavily damaged and also to prevent a famine. This document is Number Seyss-Inquart-111 in my document book. This document had been allowed by the Tribunal. I beg, therefore, that it be received in evidence. Today the General Secretary’s office sent me two affidavits. One comes from the former commander of the Defense District of Scheveningen. His name is Erwin Tschoppe. He is submitting an affidavit dealing with the attitude and conduct of the defendant with respect to the evacuation of the coastal area. Because of the short time at my disposal, I have not yet been able to hand this document and the following one to the Prosecution, but I have already informed the Prosecution that these two documents exist. The second document is also... THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, these documents, I apprehend, have not been shown to the Prosecution? DR. STEINBAUER: No. THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute; they have not been approved by the Tribunal and one question that arises is: Are they very long? Because I find that the Translation Division is being overloaded with very long documents. DR. STEINBAUER: No, it is a short document, but it appears to me to be important, because it shows how the defendant acted during that difficult situation and how he took care of the Dutch population. THE PRESIDENT: If it is short and if you will submit it to the Prosecution, then it can be translated and admitted subject to any objection. DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Sir. The same applies to the following document which I also received today. It is an affidavit of Adalbert Joppich. He was President of the German Supreme Court in the Netherlands, and he makes a very brief statement about the position and the attitude of the defendant with regard to legal questions affecting the Dutch civilian population. I beg that this document should also be admitted in evidence and that I may use the same procedure of submitting a copy of the translation to the Prosecution. THE PRESIDENT: What number did you give? DR. STEINBAUER: The Tschoppe document will be Document Number Seyss-Inquart-112 and the Adalbert Joppich document will be Document Number Seyss-Inquart-113. Documents allowed by the Tribunal and still outstanding are affidavits by Bolle, Dr. Reuter, Völkers, and Lindhorst-Homan. The General Secretariat and I are trying to obtain these affidavits. So far it has only been possible to ascertain Bolle’s address. Finally, I request that two applications which I have made in writing should be granted; one concerns the obtaining of the defendant’s NSDAP membership card which was impounded when he was arrested, and which must be among his personal documents in the custody of the Tribunal. A few months ago I made a request to that effect, but both sides apparently lost sight of the matter. THE PRESIDENT: Of course, you do not mean that it is in the custody of the Tribunal; you may mean that it is in the custody of the military authorities. DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. I meant the prison administration. THE PRESIDENT: Well, no doubt, they can reproduce it. What was the other document? DR. STEINBAUER: Well, Mr. President, then in the cross-examination... COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I do not want to take up Your Lordship’s time, but that membership card, that could have been applied for months ago. It is on the same footing as these documents which counsel has been putting in. We have not seen them. I do not know what this card is going to prove, but it is going to be a great deal of trouble to get it here, just as these documents are giving a great deal of work to the Translation Division. THE PRESIDENT: What is the importance of the membership card? Presumably he knows when he became a member. What relevance does the card have to this? DR. STEINBAUER: It is of importance because according to the war crime law which has now been published in Austria, all members having a membership number above 6,500,000 will not be regarded as so-called “old fighters” or illegals. Seyss-Inquart has stated in the witness box... THE PRESIDENT: That has nothing to do with the Tribunal. It may be relevant in some other proceeding and before some other court but not before this Court. DR. STEINBAUER: Only insofar as the Prosecution had alleged that he had been a member of the NSDAP since 1931. But, of course, I am not trying to make difficulties. I only thought that the membership card might be among the belongings which were taken away from the prisoner and that one could have a look at it. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. But did he deny that he was a member since 1931? DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, oh, yes. He states that he did not become a member until 13 March 1938—formally. THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes, formally; I remember, yes. But he had been a member of the Austrian Nazi Party very much longer, if I remember rightly. MR. DODD: We will agree here and now, Mr. President, that that card would show that he became a member, as far as the card is concerned, on that date. I am sure that is what it will show and if it will help the doctor, we will be glad to agree to that. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. DR. STEINBAUER: The last document for which I am applying is the following: During cross-examination a document was submitted in which an 18 year-old female police clerk named Hildegard Kunze confirms that my client caused Dutch Jews to be sterilized. Seyss-Inquart maintains that he has never written to the Police directly, but that in three personal letters addressed directly to Himmler, he did object to the treatment of Jews, and that in one of his letters he mentioned sterilization. This, presumably, was the reason why the witness mentioned it and probably she gained knowledge of these facts because Himmler sent the original or copy of the letters to the Main Security Office. In connection with this important matter my client has requested me to make an attempt to have these letters which he wrote to Himmler produced in order to disprove the incriminating statement made by the witness Hildegard Kunze. I do not conceal the fact that it will probably be difficult to find these letters among the very many documents of the Main Security Office. THE PRESIDENT: Have you made your application in writing about this? DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, I have made a written application. THE PRESIDENT: Giving the dates when the letters were written? DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, everything I could ascertain regarding the dates and the addresses is contained in my application. THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will consider that, but you understand that the work involved in this sort of thing is very great indeed. DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, far be it from me to underestimate the difficulties which are connected with my application. Apart from this, I have no further application to make. THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] _Afternoon Session_ THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit in open session Saturday next, nor will it sit in open session on any Saturday in the future unless it gives notice that it is going to do so. Yes, Dr. Thoma? DR. THOMA: Mr. President, yesterday I mentioned an affidavit of Dr. Heinz Oeppert, Reichshauptstellenleiter. I have now received this affidavit, and I have also already conferred with Mr. Dodd about it. I now beg the permission of the High Tribunal to submit this affidavit. Mr. Dodd has no objections to the submission of this affidavit. May I read a very brief passage from this affidavit, Mr. President? THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us what the affidavit is about? DR. THOMA: Yes, Mr. President. This Dr. Oeppert had the Office of Ideological Enlightenment in the office of the Führer’s deputy for the supervision of the entire ideological and intellectual framing of the Party. Concerning this activity and this office he testified that it involved almost exclusively a reporting and registration of events in this sphere. Any active interference in the church policy of the State or the Party would not have been possible even if they had wished it, for this office had no executive facilities of any kind. There were constantly very intense differences with the State and Party organizations which participated in this sphere of activity, that is, between the Propaganda Ministry and the Church and the SD and Party Chancellery. The suppression of certain ideological groups and sects as well as the measures taken against individual clergymen, as far as I know, were taken by the SD or the Gestapo without the knowledge or authority of this office. I am asking the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. DR. THOMA: Exhibit Number Rosenberg-51. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Fritz. On behalf of Fritzsche—is anyone representing Dr. Fritz? DR. ALFRED SCHILF (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): Dr. Schilf for Dr. Fritz, who is absent, representing the Defendant Fritzsche. Mr. President, Dr. Fritz applied in writing last Monday concerning two affidavits which are still outstanding, one an affidavit by the journalist—the English journalist, Clifton Delmar—and the other an affidavit by His Excellency Feldscher, then Minister of the protective power in Berlin, now in Berne. Neither of these affidavits has arrived yet, and we are asking the High Tribunal if we may submit and be allowed these documents later. I have no further comments. No other applications have been made. THE PRESIDENT: Have you—I did not hear the name of the second one. Was it Feldscher? DR. SCHILF: Excellency Feldscher, Minister of the protective power. He is now at Berne in Switzerland. THE PRESIDENT: Have these affidavits been placed before the Prosecution? DR. SCHILF: No, Mr. President, they are not yet available. They have not arrived yet. THE PRESIDENT: I see. Are they affidavits or interrogatories? DR. SCHILF: They are two interrogatories, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Interrogatories, I see. Well then, when the interrogatories come back answered, they can be shown to the Prosecution if they want to put in cross-interrogatories; and then they can be translated and submitted to the Tribunal. Dr. Schilf, there was an application—I am not sure whether it was in writing or whether it was only oral—with reference to Schörner and Voss, and one other man, whose statements were used in cross-examination by the Prosecution. I think they were affidavits, I am not sure; and there was an oral application, I think, to cross-examine those persons. Do you want that to be done, or have you withdrawn that? DR. SCHILF: Mr. President, that application has not been withdrawn, but it was put in only as an auxiliary application, to have effect only if the interrogation notes submitted by the Russian Prosecution—it seems to me that these interrogation notes cannot be considered as affidavits, but only interrogation records of a police character. And Dr. Fritz made application to the effect that if these three documents were to be used as documents of evidence, we cannot waive the cross-examination. These three documents were used in the examination of the Defendant Fritzsche only in part, and only short passages were submitted to the defendant in his examination. Every detail there he has... THE PRESIDENT: What you were saying is that in case the Prosecution do not want to use the whole of these documents, but only the parts which were put to the Defendant Fritzsche in the course of cross-examination, then you do not need to have those persons, Voss and Schörner, called for cross-examination; but if the Prosecution wish to put in the whole document, then you want to cross-examine them. Is that right? DR. SCHILF: Mr. President, that is correct. THE PRESIDENT: Are you meaning that you are asking the Tribunal to strike out the passages in the Defendant Fritzsche’s evidence which deal with these statements or are you merely meaning that if the Prosecution wish to use, not only the parts which they have put to the defendant in cross-examination but other parts of the document, that in that event you would like to cross-examine the deponents Voss and Schörner? DR. SCHILF: Mr. President, we only want the cross-examination to take place in case the Court should regard the three interrogation records, as a whole, as documentary evidence. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, then you do mean what I first of all put to you. Well, perhaps the Prosecution, General Rudenko, would tell us whether he is wanting to put in the whole document or whether he has put enough of it in. GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, as I have already stated to the Tribunal, when these written statements were submitted, the records of the interrogations were written down in agreement with the rules of procedure which is in existence in the Soviet Union. The Prosecution will only use those parts which were read here before the Tribunal and on which the Defendant Fritzsche was cross-examined. THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then it is not necessary to have those witnesses brought here for cross-examination. Very well. DR. SCHILF: Yes, indeed, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Then that brings the Tribunal to the end of the evidence for the Defense, with the exception of two witnesses who are to be—who are here and to be called on behalf of the Defendant Bormann. DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, on behalf of the Defendant Speer may I submit in addition a document which has already been translated and is known to the Prosecution. This is the Führer protocol of 3 January 1943. This shall have the Document Number Speer-35. I had already listed it as Exhibit Number 35 in the index of the documents submitted by me which I gave the Court. Only at that time it had not yet been translated. I should like to submit it now. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. What I wanted to say was that that concludes the whole of the evidence on behalf of the defendants with the exception of interrogatories which have already been granted, the answers to which have not yet been received. Of course, those interrogatories, subject to their being admissible, will be admitted when the answers are received and that applies also to anything in the shape of an affidavit which has been allowed by the Tribunal; but otherwise the evidence for the defendants is now closed with the exception of Dr. Bergold. DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I have another question regarding the appearance for testimony of the witness Walkenhorst. In case he is not called as a witness, I have an affidavit at my disposal, which I have received; and I assume that I may submit this in case this witness is not examined here before the Court. It deals with a very brief question, namely, the telephone conversation which Sauckel had regarding the evacuation of the Buchenwald Concentration Camp. Walkenhorst happened to be the man at the other end of the wire. I have an affidavit on this one question. Of course, if the witness is being questioned here in Court I shall ask him; but in case he is not examined I request that this be held open. THE PRESIDENT: You are speaking of Walkenhorst? DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, the witness Walkenhorst. THE PRESIDENT: Well, he is just going to be examined now. DR. SERVATIUS: I hope so, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: But—I believe he is here. I have before me a list of supplementary applications but I think that they have all been dealt with in the discussion which we have had during the last 2 days. And if there is any other matter which the defendants’ counsel wish to raise they should raise it now. Well then, I take it then, that as I said, the evidence for the Defense is now concluded, subject to the reception of documents which I may describe as outstanding, either interrogatories or affidavits. DR. MARX: Mr. President, may I be permitted, please, to introduce three more documents with the permission of the Tribunal. They concern the following questions: When considering what influence the paper published by Streicher exercised on the German population, it is of decisive importance to know how the circulation of this paper developed and to what circumstances the fact is to be attributed that, within a certain period of time, there was a marked increase in its circulation. I set myself the task of determining from the mastheads of the weekly paper, _Der Stürmer_, how its circulation developed. THE PRESIDENT: But—we have already dealt with this application. We have had the application before us and we have considered it and we have refused it. DR. MARX: Yes, I beg your pardon, Mr. President; it concerns the following: Quite by accident, when looking at various issues of this newspaper, I ascertained that in the year 1935 a marked jump in circulation took place and the Defense would like to prove that this increase is not to be traced to an increased demand by the German people but rather to the fact that high Party offices exercised their influence and, together with a new publishing management, brought about a threefold increase. Naturally, it is of essential significance whether a threefold increase results from a demand by the people or whether, as in this case, the German Labor Front intervened in the person of Dr. Ley, and a special publicity number was published, which was then circulated by Dr. Ley’s efforts and by using the huge machinery of the German Labor Front. That is something I want to prove and I am of the opinion that it is of importance to the Defense. I have three documents along these lines, Mr. President; and with the permission of the Tribunal I shall read a directive, and I ask that I be allowed to introduce it as evidence. From this it appears that Dr. Ley as the leader of the German Labor Front, gave the order to all the offices of the German Labor Front to circulate this special edition and to see to it that it was widely circulated in the factories, and so forth. For, indeed, it is one of the essential points of the Indictment that the German people were influenced against the Jews by _Der Stürmer_ and by the Defendant Streicher, and thereby later made ripe to support the measures in the East, even to the extent of mass extermination. Therefore, I ask that this evidence be admitted and that it be declared relevant. THE PRESIDENT: You said you have got three documents. The first one is a directive from Ley? DR. MARX: Yes, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What are the other two? DR. MARX: One is an excerpt from the newspaper _Der Stürmer_ in May 1935, Number 18, which reads as follows: “Bernhardt, who fled from Berlin to France, writes in the _Pariser Tageblatt_ (Paris, 29 March 1935) under the heading, _‘Stürmer_ Circulation Increases Threefold,’ as follows: “‘The support which the pornographer Streicher received from the highest offices of the Reich in circulating his _Stürmer_ helped him to triple his circulation within less than a year...’” THE PRESIDENT: Wait. You have already told us that the circulation of the Stürmer went up threefold. It is not necessary to repeat it all again. We only want to know what the documents are. The first one is a directive of Ley. The second one is an issue of _Der Stürmer_. What is the third one? DR. MARX: And the third—the third is a summary of the circulation from January 1935 until the middle of October 1935; and from this it appears that, within the period of 1 year, the circulation increased from 113,800 to 486,000. Anybody will probably... THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is quite sufficient. We do not want to know any more about it. DR. MARX: Very well, Mr. President. Then, may I be permitted... COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I—it is entirely in the hands of the Tribunal, but we should see no objection from the Prosecution’s point of view to admitting these documents. The first would appear to directly link the Defendant Streicher with another of the conspirators. It would be a most important document. THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Marx. Then the three documents will be admitted. DR. MARX: I should like to submit the documents under Exhibit Numbers 19, 20, and 21. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. DR. MARX: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. May I make one more remark? Why the matter came about now and was so delayed is that I personally did not know anything about it before. It was only by accident that I learned this from _Der Stürmer’s_ masthead. It was previously unknown to me, and I considered it—considered it from my point of view as pertinent evidence. I ask to be excused for not submitting it before now. DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I naturally do not wish to submit any further evidence; but I should like to ask you to clarify a question, a question of law. At this time interrogations are going on constantly in the commissions in order to gather evidence with regard to the organizations. Witnesses are being interrogated there whom we here do not know, and documents are being submitted which we have not yet seen. It will be several weeks before we know the results of this evidence about the organizations. Now we defense attorneys, who are working here, are thinking of the following case: It could happen, for instance, that one of these defendants could be incriminated by some new testimony about the organizations, or that documents might be submitted which we, as Defense Counsel for these defendants, would absolutely have to take into consideration in our pleas, or to which we would have to offer evidence in rebuttal. Now we are agreed that the evidence here should be concluded, but we would naturally like to reserve the right in such cases to learn the results of the hearings for the organizations. THE PRESIDENT: I think you will find, when you look carefully at the order which the Tribunal made, that this matter was provided for and that, if there is any matter in the course of the hearing of the case against the organizations which in any way materially or directly affects any of the individual defendants, the Tribunal, of course, has discretion to hear counsel for that defendant upon the matter; and I think that is specifically dealt with in the order that we have made. DR. SAUTER: This order is known to us, of course, Mr. President; but we just wanted to be clear on this point, that this order will still remain in force, even if the presentation of evidence here is concluded. THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. Do the Prosecution wish to make any application to the Tribunal? COL. PHILLIMORE: I have eight documents to put in. My Lord, they are documents which it is intended to refer to in the final speech; and accordingly I would not propose to do more than just to indicate their nature to the Tribunal and put them in very quickly. I have a list of them which I will hand up first. THE PRESIDENT: Are they documents which have not yet been offered in evidence? It may be convenient to see their nature. COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord; I am offering them in rebuttal. THE PRESIDENT: You have a list here? COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord, the first document is... THE PRESIDENT: Have they been communicated to the defendants’ counsel? COL. PHILLIMORE: No, My Lord; I have copies here. The first document, 1519-PS, contains orders for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. My Lord, that is not strictly offered in rebuttal; but the Tribunal has had before it a document, EC-338, which was put in as Exhibit USSR-356. That document consisted of a commentary by Admiral Canaris on these orders, and Your Lordship may remember the document. Defendant Keitel had made certain notes on it on which he was cross-examined, the reference in the shorthand notes being Pages 7219 to 7223 (Volume X, Pages 622-625). My Lord, it seems appropriate that the actual orders should be before the Court and not merely the commentary. My Lord, that will be GB-525, and the Tribunal will see it consists of a covering letter from the Defendant Bormann to Gauleiter and Kreisleiter covering the OKW letter signed by General Reinecke, the head of the Prisoners of War Organization; and then there follow the actual regulations. THE PRESIDENT: Has not this been in before? COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I am told not. What was put in was the commentary on this document, which was by Admiral Canaris. It was included—this document was included in the Keitel document book, but it was not formally put in. THE PRESIDENT: I see. You mean it will be GB... COL. PHILLIMORE: 525, My Lord. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the second document, D-912, will be GB-526. This is a series of broadcasts from German stations between 6 September and 22 October 1939, monitored by the British Broadcasting Corporation and dealing with the _Athenia_. My Lord, I offer that document in view of the Defendant Raeder’s evidence. The Tribunal will remember that, according to him, the article on the 23 October in the _Völkischer Beobachter_ came as a complete surprise. The reference in the shorthand notes is 9832, Page 9832 (Volume XIV, Page 80). My Lord, it also arises out of the question, I think, put to the Tribunal—put by the Tribunal to the Defendant Fritzsche; and it confirms his evidence that broadcasts blaming Mr. Winston Churchill for being responsible for the sinking of the _Athenia_ started at the early part of September and went right on through the month. Actually, these broadcasts, the Tribunal will see—the first on 6 September. I might read perhaps one sentence in the second line: “The German press refutes the accusations of the British press that the German submarine had sunk the _Athenia_. Churchill, as one of his first actions, ordered the _Athenia_ to be sunk in order to stir up anti-German feeling in the U.S.A.” Well, then there are similar broadcasts from other stations on that day, again on the 7th, the 11th, the 25th. I have not got the one on the 27th, put in by General Rudenko; but there is one by the Defendant Fritzsche on 1 October, and so on, culminating with a broadcast by Goebbels on the 22d, the day before the article appeared. My Lord, that will be GB-526. The next document, 3881-PS, is an extract from the proceedings before the Peoples’ Court on 7 and 8 August 1944, when seven defendants were tried for the attempt on Hitler’s life. My Lord, I am only putting in a translated extract, but the photostat is in fact complete. I should have said that what is before the Tribunal is only a translation of certain extracts, but the exhibit contains the complete record of the proceedings. My Lord, I... THE PRESIDENT: Unless we have it translated, we shall not be able to have it in evidence. COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, we do not intend to refer to more than the translated extracts. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. COL. PHILLIMORE: I only said that for the benefit of Defense Counsel, who may wish to look elsewhere. My Lord, I put that in in view of the Defendant Jodl’s evidence that it was only because British generals obeyed orders that the German generals were now being tried. That is Page 11043 of the shorthand notes (Volume XV, Page 383). And the passages—the nature of the passages is that the president of the Peoples’ Court is refusing to accept the defense of superior orders put forward by the defendants. My Lord, that will be GB-527. My Lord, the next document is D-181, which I offer as Exhibit GB-528. It is a letter by a Gauleiter to Gauamtsleiter, Gauinspektor, and Kreisleiter on the subject of the law of hereditary health and sterilization on the ground of imbecility. It is an important document in connection with the Defendant Frick, and I put it in in view of the statements made on his behalf by his counsel at Page 8296 (Volume XII, Page 162) of the shorthand notes, My Lord, when he said in effect that Frick had no control over the political police and that Himmler’s subordination to him was purely nominal. My Lord, there are a number of references in the letter to the fact that the decree—and indeed its administration—was the responsibility of the Defendant Frick. My Lord, the next document is of a similar nature, and I attribute it to the same page of the shorthand notes. It is Document M-151, and I offer it as Exhibit GB-529. It consists of three letters on the subject of the murder of mental patients in institutions. The first is dated the 6th of September and addressed by the supervisor of a sanatorium at Stetten to the Reich Minister of Justice. It sets out the feeling of insecurity in the neighborhood of the sanatorium administered by its inspector, in view of the number of deaths which are occurring. The second, dated the 10th, is a letter from the Minister of Justice acknowledging the complaint and saying that it has been passed to the Defendant Frick. And the third, of the same date, is the Minister’s letter to his colleague passing the complaint to him. My Lord, the next document is again on the same subject. It is Document M-152, and I offer it as Exhibit GB-530. It consists of four letters. The first, dated the 19th of July 1940, is addressed to the Defendant Frick as Reich Minister of the Interior, by Bishop Wurm, the Provincial Bishop of the Württemberg Evangelical Provincial Church. My Lord, it again sets out the mass of complaints he is receiving and then goes on to deal with the wickedness of the practice which is apparently going on. The second letter, dated the 23d of August, is a letter to the Minister of Justice referring to the letter sent to the Defendant Frick. The third, of the 5th of September, is a letter to the Defendant Frick reminding him of the previous letter of the 19th of July to which no reply had been received. And, on the 6th of September, the next letter is a parallel communication again to the Minister of Justice. Finally, on the 11th of September, the last page of the document, there is a memorandum on the Minister of Justice’s file indicating that an official of the Ministry had informed the Bishop’s dean, presumably Dean Keppler, that the matter was entirely one for the Defendant Frick. My Lord, the next document, D-455, which I offer as Exhibit GB-531, is a pamphlet prepared by the German. Military Government authorities in Belgium. It comes from the files of the German War Office, the OKW, and it is entitled, _Belgium’s Contributions to Germany’s War Economy_, and is dated the 1st of March 1942. My Lord, I offer it in view of the general evidence that German occupation was benevolent, and that—the Tribunal has heard, again and again, the suggestion that they did a great deal of good to the countries they occupied. This document is a very graphic illustration of the falsity of that evidence out of the mouths of the Defense. My Lord, if I might take the Tribunal very quickly through it, at Page 3 is a chart of the population figures in terms of employees, and it shows that more than half the working population was working for Germany. Of the 1,800,000 workers and employees in Belgium, 901,280 were employed with the German Armed Forces and in the German interests. My Lord, at Page 4 is a comparison between Belgium, Holland, and France in terms of percentage of workers employed as slave labor. My Lord, at Page 5 is a statement of the production figures for the Belgian contribution to Germany, in—I think it is the seventh line, it is summed up: “Output to the value of 1,200 million Reichsmark.” Page 6—there is a comparison between the coal taken from Belgium and the same amount produced in the year in the Ruhr. At Page 8 there is comparison of iron, with the total amount of iron used in the West Wall. Page 9, cement; Page 10, textiles; Page 11, metals. There is a statement there which contains a sentence about the summing up of what had