*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 69434 ***

                        The University of Chicago

                          HERDER’S CONCEPTION OF
                                “DAS VOLK”

                              A DISSERTATION
                         SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
              OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOLS OF ARTS AND LITERATURE
                      IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
                           DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

                         DEPARTMENT OF GERMANICS

                                    BY
                           GEORGIANA R. SIMPSON

                     Private Edition, Distributed By
                   THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES
                            CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
                                   1921

                         Composed and Printed By
                     The University of Chicago Press
                        Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.




                         DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY
                                  OF MY
                            FRIEND AND TEACHER
                         FRÄULEIN AGNES BURCHARD
                                    OF
                             ROSTOCK, GERMANY




NOTE


I wish to express my sincere thanks to all my Professors, but especially
to Professors Starr W. Cutting, Martin Schütze, and Francis A. Wood,
under whom the major portion of my work in the Graduate School has been
pursued.

This particular study, however, is the outcome of interest awakened by
Professor Schütze while I was a member of his seminars.

I owe a special debt of gratitude to him, not only for his guidance in
this endeavor, but for the inspiration and encouragement which has come
to me from the very beginning of my work under him.

                                                      GEORGIANA R. SIMPSON




CONTENTS


    CHAPTER                                                           PAGE

      I. SEMASIOLOGY OF THE WORD, _Volk_—THE IDEA IN OTHER WORDS         1

     II. CONCEPTIONS OF _Volk_ AS SEEN IN HERDER’S USE OF THE TERM       4

    III. CONCEPTIONS OF _Volk_ AS GATHERED FROM HERDER’S COLLECTION OF
           _Volkslieder_                                                15

     IV. CONCEPTIONS OF _Volk_ IN HERDER’S DISCUSSION OF “OSSIAN’S
           PEOPLE” AND THE ANCIENT HEBREWS                              22

      V. FOUNDATIONS OF INDIVIDUALITY AND PERSONALITY IN HERDER         31

     VI. EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY THOUGHT IN HERDER’S CONCEPTION OF
           _Das Volk_                                                   36

    VII. CONCLUSION                                                     54

         BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                   58




CHAPTER I

SEMASIOLOGY OF _VOLK_—THE IDEA IN OTHER WORDS


Before going directly to the main discussion of our theme, a background
is sought in a brief semasiological study of the word _Volk_. The word
is widespread in the Germanic languages; Gothic, however, offers no
examples. Among the earliest recorded Germanic forms are those in Old
English and in Old High German. Old English _folc_ meant people, common
people, multitude, a people, tribe, family, army:

“He sloh folces Denigea fyftyne men”—_Beowulf_.

“Folces hyrde”—_Beowulf_.

It was particularly used originally of a crowd of people. Skeat’s
_Etymological Dictionary_ suggests the possibility of its being related
to both flock and full.

Old High German _folc_ meant people, body of warriors, servants, crowd,
mass. The oldest meaning here suggests forces of war: _dhazs himiliscâ
folc_.

The word occurs in Old Frisian as _folk_; in Old Saxon, _folc_; and in
Old Norse, _folk_; with meanings equivalent to those found in Old High
German and Old English.

Kluge’s _Etymological Dictionary_ says that the meaning “division of an
army” seems to be the fundamental meaning of the family group, from which
Lithuanian _pulkas_, heap mass, Old Slavonic _plŭkŭ_, host of war, are
borrowed forms.

In Middle English the word took on the additional meaning of an
aggregation of people in relation to a superior; e.g., God, a king,
or priest; further it began to mean also the vulgar or lower classes,
this use easily rising out of the meaning “mass” or “the many.” Such
expressions occur as _beboden waes Godes folce_, _Folkes Mass Book_.

In Middle High German the meaning was people, hosts of war, army,
servants, subjects, multitude: _er das Volk gewan_ (_Gudrun_, 1162, 2).

In Modern English the word is chiefly colloquial, being superseded in
more formal use by “people.”

In numerous combinations (following German precedent) it has the sense of
pertaining to, current among, or existing among the masses of the people
or the common people. Such expressions as folk-belief, folk-custom,
folk-literature, folk-name, folk-song, and folk-speech are prevalent.

Modern High German has retained the word with nearly all of its
primitive meanings: _die schottischen Völker empören sich und drohen
abzuziehen_;[1] _Mein Volk zu mindern_;[2] _Was rennt das Volk?_;[3] _du
weisst, wir alten fahren, und ihr junges Volk reitet_;[4] _den Teufel
spürt das Völkchen nie_.[5]

The large number of compounds in which the word is used limit its
connotation to either “the masses” or “the common people”: _Volksbuch_,
_Volksdichter_, _Volksgeist_, _Volkslehrer_, _Volksschule_, etc. Kluge in
his _Etymological Dictionary_ says: “Connection with Latin _vulgus_ is
uncertain; for it is questionable whether the Latin word together with
the Germanic family group would come from an original _qelgos_, _qolgos_.”

Weigand, _Deutsches Wörterbuch_ says: “The earlier comparison with the
Latin, _volgus_, is not possible. Rather to be compared here are the word
_voll_ and roots related to the Greek πλῆθος.”


THE IDEA IN OTHER WORDS

The ideas conveyed by the fundamental meanings found in the word _Volk_
appear in other words and in various languages:


GREEK

    πλῆθος—a great number, a throng, a crowd, multitude, especially
    of people.

    πολύς—properly of number, many; opposed to ὀλίγος.

    οἱ πολλοί—the many; that is, the greater number.

    ὄχλος—a moving crowd, a throng, irregular crowd, in a political
    sense, the populace or mob, opposed to δῆμος.

    γένος—race, stock, family, whether by blood or by nationality:
    αἷμα τε καὶ γένος

    ―—a race in regard to number, γένος ἀνδρῶν, mankind.

    φῦλον—a set of men or any living beings as naturally distinct
    from others; a race or tribe; in a closer sense, a race of
    people or a nation.

    ἔθνος—a number of people living together, a company, a body of
    men.

    ἔθνος ἑταίρων—a band of comrades.

    ἔθνος λαῶν—a host of men.

    ὁ δῆμος—a district, country, land. Also the people of such
    a district, hence (as in early times the common people were
    scattered through the country while the chiefs held the city)
    the commons, common people. δήμου ἀνήρ opposed to βασιλεύς.


LATIN

    _Vulgus_—people collectively or without distinction, the
    public or people generally: _Non est consilium in vulgo_. The
    multitude, the common people, the populace.

    _Populus_—a people, the commons in contradistinction to
    the senate and knights: _senatus populusque Romanus_. The
    inhabitants of a country or town, a nation, a whole people:
    _Populus Romanus victor dominusque omnium gentium_. A large
    number of people, a crowd, throng: _populus fratrum_.

    _Plebs_—The common people, commonality, the ignoble opposed to
    _patricii_, _patres_ or _senatus_; whereas _populus_ comprises
    both classes. When the knights, _equites_, were raised to a
    separate class, the _plebs_ formed the third; i.e., the last or
    lowest class; hence, the lower class of people, the populace,
    the mass.


FRENCH

    _Peuple_—a multitude of people of the same country and living
    under the same laws: _Les peuples ne souffrent que par les
    fautes des rois_.[6]

    _Peuple_—a multitude of people who, although not occupying the
    same country, have the same religion or the same origin: _et je
    serai leur Dieu, et eux ils seront mon peuple_.[7]

    _Peuple_—that part of a nation considered as opposed to the
    classes among whom there is either more ease or more education:
    _Il y a le peuple qui est opposé aux grands. C’est la populace
    et la multitude._[8]

In Middle English the word people was already a synonym for _folc_: “A
Blysful lyf, Ledden the peoples in the former age” (Chaucer).

In Modern English the word people has almost entirely displaced _Volk_
except in colloquial or archaic speech. Like _Volk_ in its fundamental
sense we have:

    People—a body of persons composing a community, tribe, race, or
    nation.

    People—persons in relation to a superior, or to some one to
    whom they belong.

    People—the common people, the commonality; the mass of the
    community as distinguished from the nobility and ruling, or
    official, classes, etc. “A people’s voice! We are a people yet”
    (Tennyson).




CHAPTER II

CONCEPTIONS OF _VOLK_ AS SEEN IN HERDER’S USE OF THE TERM


I

_Volk_ is that part of a nation which is the governed class as distinct
from those who are above them in authority and who stand as the ruling
class; i.e., the governed as separate from the governing.

I, 16: “Man weiss dass nach den Staatsplänen Lykurgs und Solons, die als
die Muster der übrigen glänzten, die Stimme des Volks, eine Stimme des
Staats, ja beinahe selbst Gott war.” _Volk_ here is the collective mass
of individuals constituting the state as opposed to the ruling heads.

I, 16: “Dies konnte das Volk beantworten, nicht aus Staatseinsichten,
sondern weil jeder Bürger streiten musste.” Herder is discussing the
power which the people have in the simplest democratic form of government
to declare or to forbid war. _Volk_ is here the collection of citizens
which make up the state as opposed to nominal rulers.

I, 188: “Cicero ärgert sich, dass er dem Volk zu gefallen, ‘pulcher’ und
‘triumphus’ statt ‘pulcer’ und ‘triumpus’ aussprechen müsste.” In similar
connotation are such phrases as: “fraget das Volk”; “die niemand als das
Volk geben wird”; “worauf das Volk hinkte, wenn es nicht gehen konnte”;
“bloss weil das Volk sie vor Drüsen ansahe.”

I, 18: “Selbst das Volk ist nicht mehr dasselbe. Dort war dieser Name
ehrwürdig: er begriff alle Bürger, Rath und Priester ausgenommen.” The
collective mass of citizens who form the state in contradistinction to
the individuals who were nominal rulers.

I, 22: “So sieht man, dass ihre Schutzgötter, und ihre Gottesdienste,
dass Orakelsprüche und Ceremonien blos heiliger Nebel und Opferrauch
waren, die Augen des Volks zu blenden.” Herder here mentions Cicero
as augur and writer on religious subjects; _Volk_ are the citizens,
exclusive of those occupying the official rank such as that held by
Cicero, for example.

XIV, 34: “So ist ein Unterschied zwischen Cultur der Gelehrten und Cultur
des Volks.” Herder speaks here concerning the organization of the state
among ancient peoples. The _Gelehrten_ were the teaching and priestly
class—those who were in possession of certain secret knowledge. The
_Volk_, while not having this knowledge, were nevertheless not without
culture. We may take _Volk_ to mean nation or people in the same sense
in which a modern people might be considered as such and include its
clergymen and lawyers who had special professional training.


II

Quotations in which _Volk_ is used as synonymous with nation. The ideas
of collective personality and of _Nationalgeist_ are prominent here.

I, 23: “Der Charakter unseres Volks ist nicht mehr die dreiste Wildheit
der Alten; sondern eine feinere und mässigere Freiheit; die Freiheit des
Gewissens.” Herder discusses the question of freedom in the fatherland
and uses “fatherland” as synonymous with _Volk_; _Volk_ is nation.

I, 147: “Ein Volk das ohne Poetische Sprache grosse Dichter ... gehabt
hätte ist ein Unding.” _Volk_ is nation.

I, 261: “So sehr sich immer Voltaire, und die seines Theils sind,
beklagen, dass wir ein eckles dummes Volk aus einem Winkel der Erde so
sehr erheben.” _Wir_ here refers to the German people in the eighteenth
century. _Volk_, then, means a nation.

I, 262: “singen wir denn für Juden? die sich für das einzige Volk Gottes
hielten? die von dem feurigsten Nationalstolz belebt wurden?” _Volk_,
here, in the light of _Nationalstolz_, clearly means nation. In the same
connection and with the same meaning he says: “Unser Gott ist ein Vater
der Menschen nicht eines Volks.”

I, 276: “Ein Rabbi, der für sein Volk Patriotismus, Känntniss seiner
Gebräuche.” _Volk_ here refers to the Jews, hence means nation.

II, 8: “Allerdings ist auch die Sprache einer Nation ein beträchtliches
Stück in der Litteratur derselben.... Man kann die Litteratur eines
Volks, ohne seine Sprache nicht übersehen.” _Volk_ is clearly a synonym
with nation.

I, 13: “ein Vorrath, der freilich oft durch Raub und Beute Nachbarn
bereichert, aber so wie er ist doch eigentlich der Nation zugehört, die
ihn hat ... der Gedankenschatz eines ganzen Volks.” In this passage,
language (_Sprache_) is the word _Vorrath_, to which reference is made.
_Volk_ is the same as nation.

II, 28: “Der ganzen Nation wäre ein solches Buch ein Schatz: ... denn der
Genius, der über die Wissenschaften eines Volks wachet ist zugleich der
Schutzgott der Sprache desselben.” _Volk_ is nation.

II, 32: “Und was dörfen wir uns unserer Consonanten schämen, wenn sie
Concente der Tapferkeit sind, um Götter und Stammväter unseres Volks,
Helden und Erretter der Nation zu preisen.” _Volk_ is nation.

II, 160: “Gemeiniglich waren die grössesten Schriftsteller zugleich die
grössesten Nationalautoren. Den Geist ihrer Zeit, die Denkart ihres
Volks, die Natur ihrer Sprache, wusten sie.” _Volk_ is nation.

III, 30: “sie werden Thränen und Thaten wecken: ein Schatz des
Vaterlandes, und das Gefühl, das sie besingen und wirken, Gefühl des
Volks, Nationalgeist.” _Volk_ here is nation.

III, 62: “ihn sollte ein Held anstimmen, der zugleich König war, der
dadurch die Griechen rettete, der ihnen die Opferung versprochen hatte:
dieser also sein Wort brechen, sein Volk nicht lieben, dafür auch nicht
etwas Saures thun wollen?” _Volk_ here refers to the ancient Greeks, and
therefore has the meaning of nation.

III, 398: “Wo, unsre Religion noch sinnlichen Vorstellungen Raum gibt; wo
sie sich einer Poetischen Bildersprache bequemt: da ist sie—Orientalisch.
Unter einem Volke gebildet, das ihr Gott auf alle Art von Bildnissen
abwenden wollte, in Gegenden, die das Uebermenschliche suchten, in
Nationen, die Verhüllungen des Körpers, und Geheimnisse des Geistes
lieber verehren als das offne Schöne lieben wollten—im Geist und in der
Sprache dieses Volks die sinnliche Bildersprache unsrer Religion also
geoffenbaret.” _Volk_ is nation.

III, 414: “Wenn er durch Dichter gebildet war, wenn einem Publikum in
Griechenland Dichterverse und Poetische Bilder ihrer Mythologie im
Kopfe schwebten, ohngefähr auf die Art, als unserm Volke Kirchenlieder,
Bibelsprüche (eine Vergleichung die hier blos Nationalunterschied seyn
soll).” _Volk_ is nation.

III, 425: “eine Nation, deren Merkwürdigkeiten eben so verwickelt von
der Politischen Wissenschaft sind, dass eine einzelne Münzensymbole
sie nicht vorstellen kann, ein Volk, das aus der verblümten Bilderzeit
hinaus, Wahrheit suchet, und Wahrheit findet: ein Volk endlich, in dem
die Münzen und der Geschmack auf denselben durchaus für keine Produktion
des Publikum gelten kann—ein solches Volk soll sich seine Geschichte
des Geschmacks und der Kunst aus Münzen weissagen, sich ein Buch durch
mit einem andern, dessen Numismatik Himmelweit von der ihrigen abliegt,
hämisch vergleichen lassen? wer ist Bürger dieses Volks, und sagt nicht:
_unde mihi lapides?_” This passage shows _Volk_ to be synonymous with
nation.

There are frequent uses of the word _Volk_ in the plural, _Völker_, with
the same connotation:

II, 19: “Die Litteratur fremder Völker und Sprachen ist oft als eine
fremde Colonie unter andere Nationen eingeführt.”

II, 23: “Was haben Völker und Sprachen für Vor- und Nachtheile gegen
einander?”

II, 79: “das Namenregister ... das mich aus allen Zungen und Sprachen und
Völkern und Gesellschaften der Erde überführen soll.”

III, 32: “eine Ader des Gefühls, die die besten Dichtungen und
Geschichte, nicht blos der Griechen, sondern aller Völker durchströmt.”

III, 52: “warum die Griechen in Bildung des Schönen so hoch gekommen, um
allen Völkern der Erde hierinn den Preis abzulaufen?”

IV, 168: “der das Schöne unter allen Völkern und Zeitaltern sucht.”

V, 86: “der Erste Kopf der an eine wahre Philosophie der Grammatik ...
denkt, muss gewiss erst die Geschichte derselben durch Völker und Stuffen
hinab überdacht haben.”

I, 2: “Gestorbene Sprachen.... Glücklich, dass die Völker denen sie eigen
waren, verlebt sind.”

I, 3: “Hier knüpft die Politik des Staats die Sprachen zur allgemeinen
Kette der Völker.”

I, 262: “Von allen Völkern der Erde abgesondert, brachte es seinem
Schutzgott Nationalgesänge.” (Jews.)

V, 500: “Der Stamm des Baums zu seiner grössern Höhe erwachsen, strebte,
Völker und Nationen unter seinen Schatten zu nehmen, in Zweige.”

V, 501: “Wenn alle Völker unter dem Römischen Joche gewissermaasse die
Völker zu seyn aufhörten, die sie waren?”

V, 514: “Norden wars. Und was man auch nun über den Zustand dieser Völker
für Ursprünge und Systeme ersinnen mag.”

VI, 115: “Kannte Noah diese ganz? Konnte er allen Völkern die Warnung
Gottes bekannt machen?”

VI, 128: “Ich bleibe bei den Umwandlungen dieser Philosophie bei spätern
benachbarten Völkern, und dünkts mich kein Traum.”

“Aber dass sich die Geheimnisse mit Ideen dieser Gattung unter allen
Völkern beschäftigt.”


III

_Volk_, a special group, less cultured, unaltered in certain respects by
the influence of civilization. There are marked implications of theories
of universalism and democracy here. The largest part of the people are
the most important and respectable.

In the following two passages we have a degree of characterization of the
rabble:

XVII, 91: “den leider ist es nur Ein Ding, Poebelsinn und Tyrannei, mit
zwei Namen genannt, wie die rechte und linke Seite.”

XXV, 323: “Volk heisst nicht der Poebel auf den Gassen, der singt und
dichtet niemals, sondern schreyt und verstümmelt.”

These characterizations of _Poebel_ suggest not a lack of culture but
culture of a sort that has had a warping effect. If _Volk_ is not this
rabble and, yet, not the learned class, it must stand in some respects,
at least, between the two. It is more dignified and respectable than the
rabble; it has certain intellectual aptitudes and moral traits found
among primitive peoples, but which are usually effaced by a high degree
of civilization and culture.

I, 392: “O eine Schrift, die das ist, was eine Erbauungs—eine
Bildungsschrift für den grössten, nutzbarsten und ehrwürdigsten Theil
der Menschen, das Volk sein soll.” The author has been regretting that
the weekly journals, religious books, and sermons are not suited to the
common man, and suggests the kind of literature that would meet his
needs. _Volk_ is here the largest, most useful, and most respectable part
of mankind. These people are to be edified and cultivated.

VII, 246: “die bei dem grossen ehrwürdigen Haufen Volk erregt werden
müssen, wenn etwas würken soll. Dies Volk noch nicht zu Raisonnement
gebildet, glaubt und handelt.” These are too naïve to have reason; _Volk_
are the naïve, simple people.

VI, 294: Herder here calls the Bible “Orakel Gottes für den besten,
grössten Theil der Menschheit, Kinder und Volk.”

VI, 309: “über den Euch noch immer Kind und Volk, der edelste Theil der
Menschheit.”

VI, 443: “wie die Kindes- und Volkswelt sich das ursprünglich denken
konnte.”

In these last three passages the mental capacity of _Volk_ is that of a
child, and the thought therefore implies for _Volk_ a meager degree of
education and culture.

VI, 104: “Wo sind in allen unsern Ländern Weisheitsschulen für den
ehrwürdigen Theil unsers Publikum, den man das Volk nennet?” Herder says
these are human beings who form the stock of the nation and distinguishes
them from the nobility who would refuse to enlighten the _Volk_ that
these might be the better utilized by the nobility and the better become
the subjects of their tyranny. _Volk_ is here a class beneath the
nobility, but ideally they are enlightened and made better by social
contact and religious observances.

VI, 301: “Zu dem schrieb er fürs Volk; ich verstehe unter diesem Namen
die Menge derer, die sich nicht durch die Sprachlehre zu Deutschen
gebildet hatten.” Herder here refers to Luther and the people for whom he
wrote; these were the less cultured people.

I, 298: “Weil damals noch nicht ein Unterschied zwischen der Sprache der
Weisen und des Volks, zwischen der Denkart der Vornehmen und Geringen
war; was Homer sang war die Sprache der Götter und zugleich eine
veredelte Sprache des Pöbels.” Herder is speaking of Homer’s language
and times. In the parallel the wise are the aristocratic; the _Volk_ are
those of humble rank.


IV

_Volk_ meaning a special group characterized by primitivism in various
forms.

II, 25: “wie die Denkart des Volks mit der gelehrten Denkart neben und
in einander laufe?” “Was giebt die Denkart und Sprache des Volks dem
Philosophen, Dichter und Redner für Masse?” “Was hat dies für Vortheile
und Nachtheile für die Weisen und dem Schüler des Volks?” Here Herder
discusses two separate manners of thinking, designating one as being
peculiar to the _Volk_ and the other as being that of the _Gelehrten_;
one as belonging to the _Volk_, the other to the _Philosophen_, _Dichter_
and _Redner_. Here is a clear implication that the _Volk_ is a class
apart from philosophers, poets, and orators; a class different from
the sages. Not being wise and learned, they must be those upon whom
artificial methods of training and culture have had less effect than upon
the philosophers, poets, and orators. They are therefore more nearly the
natural man.

I, 157: “So wie das Völkerrecht jetzt im Staat zum Gesez ward: so in der
Sprache.... Es entstand ein Adel ein Pöbel und ein Mittelstand unter den
Völkern wie er in der Gesellschaft entstand.” Herder here has traced
the development of prose out of poetry. He finds that the language of
passion gave way to that of mediocre wit, and this in turn became the
speech of reason. Here is suggested a parallel between the rights of
the people, which passed into state laws, and the language which passes
from _Poebel_ to _Mittelstand_ and then to _Adel_. If we make parallel
the _Völkerrecht_ in the development of law with the _Mittelstand_ in
the social status, then _Volk_ is a class between the rabble and the
nobility. If we follow the analogy suggested in the second sentence of
the quotation, we shall make the rabble those who have the language of
passion; the _Volk_ those who have the language of mediocre wit; and the
nobility those whose language is that of reason. Herder’s _Volk_ here
would be a middle class.

_Volk_ is used commonly to mean primitive peoples, i.e., people who
have reached only an early stage of civilization. Among those to whom
frequent reference is made as such are: Greenlanders, Laplanders, Early
Scandinavians, Early Germans, Greeks of Homer’s time, Ancient Hebrews,
Ancient Celts in Scotland and Ireland, and American Indians. The moral
standards and intellectual equipment found among these are eulogized and
idealized whenever these peoples as groups are compared with civilized
communities.

V, 189: “In mehr als einer Provinz sind mir Volkslieder,
Provinziallieder, Bauerlieder bekannt, die an Lebhaftigkeit und
Rhythmus und Naivetät und Stärke der Sprache vielen derselben gewiss
nichts nachgeben würden.” Here _Volk_ is put in apposition with that
which is provincial, which has a peasant character. A meaning which is
equivalent to the less cultured. Herder is discussing the whereabouts of
_Volkslieder_ which he locates among the _Volk_, and _Volk_ are to be
found in the lanes, in the fish markets, and in the country.

V, 185: “Zuerst sollten also wohl für die Seele des Volks die doch nur
fast sinnlicher Verstand und Einbildung ist.” ... Herder here considers
the _Volk_ as having the kind of soul which would be formed by contact
with the forces of nature, unaltered by the hand of man, and, especially,
little touched by reflection, the reasoning faculty.

II, 349: “Alles was für das Volk redete und schrieb, Redner, und
Geschichtsschreiber, musste populär sprechen; alles was für Gebildetere
schrieb, Dichter, und Philosoph, und Redner, und Briefschreiber war
freyer.” This statement clearly opposes _Volk_ to those more cultured.
The adjective, “populär,” used with reference to that which would befit
them, gives a shading to the meaning of _Volk_, derived from the meaning
of “popular,” that which partakes of a quality peculiar to the populace.
_Volk_ here are the less cultured.


V

CONNATIONS ARISING FROM USES WITH ADJECTIVES

These imply an emphasis on a group in which crudeness, the natural as
opposed to the cultured and polished, are eulogized.

XIII, 299: “Jedes eingebohrne _sinnliche Volk_ hat sich also mit seinen
Begriffen auch in seine Gegend umschränkt.”

XIII, 303: “Was ich auszuzeichnen habe sind einige allgemeine
Wahrnehmungen aus diesem Schattenreich _phantasierender Völker_.”

Herder gives as an example of the _phantasierender Völker_ the people
of Greenland, India, Lappland, Japan, Peru, and Africa at a period of
their existence when they have a mythology. The mythology he calls a
philosophical effort of the human soul, which dreams before it awakens
and gladly remains in its childhood.

XIII, 328: “Auch unter den _wildesten Völkern_ unterscheidet sich das
Weib vom Mann.”

XIII, 389: “Daher ist auch bei den _rohesten Völkern_ die Sprache der
Religion immer die älteste.”

XIII, 392: “die göttlichen Gesetze und Regeln der Humanität, die sich
wenn auch nur in Resten bei dem _wildesten Volk_ äussern.”

XIII, 393: “Von den _rohen Völkern_ der Vorwelt.”

V, 681: “.... wie die Römische Staatskunst mit den Deutschen Fürsten
spielte; und die Grundverfassung dieser _Barbarischen Völker_ in Freiheit
und Einigung zu erschüttern suchte.”

XXV, 7: “Rohe Gesänge eines _rohen Volks_! Barbarische Töne und Märchen,
der Grundsuppe einer Nation.”

XXV, 7: “Ohne Zweifel war das _Gallische_, _Englische_ und noch mehr das
_Nordischere Volk_ blos Volk!”

XXV, 8: “Und wenn man sich nun diese Lieder..... in die _lebendige
Rührung des Volks_ zurückdenkt.”

XXV, 9: “die Denkart der Nation selbst National; das Volk mit ein so
_ansehnlicher Theil des Volks_ dessen Namen man also nicht so Schaamroth
oder eckelnd und betroffen ansah und abscheute.”

XXV, 11: “die Reste aller _lebendigen Volksdenkart_ rollen mit
beschleunigtem letzten Sturze in Abgrund der Vergessenheit hinab. Das
Licht der sogenannten Kultur frisst wie der Krebs um sich.”


COMPOUNDS WITH VOLK

Words compounded with _Volk_ show all the various meanings distinguished
in the following simple usages.

XXIV, 268: “Wenn Du Deine Ballade einem jungen Bauermädchen aus einem
Thale .... gäbest die ausser den Kirchenliedern .... oder sonst einem
alten schlichten Gesang nie eine Musik gehört dabei jedoch von Natur eine
angenehmere und für den Zweck deines Gedichts _passendere Volks-Melodie_
wählen als irgend einer unserer grössten Virtuosen.”

XXIV, 280: “Ein engerer Bund zwischen Gott und dem Stammvater eines
Hirtenvolks wird darauf dieses Volks Losung.” This _Hirtenvolk_ is the
Hebrews.

XXIV, 305: “dieser grosse _Völkerstamm_ sich nicht von Nord nach Süden
hinab sondern von Gallien Nordwärts.” This _Völkerstamm_ is the Irish and
Scotch.

XXIV, 307: “nur so viel ist gewiss dass die allgemeine Volkssage Ossian
einige Jahrhunderte später leben lässt.”

XXIV, 399: “und da sie Gesetzgeber, Volksleiter waren.”

I, 86: “Die herumschweifenden Beduinen sind noch solche Rhapsodisten als
Homer war: sie sammeln einen _Volkhaufen_ um sich.”

I, 157: “so wie das _Völkerrecht_ jetzt im Staat zum Gesez ward.”

V, 8: “Eigentlich ist diese Sprache der Natur eine _Völkersprache_ für
jede Gattung unter sich und so hat auch der Mensch die Seinige.”

V, 132: “Eine Morgenländische Urkunde über die Trennung der Sprachen
(die ich hier nur als ein Poetisches Fragment zur Archäologie der
_Völkergeschichte_ betrachte).”

V, 218: “Shakespeare .... fand keinen so einfachen _Volks_- und
_Vaterlandscharakter_.”

V, 486: “Wie tausendmal mehr thöricht wenn du einem Kinde .... deine
allgemeine _Völkerliebe_ voll tolerante Unterjochung .... gönnen
wolltest!”

V, 493: “ob der Phönicier gleich nicht aus Menschenliebe, Nationen
besuchte, es ward eine Art von _Völkerliebe_, _Völkerbekanntschaft_,
_Völkerrecht_ sichtbar.”

XXV, 5: “Dünkts mich indessen recht, dass wenn auch diese nie ganz
erwünschbare Vaterlandsschätze gefunden würden, sie doch kaum
_Volks-Vaterlands-Lieder_ für uns im strengern Verstande wären.”

XXV, 6: “nur mit den Augen sehen und mit dem Herzen verstehen .... wie es
allemal _Volksrührung_ ist und seyn sollte.”

XXV, 10: “Natürlich musste auch die Denkart und ruhige _Volksart_ der
Deutschen an dem ewigen Zwistgewitter theilnehmen.”

XXV, 313: “ganz _Volksartig_, d.i. leicht, einfach, aus Gegenständen und
in der Sprache der Menge.”

XXV, 314: “Der grösste Sänger der Griechen Homerus ist zugleich der
grösste Volksdichter. Sein herrliches Ganze ist .... Sage lebendige
_Volksgeschichte_.”

XXV, 316: “und doch ist überall der alte ehrwürdige _Volkssänger_ der
einfältige Hirt.”

XXV, 323: “Zum Volkssänger gehört nicht, dass er aus dem Pöbel sein muss,
oder für den Pöbel singt.”

XXIV, 263: “Heisst also die Romanze, obwohl ihr nachher der Gebrauch
eine engere Bedeutung gegeben eigentlich nichts als Muttersprache der
südlichen Länder Europens und in ihnen _Volksrede_, _Volksgesang_.”

XXIV, 265: “die alten Englischen und Schottischen _Volksgesänge_.”

XXIV, 267: “Und so wäre mit echten _Volksgesange_ abermals nicht etwa nur
ein Hauptzweig alter, edler, rühmlicher und Ruhmweckender Poesie sondern
der Grund aller Poesie die innere _Rechtschaffenheit und Honnettetät im
Herzen des Volks_—ermordet.”

XXIV, 411: “Ungebundenheit (License) soll Endzweck der Regierung sein:
_Volkslaune_ (_populare humour_) Ursprung der Regierung.”

XIII, 39: “Die Abessinier sind ein Arabischer ‘_Völkerstamm_’ (race).”

XIII, 214: “_Völkerschaften_ die den Dörfern und Städten nah sind mildern
und mischen auch mehr ihre Sitten und Züge.”

XIII, 231: “Kennten wir nun noch die zahlreichen _Völkerschaften_ die
über ihren dürren Gegenden .... wohnen.”

XIII, 392: “so ist dieser Begriff, als allgemeiner _Volksglaube_ auf der
Erde.”

XIII, 427: “Priester- und _Volkstradition_.”

XIII, 437: “Geschlechtstafel dieser Stämme .... hält sich in den
Schranken ihrer _Völkerkunde_ und ihres Erdstrichs.”

XIII, 438: “.... widerspricht nicht nur der Zeitrechnung und der
gesammten _Völkergeschichte_.”

XV, 124: “Damit ich mich des altdeutschen _Volksausdrucks_ bediene.” “Aus
dem Latein kam er ins Englische ins Deutsche, wie mehrere Wörter und noch
ist er in der _Volkssprache_.” Herder is discussing the word _Priamel_
which he says is perhaps from the Latin praeambulum. _Volk_ in the two
compounds must mean the less learned.

V, 493: “nun müsste der Bewohner des Schiffs und der Küste der expatrirte
Seestreicher und _Völkerläufer_ dem Bewohner des Zelts und der Ackerhütte
ein ganz anderes Geschöpf dünken.”

V, 501: “Völkerrecht.”

V, 515: “Ihre Feudaleinrichtung wie untergrub sie das Gewühl
_Volkreicher_ üppiger Städte.”

The foregoing citations indicate two distinct senses in which Herder uses
the term _Volk_:

_Volk_ is equivalent to nation; nation carrying the idea of a group bound
together by blood or language or government, or by all three. As such, a
_Volk_ is a collective personality, has a marked individuality, and is
characterized by a national spirit.

2. (_a_) _Volk_ is a race or a nation that never advanced beyond
primitive grades of culture; that therefore never was subject to what he
considers the deteriorating and degrading effects of higher civilization;
(_b_) _Volk_ is a group to be found within a civilized nation; a group
which has retained the primitivism just noted above. Primitivism then is
characteristic of all _Volk_ included in section II. This primitivism
whether in the entire race or in a special portion is always eulogized.
These primitive specimens have the most pronounced racial individuality
because civilization has not interfered with the influences of
environment.




CHAPTER III

CONCEPTIONS OF _VOLK_ AS GATHERED FROM HERDER’S COLLECTION OF VOLKSLIEDER


That Herder’s conception of that group of people which he calls _Volk_
bears relationship to a certain genre of poetry is implied in the fact
that he first coined the word _Volkslied_:

    “_Volkslied_, n. von Herder, August, 1771 geprägt.” F. L. K.
    Weigand, _Deutsches Wörterbuch_, Giessen; Verlag von Alfred
    Töpelmann, 1909.

    “_Volkslied_ zuerst von Herder.” M. Heyne, _Deutsches
    Wörterbuch_, Leipzig; Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1895.

Herder himself has made a collection of specimens of this peculiar
type of song. According to his own statements these poems bear the
distinguishing marks of that sort of people which he has in mind as being
distinctively _Volk_. In his essay, _Ähnlichkeit der mittlern englischen
und deutschen Dichtkunst_, he says:

    Alle unpolizirte Völker singen und handeln; was sie handeln
    singen sie und singen Abhandlung. Ihre Gesänge sind das Archiv
    des Volks der Schatz ihrer Wissenschaft und Religion ihrer
    Theogonie und Kosmogenien der Thaten ihrer Väter und der
    Begebenheiten ihrer Geschichte, Abdruck ihres Herzens, Bild
    ihres häuslichen Lebens in Freude und Leid, beim Brautbett und
    Grabe.

Herder’s collections are from national bodies of people. We ought to find
among these groups of songs common factors which would not be found as
such in that body of poetry which Herder excludes as not being _Volk_
songs.

Further, we should be able to reduce these common factors to lowest terms
which would embody some interpretation of Herder’s conception of _Volk_:
“Das sind einmal alte Nationalstücke die das Volk singt, und sang, woraus
man also die Denkart des Volks, ihre Sprache der Empfindung kennen
lernet.”


VOLK SONGS COLLECTED BY HERDER

DANISH—FOUR PIECES

    Content—themes: love, marriage, fairy tales.

    Form—rhythm and rhyme marked; often irregular.

    Method of appeal—concrete.

GERMAN—SIXTY-TWO PIECES

    Content—themes: love, war, religion, dance, court life, rural
    life, fairy tales, domestic life.

    Form—rhythm and rhyme marked; often irregular.

    Method of appeal—concrete pictures; abstract thinking.

ENGLISH AND SCOTCH—THREE PIECES

    Content—themes: love, war, religion, domestic life, idyllic
    scenes, court life, vengeance, ghost and fairy tales.

    Form—marked rhyme and rhythm; blank verse, irregular rhyme and
    rhythm.

    Method of appeal—concrete pictures; abstract thinking; deep
    reflecting; dramatic presentations.

ESTHONIAN—FIVE PIECES

    Content—themes: love, war, marriage, tyranny.

    Form—marked rhythm and rhyme.

    Method of appeal—somewhat concrete.

FRENCH—THIRTEEN PIECES

    Content—themes: love, idyllic scenes, court life, domestic
    life, phenomena of nature, classic mythology.

    Form—marked rhyme and rhythm.

    Method of appeal—concrete pictures, abstract thinking.

GALLIC (OSSIAN)—SIX PIECES

    Content—themes: love, war, religion, death, personified nature.

    Form—little rhyme, rhythm often marked but irregular.

    Method of appeal—concrete, vivid visual and auditory pictures,
    dramatic presentations.

GREEK—SEVEN PIECES

    Content—themes: friendship, freedom, marriage, love.

    Form—rhyme and rhythm, sometimes irregular.

    Method of appeal—direct and concrete.

GREENLAND—ONE PIECE

    Content—theme: death.

    Form—parallelism.

    Methods of appeal—concrete.

ITALIAN—FIVE PIECES

    Content—theme: hope, care, springtime, love.

    Form—rhythm regular.

    Method of appeal—concrete and abstract.

LAPLAND—TWO PIECES

    Content—theme: love for animals, love.

    Form—rhythm regular.

    Method of appeal—concrete.

LATIN—SIX PIECES

    Content—theme: temptation, marriage, religion.

    Form—rhythm, rhyme, sometimes irregular.

    Method of appeal—concrete, abstract.

LETTIC—FIVE PIECES

    Content—theme: love, marriage, springtime, lordship.

    Form—rhythm and rhyme.

    Method of appeal—concrete.

LITHUANIAN—NINE PIECES

    Content—love, marriage, war, idyllic scenes, fairy tales.

    Form—rhythm, rhyme, often irregular.

    Method of appeal—concrete pictures, abstract thinking.

SKALDIC—TEN PIECES

    Content—themes: mythology, battle.

    Form—rhythm is regular.

    Method of appeal—concrete, rugged.

PERUVIAN—TWO PIECES

    Content—theme: mythological, love.

    Form—rhyme irregular, rhythm.

    Method of appeal—somewhat concrete.

SPANISH—THIRTY-FOUR PIECES

    Content—themes: love, war, religion, court and city life.

    Form—rhyme and rhythm quite regular.

    Method of appeal—moralizing and abstract thinking. Few concrete
    pictures.

This investigation of these poems leads to the following: Each group of
poems embodies an expression of personality, individuality which grows
out of peculiar environment; not merely physical environment, but also
social, political, and religious environment. Each, either in content,
form, or in its method of appeal, sometimes in all three, bears traces of
the milieu out of which it sprung.

The notes of waning glory and ancestral lament of Ossian gain their
character from a different period in the life of the nation from that
recorded in the Moorish battle songs in the Spanish collection.

The ruggedness of the Skaldic poetry bespeaks a roughness in climate and
scenery not to be found in the French poems.

The mythology of the Scotch Highlanders and of the Norsemen, depicted in
their poetry, is different indeed from the Mohammedanism of which the
Spanish pieces speak.

The English and German songs which are characterized by Christian customs
are colored neither by Mohammedanism, Gallic, nor Classic mythology. The
deep reflective moods of the Shakespeare specimens grew out of a social
and intellectual environment entirely the opposite of that in which the
concrete and vivid pictures of many of Percy’s Reliques had their birth.

In all this difference, the common feature is that individuality
is expressed. Individual traits appear within each group. Racial
consciousness distinguishes one group from the other.

Now personality and individuality are corner stones in Herder’s system of
thought. His discussion of Lessing’s “Laokoon” sets forth the principle
that true art will be characterized by these.[9]

Herder’s philosophy is also emphatic in showing that all art is shaped by
the environment out of which it grew. The essays “Shakespeare,” “Homer
und Ossian,” and “Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie” are replete with such
thought.

The art of every nation then will bear national imprint. The national
stamp, this expression of personality and individuality, both products of
various kinds of environment, belongs to Herder’s conception of _Volk_
wherever the idea is identical with that of nation or race.

Now the preceding chapter has shown that however often Herder uses the
term as synonymous with nation or race, he has also a distinctive and a
sort of esoteric use.

The evidence that poetry has been shaped by environment and expresses
the individual consciousness of a group of people cannot be taken as
conclusive evidence that the group from which it emanated belongs
to Herder’s _Volk_ of the specific type, for Herder excludes from
the category of _Volkslieder_ that poetry which bears the imprint of
scholastic and pedantic cultural milieu to the extent that certain
primitive traits find no expression.

Another common factor, then, must be sought which is distinctive of
people in this more restricted sense.

The way in which the material is presented is what I have called in
my analysis of the pieces “the method of appeal.” There is no common
basis on which we can place the specimens viewing them from this side.
Many of them present vivid visual and auditory pictures. Many others
are marked by abstract thinking or sober reflection. Some are dramatic
presentations, others are simple descriptions. Some are cold moralizing;
others expressions of strong emotions.

All of these selections are in some kind of rhythmic form. It may be
parallelism, rhythmical blank verse, or marked feet and rhyme. But we
cannot make use of this as a very definite factor, since many specimens
are translations which cannot preserve the original exactly. However, we
have in the original the English and Scotch, the Ossian and the German
collections. All of these present a form of rhythm which is usually so
irregular that it would not meet the demands for measured feet, verses,
and rhyme to be found in the highly polished and formal poetry. Now in
his discussion of rhythmic forms in poetry Herder indicates that the
human love for rhythm has its foundations in the physiological processes
and symmetry of the body: _Der Pulsschlag der Natur, dies Athemholen der
Empfindung ist in allen Reden des Affekts ... in der Poesie ... die doch
eigentlich Rede des Affekts seyn soll_.

The people who produced this poetry, then, were close to nature in their
forms of rhythmical speech.

The content of these poems remains to be considered.

Among the Esthonian pieces is a little love song which Herder has heard
the harvesters sing at work. It is idyllic in setting. Thoughts of love
are all-abounding. Happiness amidst rural scenes is common among all
nations.

“König Ludwig” is an Old High German battle song which interweaves
thoughts of God and religion; subjects which never cease to engage the
attention of mankind.

_Wiegenlied einer unglücklichen Mutter_, a Scotch mother’s song of
unfaithful love; the poem has a setting in domestic life. _Litthauische
Daina_—song of the departure of a young bride who goes to her new home;
domestic life and custom are the themes. There is sadness at leaving the
home of her girlhood.

These embody expressions of common, human feelings.

A number of the Spanish songs have their scenes laid in the city and at
court; but they sing of love, vengeance, and jealousy—all of which are
intensely human.

_Erlkönigs Tochter_, is a Danish piece which sings of elves. Thoughts of
the supernatural are among all mankind.

_Frühlingslied_, is an Italian piece which rejoices at the coming of
the flowers and birds and the budding of the trees. This season always
awakens human happiness.

_Röschen auf der Heide_ presents personified nature. Such personification
is among all men.

_Totenlied_ comes from Greenland. All peoples bemoan and eulogize their
dead in song.

_Tanzlied_ is German. Nearly every collection has pieces which present
the rhythm and joyous emotions of the dance. This kind of pleasure is
common among all races.

The songs from Ossian tell of departed ancestors and heroes. The
sentiment expressed is universal.

From Shakespeare appears such things as Hamlet’s _Probe einer
schauderhaften Metaphysik über Tod und Leben_.

_Macbeths schreckliche Dolchscene_; is there any human breast in which
the sentiments involved in these deep reflections have not sometimes
found a place?

Now it is what Herder himself says in introducing these selections from
Shakespeare which justifies us in making the content, the theme of his
whole collection of _Volk_ songs, the common ground upon which they all
meet.

    “In Shakespear gibts von jeder kleinen Nuance der menschlichen
    Denkart und Stimme Proben oder vielmehr lebende Naturartungen:
    und so fange das berühmte Selbstgespräch Hamlets an, was man
    schon Prosaisch in unsrer Sprache hat.”

Herder’s collection of _Volk_ poetry embraces as themes: love, war,
religion, domestic life, idyllic scenes, vengeance, court life, ghost
tales, fairy tales, marriage, mythology, phenomena of nature, death,
personified nature, freedom, the dance, the seasons, and hero and
ancestral veneration.

These embody sentiments universal among mankind; feelings which are
fundamental in the human breast; thoughts which are innate in humanity.
That which is universal, fundamental, and innate is natural. These songs
find a response among the people from whom they arose because these
people are products of unhampered nature. Both rhythm and content lead
to this conclusion according to Herder’s conception. _Volk_ as seen
from this angle, then, are either a primitive people or a group within
a people representing advanced stages of civilization, which group has
still retained the methods of thinking, the feelings, the modes of
expression, and the tastes of primitive people.

We get from Herder’s collection of _Volkslieder_, then, two conceptions
of _Volk_: (1) _Volk_, a collective personality resulting from the
development of individual consciousness into community individuality and
consciousness; (2) _Volk_, a primitive people or, within a civilized
nation, a section, which has maintained certain natural fundamental and
primitive characteristics.




CHAPTER IV

CONCEPTIONS OF _VOLK_ IN HERDER’S DISCUSSION OF “OSSIAN’S PEOPLE” AND OF
THE ANCIENT HEBREWS


Herder has discussed, in connection with two groups of poetry which he
distinctly calls _Volkspoesie_, each race from which the particular
collection arose. Both directly and indirectly he presents in each of
these peoples the peculiar characteristics by which he identifies a
community with his ideal conception of _Volk_.

In his collection of _Volk_ songs he has presented literature from many
and varied peoples of the earth, but he has discussed at length, to show
the traits which stamp their _Volkspoesie_ as such, only two of these
groups.

An examination of the common factors which the author sees as essential
elements of each of these races ought to give us in one form his
conception of _Das Volk_.

The two races are: (1) Those whom he believes to be the ancient Gauls,
from whom we have the collection known as “The Songs of Ossian”[10]; (2)
the ancient Hebrews.[11]


OSSIAN

Herder places the people among whom this body of literature arose in the
islands known as the “Hebrides,” in the highlands of Scotland, and in
Ireland.

Rugged mountains covered with roaring forests or spotted with desert
tracts surround the inhabitants. Mists and clouds, midnight and storm,
abound both on mountain tops and in the intervening valleys. Their huts
are bordered by rocks and narrowly shut in by foggy darkness or from
rough cliffs; they overlook the sea.

At the time at which we see them these highland dwellers look often upon
wilderness full of sacred views, upon battlefields, lonesome graves, and
blotted-out footsteps.

These old Highlanders believed in an all-high Being, whom they conceived
to be self-existing. The cloud was the dwelling place of patriotism and
love. The voice of renown, that is of song sung by friends yet alive to
the honor of their departed ones, still highly esteemed, introduced these
departed to their ancestors. With a sigh and tear as password, they were
received at once into the smiling presence of their forefathers, who had
clear, transparent figures like to the curled clouds. Their hands were
weak, their voices deep and soft. They swayed themselves over the entire
abode of their race and rejoiced in boundless space. Space they prized
above everything else. Fright and horror were considered as narrow and
shut in. Hence they called the grave the narrow house, and weak courage,
the breath of a narrow soul.

The noble dead never became old, but grew constantly wiser because they
conversed with the good of other times. On the other hand, the souls of
the wicked were driven whirling into a thick fog which always hung over
an offensive smelling morass. They never came out of this fog, and never
saw the sun. One did not know the name of the other. The black water of
the morass lake was their only converse; the voice of the Heron and the
quacking of ducks their music.

Ossian’s folk attributed every sudden death to an invisible hand which
threw a stone out of the clouds and which they called an “arrow of the
destroying woman.”

“Their chief conception of the highest being was that it governs the
clouds and heavenly bodies and rejoices at bravery and fortune of
mankind; that it remained ever invisible ... that the entire earth out of
fear would like to catch and imprison it.”

The dead were mourned in funeral dirges sung on the graves of the
departed; in the case of heroes, often amid battle tumult, these songs
were directed to ancestral heroes who awaited the dead in the clouds.

One of their myths which Herder extracts from Ossian shows a certain
phase of their religion:

“As they sing in the moonlight to the moon goddess, Mona, this maiden of
the heavens comes with gentle movement, with silent, beautiful cheek; her
playmates, the stars, stand in rows to receive her; the clouds bordered
with gold trip before them as servants; she outshines all her rivals so
that they blush and conceal themselves in veils. On such an occasion as
this the hero Ossian turns his sad song to the thought, How would it be
if she should once disappear from the heavens, if she should then go
into her little hut to cry and cry as he does? He wonders if she like
him has lost friends, and he begins to comfort the beautiful girl and to
cheer her up so that she quite joyfully smiles again.”

The family feeling is strong, and it is the foundation of nearly all
good feeling toward fatherland and friend, tribe and neighbor. There
are common among these people scenes full of innocence, of friendship,
of fatherly, brotherly, in fact family, love in general. Fingal is hero
and leader but also lover, bridegroom, husband, friend, father. Ossian
is warrior, but also son of noble Fingal, and in this very relation the
singer of the praises of his ancestors, of his friends, of his brothers,
of his sons.

It is out of the sadness of separated loved ones that we hear the most
touching tones and the harp is made to resound to praises sung to
ancestors. Although these tribes are said to be wild, they are in many
respects closely bound to customs and forms. The harp is their musical
instrument to whose touching tones their legends are fitted into song.

Herder points out that the stage in the history of Ossian’s people from
which this collection of poetry wins its character is the time of the
extinction of the race of heroes of whom Ossian the brave is the chief
and sad singer. He is the last of his courageous tribe; the witness
to the deeds of noted Fingal and his colleagues; the departing voice
of a heroic age to its weaker descendants. His mournful strains are
accompanied by no awakening call for an age yet to come. His race was
not, like Homer’s on Ionian shores, a growing people in the dawn of
splendor looking toward a flowering in the future.

The cause of the mournful strain in the life of Ossian’s race may have
been subjection by a foreign power or the invasion of monks bringing the
Christian religion. The poems suggest both. Ossian’s songs must have had
a powerful effect upon the people out of whose midst they grew. As long
as there were bards this people’s strength was irrepressible. But now we
see a patient, subject race trying to revive itself on the renown and
happy existence of departed ancestors.

When Herder brings to our attention the difference between the mournful
tones of Ossian and the arousing strains of Homer, when he reminds us of
the differing stages of history commemorated by each, the points entirely
unlike at which each writer halts and from which he extracts for his art
character, he sets forth a definite theory; namely, that each writer,
speaking as his people would speak, characterizes his poetry with the
individual content and feeling of his race; that each race has its
personality, and each spontaneously expresses this personality in its
song:

    Und Ossian? Es ist ungerecht von einem Baume Früchte zu
    erwarten, die er, seiner Art nach, nicht bringen kann; Ossian
    sei an seinem Orte das was Homer war; nur stand er auf einer
    ganz andern Stelle. In jedem Lande bildet sich der Volksgesang
    nach innnern und äussern Veranlassungen der Nation.

The eye and the ear of these people are wide open to every sight and
sound which their physical environment presents. The ear is strong,
quick, lasting; the eye keen, embracing, receptive. A certain perceptual
power expressed in alertness, boldness, and noble aspect pervaded their
entire being. According to Herder’s philosophy, as expressed in _Erkennen
und Empfinden_, the senses present to the mind pictures which receive the
stamp of feeling and which in turn are given back through some medium of
expression.

In Ossian, the material for these pictures is first and foremost Nature;
Nature robed in the peculiar majesty of the north. The sun is a rash
youth, the moon a maiden who has had as sisters other moons in the
heavens. The evening star is a lovely boy who comes out, winks, and goes
away again. All objects are personified, filled with life and movement,
whether it be wind or wave, or even the down of a thistle. As soon as
possible the object itself becomes a voice, and we hear moanings of
sadness and songs of the harp. These figures are often of the mist,
coming out of clouds through which the stars twinkle.

Ossian sings, also, deeds, happenings of history, the bygone fates of
forefathers, and old legends.

In outline all these pictures are delineations, which are snappy,
strong, manly, abrupt, wild, lively. They are not painted in detail,
and their content does not stream forth slowly in regular and measured
intervals. Less harsh and wild are they, however, than the songs of the
so-called “Northmen,” because Ossian’s soul possesses a charm giving out
lonesomeness, love, and gentleness mingled with courage and strength of
feeling.

The language is crisp, short, true, and exact, and penetrates by its
simplicity. A single word literally seizes a whole thought and the two
break forth together upon a voice tender and sad. When the singer would
exhort his comrades to courage, he painted his pictures through tones
that fell upon the ear.

In general, Ossian makes us see and hear the living world in scenes
that pass quickly, singly, one by one, without arranging themselves
in a regular and formal procession. Rough, strong sublimity is their
character. The colors which burst upon the eye and the tones which storm
the ear come forth without premeditation and polish; the natural outlet
of a people to whom nature has given an eye and heart and mind for wild
beauty, and in whom manners, customs, and language of civilization have
wrought no marring effects. These peoples see and feel, but they do not
think and ponder. Here Herder makes spontaneity a child of unwarped
nature.


THE ANCIENT HEBREWS

Herder applies his studies to the Hebrew people as he finds them in
their earliest habitations. From his analysis of formative forces and
of the peculiar personality resulting from these influences we have
what follows: The physical features of the lands with which the Hebrews
were familiar were varied enough to give them a rather complete natural
history of the earth. They understood the subsiding of water that left
mountains above them and valleys in between these. They saw that waters
coursed through the valleys and made fertile plains. They knew how
springs gush forth from rocks and trees grow on the banks of rivers. They
knew both the sea and the desert. The summer sun brought calm waters and
the cold winds forged fetters of ice. The palm tree and the cedar, the
olive and the grape, grew in these lands. The variety of animals seems to
imply a wide and varied expanse of territory.

The crane, the turtledove, the eagle, the raven, the stork, the ostrich,
the lion, the wild ox, perhaps the elephant and the rhinoceros, as well
as most of our common domestic birds and other animals, frequented these
environments.

Herder conceives of this entire milieu as a world in which the dawn of
human life was arising out of dark night, and giving way to the broad
daylight in which water and air, earth and sea, mountain and forest, were
in the fullest view and most powerful working. The strong contrasts of
oriental skies wrought through light and darkness their sharpest outlines.

The mild climate was perhaps the most beautiful in the world, and
produced the simplest needs of life with little labor on the part of the
inhabitants. With fertile river valleys in addition, which furnished
grazing lands, it was natural that one of the earliest grades of
civilization should arise here—the shepherd folk.

Although these people had a civilization that was early circumscribed, it
nevertheless presupposes some cultivation. Even the shepherd state cannot
exist without arts and fixed customs. The Hebrews in this shepherd state
had developed family bonds and fixed the ruling power of the father
in domestic life. They had domesticated animals, and developed tender
feelings toward them.

Let us look at the moral and mental traits due to this physical and
social environment.

The eye developed clearness and acuteness, a vivid sensitiveness; it saw
every leaf, every blade of grass, the plains and valleys, the waters in
outline and expanse, the planets and the broad ether in which they hung,
and it distinguished every movement. The ear heard the delicate rustlings
of branches and bows, as well as the roar of winds, the smallest
raindrop, and the rush of mighty waters. Every sense was thus developed
to a finesse which left no phenomenon of nature unobserved.

These sense impressions were impregnated with the feelings and carrying
these effects of feelings they passed onward to the mind and made mental
pictures of a kind which correspond to the character of the imprint made
by the feelings. Then these made-over pictures were given back to the
world in the sublime language found in the Old Testament. It is in these
pictures, in this investing of free nature with the power to feel, that
we see the texture and depth of feeling which are an essential part of
the personality of this group.

They saw the dawn rising out of darkness. They felt that the phenomenon
was due to a cause superior to any power in man. They could not account
for the beginnings of mankind. The consciousness of limitations of their
own knowledge and the awe for the unknown first cause turned the actual
darkness and dawn and full daylight into chaotic emptiness, a ray of
light at the beginning of creation and a completed work at the end of
six days—a wonderful personality directing it all. They saw the trees
and the plants thriving in their own spheres, and they attributed to
them life impulses given them by the sympathy and love and directing
force of special geniuses, the messengers of God. The stars were light;
they had undeceiving brightness and constant courses. They stamped the
sense impression of them with the feeling of worshipful joy, of rhythm
which became music and dancing, and so it was that the stars became the
daughters that shouted about the throne of the Great Ruler. At times they
assigned to them the sense of power for defense in well-ordered numbers
of individuals, and the stars became an army ready to do battle for God.
Again they were his willing servants and messengers. They saw the heavens
stretching from horizon to horizon, and everything in creation working in
its own sphere with regularity and order. Their own feeling for system,
harmonious working in family and tribal circles, pictured God in paternal
relations; a householder who stretched his great tent by fastening it
to the outmost borders of the earth, and opened and arranged therein
the treasures of his household. They heard a light rustle of leaves and
imprinted upon it the feeling of gentleness and kindness, and it became a
messenger of God, an angel. They heard the thunder and their shuddering
gloom translated it into the voice of an angry God. They listened to
their own heartbeats and transferred their rhythm to their own speech,
for we may account for the free light rhythm in their songs by comparing
it with the systole and diastole of the heart and the movements of the
breath in the physiological processes of inspiration and expiration.

Their national pride and national joy found expression in collective song
which might either glorify God or invoke their own well-being. Such song
is at one and the same time inspiration and expression.

In general, their poetic language draws concise analogy between the
objects of creation and the qualities and attributes of the creator of
these things. It lingers over single images, repeats them, wonders at
them, and finally gives them forth with a vigorous tongue incapable of
empty words.

These souls so entirely formed by the sights and sounds of nature blended
with inner feeling give a secret, mystical significance touched with
the finest spiritual sense to the pictures and parallels which they
produce. We have here a peculiar race type living close to crude nature,
an individuality which is shaped by this primitive milieu and which
expresses itself in sharp and strong outlines in its art. The most marked
feature of this individuality is the spontaneity in its expression.

The common factors to be drawn from this exposition, which contribute to
the interpretation of Herder’s general conception of _Volk_ are:

1. The physical environment of both groups was primeval nature; i.e.,
a material world that had undergone very few of the changes which may
be wrought by the arts and crafts of what we term higher stages of
civilization.

    Kurz wir sind mit Denkart, Sprache, Sitten des Jahrhunderts
    so weit aus Ossians Natur heraus, als unsre Städte, Höfe,
    Palläste, Schulgebäude keine Schottische rauhen Gebürge, unsre
    Gesellschaftskreise und Zerstreuungen im Museum kein Tanz unter
    rauschenden Bäumen.[12]

    Als Gesetzgeber wirkte Moses auf den Geist seines Volks mit
    Riesenstärke. Dass er sie zum Acker- und Hirtenvolk machte,
    und so viel es seyn konnte, Handel u. Eroberung ausschloss.
    Land- und Hirtenmässig ist ihre Poesie dem grössten Theile
    nach. Ländlich sind ihre Bilder, im Hirten- und Ackerleben der
    grösste Reichtum ihrer Sprache.[13]

2. Both races were subject to powerful control by this physical
environment:

    Alle Gesänge solcher wilden Völker weben um daseiende
    Gegenstände, Handlungen, Begebenheiten, um eine lebendige
    Welt.[14]

    Und alle hat das Auge gesehen! Die Seele stellt sie sich vor!
    Das setzt Sprünge und Würfe:[15]

    Ihre Ideen sind voll starker Contraste, voll Licht und
    Dunkel, voll Ruhe und Arbeit: dies ist der Character des
    morgenländischen Himmels, und des Genius seiner Nationen.[16]

    Wenn die Biblischen Dichter von den Schneegüssen des Libanon;
    vom Thau des Hermon; von den Eichen Basans; vom prächtigen
    Libanon, und angenehmen Carmel reden; so geben sie Bilder, die
    ihnen die Natur selbst vorgestellt hat.[17]

3. Among both, their ideas of God and their religion were interwoven with
personified nature:

    Darthula. Ein Gesang an die Mondgöttin (Mona, Mana, μήνη)
    vielleicht der schönste, der je im Mondschein gesungen
    worden.[18]

    Solche Bilder und Ideen, als uns auch nur die ersten Kapitel
    Moses gewähren. Hier ist als ob Einer der Elohim selbst, der
    Genius der Menschheit unsichtbar lehrte .... und singet den
    Menschen, seinem unsichtbaren Vater und Schöpfer gleich.[19]

4. Both were races of people with keen, strong, exact senses:

    .... der rauhe Schotte Ossian? Er sang lebendig, und stürmte
    also in den kurzen Augenblicken lebendiger Stimme auf Herz und
    Ohr; für matte Augen im Lehnstuhl, .... wollte er nie in der
    Welt solche schöne klassische Augenweide schaffen.[20]

    Bilderrede und Gesang also sind die beiden Hauptforten der
    Poesie der Ebräer; .... sie sind Poesie fürs Auge und Ohr,
    durch welche beide sie das Herz besänftigen oder bestürmen.[21]

5. The members of both races had, as innate characteristics, rapid
and direct interaction between sensation, feeling, imagination, and
expression:

    Wir sind freilich in der ganzen Denkart unsres Jahrhunderts
    zu weit von Ossian ab. Mehr an eine Kette raffinirter
    Vorstellungen, leichter Abstraktionen angenehmer _Pensées_
    und Reflexionen gewöhnt, fals an den rauhen Schrei der
    Leidenschaft, kühner Hinwürfe einer starkgetrofnen Einbildung,
    und einer wüsten, starken Gestalt der Seele.[22]

    Seine Muse ist Tochter der Natur auf ihren wildesten Höhen
    erzogen, aber rasch, kühn, edeln Ansehens, nur mit natürlichem
    Reitze geschmückt und im Tanze der Natur hinfliegend.[22]

    Sehen Sie Hiob. Die Erde war ein Pallast.... Der Ocean ward,
    wie ein Kind, gebohren und gewindelt: das Morgenroth handelte,
    die Blitze sprachen.[23]

6. In general, the texture resulting from control of the individual by
forces of nature unchanged by human interference is in both peoples
fitly correlated with functioning; i.e., spontaneity is innately and
intrinsically their nature.

    Homers Rhapsodien und Ossians Lieder waren gleichsam
    impromptus, weil man damals noch von Nichts als impromptus der
    Rede wusste.[24]

    Nun ist bei den Ebräern beinahe Alles Verbum: d.i. alles lebt
    und handelt.[25] Alles in ihr ruft: ... ich lebe, bewege
    mich, wirke. Mich erschuffen Sinne und Leidenschaften, nicht
    abstrakte Denken und Philosophen.[26]

With all these points in common, Ossian’s people and the ancient Hebrews,
as portrayed in Herder’s analysis of their poetry, differ from each
other as races in religion and in social customs. They show us different
habitats. They depict different historical epochs and scenes. But that
which is common in all this difference is, according to Herder, that each
has a personality of its own which characterizes its art.

    In jedem Lande bildet sich der Volksgesang nach innern und
    äussern Veranlassungen der Nation. Ossians Gedichte bezeichnen
    den Herbst seines Volkes. Die Blätter färben und krümmen sich;
    sie falben und fallen. Der Lufthauch, der sie ablöset, hat
    keine Erguickung des Frühlinges in sich; sein Spiel indessen
    ist traurig ... angenehm mit den sinkenden Blättern.[27]

    Gesetzt, wir konnten alles dies wissen; singen wir denn
    für Juden die sich für das einzige Volk Gottes hielten?...
    Von allen Völkern der Erde abgesondert, brachte es seinem
    Schutzgott Nationalgesänge.[28]

    Es verdient fast nicht bemerkt zu werden ... dass man die
    poetischen Bilder und Empfindungen keines Volks und keiner Zeit
    nach dem Regelmaas eines andern Volks, einer andern Zeit zu
    beurteilen, zu tadeln, zu verwerfen habe.[29]




CHAPTER V

FOUNDATIONS OF INDIVIDUALITY AND PERSONALITY IN HERDER


Herder as philosopher was concerned more with practical and concrete
applications of his principles than with dogmas and abstract theories.
The following brief investigation of purely philosophical discussions is
made with a view of determining how he applies his philosophy to this
definite anthropological conception.

In his _Gespräche über Spinozas System_ Herder sets forth much of his own
religious philosophy. A passage in the second dialogue substitutes for
the word “attributes” the word “forces” in expounding one of Spinoza’s
postulates. The passage then reads: “The Godhead reveals itself in an
infinite number of forces and in an infinite number of ways.” It is with
the word for forces that we are concerned at this point—_Kraft_, _Kräfte_.

This same word Herder uses in discussing the fundamental life-principle
in the world at large, which is the theme of his first few sections in
the essay entitled: _Vom Erkennen und Empfinden in ihrem menschlichen
Ursprunge und den Gesetzen ihrer Würkung_. These _Kräfte_, these
“modifications of God,” find their impulse to operate in a stimulus,
beyond the material form of which Herder cannot go.

Herder’s philosophy plants itself from the beginning quite firmly on
material foundations. He says that in the qualities which are constantly
designated by such words as heavy, thrust, fall, movement, rest,
strength, even power of inertia, is implied a life-principle, a soul.
Any close observation of nature must show that the great working power
of nature is everywhere the same, and it is the analogy between the
processes of the material world in general and the phenomena in the human
organism in particular which can give the clearest insight into the great
life-principle. This study by analogous reasoning is not artificial, Man
cannot avoid feeling the similarity between himself and external nature.
Human beings must of necessity, he continues, vitalize everything about
them with their own feelings.

The feelings then are strongly instrumental in man’s interpretation of
the world about him.


I. STIMULUS

The first phase of feeling which Herder considers is _Reiz_ or stimulus.
The peculiar phenomenon of stimulus says he, which may be seen in the
smallest, most delicate filaments of plants, causing them to contract and
expand, and bespeaking a sort of feeling is due to the same law which
controls the most complicated feelings and passions of the human being.
This all-pervading law of stimulus Herder finds in the action of physical
heat and cold, which he makes parallel in its working with pleasure and
pain respectively. Pain, disturbance by something foreign, contracts; the
strength collects, increases for resistance, and takes its stand again.
Well-being and pleasure—warmth—expands, makes for calmness, placidity,
enjoyment, and release.

That which is expansion and contraction in dead nature, the result of
warmth and cold, seems to be here the obscure seed of stimulus and
feeling in man. The “world-all,” the entire feeling, nature of human
beings and animals moves in this ebb and flood of warmth and cold. The
power to expand and contract which is the effect of this heat and cold,
pleasure and pain, Herder makes the fundamental principle of the power
for self-nutriment.

This power is nothing external or mechanical, in which case it would
not be life. The plant structure of organic fibers which takes in life
from the surrounding elements does so through its own activities. The
power to escape its enemies and to make over all its nourishment into
differentiated parts lies within the plant. The complicated body of the
animal likewise has this stimulus to seek the nutrition essential for
life within: hunger and thirst are powerful exciting forces. When he
applies his theories to man, he calls love the most powerful stimulus to
life.

Herder ascribes to the plant something in addition to the stimulus to
seek nutrition when he recognizes that intelligence in plant structures
which selects only such elements as fit the peculiar needs for its
development after its kind. He does not succeed in getting rid entirely
of the external in operating the organism; he sees in breathing a kind
of time-beating by which nature swings the machine, and here nature is
without, for she breathes upon the machine, in this harmonious way, the
spirit of life.

Thus far Herder has recognized the existence of a stimulus in the
vegetable and animal kingdoms, which is in reality a life-principle. This
life-principle is not only the monitor over the feelings, but merges into
them and becomes the stuff of which feelings are made.

What is the relation of these indefinable and unanalyzed stimuli to the
feelings? Since the passions which surround the heart find their roots in
the finest fibers of the physical structure, the degree to which these
fibers are stimulated determines the degree to which the feelings will be
excited and will express themselves. Love, courage, anger, and bravery
are in proportion to the stimulus of the heart and the collaborating
parts: “Die Innigkeit, Tiefe und Ausbreitung mit der wir Leidenschaften
empfangen, verarbeiten und fortpflanzen macht uns zu den flachen oder
tiefen Gefässen die wir sind.”

The forcefulness of thought is likewise dependent upon the vigor of this
obscure stimulus, for no thought, says he, can reach the brain unless
feeling in its proper physical connection has preceded it.

And just here our philosopher lays the very roots of individuality.
The degree to which the fibers are stimulated is the beginning of the
operations which will end in producing an aggregate of properties
peculiar to an individual.


II. SENSES

By this inductive method, which develops fundamentally a philosophy of
evolution, Herder finds that the senses are a nerve-structure developed
to meet the waves of stimulus from without and feeling from within and to
differentiate them more finely than did the fibers which worked only in a
general way. But the law is the same. The nerves of every sense operate
according to the same law by which the fibers contract and expand. The
nerves advance to meet pleasant agreeable things, but recede from and
resist unpleasant things.

Now Herder observes that something other than the organ of sense and the
external objects must operate to produce sensation in at least two of the
senses. He sees a certain mental bond without which sight and hearing
could not go to the object nor the object to the senses; this common
substance, he says, is light, a substance which has the peculiarity of
taking just so much from creation as the two end organs can receive. But
this light as a medium is a requisite for the finer senses only. There
are coarser senses, fibers, and stimuli which cannot be brought into
action thus. They can feel only in themselves, for the object must come
to them, touch them, and, to a certain extent, be one with them.

Herder is explicit in connecting individual character with the senses.
The contribution which each sense makes to the soul cannot with any two
human beings be the same in kind, strength, depth, and breadth. There
are many proofs of this. Seeing and hearing, which furnish most of
the material for thinking, are seldom in one individual with the same
degree of training or of natural force. This will not only account for
inequalities of the senses evinced in all forms of expression in a single
individual, but for such inequalities among groups and races. For, he
continues, imaginative power in which thoughts and feelings disport
themselves is made of the flowing together of sense impressions.

This is Plato’s thought also when he objects to making knowledge mere
sense-perception because it would make a different standard of knowledge
for each man. Socrates in _Theaetetus_ quotes Protagoras on the same
point: “Sensations are relative and individual.” One scarcely needs to be
reminded here of Herder’s thorough acquaintance with Greek philosophy.

The way from a sensation to thought is through the nerve-structure of
sense organs, these nerve-structures furnishing just such a medium
between the object of sensation on the one hand and thinking and willing
on the other, as does light between the object of sense and the visual
and auditory organs.

Never losing sight of the physiological element in his psychology, Herder
tells us that the soul has grown out of the body, and has so outgrown the
body that soul has become the monarch over that, without which soul could
not exist. All its thinking grows out of feeling, and this feeling out of
a body having in its command manifold obscure forces administered to by
variously endowed “servants” and “messengers.”


III. KNOWING AND WILLING

Herder denies that anything in the way of knowledge comes back to the
soul out of the platonic fore-world, and abstract egoism, he says, is
opposed to truth and the open course of nature. Just as all of the soul’s
knowing depends upon obscure stimuli and forces having their foundations
in the body and leading to sensations and then to reasoning, so her
willing comes from these as a natural sequence of her knowing. Any
knowing without willing would be false and incomplete. If knowing is only
a deep feeling of truth, who is going to see truth and at the same time
be blind to it—know goodness and not will to do it? Every single passion
or feeling thus knowing the good would at the same time will the good.
Herder is emphatic about the interdependence of these two. Just as no
knowing is without willing, no willing is without knowing; they are only
one energy of the soul.

This suggests Socrates in the _Protagoras_, as he argues that men would
always do good if they knew the good. “No man voluntarily pursues evil
or that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in
human nature.”

Briefly summarizing: Herder finds his _stimulus_ the same everywhere
in the material world. It is the principle of life since it impels
to self-nutriment and reproduction. It works by the same law in
both body and soul. Variations of it in degree are the foundations
for individuality and personality. All that is true of feeling for
essentially stimulus becomes feeling. Out of all this Herder arrives
at the conclusion: “Der tiefste Grund unseres Daseyns ist individuell,
sowohl in Empfindungen als Gedanken.”

The distinctive personal and individual character whose foundations have
just been traced, according to our author, can not come to its fullest
development except as a component part in a larger self-conscious and
self-directing entity which he calls “humanity.”

This humanity as a whole, and the relation of the individual to it, is
discussed in the collections _Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität_. An
emphatic tone regarding personality and individuality as characteristics
of the group pervades these letters.

Existence as a self-conscious being which develops into group
consciousness Herder finds rooted in human frailty.

Primitive man, to himself and enigma, he observes, when comparing his
visible condition, his natural capacities, his will-power with enduring
nature, was forced to a feeling of weakness, to a sense of mortal
existence; he finds himself of the earth, a fragile house of clay.
Sympathy then and the realization of one’s duty to one’s fellow-men began
here.

But the consciousness of frailty led also to a knowledge of our powers
and abilities, to a sense of our calling and our duties, and brought us
to a deep consideration of human nature.

The group is always striving toward an ideal pattern which is “the
character of the race,” and, again, this character is in the individual;
for, says Herder, he who does not make the best of himself cannot assist
the sum total of the race.

The author states the idea when he says that it is according to the
sacred laws of nature that man is a complete unit in himself, and at the
same time an important element of groups each a consistent part of larger
groups which make the sum total of humanity. Man is friend, citizen,
husband, father; fellow-citizen, finally, in the great city of God on
earth.




CHAPTER VI

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY IN HERDER’S CONCEPTION OF _DAS VOLK_


Herder, by numerous references and discussions, in which he is definite
and explicit as to name and theories, shows a thorough acquaintance with
the various schools of philosophy which were influential throughout the
century in which he lived. Among those whose names occur many times in
his works are:

    Roger Bacon
    Francis Bacon
    Baumgarten
    Berkeley
    Boileau
    Bolingbroke
    Condillac
    Descartes
    Diderot
    Hume
    Kant
    Leibniz
    Locke
    Montaigne
    Montesquieu
    Newton
    Rousseau
    Shaftesbury
    Spinoza
    Voltaire
    Wolf

These are philosophers whose expressions of thought left their traces
either vaguely or deeply upon the enlightenment period and, as already
said, whom Herder knew well. But the doctrines of many of these men
converged. Of others, the principles were developed and amplified by
successors. The main ideas of the period which enter into Herder’s
conception of _Volk_ are found in three great exponents: Leibniz,
Shaftesbury, and Rousseau. The influence of each upon Herder will be
examined here.


LEIBNIZ AND HERDER

IV, 224: Herder calls Leibniz the greatest man that Germany has produced
in later times.

IV, 361: Herder calls Leibniz and Plato the two greatest heads for
hypotheses.

VIII, 178: Herder says that no one says it better than Leibniz, that
bodies as such are only phenomena of substances, as the Milky Way is of
stars and the clouds of drops.

IX, 493: Herder regrets that Leibniz was not sufficiently appreciated by
the Germans; most of them in the city in which he lies did not even know
where his grave was.

IX, 534: Herder cites Leibniz as saying that human wit and humor are
never more effective than in play, and uses this in support of his own
belief that the human heart expresses itself most effectively in the
nature songs of primitive people.

X, 305: Herder sees the flower of Leibniz in Shaftesbury.

XIII, 199: Herder agrees with Leibniz that the soul is a mirror of the
“world-all” and he believes there is a deeper truth in Leibniz’ statement
than is usually recognized; i.e., all the forces of a “world-all” lie
hidden in the soul, and they need only an organization or a succession of
organizations to set them into activity.

XIV, 417: Herder finds support in Leibniz for the statement that the
Catholic Church considered the king a protective magistrate under the
supremacy of the Pope.

XV, 180: Herder says Leibniz pointed out weak sides of Locke’s philosophy.

XVI, 450: Herder makes the following statements:

    1. In Leibniz’ mind were associated fruitful conceptions of all
    sciences and of all the realms of nature.

    2. Leibniz said that one must finally, so far as conceptions of
    bodies are concerned, come to simple substances, which he calls
    “Monads.”

    3. I (Herder) am convinced that among the three ingenious
    hypotheses with which he has enriched metaphysics the monad is
    the most fundamental, and will sometime win a place.

    4. Without this indivisible working element, the nature of
    physical bodies cannot be explained.

XVI, 458: Herder calls Leibniz a “Proteus of Science,” who has done much
to unify philosophical truths.

XVI, 606: Herder calls Leibniz, “our immortal Leibniz.”

XVII, 331 ff.: Herder eulogizes Leibniz, emphasizing his theories of
play, his mildness and sympathy in criticizing others his youthful,
impartial soul.

XVIII, 126: Herder says that Leibniz was the most modest among all the
reformers of philosophical thought; he thought that all systems of the
ancients could be united because each held something good.

XXI, 19: Herder quotes Leibniz as saying that language is the mirror of
human understanding.

XXI, 70 ff.: Herder translates Leibniz’ _Ueber Philosophie in der
Deutschen Sprache_.

XXI, 145: Herder mentions Leibniz’ principles of _Identity and
Causality_.

XXI, 319: Herder translates Leibniz’ _Vom philosophischen Vortrag_.

XXII, 190: Herder translates Leibniz’ _Ueber Macht und Anwendung der
Musik_.

XXIII, 132: Herder recommends Leibniz’ _Neue Versuche über den
menschlichen Verstand_ to young men.

XXIII, 479: Herder says, Leibniz, had he lived to see his original
plans revived in the Scientific Society in Berlin, probably would have
arranged a _System der Völker nach Sprachen und Bildungen_. This method
of studying history by going to natural environments and to the sources
is sufficiently in accord with Herder’s ideas to call forth the prophecy
that what the past century had omitted in this respect the future would
do.

XXIII, 483: Herder, referring to Leibniz’ system of _Monaden,
prästabilirten Harmonie u. f._, says that no one doubts that there is
much that is true and beautiful in it; no one dares deny a world of souls
and a harmony between mind and body; there is no doubt that there are
pure conceptions in which thoughts are considered only as workings or
developments of the soul, and, on the other hand, the laws of the world
of bodies are considered as mechanical and artificial.

XXIV, 267: Herder notes Leibniz’ romantic attitude, observing that
Leibniz regretted the decline in the feeling of courage and honor and
that he counseled a return to the deeds and voices and models of the past
to reawaken these.

XXV, 88: Herder says if Leibniz found human wit and humor most real and
effective in play, certainly he (Herder) is justified, in finding the
most faithful reproductions of traditions, language, and customs at the
point where truth and delight meet; i.e., in song.

XXX, 135: Herder calls Leibniz the greatest man that Germany has had.

XXX, 258: Herder has remarked frequently upon Leibniz’ theory that the
human mind is never more clear-sighted and disposed to activity than in
play. He analyzes the thought here, and it is worth considering because
it hinges closely upon Herder’s philosophy which causes him to seek
genuine _Volk_ character in methods of expression which are natural
rather than artificial.

He asks, Why is it that there is this connection between our innermost
selves and pleasure and joy? Many forms of play are so difficult and
fatiguing, others are subject to such strict rules; just because they
demand this is the form of play interesting for those who like it.
It becomes pleasant because it keeps both soul and body constantly
and interchangeably busied. In the progress of being occupied lies an
indefinable pleasure; we feel the happy progressiveness by which our
forces are strengthened and grow. The more frequently this interchange
takes place, the more do we realize our forces enriched.

XXIII, 154: Herder says Shaftesbury sent to Leibniz the former’s works
and that Leibniz found in them his own system.

XXIII, 461: Herder praises Leibniz’ efforts in behalf of the Royal
Scientific Society in Berlin.

XXIII, 468 ff.: Herder has written an essay on Leibniz in which he
reviews the work of the latter under the following heads: _Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz_: (1) _Theologie und Religion_; (2) _Rechtsgelehrsamkeit
und Politik_; (3) _Geschichte, Alterthümer, Sprachen_; (4) _Mathematik
und Physik_; and (5) _Die erste Philosophie_.

Herder’s own comments in certain parts of this series of expositions are
important in this connection.

1. _Theology and religion._—Leibniz’ proof of Christianity Herder
finds was based upon natural religion; after firmly laying the
foundation of this natural religion, one should show the necessity of a
revealed religion, then the superior beauty of the Christian religion,
surpassing as it does all other religions. Leibniz sees atheism as
well as materialism, to say nothing of the disparagement or mockery
of Christendom, as the herald of a barbarism with which is bound up
the decay of honor and morality. Herder’s comment upon this is: How
faithfully have succeeding times proved this to be true! Leibniz,
he continues, would rejoice if he could see the Bible so clarified,
every one of its books interpreted in the light and spirit of its own
time and above all the subtleties foreign to the sense and content of
Christianity removed—all this, such as it was in his own day, is Herder’s
idea. Important to note here is the return to nature as a foundation
for Christianity, and to natural environment for the interpretation of
Christian teachings.

2. _Jurisprudence and statesmanship._—Here Herder finds that Leibniz
became a real teacher _der Völker_ through his work, _Codex des
allgemeinen Völkerrechts_. Just as Leibniz in his opposition to
Puffendorf founds man’s natural rights upon eternal principles of right
and reason, so he carries these on into the so-called “voluntary rights
of peoples” to which he adds in the Christian Republic a divine, positive
right.

This divine, positive right Herder admits was, in the beginnings of the
Christian republic, conceived of as being embodied in the emperor as head
of the state. But, says he, Leibniz’ great thought was true; true in the
sense that this divine, positive right is that which made itself evident
long before the French Revolution.

He asks, Does Christendom teach anything other than pure humanity?
It must be founded upon humanity which is also Leibniz’ _Codex des
Völkerrechts_.

It is clear, continues the commentator, that what a nation demands or
wishes from another it must also offer; force, faithlessness, and bold
arrogance of one toward the other enrage all nations. This _Codex des
Völkerrechts_ is written in the breasts of all human beings. Wherever
his view was unobstructed, he saw clearly the political relationships of
Europe, and prophesied much that followed.

The natural rights of mankind to be applied to humanity through states
and nations, then, is what Herder notes at this point in Leibniz.

3. _History, antiquities, languages._—Herder notes here that Leibniz
liked above everything else in History the origins of races, _Uranfänge
der Völker_, which led to their antiquities and language stocks. This
accounts for his diligence in comparison and derivation of languages
and in etymologies. Herder reminds us that a family tree of languages
has been established since Leibniz’ time through the Russian journeys
in Northern Asia, continuous news from China, the investigations of the
English in India, and other studies made in Tibet, Persia, Arabia, Egypt,
Africa, America, and the Southern world.

XXXII, 226: Herder’s discussion of Leibniz’ monad:

    A monad is said to be able to change its representations
    (_Vorstellungen_) and it must change them in accordance with
    its fundamental force; now if these representations are nothing
    but external rapports, must there not lie in the fundamental
    force also the foundation of perceptibility of the external and
    the foundation of the constantly changing perceptibility?... If
    therefore, the soul is a living mirror of the universe then it
    must not reflect this universe from within itself outward....
    But there must be an internal cause in every soul which
    accounts for the part of the universe which the soul looks upon
    and which cannot be sought in a third being, the cause of both.

    Everywhere there is life; everywhere life is connected with
    organs, and where would the cause of the connection lie? Not
    in the life; not in the organ. Where then? A _Deus ex machina_
    must be called which contains the cause of the connection of
    both so that neither of these (life, organ) contain anything
    of this cause, and that is contradiction. One monad is said
    to rule over the others and over many others without there
    being in any one the cause of change which is in the other. A
    monad is said to heighten its forces just so much as its body
    heightens its own organization.

    Now still this interconnected increase is to contain nothing
    in the one for the other; not _causa efficiens_, not _conditio
    sine qua non_, only simultaneousness. How unbelieveable! If the
    adjustment of the organs extends to the making of a certain
    relief or difference, then such a relief or difference in
    the perceptions and all the connecting comes about without
    internal cause, only one cause to explain so many effects which
    are scarcely covered by it. It seems to me the world would be
    incomparably simpler and more manifold if in every monad were
    the cause for its connection and all of its changes.

It seems evident that Herder accepts much of Leibniz’ theory of the
monad. The important point of departure is expressed in the two sentences:

    1. But there must be _an internal cause in every soul_ which
    accounts for the part of the universe which that soul looks
    over and which cannot be sought in a third being, the cause of
    both.

    2. The world would be simpler and more manifold if _in every
    monad were the cause for its connection and all its changes_.
    It is at this point of departure that we see Herder’s emphasis
    on innate potentialities, which are fundamentally different,
    taking shape. Here are individuality and spontaneity in
    incipiency.


REFERENCES TO LEIBNIZ

         I: 116, 142, 166, 233, 415.
        II: 50, 96, 300.
        IV: 15, 224, 248, 361.
         V: 57, 316, 318, 410, 412, 459, 461, 504, 512, 532.
      VIII: 112, 170, 178, 226, 247, 266, 272, 319.
        IX: 493, 500, 534.
         X: 305, 346.
        XI: 90.
      XIII: 199, 364.
       XIV: 417.
        XV: Note to page 33; 35, 71, 180, 320.
       XVI: 450, 458, 504, 292, 606.
      XVII: 158, 210, 265, 267, 274, 326, 331, 334, 336, 338.
     XVIII: 126, 323.
        XX: 358.
       XXI: 17, 19, 49, 70, 71, 145, 185, 319.
      XXII: 67, 190.
     XXIII: 67, 88, 132, 154, 461, 468, 472.
      XXIV: 9, 92, 267, 315.
       XXV: 88.
    XXVIII: 232, 353.
      XXIX: 581.
       XXX: 64, 135, 403, 258, 407.
     XXXII: 32, 221, 225.


SHAFTESBURY AND HERDER

I, 182: Herder says Shaftesbury knows how to use the dialogue
excellently; he had learned it from Plato and taught Diderot.

V, 490: Herder calls Shaftesbury the amiable Plato of Europe.

X, 232: Herder mentions Shaftesbury’s _philosophischen Lobgesang auf die
Natur in seinen “Moralists”_.

X, 305: Herder concedes to Shaftesbury a refined, beautiful,
philosophical intellect. He is impressed with the “Characteristics” and
the “Moralists.” The latter, says he, can be put side by side with the
writings of the Ancients. Herder finds in Shaftesbury the flower of
Leibniz’ philosophy and the teachings of new platonism. He sees traces of
Shaftesbury in Mendelsohn’s _Letters concerning Feeling_.

Herder’s tone defends Shaftesbury in the statement that one should love
virtue for her own sake, on the ground that many religious enthusiasts,
including Fénélon, have maintained the same thing. Nor is he either
atheist or pantheist in his _Song of Praise to Nature_. He further
mentions the following works in German translations: _The Moralists;
Investigations Concerning Virtue_, Berlin, 1745; _Shaftesbury’s
Philosophical Works_, translated by Voss, Leipzig, 1776.

XI, 123: Herder finds Shaftesbury’s _Ten Letters to a Student of
Theology_ excellent in the following points: (1) What he says of real
philosophy, of empty speculation, of academic _polyhistorie_, of
intellectual ambition and the real freedom of thought, of the writings
of the Greek, and of the beautiful and pure toward which one must aim in
studies of all kinds; (2) what he says of the spirit of endurance and
Christian simplicity.

XI, 220: Herder admires _die Grazien des Platonish-Shaftesbury_ dialogue.

XVI, 407: Herder expresses himself by quoting in translation a stanza
from Shaftesbury’s _Moralists_.

XVI, 158, 159: Article on Shaftesbury; holds him in high esteem, calls
him _Virtuoso der Humanität_. Herder declares that Shaftesbury has
influenced the best minds of the eighteenth century.

XXIII, 143 ff.: Herder shows an intimate acquaintance with the life and
works of Shaftesbury as well as the sources of his philosophy. He reminds
that Shaftesbury influenced both Diderot and Leibniz. Herder reveals his
own inclination to take nature and the feelings as standards: (1) By
criticizing Shaftesbury for overlooking an important principle in Greek
philosophy in one of his discussions; namely, the principle _der Natur zu
folgen_. (2) By saying an honorable feeling for truth and justice is a
law of our nature.

XXX, 321: Herder calls Shaftesbury the high priest of the temple of
_Grazie_.

Shaftesbury’s _Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Time_ will
be used as a reference book.


SHAFTESBURY AND HERDER

The elevation of human nature, as found in the individual, to something
which has a universal value, to something higher and nobler than the
interests of self alone was one of the prominent tenets of Shaftesbury’s
philosophy. This implied a moral and social system composed of parts
nicely adjusted in each single entity, which in turn was a component part
of a larger whole; the parts of this greater system were likewise in
constant proportion to one another, and so finely and fitly adjusted that
any disarrangement could not fail to effect the harmonious blending and
the unity of the entire design. Out of this, it follows that man can come
to his truest and most natural development in community life only.

    And thus, if there be found in any creature a more than
    ordinary self-concernment or regard to private good, which
    is inconsistent with the interest of the species or public,
    this must in every respect be esteemed an ill and vicious
    affection. And this is what we commonly call selfishness, and
    disapprove so much, in whatever creature we happen to discover
    it.—_Inquiry_, Book I.

    When we reflect on any ordinary frame or constitution either of
    art or nature, and consider how hard it is to give the least
    account of a particular part without a competent knowledge of
    the whole, we need not wonder to find ourselves at a loss in
    many things relating to the constitution and frame of nature
    herself.—_Inquiry_, Book I.

    To love the public, to study universal good, and to promote the
    interest of the whole world, as far as lies within our power,
    is surely the height of goodness, and makes that temper which
    we call divine.—_Letter Concerning Enthusiasm_, section 4.

The harmonious man is to be the product of a natural unfolding of
innate human nature. The potentialities within are to be allowed to
develop unwarped and unimpeded and to express themselves completely
and symmetrically. There must be no subordination of personality or
individuality to artificial standards, for nature is the sovereign. If
no powers, inclinations, or impulses are thwarted in their trend and
activity, they will, in all their manifold variety, flower into the
perfectly beautiful and therefore the perfectly good.

    Now the variety of nature is such as to distinguish everything
    she forms by a peculiar, original character, which, if strictly
    observed, will make the subject appear unlike to anything
    extant in the world besides.

    For all beauty is truth. True features make the beauty of a
    face, and true proportions the beauty of architecture—_Essay on
    the Freedom of Wit and Humor_, Part IV.

That faculty by which the good and the beautiful are to be recognized and
approved is indeed little different if different at all from an emotion.
The principle of feeling really becomes the criterion of right and wrong.
It is the principle of feeling which forms the essence of Shaftesbury’s
_Moral Sense_. He admits that this sense may be improved by cultivation,
but its essential part is innate. “Sense of right and wrong” is as
natural to us as natural affection itself, and a first principle in our
constitution.

The two ideas which we are considering here as a part of Shaftesbury’s
philosophy are the development of the individual and his harmonious
relation to the whole of mankind.

These ideas are made the nucleus of a collection of writings and reviews
by Herder which he calls _Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität_. These
have been considered to some extent in a preceding chapter as a part of
Herder’s system of thought, but the purpose here is to connect the same
with that of Shaftesbury.—_Dritte Sammlung_, Brief 27 ff.

At the outset in this letter the author is concerned with the distinction
between the following:

    1. Menschheit: Menschen sind wir allesamt ... wir gehören zur
    Menschheit.

    2. Mensch, Menschlichkeit: Leider hat man in unserer Sprache
    dem Wort Mensch, und noch mehr dem barmherzigen Wort
    Menschlichkeit so oft eine Nebenbedeutung von Niedrigkeit,
    Schwäche und falschem Mitleid angehängt.

    3. Menschenrechte: Kann ohne Menschenpflichten nicht genannt
    werden.

    4. Menschenwürde: Das Menschengeschlecht ... hat seinem
    grössesten Theil nach keine Würde.... Es soll aber zum
    Charakter seines Geschlechtes, mithin auch zu dessen Werth und
    Würde gebildet werden.

    5. Menschenliebe: Das schöne Wort Menschenliebe is so trivial
    worden, dass man meistens die Menschen liebt um keinen unter
    den Menschen wirksam zu lieben.

He concludes that the word _Humanität_ will best suit, because among
both ancients and moderns it connotes worthy ideas. The reference to
the ancients reminds us of the common source from which both Herder and
Shaftesbury drew inspiration. Both were schooled in the literature of the
ancients.

As Herder lingers on the philological discussion, he gives us the
philosophical reason why the conception of frailty attaches to the idea
expressed in the word for man, _Mensch_.

The word “humanity,” he says, not only connotes the thought which he
desires to express, but it suits his purpose also on account of its
history. Among the upper classes of the Romans were some who were wont
to temper the execution of justice with mercy when exercising power
over their subjects; such a Roman citizen, Patrician, was _humanus_,
_humanissimus_. Now, he thinks, that since with the Romans the word
connoted the idea of mildness in the exercises of citizenship and law,
that it would be well to take over the word and the idea. He makes
reference also to the Greeks whose word, ἂνθρωπος, looking upward, he
clothes in Plato’s words: “As he looks he reasons.” Therefore, says
Herder, he does not fail to notice the human failings that lead to
sympathy, consequently to humanity. The knowledge of our powers and
inborn potentialities, of our calling and our duty arises from an intense
study of mankind. He repeats that the Greeks and Romans led the way in
this _studium humanitatis_. The only limit which Herder sets to what we
shall be is to be found in the highest possible formation and completion
of whatever belongs to the character of our race.

Many of the telling thoughts in these letters are scattered in isolated
paragraphs running something like the following: Truth is the bond of
humanity between friends. The purer the thoughts of men are, the more
they agree. The true invisible church is one in all times, in all lands.

Franklin had a wonderful sense of humanity. He proceeds from the simple
eternal laws of nature, from the most infallible practical rules—the
needs and interests of mankind. Franklin recognized the value of the
common people and thought to teach them by clothing his ideas in
simplicity.

Companionship is the foundation of humanity and the communion of human
souls, a mutual interchange of acquired ideas (thoughts) and of traits
of understanding which increases the mass of human knowledge and skill
infinitely. If humanity is no empty name, suffering mankind must rejoice
at the advance in medical science. Human society founded on virtue must
stand. The highest and most fruitful wisdom arises from the (common)
people because they have felt need and suffering, they have been driven
here and there, they have tasted the sweet fruit of trouble and they know
how to care for others.

The kinship to the spirit and philosophy pervading Shaftesbury is here
quite evident.


REFERENCES TO SHAFTESBURY

        I: 182, 303, 305, 307, 524.
       IV: 367.
        V: 284, 316, 388, 390, 396, 490.
      VII: 113, 236.
     VIII: 218, 311, 461.
       IX: 306.
        X: Note to page 232; 305.
       XI: 123, 205; note to page 220.
       XV: 199
      XVI: 26, 403, 407.
     XVII: 154, 249, 274, 326.
       XX: 308.
     XXII: Note to page 210; note to page 334.
    XXIII: 132_d_, 132, 136, 144, 151; note to page 155; 396.
     XXIV: 219.
    XXVII: 397.
      XXX: 17, 32, 407.
    XXXII: 33, 199.


ROUSSEAU AND HERDER

IV, 369: In discussing his ideal book for the development of humanity,
Herder finds that important points would be rules and exhortations for
the development of body and soul; in this he says: _ist Rousseau ein
grosser Lehrer_.

IV, 371: He will imitate Rousseau zealously; will read him, contemplate
him, nationalize him.

V, 37: Herder agrees with Rousseau in that language is not the result of
convention and agreement.

VI, 250: Reference is made to Rousseau’s _Pygmalion_.

VII, 65: Herder in his discussion concerning the fall of man quotes
Rousseau with reference to the tree of knowledge and the fall of man.

VII, 74: Herder calls Rousseau one of the greatest lights of his times.

X, 298: Herder says Rousseau’s _Confessions_ and other writings contain
excellent passages for philosophy and natural theology. Many of these
writings have suffered evil repute (_übel berüchtigt_.)

XV, 248: Herder calls Rousseau a great, wonderful man.

XVI, 26: Herder calls Rousseau a teacher of wisdom and morals.

XVII, 190: Herder speaks of Rousseau as a good man who exaggerates and
who in his phantasy is an idealist for the good.

XVII, 326: Herder says in his own day (_bis in unsern Tagen_) Rousseau’s
_Social Contract_ has had an effect that its author had scarcely expected.

XVIII, 359 and 371: Herder says that in his own time (_in unserer Zeit_),
Rousseau’s _Confessions_ have aroused a great sensation. He quotes from
them.

XVIII, 372: _Sein Geist war stolz, seine Grundsätze waren edel_, p. 374,
he speaks of Rousseau as a tree having brought forth beautiful fruit and
blossoms.

XXII, 151: Herder approves Rousseau’s views in the introduction to
_Nouvelle Héloise_, views on poetic language as a natural human art.

XXII, 161: He calls Rousseau one with great ability to express the
thoughts of his heart, and Herder considers this ability peculiar to
_Naturmenschen_.

XXIII, 272: Herder says much that Rousseau has said in _Emile_ against
the use of _La Fontaine’s Fables_ for youth is right.

XXV, 601: Herder translates from Rousseau’s _Consolations_.

XXV, 631: Herder has a translation of Rousseau’s “Shepherd Song,”
_Consolations_, p. 97, No. 53.

XXV, 632: Translation of “Song of Desdemona,” _Consolations_, p. 125, No.
65.

XXIX, 256: Herder eulogizes Rousseau in the poem _Der Mensch_.

XXIX, 265: Herder calls upon Rousseau to help him know himself.

XXX, 30: In regretting the fact that the taste and desire for
overrefinement was causing wholesome simplicity to be displaced in
educational methods and life in general, Herder calls attention to
Rousseau and interprets him thus:

    Rousseau ruft also ein philosophisches Wehe über unser
    Geschlecht, das die Tugend, Menschlichkeit und Wahrheit
    vom Altar gestürzt hat, und statt dessen eine lächerlich
    verkleidete Puppe des Wohlstandes anbetet. Dieser falsche
    Anstand hat die Schöpfung verdorben; denn was sind seine
    Vasallen?

XXXII, 41: Herder calls Rousseau “our patriotic friend of mankind.”

XXXII, 147: Herder says only Rousseau could dig to the knowledge of the
human heart.


“DER MENSCH”

Line 45 ff.: Herder shows that he is influenced by the eighteenth-century
demand for a return to nature in general and by Rousseau’s philosophy in
particular in a portion of this poem:

1. He prizes the universal and fundamental instincts and longings of man
which show him to be a simple product of nature:

    Den Menschen der Natur den keiner je gesehen und jeder in sich
    fühlt und jeder wünscht zu sehen ... den sing’ ich.

2. The primitivism of this nature-man is eulogized:

                      den Menschen ohne Kunst
    voll Seele ohne Witz, gut ohne Göttergunst,
    voll Menschheit ohne Scham, voll Wahrheit ohne Lügen
    ohn’ alle Tugend fromm und glücklich ohn’ Vergnügen—
    Den sing’ ich.

    Sohn der Natur o Mensch—blühst du in Edens Flur?
    halb Pflanze und halb Thier.

3. The feelings are set up as a standard:

    blos durch Empfindung wahr, schön durch die Wahrheit nur.
    Nicht weniger nicht mehr als Mensch! so ist dein Leben
    dir zum Gefühl, zur Ruh, zur Wirksamkeit gegeben.

4. Physical environment is to have free sway in shaping this ideal man:

                    wie zeigt sich deine Spur?
    im Schnee der Eskimaux wo edelfrei die Wilden
    Empfindung und Gesezz nach Jagd und Eis sich bilden.

5. Rousseau is eulogized:

    gebar dich Rousseaus Geist? sahn dich verblichne Zeiten?
    ...
    O Rousseau! den die Welt im Vorurtheil verkandt,
    das wahre grosse Maas des Menschen in der Hand
    wägst du was edel sey wenns gleich das Volk verdammet

The eulogy continues by praising Rousseau’s condemnation of wealth and
pomp and false glory and, finally:

    Du Prediger in der Wüste, fühlst dass du edel bist wenn niemand
      dich auch grüsste.


ROUSSEAU AND HERDER

_Discourses._—In his _Discourse concerning the Arts and Sciences_
Rousseau insists that our outward lives should be true expressions of
our inner feelings. This harmony between expression and feeling began
its decline under the influences of overrefinement and of tastes that
had been distorted by excessive civilization. Therefore, he argues,
it is the common man, the crude rustic, rather than the polished and
elegant courtier who reveals his heart in all purity; we may deal with
this common man without suspicions, fears, reserves, and treacheries.
It was the simplicity of ancient times when men lived in a primitive
state that bred innocence and virtue, courage and genuine humanity. In
this discourse there is in general a pointed attack upon literary and
scientific training and polish.

The discourse which deals with the inequality of man is based in general
upon the same doctrine which furnishes the ground for the attack on the
sciences and the arts. It attempts to show us what men would have been
had they remained in their original state. This original state was one in
which man lived much like the dumb animals; forests and rocks, running
brooks and springs, furnished abode by day and bed and shelter for the
night, and among these were to be found the meat and drink which produced
strong healthy bodies; bodies robust because their nourishment was
simple. This was a primitive state which had remained true to nature by
not advancing at all or at least not more than a single degree beyond the
original. In such a state man by reason of both his physical hardiness
and his native animal instincts and alertness has all his faculties,
these operating with a force and fineness unknown to the highly civilized
man. Here, as in the essay on the social contract, the philosopher is
opposed to a superior ruling power and arbitrary establishment of laws.

_Social contract._—In the _Social Contract_ in which Rousseau’s social
state is presented as the superior form of government, men had been
brought to realize their dependence upon one another and to know that
co-operation was the true basis of welfare. The doctrine of individuality
which made of man a self-centered unit was weak in that it offered little
protection for the individual. For this individual, born with natural
freedom, was in danger of exercising this freedom to the detriment of the
rights of others.

In giving up himself and his rights to the group, the individual became
subject to no one person, but gained certain rights over each member of
the community. In this compact there is a union of individuals, each
working for the good of the body politic, each a sovereign with civil
liberty and moral freedom.

Thus the restrictions which would be imposed upon members of society by
one supreme authority were avoided. By this means the general will worked
for the general good of humanity.

But the idea of progress implied not only the teaching that the good
of one must be the good of all, but meant also: (1) That man was not
self-sufficient and therefore could come to fullest development only
in the group. (2) That the seeds of individuality lay within man as a
universal element and were nurtured and brought to flower by the peculiar
touch of him who was expressed in their flowering. The fundamental
tendencies in mankind being allowed to unfold, the man will be good; this
goodness is the essential thing in his manhood, and it is natural.

_Emile._—The keynote of Rousseau’s doctrine here is that of absolute
reliance upon nature without impeding or diverting her progress at
any point. He is in accord with the epistemological side of Locke’s
philosophy, and therefore demands that Emile shall have his senses well
developed. He is to have a strong vigorous body, full of courage and
hardihood. Moral education is to be the result of natural discipline
carried on in a sort of laissez-faire way. In general, Emile gets his
education by being thrown into contact with nature and being allowed to
observe and feel the phenomena of a crude environment, and by expressing
directly what he has learned at first hand from this teacher. Emile,
then, is shaped by primitive forces just as the simple, common man in the
_Social Contract_ and the _Inequality_. These made the simple, common man
the epitome of that which was of greatest worth to humanity.

_Origin of language._—In fixing the beginnings of speech, Rousseau says
we can believe that necessities dictated the first movements, and that
passions called forth the first voices. The genius of oriental languages,
the most ancient known to us, have nothing in them that is methodical or
reasoned out; they are vivacious and figurative. It is evident that the
origin of languages is not at all due to the primary needs of man. The
origin is due to the moral needs, to the passions. It is neither hunger
nor thirst, but love, hate, pity, or anger which have called forth from
men the first voices. Fruits do not steal away from our hands at all;
one may nourish one’s self with them without talking; we may follow in
silence the prey of which we wish to make a repast; but to move a young
heart, to repel an unjust aggressor, nature dictates accents, cries, and
tones of resentment. It was for this reason that the oldest words were
invented.

The following quotations affirm in a general way the preceding statements
of Rousseau’s philosophy:

    L’astronomie est née de la superstition, de la haine,
    de la flatterie, du mensonge;
    la géométrie, de l’avarice;
    la physique, d’une vaine curiosité;
    toute et la morale même de l’orgueil humain.
    Les sciences et les arts doivent donc leur naissance à nos vices.

Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts, Part. II:

    O vertu! science sublime des âmes simples, faut-il donc tant
    de peines et d’appareil pour te connaître? Tes principes ne
    sont-ils pas graves dans tous les coeurs? et ne suffit-il pas
    pour apprendre tes lois de rentrer en soi-même et d’écouter la
    voix de sa conscience dans le silence des passions?

Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes:

    Il suit de cet exposé que l’inégalité, étant presque nulle
    dans l’état de nature tire sa force et son accroissement du
    developpement de nos facultés et des progrès de l’esprit
    humain, et devient enfin stable et légitime par l’établissement
    de la propriété et des lois.

    Il suit encore que l’inégalité morale autorisée par le seul
    droit positif, est contraire au droit naturel toutes les fois
    qu’elle ne concourt pas en même proportion avec l’inégalité
    physique; distinction qui détermine suffisamment ce qu’on doit
    penser à cet égard de la sorte d’inégalité qui règne parmi tous
    les peuples policés, puis-qu’il est manifestement contre la loi
    de nature.

The primitivism which stands out in Rousseau’s two discourses is to
be seen in a general way in Herder’s dislike for the higher culture
that would discourage spontaneous outbursts of human feelings as they
appear in the so-called cruder forms of literature; a culture that would
displace these by a smoother product born of reflection and regulated by
set rules and formulas.

He has an admiration for the instinct which to him is always to be found
in women, children, and fools, and which he sees as the foundation of a
naïveté more valuable as a part of mental equipment than anything which
could be substituted by processes of training and culture.

Rousseau’s attempt to return to nature for concrete everyday life finds
its approval with Herder, but the general idea takes a new turn. He finds
in it the inspiration for scientific methods of studying art, history,
and philosophy. His line of investigation in these will be by way of
nature; i.e., man in his primitive abode; man in the hands of nature; man
as the product of his environment.

The opposition to a central and superior governing power, which is
found in the _Social Contract_, to be opposed to the natural method of
community life, finds its echo in Herder in frequent tirades against the
_policirte Nationen_. It is the _unpolicirte Nationen_ to whom nature
has given a certain solace that can scarcely be found in _Menschliche
Künsteleien_.

The _Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität_ carry a constant strain,
which makes the interdependence between the individual and the group a
requisite for well-being. This theory, we have seen, finds a distinct
place in Shaftesbury’s philosophy before Rousseau had voiced it as his
own.

Emile’s senses have been highly developed by his contact with nature,
and it is this sharpness and exactness of the senses that Herder extols
so much in primitive peoples. They are both cause and effect of the work
which nature achieves by her most trusted handmaiden; namely, environment.

In discussing the origin of language, even though Herder at certain
points takes issue with Rousseau, it is very clear that he is influenced
by the latter and is in agreement with him to considerable extent.

Rousseau has pursued the question of the origin of language, not only in
his essay bearing this title, but also in the _Discourse on Inequality_.

The first sentences of Herder’s essay _Abhandlung über den Ursprung der
Sprache_ run not unlike a passage in Rousseau’s _Discours_ just mentioned:

    Schon als Thier, hat der Mensch Sprache. Alle heftigen, und die
    heftigsten unter den heftigen, die schmerzhaften Empfindungen
    seines Körpers, alle starken Leidenschaften seiner Seele
    äussern sich unmittelbar in Geschrei, in Töne, in wilde,
    unartikulirte Laute.

    Le premier langage de l’homme, le langage le plus universel, le
    plus énergique et le seul dont il eut besoin avant qu’il fallût
    persuader des hommes assemblés est le cri de la nature. Comme
    ce cri n’était arraché que par une sorte d’instinct dans les
    occasions pressantes, pour implorer du secours dans les grands
    dangers ou du soulagement dans les maux violents, il n’était
    pas d’un grand usage dans le cours ordinaire de la vie, où
    règnent des sentiments plus modérés.

Further, in his own essay, Herder says, that as our tones of nature are
for the purpose of expressing passion, it is natural that they should
become also the elements of all that which is emotional, and if we call
this immediate sound of feeling speech, then, says he, it is easy to find
the origin of speech natural.

But although all animals have a speech by which they sound forth their
feelings, such speech will never become human language until reason,
understanding (_Verstand_), arises to use these tones with direct
intention.

In so far, then, as the very beginnings of language are cries of passion,
Herder is in accord with Rousseau in both essays in which the latter
discusses the question.


REFERENCES TO ROUSSEAU, JEAN JACQUES

        I: 22, 47, 96, 484.
       II: 229, 269, 276, 313.
      III: 279.
       IV: 52, 145, 369, 371.
        V: 20, 21, 33, 37, 44, 58, 85, 114, 117, 120, 147, 168, 314, 394,
             452, 583, 640, 643.
       IV: 163; note to page 250.
      VII: 65, 74.
     VIII: 328.
       IX: 354, 474.
        X: 298, 306, 307, 352.
      XII: Note to page 198.
     XIII: 265.
       XV: 35, 248, 495.
      XVI: 26.
     XVII: 8, 97, 190, 309, 326.
    XVIII: 91, 359, 371.
       XX: 288, 293.
     XXII: 151, 161.
    XXIII: 231, 272.
      XXV: Note to page 601; 631, 632.
     XXIX: 256, 265.
      XXX: 30.
    XXXII: 17, 33, 41, 75, 147, 185, 233.


CONCLUSION

The character and frequency of the references which Herder makes in his
writings to the philosophers of the eighteenth century show that he knew
the predominant lines of thought which characterized the entire period of
the enlightenment. The outstanding eighteenth-century theories which seem
to have a place in Herder’s conception of _das Volk_ are well epitomized
in the teachings of Leibniz, Shaftesbury, and Rousseau.

Herder’s own exposition of a part of Leibniz’ contribution to thought
shows how he found here some things which were in agreement with his own
fundamental ideas concerning innate potentialities.

The praise given to Shaftesbury’s principal ideas of the harmonious
development of the individual and of humanity lead us to believe that
Shaftesbury had exercised an influence on the German writer.

The numerous eulogistic outbursts over Rousseau, the coinciding in many
writings by both men of details concerning the essential elements in
man’s nature, concerning primitivism, liberty, and the ideal state, show
that Herder was fully imbued with the spirit of Rousseau, expressed in
the cry, “back to nature.”




CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION


Both the word _Volk_ and the various ideas for which it stands are
old and are to be found among many peoples. The parent tongue, the
Indo-European, seems to have had a form which meant “full,” “many.” The
“many” easily became the “common,” so that the “many” as opposed to
the “few” was parallel with the “common,” “vulgar” as opposed to the
“upper classes,” the “aristocracy.” This meaning seems to have been a
fundamental one in both ancient and modern times.

The shift in meaning of the Germanic word _Volk_, which extends the
sense to that of “nation,” has been more general and more permanent in
German than in English. It is with these two main conceptions, that is
_Volk_, the common people, and _Volk_, nation, that we are concerned in
this study of Herder. Many examples of Herder’s use of the term _Volk_
show that he makes the word an exact synonym for nation. In many other
examples it is used as an equivalent term for nation. In both of these
uses “nation” with Herder means those bound together only by the same
laws and customs whether related by consanguinity or not.

But Herder frequently makes _Volk_ stand more specifically for those
who are of the same blood, and in that sense identifies it with “race.”
We have seen that these are common uses of the term _Volk_ and the
idea conveyed by it, uses which occur in many languages and among many
civilized peoples.

Now Herder, while using the term _Volk_ in the commonly accepted sense
of nation, has always firmly in mind certain attributes and powers which
characterize groups as such. They have power to rule; they have power
to express themselves in peculiar ways; they have _Nationalgeist_. This
_Nationalgeist_ in the final analysis is the outgrowth of physical and
social environment and conforms to the dictates of these in all its
peculiarities.

In exercising their powers and general spirit, they act as an entity
according to Herder’s conception. He makes the group a single being, an
individual. In Herder’s day when ideas of nationalism had no definite
shape, this added sense of the meaning of nation meant clearly that
he was a forerunner in the realm of philosophy, and gave to Herder’s
conception of _Volk_, even in this commonly used sense, a unique place.
Individuality, personality, distinguished nations just as these traits
mark out human beings.

Herder makes use of the term _Volk_ in a second sense. Here he means
a group within a civilized nation which forms the mass below the
aristocracy and the governing class. This use likewise is to be found in
all languages of civilized peoples.

But Herder is emphatic in noting that this group has not been affected
by expurgating and eliminating influences to the fullest extent to which
these have operated. It has therefore been more thoroughly the product of
natural environment. In the proportion to which innate tendencies have
not been checked and warped, individual traits have had free development.
Therefore spontaneous personality characterizes this group to a higher
degree than it does the more cultured. Here Herder makes prominent
his philosophy that unhampered nature is the most potent force in the
development of this spontaneous personality.

In his collection of _Volkslieder_, Herder does not confine himself to
those which are marked by primitivism, but includes also many selections
of polished literary form. But these all submit to a classification which
takes into account the true expression of universal and fundamental
feelings common to all humanity. Here Herder’s mind is fixed on that
power which the group has to express itself, to express that which is
fundamental and therefore to show forth its personality.

Ossian’s people and the Ancient Hebrews are products of an environment
which is most effective in shaping Herder’s ideal _Volk_: namely,
nature unaltered by the hand of man. As a result of such rough, crude
surroundings, these peoples have developed into simple, harmonious
beings, and possess all the elements which Herder considers essential
in man’s nature. He finds they are natural because they are primitive,
and they possess superior traits because they are natural. They have the
power to give expression to their personality and have exercised this
power in a marked way in their unique literatures. The individuality of
each group is sharply defined in the songs of each.

Now how does Herder arrive at the requirements to which he makes his
_Volk_ conform?

His philosophy as expressed in _Erkennen und Empfindung_ recognizes
inborn forces in the individual which are potentialities differing
in kind and degree of working power in each person. These varying
potentialities he makes the constituencies of the senses which are
accordingly different in scope and capacity in every human being.

It must be noted that Herder does not regard these original “forces” as
constituted by the senses; they are prior to and more fundamental than
the senses. The phenomenon _Reiz_, stimulus, which causes the smallest
fiber either in plant or animal to contract or expand, repeats itself
in the nerves of each one of the senses. But this _Reiz_ is in the
beginning, and without it there would be no _Kräfte_, no nerve, no sense
organ. This _Reiz_, then, is identical with the innate forces, _Kräfte_.

They control and direct the development of the senses and are, therefore,
the very beginning of that variation in sense functioning which initiates
individuality.

It is in the treatment of these original _Kräfte_ that Herder gives his
own turn to Leibniz’ theory of the monad.

The principle of the monad was highly abstract, and when Herder took it
over he gave to it a more concrete application. It became the principle
of innate and varying potentialities. The monad was not controlled and
directed by a force outside itself, according to Herder, but by a power
within, and as the power within was never exactly alike in any two
beings, no two could develop just alike. Here are Herder’s foundations
for individuality and personality.

A perfection resulting from the unfolding of the content of the
individual life and the shaping of its originality are seen in
Shaftesbury’s thought when he makes morality consist of the rich and full
expression of individual powers in a beautiful and sovereign personality.
The individual system as seen in one man in all its physical and mental
elements is related to something external to himself. Altruistic
inclinations are an important part of the natural endowment of every
human being.

Now Herder sees that this unfettered development of natural endowments
will come to its fullest only in relations to others. It is the essence
of his _Humanität_. He goes further than Shaftesbury in that he finds
in this tie, which unites the individual to the group, that which is
universal and fundamental. He endows his _Volk_ with sentiments which are
universal and fundamental. It is this universal and fundamental which
makes such expressions as “Hamlet’s soliloquy” find a place among the
songs of Herder’s _Volk_.

We have seen that when Herder lays emphasis on the feelings, when he is
opposed to arbitrary and restrictive government, when he elevates the
crude and primitive, his system of thought is in agreement with that of
Rousseau. But Herder makes an advance in seeking standards in processes
actually or believed to be found in Nature. His line of investigation in
history, art, and philosophy will be by way of the natural man, i.e.,
the primitive. His _Volk_, then, because of their power to express their
personality freely, give him a theory of art; art must be an expression
of personality.

Both Shaftesbury and Rousseau relate the development of the individual
to the group but neither makes the altruism or interdependence such
an impelling force as does Herder. His _Volk_, conscious of their own
frailty, will have sympathy and a general regard for the needs and
interests of mankind. This consciousness will be not merely a passive
altruism nor an interdependence of material and economic necessity, but
it will be heightened by an ideal love for humanity, which will force to
active and positive efforts to make humanity the highest possible.

When we eliminate details, when we regard only those elements upon which
Herder’s thought seems to be continuous, those qualifications of which
he never seems to loose sight, whether he idealizes his _Volk_ through
his philosophy, his song collections, his study of the works of other
philosophers, or through the analysis of concrete examples, we come to
the following as essentials in Herder’s _Volk_: _Das Volk_ is a group
whose innate, natural tendencies have been allowed to unfold and develop
unhindered and unwarped by civilization. They are people who have come
into contact with various forces of nature in the physical world and have
been strongly influenced by their natural environment.

They, as an entity, possess: (1) Individuality, personality; (2) a sense
of that which is universal and fundamental among mankind; (3) common
feelings of relationship to humanity; (4) strong religious sentiments.

They are wont to express themselves freely, fully, truthfully, in
various forms of art, the individual specimens of which find their test
of genuineness in the response which they receive from the group out of
which they arose.

In this ideal conception Herder sees the best that mankind can produce.




FOOTNOTES


[1] Schiller, _Jungfrau von Orleans_, I, p. 3.

[2] _Piccolomini_, II, p. 7.

[3] _Kampf mit dem Drachen._

[4] Wildenbruch.

[5] Goethe, _Faust_, I.

[6] Fénélon, _Télémaque_, XXIV.

[7] Bible, _Jérémie_, XXXI, 33.

[8] _La Bruyère_, IX.

[9] Dr. Martin Schütze has analyzed this feature of Herder’s philosophy,
“Fundamental Ideas in Herder’s Thought,” _Modern Philosophy_, XVIII;
June, October, 1920.

[10] References to these discussions: Herder’s _Sämmtliche Werke_,
Suphan, volume and page: I, 437; II, 119, 132, 168, 182, 203, 259, 322,
324, 331, 387, 416; VI, 21; VIII, 99, 216, 391; IX, 317, 543; XI, 297;
XII, 334; XIV, 103, 263; XVI, 323; XVIII, 446; XXIII, 569; XXIV, 232,
301, 302; XXVII, 180.

[11] References to these discussions: Herder’s _Sämmtliche Werke_,
Suphan, volume and page: I, 258; VI, 1; XI, 215; XII, 1.

[12] Ossian, V, 325.

[13] Ancient Hebrews, XI, 173.

[14] Ossians Gedichte, _Lieder_ .... V, 196.

[15] Ossians Gedichte, V, 197.

[16] Ancient Hebrews, XII, 28.

[17] Ancient Hebrews, I, 258.

[18] Ossian, V, 326.

[19] Ancient Hebrews, XII, 27.

[20] Ossian, V, 324.

[21] Ancient Hebrews, XII, 22.

[22] Ossian, V, 324.

[23] Ancient Hebrews, XI, 292.

[24] Ossian, V, 182.

[25] Ancient Hebrews, XI, 227.

[26] Ancient Hebrews, XI, 228. (_die Ebräische Sprache_).

[27] Ossian, XVIII, 457.

[28] Ancient Hebrews, I, 262.

[29] Ancient Hebrews, XII, 8.




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*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 69434 ***