*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 60426 ***

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

  * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.
  * Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
  * Letter spaced Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ
    λοιπά~.
  * Footnotes have been renumbered. Each footnote is placed at the
    end of the paragraph that includes its anchor.
  * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after
    comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has
    also been corrected after checking with this later edition and
    with Perseus, when the reference was found.
  * Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept,
    but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant
    usage was found.
  * Nevetherless, no attempt has been made at normalizing proper
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    but neither he nor his publisher follow them consistently.




  HISTORY OF GREECE.

  BY

  GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.

  VOL. IV.

  REPRINTED FROM THE SECOND LONDON EDITION.

  NEW YORK:
  HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS.
  329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
  1880.




CONTENTS.

VOL. IV.


PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.


CHAPTER XXV.

ILLYRIANS, MACEDONIANS, PÆONIANS.

  Different tribes of Illyrians. — Conflicts and contrast of
  Illyrians with Greeks. — Epidamnus and Apollonia in relation to
  the Illyrians. — Early Macedonians. — Their original seats. —
  General view of the country which they occupied — eastward of
  Pindus and Skardus. — Distribution and tribes of the Macedonians.
  — Macedonians round Edessa — the leading portion of the nation. —
  Pierians and Bottiæans — originally placed on the Thermaic gulf,
  between the Macedonians and the sea. — Pæonians. — Argeian Greeks
  who established the dynasty of Edessa — Perdikkas. — Talents for
  command manifested by Greek chieftains over barbaric tribes. —
  Aggrandizement of the dynasty of Edessa — conquests as far as
  the Thermaic gulf, as well as over the interior Macedonians. —
  Friendship between king Amyntas and the Peisistratids.
                                                          _pages_ 1-19


CHAPTER XXVI.

THRACIANS AND GREEK COLONIES IN THRACE.

  Thracians — their numbers and abode. — Many distinct tribes, yet
  little diversity of character. — Their cruelty, rapacity, and
  military efficiency. — Thracian worship and character Asiatic.
  — Early date of the Chalkidic colonies in Thrace. — Methônê the
  earliest — about 720 B. C. — Several other small settlements
  on the Chalkidic peninsula and its three projecting headlands.
  — Chalkidic peninsula — Mount Athos. — Colonies in Pallênê, or
  the westernmost of the three headlands. — In Sithonia, or the
  middle headland. — In the headland of Athos — Akanthus, Stageira,
  etc. — Greek settlements east of the Strymôn in Thrace. — Island
  of Thasus. — Thracian Chersonesus. — Perinthus, Selymoria, and
  Byzantium. — Grecian settlements on the Euxine, south of the
  Danube. — Lemnos and Imbros.                                   20-28


CHAPTER XXVII.

KYRENE AND BARKA. — HESPERIDES.

  First voyages of the Greeks to Libya. — Foundation of Kyrênê.
  — Founded by Battus from the island of Thêra. — Colony first
  settled in the island of Platea — afterwards removed to Kyrênê.
  — Situation of Kyrênê. — Fertility, produce, and prosperity. —
  Libyan tribes near Kyrênê. — Extensive dominion of Kyrênê and
  Barka over the Libyans. — Connection of the Greek colonies with
  the Nomads of Libya. — Manners of the Libyan Nomads. — Mixture
  of Greeks and Libyan inhabitants at Kyrênê. — Dynasty of Battus,
  Arkesilaus, Battus the Second, at Kyrênê — fresh colonists from
  Greece. — Disputes with the native Libyans. — Arkesilaus the
  Second, prince of Kyrênê — misfortunes of the city — foundation
  of Barka. — Battus the Third, a lame man — reform by Demônax,
  who takes away the supreme power from the Battiads. — New
  emigration — restoration of the Battiad Arkesilaus the Third. —
  Oracle limiting the duration of the Battiad dynasty. — Violences
  at Kyrênê under Arkesilaus the Third. — Arkesilaus sends his
  submission to Kambysês, king of Persia. — Persian expedition from
  Egypt against Barka — Pheretimê, mother of Arkesilaus. — Capture
  of Barka by perfidy — cruelty of Pheretimê. — Battus the Fourth
  and Arkesilaus the Fourth — final extinction of the dynasty about
  460-450 B. C. — Constitution of Demônax not durable.           29-49


CHAPTER XXVIII.

PAN-HELLENIC FESTIVALS — OLYMPIC, PYTHIAN, NEMEAN, AND ISTHMIAN.

  Want of grouping and unity in the early period of Grecian
  history. — New causes, tending to favor union, begin after
  560 B. C. — no general war between 776 and 560 B. C. known to
  Thucydidês. — Increasing disposition to religious, intellectual,
  and social union. — Reciprocal admission of cities to the
  religious festivals of each other. — Early splendor of the
  Ionic festival at Delos — its decline. — Olympic games — their
  celebrity and long continuance. — Their gradual increase —
  new matches introduced. — Olympic festival — the first which
  passes from a local to a Pan-Hellenic character. — Pythian
  games, or festival. — Early state and site of Delphi. — Phocian
  town of Krissa. — Kirrha, the seaport of Krissa. — Growth of
  Delphi and Kirrha — decline of Krissa. — Insolence of the
  Kirrhæans punished by the Amphiktyons. — First Sacred War, in
  595 B. C. — Destruction of Kirrha. — Pythian games founded by
  the Amphiktyons. — Nemean and Isthmian games. — Pan-Hellenic
  character acquired by all the four festivals — Olympic, Pythian,
  Nemean, and Isthmian. — Increased frequentation of the other
  festivals in most Greek cities. — All other Greek cities, except
  Sparta, encouraged such visits. — Effect of these festivals upon
  the Greek mind.                                                50-73


CHAPTER XXIX.

LYRIC POETRY. — THE SEVEN WISE MEN.

  Age and duration of the Greek lyric poetry. — Epical age
  preceding the lyrical. — Wider range of subjects for poetry — new
  metres — enlarged musical scale. — Improvement of the harp by
  Terpander — of the flute by Olympus and others. — Archilochus,
  Kallinus, Tyrtæus, and Alkman — 670-600 B. C. — New metres
  superadded to the Hexameter — Elegiac, Iambic, Trochaic. —
  Archilochus. — Simonidês of Amorgos, Kallinus, Tyrtæus. — Musical
  and poetical tendencies at Sparta. — Choric training — Alkman,
  Thalêtas. — Doric dialect employed in the choric compositions.
  — Arion and Stêsichorus — substitution of the professional in
  place of the popular chorus. — Distribution of the chorus by
  Stêsichorus — Strophê — Antistrophê — Epôdus. — Alkæus and
  Sappho. — Gnomic or moralizing poets. — Solon and Theognis. —
  Subordination of musical and orchestrical accompaniment to the
  words and meaning. — Seven Wise Men. — They were the first men
  who acquired an Hellenic reputation, without poetical genius.
  — Early manifestation of philosophy — in the form of maxims. —
  Subsequent growth of dialectics and discussion. — Increase of the
  habit of writing — commencement of prose compositions. — First
  beginnings of Grecian art. — Restricted character of early art,
  from religious associations. — Monumental ornaments in the cities
  — begin in the sixth century B. C. — Importance of Grecian art as
  a means of Hellenic union.                                    73-101


CHAPTER XXX.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS DURING THE GOVERNMENT OF PEISISTRATUS AND HIS SONS AT
ATHENS.

  Peisistratus and his sons at Athens — B. C. 500-510 — uncertain
  chronology as to Peisistratus. — State of feeling in Attica at
  the accession of Peisistratus. — Retirement of Peisistratus, and
  stratagem whereby he is reinstated. — Quarrel of Peisistratus
  with the Alkmæônids — his second retirement. — His second and
  final restoration. — His strong government — mercenaries —
  purification of Delos. — Mild despotism of Peisistratus. — His
  sons Hippias and Hipparchus. — Harmodius and Aristogeitôn. — They
  conspire and kill Hipparchus. B. C. 514. — Strong and lasting
  sentiment, coupled with great historical mistake, in the Athenian
  public. — Hippias despot alone — 514-510 B. C. — his cruelty and
  conscious insecurity. — Connection of Athens with the Thracian
  Chersonesus and the Asiatic coast of the Hellespont. — First
  Miltiadês — œkist of the Chersonese. — Second Miltiadês — sent
  out thither by the Peisistratids. — Proceedings of the exiled
  Alkmæônids against Hippias. — Conflagration and rebuilding of
  the Delphian temple. — The Alkmæônids rebuild the temple with
  magnificence. — Gratitude of the Delphians towards them — they
  procure from the oracle directions to Sparta, enjoining the
  expulsion of Hippias. — Spartan expeditions into Attica. —
  Expulsion of Hippias, and liberation of Athens.              102-126


CHAPTER XXXI.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE PEISISTRATIDS. —
REVOLUTION OF KLEISTHENES AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS.

  State of Athens after the expulsion of Hippias. — Opposing
  party-leaders — Kleisthenês — Isagoras. — Democratical revolution
  headed by Kleisthenês. — Rearrangement and extension of the
  political franchise. — Suppression of the four old tribes, and
  formation of ten new tribes, including an increased number
  of the population. — Imperfect description of this event in
  Herodotus — its real bearing. — Grounds of opposition to it in
  ancient Athenian feeling. — Names of the new tribes — their
  relation to the demes. — Demes belonging to each tribe usually
  not adjacent to each other. — Arrangements and functions of the
  deme. — Solonian constitution preserved, with modifications. —
  Change of military arrangement in the state. — The ten stratêgi,
  or generals. — The judicial assembly of citizens, or Heliæa,
  subsequently divided into fractions, each judging separately. —
  The political assembly, or ekklesia. — Financial arrangements.
  — Senate of Five Hundred. — Ekklesia, or political assembly. —
  Kleisthenês the real author of the Athenian democracy. — Judicial
  attributes of the people — their gradual enlargement. — Three
  points in Athenian constitutional law, hanging together: —
  Universal admissibility of citizens to magistracy — choice by lot
  — reduced functions of the magistrates chosen by lot. — Universal
  admissibility of citizens to the archonship — not introduced
  until after the battle of Platæa. — Constitution of Kleisthenês
  retained the Solonian law of exclusion as to individual office. —
  Difference between that constitution and the political state of
  Athens after Periklês. — Senate of Areopagus. — The ostracism.
  — Weakness of the public force in the Grecian governments. —
  Past violences of the Athenian nobles. — Necessity of creating a
  constitutional morality. — Purpose and working of the ostracism.
  — Securities against its abuse. — Ostracism necessary as a
  protection to the early democracy — afterwards dispensed with.
  — Ostracism analogous to the exclusion of a known pretender to
  the throne in a monarchy. — Effect of the long ascendency of
  Periklês, in strengthening constitutional morality. — Ostracism
  in other Grecian cities. — Striking effect of the revolution
  of Kleisthenês on the minds of the citizens. — Isagoras calls
  in Kleomenês and the Lacedæmonians against it. — Kleomenês and
  Isagoras are expelled from Athens. — Recall of Kleisthenês —
  Athens solicits the alliance of the Persians. — First connection
  between Athens and Platæa. — Disputes between Platæa and Thebes
  — decision of Corinth as arbitrator. — Second march of Kleomenês
  against Athens — desertion of his allies. — First appearance of
  Sparta as acting head of Peloponnesian allies. — Signal successes
  of Athens against Bœotians and Chalkidians. — Plantation of
  Athenian settlers, or klêruchs, in the territory of Chalkis. —
  Distress of the Thebans — they ask assistance from Ægina. — The
  Æginetans make war on Athens. — Preparations at Sparta to attack
  Athens anew — the Spartan allies are summoned, together with
  Hippias. — First formal convocation at Sparta — advance of Greece
  towards a political system. — Proceedings of the convocation
  — animated protest of Corinth against any interference in
  favor of Hippias — the Spartan allies refuse to interfere. —
  Aversion to single-headed rule — now predominant in Greece. —
  Striking development of Athenian energy after the revolution of
  Kleisthenês — language of Herodotus. — Effect of the idea or
  theory of democracy in exciting Athenian sentiment. — Patriotism
  of an Athenian between 500-400 B. C. — combined with an eager
  spirit of personal military exertion and sacrifice. — Diminution
  of this active sentiment in the restored democracy after the
  Thirty Tyrants.                                              126-181


CHAPTER XXXII.

RISE OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE. — CYRUS.

  State of Asia before the rise of the Persian monarchy. — Great
  power and alliances of Crœsus. — Rise of Cyrus — uncertainty of
  his early history. — Story of Astyagês. — Herodotus and Ktêsias.
  — Condition of the native Persians at the first rise of Cyrus.
  — Territory of Iran — between Tigris and Indus. — War between
  Cyrus and Crœsus. — Crœsus tests the oracles — triumphant reply
  from Delphi — munificence of Crœsus to the oracle. — Advice given
  to him by the oracle. — He solicits the alliance of Sparta. —
  He crosses the Halys and attacks the Persians. — Rapid march of
  Cyrus to Sardis. — Siege and capture of Sardis. — Crœsus becomes
  prisoner of Cyrus — how treated. — Remonstrance addressed by
  Crœsus to the Delphian god. — Successful justification of the
  oracle. — Fate of Crœsus impressive to the Greek mind. — The
  Mœræ, or Fates. — State of the Asiatic Greeks after the conquest
  of Lydia by Cyrus. — They apply in vain to Sparta for aid. —
  Cyrus quits Sardis — revolt of the Lydians suppressed. — The
  Persian general Mazarês attacks Ionia — the Lydian Paktyas. —
  Harpagus succeeds Mazarês — conquest of Ionia by the Persians.
  — Fate of Phôkæa. — Emigration of the Phôkæans vowed by all,
  executed only by one half. — Phôkæan colony first at Alalia, then
  at Elea. — Proposition of Bias for a Pan-Ionic emigration not
  adopted. — Entire conquest of Asia Minor by the Persians.    182-208


CHAPTER XXXIII.

GROWTH OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.

  Conquests of Cyrus in Asia. — His attack of Babylon. — Difficult
  approach to Babylon — no resistance made to the invaders. — Cyrus
  distributes the river Gyndês into many channels. — He takes
  Babylon, by drawing off for a time the waters of the Euphrates.
  — Babylon left in undiminished strength and population. — Cyrus
  attacks the Massagetæ — is defeated and slain. — Extraordinary
  stimulus to the Persians, from the conquests of Cyrus. —
  Character of the Persians. — Thirst for foreign conquest among
  the Persians, for three reigns after Cyrus. — Kambysês succeeds
  his father Cyrus — his invasion of Egypt. — Death of Amasis, king
  of Egypt, at the time when the Persian expedition was preparing
  — his son Psammenitus succeeds. — Conquest of Egypt by Kambysês.
  — Submission of Kyrênê and Barka to Kambysês — his projects for
  conquering Libya and Ethiopia disappointed. — Insults of Kambysês
  to the Egyptian religion. — Madness of Kambysês — he puts to
  death his younger brother, Smerdis. — Conspiracy of the Magian
  Patizeithês who sets up his brother as king under the name of
  Smerdis. — Death of Kambysês. — Reign of the false Smerdis —
  conspiracy of the seven Persian noblemen against him — he is
  slain. — Darius succeeds to the throne. — Political bearing
  of this conspiracy — Smerdis represents Median preponderance,
  which is again put down by Darius. — Revolt of the Medes —
  suppressed. — Discontents of the satraps. — Revolt of Babylon.
  — Reconquered and dismantled by Darius. — Organization of the
  Persian empire by Darius. — Twenty satrapies with a fixed tribute
  apportioned to each. — Imposts upon the different satrapies.
  — Organizing tendency of Darius — first imperial coinage —
  imperial roads and posts. — Island of Samos — its condition at
  the accession of Darius. — Polykratês. — Polykratês breaks with
  Amasis, king of Egypt, and allies himself with Kambysês. — The
  Samian exiles, expelled by Polykratês, apply to Sparta for aid.
  — The Lacedæmonians attack Samos, but are repulsed. — Attack on
  Siphnos by the Samian exiles. — Prosperity of Polykratês. — He is
  slain by the Persian satrap Orœtês. — Mæandrius, lieutenant of
  Polykratês in Samos — he desires to establish a free government
  after the death of Polykratês — conduct of the Samians. —
  Mæandrius becomes despot. — Contrast between the Athenians
  and the Samians. — Sylosôn, brother of Polykratês, lands with
  a Persian army in Samos — his history. — Mæandrius agrees to
  evacuate the island. — Many Persian officers slain — slaughter
  of the Samians. — Sylosôn despot at Samos. — Application of
  Mæandrius to Sparta for aid — refused.                       209-252


CHAPTER XXXIV.

DEMOKEDES. — DARIUS INVADES SCYTHIA.

  Conquering dispositions of Darius. — Influence of his wife,
  Atossa. — Dêmokêdês, the Krotoniate surgeon — his adventures — he
  is carried a slave to Susa. — He cures Darius, who rewards him
  munificently. — He procures permission by artifice, and through
  the influence of Atossa, to return to Greece. — Atossa suggests
  to Darius an expedition against Greece. — Dêmokêdês, with some
  Persians, is sent to procure information for him. — Voyage of
  Dêmokêdês along the coast of Greece — he stays at Kroton — fate
  of his Persian companions. — Consequences which might have been
  expected to happen if Darius had then undertaken his expedition
  against Greece. — Darius marches against Scythia. — His naval
  force formed of Asiatic and insular Greeks. — He directs the
  Greeks to throw a bridge over the Danube and crosses the river.
  — He marches into Scythia — narrative of his march impossible
  and unintelligible, considered as history. — The description
  of his march is rather to be looked upon as a fancy-picture,
  illustrative of Scythian warfare. — Poetical grouping of the
  Scythians and their neighbors by Herodotus. — Strong impression
  produced upon the imagination of Herodotus by the Scythians. —
  Orders given by Darius to the Ionians at the bridge over the
  Danube. — The Ionians are left in guard of the bridge; their
  conduct when Darius’s return is delayed. — The Ionian despots
  preserve the bridge and enable Darius to recross the river, as
  a means of support to their own dominion at home. — Opportunity
  lost of emancipation from the Persians — Conquest of Thrace by
  the Persians as far as the river Strymon — Myrkinus near that
  river given to Histiæus. — Macedonians and Pæonians are conquered
  by Megabazus. — Insolence of the Persian envoys in Macedonia
  — they are murdered. — Histiæus founds a prosperous colony at
  Myrkinus — Darius sends for him into Asia. — Otanês Persian
  general on the Hellespont — he conquers the Pelasgian population
  of Lemnos, Imbros, etc. — Lemnos and Imbros captured by the
  Athenians and Miltiadês.                                     252-280


CHAPTER XXXV.

IONIC REVOLT.

  Darius carries Histiæus to Susa. — Application of the banished
  Hippias to Artaphernês, satrap of Sardis. — State of the island
  of Naxos — Naxian exiles solicit aid from Aristagoras of Milêtus.
  — Expedition against Naxos, undertaken by Aristagoras with the
  assistance of Artaphernês the satrap. — Its failure, through
  dispute between Aristagoras and the Persian general, Megabatês.
  — Alarm of Aristagoras — he determines to revolt against Persia
  — instigation to the same effect from Histiæus. — Revolt of
  Aristagoras and the Milesians — the despots in the various cities
  deposed and seized. — Extension of the revolt throughout Asiatic
  Greece — Aristagoras goes to solicit aid from Sparta. — Refusal
  of the Spartans to assist him. — Aristagoras applies to Athens —
  obtains aid both from Athens and Eretria. — March of Aristagoras
  up to Sardis with the Athenian and Eretrian allies — burning of
  the town — retreat and defeat of these Greeks by the Persians.
  — The Athenians abandon the alliance. — Extension of the revolt
  to Cyprus and Byzantium. — Phenician fleet called forth by the
  Persians — Persian and Phenician armament sent against Cyprus
  — the Ionians send aid thither — victory of the Persians —
  they reconquer the island. — Successes of the Persians against
  the revolted coast of Asia Minor. — Aristagoras loses courage
  and abandons the country. — Appearance of Histiæus, who had
  obtained leave of departure from Susa. — Histiæus is suspected by
  Artaphernês — flees to Chios. — He attempts in vain to procure
  admission into Milêtus — puts himself at the head of a small
  piratical squadron. — Large Persian force assembled, aided by the
  Phenician fleet, for the siege of Milêtus. — The allied Grecian
  fleet mustered at Ladê. — Attempts of the Persians to disunite
  the allies, by means of the exiled despots. — Want of command
  and discipline in the Grecian fleet. — Energy of the Phôkæan
  Dionysius — he is allowed to assume the command. — Discontent
  of the Grecian crews — they refuse to act under Dionysius.
  — Contrast of this incapacity of the Ionic crews with the
  subsequent severe discipline of the Athenian seamen. — Disorder
  and mistrust grow up in the fleet — treachery of the Samian
  captains. — Complete victory of the Persian fleet at Ladê — ruin
  of the Ionic fleet — severe loss of the Chians. — Voluntary
  exile and adventures of Dionysius. — Siege, capture, and ruin of
  Milêtus by the Persians. — The Phenician fleet reconquers all
  the coast-towns and islands. — Narrow escape of Miltiadês from
  their pursuit. — Cruelties of the Persians after the reconquest.
  — Movements and death of Histiæus. — Sympathy and terror of
  the Athenians at the capture of Milêtus — the tragic writer
  Phrynichus is fined.                                         280-310


CHAPTER XXXVI.

FROM THE IONIC REVOLT TO THE BATTLE OF MARATHON.

  Proceedings of the satrap Artaphernês after the reconquest of
  Ionia — Mardonius comes with an army into Ionia — he puts down
  the despots in the Greek cities. — He marches into Thrace and
  Macedonia — his fleet destroyed by a terrible storm near Mount
  Athos — he returns into Asia. — Island of Thasos — prepares to
  revolt from the Persians — forced to submit. — Preparations of
  Darius for invading Greece — he sends heralds round the Grecian
  towns to demand earth and water — many of them submit. — Ægina
  among those towns which submitted — state and relations of this
  island. — Heralds from Darius are put to death, both at Athens
  and Sparta. — Effects of this act in throwing Sparta into a state
  of hostility against Persia. — The Athenians appeal to Sparta,
  in consequence of the _medism_ (or submission to the Persians)
  of Ægina. — Interference of Sparta — her distinct acquisition
  and acceptance of the leadership of Greece. — One condition of
  recognized Spartan leadership was the extreme weakness of Argos
  at this moment. — Victorious war of Sparta against Argos. —
  Destruction of the Argeians by Kleomenês, in the grove of the
  hero Argus. — Kleomenês returns without having attacked the
  city of Argos. — He is tried — his peculiar mode of defence
  — acquitted. — Argos unable to interfere with Sparta in the
  affair of Ægina and in her presidential power. — Kleomenês goes
  to Ægina to seize the _medizing_ leaders — resistance made to
  him, at the instigation of his colleague Demaratus. — Demaratus
  is deposed, and Leotychidês chosen king, by the intrigues of
  Kleomenês. — Demaratus leaves Sparta and goes to Darius. —
  Kleomenês and Leotychidês go to Ægina, seize ten hostages,
  and convey them as prisoners to Athens. — Important effect of
  this proceeding upon the result of the first Persian invasion
  of Greece. — Assemblage of the vast Persian armament under
  Datis at Samos. — He crosses the Ægean — carries the island of
  Naxos without resistance — respects Delos. — He reaches Eubœa
  — siege and capture of Eretria. — Datis lands at Marathon. —
  Existing condition and character of the Athenians. — Miltiadês
  — his adventures — chosen one of the ten generals in the year
  in which the Persians landed at Marathon. — Themistoklês and
  Aristeidês. — Miltiadês, Aristeidês, and perhaps Themistoklês,
  were now among the ten stratêgi, or generals, in 490 B. C. —
  The Athenians ask aid from Sparta — delay of the Spartans. —
  Difference of opinion among the ten Athenian generals — five of
  them recommend an immediate battle, the other five are adverse
  to it. — Urgent instances of Miltiadês in favor of an immediate
  battle — casting-vote of the polemarch determines it. — March of
  the Athenians to Marathon — the Platæans spontaneously join them
  there. — Numbers of the armies. — Locality of Marathon. — Battle
  of Marathon — rapid charge of Miltiadês — defeat of the Persians.
  — Loss on both sides. — Ulterior plans of the Persians against
  Athens — party in Attica favorable to them. — Rapid march of
  Miltiadês back to Athens on the day of the battle. — The Persians
  abandon the enterprise, and return home. — Athens rescued through
  the speedy battle brought on by Miltiadês. — Change of Grecian
  feeling as to the Persians — terror which the latter inspired
  at the time of the battle of Marathon. — Immense effect of the
  Marathonian victory on the feelings of the Greeks — especially
  of the Athenians. — Who were the traitors that invited the
  Persians to Athens after the battle — false imputation on the
  Alkmæônids. — Supernatural belief connected with the battle —
  commemorations of it. — Return of Datis to Asia — fate of the
  Eretrian captives. — Glory of Miltiadês — his subsequent conduct
  — unsuccessful expedition against Paros — bad hurt of Miltiadês.
  — Disgrace of Miltiadês on his return. — He is fined — dies of
  his wound — the fine is paid by his son Kimon. — Reflections on
  the closing adventures of the life of Miltiadês. — Fickleness
  and ingratitude imputed to the Athenians — how far they deserve
  the charge. — Usual temper of the Athenian dikasts in estimating
  previous services. — Tendency of eminent Greeks to be corrupted
  by success. — In what sense it is apparently true that fickleness
  was an attribute of the Athenian democracy.                  311-378


CHAPTER XXXVII.

IONIC PHILOSOPHERS. — PYTHAGORAS. — KROTON AND SYBARIS.

  Phalaris despot of Agrigentum. — Thalês. — Ionic philosophers
  — not a school or succession. — Step in philosophy commenced
  by Thalês. — Vast problems with scanty means of solution. —
  One cause of the vein of skepticism which runs through Grecian
  philosophy. — Thalês — primeval element of water, or the fluid.
  — Anaximander. — Problem of the One and the Many — the Permanent
  and the Variable. — Xenophanês — his doctrine the opposite of
  that of Anaximander. — The Eleatic school, Parmenidês and Zeno,
  springing from Xenophanês — their dialectics — their great
  influence on Grecian speculation. — Pherekydês. — History of
  Pythagoras. — His character and doctrines. — Pythagoras more a
  missionary and schoolmaster than a politician — his political
  efficiency exaggerated by later witnesses. — His ethical training
  — probably not applied to all the members of his order. — Decline
  and subsequent renovation of the Pythagorean order. — Pythagoras
  not merely a borrower, but an original and ascendent mind. — He
  passes from Samos to Kroton. — State of Kroton — oligarchical
  government — excellent gymnastic training and medical skill.
  — Rapid and wonderful effects said to have been produced by
  the exhortations of Pythagoras. — He forms a powerful club, or
  society, consisting of three hundred men taken from the wealthy
  classes at Kroton. — Political influence of Pythagoras — was an
  indirect result of the constitution of the order. — Causes which
  led to the subversion of the Pythagorean order. — Violences which
  accompanied its subversion. — The Pythagorean order is reduced
  to a religious and philosophical sect, in which character it
  continues. — War between Sybaris and Kroton. — Defeat of the
  Sybarites, and destruction of their city, partly through the
  aid of the Spartan prince Dorieus. — Sensation excited in the
  Hellenic world by the destruction of Sybaris. — Gradual decline
  of the Greek power in Italy. — Contradictory statements and
  arguments respecting the presence of Dorieus. — Herodotus does
  not mention the Pythagoreans, when he alludes to the war between
  Sybaris and Kroton. — Charondas, lawgiver of Katana, Naxos,
  Zanklê, Rhegium, etc.                                        378-419




HISTORY OF GREECE.




PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.




CHAPTER XXV.

ILLYRIANS, MACEDONIANS, PÆONIANS.


Northward of the tribes called Epirotic lay those more numerous
and widely extended tribes who bore the general name of Illyrians;
bounded on the west by the Adriatic, on the east by the
mountain-range of Skardus, the northern continuation of Pindus,—and
thus covering what is now called Middle and Upper Albania, together
with the more northerly mountains of Montenegro, Herzegovina, and
Bosnia. Their limits to the north and north-east cannot be assigned,
but the Dardani and Autariatæ must have reached to the north-east of
Skardus and even east of the Servian plain of Kossovo; while along
the Adriatic coast, Skylax extends the race so far northward as to
include Dalmatia, treating the Liburnians and Istrians beyond them
as not Illyrian: yet Appian and others consider the Liburnians and
Istrians as Illyrian, and Herodotus even includes under that name
the Eneti, or Veneti, at the extremity of the Adriatic gulf.[1] The
Bulini, according to Skylax, were the northernmost Illyrian tribe:
the Amantini, immediately northward of the Epirotic Chaonians,
were the southernmost. Among the southern Illyrian tribes are to
be numbered the Taulantii,—originally the possessors, afterwards
the immediate neighbors, of the territory on which Epidamnus was
founded. The ancient geographer Hekatæus[2] (about 500 B. C.),
is sufficiently well acquainted with them to specify their town
Sesarêthus: he also named the Chelidonii as their northern, the
Encheleis as their southern neighbors; and the Abri also as a tribe
nearly adjoining. We hear of the Illyrian Parthini, nearly in the
same regions,—of the Dassaretii,[3] near Lake Lychnidus,—of the
Penestæ, with a fortified town Uscana, north of the Dassaretii,—of
the Ardiæans, the Autariatæ, and the Dardanians, throughout Upper
Albania eastward as far as Upper Mœsia, including the range of
Skardus itself; so that there were some Illyrian tribes conterminous
on the east with Macedonians, and on the south with Macedonians as
well as with Pæonians. Strabo even extends some of the Illyrian
tribes much farther northward, nearly to the Julian Alps.[4]

  [1] Herodot. i, 196; Skylax, c. 19-27; Appian. Illyric. c. 2, 4,
  8.

  The geography of the countries occupied in ancient times by
  the Illyrians, Macedonians, Pæonians, Thracians, etc., and now
  possessed by a great diversity of races, among whom the Turks
  and Albanians retain the primitive barbarism without mitigation,
  is still very imperfectly understood; though the researches of
  Colonel Leake, of Boué, of Grisebach, and others (especially
  the valuable travels of the latter), have of late thrown much
  light upon it. How much our knowledge is extended in this
  direction, may be seen by comparing the map prefixed to Mannert’s
  Geographie, or to O. Müller’s Dissertation on the Macedonians,
  with that in Boué’s Travels, but the extreme deficiency of the
  maps, even as they now stand, is emphatically noticed by Boué
  himself (see his Critique des Cartes de la Turquie in the fourth
  volume of his Voyage),—by Paul Joseph Schaffarik, the learned
  historian of the Sclavonic race, in the preface attached by him
  to Dr. Joseph Müller’s Topographical Account of Albania,—and
  by Grisebach, who in his surveys, taken from the summits of
  the mountains Peristeri and Ljubatrin, found the map differing
  at every step from the bearings which presented themselves to
  his eye. It is only since Boué and Grisebach that the idea has
  been completely dismissed, derived originally from Strabo,
  of a straight line of mountains (εὐθεῖα γραμμὴ, Strabo, lib.
  vii, Fragm. 3) running across from the Adriatic to the Euxine,
  and sending forth other lateral chains in a direction nearly
  southerly. The mountains of Turkey in Europe, when examined with
  the stock of geological science which M. Viquesnel (the companion
  of Boué) and Dr. Grisebach bring to the task, are found to belong
  to systems very different, and to present evidences of conditions
  of formation often quite independent of each other.

  The thirteenth chapter of Grisebach’s Travels presents the
  best account which has yet been given of the chain of Skardus
  and Pindus: he has been the first to prove clearly, that the
  Ljubatrin, which immediately overhangs the plain of Kossovo at
  the southern border of Servia and Bosnia, is the north-eastern
  extremity of a chain of mountains reaching southward to the
  frontiers of Ætolia, in a direction not very wide of N-S.,—with
  the single interruption (first brought to view by Colonel
  Leake) of the Klissoura of Devol,—a complete gap, where the
  river Devol, rising on the eastern side, crosses the chain and
  joins the Apsus, or Beratino, on the western,—(it is remarkable
  that both in the map of Boué and in that annexed to Dr. Joseph
  Müller’s Topographical Description of Albania, the river Devol
  is made to join the Genussus, or Skoumi, considerably north of
  the Apsus, though Colonel Leake’s map gives the correct course.)
  In Grisebach’s nomenclature Skardus is made to reach from the
  Ljubatrin as its north-eastern extremity, south-westward and
  southward as far as the Klissoura of Devol: south of that point
  Pindus commences, in a continuation, however, of the same axis.

  In reference to the seats of the ancient Illyrians and
  Macedonians Grisebach has made another observation of great
  importance (vol. ii, p. 121). Between the north-eastern
  extremity, Mount Ljubatrin, and the Klissoura of Devol, there
  are in the mighty and continuous chain of Skardus (above seven
  thousand feet high) only two passes fit for an army to cross: one
  near the northern extremity of the chain, over which Grisebach
  himself crossed, from Kalkandele to Prisdren, a very high _col_,
  not less than five thousand feet above the level of the sea;
  the other, considerably to the southward, and lower as well as
  easier, nearly in the latitude of Lychnidus, or Ochrida. It was
  over this last pass that the Roman Via Egnatia travelled, and
  that the modern road from Scutari and Durazzo to Bitolia now
  travels. With the exception of these two partial depressions,
  the long mountain-ridge maintains itself undiminished in height,
  admitting, indeed, paths by which a small company either of
  travellers or of Albanian robbers from the Dibren, may cross
  (there is a path of this kind which connects Struga with
  Ueskioub, mentioned by Dr. Joseph Müller, p. 70, and some others
  by Boué, vol. iv, p. 546), but nowhere admitting the passage of
  an army.

  To attack the Macedonians, therefore, an Illyrian army would have
  to go through one or other of these passes, or else to go round
  the north-eastern pass of Katschanik, beyond the extremity of
  Ljubatrin. And we shall find that, in point of fact, the military
  operations recorded between the two nations carry us usually in
  one or other of these directions. The military proceedings of
  Brasidas (Thucyd. iv, 124),—of Philip the son of Amyntas king of
  Macedon (Diodor. xvi, 8),—of Alexander the Great in the first
  year of his reign (Arrian, i, 5), all bring us to the pass near
  Lychnidus (compare Livy, xxxii, 9; Plutarch, Flaminin. c. 4);
  while the Illyrian Dardani and Autariatæ border upon Pæonia,
  to the north of Pelagonia, and threaten Macedonia from the
  north-east of the mountain-chain of Skardus. The Autariatæ are
  not far removed from the Pæonian Agrianes, who dwelt near the
  sources of the Strymon, and both Autariatæ and Dardani threatened
  the return march of Alexander from the Danube into Macedonia,
  after his successful campaign against the Getæ, low down in the
  course of that great river (Arrian, i, 5). Without being able to
  determine the precise line of Alexander’s march on this occasion,
  we may see that these two Illyrian tribes must have come down
  to attack him from Upper Mœsia, and on the eastern side of the
  Axius. This, and the fact that the Dardani were the immediate
  neighbors of the Pæonians, shows us that their seats could not
  have been far removed from Upper Mœsia (Livy, xlv, 29): the
  fauces Pelagoniæ (Livy, xxxi, 34) are the pass by which they
  entered Macedonia from the north. Ptolemy even places the Dardani
  at Skopiæ (Ueskioub) (iii, 9); his information about these
  countries seems better than that of Strabo.

  [2] Hekatæi Fragm. ed. Klausen, Fr. 66-70; Thucyd. i, 26.

  Skylax places the Encheleis north of Epidamnus and of the
  Taulantii. It may be remarked that Hekatæus seems to have
  communicated much information respecting the Adriatic: he noticed
  the city of Adria at the extremity of the Gulf, and the fertility
  and abundance of the territory around it (Fr. 58: compare Skymnus
  Chius, 384).

  [3] Livy, xliii, 9-18. Mannert (Geograph. der Griech. und Römer,
  part vii, ch. 9, p. 386, _seq._) collects the points and shows
  how little can be ascertained respecting the localities of these
  Illyrian tribes.

  [4] Strabo, iv, p. 206.

With the exception of some portions of what is now called Middle
Albania, the territory of these tribes consisted principally of
mountain pastures with a certain proportion of fertile valley, but
rarely expanding into a plain. The Autariatæ had the reputation of
being unwarlike, but the Illyrians generally were poor, rapacious,
fierce, and formidable in battle. They shared with the remote
Thracian tribes the custom of tattooing[5] their bodies and of
offering human sacrifices: moreover, they were always ready to
sell their military service for hire, like the modern Albanian
Schkipetars, in whom probably their blood yet flows, though with
considerable admixture from subsequent emigrations. Of the Illyrian
kingdom on the Adriatic coast, with Skodra (Scutari) for its capital
city, which became formidable by its reckless piracies in the third
century B. C., we hear nothing in the flourishing period of Grecian
history. The description of Skylax notices in his day, all along the
northern Adriatic, a considerable and standing traffic between the
coast and the interior, carried on by Liburnians, Istrians, and the
small Grecian insular settlements of Pharus and Issa. But he does not
name Skodra, and probably this strong post—together with the Greek
town Lissus, founded by Dionysius of Syracuse—was occupied after
his time by conquerors from the interior,[6] the predecessors of
Agrôn and Gentius,—just as the coast-land of the Thermaic gulf was
conquered by inland Macedonians.

  [5] Strabo, vii, p. 315; Arrian, i, 5, 4-11. So impracticable
  is the territory, and so narrow the means of the inhabitants,
  in the region called Upper Albania, that most of its resident
  tribes even now are considered as free, and pay no tribute to
  the Turkish government: the Pachas cannot extort it without
  greater expense and difficulty than the sum gained would repay.
  The same was the case in Epirus, or Lower Albania, previous to
  the time of Ali Pacha: in Middle Albania, the country does not
  present the like difficulties, and no such exemptions are allowed
  (Boué, Voyage en Turquie, vol. iii, p. 192). These free Albanian
  tribes are in the same condition with regard to the Sultan as the
  Mysians and Pisidians in Asia Minor with regard to the king of
  Persia in ancient times (Xenophon, Anab. iii, 2, 23).

  [6] Diodor. xv, 13: Polyb. ii, 4.

Once during the Peloponnesian war, a detachment of hired Illyrians,
marching into Macedonia Lynkêstis (seemingly over the pass of Skardus
a little east of Lychnidus, or Ochrida), tried the valor of the
Spartan Brasidas; and on that occasion—as in the expedition above
alluded to of the Epirots against Akarnania—we shall notice the
marked superiority of the Grecian character, even in the case of an
armament chiefly composed of helots newly enfranchised, over both
Macedonians and Illyrians,—we shall see the contrast between brave
men acting in concert and obedience to a common authority, and an
assailing host of warriors, not less brave individually, but in which
every man is his own master,[7] and fights as he pleases. The rapid
and impetuous rush of the Illyrians, if the first shock failed of
its effect, was succeeded by an equally rapid retreat or flight. We
hear nothing afterwards respecting these barbarians until the time of
Philip of Macedon, whose vigor and military energy first repressed
their incursions, and afterwards partially conquered them. It seems
to have been about this period (400-350 B. C.) that the great
movement of the Gauls from west to east took place, which brought
the Gallic Skordiski and other tribes into the regions between the
Danube and the Adriatic sea, and which probably dislodged some of the
northern Illyrians so as to drive them upon new enterprises and fresh
abodes.

  [7] See the description in Thucydidês (iv, 124-128);
  especially the exhortation which he puts into the mouth of
  Brasidas,—αὐτοκράτωρ μάχῃ, contrasted with the orderly array of
  Greeks.

    “Illyriorum velocitas ad excursiones et impetus subitos.”

      (Livy, xxxi, 35.)

What is now called Middle Albania, the Illyrian territory immediately
north of Epirus, is much superior to the latter in productiveness.[8]
Though mountainous, it possesses more both of low hill and valley,
and ampler as well as more fertile cultivable spaces. Epidamnus and
Apollonia formed the seaports of this territory, and the commerce
with the southern Illyrians, less barbarous than the northern, was
one of the sources[9] of their great prosperity during the first
century of their existence,—a prosperity interrupted in the case
of the Epidamnians by internal dissensions, which impaired their
ascendency over their Illyrian neighbors, and ultimately placed
them at variance with their mother-city Korkyra. The commerce
between these Greek seaports and the interior tribes, when once
the former became strong enough to render violent attack from the
latter hopeless, was reciprocally beneficial to both of them.
Grecian oil and wine were introduced among these barbarians, whose
chiefs at the same time learned to appreciate the woven fabrics,[10]
the polished and carved metallic work, the tempered weapons,
and the pottery, which issued from Grecian artisans. Moreover,
the importation sometimes of salt-fish, and always that of salt
itself, was of the greatest importance to these inland residents,
especially for such localities as possessed lakes abounding in
fish, like that of Lychnidus. We hear of wars between the Autariatæ
and the Ardiæi, respecting salt-springs near their boundaries, and
also of other tribes whom the privation of salt reduced to the
necessity of submitting to the Romans.[11] On the other hand,
these tribes possessed two articles of exchange so precious in
the eyes of the Greeks, that Polybius reckons them as absolutely
indispensable,[12]—cattle and slaves; which latter were doubtless
procured from Illyria, often in exchange for salt, as they were from
Thrace and from the Euxine and from Aquileia in the Adriatic, through
the internal wars of one tribe with another. Silver-mines were worked
at Damastium in Illyria. Wax and honey were probably also articles of
export, and it is a proof that the natural products of Illyria were
carefully sought out, when we find a species of iris peculiar to the
country collected and sent to Corinth, where its root was employed to
give the special flavor to a celebrated kind of aromatic unguent.[13]

  [8] See Pouqueville, Voyage en Grèce, vol. i, chs. 23 and 24;
  Grisebach, Reise durch Rumelien und nach Brussa, vol. ii, pp.
  138-139; Boué, La Turquie en Europe, Géographie Générale, vol. i,
  pp. 60-65.

  [9] Skymnus Chius, v, 418-425.

  [10] Thucydidês mentions the ὑφαντὰ τε καὶ λεῖα, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη
  κατασκευὴ, which the Greek settlements on the Thracian coast
  sent up to king Seuthês (ii, 98): similar to the ὑφασμαθ᾽ ἱερὰ,
  and to the χεριαρᾶν τεκτόνων δαίδαλα, offered as presents to the
  Delphian god (Eurip. Ion. 1141; Pindar, Pyth. v, 46).

  [11] Strabo, vii, p. 317; Appian, Illyric. 17; Aristot. Mirab.
  Ausc. c. 138. For the extreme importance of the trade in salt,
  as a bond of connection, see the regulations of the Romans when
  they divided Macedonia into four provinces, with the distinct
  view of cutting off all connection between one and the other. All
  _commercium_ and _connubium_ were forbidden between them: the
  fourth region, whose capital was Pelagonia (and which included
  all the primitive or Upper Macedonia, east of the range of
  Pindus and Skardus), was altogether inland, and it was expressly
  forbidden to draw its salt from the third region, or the country
  between the Axius and the Peneius; while on the other hand the
  Illyrian Dardani, situated northward of Upper Macedonia, received
  express permission to draw _their_ salt from this third or
  maritime region of Macedonia: the salt was to be conveyed from
  the Thermaic gulf along the road of the Axius to Stobi in Pæonia,
  and was there to be sold at a fixed price.

  The inner or fourth region of Macedonia, which included the
  modern Bitoglia and Lake Castoria, could easily obtain its salt
  from the Adriatic, by the communication afterwards so well
  known as the Roman Egnatian way; but the communication of the
  Dardani with the Adriatic led through a country of the greatest
  possible difficulty, and it was probably a great convenience to
  them to receive their supply from the gulf of Therma by the road
  along the Vardar (Axius) (Livy, xlv, 29). Compare the route of
  Grisebach from Salonichi to Scutari, in his Reise durch Rumelien,
  vol. ii.

  [12] About the cattle in Illyria, Aristotle, De Mirab. Ausc. c.
  128. There is a remarkable passage in Polybius, wherein he treats
  the importation of slaves as a matter of necessity to Greece (iv,
  37). The purchasing of the Thracian slaves in exchange for salt
  is noticed by Menander.—Θρᾶξ εὐγενὴς εῖ, πρὸς ἄλας ἠγορασμένος:
  see Proverb. Zenob. ii, 12, and Diogenian, i, 100.

  The same trade was carried on in antiquity with the nations on
  and near Caucasus, from the seaport of Dioskurias at the eastern
  extremity of the Euxine (Strabo, xi, p. 506). So little have
  those tribes changed, that the Circassians now carry on much
  the same trade. Dr. Clarke’s statement carries us back to the
  ancient world: “The Circassians frequently sell their children
  to strangers, particularly to the Persians and Turks, and their
  princes supply the Turkish seraglios with the most beautiful
  of the prisoners of both sexes whom they take in war. In their
  commerce with the Tchernomorski Cossacks (north of the river
  Kuban), the Circassians bring considerable quantities of wood,
  and the delicious honey of the mountains, sewed up in goats’
  hides, with the hair on the outside. These articles they exchange
  for salt, a commodity found in the neighboring lakes, of a
  very excellent quality. Salt is more precious than any other
  kind of wealth to the Circassians, and it constitutes the most
  acceptable present which can be offered to them. They weave mats
  of very great beauty, which find a ready market both in Turkey
  and Russia. They are also ingenious in the art of working silver
  and other metals, and in the fabrication of guns, pistols, and
  sabres. Some, which they offered us for sale, we suspected had
  been procured in Turkey in exchange for slaves. Their bows
  and arrows are made with inimitable skill, and the arrows
  being tipped with iron, and otherwise exquisitely wrought, are
  considered by the Cossacks and Russians as inflicting incurable
  wounds.” (Clarke’s Travels, vol. i, ch. xvi, p. 378.)

  [13] Theophrast. Hist. Plant. iv, 5, 2; ix, 7, 4: Pliny. H. N.
  xiii, 2; xxi, 19: Strabo, vii, p. 326. Coins of Epidamnus and
  Apollonia are found not only in Macedonia, but in Thrace and in
  Italy: the trade of these two cities probably extended across
  from sea to sea, even before the construction of the Egnatian
  way; and the Inscription 2056 in the Corpus of Boeckh proclaims
  the gratitude of Odêssus (Varna) in the Euxine sea towards a
  citizen of Epidamnus (Barth, Corinthiorum Mercatur. Hist. p. 49;
  Aristot. Mirab. Auscult. c. 104).

Nor was the intercourse between the Hellenic ports and Illyrians
inland exclusively commercial. Grecian exiles also found their way
into Illyria, and Grecian mythes became localized there, as may be
seen by the tale of Kadmus and Harmonia, from whom the chiefs of the
Illyrian Encheleis professed to trace their descent.[14]

  [14] Herodot. v, 61; viii, 137: Strabo, vii, p. 326. Skylax
  places the λίθοι of Kadmus and Harmonia among the Illyrian Manii,
  north of the Encheleis (Diodor. xix, 53; Pausan. ix, 5, 3).

The Macedonians of the fourth century B. C. acquired, from
the ability and enterprise of two successive kings, a great
perfection in Greek military organization without any of the
loftier Hellenic qualities. Their career in Greece is purely
destructive, extinguishing the free movement of the separate
cities, and disarming the citizen-soldier to make room for the
foreign mercenary, whose sword was unhallowed by any feelings of
patriotism,—yet totally incompetent to substitute any good system
of central or pacific administration. But the Macedonians of the
seventh and sixth centuries B. C. are an aggregate only of rude
inland tribes, subdivided into distinct petty principalities, and
separated from the Greeks by a wider ethnical difference even than
the Epirots; since Herodotus, who considers the Epirotic Molossians
and Thesprotians as children of Hellen, decidedly thinks the contrary
respecting the Macedonians.[15] In the main, however, they seem
at this early period analogous to the Epirots in character and
civilization. They had some few towns, but were chiefly village
residents, extremely brave and pugnacious. The customs of some of
their tribes enjoined that the man who had not yet slain an enemy
should be distinguished on some occasions by a badge of discredit.[16]

  [15] Herodot. v, 22.

  [16] Aristot. Polit. vii, 2, 6. That the Macedonians were chiefly
  village residents, appears from Thucyd. ii, 100, iv, 124, though
  this does not exclude _some_ towns.

The original seats of the Macedonians were in the regions east of the
chain of Skardus (the northerly continuation of Pindus)—north of the
chain called the Cambunian mountains, which connects Olympus with
Pindus, and which forms the north-western boundary of Thessaly. But
they did not reach so far eastward as the Thermaic gulf; apparently
not farther eastward than Mount Bermius, or about the longitude of
Edessa and Berrhoia. They thus covered the upper portions of the
course of the rivers Haliakmôn and Erigôn, before the junction of
the latter with the Axius; while the upper course of the Axius,
higher than this point of junction, appears to have belonged to
Pæonia,—though the boundaries of Macedonia and Pæonia cannot be
distinctly marked out at any time.

The large space of country included between the above-mentioned
boundaries is in great part mountainous, occupied by lateral ridges,
or elevations, which connect themselves with the main line of
Skardus. But it also comprises three wide alluvial basins, or plains,
which are of great extent and well-adapted to cultivation,—the
plain of Tettovo, or Kalkandele (northernmost of the three), which
contains the sources and early course of the Axius, or Vardar,—that
of Bitolia, coinciding to a great degree with the ancient Pelagonia,
wherein the Erigon flows towards the Axius,—and the larger and more
undulating basin of Greveno and Anaselitzas, containing the upper
Haliakmôn with its confluent streams. This latter region is separated
from the basin of Thessaly by a mountainous line of considerable
length, but presenting numerous easy passes.[17] Reckoning the basin
of Thessaly as a fourth, here are four distinct inclosed plains
on the east side of this long range of Skardus and Pindus,—each
generally bounded by mountains which rise precipitously to an
alpine height, and each leaving only one cleft for drainage by a
single river,—the Axius, the Erigôn, the Haliakmôn, and the Peneius
respectively. All four, moreover, though of high level above the sea,
are yet for the most part of distinguished fertility, especially
the plains of Tettovo, of Bitolia, and Thessaly. The fat, rich land
to the east of Pindus and Skardus is described as forming a marked
contrast with the light calcareous soil of the Albanian plains
and valleys on the western side. The basins of Bitolia and of the
Haliakmôn, with the mountains around and adjoining, were possessed by
the original Macedonians; that of Tettovo, on the north, by a portion
of the Pæonians. Among the four, Thessaly is the most spacious; yet
the two comprised in the primitive seats of the Macedonians, both
of them very considerable in magnitude, formed a territory better
calculated to nourish and to generate a considerable population,
than the less favored home, and smaller breadth of valley and plain,
occupied by Epirots or Illyrians. Abundance of corn easily raised,
of pasture for cattle, and of new fertile land open to cultivation,
would suffice to increase the numbers of hardy villagers, indifferent
to luxury as well as to accumulation, and exempt from that oppressive
extortion of rulers which now harasses the same fine regions.[18]

  [17] Boué, Voyage en Turquie, vol. i, p. 199: “Un bon nombre de
  cols dirigés du nord au sud, comme pour inviter les habitans de
  passer d’une de ces provinces dans l’autre.”

  [18] For the general physical character of the region, both
  east and west of Skardus, continued by Pindus, see the valuable
  charter of Grisebach’s Travels above referred to (Reisen, vol.
  ii. ch. xiii, pp. 125-130; c. xiv, p. 175; c. xvi, pp. 214-216;
  c. xvii, pp. 244-245).

  Respecting the plains comprised in the ancient Pelagonia, see
  also the Journal of the younger Pouqueville, in his progress from
  Travnik in Bosnia to Janina. He remarks, in the two days’ march
  from Prelepe (Prilip) through Bitolia to Florina, “Dans cette
  route on parcourt des plaines luxuriantes couvertes de moissons,
  de vastes prairies remplies de trèfle, des plateaux abondans en
  pâturages inépuisables, où paissent d’innombrables troupeaux de
  bœufs, de chèvres, et de menu bétail.... Le blé, le maïs, et
  les autres grains sont toujours à très bas prix, à cause de la
  difficulté des débouchés, d’où l’on exporte une grande quantité
  de laines, de cotons, de peaux d’agneaux, de buffles, et de
  chevaux, qui passent par le moyen des caravanes en Hongrie.”
  (Pouqueville, Voyage dans la Grèce, tom. ii, ch. 62, p. 495.)

  Again, M. Boué remarks upon this same plain, in his Critique des
  Cartes de la Turquie, Voyage, vol. iv, p. 483, “La plaine immense
  de Prilip, de Bitolia, et de Florina, n’est pas représentée (sur
  les cartes) de manière à ce qu’on ait une idée de son étendue,
  et surtout de sa largeur.... La plaine de Sarigoul est changée
  en vallée,” etc. The basin of the Haliakmôn he remarks to be
  represented equally imperfectly on the maps: compare also his
  Voyage, i, pp. 211, 299, 300.

  I notice the more particularly the large proportion of fertile
  plain and valley in the ancient Macedonia, because it is often
  represented (and even by O. Müller, in his Dissertation on the
  ancient Macedonians, attached to his History of the Dorians) as
  a cold and rugged land, pursuant to the statement of Livy (xlv,
  29), who says, respecting the fourth region of Macedonia as
  distributed by the Romans, “Frigida hæc omnis, duraque cultu, et
  aspera plaga est: cultorum quoque ingenia terræ similia habet:
  ferociores eos et accolæ barbari faciunt, nunc bello exercentes,
  nunc in pace miscentes ritus suos.”

  This is probably true of the mountaineers included in the region,
  but it is too much generalized.

The inhabitants of this primitive Macedonia doubtless differed
much in ancient times, as they do now, according as they dwelt on
mountain or plain, and in soil and climate more or less kind; but all
acknowledged a common ethnical name and nationality, and the tribes
were in many cases distinguished from each other, not by having
substantive names of their own, but merely by local epithets of
Grecian origin. Thus we find Elymiotæ Macedonians, or Macedonians of
Elymeia,—Lynkestæ Macedonians, or Macedonians of Lynkus, etc. Orestæ
is doubtless an adjunct name of the same character. The inhabitants
of the more northerly tracts, called Pelagonia and Deuriopis, were
also portions of the Macedonian aggregate, though neighbors of the
Pæonians, to whom they bore much affinity: whether the Eordi and
Almopians were of Macedonian race, it is more difficult to say. The
Macedonian language was different from Illyrian,[19] from Thracian,
and seemingly also from Pæonian. It was also different from Greek,
yet apparently not more widely distinct than that of the Epirots,—so
that the acquisition of Greek was comparatively easy to the chiefs
and people, though there were always some Greek letters which they
were incapable of pronouncing. And when we follow their history,
we shall find in them more of the regular warrior, conquering in
order to maintain dominion and tribute, and less of the armed
plunderer,—than in the Illyrians, Thracians, or Epirots, by whom it
was their misfortune to be surrounded. They approach nearer to the
Thessalians,[20] and to the other ungifted members of the Hellenic
family.

  [19] Polyb. xxviii, 8, 9. This is the most distinct testimony
  which we possess, and it appears to me to contradict the opinion
  both of Mannert (Geogr. der Gr. und Röm. vol. vii, p. 492) and
  of O. Müller (On the Macedonians, sects. 28-36), that the native
  Macedonians were of Illyrian descent.

  [20] The Macedonian military array seems to have been very like
  that of the Thessalians,—horsemen well-mounted and armed, and
  maintaining good order (Thucyd. ii, 101): of their infantry,
  before the time of Philip son of Amyntas, we do not hear much.

  “Macedoniam, quæ tantis barbarorum gentibus attingitur, ut
  semper Macedonicis imperatoribus iidem fines imperii fuerint qui
  gladiorum atque pilorum.” (Cicero, in Pison. c. xvi.)

The large and comparatively productive region covered by the various
sections of Macedonians, helps to explain that increase of ascendency
which they successively acquired over all their neighbors. It was
not, however, until a late period that they became united under one
government. At first each section, how many we do not know, had its
own prince, or chief. The Elymiots, or inhabitants of Elymeia, the
southernmost portion of Macedonia, were thus originally distinct and
independent; also the Orestæ, in mountain-seats somewhat north-west
of the Elymiots,—the Lynkêstæ and Eordi, who occupied portions
of territory on the track of the subsequent Egnatian way, between
Lychnidus (Ochrida) and Edessa,—the Pelagonians,[21] with a town
of the same name, in the fertile plain of Bitolia,—and the more
northerly Deuriopians. And the early political union was usually
so loose, that each of these denominations probably includes many
petty independencies, small towns, and villages. That section of the
Macedonian name who afterwards swallowed up all the rest and became
known as _The Macedonians_, had their original centre at Ægæ, or
Edessa,—the lofty, commanding, and picturesque site of the modern
Vodhena. And though the residence of the kings was in later times
transferred to the marshy Pella, in the maritime plain beneath,
yet Edessa was always retained as the regal burial-place, and as
the hearth to which the religious continuity of the nation, so
much reverenced in ancient times, was attached. This ancient town,
which lay on the Roman Egnatian way from Lychnidus to Pella and
Thessalonika, formed the pass over the mountain-ridge called Bermius,
or that prolongation to the northward of Mount Olympus, through which
the Haliakmôn makes its way out into the maritime plain at Verria, by
a cleft more precipitous and impracticable than that of the Peneius
in the defile of Tempê.

  [21] Strabo, lib. vii, Fragm. 20, ed. Tafel.

This mountain-chain called Bermius, extending from Olympus
considerably to the north of Edessa, formed the original eastern
boundary of the Macedonian tribes; who seem at first not to have
reached the valley of the Axius in any part of its course, and who
certainly did not reach at first to the Thermaic gulf. Between the
last-mentioned gulf and the eastern counterforts of Olympus and
Bermius there exists a narrow strip of plain land or low hill,
which reaches from the mouth of the Peneius to the head of the
Thermaic gulf. It there widens into the spacious and fertile plain
of Salonichi, comprising the mouths of the Haliakmôn, the Axius,
and the Echeidôrus: the river Ludias, which flows from Edessa into
the marshes surrounding Pella, and which in antiquity joined the
Haliakmôn near its mouth, has now altered its course so as to join
the Axius. This narrow strip, between the mouths of the Peneius
and the Haliakmôn, was the original abode of the Pierian Thracians,
who dwelt close to the foot of Olympus, and among whom the worship
of the Muses seems to have been a primitive characteristic; Grecian
poetry teems with local allusions and epithets which appear traceable
to this early fact, though we are unable to follow it in detail.
North of the Pierians, from the mouth of the Haliakmôn to that of
the Axius, dwelt the Bottiæans.[22] Beyond the river Axius, at the
lower part of its course, began the tribes of the great Thracian
race,—Mygdonians, Krestônians, Edônians, Bisaltæ, Sithonians: the
Mygdonians seem to have been originally the most powerful, since the
country still continued to be called by their name, Mygdonia, even
after the Macedonian conquest. These, and various other Thracian
tribes, originally occupied most part of the country between the
mouth of the Axius and that of the Strymon; together with that
memorable three-pronged peninsula which derived from the Grecian
colonies its name of Chalkidikê. It will thus appear, if we consider
the Bottiæans as well as the Pierians to be Thracians, that the
Thracian race extended originally southward as far as the mouth of
the Peneius: the Bottiæans professed, indeed, a Kretan origin, but
this pretension is not noticed by either Herodotus or Thucydidês. In
the time of Skylax,[23] seemingly during the early reign of Philip
the son of Amyntas, Macedonia and Thrace were separated by the
Strymon.

  [22] I have followed Herodotus in stating the original series
  of occupants on the Thermaic gulf, anterior to the Macedonian
  conquests. Thucydidês introduces the Pæonians between Bottiæans
  and Mygdonians: he says that the Pæonians possessed “a narrow
  strip of land on the side of the Axius, down to Pella and the
  sea,” (ii, 96.) If this were true, it would leave hardly any room
  for the Bottiæans, whom, nevertheless, Thucydidês recognizes on
  the coast; for the whole space between the mouths of the two
  rivers, Axius and Haliakmôn, is inconsiderable; moreover, I
  cannot but suspect that Thucydidês has been led to believe, by
  finding in the Iliad that the Pæonian allies of Troy came from
  the Axius, that there _must have been_ old Pæonian settlements at
  the mouth of that river, and that he has advanced the inference
  as if it were a certified fact. The case is analogous to what he
  says about the Bœotians in his preface (upon which O. Müller has
  already commented); he stated the emigration of the Bœotians into
  Bœotia as having taken place after the Trojan war, but saves the
  historical credit of the Homeric catalogue by adding that there
  had been a _fraction_ of them in Bœotia _before_, from whom the
  contingent which went to Troy was furnished (ἀποδασμός, Thucyd.
  i, 12).

  On this occasion, therefore, having to choose between Herodotus
  and Thucydidês, I prefer the former. O. Müller (On the
  Macedonians, sect. 11) would strike out just so much of the
  assertion of Thucydidês as positively contradicts Herodotus, and
  retain the rest; he thinks that the Pæonians came down _very
  near_ to the mouth of the river, but _not quite_. I confess that
  this does not satisfy me; the more so as the passage from Livy by
  which he would support his view will appear, on examination, to
  refer to Pæonia high up the Axius,—not to a supposed portion of
  Pæonia near the mouth (Livy, xlv, 29).

  Again, I would remark that the original residence of the Pierians
  between the Peneius and the Haliakmôn rests chiefly upon the
  authority of Thucydidês: Herodotus knows the Pierians in their
  seats between Mount Pangæus and the sea, but he gives no
  intimation that they had before dwelt south of the Haliakmôn; the
  tract between the Haliakmôn and the Peneius is by him conceived
  as Lower Macedonia, or Macedonis, reaching to the borders of
  Thessaly (vii, 127-173). I make this remark in reference to
  sects. 7-17 of O. Müller’s Dissertation, wherein the conception
  of Herodotus appears incorrectly apprehended, and some erroneous
  inferences founded upon it. That this tract was the original
  Pieria, there is sufficient reason for believing (compare Strabo,
  vii, Frag. 22, with Tafel’s note, and ix, p. 410; Livy, xliv, 9);
  but Herodotus notices it only as Macedonia.

  [23] Skylax, c. 67. The conquests of Philip extended the boundary
  beyond the Strymon to the Nestus (Strabo, lib. vii, Fragm. 33,
  ed. Tafel).

We have yet to notice the Pæonians, a numerous and much-divided
race,—seemingly neither Thracian nor Macedonian nor Illyrian, but
professing to be descended from the Teukri of Troy,—who occupied
both banks of the Strymon, from the neighborhood of Mount Skomius,
in which that river rises, down to the lake near its mouth. Some of
their tribes possessed the fertile plain of Siris (now Seres),—the
land immediately north of Mount Pangæus,—and even a portion of the
space through which Xerxês marched on his route from Akanthus to
Therma. Besides this, it appears that the upper parts of the valley
of the Axius were also occupied by Pæonian tribes; how far down the
river they extended, we are unable to say. We are not to suppose
that the whole territory between Axius and Strymon was continuously
peopled by them. Continuous population is not the character of
the ancient world, and it seems, moreover, that while the land
immediately bordering on both rivers is in very many places of the
richest quality, the spaces between the two are either mountain or
barren low hill,—forming a marked contrast with the rich alluvial
basin of the Macedonian river Erigon.[24] The Pæonians, in their
north-western tribes, thus bordered upon the Macedonian Pelagonia,—in
their northern tribes, upon the Illyrian Dardani and Autariatæ,—in
their eastern, southern, and south-eastern tribes, upon the Thracians
and Pierians;[25] that is, upon the second seats occupied by the
expelled Pierians under Mount Pangæus.

  [24] See this contrast noticed in Grisebach, especially in
  reference to the wide but barren region called the plain of
  Mustapha, no great distance from the left bank of the Axius
  (Grisebach, Reisen, v, ii, p. 225; Boué, Voyage, vol. i, p. 168).

  For the description of the banks of the Axius (Vardar) and the
  Strymon, see Boué, Voyage en Turquie, vol. i, pp. 196-199. “La
  plaine ovale de Seres est un des diamans de la couronne de
  Byzance,” etc. He remarks how incorrectly the course of the
  Strymon is depicted on the maps (vol. iv, p. 482).

  [25] The expression of Strabo or his Epitomator—τὴν Παιονίαν
  μέχρι Πελαγονίας καὶ Πιερίας ἐκτετάσθαι,—seems quite exact,
  though Tafel finds a difficulty in it. See his Note on the
  Vatican Fragments of the seventh book of Strabo, Fr. 37. The
  Fragment 40 is expressed much more loosely. Compare Herodot. v,
  13-16, vii, 124; Thucyd. ii, 96; Diodor. xx, 19.

Such was, as far as we can make it out, the position of the
Macedonians and their immediate neighbors, in the seventh century B.
C. It was first altered by the enterprise and ability of a family of
exiled Greeks, who conducted a section of the Macedonian people to
those conquests which their descendants, Philip and Alexander the
Great, afterwards so marvellously multiplied.

Respecting the primitive ancestry of these two princes, there were
different stories, but all concurred in tracing the origin of the
family to the Herakleid or Temenid race of Argos. According to one
story (which apparently cannot be traced higher than Theopompus),
Karanus, brother of the despot Pheidon, had migrated from Argos to
Macedonia, and established himself as conqueror at Edessa; according
to another tale, which we find in Herodotus, there were three exiles
of the Temenid race, Gauanês, Aëropus, and Perdikkas, who fled from
Argos to Illyria, from whence they passed into Upper Macedonia, in
such poverty as to be compelled to serve the petty king of the town
Lebæa in the capacity of shepherds. A remarkable prodigy happening to
Perdikkas foreshadows the future eminence of his family, and leads
to his dismissal by the king of Lebæa,—from whom he makes his escape
with difficulty, by the sudden rise of a river immediately after
he had crossed it, so as to become impassable by the horsemen who
pursued him. To this river, as to the saviour of the family, solemn
sacrifices were still offered by the kings of Macedonia in the time
of Herodotus. Perdikkas with his two brothers having thus escaped,
established himself near the spot called the Garden of Midas on Mount
Bermius, and from the loins of this hardy young shepherd sprang the
dynasty of Edessa.[26] This tale bears much more the marks of a
genuine local tradition than that of Theopompus. And the origin of
the Macedonian family, or Argeadæ, from Argos, appears to have been
universally recognized by Grecian inquirers,[27]—so that Alexander
the son of Amyntas, the contemporary of the Persian invasion, was
admitted by the Hellanodikæ to contend at the Olympic games as a
genuine Greek, though his competitors sought to exclude him as a
Macedonian.

  [26] Herodot. viii, 137-138.

  [27] Herodot. v, 22. Argeadæ, Strabo, lib. vii, Fragm. 20, ed.
  Tafel, which may probably have been erroneously changed into
  Ægeadæ (Justin, vii, 1).

The talent for command was so much more the attribute of the Greek
mind than of any of the neighboring barbarians, that we easily
conceive a courageous Argeian adventurer acquiring to himself
great ascendency in the local disputes of the Macedonian tribes,
and transmitting the chieftainship of one of those tribes to his
offspring. The influence acquired by Miltiadês among the Thracians of
the Chersonese, and by Phormion among the Akarnanians (who specially
requested that, after his death, his son, or some one of his kindred,
might be sent from Athens to command them),[28] was very much of
this character: we may add the case of Sertorius among the native
Iberians. In like manner, the kings of the Macedonian Lynkêstæ
professed to be descended from the Bacchiadæ[29] of Corinth; and the
neighborhood of Epidamnus and Apollonia, in both of which doubtless
members of that great gens were domiciliated, renders this tale even
more plausible than that of an emigration from Argos. The kings of
the Epirotic Molossi pretended also to a descent from the heroic
Æakid race of Greece. In fact, our means of knowledge do not enable
us to discriminate the cases in which these reigning families were
originally Greeks, from those in which they were Hellenized natives
pretending to Grecian blood.

  [28] Thucyd. iii, 7; Herodot. vi, 34-37: compare the story of
  Zalmoxis among the Thracians (iv, 94).

  [29] Strabo, vii, p. 326.

After the foundation-legend of the Macedonian kingdom, we have
nothing but a long blank until the reign of king Amyntas (about
520-500 B. C.), and his son Alexander, (about 480 B. C.) Herodotus
gives us five successive kings between the founder Perdikkas and
Amyntas,—Perdikkas, Argæus, Philippus, Aëropus, Alketas, Amyntas,
and Alexander,—the contemporary and to a certain extent the ally
of Xerxês.[30] Though we have no means of establishing any dates
in this early series, either of names or of facts, yet we see
that the Temenid kings, beginning from a humble origin, extended
their dominions successively on all sides. They conquered the
Briges,[31]—originally their neighbors on Mount Bermius,—the Eordi,
bordering on Edessa to the westward, who were either destroyed or
expelled from the country, leaving a small remnant still existing
in the time of Thucydidês at Physka between Strymon and Axius,—the
Almopians, an inland tribe of unknown site,—and many of the interior
Macedonian tribes who had been at first autonomous. Besides these
inland conquests, they had made the still more important acquisition
of Pieria, the territory which lay between Mount Bermius and the sea,
from whence they expelled the original Pierians, who found new seats
on the eastern bank of the Strymon between Mount Pangæus and the
sea. Amyntas king of Macedon was thus master of a very considerable
territory, comprising the coast of the Thermaic gulf as far north as
the mouth of the Haliakmôn, and also some other territory on the same
gulf from which the Bottiæans had been expelled; but not comprising
the coast between the mouths of the Axius and the Haliakmôn, nor even
Pella, the subsequent capital, which were still in the hands of the
Bottiæans at the period when Xerxês passed through.[32] He possessed
also Anthemus, a town and territory in the peninsula of Chalkidikê,
and some parts of Mygdonia, the territory east of the mouth of the
Axius; but how much, we do not know. We shall find the Macedonians
hereafter extending their dominion still farther, during the period
between the Persian and Peloponnesian war.

  [30] Herodot. viii, 139. Thucydidês agrees in the number of
  kings, but does not give the names (ii, 100).

  For the divergent lists of the early Macedonian kings, see Mr.
  Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, vol. ii, p. 221.

  [31] This may be gathered, I think, from Herodot. vii, 73 and
  viii, 138. The alleged migration of the Briges into Asia, and the
  change of their name to Phryges, is a statement which I do not
  venture to repeat as credible.

  [32] Herodot. vii, 123. Herodotus recognizes both Bottiæans
  between the Axius and the Haliakmôn,—and Bottiæans at Olynthus,
  whom the Macedonians had expelled from the Thermaic gulf,—at
  the time when Xerxês passed (viii, 127). These two statements
  seem to me compatible, and both admissible: the former Bottiæans
  were expelled by the Macedonians subsequently, anterior to the
  Peloponnesian war.

  My view of these facts, therefore, differs somewhat from that of
  O. Müller (Macedonians, sect. 16).

We hear of king Amyntas in friendly connection with the Peisistratid
princes at Athens, whose dominion was in part sustained by
mercenaries from the Strymon, and this amicable sentiment
was continued between his son Alexander and the emancipated
Athenians.[33] It is only in the reigns of these two princes that
Macedonia begins to be implicated in Grecian affairs: the regal
dynasty had become so completely Macedonized, and had so far
renounced its Hellenic brotherhood, that the claim of Alexander to
run at the Olympic games was contested by his competitors, and he was
called upon to prove his lineage before the Hellanodikæ.

  [33] Herodot. i, 59, v, 94; viii, 136.




CHAPTER XXVI.

THRACIANS AND GREEK COLONIES IN THRACE.


That vast space comprised between the rivers Strymon and Danube, and
bounded to the west by the easternmost Illyrian tribes, northward of
the Strymon, was occupied by the innumerable subdivisions of the race
called Thracians, or Threïcians. They were the most numerous and most
terrible race known to Herodotus: could they by possibility act in
unison or under one dominion (he says), they would be irresistible. A
conjunction thus formidable once seemed impending, during the first
years of the Peloponnesian war, under the reign of Sitalkês king of
the Odrysæ, who reigned from Abdêra at the mouth of the Nestus to
the Euxine, and compressed under his sceptre a large proportion of
these ferocious but warlike plunderers; so that the Greeks even down
to Thermopylæ trembled at his expected approach. But the abilities
of that prince were not found adequate to bring the whole force of
Thrace into effective coöperation and aggression against others.

Numerous as the tribes of Thracians were, their customs and character
(according to Herodotus) were marked by great uniformity: of the
Getæ, the Trausi, and others, he tells us a few particularities.
And the large tract over which the race were spread, comprising as
it did the whole chain of Mount Hæmus and the still loftier chain
of Rhodopê, together with a portion of the mountains Orbêlus and
Skomius, was yet partly occupied by level and fertile surface,—such
as the great plain of Adrianople, and the land towards the lower
course of the rivers Nestus and Hebrus. The Thracians of the plain,
though not less warlike, were at least more home-keeping, and less
greedy of foreign plunder, than those of the mountains. But the
general character of the race presents an aggregate of repulsive
features unredeemed by the presence of even the commonest domestic
affections.[34] The Thracian chief deduced his pedigree from a god
called by the Greeks Hermês, to whom he offered up worship apart
from the rest of his tribe, sometimes with the acceptable present
of a human victim. He tattooed his body,[35] and that of the women
belonging to him, as a privilege of honorable descent: he bought
his wives from their parents, and sold his children for exportation
to the foreign merchant: he held it disgraceful to cultivate the
earth, and felt honored only by the acquisitions of war and robbery.
The Thracian tribes worshipped deities whom the Greeks assimilate
to Arês, Dionysus, and Artemis: the great sanctuary and oracle of
their god Dionysus was in one of the loftiest summits of Rhodopê,
amidst dense and foggy thickets,—the residence of the fierce and
unassailable Satræ. To illustrate the Thracian character, we may
turn to a deed perpetrated by the king of the Bisaltæ,—perhaps
one out of several chiefs of that extensive Thracian tribe,—whose
territory, between Strymon and Axius, lay in the direct march of
Xerxês into Greece, and who fled to the desolate heights of Rhodopê,
to escape the ignominy of being dragged along amidst the compulsory
auxiliaries of the Persian invasion, forbidding his six sons to take
any part in it. From recklessness, or curiosity, the sons disobeyed
his commands, and accompanied Xerxês into Greece; they returned
unhurt by the Greek spear; but the incensed father, when they again
came into his presence, caused the eyes of all of them to be put
out. Exultation of success manifested itself in the Thracians by
increased alacrity in shedding blood; but as warriors, the only
occupation which they esteemed, they were not less brave than patient
of hardship, and maintained a good front, under their own peculiar
array, against forces much superior in all military efficacy.[36] It
appears that the Thynians and Bithynians,[37] on the Asiatic side of
the Bosphorus, perhaps also the Mysians, were members of this great
Thracian race, which was more remotely connected, also, with the
Phrygians. And the whole race may be said to present a character more
Asiatic than European, especially in those ecstatic and maddening
religious rites, which prevailed not less among the Edonian Thracians
than in the mountains of Ida and Dindymon of Asia, though with some
important differences. The Thracians served to furnish the Greeks
with mercenary troops and slaves, and the number of Grecian colonies
planted on the coast had the effect of partially softening the tribes
in the immediate vicinity, between whose chiefs and the Greek leaders
intermarriages were not unfrequent. But the tribes in the interior
seem to have retained their savage habits with little mitigation,
so that the language in which Tacitus[38] describes them is an apt
continuation to that of Herodotus, though coming more than five
centuries after.

  [34] Mannert assimilates the civilization of the Thracians
  to that of the Gauls when Julius Cæsar invaded them,—a great
  injustice to the latter, in my judgment (Geograph. Gr. und Röm.
  vol. vii, p. 23).

  [35] Cicero, De Officiis, ii, 7. “Barbarum compunctum notis
  Threiciis.” Plutarch (De Serâ Numin. Vindict. c. 13, p. 558)
  speaks as if the women only were tattooed, in Thrace: he puts a
  singular interpretation upon it, as a continuous punishment on
  the sex for having slain Orpheus.

  [36] For the Thracians generally, see Herodot. v, 3-9, vii,
  110, viii, 116, ix, 119; Thucyd. ii, 100, vii, 29-30; Xenophon,
  Anabas. vii, 2, 38, and the seventh book of the Anabasis
  generally, which describes the relations of Xenophon and the Ten
  Thousand Greeks with Seuthês the Thracian prince.

  [37] Xenoph. Anab. vi, 2, 17; Herodot. vii, 75.

  [38] Tacit. Annal. ii, 66; iv, 46.

To note the situation of each one among these many different tribes,
in the huge territory of Thrace, which is even now so imperfectly
known and badly mapped, would be unnecessary, and, indeed,
impracticable. I shall proceed to mention the principal Grecian
colonies which were formed in the country, noticing occasionally the
particular Thracian tribes with which they came in contact.

The Grecian colonies established on the Thermaic gulf, as well as
in the peninsula of Chalkidikê, emanating principally from Chalkis
and Eretria, though we do not know their precise epoch, appear to
have been of early date, and probably preceded the time when the
Macedonians of Edessa extended their conquests to the sea. At that
early period, they would find the Pierians still between the Peneius
and Haliakmôn,—also a number of petty Thracian tribes throughout
the broad part of the Chalkidic peninsula; they would find Pydna a
Pierian town, and Therma, Anthemus, Chalastra, etc. Mygdonian.

The most ancient Grecian colony in these regions seems to have been
Methônê, founded by the Eretrians in Pieria; nearly at the same time
(if we may trust a statement of rather suspicious character, though
the date itself is noway improbable) as Korkyra was settled by the
Corinthians (about 730-720 B. C.).[39] It was a little to the north
of the Pierian town of Pydna, and separated by about ten miles from
the Bottiæan town of Alôrus, which lay north of the Haliakmôn.[40] We
know very little about Methônê, except that it preserved its autonomy
and its Hellenism until the time of Philip of Macedon, who took
and destroyed it. But though, when once established, it was strong
enough to maintain itself in spite of conquests made all around by
the Macedonians of Edessa, we may fairly presume that it could not
have been originally planted on Macedonian territory. Nor in point of
fact was the situation peculiarly advantageous for Grecian colonists,
inasmuch as there were other maritime towns, not Grecian, in its
neighborhood,—Pydna, Alôrus, Therma, Chalastra; whereas the point of
advantage for a Grecian colony was, to become the exclusive seaport
for inland indigenous people.

  [39] Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. p. 293.

  [40] Skylax, c. 67.

The colonies, founded by Chalkis and Eretria on all the three
projections of the Chalkidic peninsula, were numerous, though for a
long time inconsiderable. We do not know how far these projecting
headlands were occupied before the arrival of the settlers from
Eubœa,—an event which we may probably place at some period earlier
than 600 B. C.; for after that period Chalkis and Eretria seem rather
on the decline,—and it appears too, that the Chalkidian colonists
in Thrace aided their mother-city Chalkis in her war against
Eretria, which cannot be much later than 600 B. C., though it may be
considerably earlier.

The range of mountains which crosses from the Thermaic to the
Strymonic gulf, and forms the northern limit of the Chalkidic
peninsula, slopes down towards the southern extremity, so as to leave
a considerable tract of fertile land between the Torônaic and the
Thermaic gulfs, including the fertile headland called Pallênê,—the
westernmost of those three prongs of Chalkidikê which run out into
the Ægean. Of the other two prongs, or projections, the easternmost
is terminated by the sublime Mount Athos, which rises out of the sea
as a precipitous rock six thousand four hundred feet in height,
connected with the mainland by a ridge not more than half the height
of the mountain itself, yet still high, rugged, and woody from sea
to sea, leaving only little occasional spaces fit to be occupied or
cultivated. The intermediate or Sithonian headland is also hilly
and woody, though in a less degree,—both less inviting and less
productive than Pallênê.[41]

  [41] For the description of Chalkidikê, see Grisebach’s Reisen,
  vol. ii, ch. 10, pp. 6-16, and Leake, Travels in Northern Greece,
  vol. iii, ch. 24, p. 152.

  If we read attentively the description of Chalkidikê as given
  by Skylax (c. 67), we shall see that he did not conceive it
  as three-pronged, but as terminating only in the peninsula of
  Pallênê, with Potidæa at its isthmus.

Æneia, near that cape which marks the entrance of the inner Thermaic
gulf,—and Potidæa, at the narrow isthmus of Pallênê,—were both
founded by Corinth. Between these two towns lay the fertile territory
called Krusis, or Krossæa, forming in after-times a part of the
domain of Olynthus, but in the sixth century B. C. occupied by petty
Thracian townships.[42] Within Pallênê were the towns of Mendê, a
colony from Eretria,—Skiônê, which, having no legitimate mother-city
traced its origin to Pellenian warriors returning from Troy,—Aphytis,
Neapolis, Ægê, Therambôs, and Sanê,[43] either wholly or partly
colonies from Eretria. In the Sithonian peninsula were Assa, Pilôrus,
Singus, Sartê, Torônê, Galêpsus, Sermylê, and Mekyberna; all or
most of these seem to have been of Chalkidic origin. But at the
head of the Torônaic gulf (which lies between Sithonia and Pallênê)
was placed Olynthus, surrounded by an extensive and fertile plain.
Originally a Bottiæan town, Olynthus will be seen at the time of
the Persian invasion to pass into the hands of the Chalkidian
Greeks,[44] and gradually to incorporate with itself several of the
petty neighboring establishments belonging to that race; whereby the
Chalkidians acquired that marked preponderance in the peninsula which
they retained, even against the efforts of Athens, until the days of
Philip of Macedon.

  [42] Herodot. vii, 123; Skymnus Chius, v, 627.

  [43] Strabo, x, p. 447; Thucyd. iv, 120-123; Pompon. Mela, ii, 2;
  Herodot. vii, 123.

  [44] Herodot. vii, 122; viii, 127. Stephanus Byz. (v. Παλλήνη)
  gives us some idea of the mythes of the lost Greek writers,
  Hegesippus and Theagenês about Pallênê.

On the scanty spaces, admitted by the mountainous promontory, or
ridge, ending in Athos, were planted some Thracian and some Pelasgic
settlements of the same inhabitants as those who occupied Lemnos
and Imbros; a few Chalkidic citizens being domiciliated with them,
and the people speaking both Pelasgic and Hellenic. But near the
narrow isthmus which joins this promontory to Thrace, and along
the north-western coast of the Strymonic gulf, were Grecian towns
of considerable importance,—Sanê, Akanthus, Stageira, and Argilus,
all colonies from Andros, which had itself been colonized from
Eretria.[45] Akanthus and Stageira are said to have been founded in
654 B. C.

  [45] Thucyd. iv, 84, 103, 109. See Mr. Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici,
  ad ann. 654 B. C.

Following the southern coast of Thrace, from the mouth of the river
Strymôn towards the east, we may doubt whether, in the year 560
B. C., any considerable independent colonies of Greeks had yet
been formed upon it. The Ionic colony of Abdêra, eastward of the
mouth of the river Nestus, formed from Teôs in Ionia, is of more
recent date, though the Klazomenians[46] had begun an unsuccessful
settlement there as early as the year 651 B. C.; while Dikæa—the
Chian settlement of Marôneia—and the Lesbian settlement of Ænus at
the mouth of the Hebrus, are of unknown date.[47] The important and
valuable territory near the mouth of the Strymôn, where, after many
ruinous failures,[48] the Athenian colony of Amphipolis afterwards
maintained itself, was at the date here mentioned possessed by
Edonian Thracians and Pierians: the various Thracian tribes,—Satræ,
Edonians, Dersæans, Sapæans, Bistones, Kikones, Pætians, etc.—were
in force on the principal part of the tract between Strymôn and
Hebrus, even to the sea-coast. It is to be remarked, however, that
the island of Thasus, and that of Samothrace, each possessed what
in Greek was called a Peræa,[49]—a strip of the adjoining mainland
cultivated and defended by means of fortified posts, or small towns:
probably, these occupations are of very ancient date, since they seem
almost indispensable as a means of support to the islands. For the
barren Thasus, especially, merits even at this day the uninviting
description applied to it by the poet Archilochus, in the seventh
century B. C.,—“an ass’s backbone, overspread with wild wood:”[50]
so wholly is it composed of mountain, naked or wooded, and so scanty
are the patches of cultivable soil left in it, nearly all close to
the sea-shore. This island was originally occupied by the Phenicians,
who worked the gold mines in its mountains with a degree of industry
which, even in its remains, excited the admiration of Herodotus.
How and when it was evacuated by them, we do not know; but the poet
Archilochus[51] formed one of a body of Parian colonists who planted
themselves on it in the seventh century B. C., and carried on war,
not always successful, against the Thracian tribe called Saians: on
one occasion, Archilochus found himself compelled to throw away his
shield. By their mines and their possessions on the mainland (which
contained even richer mines, at Skaptê Hylê, and elsewhere, than
those in the island), the Thasian Greeks rose to considerable power
and population. And as they seem to have been the only Greeks, until
the settlement of the Milesian Histiæus on the Strymôn about 510 B.
C., who actively concerned themselves in the mining districts of
Thrace opposite to their island, we cannot be surprised to hear that
their clear surplus revenue before the Persian conquest, about 493
B. C., after defraying the charges of their government without any
taxation, amounted to the large sum of two hundred talents, sometimes
even to three hundred talents, in each year (from forty-six thousand
to sixty-six thousand pounds).

  [46] Solinus, x, 10.

  [47] Herodot. i, 168; vii, 58-59, 109; Skymnus Chius, v, 675.

  [48] Thucyd. i, 100, iv, 102; Herodot. v, 11. Large quantities
  of corn are now exported from this territory to Constantinople
  (Leake, North. Gr. vol. iii, ch. 25, p. 172).

  [49] Herodot. vii, 108-109; Thucyd. i, 101.

  [50]

    ... ἥδε δ᾽ ὥστ᾽ ὄνου ῥαχις
    Ἕστηκεν, ὕλης ἀγρίας ἐπιστεφής.

  Archiloch. Fragm. 17-18, ed. Schneidewin.

  The striking propriety of this description, even after the lapse
  of two thousand five hundred years, may be seen in the Travels
  of Grisebach, vol. i. ch. 7, pp. 210-218, and in Prokesch,
  Denkwürdigkeiten des Orients, Th. 3, p. 612. The view of Thasus
  from the sea justifies the title Ἠερίη (Œnomaus ap. Euseb.
  Præpar. Evang. vii, p. 256; Steph. Byz. Θάσσος).

  Thasus (now Tasso) contains at present a population of about
  six thousand Greeks, dispersed in twelve small villages; it
  exports some good ship-timber, principally fir, of which there is
  abundance on the island, together with some olive oil and wax;
  but it cannot grow corn enough even for this small population. No
  mines either are now, or have been for a long time, in work.

  [51] Archiloch. Fragm. 5, ed. Schneidewin; Aristophan. Pac. 1298,
  with the Scholia; Strabo, x, p. 487, xii, p. 549; Thucyd. iv, 104.

On the long peninsula called the Thracian Chersonese there may
probably have been small Grecian settlements at an early date, though
we do not know at what time either the Milesian settlement of Kardia,
on the western side of the isthmus of that peninsula, near the Ægean
sea,—or the Æolic colony of Sestus on the Hellespont,—were founded;
while the Athenian ascendency in the peninsula begins only with the
migration of the first Miltiadês, during the reign of Peisistratus
at Athens. The Samian colony of Perinthus, on the northern coast of
the Propontis,[52] is spoken of as ancient in date, and the Megarian
colonies, Selymbria and Byzantium, belong to the seventh century B.
C.: the latter of these two is assigned to the 30th Olympiad (657 B.
C.), and its neighbor Chalkêdôn, on the opposite coast, was a few
years earlier. The site of Byzantium in the narrow strait of the
Bosphorus, with its abundant thunny-fishery,[53] which both employed
and nourished a large proportion of the poorer freemen, was alike
convenient either for maritime traffic, or for levying contributions
on the numerous corn ships which passed from the Euxine into the
Ægean; and we are even told that it held a considerable number of the
neighboring Bithynian Thracians as tributary Periœki. Such dominion,
though probably maintained during the more vigorous period of Grecian
city life, became in later times impracticable, and we even find the
Byzantines not always competent to the defence of their own small
surrounding territory. The place, however, will be found to possess
considerable importance during all the period of this history.[54]

  [52] Skymnus Chius, 699-715; Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. c. 57. See M.
  Raoul Rochette, Histoire des Colonies Grecques chs. xi-xiv, vol.
  iii, pp. 273-298.

  [53] Aristot. Polit. iv, 4, l.

  [54] Polyb. iv, 39, Phylarch. Fragm. 10, ed. Didot.

The Grecian settlements on the inhospitable south-western coast of
the Euxine, south of the Danube, appear never to have attained any
consideration: the principal traffic of Greek ships in that sea
tended to more northerly ports, on the banks of the Borysthenês and
in the Tauric Chersonese. Istria was founded by the Milesians near
the southern embouchure of the Danube,—Apollonia and Odêssus on the
same coast, more to the south,—all probably between 600-560 B. C. The
Megarian or Byzantine colony of Mesambria, seems to have been later
than the Ionic revolt; of Kallatis the age is not known. Tomi, north
of Kallatis and south of Istria, is renowned as the place of Ovid’s
banishment.[55] The picture which he gives of that uninviting spot,
which enjoyed but little truce from the neighborhood of the murderous
Getæ, explains to us sufficiently why these towns acquired little or
no importance.

  [55] Skymnus Chius, 720-740; Herodot. ii, 33, vi, 33; Strabo,
  vii, p. 319; Skylax, c. 68; Mannert, Geograph. Gr. Röm. vol. vii,
  ch. 8, pp. 126-140.

  An inscription in Boeckh’s Collection proves the existence of a
  pentapolis, or union, of five Grecian cities on this coast. Tomi,
  Kallatis, Mesambria, and Apollônia, are presumed by Blaramberg to
  have belonged to this union. See Inscript. No. 2056 c.

  Syncellus, however (p. 213), places the foundation of Istria
  considerably earlier, in 651 B. C.

The islands of Lemnos and Imbros, in the Ægean, were at this early
period occupied by Tyrrhenian Pelasgi, were conquered by the Persians
about 508 B. C., and seem to have passed into the power of the
Athenians at the time when Ionia revolted from the Persians. If the
mythical or poetical stories respecting these Tyrrhenian Pelasgi
contain any basis of truth, they must have been a race of buccaneers
not less rapacious than cruel. At one time, these Pelasgi seem also
to have possessed Samothrace, but how or when they were supplanted by
Greeks, we find no trustworthy account; the population of Samothrace
at the time of the Persian war was Ionic.[56]

  [56] Herodot. viii, 90.




CHAPTER XXVII.

KYRENE AND BARKA. — HESPERIDES.


It has been already mentioned, in a former chapter, that Psammetichus
king of Egypt, about the middle of the seventh century B. C., first
removed those prohibitions which had excluded Grecian commerce from
his country. In his reign, Grecian mercenaries were first established
in Egypt, and Grecian traders admitted, under certain regulations,
into the Nile. The opening of this new market emboldened them to
traverse the direct sea which separates Krête from Egypt,—a dangerous
voyage with vessels which rarely ventured to lose sight of land,—and
seems to have first made them acquainted with the neighboring coast
of Libya, between the Nile and the gulf called the Great Syrtis.
Hence arose the foundation of the important colony called Kyrênê.

As in the case of most other Grecian colonies, so in that of Kyrênê,
both the foundation and the early history are very imperfectly
known. The date of the event, as far as can be made out amidst much
contradiction of statement, was about 630 B. C.:[57] Thêra was the
mother-city, herself a colony from Lacedæmon; and the settlements
formed in Libya became no inconsiderable ornaments to the Dorian name
in Hellas.

  [57] See the discussion of the era of Kyrênê in Thrige, Historia
  Cyrênês, chs. 22, 23, 24, where the different statements are
  noticed and compared.

According to the account of a lost historian, Meneklês,[58]—political
dissension among the inhabitants of Thêra led to that emigration
which founded Kyrênê; and the more ample legendary details which
Herodotus collected, partly from Theræan, partly from Kyrenæan
informants, are not positively inconsistent with this statement,
though they indicate more particularly bad seasons, distress, and
over-population. Both of them dwell emphatically on the Delphian
oracle as the instigator as well as the director of the first
emigrants, whose apprehensions of a dangerous voyage and an unknown
country were very difficult to overcome. Both of them affirmed that
the original œkist Battus was selected and consecrated to the work
by the divine command: both called Battus the son of Polymnêstus,
of the mythical breed called Minyæ. But on other points there was
complete divergence between the two stories, and the Kyrenæans
themselves, whose town was partly peopled by emigrants from Krête,
described the mother of Battus as daughter of Etearchus, prince of
the Kretan town of Axus.[59] Battus had an impediment in his speech,
and it was on his intreating from the Delphian oracle a cure for this
infirmity that he received directions to go as “a cattle-breeding
œkist to Libya.” The suffering Theræans were directed to assist him,
but neither he nor they knew where Libya was, nor could they find
any resident in Krête who had ever visited it. Such was the limited
reach of Grecian navigation to the south of the Ægean sea, even a
century after the foundation of Syracuse. At length, by prolonged
inquiry, they discovered a man employed in catching the purple
shellfish, named Korôbius,—who said that he had been once forced by
stress of weather to the island of Platea, close to the shores of
Libya, and on the side not far removed from the western limit of
Egypt. Some Theræans being sent along with Korôbius to inspect this
island, left him there with a stock of provisions, and returned to
Thêra to conduct the emigrants. From the seven districts into which
Thêra was divided, emigrants were drafted for the colony, one brother
being singled out by lot from the different numerous families. But
so long was their return to Platea deferred, that the provisions
of Korôbius were exhausted, and he was only saved from starvation
by the accidental arrival of a Samian ship, driven by contrary
winds out of her course on the voyage to Egypt. Kôlæus, the master
of this ship (whose immense profits made by the first voyage to
Tartêssus have been noticed in a former chapter), supplied him with
provisions for a year,—an act of kindness, which is said to have laid
the first foundation of the alliance and good feeling afterwards
prevalent between Thêra, Kyrênê, and Samos. At length the expected
emigrants reached the island, having found the voyage so perilous
and difficult, that they once returned in despair to Thêra, where
they were only prevented by force from relanding. The band which
accompanied Battus was all conveyed in two pentekonters,—armed ships,
with fifty rowers each. Thus humble was the start of the mighty
Kyrênê, which, in the days of Herodotus, covered a city-area equal to
the entire island of Platea.[60]

  [58] Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. iv.

  [59] Herodot. iv, 150-154.

  [60] Herodot. iv, 155.

That island, however, though near to Libya, and supposed by the
colonists to be Libya, was not so in reality: the commands of the
oracle had not been literally fulfilled. Accordingly, the settlement
carried with it nothing but hardship for the space of two years, and
Battus returned with his companions to Delphi, to complain that the
promised land had proved a bitter disappointment. The god, through
his priestess, returned for answer, “If you, who have never visited
the cattle-breeding Libya, know it better than I, who _have_, I
greatly admire your cleverness.” Again the inexorable mandate forced
them to return; and this time they planted themselves on the actual
continent of Libya, nearly over against the island of Platea, in
a district called Aziris, surrounded on both sides by fine woods,
and with a running stream adjoining. After six years of residence
in this spot, they were persuaded by some of the indigenous Libyans
to abandon it, under the promise that they should be conducted to a
better situation: and their guides now brought them to the actual
site of Kyrênê, saying, “Here, men of Hellas, is the place for you to
dwell, for here the sky is perforated.”[61] The road through which
they passed had led through the tempting region of Irasa with its
fountain Thestê, and their guides took the precaution to carry them
through it by night, in order that they might remain ignorant of its
beauties.

  [61] Herodot. iv, 158. ἐνθαῦτα γὰρ ὁ οὐρανὸς τέτρηται. Compare
  the jest ascribed to the Byzantian envoys, on occasion of the
  vaunts of Lysimachus (Plutarch, De Fortunâ Alexandr. Magn. c. 3,
  p. 338).

Such were the preliminary steps, divine and human, which brought
Battus and his colonists to Kyrênê. In the time of Herodotus, Irasa
was an outlying portion of the eastern territory of this powerful
city. But we trace in the story just related an opinion prevalent
among his Kyrenæan informants, that Irasa with its fountain Thestê
was a more inviting position than Kyrênê with its fountain of
Apollo, and ought in prudence to have been originally chosen; out of
which opinion, according to the general habit of the Greek mind, an
anecdote is engendered and accredited, explaining how the supposed
mistake was committed. What may have been the recommendations of
Irasa, we are not permitted to know: but descriptions of modern
travellers, no less than the subsequent history of Kyrênê, go
far to justify the choice actually made. The city was placed at
the distance of about ten miles from the sea, having a sheltered
port called Apollonia, itself afterwards a considerable town,—it
was about twenty miles from the promontory Phykus, which forms
the northernmost projection of the African coast, nearly in the
longitude of the Peloponnesian Cape Tænarus (Matapan). Kyrênê
was situated about eighteen hundred feet above the level of the
Mediterranean, of which it commanded a fine view, and from which it
was conspicuously visible, on the edge of a range of hills which
slope by successive terraces down to the port. The soil immediately
around, partly calcareous, partly sandy, is described by Captain
Beechey to present a vigorous vegetation and remarkable fertility,
though the ancients considered it inferior in this respect both
to Barka[62] and Hesperides, and still more inferior to the more
westerly region near Kinyps. But the abundant periodical rains,
attracted by the lofty heights around, and justifying the expression
of the “perforated sky,” were even of greater importance, under an
African sun, than extraordinary richness of soil.[63] The maritime
regions near Kyrênê and Barka, and Hesperides, produced oil and
wine as well as corn, while the extensive district between these
towns, composed of alternate mountain, wood, and plain, was eminently
suited for pasture and cattle-breeding; and the ports were secure,
presenting conveniences for the intercourse of the Greek trader
with Northern Africa, such as were not to be found along all the
coasts of the Great Syrtis westward of Hesperides. Abundance of
applicable land,—great diversity both of climate and of productive
season, between the sea-side, the low hill, and the upper mountain,
within a small space, so that harvest was continually going on,
and fresh produce coming in from the earth, during eight months of
the year,—together with the monopoly of the valuable plant called
the Silphium, which grew nowhere except in the Kyrenaic region,
and the juice of which was extensively demanded throughout Greece
and Italy,—led to the rapid growth of Kyrênê, in spite of serious
and renewed political troubles. And even now, the immense remains
which still mark its desolate site, the evidences of past labor and
solicitude at the Fountain of Apollo, and elsewhere, together with
the profusion of excavated and ornamented tombs,—attest sufficiently
what the grandeur of the place must have been in the days of
Herodotus and Pindar. So much did the Kyrenæans pride themselves
on the Silphium, found wild in their back country, from the island
of Platea on the east to the inner recess of the Great Syrtis
westward,—the leaves of which were highly salubrious for cattle, and
the stalk for man, while the root furnished the peculiar juice for
export,—that they maintained it to have first appeared seven years
prior to the arrival of the first Grecian colonists in their city.[64]

  [62] Herodot. iv, 198.

  [63] See, about the productive powers of Kyrênê and its
  surrounding region, Herodot. iv, 199; Kallimachus (himself a
  Kyrenæan), Hymn. ad Apoll. 65, with the note of Spanheim; Pindar,
  Pyth. iv, with the Scholia _passim_; Diodor. iii, 49; Arrian,
  Indica, xliii, 13. Strabo (xvii, p. 837) saw Kyrênê from the sea
  in sailing by, and was struck with the view: he does not appear
  to have landed.

  The results of modern observation in that country are given in
  the Viaggio of Della Cella and in the exploring expedition of
  Captain Beechey; see an interesting summary in the History of
  the Barbary States, by Dr. Russell (Edinburgh, 1835), ch. v, pp.
  160-171. The chapter on this subject (c. 6) in Thrige’s Historia
  Cyrênês is defective, as the author seems never to have seen
  the careful and valuable observations of Captain Beechey, and
  proceeds chiefly on the statements of Della Cella.

  I refer briefly to a few among the many interesting notices
  of Captain Beechey. For the site of the ancient Hesperides
  (Bengazi), and the “beautiful fertile plain near it, extending
  to the foot of a long chain of mountains about fourteen miles
  distant to the south-eastward,”—see Beechey, Expedition, ch. xi,
  pp. 287-315; “a great many datepalm-trees in the neighborhood,”
  (ch. xii, pp. 340-345.)

  The distance between Bengazi (Hesperides) and Ptolemeta
  (Ptolemais, the port of Barka) is fifty-seven geographical
  miles, along a fertile and beautiful plain, stretching from the
  mountains to the sea. Between these two was situated the ancient
  Teucheira (_ib._ ch. xii, p. 347), about thirty-eight miles from
  Hesperides (p. 349), in a country highly productive wherever it
  is cultivated (pp. 350-355). Exuberant vegetation exists near
  the deserted Ptolemeta, or Ptolemais, after the winter rains (p.
  364). The circuit of Ptolemais, as measured by the ruins of its
  walls, was about three and a half English miles (p. 380).

  The road from Barka to Kyrênê presents continued marks of ancient
  chariot-wheels (ch. xiv, p. 406); after passing the plain of
  Mergê, it becomes hilly and woody, “but on approaching Grenna
  (Kyrênê) it becomes more clear of wood; the valleys produce fine
  crops of barley, and the hills excellent pasturage for cattle,”
  (p. 409.) Luxuriant vegetation after the winter rains in the
  vicinity of Kyrênê (ch. xv, p. 465).

  [64] Theophrast. Hist. Pl. vi, 3, 3; ix, 1, 7; Skylax, c. 107.

But it was not only the properties of the soil which promoted the
prosperity of Kyrênê. Isokratês[65] praises the well-chosen site
of that colony because it was planted in the midst of indigenous
natives apt for subjection, and far distant from any formidable
enemies. That the native Libyan tribes were made conducive in an
eminent degree to the growth of the Greco-Libyan cities, admits of
no doubt; and in reviewing the history of these cities, we must bear
in mind that their population was not pure Greek, but more or less
mixed, like that of the colonies in Italy, Sicily, or Ionia. Though
our information is very imperfect, we see enough to prove that the
small force brought over by Battus the Stammerer was enabled first
to fraternize with the indigenous Libyans,—next, reinforced by
additional colonists and availing themselves of the power of native
chiefs, to overawe and subjugate them. Kyrênê—combined with Barka
and Hesperides, both of them sprung from her root[66]—exercised over
the Libyan tribes between the borders of Egypt and the inner recess
of the Great Syrtis, for a space of three degrees of longitude,
an ascendency similar to that which Carthage possessed over the
more westerly Libyans near the Lesser Syrtis. Within these Kyrenæan
limits, and further westward along the shores of the Great Syrtis,
the Libyan tribes were of pastoral habits; westward, beyond the Lake
Tritônis and the Lesser Syrtis,[67] they began to be agricultural.
Immediately westward of Egypt were the Adyrmachidæ, bordering upon
Apis and Marea, the Egyptian frontier towns;[68] they were subject
to the Egyptians, and had adopted some of the minute ritual and
religious observances which characterized the region of the Nile.
Proceeding westward from the Adyrmachidæ were found the Giligammæ,
the Asbystæ, the Auschisæ, the Kabales, and the Nasamônes,—the latter
of whom occupied the south-eastern corner of the Great Syrtis;—next,
the Makæ, Gindânes, Lotophagi, Machlyes, as far as a certain river
and lake called Tritôn and Tritônis, which seems to have been near
the Lesser Syrtis. These last-mentioned tribes were not dependent
either on Kyrênê or on Carthage, at the time of Herodotus, nor
probably during the proper period of free Grecian history, (600-300
B. C.) In the third century B. C., the Ptolemaic governors of Kyrênê
extended their dominion westward, while Carthage pushed her colonies
and castles eastward, so that the two powers embraced between them
the whole line of coast between the Greater and Lesser Syrtis,
meeting at the spot called the Altars of the Brothers Philæni,—so
celebrated for its commemorative legend.[69] But even in the sixth
century B. C., Carthage was jealous of the extension of Grecian
colonies along this coast, and aided the Libyan Makæ (about 510 B.
C.) to expel the Spartan prince Dorieus from his settlement near the
river Kinyps. Near that spot was afterwards planted, by Phenician or
Carthaginian exiles, the town of Leptis Magna[70] (now Lebida), which
does not seem to have existed in the time of Herodotus. Nor does the
latter historian notice the Marmaridæ, who appear as the principal
Libyan tribe near the west of Egypt, between the age of Skylax and
the third century of the Christian era. Some migration or revolution
subsequent to the time of Herodotus must have brought this name into
predominance.[71]

  [65] Isokratês, Or. v, ad Philipp. p. 84, (p. 107, ed. Bek.)
  Thêra being a colony of Lacedæmon, and Kyrênê of Thêra, Isokratês
  speaks of Kyrênê as a colony of Lacedæmon.

  [66] Pindar, Pyth. iv, 26. Κυρήνην—ἀστέων ῥίζαν. In the time of
  Herodotus these three cities may possibly have been spoken of
  as a Tripolis; but no one before Alexander the Great would have
  understood the expression Pentapolis, used under the Romans to
  denote Kyrênê, Apollonia, Ptolemais, Teucheira, and Berenikê, or
  Hesperides.

  Ptolemais, originally the port of Barka, had become autonomous,
  and of greater importance than the latter.

  [67] The accounts respecting the lake called in ancient times
  Tritônis are, however, very uncertain: see Dr. Shaw’s Travels in
  Barbary, p. 127. Strabo mentions a lake so called near Hesperides
  (xvii, p. 836); Pherekydês talks of it as near Irasa (Pherekyd.
  Fragm. 33 _d._ ed. Didot).

  [68] Eratosthenês, born at Kyrênê and resident at Alexandria,
  estimated the land-journey between the two at five hundred and
  twenty-five Roman miles (Pliny, H. N. v, 6).

  [69] Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. c. 75; Valerius Maximus, v, 6.
  Thrige (Histor. Cyr. c. 49) places this division of the Syrtis
  between Kyrênê and Carthage at some period between 400-330 B. C.,
  anterior to the loss of the independence of Kyrênê; but I cannot
  think that it was earlier than the Ptolemies: compare Strabo,
  xvii, p. 836.

  [70] The Carthaginian establishment Neapolis is mentioned by
  Skylax (c. 109), and Strabo states that Leptis was another name
  for the same place (xvii, p. 835).

  [71] Skylax, c. 107; Vopiscus, Vit. Prob. c. 9; Strabo, xvii,
  p. 838; Pliny, H. N. v, 5. From the Libyan tribe Marmaridæ was
  derived the name Marmarika, applied to that region.

The interior country, stretching westward from Egypt along the
thirtieth and thirty-first parallel of latitude, to the Great
Syrtis, and then along the southern shore of that gulf, is to a
great degree low and sandy, and quite destitute of trees; yet
affording in many parts water, herbage, and a fertile soil.[72] But
the maritime region north of this, constituting the projecting
bosom of the African coast from the island of Platea (Gulf of
Bomba) on the east to Hesperides (Bengazi) on the west, is of a
totally different character; covered with mountains of considerable
elevation, which reach their highest point near Kyrênê, interspersed
with productive plain and valley, broken by frequent ravines which
carry off the winter torrents into the sea, and never at any time
of the year destitute of water. It is this latter advantage that
causes them to be now visited every summer by the Bedouin Arabs,
who flock to the inexhaustible Fountain of Apollo and to other
parts of the mountainous region from Kyrênê to Hesperides, when
their supply of water and herbage fails in the interior:[73] and
the same circumstance must have operated in ancient times to hold
the nomadic Libyans in a sort of dependence on Kyrênê and Barka.
Kyrênê appropriated the maritime portion of the territory of the
Libyan Asbystæ;[74] the Auschisæ occupied the region south of Barka,
touching the sea near Hesperides,—the Kabales near Teucheira in the
territory of Barka. Over the interior spaces these Libyan Nomads,
with their cattle and twisted tents, wandered unrestrained, amply fed
upon meat and milk,[75] clothed in goatskins, and enjoying better
health than any people known to Herodotus. Their breed of horses
was excellent, and their chariots or wagons with four horses could
perform feats admired even by Greeks: it was to these horses that the
princes[76] and magnates of Kyrênê and Barka often owed the success
of their chariots in the games of Greece. The Libyan Nasamônes,
leaving their cattle near the sea, were in the habit of making an
annual journey up the country to the Oasis of Augila, for the purpose
of gathering the date-harvest,[77] or of purchasing dates,—a journey
which the Bedouin Arabs from Bengazi still make annually, carrying
up their wheat and barley, for the same purpose. Each of the Libyan
tribes was distinguished by a distinct mode of cutting the hair, and
by some peculiarities of religious worship, though generally all
worshipped the Sun and the Moon.[78] But in the neighborhood of the
Lake Tritônis (seemingly the western extremity of Grecian coasting
trade in the time of Herodotus, who knows little beyond, and begins
to appeal to Carthaginian authorities), the Grecian deities Poseidôn
and Athênê, together with the legend of Jason and the Argonauts, had
been localized. There were, moreover, current prophecies announcing
that one hundred Hellenic cities were destined one day to be founded
round the lake,—and that one city in the island Phla, surrounded
by the lake, was to be planted by the Lacedæmonians.[79] These,
indeed, were among the many unfulfilled prophecies which from every
side cheated the Grecian ear,—proceeding in this case probably from
Kyrenæan or Theræan traders, who thought the spot advantageous for
settlement, and circulated their own hopes under the form of divine
assurances. It was about the year 510 B. C.[80] that some of these
Theræans conducted the Spartan prince Dorieus to found a colony in
the fertile region of Kinyps, belonging to the Libyan Makæ. But
Carthage, interested in preventing the extension of Greek settlements
westward, aided the Libyans in driving him out.

  [72] ταπεινή τε καὶ ψαμμώδης (Herodot. iv, 191); Sallust, Bell.
  Jugurthin. c. 17.

  Captain Beechey points out the mistaken conceptions which have
  been entertained of this region:—

  “It is not only in the works of early writers that we find the
  nature of the Syrtis misunderstood; for the whole of the space
  between Mesurata (_i. e._ the cape which forms the western
  extremity of the Great Syrtis) and Alexandria is described
  by Leo Africanus, under the title of Barka, as a wild and
  desert country, where there is neither water nor land capable
  of cultivation. He tells us that the most powerful among the
  Mohammedan invaders possessed themselves of the fertile parts of
  the coast, leaving the others only the desert for their abode,
  exposed to all the miseries and privations attendant upon it; for
  this desert (he continues) is far removed from any habitations,
  and nothing is produced there whatever. So that if these poor
  people would have a supply of grain, or of any other articles
  necessary to their existence, they are obliged to pledge their
  children to the Sicilians who visit the coast; who, on providing
  them with these things, carry off the children they have
  received....

  “It appears to be chiefly from Leo Africanus that modern
  historians have derived their idea of what they term the
  district and desert of Barka. Yet the whole of the Cyrenaica is
  comprehended within the limits which they assign to it; and the
  authority of Herodotus, without citing any other, would be amply
  sufficient to prove that this tract of country not only was no
  desert, but was at all times remarkable for its fertility....
  The impression left upon our minds, after reading the account of
  Herodotus, would be much more consistent with the appearance and
  peculiarities of both, in their actual state, than that which
  would result from the description of any succeeding writer....
  The district of Barka, including all the country between Mesurata
  and Alexandria, neither is, nor ever was, so destitute and barren
  as has been represented: the part of it which constitutes the
  Cyrenaica is capable of the highest degree of cultivation, and
  many parts of the Syrtis afford excellent pasturage, while some
  of it is not only adapted to cultivation, but does actually
  produce good crops of barley and dhurra.” (Captain Beechey,
  Expedition to Northern Coast of Africa, ch. x, pp. 263, 265, 267,
  269: comp. ch. xi, p. 321.)

  [73] Justin, xiii, 7. “Amœnitatem loci et fontium ubertatem.”
  Captain Beechey notices this annual migration of the Bedouin
  Arabs:—

  “Teucheira (on the coast between Hesperides and Barka) abounds
  in wells of excellent water, which are reserved by the Arabs for
  their summer consumption, and only resorted to when the more
  inland supplies are exhausted: at other times it is uninhabited.
  Many of the excavated tombs are occupied as dwelling-houses by
  the Arabs during their summer visits to that part of the coast.”
  (Beechey, Exp. to North. Afric. ch. xii, p. 354.)

  And about the wide mountain plain, or table-land of Mergê,
  the site of the ancient Barka, “The water from the mountains
  inclosing the plain settles in pools and lakes in different parts
  of this spacious valley; and affords a constant supply during the
  summer months, to the Arabs who frequent it.” (ch. xiii, p. 390.)
  The red earth which Captain Beechey observed in this plain is
  noticed by Herodotus in regard to Libya (ii, 12). Stephan. Byz.
  notices also the bricks used in building (v. Βάρκη). Derna, too,
  to the eastward of Cyrene on the sea-coast, is amply provided
  with water (ch. xvi, p. 471).

  About Kyrênê itself, Captain Beechey states: “During the time,
  about a fortnight, of our absence from Kyrene, the changes
  which had taken place in the appearance of the country about it
  were remarkable. We found the hills on our return covered with
  Arabs, their camels, flocks, and herds; the scarcity of water
  in the interior at this time having driven the Bedouins to the
  mountains, and particularly to Kyrene, where the springs afford
  at all times an abundant supply. The corn was all cut, and the
  high grass and luxuriant vegetation, which we had found it so
  difficult to wade through on former occasions, had been eaten
  down to the roots by the cattle.” (ch. xviii, pp. 517-520.)

  The winter rains are also abundant, between January and March, at
  Bengazi (the ancient Hesperides): sweet springs of water near the
  town (ch. xi, pp. 282, 315, 327). About Ptolemeta, or Ptolemais,
  the port of the ancient Barka, _ib._ ch. xii, p. 363.

  [74] Herodot. iv, 170-171. παραλία σφόδρα εὐδαίμων. Strabo, ii,
  p. 131. πολυμήλου καὶ πολυκαρποτάτας χθονὸς, Pindar. Pyth. ix, 7.

  [75] Herodot. iv, 186, 187, 189, 190. Νομάδες κρεοφάγοι καὶ
  γαλακτοπόται. Pindar, Pyth. ix, 127, ἱππευταὶ Νομάδες. Pompon.
  Mela, i, 8.

  [76] See the fourth, fifth, and ninth Pythian Odes of Pindar. In
  the description given by Sophoklês (Electra, 695) of the Pythian
  contests, in which pretence is made that Orestês has perished,
  ten contending chariots are supposed, of which two are Libyan,
  from Barka: of the remaining eight, one only comes from each
  place named.

  [77] Herodot. iv, 172-182. Compare Hornemann’s Travels in Africa,
  p. 48, and Heeren, Verkehr und Handel der Alten Welt, Th. ii,
  Abth. 1, Abschnitt vi, p. 226.

  [78] Herodot. iv, 175-188.

  [79] Herodot. iv, 178, 179, 195, 196.

  [80] Herodot. iv, 42.

The Libyans in the immediate neighborhood of Kyrênê were materially
changed by the establishment of that town, and constituted a large
part—at first, probably, far the largest part—of its constituent
population. Not possessing that fierce tenacity of habits which the
Mohammedan religion has impressed upon the Arabs of the present
day, they were open to the mingled influence of constraint and
seduction applied by Grecian settlers; so that in the time of
Herodotus, the Kabales and the Asbystæ of the interior had come
to copy Kyrenæan tastes and customs.[81] The Theræan colonists,
having obtained not merely the consent but even the guidance of the
natives to their occupation of Kyrênê, constituted themselves like
privileged Spartan citizens in the midst of Libyan Periœki.[82] They
seem to have married Libyan wives, whence Herodotus describes the
women of Kyrênê and Barka as following, even in his time, religious
observances indigenous and not Hellenic.[83] Even the descendants
of the primitive œkist Battus were semi-Libyan. For Herodotus gives
us the curious information that Battus was the Libyan word for a
king, deducing from it the just inference, that the name Battus was
not originally personal to the œkist, but acquired in Libya first
as a title,[84]—and that it afterwards passed to his descendants
as a proper name. For eight generations the reigning princes were
called Battus and Arkesilaus, the Libyan denomination alternating
with the Greek, until the family was finally deprived of its power.
Moreover, we find the chief of Barka, kinsman of Arkesilaus of Kyrênê
bearing the name of Alazir; a name certainly not Hellenic, and
probably Libyan.[85] We are, therefore, to conceive the first Theræan
colonists as established in their lofty fortified post Kyrênê, in the
centre of Libyan Periœki, till then strangers to walls, to arts, and
perhaps even to cultivated land. Probably these Periœki were always
subject and tributary, in a greater or less degree, though they
continued for half a century to retain their own king.

  [81] Herodot. iv, 170. νόμους δὲ τοὺς πλείστους μιμέεσθαι
  ἐπιτηδεύουσι τοὺς Κυρηναίων.

  [82] Herodot. iv, 161. Θηραίων καὶ τῶν περιοίκων, etc.

  [83] Herodot. iv, 186-189. Compare, also, the story in Pindar.
  Pyth. ix, 109-126, about Alexidamus, the ancestor of Telesikratês
  the Kyrenæan; how the former won, by his swiftness in running,
  a Libyan maiden, daughter of Antæus of Irasa,—and Kallimachus,
  Hymn. Apoll. 86.

  [84] Herodot. iv, 155.

  [85] Herodot. iv, 164.

To these rude men the Theræans communicated the elements of Hellenism
and civilization, not without receiving themselves much that was
non-Hellenic in return; and perhaps the reactionary influence of
the Libyan element against the Hellenic might have proved the
stronger of the two, had they not been reinforced by new-comers
from Greece. After forty years of Battus the œkist (about 630-590
B. C.), and sixteen years of his son Arkesilaus (about 590-574 B.
C.), a second Battus[86] succeeded, called Battus the Prosperous,
to mark the extraordinary increase of Kyrênê during his presidency.
The Kyrenæans under him took pains to invite new settlers from all
parts of Greece without distinction,—a circumstance deserving notice
in Grecian colonization, which usually manifested a preference for
certain races, if it did not positively exclude the rest. To every
new-comer was promised a lot of land, and the Delphian priestess
strenuously seconded the wishes of the Kyrenæans, proclaiming that
“whosoever should reach the place too late for the land-division,
would have reason to repent it.” Such promise of new land, as well
as the sanction of the oracle, were doubtless made public at all the
games and meetings of Greeks, and a large number of new colonists
embarked for Kyrênê. The exact number is not mentioned, but we must
conceive it to have been very great, when we are told that during the
succeeding generation, not less than seven thousand Grecian hoplites
of Kyrênê perished by the hands of the revolted Libyans,—yet leaving
both the city itself and its neighbor Barka still powerful. The loss
of so great a number as seven thousand Grecian hoplites has very
few parallels throughout the whole history of Greece. In fact, this
second migration, during the government of Battus the Prosperous,
which must have taken place between 574-554 B. C., ought to be looked
upon as the moment of real and effective colonization for Kyrênê. It
was on this occasion, probably, that the port of Apollonia, which
afterwards came to equal the city itself in importance, was first
occupied and fortified,—for this second swarm of emigrants came by
sea direct, while the original colonists had reached Kyrênê by land
from the island of Platea through Irasa. The fresh emigrants came
from Peloponnesus, Krete, and some other islands of the Ægean.

  [86] Respecting the chronology of the Battiad princes, see
  Boeckh, ad Pindar. Pyth. iv, p. 265, and Thirge, Histor. Cyrenes,
  p. 127, _seq._

To furnish so many new lots of land, it was either necessary, or it
was deemed expedient, to dispossess many of the Libyan Periœki, who
found their situation in other respects also greatly changed for the
worse. The Libyan king Adikran, himself among the sufferers, implored
aid from Apriês king of Egypt, then in the height of his power;
sending to declare himself and his people Egyptian subjects, like
their neighbors the Adyrmachidæ. The Egyptian prince, accepting the
offer, despatched a large military force of the native soldier-caste,
who were constantly in station at the western frontier-town Marea,
by the route along shore to attack Kyrênê. They were met at Irasa by
the Greeks of Kyrênê, and, being totally ignorant of Grecian arms and
tactics, experienced a defeat so complete that few of them reached
home.[87] The consequences of this disaster in Egypt, where it caused
the transfer of the throne from Apriês to Amasis, have been noticed
in a former chapter.

  [87] Herodot. iv, 159.

Of course the Libyan Periœki were put down, and the redivision of
lands near Kyrênê among the Greek settlers accomplished, to the
great increase of the power of the city. And the reign of Battus
the Prosperous marks a flourishing era in the town, and a large
acquisition of land-dominion, antecedent to years of dissension and
distress. The Kyrenæans came into intimate alliance with Amasis king
of Egypt, who encouraged Grecian connection in every way, and who
even took to wife Ladikê, a woman of the Battiad family at Kyrênê, so
that the Libyan Periœki lost all chance of Egyptian aid against the
Greeks.[88]

  [88] Herodot. ii, 180-181.

New prospects, however, were opened to them during the reign of
Arkesilaus the Second, son of Battus the Prosperous, (about 554-544
B. C.). The behavior of this prince incensed and alienated his own
brothers, who raised a revolt against him, seceded with a portion
of the citizens, and induced a number of the Libyan Periœki to take
part with them. They founded the Greco-Libyan city of Barka, in the
territory of the Libyan Auschisæ, about twelve miles from the coast,
distant from Kyrênê by sea about seventy miles to the westward. The
space between the two, and even beyond Barka, as far as the more
westerly Grecian colony called Hesperides, was in the days of Skylax
provided with commodious ports for refuge or landing:[89] at what
time Hesperides was founded we do not know, but it existed about
510 B. C.[90] Whether Arkesilaus obstructed the foundation of Barka
is not certain; but he marched the Kyrenæan forces against those
revolted Libyans who had joined it. Unable to resist, the latter
fled for refuge to their more easterly brethren near the borders of
Egypt, and Arkesilaus pursued them. At length, in a district called
Leukôn, the fugitives found an opportunity of attacking him at such
prodigious advantage, that they almost destroyed the Kyrenæan army,
seven thousand hoplites (as has been before intimated) being left
dead on the field. Arkesilaus did not long survive this disaster. He
was strangled during sickness by his brother Learchus, who aspired to
the throne; but Eryxô, widow of the deceased prince,[91] avenged the
crime, by causing Learchus to be assassinated.

  [89] Herodot. iv, 160; Skylax, c. 107; Hekatæus, Fragm. 300, ed.
  Klausen.

  [90] Herodot. iv, 204.

  [91] Herodot. iv, 160. Plutarch (De Virtutibus Mulier. p. 261)
  and Polyænus (viii, 41) give various details of this stratagem
  on the part of Eryxô; Learchus being in love with her. Plutarch
  also states that Learchus maintained himself as despot for some
  time by the aid of Egyptian troops from Amasis, and committed
  great cruelties. His story has too much the air of a romance to
  be transcribed into the text, nor do I know from what authority
  it is taken.

That the credit of the Battiad princes was impaired by such a series
of disasters and enormities, we can readily believe. But it received
a still greater shock from the circumstance, that Battus the Third,
son and successor of Arkesilaus, was lame and deformed in his feet.
To be governed by a man thus personally disabled, was in the minds
of the Kyrenæans an indignity not to be borne, as well as an excuse
for preëxisting discontents; and the resolution was taken to send to
the Delphian oracle for advice. They were directed by the priestess
to invite from Mantineia, a moderator, empowered to close discussions
and provide a scheme of government,—the Mantineans selecting Demônax,
one of the wisest of their citizens, to solve the same problem which
had been committed to Solon at Athens. By his arrangement, the regal
prerogative of the Battiad line was terminated, and a republican
government established seemingly about 543 B. C.; the dispossessed
prince retaining both the landed domains[92] and the various
sacerdotal functions which had belonged to his predecessors.

  [92] Herodot. iv, 161. Τῷ βασιλέϊ Βάττῳ τεμένεα ἐξελὼν καὶ
  ἱρωσύνας, τὰ ἄλλα πάντα τὰ πρότερον εἶχον οἱ βασιλεῖς ἐς μέσον τῷ
  δήμῳ ἔθηκε.

  I construe the word τεμένεα as meaning all the domains, doubtless
  large, which had belonged to the Battiad princes; contrary
  to Thrige (Historia Cyrênês, ch. 38, p. 150), who restricts
  the expression to revenues derived from sacred property. The
  reference of Wesseling to Hesych.—Βάττου σίλφιον—is of no avail
  for illustrating this passage.

  The supposition of O. Müller, that the preceding king had made
  himself despotic by means of Egyptian soldiers, appears to me
  neither probable in itself, nor admissible upon the simple
  authority of Plutarch’s romantic story, when we take into
  consideration the silence of Herodotus. Nor is Müller correct in
  affirming that Demônax “restored the supremacy of the community:”
  that legislator superseded the old kingly political privileges,
  and framed a new constitution (see O. Müller, History of Dorians,
  b. iii, ch. 9. s. 13.)

Respecting the government, as newly framed, however, Herodotus
unfortunately gives us hardly any particulars. Demônax classified
the inhabitants of Kyrênê into three tribes; composed of: 1.
Theræans with their Libyan Periœki; 2. Greeks who had come from
Peloponnesus and Krete; 3. Such Greeks as had come from all other
islands in the Ægean. It appears, too, that a senate was constituted,
taken doubtless from these three tribes, and we may presume, in
equal proportion. It seems probable that there had been before no
constitutional classification, nor political privilege, except what
was vested in the Theræans,—that these latter, the descendants of
the original colonists were the only persons hitherto _known to the
constitution_,—and that the remaining Greeks, though free landed
proprietors and hoplites, were not permitted to act as an integral
part of the body politic, nor distributed in tribes at all.[93] The
whole powers of government,—up to this time vested in the Battiad
princes, subject only to such check, how effective we know not, which
the citizens of Theræan origin might be able to interpose,—were
now transferred from the prince to the people; that is, to certain
individuals or assemblies chosen somehow from among all the citizens.
There existed at Kyrênê, as at Thêra and Sparta, a board of Ephors,
and a band of three hundred armed police,[94] analogous to those
who were called the Hippeis, or Horsemen, at Sparta: whether these
were instituted by Demônax, we do not know, nor does the identity of
titular office, in different states, afford safe ground for inferring
identity of power. This is particularly to be remarked with regard
to the Periœki at Kyrênê, who were perhaps more analogous to the
Helots than to the Periœki of Sparta. The fact that the Periœki were
considered in the new constitution as belonging specially to the
Theræan branch of citizens, shows that these latter still continued a
privileged order, like the Patricians with their Clients at Rome in
relation to the Plebs.

  [93] Both O. Müller (Dor. b. iii, 4, 5), and Thrige (Hist. Cyren.
  c. 38, p. 148), speak of Demônax as having abolished the old
  tribes and created new ones. I do not conceive the change in this
  manner. Demônax did not _abolish_ any tribes, but distributed
  for the first time the inhabitants into tribes. It is possible
  indeed that, before his time, the Theræans of Kyrênê may have
  been divided among themselves into distinct tribes; but the other
  inhabitants, having emigrated from a great number of different
  places, had never before been thrown into tribes at all. Some
  formal enactment or regulation was necessary for this purpose,
  to define and sanction that religious, social, and political
  communion, which went to make up the idea of the Tribe. It is not
  to be assumed, as a matter of course, that there must necessarily
  have been tribes anterior to Demônax, among a population so
  miscellaneous in its origin.

  [94] Hesychius, Τριακάτιοι; Eustath. ad Hom. Odyss. p. 303;
  Herakleidês Pontic. De Polit. c. 4.

That the rearrangement introduced by Demônax was wise, consonant to
the general current of Greek feeling, and calculated to work well,
there is good reason to believe: and no discontent within would have
subverted it without the aid of extraneous force. Battus the Lame
acquiesced in it peaceably during his life; but his widow and his
son, Pheretimê and Arkesilaus, raised a revolt after his death, and
tried to regain by force the kingly privileges of the family. They
were worsted and obliged to flee,—the mother to Cyprus, the son to
Samos,—where both employed themselves in procuring foreign arms to
invade and conquer Kyrênê. Though Pheretimê could obtain no effective
aid from Euelthôn prince of Salamis in Cyprus, her son was more
successful in Samos, by inviting new Greek settlers to Kyrênê, under
promise of a redistribution of the land. A large body of emigrants
joined him on this promise; the period seemingly being favorable to
it, since the Ionian cities had not long before become subject to
Persia, and were discontented with the yoke. But before he conducted
this numerous band against his native city, he thought proper to
ask the advice of the Delphian oracle. Success in the undertaking
was promised to him, but moderation and mercy after success was
emphatically enjoined, on pain of losing his life; and the Battiad
race was declared by the god to be destined to rule at Kyrênê for
eight generations, but no longer,—as far as four princes named Battus
and four named Arkesilaus.[95] “More than such eight generations
(said the Pythia), Apollo forbids the Battiads even to aim at.” This
oracle was doubtless told to Herodotus by Kyrenæan informants when he
visited their city after the final deposition of the Battiad princes,
which took place in the person of the fourth Arkesilaus, between
460-450 B. C.; the invasion of Kyrênê by Arkesilaus the Third, sixth
prince of the Battiad race, to which the oracle professed to refer,
having occurred about 530 B. C. The words placed in the mouth of
the priestess doubtless date from the later of these two periods,
and afford a specimen of the way in which pretended prophecies are
not only made up by antedating after-knowledge, but are also so
contrived as to serve a present purpose. For the distinct prohibition
of the god, “not even to aim at a longer lineage than eight Battiad
princes,” seems plainly intended to deter the partisans of the
dethroned family from endeavoring to reinstate them.

  [95] Herodot. iv, 163. Ἐπὶ μὲν τέσσερας Βάττους, καὶ Ἀρκεσιλέως
  τέσσερας, διδοῖ ὑμῖν Λοξίης βασιλεύειν Κυρήνης· πλέον μέντοι
  τούτου οὐδὲ πειρᾶσθαι παραινέει.

Arkesilaus the Third, to whom this prophecy purports to have been
addressed, returned with his mother Pheretimê and his army of new
colonists to Kyrênê. He was strong enough to carry all before him,—to
expel some of his chief opponents and seize upon others, whom he
sent to Cyprus to be destroyed; though the vessels were driven out
of their course by storms to the peninsula of Knidus, where the
inhabitants rescued the prisoners and sent them to Thêra. Other
Kyrenæans, opposed to the Battiads, took refuge in a lofty private
tower, the property of Aglômachus, wherein Arkesilaus caused them
all to be burned, heaping wood around and setting it on fire. But
after this career of triumph and revenge, he became conscious that
he had departed from the mildness enjoined to him by the oracle, and
sought to avoid the punishment which it had threatened by retiring
from Kyrênê. At any rate, he departed from Kyrênê to Barka, to the
residence of the Barkæan prince, his kinsman Alazir, whose daughter
he had married. But he found in Barka some of the unfortunate men
who had fled from Kyrênê to escape him: these exiles, aided by a
few Barkæans, watched for a suitable moment to assail him in the
market-place, and slew him, together with his kinsman the prince
Alazir.[96]

  [96] Herodot. iv, 163-164.

The victory of Arkesilaus at Kyrênê, and his assassination at Barka,
are doubtless real facts; but they seem to have been compressed
together and incorrectly colored, in order to give to the death of
the Kyrenæan prince the appearance of a divine judgment. For the
reign of Arkesilaus cannot have been very short, since events of the
utmost importance occurred within it. The Persians under Kambysês
conquered Egypt, and both the Kyrenæan and the Barkæan prince sent to
Memphis to make their submission to the conqueror,—offering presents
and imposing upon themselves an annual tribute. The presents of the
Kyrenæans, five hundred minæ of silver, were considered by Kambysês
so contemptibly small, that he took hold of them at once and threw
them among his soldiers. And at the moment when Arkesilaus died,
Aryandes, the Persian satrap after the death of Kambysês, is found
established in Egypt.[97]

  [97] Herodot. iii, 13; iv, 165-166.

During the absence of Arkesilaus at Barka, his mother Pheretimê had
acted as regent, taking her place at the discussions in the senate;
but when his death took place, and the feeling against the Battiads
manifested itself strongly at Barka, she did not feel powerful enough
to put it down, and went to Egypt to solicit aid from Aryandes. The
satrap, being made to believe that Arkesilaus had met his death in
consequence of steady devotion to the Persians, sent a herald to
Barka to demand the men who had slain him. The Barkæans assumed the
collective responsibility of the act, saying that he had done them
injuries both numerous and severe,—a farther proof that his reign
cannot have been very short. On receiving this reply, the satrap
immediately despatched a powerful Persian armament, land-force as
well as sea-force, in fulfilment of the designs of Pheretimê against
Barka. They besieged the town for nine months, trying to storm, to
batter, and to undermine the walls;[98] but their efforts were vain,
and it was taken at last only by an act of the grossest perfidy.
Pretending to relinquish the attempt in despair, the Persian general
concluded a treaty with the Barkæans, wherein it was stipulated that
the latter should continue to pay tribute to the Great King, but that
the army should retire without farther hostilities: “I swear it (said
the Persian general), and my oath shall hold good, as long as this
earth shall keep its place.” But the spot on which the oaths were
exchanged had been fraudulently prepared: a ditch had been excavated
and covered with hurdles, upon which again a surface of earth had
been laid. The Barkæans, confiding in the oath, and overjoyed at
their liberation, immediately opened their gates and relaxed their
guard; while the Persians, breaking down the hurdles and letting fall
the superimposed earth, so that they might comply with the letter of
their oath, assaulted the city and took it without difficulty.

  [98] Polyænus (Strateg. vii, 28) gives a narrative in many
  respects different from this of Herodotus.

Miserable was the fate which Pheretimê had in reserve for these
entrapped prisoners. She crucified the chief opponents of herself and
her late son around the walls, on which were also affixed the breasts
of their wives: then, with the exception of such of the inhabitants
as were Battiads, and noway concerned in the death of Arkesilaus,
she consigned the rest to slavery in Persia. They were carried away
captive into the Persian empire, where Darius assigned to them a
village in Baktria as their place of abode, which still bore the name
of Barka, even in the days of Herodotus.

During the course of this expedition, it appears, the Persian army
advanced as far as Hesperides, and reduced many of the Libyan tribes
to subjection: these, together with Kyrênê and Barka, figure among
the tributaries and auxiliaries of Xerxês in his expedition against
Greece. And when the army returned to Egypt, by order of Aryandês,
they were half inclined to seize Kyrênê itself in their way, though
the opportunity was missed and the purpose left unaccomplished.[99]

  [99] Herodot. iv, 203-204.

Pheretimê accompanied the retreating army to Egypt, where she died
shortly of a loathsome disease, consumed by worms; thus showing, says
Herodotus,[100] that “excessive cruelty in revenge brings down upon
men the displeasure of the gods.” It will be recollected that in the
veins of this savage woman the Libyan blood was intermixed with the
Grecian. Political enmity in Greece proper kills, but seldom if ever
mutilates or sheds the blood, of women.

  [100] Herodot. iv, 205.

We thus leave Kyrênê and Barka again subject to Battiad princes, at
the same time that they are tributaries of Persia. Another Battus
and another Arkesilaus have to intervene before the glass of this
worthless dynasty is run out, between 460-450 B. C. I shall not at
present carry the reader’s attention to this last Arkesilaus, who
stands honored by two chariot victories in Greece, and two fine odes
of Pindar.

The victory of the third Arkesilaus, and the restoration of the
Battiads, broke up the equitable constitution established by
Demônax. His triple classification into tribes must have been
completely remodelled, though we do not know how. For the number
of new colonists whom Arkesilaus introduced must have necessitated
a fresh distribution of land, and it is extremely doubtful whether
the relation of the Theræan class of citizens with their Periœki, as
established by Demônax, still continued to subsist. It is necessary
to notice this fact, because the arrangements of Demônax are spoken
of by some authors as if they formed the permanent constitution of
Kyrênê; whereas they cannot have outlived the restoration of the
Battiads, nor can they even have been revived after that dynasty was
finally expelled, since the number of new citizens and the large
change of property, introduced by Arkesilaus the Third, would render
them inapplicable to the subsequent city.




CHAPTER XXVIII.

PAN-HELLENIC FESTIVALS — OLYMPIC, PYTHIAN, NEMEAN, AND ISTHMIAN.


In the preceding chapters I have been under the necessity of
presenting to the reader a picture altogether incoherent and
destitute of central effect,—to specify briefly each of the two or
three hundred towns which agreed in bearing the Hellenic name, and to
recount its birth and early life, as far as our evidence goes,—but
without being able to point out any action and reaction, exploits
or sufferings, prosperity or misfortune, glory or disgrace, common
to all. To a great degree, this is a characteristic inseparable
from the history of Greece from its beginning to its end, for the
only political unity which it ever receives is the melancholy unity
of subjection under all-conquering Rome. Nothing short of force
will efface in the mind of a free Greek the idea of his city as an
autonomous and separate organization; the village is a fraction,
but the city is an unit,—and the highest of all political units,
not admitting of being consolidated with others into a ten or a
hundred, to the sacrifice of its own separate and individual mark.
Such is the character of the race, both in their primitive country
and in their colonial settlements,—in their early as well as in
their late history,—splitting by natural fracture into a multitude
of self-administering, indivisible cities. But that which marks the
early historical period before Peisistratus, and which impresses upon
it an incoherence at once so fatiguing and so irremediable, is, that
as yet no causes have arisen to counteract this political isolation.
Each city, whether progressive or stationary, prudent or adventurous,
turbulent or tranquil, follows out its own thread of existence,
having no partnership or common purposes with the rest, and not yet
constrained into any active partnership with them by extraneous
forces. In like manner, the races which on every side surround the
Hellenic world appear distinct and unconnected, not yet taken up into
any coöperating mass or system.

Contemporaneously with the accession of Peisistratus, this state of
things becomes altered both in and out of Hellas,—the former as a
consequence of the latter: for at that time begins the formation of
the great Persian empire, which absorbs into itself not only Upper
Asia and Asia Minor, but also Phenicia, Egypt, Thrace, Macedonia,
and a considerable number of the Grecian cities themselves; and
the common danger, threatening the greater states of Greece proper
from this vast aggregate, drives them, in spite of great reluctance
and jealousy, into active union. Hence arises a new impulse,
counterworking the natural tendency to political isolation in the
Hellenic cities, and centralizing their proceedings to a certain
extent for the two centuries succeeding 560 B. C.; Athens and Sparta
both availing themselves of the centralizing tendencies which had
grown out of the Persian war. But during the interval between 776-560
B. C., no such tendency can be traced even in commencement, nor any
constraining force calculated to bring it about. Even Thucydidês,
as we may see by his excellent preface, knew of nothing during
these two centuries except separate city-politics and occasional
wars between neighbors: the only event, according to him, in which
any considerable number of Grecian cities were jointly concerned,
was the war between Chalkis and Eretria, the date of which we do
not know. In this war, several cities took part as allies; Samos,
among others, with Eretria,—Milêtus with Chalkis:[101] how far the
alliances of either may have extended, we have no evidence to inform
us, but the presumption is that no great number of Grecian cities
was comprehended in them. Such as it was, however, this war between
Chalkis and Eretria was the nearest approach, and the only approach,
to a Pan-Hellenic proceeding which Thucydidês indicates between the
Trojan and the Persian wars. Both he and Herodotus present this
early period only by way of preface and contrast to that which
follows,—when the Pan-Hellenic spirit and tendencies, though never at
any time predominant, yet counted for a powerful element in history,
and sensibly modified the universal instinct of city-isolation.
They tell us little about it, either because they could find no
trustworthy informants, or because there was nothing in it to
captivate the imagination in the same manner as the Persian or the
Peloponnesian wars. From whatever cause their silence arises, it is
deeply to be regretted, since the phenomena of the two centuries
from 776-560 B. C., though not susceptible of any central grouping,
must have presented the most instructive matter for study, had they
been preserved. In no period of history have there ever been formed
a greater number of new political communities, under such variety
of circumstances, personal as well as local. And a few chronicles,
however destitute of philosophy, reporting the exact march of some of
these colonies from their commencement,—amidst all the difficulties
attendant on amalgamation with strange natives, as well as on a fresh
distribution of land,—would have added greatly to our knowledge both
of Greek character and Greek social existence.

  [101] Thucyd. i, 15.

Taking the two centuries now under review, then, it will appear
that there is not only no growing political unity among the Grecian
states, but a tendency even to the contrary,—to dissemination and
mutual estrangement. Not so, however, in regard to the other feelings
of unity capable of subsisting between men who acknowledge no
common political authority,—sympathies founded on common religion,
language, belief of race, legends, tastes and customs, intellectual
appetencies, sense of proportion and artistic excellence, recreative
enjoyments, etc. On all these points the manifestations of Hellenic
unity become more and more pronounced and comprehensive, in spite of
increased political dissemination, throughout the same period. The
breadth of common sentiment and sympathy between Greek and Greek,
together with the conception of multitudinous periodical meetings as
an indispensable portion of existence, appears decidedly greater in
560 B. C. than it had been a century before. It was fostered by the
increased conviction of the superiority of Greeks as compared with
foreigners,—a conviction gradually more and more justified as Grecian
art and intellect improved, and as the survey of foreign countries
became extended,—as well as by the many new efforts of men of genius
in the field of music, poetry, statuary, and architecture, each of
whom touched chords of feeling belonging to other Greeks hardly
less than to his own peculiar city. At the same time, the life of
each peculiar city continues distinct, and even gathers to itself a
greater abundance of facts and internal interests. So that during the
two centuries now under review there was in the mind of every Greek
an increase both of the city-feeling and of the Pan-Hellenic feeling,
but on the other hand a decline of the old sentiment of separate
race,—Doric, Ionic, Æolic.

I have already, in my former volume, touched upon the many-sided
character of the Grecian religion, entering as it did into all the
enjoyments and sufferings, the hopes and fears, the affections and
antipathies, of the people,—not simply imposing restraints and
obligations, but protecting, multiplying, and diversifying all the
social pleasures and all the decorations of existence. Each city and
even each village had its peculiar religious festivals, wherein the
sacrifices to the gods were usually followed by public recreations of
one kind or other,—by feasting on the victims, processional marches,
singing and dancing, or competition in strong and active exercises.
The festival was originally local, but friendship or communion of
race was shown by inviting others, non-residents, to partake in its
attractions. In the case of a colony and its metropolis, it was a
frequent practice that citizens of the metropolis were honored with
a privileged seat at the festivals of the colony, or that one of
their number was presented with the first taste of the sacrificial
victim.[102] Reciprocal frequentation of religious festivals was thus
the standing evidence of friendship and fraternity among cities not
politically united. That it must have existed to a certain degree
from the earliest days, there can be no reasonable doubt; though in
Homer and Hesiod we find only the celebration of funeral games, by a
chief at his own private expense, in honor of his deceased father or
friend,—with all the accompanying recreations, however, of a public
festival, and with strangers not only present, but also contending
for valuable prizes.[103] Passing to historical Greece during the
seventh century B. C., we find evidence of two festivals, even then
very considerable, and frequented by Greeks from many different
cities and districts,—the festival at Delos, in honor of Apollo, the
great place of meeting for Ionians throughout the Ægean,—and the
Olympic games. The Homeric Hymn to the Delian Apollo, which must be
placed earlier than 600 B. C., dwells with emphasis on the splendor
of the Delian festival,—unrivalled throughout Greece, as it would
appear, during all the first period of this history, for wealth,
finery of attire, and variety of exhibitions as well in poetical
genius as in bodily activity,[104]—equalling probably at that time,
if not surpassing, the Olympic games. The complete and undiminished
grandeur of this Delian Pan-Ionic festival is one of our chief marks
of the first period of Grecian history, before the comparative
prostration of the Ionic Greeks through the rise of Persia: it was
celebrated periodically in every fourth year, to the honor of Apollo
and Artemis. It was distinguished from the Olympic games by two
circumstances both deserving of notice,—first, by including solemn
matches not only of gymnastic, but also of musical and poetical
excellence, whereas the latter had no place at Olympia; secondly,
by the admission of men, women, and children indiscriminately as
spectators, whereas women were formally excluded from the Olympic
ceremony.[105] Such exclusion may have depended in part on the inland
situation of Olympia, less easily approachable by females than the
island of Delos; but even making allowance for this circumstance,
both the one distinction and the other mark the rougher character
of the Ætolo-Dorians in Peloponnesus. The Delian festival, which
greatly dwindled away during the subjection of the Asiatic and
insular Greeks to Persia, was revived afterwards by Athens during the
period of her empire, when she was seeking in every way to strengthen
her central ascendency in the Ægean. But though it continued to be
ostentatiously celebrated under her management, it never regained
that commanding sanctity and crowded frequentation which we find
attested in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo for its earlier period.

  [102] Thucyd. i, 26. See the tale in Pausanias (v, 25, 1)
  of the ancient chorus sent annually from Messênê in Sicily
  across the strait to Rhegium, to a local festival of the
  Rhegians,—thirty-five boys with a chorus-master and a
  flute-player: on one unfortunate occasion, all of them perished
  in crossing. For the Theôry (or solemn religious deputation)
  periodically sent by the Athenians to Delos, see Plutarch,
  Nicias, c. 3; Plato, Phædon, c. 1, p. 58. Compare also Strabo,
  ix, p. 419, on the general subject.

  [103] Homer, Iliad, xi, 879, xxiii, 679; Hesiod, Opp. Di. 651.

  [104] Homer, Hymn. Apoll. 150; Thucyd. iii, 104.

  [105] Pausan. v, 6, 5; Ælian, N. H. x, 1; Thucyd. iii, 104. When
  Ephesus, and the festival called Ephesia, had become the great
  place of Ionic meeting, the presence of women was still continued
  (Dionys. Hal. A. R. iv, 25).

Very different was the fate of the Olympic festival,—on the banks
of the Alpheius[106] in Peloponnesus, near the old oracular temple
of the Olympian Zeus,—which not only grew up uninterruptedly from
small beginnings to the maximum of Pan-Hellenic importance, but
even preserved its crowds of visitors and its celebrity for many
centuries after the extinction of Greek freedom, and only received
its final abolition, after more than eleven hundred years of
continuance, from the decree of the Christian emperor Theodosius in
394 A. D. I have already recounted, in the preceding volume of this
history, the attempt made by Pheidon, despot of Argos, to restore
to the Pisatans, or to acquire for himself, the administration of
this festival,—an event which proves the importance of the festival
in Peloponnesus, even so early as 740 B. C. At that time, and for
some years afterwards, it seems to have been frequented chiefly,
if not exclusively, by the neighboring inhabitants of central and
western Peloponnesus,—Spartans, Messenians, Arkadians, Triphylians,
Pisatans, Eleians, and Achæans,[107]—and it forms an important link
connecting the Etolo-Eleians, and their privileges as Agonothets
to solemnize and preside over it, with Sparta. From the year 720
B. C., we trace positive evidences of the gradual presence of more
distant Greeks,—Corinthians, Megarians, Bœotians, Athenians, and even
Smyrnæans from Asia.

  [106] Strabo, viii, p. 353; Pindar, Olymp. viii, 2; Xenophon,
  Hellen. iv, 7, 2; iii, 2, 22.

  [107] See K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griechischen
  Staats-Alterthümer, sect. 10.

We observe also another proof of growing importance, in the increased
number and variety of matches exhibited to the spectators, and in the
substitution of the simple crown of olive, an honorary reward, in
place of the more substantial present which the Olympic festival and
all other Grecian festivals began by conferring upon the victor. The
humble constitution of the Olympic games presented originally nothing
more than a match of runners in the measured course called the
Stadium: a continuous series of the victorious runners was formally
inscribed and preserved by the Eleians, beginning with Korœbus in
776 B. C., and was made to serve by chronological inquirers from
the third century B. C. downwards, as a means of measuring the
chronological sequence of Grecian events. It was on the occasion of
the 7th Olympiad after Korœbus, that Daiklês the Messenian first
received for his victory in the stadium no farther recompense than
a wreath from the sacred olive-tree near Olympia:[108] the honor of
being proclaimed victor was found sufficient, without any pecuniary
addition. But until the 14th Olympiad, there was no other match
for the spectators to witness beside that of simple runners in the
stadium. On that occasion a second race was first introduced, of
runners in the double stadium, or up and down the course; in the
next, or 15th Olympiad (720 B. C.), a third match, the long course
for runners, or several times up and down the stadium. There were
thus three races,—the simple stadium, the double stadium, or diaulos,
and the long course, or dolichos, all for runners,—which continued
without addition until the 18th Olympiad, when the wrestling-match
and the complicated pentathlon—including jumping, running, the quoit,
the javelin, and wrestling—were both added. A farther novelty appears
in the 23rd Olympiad (688 B. C.), the boxing-match; and another,
still more important, in the 25th (680 B. C.), the chariot with
four full-grown horses. This last-mentioned addition is deserving
of special notice, not merely as it diversified the scene by the
introduction of horses, but also as it brought in a totally new
class of competitors,—rich men and women, who possessed the finest
horses and could hire the most skilful drivers, without any personal
superiority, or power of bodily display, in themselves.[109] The
prodigious exhibition of wealth in which the chariot proprietors
indulged, is not only an evidence of growing importance in the
Olympic games, but also served materially to increase that
importance, and to heighten the interest of spectators. Two farther
matches were added in the 33rd Olympiad (648 B. C.),—the pankration,
or boxing and wrestling conjoined,[110] with the hand unarmed or
divested of that hard leather cestus[111] worn by the pugilist, which
rendered the blow of the latter more terrible, but at the same time
prevented him from grasping or keeping hold of his adversary,—and the
single race-horse. Many other novelties were introduced one after
the other, which it is unnecessary fully to enumerate,—the race
between men clothed in full panoply, and bearing each his shield,—the
different matches between boys, analogous to those between full-grown
men, and between colts, of the same nature as between full-grown
horses. At the maximum of its attraction the Olympic solemnity
occupied five days, but until the 77th Olympiad, all the various
matches had been compressed into one,—beginning at daybreak and
not always closing before dark.[112] The 77th Olympiad follows
immediately after the successful expulsion of the Persian invaders
from Greece, when the Pan-Hellenic feeling had been keenly stimulated
by resistance to a common enemy; and we may easily conceive that this
was a suitable moment for imparting additional dignity to the chief
national festival.

  [108] Dionys. Halikarn. Ant. Rom. i, 71; Phlegon. De Olympiad. p.
  140. For an illustration of the stress laid by the Greeks on the
  purely honorary rewards of Olympia, and on the credit which they
  took to themselves as competitors, not for money, but for glory,
  see Herodot. viii, 26. Compare the Scholia on Pindar, Nem. and
  Isthm. Argument, pp. 425-514, ed. Boeckh.

  [109] See the sentiment of Agesilaus, somewhat contemptuous,
  respecting the chariot-race, as described by Xenophon (Agesilaus,
  ix, 6); the general feeling of Greece, however, is more in
  conformity with what Thucydidês (vi, 16) puts into the mouth of
  Alkibiadês, and Xenophon into that of Simonidês (Xenophon, Hiero,
  xi, 5). The great respect attached to a family which had gained
  chariot victories is amply attested: see Herodot. vi, 35, 36,
  103, 126,—οἰκίη τεθριπποτρόφος,—and vi, 70, about Demaratus king
  of Sparta.

  [110] Antholog. Palatin. ix, 588; vol. ii. p. 299, Jacobs.

  [111] The original Greek word for this covering (which surrounded
  the middle hand and upper portion of the fingers, leaving both
  the ends of the fingers and the thumb exposed) was ἱμὰς, the word
  for a thong, strap, or whip, of leather: the special word μύρμηξ
  seems to have been afterwards introduced (Hesychius, v. Ἱμάς):
  see Homer, Iliad, xxiii, 686. Cestus, or Cæstus, is the Latin
  word (Virg. Æn. v, 404), the Greek word κεστός is an adjective
  annexed to ἱμὰς—κεστὸν ἱμάντα—πολύκεστος ἱμὰς (Iliad, xiv, 214;
  iii, 371). See Pausan. viii, 40, 3, for the description of the
  incident which caused an alteration in this hand-covering at the
  Nemean games: ultimately, it was still farther hardened by the
  addition of iron.

  [112] Ἀέθλων πεμπαμέρους ἁμίλλαις,—Pindar, Olymp. v, 6: compare
  Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. iii, 33.

  See the facts respecting the Olympic Agôn collected by Corsini
  (Dissertationes Agonisticæ, Dissert. i, sects. 8, 9, 10), and
  still more amply set forth with a valuable commentary, by Krause
  (Olympia, oder Darstellung der grossen Olympischen Spiele, Wien,
  1838, sects. 8-11 especially).

We are thus enabled partially to trace the steps by which, during the
two centuries succeeding 776 B. C., the festival of the Olympic Zeus
in the Pisatid gradually passed from a local to a national character,
and acquired an attractive force capable of bringing together into
temporary union the dispersed fragments of Hellas, from Marseilles to
Trebizond. In this important function it did not long stand alone.
During the sixth century B. C., three other festivals, at first
local, became successively nationalized,—the Pythia near Delphi, the
Isthmia, near Corinth, the Nemea near Kleônæ, between Sikyôn and
Argos.

In regard to the Pythian festival, we find a short notice of the
particular incidents and individuals by whom its reconstitution
and enlargement were brought about,—a notice the more interesting,
inasmuch as these very incidents are themselves a manifestation
of something like Pan-Hellenic patriotism, standing almost alone
in an age which presents little else in operation except distinct
city-interests. At the time when the Homeric Hymn to the Delphinian
Apollo was composed (probably in the seventh century B. C.), the
Pythian festival had as yet acquired little eminence. The rich and
holy temple of Apollo was then purely oracular, established for the
purpose of communicating to pious inquirers “the counsels of the
immortals.” Multitudes of visitors came to consult it, as well as
to sacrifice victims and to deposit costly offerings; but while the
god delighted in the sound of the harp as an accompaniment to the
singing of pæans, he was by no means anxious to encourage horse-races
and chariot-races in the neighborhood,—nay, this psalmist considers
that the noise of horses would be “a nuisance,” the drinking of
mules a desecration to the sacred fountains, and the ostentation of
fine-built chariots objectionable,[113] as tending to divert the
attention of spectators away from the great temple and its wealth.

  [113] Hom. Hymn. Apoll. 262.

    Πημανέει σ᾽ αἰεὶ κτυπὸς ἵππων ὠκειάων,
    Ἀρδόμενοί τ᾽ οὐρῆες ἐμῶν ἱερῶν ἀπὸ πηγέων·
    Ἔνθα τις ἀνθρώπων βουλήσεται εἰσοράασθαι
    Ἅρματά τ᾽ εὐποίητα καὶ ὠκυπόδων κτυπὸν ἵππων,
    Ἢ νηόν τε μέγαν καὶ κτήματα πόλλ᾽ ἐνεόντα.

  Also v. 288-394. γυάλων ὑπὸ Παρνήσοιο—484. ὑπὸ πτυχὶ
  Παρνήσοιο—Pindar, Pyth. viii, 90. Πυθῶνος ἐν γυάλοις—Strabo, ix,
  p. 418. πετρωδὲς χώριον καὶ θεατροειδὲς—Heliodorus, Æthiop. ii,
  26: compare Will. Götte, Das Delphische Orakel (Leipzig, 1839),
  pp. 39-42.

From such inconveniences the god was protected by placing his
sanctuary “in the rocky Pytho,”—a rugged and uneven recess, of
no great dimensions, embosomed in the southern declivity of
Parnassus, and about two thousand feet above the level of the sea,
while the topmost Parnassian summits reach a height of near eight
thousand feet. The situation was extremely imposing, but unsuited
by nature for the congregation of any considerable number of
spectators,—altogether impracticable for chariot-races,—and only
rendered practicable by later art and outlay for the theatre as well
as for the stadium; the original stadium, when first established,
was placed in the plain beneath. It furnished little means of
subsistence, but the sacrifices and presents of visitors enabled
the ministers of the temple to live in abundance,[114] and gathered
together by degrees a village around it. Near the sanctuary of Pytho,
and about the same altitude, was situated the ancient Phocian town
of Krissa, on a projecting spur of Parnassus,—overhung above by the
line of rocky precipice called the Phædriades, and itself overhanging
below the deep ravine through which flows the river Pleistus. On the
other side of this river rises the steep mountain Kirphis, which
projects southward into the Corinthian gulf,—the river reaching that
gulf through the broad Krissæan or Kirrhæan plain, which stretches
westward nearly to the Lokrian town of Amphissa; a plain for the
most part fertile and productive, though least so in its eastern
part immediately under the Kirphis, where the seaport Kirrha was
placed.[115] The temple, the oracle, and the wealth of Pytho, belong
to the very earliest periods of Grecian antiquity; but the octennial
solemnity in honor of the god included at first no other competition
except that of bards, who sang each a pæan with the harp. It has been
already mentioned, in my preceding volume, that the Amphiktyonic
assembly held one of its half-yearly meetings near the temple of
Pytho, the other at Thermopylæ.

  [114] Βωμοί μ᾽ ἔφερβον, οὕπιών τ᾽ ἀεὶ ξένος, says Ion (in
  Euripidês, Ion. 334) the slave of Apollo, and the verger of
  his Delphian temple, who waters it from the Kastalian spring,
  sweeps it with laurel boughs, and keeps off with his bow and
  arrows the obtrusive birds (Ion, 105, 143, 154). Whoever reads
  the description of Professor Ulrichs (Reisen und Forschungen in
  Griechenland, ch. 7, p. 110) will see that the birds—eagles,
  vultures, and crows—are quite numerous enough to have been
  exceedingly troublesome. The whole play of Ion conveys a lively
  idea of the Delphian temple and its scenery, with which Euripidês
  was doubtless familiar.

  [115] There is considerable perplexity respecting Krissa and
  Kirrha, and it still remains a question among scholars whether
  the two names denote the same place or different places; the
  former is the opinion of O. Müller (Orchomenos, p. 495). Strabo
  distinguishes the two. Pausanias identifies them, conceiving
  no other town to have ever existed except the seaport (x, 37,
  4). Mannert (Geogr. Gr. Röm. viii, p. 148) follows Strabo, and
  represents them as different.

  I consider the latter to be the correct opinion, upon the
  grounds, and partly, also, on the careful topographical
  examination of Professor Ulrichs, which affords an excellent
  account of the whole scenery of Delphi (Reisen und Forschungen
  in Griechenland, Bremen, 1840, chapters 1, 2, 3). The ruins
  described by him on the high ground near Kastri, called the
  Forty Saints, may fairly be considered as the ruins of Krissa;
  the ruins of Kirrha are on the sea-shore near the mouth of the
  Pleistus. The plain beneath might without impropriety be called
  either the Krissæan or the Kirrhæan plain (Herodot. viii, 32;
  Strabo, ix, p. 419). Though Strabo was right in distinguishing
  Krissa from Kirrha, and right also in the position of the latter
  under Kirphis, he conceived incorrectly the situation of Krissa;
  and his representation that there were two wars,—in the first
  of which, Kirrha was destroyed by the Krissæans, while in the
  second, Krissa itself was conquered by the Amphiktyons,—is not
  confirmed by any other authority.

  The mere circumstance that Pindar gives us in three separate
  passages, Κρίσᾳ, Κρισαῖον, Κρισαίοις (Isth. ii, 26; Pyth. v, 49,
  vi, 18), and in five other passages, Κίῤῥᾳ, Κίῤῥας, Κίῤῥαθεν
  (Pyth. iii, 33, vii, 14, viii, 26, x, 24, xi, 20), renders it
  almost certain that the two names belong to different places, and
  are not merely two different names for the same place; the poet
  could not in this case have any metrical reason for varying the
  denomination, as the metre of the two words is similar.

In those early times when the Homeric Hymn to Apollo was composed,
the town of Krissa appears to have been great and powerful,
possessing all the broad plain between Parnassus, Kirphis, and
the gulf, to which latter it gave its name,—and possessing also,
what was a property not less valuable, the adjoining sanctuary of
Pytho itself, which the Hymn identifies with Krissa, not indicating
Delphi as a separate place. The Krissæans, doubtless, derived great
profits from the number of visitors who came to visit Delphi, both
by land and by sea, and Kirrha was originally only the name for
their seaport. Gradually, however, the port appears to have grown
in importance at the expense of the town, just as Apollonia and
Ptolemais came to equal Kyrênê and Barka, and as Plymouth Dock has
swelled into Devonport; while at the same time, the sanctuary of
Pytho with its administrators expanded into the town of Delphi, and
came to claim an independent existence of its own. The original
relations between Krissa, Kirrha, and Delphi, were in this manner
at length subverted, the first declining and the two latter rising.
The Krissæans found themselves dispossessed of the management of the
temple, which passed to the Delphians, as well as of the profits
arising from the visitors, whose disbursements went to enrich the
inhabitants of Kirrha. Krissa was a primitive city of the Phocian
name, and could boast of a place as such in the Homeric Catalogue,
so that her loss of importance was not likely to be quietly endured.
Moreover, in addition to the above facts, already sufficient in
themselves as seeds of quarrel, we are told that the Kirrhæans abused
their position as masters of the avenue to the temple by sea, and
levied exorbitant tolls on the visitors who landed there,—a number
constantly increasing from the multiplication of the transmarine
colonies, and from the prosperity of those in Italy and Sicily.
Besides such offence against the general Grecian public, they had
also incurred the enmity of their Phocian neighbors by outrages
upon women, Phocian as well as Argeian, who were returning from the
temple.[116]

  [116] Athenæus, xiii, p. 560; Æschinês cont. Ktesiphont. c. 36,
  p. 406; Strabo, ix, p. 418. Of the Akragallidæ, or Kraugallidæ,
  whom Æschinês mentions along with the Kirrhæans as another
  impious race who dwelt in the neighborhood of the god,—and who
  were overthrown along with the Kirrhæans,—we have no farther
  information. O. Müller’s conjecture would identify them with
  the Dryopes (Dorians, i, 2, 5, and his Orchomenos, p. 496);
  Harpokration, v. Κραυγαλλίδαι.

Thus stood the case, apparently, about 595 B. C., when the
Amphiktyonic meeting interfered—either prompted by the Phocians,
or perhaps on their own spontaneous impulse, out of regard to the
temple—to punish the Kirrhæans. After a war of ten years, the first
Sacred War in Greece, this object was completely accomplished, by
a joint force of Thessalians under Eurylochus, Sikyonians under
Kleisthenês, and Athenians under Alkmæon; the Athenian Solon being
the person who originated and enforced, in the Amphiktyonic council,
the proposition of interference. Kirrha appears to have made a
strenuous resistance until its supplies from the sea were intercepted
by the naval force of the Sikyonian Kleisthenês; and even after the
town was taken, its inhabitants defended themselves for some time on
the heights of Kirphis.[117] At length, however, they were thoroughly
subdued. Their town was destroyed, or left to subsist merely as
a landing-place; and the whole adjoining plain was consecrated
to the Delphian god, whose domains thus touched the sea. Under
this sentence, pronounced by the religious feeling of Greece, and
sanctified by a solemn oath publicly sworn and inscribed at Delphi,
the land was condemned to remain untilled and unplanted, without any
species of human care, and serving only for the pasturage of cattle.
The latter circumstance was convenient to the temple, inasmuch as it
furnished abundance of victims for the pilgrims who landed and came
to sacrifice,—for without preliminary sacrifice no man could consult
the oracle;[118] while the entire prohibition of tillage was the only
means of obviating the growth of another troublesome neighbor on the
sea-board. The fate of Kirrha in this war is ascertained: that of
Krissa is not so clear, nor do we know whether it was destroyed, or
left subsisting in a position of inferiority with regard to Delphi.
From this time forward, however, the Delphian community appears
as substantive and autonomous, exercising in their own right the
management of the temple; though we shall find, on more than one
occasion, that the Phocians contest this right, and lay claim to
the management of it for themselves,[119]—a remnant of that early
period when the oracle stood in the domain of the Phocian Krissa.
There seems, moreover, to have been a standing antipathy between the
Delphians and the Phocians.

  [117] Schol. ad Pindar, Pyth. Introduct.: Schol. ad Pindar,
  Nem. ix, 2; Plutarch, Solon, c. 11; Pausan. ii, 9, 6. Pausanias
  (x, 37, 4) and Polyænus (Strateg. iii, 6) relate a stratagem of
  Solon, or of Eurylochus, to poison the water of the Kirrhæans
  with hellebore.

  [118] Eurip. Ion, 230.

  [119] Thucyd. i, 112.

The Sacred War just mentioned, emanating from a solemn Amphiktyonic
decree, carried on jointly by troops of different states whom we do
not know to have ever before coöperated, and directed exclusively
towards an object of common interest, is in itself a fact of high
importance as manifesting a decided growth of Pan-Hellenic feeling.
Sparta is not named as interfering,—a circumstance which seems
remarkable when we consider both her power, even as it then stood,
and her intimate connection with the Delphian oracle,—while the
Athenians appear as the prime movers, through the greatest and best
of their citizens: the credit of a large-minded patriotism rests
prominently upon them.

But if this Sacred War itself is a proof that the Pan-Hellenic
spirit was growing stronger, the positive result in which it ended
reinforced that spirit still farther. The spoils of Kirrha were
employed by the victorious allies in founding the Pythian games.
The octennial festival hitherto celebrated at Delphi in honor of
the god, including no other competition except in the harp and the
pæan, was expanded into comprehensive games on the model of the
Olympic, with matches not only of music, but also of gymnastics and
chariots,—celebrated, not at Delphi itself, but on the maritime
plain near the ruined Kirrha,—and under the direct superintendence
of the Amphiktyons themselves. I have already mentioned that Solon
provided large rewards for such Athenians as gained victories in
the Olympic and Isthmian games, thereby indicating his sense of the
great value of the national games as a means of promoting Hellenic
intercommunion. It was the same feeling which instigated the
foundation of the new games on the Kirrhæan plain, in commemoration
of the vindicated honor of Apollo, and in the territory newly made
over to him. They were celebrated in the latter half of summer, or
first half of every third Olympic year,—the Amphiktyons being the
ostensible agonothets, or administrators, and appointing persons
to discharge the duty in their names.[120] At the first Pythian
ceremony (in 586 B. C.), valuable rewards were given to the different
victors; at the second (582 B. C.), nothing was conferred but wreaths
of laurel,—the rapidly attained celebrity of the games being such
as to render any farther reward superfluous. The Sikyonian despot
Kleisthenês himself, one of the leaders in the conquest of Kirrha,
gained the prize at the chariot-race of the second Pythia. We find
other great personages in Greece frequently mentioned as competitors,
and the games long maintained a dignity second only to the Olympic,
over which, indeed, they had some advantages; first, that they
were not abused for the purpose of promoting petty jealousies and
antipathies of any administering state, as the Olympic games were
perverted by the Eleians, on more than one occasion; next, that
they comprised music and poetry as well as bodily display. From
the circumstances attending their foundation, the Pythian games
deserved, even more than the Olympic, the title bestowed on them by
Demosthenês,—“The common Agôn of the Greeks.”[121]

  [120] Mr. Clinton thinks that the Pythian games were celebrated
  in the autumn: M. Boeckh refers the celebration to the spring:
  Krause agrees with Boeckh. (Clinton, Fast. Hell. vol. ii, p. 200,
  Appendix; Boeckh, ad Corp. Inscr. No. 1688, p. 813; Krause, Die
  Pythien, Nemeen und Isthmien, vol. ii, pp. 29-35.)

  Mr. Clinton’s opinion appears to me nearly the truth; the real
  time, as I conceive it, being about the beginning of August, or
  end of July. Boeckh admits that, with the exception of Thucydidês
  (v, 1-19), the other authorities go to sustain it; but he relies
  on Thucydidês to outweigh them. Now the passage of Thucydidês,
  properly understood, seems to me as much against Boeckh’s view as
  the rest.

  I may remark, as a certain additional reason in the case, that
  the Isthmia appear to have been celebrated in the third year
  of each Olympiad, and in the spring (Krause, p. 187). It seems
  improbable that these two great festivals should have come
  one immediately after the other, which, nevertheless, must be
  supposed, if we adopt the opinion of Boeckh and Krause.

  The Pythian games would be sometimes a little earlier, sometimes
  a little later, in consequence of the time of full moon: notice
  being always sent round by the administrators beforehand of the
  commencement of the sacred month. See the references in K. F.
  Hermann, Lehrbuch der gottesdienstl. Alterth. der Griechen, ch.
  49, not. 12.—This note has been somewhat modified since my first
  edition,—see the note vol. vi, ch. liv.

  [121] Demosthen. Philipp. iii, p. 119.

The Olympic and Pythian games continued always to be the most
venerated solemnities in Greece: yet the Nemea and Isthmia acquired
a celebrity not much inferior; the Olympic prize counting for
the highest of all.[122] Both the Nemea and the Isthmia were
distinguished from the other two festivals by occurring, not once
in four years, but once in two years; the former in the second and
fourth years of each Olympiad, the latter in the first and third
years. To both is assigned, according to Greek custom, an origin
connected with the interesting persons and circumstances of Grecian
antiquity: but our historical knowledge of both begins with the sixth
century B. C. The first historical Nemead is presented as belonging
to Olympiad 52 or 53 (572-568 B. C.), a few years subsequent to the
Sacred War above mentioned and to the origin of the Pythia. The
festival was celebrated in honor of the Nemean Zeus, in the valley
of Nemea, between Phlius and Kleônæ,—and originally by the Kleônæans
themselves, until, at some period after 460 B. C., the Argeians
deprived them of that honor and assumed the honors of administration
to themselves.[123] The Nemean games had their Hellanodikæ[124] to
superintend, to keep order, and to distribute the prizes, as well as
the Olympic. Respecting the Isthmian festival, our first historical
information is a little earlier, for it has already been stated that
Solon conferred a premium upon every Athenian citizen who gained a
prize at that festival as well as at the Olympian,—in or after 594
B. C. It was celebrated by the Corinthians at their isthmus, in
honor of Poseidôn; and if we may draw any inference from the legends
respecting its foundation, which is ascribed sometimes to Theseus,
the Athenians appear to have identified it with the antiquities of
their own state.[125]

  [122] Pindar, Nem. x, 28-33.

  [123] Strabo, viii, p. 377; Plutarch, Arat. c. 28; Mannert.
  Geogr. Gr. Röm. pt. viii, p. 650. Compare the second chapter in
  Krause, Die Pythien, Nemeen und Isthmien, vol. ii. p. 108, _seq._

  That the Kleônæans continued without interruption to administer
  the Nemean festival down to Olympiad 80 (460 B. C.), or
  thereabouts, is the rational inference from Pindar, Nem. x, 42:
  compare Nem. iv, 17. Eusebius, indeed, states that the Argeians
  seized the administration for themselves in Olympiad 53, and
  in order to reconcile this statement with the above passage in
  Pindar, critics have concluded that the Argeians lost it again,
  and that the Kleônæans resumed it a little before Olympiad 80. I
  take a different view, and am disposed to reject the statement of
  Eusebius altogether; the more so as Pindar’s tenth Nemean ode is
  addressed to an Argeian citizen named Theiæus. If there had been
  at that time a standing dispute between Argos and Kleônæ on the
  subject of the administration of the Nemea, the poet would hardly
  have introduced the mention of the Nemean prizes gained by the
  ancestors of Theiæus, under the untoward designation of “prizes
  received from Kleônæan men.”

  [124] See Boeckh, Corp. Inscript. No. 1126.

  [125] K. F. Hermann, in his Lehrbuch der Griechischen
  Staatsalterthümer (ch. 32, not. 7. and ch. 65, not. 3), and
  again in his more recent work (Lehrbuch der gottesdienstlichen
  Alterthümer der Griechen, part iii, ch. 49, also not. 6), both
  highly valuable publications, maintains,—1. That the exaltation
  of the Isthmian and Nemean games into Pan-Hellenic importance
  arose directly after and out of the fall of the despots of
  Corinth and Sikyon. 2. That it was brought about by the paramount
  influence of the Dorians, especially by Sparta. 3. That the
  Spartans put down the despots of both these two cities.

  The last of these three propositions appears to me untrue in
  respect to Sikyon,—improbable in respect to Corinth: my reasons
  for thinking so have been given in a former chapter. And if this
  be so, the reason for presuming Spartan intervention as to the
  Isthmian and Nemean games falls to the ground; for there is no
  other proof of it, nor does Sparta appear to have interested
  herself in any of the four national festivals except the Olympic,
  with which she was from an early period peculiarly connected.

  Nor can I think that the first of Hermann’s three propositions
  is at all tenable. No connection whatever can be shown between
  Sikyon and the Nemean games; and it is the more improbable in
  this case that the Sikyonians should have been active, inasmuch
  as they had under Kleisthenês a little before contributed to
  nationalize the Pythian games: a second interference for a
  similar purpose ought not to be presumed without some evidence.
  To prove his point about the Isthmia, Hermann cites only a
  passage of Solinus (vii, 14), “Hoc spectaculum, per Cypselum
  tyrannum intermissum, Corinthii Olymp. 49 solemnitati pristinæ
  reddiderunt.” To render this passage at all credible, we must
  read _Cypselidas_ instead of _Cypselum_, which deducts from
  the value of a witness whose testimony can never under any
  circumstances be rated high. But granting the alteration, there
  are two reasons against the assertion of Solinus. One, a positive
  reason, that Solon offered a large reward to Athenian victors at
  the Isthmian games: his legislation falls in 594 B. C., ten years
  before the time when the Isthmia are said by Solinus to have been
  renewed after a long intermission. The other reason (negative,
  though to my mind also powerful) is the silence of Herodotus in
  that long invective which he puts into the mouth of Sosiklês
  against the Kypselids (v, 92). If Kypselus had really been
  guilty of so great an insult to the feelings of the people as to
  suppress their most solemn festival, the fact would hardly have
  been omitted in the indictment which Sosiklês is made to urge
  against him. Aristotle, indeed, representing Kypselus as a mild
  and popular despot, introduces a contrary view of his character,
  which, if we admitted it, would of itself suffice to negative the
  supposition that he had suppressed the Isthmia.

We thus perceive that the interval between 600-560 B. C. exhibits the
first historical manifestation of the Pythia, Isthmia, and Nemea,—the
first expansion of all the three from local into Pan-Hellenic
festivals. To the Olympic games, for some time the only great centre
of union among all the widely dispersed Greeks, are now added three
other sacred agônes of the like public, open, national character;
constituting visible marks, as well as tutelary bonds, of collective
Hellenism, and insuring to every Greek who went to compete in the
matches, a safe and inviolate transit even through hostile Hellenic
states.[126] These four, all in or near Peloponnesus, and one of
which occurred in each year, formed the period, or cycle, of sacred
games, and those who had gained prizes at all the four received the
enviable designation of periodonikes:[127] the honors paid to Olympic
victors on their return to their native city were prodigious, even in
the sixth century B. C., and became even more extravagant afterwards.
We may remark that in the Olympic games alone, the oldest as well
as the most illustrious of the four, the musical and intellectual
element was wanting: all the three more recent agônes included crowns
for exercises of music and poetry, along with gymnastics, chariots,
and horses.

  [126] Plutarch, Arat. c. 28. καὶ συνεχύθη τότε πρῶτον (by order
  of Aratus) ἡ δεδομένη τοῖς ἀγωνισταῖς ἀσυλία καὶ ἀσφάλεια, a
  deadly stain on the character of Aratus.

  [127] Festus, v, Perihodos, p. 217, ed. Müller. See the animated
  protest of the philosopher Xenophanês against the great rewards
  given to Olympic victors (540-520 B. C.), Xenophan. Fragment. 2,
  p 357, ed. Bergk.

Nor was it only in the distinguishing national stamp set upon
these four great festivals that the gradual increase of Hellenic
family-feeling exhibited itself, during the course of this earliest
period of our history. Pursuant to the same tendencies, religious
festivals in all the considerable towns gradually became more
and more open and accessible, and attracted guests as well as
competitors from beyond the border; the dignity of the state, as
well as the honor rendered to the presiding god, being measured by
numbers, admiration, and envy, in the frequenting visitors.[128]
There is no positive evidence, indeed, of such expansion in the Attic
festivals earlier than the reign of Peisistratus, who first added the
quadrennial or greater Panathenæa to the ancient annual or lesser
Panathenæa; nor can we trace the steps of progress in regard to
Thebes, Orchomenus, Thespiæ, Megara, Sikyôn, Pellênê, Ægina, Argos,
etc., but we find full reason for believing that such was the general
reality. Of the Olympic or Isthmian victors whom Pindar and Simonidês
celebrated, many derived a portion of their renown from previous
victories acquired at several of these local contests,[129]—victories
sometimes so numerous, as to prove how wide-spread the habit of
mutual frequentation had become;[130] though we find, even in the
third century B. C., treaties of alliance between different cities,
in which it is thought necessary to confer this mutual right by
express stipulation. Temptation was offered, to the distinguished
gymnastic or musical competitors, by prizes of great value; and
Timæus even asserted, as a proof of the overweening pride of Kroton
and Sybaris, that these cities tried to supplant the preëminence
of the Olympic games, by instituting games of their own with the
richest prizes, to be celebrated at the same time,[131]—a statement
in itself not worthy of credit, but nevertheless illustrating the
animated rivalry known to prevail among the Grecian cities in
procuring for themselves splendid and crowded games. At the time
when the Homeric Hymn to Dêmêtêr was composed, the worship of that
goddess seems to have been purely local at Eleusis; but before the
Persian war, the festival celebrated by the Athenians every year, in
honor of the Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, admitted Greeks of all cities to be
initiated, and was attended by vast crowds of them.[132]

  [128] Thucyd. vi, 16. Alkibiadês says, καὶ ὅσα αὖ ἐν τῇ πόλει
  χορηγίαις ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ λαμπρύνομαι, τοῖς μὲν ἀστοῖς φθονεῖται φύσει,
  πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ξένους καὶ αὐτὴ ἰσχὺς φαίνεται.

  The greater Panathenæa are ascribed to Peisistratus by the
  Scholiast on Aristeidês, vol. iii, p. 323, ed. Dindorf: judging
  by what immediately precedes, the statement seems to come from
  Aristotle.

  [129] Simonidês, Fragm. 154-158, ed. Bergk; Pindar, Nem. x, 45;
  Olymp. xiii, 107.

  The distinguished athlete Theagenês is affirmed to have gained
  twelve hundred prizes in these various agônes: according to some,
  fourteen hundred prizes (Pausan. vi, 11, 2; Plutarch, Præcept.
  Reip. Ger. c. 15, p. 811).

  An athlete named Apollonius arrived too late for the Olympic
  games, having stayed away too long, from his anxiety to get money
  at various agônes in Ionia (Pausan. v, 21, 5).

  [130] See, particularly, the treaty between the inhabitants of
  Latus and those of Olûs in Krête, in Boeckh’s Corp. Inscr. No.
  2554, wherein this reciprocity is expressly stipulated. Boeckh
  places this Inscription in the third century B. C.

  [131] Timæus, Fragm. 82, ed. Didot. The Krotoniates furnished a
  great number of victors both to the Olympic and to the Pythian
  games (Herodot. viii, 47; Pausan. x, 5, 5–x, 7, 3; Krause,
  Gymnastik und Agonistik der Hellenen, vol. ii, sect. 29, p. 752).

  [132] Herodot. viii, 65. καὶ αὐτῶν ὁ βουλόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
  Ἑλλήνων μυεῖται.

  The exclusion of all competitors, natives of Lampsakus, from
  the games celebrated in the Chersonesus to the honor of the
  œkist Miltiadês, is mentioned by Herodotus as something special
  (Herodot. vi, 38).

It was thus that the simplicity and strict local application of
the primitive religious festival, among the greater states in
Greece, gradually expanded, on certain great occasions periodically
recurring, into an elaborate and regulated series of exhibitions,—not
merely admitting, but soliciting the fraternal presence of all
Hellenic spectators. In this respect Sparta seems to have formed
an exception to the remaining states: her festivals were for
herself alone, and her general rudeness towards other Greeks was
not materially softened even at the Karneia,[133] or Hyakinthia, or
Gymnopædiæ. On the other hand, the Attic Dionysia were gradually
exalted, from their original rude spontaneous outburst of village
feeling in thankfulness to the god, followed by song, dance, and
revelry of various kinds,—into costly and diversified performances,
first, by a trained chorus, next, by actors superadded to it;[134]
and the dramatic compositions thus produced, as they embodied the
perfection of Grecian art, so they were eminently calculated to
invite a Pan-Hellenic audience and to encourage the sentiment of
Hellenic unity. The dramatic literature of Athens, however, belongs
properly to a later period; previous to the year 560 B. C., we see
only those commencements of innovation which drew upon Thespis[135]
the rebuke of Solon, who himself contributed to impart to the
Panathenaic festival a more solemn and attractive character, by
checking the license of the rhapsodes, and insuring to those present
a full, orderly recital of the Iliad.

  [133] See the remarks, upon the Lacedæmonian discouragement of
  stranger-visitors at their public festivals, put by Thucydidês
  into the mouth of Periklês (Thucyd. ii, 39).

  Lichas the Spartan gained great renown by treating hospitably
  the strangers who came to the Gymnopædiæ at Sparta (Xenophon,
  Memorab. i, 2, 61; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 10),—a story which proves
  that _some_ strangers came to the Spartan festivals, but which
  also proves that they were not many in number, and that to show
  them hospitality was a striking distinction from the general
  character of Spartans.

  [134] Aristot. Poetic, c. 3 and 4; Maximus Tyrius. Diss. xxi. p.
  215; Plutarch. De Cupidine Divitiarum. c. 8. p. 527: compare the
  treatise, “Quod non potest suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum.” c.
  16. p. 1098. The old oracles quoted by Demosthenês, cont. Meidiam
  (c. 15. p. 531. and cont. Makartat. p. 1072: see also Buttmann’s
  note on the former passage), convey the idea of the ancient
  simple Athenian festival.

  [135] Plutarch. Solon, c. 29: see above, chap. xi. vol. iii. p.
  195.

The sacred games and festivals, here alluded to as a class, took
hold of the Greek mind by so great a variety of feelings,[136] as
to counterbalance in a high degree the political disseverance,
and to keep alive among their wide-spread cities, in the midst of
constant jealousy and frequent quarrel, a feeling of brotherhood
and congenial sentiment such as must otherwise have died away. The
Theôrs, or sacred envoys, who came to Olympia or Delphi from so many
different points, all sacrificed to the same god and at the same
altar, witnessed the same sports, and contributed by their donatives
to enrich or adorn one respected scene. Nor must we forget that the
festival afforded opportunity for a sort of fair, including much
traffic amid so large a mass of spectators,[137] and besides the
exhibitions of the games themselves, there were recitations and
lectures in a spacious council-room for those who chose to listen
to them, by poets, rhapsodes, philosophers, and historians,—among
which last, the history of Herodotus is said to have been publicly
read by its author.[138] Of the wealthy and great men in the various
cities, many contended simply for the chariot victories and horse
victories. But there were others whose ambition was of a character
more strictly personal, and who stripped naked as runners, wrestlers,
boxers, or pankratiasts, having gone through the extreme fatigue of
a complete previous training. Kylon, whose unfortunate attempt to
usurp the sceptre at Athens has been recounted, had gained the prize
in the Olympic stadium: Alexander son of Amyntas, the prince of
Macedon, had run for it.[139] The great family of the Diagoridæ at
Rhodes, who furnished magistrates and generals to their native city,
supplied a still greater number of successful boxers and pankratiasts
at Olympia, while other instances also occur of generals named by
various cities from the lists of successful Olympic gymnasts; and the
odes of Pindar, always dearly purchased, attest how many of the great
and wealthy were found in that list.[140] The perfect popularity
and equality of persons at these great games, is a feature not less
remarkable than the exact adherence to predetermined rule, and the
self-imposed submission of the immense crowd to a handful of servants
armed with sticks,[141] who executed the orders of the Eleian
Hellanodikæ. The ground upon which the ceremony took place, and even
the territory of the administering state, was protected by a “Truce
of God,” during the month of the festival, the commencement of which
was formally announced by heralds sent round to the different states.
Treaties of peace between different cities were often formally
commemorated by pillars there erected, and the general impression
of the scene suggested nothing but ideas of peace and brotherhood
among Greeks.[142] And I may remark that the impression of the games
as belonging to all Greeks, and to none but Greeks, was stronger
and clearer during the interval between 600-300 B. C., than it came
to be afterwards. For the Macedonian conquests had the effect of
diluting and corrupting Hellenism, by spreading an exterior varnish
of Hellenic tastes and manners over a wide area of incongruous
foreigners, who were incapable of the real elevation of the Hellenic
character; so that although in later times the games continued
undiminished, both in attraction and in number of visitors, the
spirit of Pan-Hellenic communion, which had once animated the scene,
was gone forever.

  [136] The orator Lysias, in a fragment of his lost Panegyrical
  Oration preserved by Dionysius of Halikarnassus (vol. v. p. 520
  R.), describes the influence of the games with great force and
  simplicity. Hêraklês, the founder of them, ἀγῶνα μὲν σωμάτων
  ἐποίησε, φιλοτιμίαν δὲ πλούτῳ, γνώμης δ᾽ ἐπίδειξιν ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ
  τῆς Ἑλλάδος· ἵνα τούτων ἁπάντων ἕνεκα ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔλθωμεν, τὰ μὲν
  ὀψόμενοι, τὰ δὲ ἀκουσόμενοι. Ἡγήσατο γὰρ τὸν ἐνθάδε σύλλογον
  ~ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλίας~.

  [137] Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. v, 3. “_Mercatum_ eum, qui haberetur
  maximo ludorum apparatu totius Græciæ celebritate: nam ut illic
  alii corporibus exercitatis gloriam et nobilitatem coronæ
  peterent, alii emendi aut vendendi quæstu et lucro ducerentur,”
  etc.

  Both Velleius Paterculus also (i, 8) and Justin (xiii, 5), call
  the Olympic festival by the name _mercatus_.

  There were booths all round the Altis, or sacred precinct of Zeus
  (Schol. Pindar. Olymp. xi, 55), during the time of the games.

  Strabo observes with justice, respecting the multitudinous
  festivals generally—Ἡ πανήγυρις, ἐμπορικόν τι πρᾶγμα (x, p. 486),
  especially in reference to Delos: see Cicero pro Lege Maniliâ, c.
  18: compare Pausanias, x, 32, 9, about the Panegyris and fair at
  Tithorea in Phokis, and Becker, Chariklês, vol. i, p. 283.

  At the Attic festival of the Herakleia, celebrated by the
  communion called Mesogei, or a certain number of the demes
  constituting Mesogæa, a regular market-due, or ἀγοραστικὸν, was
  levied upon those who brought goods to sell (Inscriptiones Atticæ
  nuper repertæ 12, by E. Curtius, pp. 3-7).

  [138] Pausan. vi, 23, 5; Diodor. xiv, 109, xv, 7; Lucian, Quomodo
  Historia sit conscribenda, c. 42. See Krause, Olympia, sect. 29.
  pp. 183-186.

  [139] Thucyd. i, 120; Herodot. v, 22-71. Eurybatês of Argos
  (Herodot. vi, 92); Philippus and Phayllus of Kroton (v, 47; viii,
  47); Eualkidês of Eretria (v, 102); Hermolykus of Athens (ix,
  105).

  Pindar (Nem. iv and vi) gives the numerous victories of the
  Bassidæ and Theandridræ at Ægina: also Melissus the pankratiast
  and his ancestors the Kleonymidæ of Thebes—τιμάεντες ἀρχᾶθεν
  πρόξενοί τ᾽ ἐπιχωρίων (Isthm. iii, 25).

  Respecting the extreme celebrity of Diagoras and his sons, of
  the Rhodian gens Eratidæ, Damagêtus, Akusilaus, and Dorieus, see
  Pindar, Olymp. vii, 16-145, with the Scholia; Thucyd. iii, 11;
  Pausan. vi, 7, 1-2; Xenophon, Hellenic. i, 5, 19: compare Strabo.
  xiv, p. 655.

  [140] The Latin writers remark it as a peculiarity of Grecian
  feeling, as distinguished from Roman, that men of great station
  accounted it an honor to contend in the games: see, as a
  specimen, Tacitus, Dialogus de Orator. c. 9. “Ac si in Græciâ
  natus esses, ubi ludicras quoque artes exercere honestum est, ac
  tibi Nicostrati robur Dii dedissent, non paterer immanes illos
  et ad pugnam natos lacertos levitate jaculi vanescere.” Again,
  Cicero, pro Flacco, c. 13, in his sarcastic style: “Quid si etiam
  occisus est a piratis Adramyttenus, homo nobilis, cujus est fere
  nobis omnibus nomen auditum, Atinas pugil, Olympionices? hoc est
  apud Græcos (quoniam de corum _gravitate_ dicimus) prope majus et
  gloriosius, quam Romæ triumphasse.”

  [141] Lichas, one of the chief men of Sparta, and moreover a
  chariot-victor, received actual chastisement on the ground, from
  these staff-bearers, for an infringement of the regulations
  (Thucyd. v, 50).

  [142] Thucyd. v, 18-47. and the curious ancient Inscription in
  Boeckh’s Corpus Inscr. No. 11. p. 28. recording the convention
  between the Eleians and the inhabitants of the Arcadian town of
  Heræa.

  The comparison of various passages referring to the Olympia,
  Isthmia, and Nemea (Thucydidês iii, 11; viii, 9-10; v, 49-51;
  and Xenophon, Hellenic. iv, 7, 2; v, 1, 29) shows that various
  political business was often discussed at these Games,—that
  diplomatists made use of the intercourse for the purpose of
  detecting the secret designs of states whom they suspected, and
  that the administering state often practised manœuvres in respect
  to the obligations of truce for the Hieromenia, or Holy Month.




CHAPTER XXIX.

LYRIC POETRY. — THE SEVEN WISE MEN.


The interval between 776-560 B. C. presents to us a remarkable
expansion of Grecian genius in the creation of their elegiac, iambic,
lyric, choric, and gnomic poetry, which was diversified in a great
many ways and improved by many separate masters. The creators of
all these different styles—from Kallinus and Archilochus down to
Stesichorus—fall within the two centuries here included; though
Pindar and Simonidês, “the proud and high-crested bards,”[143]
who carried lyric and choric poetry to the maximum of elaboration
consistent with full poetical effect, lived in the succeeding
century, and were contemporary with the tragedian Æschylus. The
Grecian drama, comic as well as tragic, of the fifth century B.
C., combined the lyric and choric song with the living action of
iambic dialogue,—thus constituting the last ascending movement in the
poetical genius of the race. Reserving this for a future time, and
for the history of Athens, to which it more particularly belongs, I
now propose to speak only of the poetical movement of the two earlier
centuries, wherein Athens had little or no part. So scanty are the
remnants, unfortunately, of these earlier poets, that we can offer
little except criticisms borrowed at second-hand, and a few general
considerations on their workings and tendency.[144]

  [143] Himerius, Orat. iii, p. 426, Wernsdorf—ἀγέρωχοι καὶ
  ὑψαυχένες.

  [144] For the whole subject of this chapter, the eleventh,
  twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth chapters of O. Müller’s
  History of the Literature of Ancient Greece, wherein the lyric
  poets are handled with greater length than consists with the
  limits of this work, will be found highly valuable,—chapters
  abounding in erudition and ingenuity, but not always within the
  limits of the evidence.

  The learned work of Ulrici (Geschichte der Griechischen
  Poesie—_Lyrik_) is still more open to the same remark.

Archilochus and Kallinus both appear to fall about the middle of
the seventh century B. C., and it is with them that the innovations
in Grecian poetry commence. Before them, we are told, there existed
nothing but the epos, or daktylic hexameter poetry, of which much
has been said in my former volume,—being legendary stories or
adventures narrated, together with addresses or hymns to the gods.
We must recollect, too, that this was not only the whole poetry, but
the whole literature of the age: prose composition was altogether
unknown, and writing, if beginning to be employed as an aid to a few
superior men, was at any rate generally unused, and found no reading
public. The voice was the only communicant, and the ear the only
recipient, of all those ideas and feelings which productive minds in
the community found themselves impelled to pour out; both voice and
ear being accustomed to a musical recitation, or chant, apparently
something between song and speech, with simple rhythm and a still
simpler occasional accompaniment from the primitive four-stringed
harp. Such habits and requirements of the voice and ear were, at
that time, inseparably associated with the success and popularity
of the poet, and contributed doubtless to restrict the range of
subjects with which he could deal. The type was to a certain extent
consecrated, like the primitive statues of the gods, from which
men only ventured to deviate by gradual and almost unconscious
innovations. Moreover, in the first half of the seventh century B.
C., that genius which had once created an Iliad and an Odyssey was no
longer to be found, and the work of hexameter narrative had come to
be prosecuted by less gifted persons,—by those Cyclic poets of whom I
have spoken in the preceding volumes.

Such, as far as we can make it out amidst very uncertain evidence,
was the state of the Greek mind immediately before elegiac and lyric
poets appeared; while at the same time its experience was enlarging
by the formation of new colonies, and the communion among its various
states tended to increase by the freer reciprocity of religious games
and festivals. There arose a demand for turning the literature of the
age—I use this word as synonymous with the poetry—to new feelings and
purposes, and for applying the rich, plastic, and musical language of
the old epic, to present passion and circumstance, social as well as
individual. Such a tendency had become obvious in Hesiod, even within
the range of hexameter verse; but the same causes which led to an
enlargement of the subjects of poetry inclined men also to vary the
metre.

In regard to this latter point, there is reason to believe that the
expansion of Greek music was the immediate determining cause; for
it has been already stated that the musical scale and instruments
of the Greeks, originally very narrow, were materially enlarged
by borrowing from Phrygia and Lydia, and these acquisitions seem
to have been first realized about the beginning of the seventh
century B. C., through the Lesbian harper Terpander,—the Phrygian
(or Greco-Phrygian) flute-player Olympus,—and the Arkadian or
Bœotian flute-player Klonas. Terpander made the important advance of
exchanging the original four-stringed harp for one of seven strings,
embracing the compass of one octave or two Greek tetrachords, and
Olympus as well as Klonas taught many new nomes, or tunes, on the
flute, to which the Greeks had before been strangers,—probably also
the use of a flute of more varied musical compass. Terpander is
said to have gained the prize at the first recorded celebration of
the Lacedæmonian festival of the Karneia, in 676 B. C.: this is
one of the best-ascertained points among the obscure chronology of
the seventh century; and there seem grounds for assigning Olympus
and Klonas to nearly the same period, a little before Archilochus
and Kallinus.[145] To Terpander, Olympus, and Klonas, are ascribed
the formation of the earliest musical nomes known to the inquiring
Greeks of later times: to the first, nomes on the harp; to the two
latter, on the flute,—every nome being the general scheme, or basis,
of which the airs actually performed constituted so many variations,
within certain defined limits.[146] Terpander employed his enlarged
instrumental power as a new accompaniment to the Homeric poems, as
well as to certain epic proœmia or hymns to the gods of his own
composition. But he does not seem to have departed from the hexameter
verse and the daktylic rhythm, to which the new accompaniment
was probably not quite suitable; and the idea may thus have been
suggested of combining the words also according to new rhythmical and
metrical laws.

  [145] These early innovators in Grecian music, rhythm, metre,
  and poetry, belonging to the seventh century B. C., were very
  imperfectly known, even to those contemporaries of Plato and
  Aristotle who tried to get together facts for a consecutive
  history of music. The treatise of Plutarch, De Musicâ, shows
  what very contradictory statements he found. He quotes from
  four different authors,—Herakleidês, Glaukus, Alexander, and
  Aristoxenus, who by no means agreed in their series of names
  and facts. The first three of them blend together mythe and
  history; while even the Anagraphê or inscription at Sikyon, which
  professed to give a continuous list of such poets and musicians
  as had contended at the Sikyonian games, began with a large stock
  of mythical names,—Amphion, Linus, Pierius, etc. (Plutarch,
  Music. p. 1132.) Some authors, according to Plutarch (p. 1133),
  made the great chronological mistake of placing Terpander as
  contemporary with Hippônax; a proof how little of chronological
  evidence was then accessible.

  That Terpander was victor at the Spartan festival of the Karneia,
  in 676 B. C., may well have been derived by Hellanikus from the
  Spartan registers: the name of the Lesbian harper Perikleitas, as
  having gained the same prize at some subsequent period (Plutarch,
  De Mus. p. 1133), probably rests on the same authority. That
  Archilochus was rather later than Terpander, and Thalêtas rather
  later than Archilochus, was the statement of Glaukus (Plutarch,
  De Mus. p. 1134). Klonas and Polymnêstus are placed later than
  Terpander; Archilochus later than Klonas: Alkman is said to have
  mentioned Polymnêstus in one of his songs (pp. 1133-1135). It
  can hardly be true that Terpander gained _four_ Pythian prizes,
  if the festival was octennial prior to its reconstitution by
  the Amphiktyons (p. 1132). Sakadas gained three Pythian prizes
  _after_ that period, when the festival was quadrennial (p. 1134).

  Compare the confused indications in Pollux, iv, 65-66, 78-79. The
  abstract given by Photius of certain parts of the Chrestomathia
  of Proclus (published in Gaisford’s edition of Hephæstion, pp.
  375-389), is also extremely valuable, in spite of its brevity and
  obscurity, about the lyric and choric poetry of Greece.

  [146] The difference between Νόμος and Μέλος appears in Plutarch,
  De Musicâ, p. 1132—Καὶ τὸν Τέρπανδρον, κιθαρῳδικῶν ποιητὴν ὄντα
  νόμων, κατὰ νόμον ἕκαστον τοῖς ἔπεσι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῖς Ὁμήρου
  μέλη περιτιθέντα, ᾅδειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι· ἀποφῆναι δὲ τοῦτον λέγει
  ὀνόματα πρῶτον τοῖς κιθαρῳδικοῖς νόμοις.

  The nomes were not many in number; they went by special names;
  and there was a disagreement of opinion as to the persons who had
  composed them (Plutarch, Music. p. 1133). They were monodic, not
  choric,—intended to be sung by one person (Aristot. Problem. xix,
  15). Herodot. i, 23, about Arion and the Nomus Orthius.

It is certain, at least, that the age (670-600) immediately
succeeding Terpander,—comprising Archilochus, Kallinus, Tyrtæus, and
Alkman, whose relations of time one to another we have no certain
means of determining,[147] though Alkman seems to have been the
latest,—presents a remarkable variety both of new metres and of new
rhythms, superinduced upon the previous daktylic hexameter. The
first departure from this latter is found in the elegiac verse,
employed seemingly more or less by all the four above-mentioned
poets, but chiefly by the first two, and even ascribed by some to
the invention of Kallinus. Tyrtæus in his military march-songs
employed the anapæstic metre, but in Archilochus as well as in Alkman
we find traces of a much larger range of metrical variety,—iambic,
trochaic, anapæstic, ionic, etc.,—sometimes even asynartetic or
compound metres, anapæstic or daktylic, blended with trochaic or
iambic. What we have remaining from Mimnermus, who comes about the
close of the preceding four, is elegiac; his contemporaries Alkæus
and Sappho, besides employing most of those metres which they found
existing, invented each a peculiar stanza of their own, which is
familiarly known under a name derived from each. In Solon, the
younger contemporary of Mimnermus, we have the elegiac, iambic, and
trochaic: in Theognis, yet later, the elegiac only. But both Arion
and Stesichorus appear to have been innovators in this department,
the former by his improvement in the dithyrambic chorus or circular
song and dance in honor of Dionysus,—the latter by his more elaborate
choric compositions, containing not only a strophê and antistrophê,
but also a third division or epode succeeding them, pronounced by the
chorus standing still. Both Anakreon and Ibykus likewise added to the
stock of existing metrical varieties. And we thus see that, within
the century and a half succeeding Terpander, Greek poetry (or Greek
literature, which was then the same thing) became greatly enriched in
matter as well as diversified in form.

  [147] Mr. Clinton (Fasti Hellen. ad ann. 671, 665, 644) appears
  to me noway satisfactory in his chronological arrangements of
  the poets of this century. I agree with O. Müller (Hist. of
  Literat. of Ancient Greece, ch. xii, 9) in thinking that he makes
  Terpander too recent, and Thalêtas too ancient; I also believe
  both Kallinus and Alkman to have been more recent than the place
  which Mr. Clinton assigns to them; the epoch of Tyrtæus will
  depend upon the date which we assign to the second Messenian war.

  How very imperfectly the chronology of the poetical names even
  of the sixth century B. C.—Sappho, Anakreon, Hippônax—was known
  even to writers of the beginning of the Ptolemaic age (or
  shortly after 300 B. C.), we may see by the mistakes noted in
  Athenæus, xiii, p. 599. Hermesianax of Kolophon, the elegiac
  poet, represented Anakreon as the lover of Sappho; this might
  perhaps be not absolutely impossible, if we supposed in Sappho an
  old age like that of Ninon de l’Enclos; but others (even earlier
  than Hermesianax, since they are quoted by Chamæleon) represented
  Anakreon, when in old age, as addressing verses to Sappho,
  still young. Again, the comic writer Diphilus introduced both
  Archilochus and Hippônax as the lovers of Sappho.

To a certain extent there seems to have been a real connection
between the two: new forms were essential for the expression of
new wants and feelings,—though the assertion that elegiac metre is
especially adapted for one set of feelings,[148] trochaic for a
second, and iambic for a third, if true at all, can only be admitted
with great latitude of exception, when we find so many of them
employed by the poets for very different subjects,—gay or melancholy,
bitter or complaining, earnest or sprightly,—seemingly with little
discrimination.

  [148] The Latin poets and the Alexandrine critics seem to have
  both insisted on the natural mournfulness of the elegiac metre
  (Ovid, Heroid. xv, 7; Horat. Art. Poet. 75): see also the
  fanciful explanation given by Didymus in the Etymologicon Magnum,
  v. Ἔλεγος.

  We learn from Hephæstion (c. viii, p. 45, Gaisf.) that the
  anapæstic march-metre of Tyrtæus was employed by the comic
  writers also, for a totally different vein of feeling. See the
  Dissertation of Franck, Callinus, pp. 37-48 (Leips. 1816).

  Of the remarks made by O. Müller respecting the metres of these
  early poets (History of the Literature of Ancient Greece, ch.
  xi, s. 8-12, etc.; ch. xii, s. 1-2, etc.), many appear to be
  uncertified and disputable.

  For some good remarks on the fallibility of men’s impressions
  respecting the natural and inherent ἦθος of particular metres,
  see Adam Smith (Theory of Moral Sentiment, part v, ch. i, p.
  329), in the edition of his works by Dugald Stewart.

But the adoption of some new metre, different from the perpetual
series of hexameters, was required when the poet desired to do
something more than recount a long story or fragment of heroic
legend,—when he sought to bring himself, his friends, his enemies,
his city, his hopes and fears with regard to matters recent or
impending, all before the notice of the hearer, and that, too, at
once with brevity and animation. The Greek hexameter, like our blank
verse, has all its limiting conditions bearing upon each separate
line, and presents to the hearer no predetermined resting-place or
natural pause beyond.[149] In reference to any long composition,
either epic or dramatic, such unrestrained license is found
convenient, and the case was similar for Greek epos and drama,—the
single-lined iambic trimeter being generally used for the dialogue
of tragedy and comedy, just as the daktylic hexameter had been
used for the epic. The metrical changes introduced by Archilochus
and his contemporaries may be compared to a change from our blank
verse to the rhymed couplet and quatrain: the verse was thrown into
little systems of two, three, or four lines, with a pause at the
end of each; and the halt thus assured to, as well as expected and
relished by, the ear, was generally coincident with a close, entire
or partial, in the sense, which thus came to be distributed with
greater point and effect. The elegiac verse, or common hexameter and
pentameter (this second line being an hexameter with the third and
sixth thesis,[150] or the last half of the third and sixth foot,
suppressed, and a pause left in place of it), as well as the epode
(or iambic trimeter followed by an iambic dimeter) and some other
binary combinations of verse which we trace among the fragments of
Archilochus, are conceived with a view to such increase of effect
both on the ear and the mind, not less than to the direct pleasures
of novelty and variety.

  [149] See the observations in Aristotle (Rhetor. iii, 9) on
  the λέξις εἰρομένη as compared with λέξις κατεστραμμένη·—λέξις
  εἰρομένη, ἣ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν, ἂν μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ
  λεγόμενον τελειώθη·—κατεστραμμένη δὲ, ἡ ἐν περιόδοις· λέγω δὲ
  περίοδον, λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν καὶ
  μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον.

  [150] I employ, however unwillingly, the word _thesis_ here
  (arsis and thesis) in the sense in which it is used by G. Hermann
  (“Illud tempus, in quo ictus est, _arsin_; ea tempora, quæ carent
  ictu, _thesin_ vocamus,” Element. Doctr. Metr. sect. 15), and
  followed by Boeckh, in his Dissertation on the Metres of Pindar
  (i, 4), though I agree with Dr. Barham (in the valuable Preface
  to his edition of Hephæstion, Cambridge, 1843, pp. 5-8) that the
  opposite sense of the words would be the preferable one, just as
  it was the original sense in which they were used by the best
  Greek musical writers: Dr. Barham’s Preface is very instructive
  on the difficult subject of ancient rhythm generally.

The iambic metre, built upon the primitive iambus, or coarse and
licentious jesting,[151] which formed a part of some Grecian
festivals (especially of the festivals of Dêmêtêr as well in
Attica as in Paros, the native country of the poet), is only one
amongst many new paths struck out by his inventive genius; whose
exuberance astonishes us, when we consider that he takes his start
from little more than the simple hexameter,[152] in which, too, he
was a distinguished composer,—for even of the elegiac verse he is
as likely to have been the inventor as Kallinus, just as he was
the earliest popular and successful composer of table-songs, or
Skolia, though Terpander may have originated some such before him.
The entire loss of his poems, excepting some few fragments, enables
us to recognize little more than one characteristic,—the intense
personality which pervaded them, as well as that coarse, direct,
and out-spoken license, which afterwards lent such terrible effect
to the old comedy at Athens. His lampoons are said to have driven
Lykambês, the father of Neobulê, to hang himself: the latter had been
promised to Archilochus in marriage, but that promise was broken,
and the poet assailed both father and daughter with every species of
calumny.[153] In addition to this disappointment, he was poor, the
son of a slave-mother, and an exile from his country, Paros, to the
unpromising colony of Thasos. The desultory notices respecting him
betray a state of suffering combined with loose conduct which vented
itself sometimes in complaint, sometimes in libellous assault; and
he was at last slain by some whom his muse had thus exasperated.
His extraordinary poetical genius finds but one voice of encomium
throughout antiquity. His triumphal song to Hêraklês was still
popularly sung by the victors at Olympia, near two centuries after
his death, in the days of Pindar; but that majestic and complimentary
poet at once denounces the malignity, and attests the retributive
suffering, of the great Parian iambist.[154]

  [151] Homer, Hymn. ad Cererem. 202; Hesychius, v. Γεφυρὶς;
  Herodot. v, 83; Diodor. v, 4. There were various gods at whose
  festivals scurrility (τωθασμὸς) was a consecrated practice,
  seemingly different festivals in different places (Aristot.
  Politic. vii, 15, 8).

  The reader will understand better what this consecrated
  scurrility means by comparing the description of a modern
  traveller in the kingdom of Naples (Tour through the Southern
  Provinces of the Kingdom of Naples, by Mr. Keppel Craven, London,
  1821, ch. xv, p. 287):—

  “I returned to Gerace (the site of the ancient Epizephyrian
  Lokri) by one of those moonlights which are known only in these
  latitudes, and which no pen or pencil can portray. My path lay
  along some cornfields, in which the natives were employed in the
  last labors of the harvest, and I was not a little surprised to
  find myself saluted with a volley of opprobrious epithets and
  abusive language, uttered in the most threatening voice, and
  accompanied with the most insulting gestures. This extraordinary
  custom is of the most remote antiquity, and is observed towards
  all strangers during the harvest and vintage seasons; those
  who are apprized of it will keep their temper as well as their
  presence of mind, as the loss of either would only serve as a
  signal for still louder invectives, and prolong a contest in
  which success would be as hopeless as undesirable.”

  [152] The chief evidence for the rhythmical and metrical changes
  introduced by Archilochus is to be found in the 28th chapter of
  Plutarch, De Musicâ, pp. 1140-1141, in words very difficult to
  understand completely. See Ulrici, Geschichte der Hellenisch.
  Poesie, vol. ii, p. 381.

  The epigram ascribed to Theokritus (No. 18 in Gaisford’s
  Poetæ Minores) shows that the poet had before him hexameter
  compositions of Archilochus, as well as lyric:—

    ὡς ἐμμελὴς τ᾽ ἔγεντο κἀπιδέξιος
    ἐπεά τε ποιεῖν, πρὸς λύραν τ᾽ ἀείδειν

  See the article on Archilochus in Welcker’s Kleine Schriften,
  pp. 71-82, which has the merit of showing that iambic bitterness
  is far from being the only marked feature in his character and
  genius.

  [153] See Meleager, Epigram. cxix, 3; Horat. Epist. 19, 23, and
  Epod. vi, 13 with the Scholiast; Ælian. V. H. x, 13.

  [154] Pindar, Pyth. ii, 55; Olymp. ix, 1, with the Scholia;
  Euripid. Hercul. Furens, 583-683. The eighteenth epigram of
  Theokritus (above alluded to) conveys a striking tribute of
  admiration to Archilochus: compare Quintilian, x, 1, and Liebel.
  ad Archilochi Fragmenta, sects. 5, 6, 7.

Amidst the multifarious veins in which Archilochus displayed his
genius, moralizing or gnomic poetry is not wanting, while his
contemporary Simonides, of Amorgos, devotes the iambic metre
especially to this destination, afterwards followed out by Solon and
Theognis. But Kallinus, the earliest celebrated elegiac poet, so far
as we can judge from his few fragments, employed the elegiac metre
for exhortations of warlike patriotism; and the more ample remains
which we possess of Tyrtæus are sermons in the same strain, preaching
to the Spartans bravery against the foe, and unanimity as well as
obedience to the law at home. They are patriotic effusions, called
forth by the circumstances of the time, and sung by single voice,
with accompaniment of the flute,[155] to those in whose bosoms the
flame of courage was to be kindled. For though what we peruse is in
verse, we are still in the tide of real and present life, and we
must suppose ourselves rather listening to an orator addressing the
citizens when danger or dissension is actually impending. It is only
in the hands of Mimnermus that elegiac verse comes to be devoted
to soft and amatory subjects. His few fragments present a vein of
passive and tender sentiment, illustrated by appropriate matter of
legend, such as would be cast into poetry in all ages, and quite
different from the rhetoric of Kallinus and Tyrtæus.

  [155] Athenæus, xiv, p. 630.

The poetical career of Alkman is again distinct from that of any
of his above-mentioned contemporaries. Their compositions, besides
hymns to the gods, were principally expressions of feeling intended
to be sung by individuals, though sometimes also suited for the
kômus, or band of festive volunteers, assembled on some occasion of
common interest: those of Alkman were principally choric, intended
for the song and accompanying dance of the chorus. He was a native
of Sardis in Lydia, or at least his family were so; and he appears
to have come in early life to Sparta, though his genius and mastery
of the Greek language discountenance the story that he was brought
over to Sparta as a slave. The most ancient arrangement of music at
Sparta, generally ascribed to Terpander,[156] underwent considerable
alteration, not only through the elegiac and anapæstic measures of
Tyrtæus, but also through the Kretan Thalêtas and the Lydian Alkman.
The harp, the instrument of Terpander, was rivalled and in part
superseded by the flute or pipe, which had been recently rendered
more effective in the hands of Olympus, Klonas, and Polymnêstus, and
which gradually became, for compositions intended to raise strong
emotion, the favorite instrument of the two,—being employed as
accompaniment both to the elegies of Tyrtæus, and to the hyporchemata
(songs, or hymns, combined with dancing) of Thalêtas; also, as the
stimulus and regulator to the Spartan military march.[157]

  [156] Plutarch, De Musicâ, pp. 1134, 1135; Aristotle, De
  Lacedæmon. Republicâ, Fragm. xi, p. 132, ed. Neumann; Plutarch,
  De Serâ Numin. Vindict. c. 13, p. 558.

  [157] Thucyd. v, 69-70, with the Scholia,—μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν
  νόμων ... Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ βραδέως καὶ ὑπὸ αὐλητῶν πολλῶν νόμῳ
  ἐγκαθεστώτων, οὐ τοῦ θείου χάριν, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ὁμαλῶς μετὰ ῥυθμοῦ
  βαίνοιεν, καὶ μὴ διασπασθείη αὐτοῖς ἡ τάξις.

  Cicero, Tuscul. Qu. ii, 16. “Spartiatarum quorum procedit Mora ad
  tibiam, neque adhibetur ulla sine anapæstis pedibus hortatio.”

  The flute was also the instrument appropriated to Kômus, or the
  excited movement of half-intoxicated revellers (Hesiod. Scut.
  Hercul. 280; Athenæ. xiv, pp. 617-618).

These elegies (as has been just remarked) were sung by one person,
in the midst of an assembly of listeners, and there were doubtless
other compositions intended for the individual voice. But in general
such was not the character of music and poetry at Sparta; everything
done there, both serious and recreative, was public and collective,
so that the chorus and its performances received extraordinary
development. It has been already stated, that the chorus usually,
with song and dance combined, constituted an important part of
divine service throughout all Greece, and was originally a public
manifestation of the citizens generally,—a large proportion of
them being actively engaged in it,[158] and receiving some training
for the purpose as an ordinary branch of education. Neither the
song nor the dance, under such conditions, could be otherwise than
extremely simple. But in process of time, the performance at the
chief festivals tended to become more elaborate, and to fall into
the hands of persons expressly and professionally trained,—the mass
of the citizens gradually ceasing to take active part, and being
present merely as spectators. Such was the practice which grew up in
most parts of Greece, and especially at Athens, where the dramatic
chorus acquired its highest perfection. But the drama never found
admission at Sparta, and the peculiarity of Spartan life tended much
to keep up the popular chorus on its ancient footing. It formed, in
fact, one element in that never-ceasing drill to which the Spartans
were subject from their boyhood, and it served a purpose analogous
to their military training, in accustoming them to simultaneous and
regulated movement,—insomuch that the comparison between the chorus,
especially in its Pyrrhic, or war-dances, and the military enomoty,
seems to have been often dwelt upon.[159] In the singing of the
solemn pæan in honor of Apollo, at the festival of the Hyakinthia,
king Agesilaus was under the orders of the chorus-master, and sang
in the place allotted to him;[160] while the whole body of Spartans
without exception,—the old, the middle-aged, and the youth, the
matrons, and the virgins,—were distributed in various choric
companies,[161] and trained to harmony both of voice and motion,
which was publicly exhibited at the solemnities of the Gymnopædiæ.
The word _dancing_ must be understood in a larger sense than that
in which it is now employed, and as comprising every variety of
rhythmical, accentuated, conspiring movements, or gesticulations,
or postures of the body, from the slowest to the quickest;[162]
cheironomy, or the decorous and expressive movement of the hands,
being especially practised.

  [158] Plato, Legg. vii, p. 803. θύοντα καὶ ᾅδοντα καὶ ὀρχούμενον,
  ὥστε τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἱλέως αὑτῷ παρασκευάζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι,
  etc.: compare p. 799; Maximus Tyr. Diss. xxxvii, 4: Aristophan.
  Ran. 950-975; Athenæus, xiv, p. 626; Polyb. iv, 30; Lucian, De
  Saltatione, c. 10, 11, 16, 31.

  Compare Aristotle (Problem xix, 15) about the primitive character
  and subsequent change of the chorus; and the last chapter of the
  eighth book of his Politica: also, a striking passage in Plutarch
  (De Cupidine Divitiarum, c. 8, p. 527) about the transformation
  of the Dionysiac festival at Chæroneia from simplicity to
  costliness.

  [159] Athenæus, xiv, p. 628; Suidas, vol. iii, p. 715, ed.
  Kuster; Plutarch, Instituta Laconica, c. 32,—κωμῳδίας καὶ
  τραγῳδίας οὐκ ἠκρόωντο, ὅπως μήτε ἐν σπουδῇ, μήτε ἐν παιδίᾳ,
  ἀκούωσι τῶν ἀντιλεγόντων τοῖς νόμοις,—which exactly corresponds
  with the ethical view implied in the alleged conversation between
  Solon and Thespis (Plutarch, Solon, c. 29: see above, ch. xi,
  vol. ii, p. 195), and with Plato, Legg. vii, p. 817.

  [160] Xenophon, Agesilaus ii, 17. οἴκαδε ἀπελθὼν εἰς τὰ Ὑακίνθια,
  ὅπου ἐτάχθη ὑπὸ τοῦ χοροποιοῦ, τὸν παιᾶνα τῷ θεῷ συνεπετέλει.

  [161] Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 14, 16, 21: Athenæus, xiv, pp.
  631-632, xv, p. 678; Xenophon, Hellen. vi, 4, 15; De Republic.
  Lacedæm. ix, 5; Pindar, Hyporchemata, Fragm. 78, ed. Bergk.

    Λάκαινα μὲν παρθένων ἀγέλα.

  Also, Alkman, Fragm. 13, ed. Bergk; Antigon. Caryst. Hist. Mirab.
  c. 27.

  [162] How extensively pantomimic the ancient orchêsis was, may be
  seen by the example in Xenophon, Symposion, vii, 5, ix, 3-6, and
  Plutarch, Symposion, ix, 15, 2: see K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der
  gottesdienstlichen Alterthümer der Griechen, ch. 29.

  “Sane ut in religionibus saltaretur, hæc ratio est: quod nullam
  majores nostri partem corporis esse voluerunt, quæ non sentiret
  religionem: nam cantus ad animum, saltatio ad mobilitatem
  corporis pertinet.” (Servius ad Virgil. Eclog. v, 73.)

We see thus that both at Sparta and in Krête (which approached in
respect to publicity of individual life most nearly to Sparta),
the choric aptitudes and manifestations occupied a larger space
than in any other Grecian city. And as a certain degree of musical
and rhythmical variety was essential to meet this want,[163] while
music was never taught to Spartan citizens individually,—we farther
understand how strangers like Terpander, Polymnêstus, Thalêtas,
Tyrtæus, Alkman, etc., were not only received, but acquired great
influence at Sparta, in spite of the preponderant spirit of jealous
seclusion in the Spartan character. All these masters appear to
have been effective in their own special vocation,—the training of
the chorus,—to which they imparted new rhythmical action, and for
which they composed new music. But Alkman did this, and something
more; he possessed the genius of a poet, and his compositions were
read afterwards with pleasure by those who could not hear them
sung or see them danced. In the little of his poems which remains,
we recognize that variety of rhythm and metre for which he was
celebrated. In this respect he (together with the Kretan Thalêtas,
who is said to have introduced a more vehement style both of music
and dance, with the Kretic and Pæonic rhythm, into Sparta[164])
surpassed Archilochus, and prepared the way for the complicated
choric movements of Stesichorus and Pindar: some of the fragments,
too, manifest that fresh outpouring of individual sentiment and
emotion which constitutes so much of the charm of popular poetry.
Besides his touching address in old age to the Spartan virgins, over
whose song and dance he had been accustomed to preside.—he is not
afraid to speak of his hearty appetite, satisfied with simple food
and relishing a bowl of warm broth at the winter tropic.[165] And
he has attached to the spring an epithet, which comes home to the
real feelings of a poor country more than those captivating pictures
which abound in verse, ancient as well as modern: he calls it “the
season of short fare,”—the crop of the previous year being then
nearly consumed, the husbandman is compelled to pinch himself until
his new harvest comes in.[166] Those who recollect that in earlier
periods of our history, and in all countries where there is little
accumulated stock, an exorbitant difference is often experienced in
the price of corn before and after the harvest, will feel the justice
of Alkman’s description.

  [163] Aristot. Politic. viii, 4, 6. Οἱ Λάκωνες—~οὐ μανθάνοντες
  ὅμως~ δύνανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὥς φασι, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῶν
  μέλων.

  [164] Homer. Hymn. Apoll. 340. Οἷοί τε Κρητῶν παιήονες, etc.: see
  Boeckh. De Metris Pindari, ii, 7, p. 143; Ephorus ap. Strabo, x,
  p. 480: Plutarch, De Musicâ, p. 1142.

  Respecting Thalêtas, and the gradual alterations in the character
  of music at Sparta. Hoeckh has given much instructive matter
  (Kreta. vol. iii, pp. 340-377). Respecting Nymphæus of Kydonia,
  whom Ælian (V. II. xii, 50) puts in juxtaposition with Thalêtas
  and Terpander, nothing is known.

  After what is called the second fashion of music (κατάστασις)
  had thus been introduced by Thalêtas and his contemporaries.—the
  first fashion being that of Terpander,—no farther innovations
  were allowed. The ephors employed violent means to prohibit the
  intended innovations of Phrynis and Timotheus, after the Persian
  war: see Plutarch Agis, c. 10.

  [165] Alkman. Fragm. 13-17. ed. Bergk, ὁ πάμφαγος Ἀλκμάν:
  compare Fr. 63. Aristides calls him ὁ τῶν παρθένων ἐπαινέτης καὶ
  σύμβουλος (Or. xlv, vol. ii, p. 40. Dindorf).

  Of the Partneneia of Alkman (songs, hymns, and dances, composed
  for a chorus of maidens) there were at least two books (Stephanus
  Byzant. v. Ἐρυσίχη). He was the earliest poet who acquired renown
  in this species of composition, afterwards much pursued by
  Pindar, Bacchylidês, and Simonidês of Keôs: see Welcker, Alkman.
  Fragment. p. 10.

  [166] Alkman, Frag. 64, ed. Bergk.

    Ὥρας δ᾽ ἐσῆκε τρεῖς, θέρος
    Καὶ χεῖμα κ᾽ ὠπώραν τρίταν·
    Καὶ τέτρατον τὸ ἦρ, ὅκα
    Σάλλει μὲν, ἐσθίειν δ᾽ ἄδαν
      Οὐκ ἐστί.

Judging from these and from a few other fragments of this poet,
Alkman appears to have combined the life and exciting vigor of
Archilochus in the song properly so called, sung by himself
individually,—with a larger knowledge of musical and rhythmical
effect in regard to the choric performance. He composed in the
Laconian dialect,—a variety of the Doric with some intermixture of
Æolisms. And it was from him, jointly with those other composers who
figured at Sparta during the century after Terpander, as well as
from the simultaneous development of the choric muse[167] in Argos,
Sikyôn, Arcadia, and other parts of Peloponnesus, that the Doric
dialect acquired permanent footing in Greece, as the only proper
dialect for choric compositions. Continued by Stesichorus and Pindar,
this habit passed even to the Attic dramatists, whose choric songs
are thus in a great measure Doric, while their dialogue is Attic. At
Sparta, as well as in other parts of Peloponnesus,[168] the musical
and rhythmical style appears to have been fixed by Alkman and his
contemporaries, and to have been tenaciously maintained, for two or
three centuries, with little or no innovation; the more so, as the
flute-players at Sparta formed an hereditary profession, who followed
the routine of their fathers.[169]

  [167] Plutarch, De Musicâ, c. 9, p. 1134. About the dialect of
  Alkman, see Ahrens, De Dialecto Æolicâ, sects. 2, 4; about his
  different metres, Welcker, Alkman. Fragm. pp. 10-12.

  [168] Plutarch, De Musicâ, c. 32, p. 1142, c. 37, p. 1144;
  Athenæus, xiv, p. 632. In Krête, also, the popularity of the
  primitive musical composers was maintained, though along with the
  innovator Timotheus: see Inscription No. 3053, ap. Boeckh, Corp.
  Ins.

  [169] Herodot. vi, 60. They were probably a γένος with an heroic
  progenitor, like the heralds, to whom the historian compares
  them.

Alkman was the last poet who addressed himself to the popular chorus.
Both Arion and Stesichorus composed for a body of trained men, with
a degree of variety and involution such as could not be attained
by a mere fraction of the people. The primitive dithyrambus was a
round choric dance and song in honor of Dionysus,[170] common to
Naxos, Thebes, and seemingly to many other places, at the Dionysiac
festival,—a spontaneous effusion of drunken men in the hour of
revelry, wherein the poet Archilochus, “with the thunder of wine full
upon his mind,” had often taken the chief part.[171] Its exciting
character approached to the worship of the Great Mother in Asia,
and stood in contrast with the solemn and stately pæan addressed to
Apollo. Arion introduced into it an alteration such as Archilochus
had himself brought about in the scurrilous iambus. He converted it
into an elaborate composition in honor of the god, sung and danced
by a chorus of fifty persons, not only sober, but trained with great
strictness; though its rhythm and movements, and its equipment in
the character of satyrs, presented more or less an imitation of
the primitive license. Born at Methymna in Lesbos, Arion appears
as a harper, singer, and composer, much favored by Periander at
Corinth, in which city he first “composed, denominated, and taught
the dithyramb,” earlier than any one known to Herodotus.[172] He did
not, however, remain permanently there, but travelled from city to
city, exhibiting at the festivals for money,—especially to Sicilian
and Italian Greece, where he acquired large gains. We may here again
remark how the poets as well as the festivals served to promote a
sentiment of unity among the dispersed Greeks. Such transfer of the
dithyramb, from the field of spontaneous nature into the garden of
art,[173] constitutes the first stage in the refinement of Dionysiac
worship; which will hereafter be found still farther exalted in the
form of the Attic drama.

  [170] Pindar, Fragm. 44, ed. Bergk: Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp.
  xiii, 25; Proclus, Chrestomathia, c. 12-14. ad calc. Hephæst.
  Gaisf. p. 382: compare W. M. Schmidt, In Dithyrambum Poetarumque
  Dithyrambicorum Reliquias, pp. 171-183 (Berlin, 1845).

  [171] Archiloch. Fragm. 72, ed. Bergk.

    Ὡς Διωνύσου ἄνακτος καλὸν ἐξάρξαι μέλος
    Οἶδα διθύραμβον, οἴνῳ ξυγκεραυνωθεὶς φρένας.

  The old oracle quoted in Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, about the
  Dionysia at Athens, enjoins—Διονύσῳ δημοτελῆ ἱερὰ τελεῖν, ~καὶ
  κρατῆρα κεράσαι~, καὶ χοροὺς ἱστάναι.

  [172] Herodot. i, 23; Suidas, v. Ἀρίων; Pindar, Olymp. xiii, 25.

  [173] Aristot. Poetic. c. 6, ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποίησιν ἐκ τῶν
  αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων; again, to the same effect, _ibid._ c. 9.

The date of Arion seems about 600 B. C., shortly after Alkman:
that of Stesichorus is a few years later. To the latter the Greek
chorus owed a high degree of improvement, and in particular the
last finished distribution of its performance into the strophê, the
antistrophê, and the epôdus: the turn, the return, and the rest,—the
rhythm and metre of the song during each strophê corresponded with
that during the antistrophê, but was varied during the epôdus,
and again varied during the following strophês. Until this time
the song had been monostrophic, consisting of nothing more than
one uniform stanza, repeated from the beginning to the end of the
composition;[174] so that we may easily see how vast was the new
complication and difficulty introduced by Stesichorus,—not less
for the performers than for the composer, himself at that time
the teacher and trainer of performers. Both this poet and his
contemporary the flute-player Sakadas of Argos,—who gained the prize
at the first three Pythian games founded after the Sacred War,—seem
to have surpassed their predecessors in the breadth of subject which
they embraced, borrowing from the inexhaustible province of ancient
legend, and expanding the choric song into a well-sustained epical
narrative.[175] Indeed, these Pythian games opened a new career to
musical composers just at the time when Sparta began to be closed
against musical novelties.

  [174] Alkman slightly departed from this rule: in one of his
  compositions of fourteen strophês, the last seven were in a
  different metre from the first seven (Hephæstion, c. xv, p. 134,
  Gaisf.; Hermann, Elementa Doctrin. Metricæ, c. xvii, sect. 595).
  Ἀλκμανικὴ καινοτομία καὶ Στησιχόρειος (Plutarch, De Musicâ, p.
  1135).

  [175] Pausanias, vi, 14, 4; x, 7, 3. Sakadas, as well as
  Stesichorus, composed an Ἰλίου πέρσις (Athenæus, xiii, p. 609).

  “Stesichorum (observes Quintilian, x, 1) quam sit ingenio
  validus, materiæ quoque ostendunt, maxima bella et clarissimos
  canentem duces, et epici carminis onera lyrâ sustinentem. Reddit
  enim personis in agendo simul loquendoque debitam dignitatem: ac
  si tenuisset modum, videtur æmulari proximus Homerum potuisse:
  sed redundat, atque effunditur: quod, ut est reprehendendum, ita
  copiæ vitium est.”

  Simonidês of Keôs (Frag. 19. ed. Bergk) puts Homer and
  Stesichorus together: see the epigram of Antipater in the
  Anthologia, t. i, p. 328, ed. Jacobs, and Dio Chrysostom. Or. 55,
  vol. ii, p. 284, Reisk. Compare Kleine, Stesichori Fragment. pp.
  30-34 (Berlin 1828), and O. Müller, History of the Literature of
  Ancient Greece, ch. xiv, sect. 5.

  The musical composers of Argos are affirmed by Herodotus to have
  been the most renowned in Greece, half a century after Sakadas
  (Her. iii, 131).

Alkæus and Sappho, both natives of Lesbos, appear about
contemporaries with Arion, B. C. 610-580. Of their once celebrated
lyric compositions, scarcely anything remains. But the criticisms
which are preserved on both of them place them in strong contrast
with Alkman, who lived and composed under the more restrictive
atmosphere of Sparta,—and in considerable analogy with the turbulent
vehemence of Archilochus,[176] though without his intense private
malignity. Both composed for their own local audience, and in their
own Lesbian Æolic dialect; not because there was any peculiar fitness
in that dialect to express their vein of sentiment, but because
it was more familiar to their hearers. Sappho herself boasts of
the preëminence of the Lesbian bards;[177] and the celebrity of
Terpander, Perikleitas, and Arion, permits us to suppose that there
may have been before her many popular bards in the island who did
not attain to Hellenic celebrity. Alkæus included in his songs the
fiercest bursts of political feeling, the stirring alternations of
war and exile, and all the ardent relish of a susceptible man for
wine and love.[178] The love-song seems to have formed the principal
theme of Sappho, who, however, also composed odes or songs[179] on
a great variety of other subjects, serious as well as satirical,
and is said farther to have first employed the Mixolydian mode
in music. It displays the tendency of the age to metrical and
rhythmical novelty, that Alkæus and Sappho are said to have each
invented the peculiar stanza, well-known under their respective
names,—combinations of the dactyl, trochee, and iambus, analogous
to the asynartetic verses of Archilochus; they by no means confined
themselves, however, to Alkaic and Sapphic metre. Both the one
and the other composed hymns to the gods; indeed, this is a theme
common to all the lyric and choric poets, whatever may be their
peculiarities in other ways. Most of their compositions were songs
for the single voice, not for the chorus. The poetry of Alkæus is the
more worthy of note, as it is the earliest instance of the employment
of the Muse in actual political warfare, and shows the increased hold
which that motive was acquiring on the Grecian mind.

  [176] Horat. Epistol. i, 19, 23.

  [177] Sappho, Fragm. 93, ed. Bergk. See also Plehn, Lesbiaca,
  pp. 145-165. Respecting the poetesses, two or three of whom were
  noted, contemporary with Sappho, see Ulrici, Gesch. der Hellen.
  Poesie, vol. ii, p. 370.

  [178] Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. v, 82; Horat. Od. i, 32, ii, 13;
  Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i, 28; the striking passage in Plutarch,
  Symposion iii, 1, 3, ap. Bergk. Fragm. 42. In the view of
  Dionysius, the Æolic dialect of Alkæus and Sappho diminished the
  value of their compositions: the Æolic accent, analogous to the
  Latin, and acknowledging scarcely any oxyton words, must have
  rendered them much less agreeable in recitation or song.

  [179] See Plutarch, De Music. p. 1136; Dionys. Hal. de Comp.
  Verb. c. 23, p. 173, Reisk, and some striking passages of
  Himerius, in respect to Sappho (i, 4, 16, 19; Maximus Tyrius,
  Dissert. xxiv, 7-9), and the encomium of the critical Dionysius
  (De Compos. Verborum, c. 23, p. 173).

  The author of the Parian marble adopts, as one of his
  chronological epochs (Epoch 37), the flight of Sappho, or exile,
  from Mitylênê to Sicily somewhere between 604-596 B. C. There
  probably was something remarkable which induced him to single out
  this event; but we do not know what, nor can we trust the hints
  suggested by Ovid (Heroid. xv, 51).

  Nine books of Sappho’s songs were collected by the later literary
  Greeks, arranged chiefly according to the metres (C. F. Neue,
  Sapphonis Fragm. p. 11, Berlin 1827). There were ten books of the
  songs of Alkæus (Athenæus, xi, p. 481), and both Aristophanês
  (Grammaticus) and Aristarchus published editions of them.
  (Hephæstion, c. xv, p. 134, Gaisf.) Dikæarchus wrote a commentary
  upon his songs (Athenæus, xi, p. 461).

The gnomic poets, or moralists in verse, approach by the tone of
their sentiments more to the nature of prose. They begin with
Simonidês of Amorgos or of Samos, the contemporary of Archilochus:
indeed, the latter himself devoted some compositions to the
illustrative fable, which had not been unknown even to Hesiod. In
the remains of Simonidês of Amorgos we trace nothing relative to the
man personally, though he too, like Archilochus, is said to have had
an individual enemy, Orodœkidês, whose character was aspersed by his
muse.[180] His only considerable poem extant is devoted to a survey
of the characters of women, in iambic verse, and by way of comparison
with various animals,—the mare, the ass, the bee, etc. It follows
out the Hesiodic vein respecting the social and economical mischief
usually caused by women, with some few honorable exceptions; but the
poet shows a much larger range of observation and illustration, if we
compare him with his predecessor Hesiod; moreover, his illustrations
come fresh from life and reality. We find in this early iambist the
same sympathy with industry and its due rewards which are observable
in Hesiod, together with a still more melancholy sense of the
uncertainty of human events.

  [180] Welcker, Simonidis Amorgini Iambi qui supersunt, p. 9.

Of Solon and Theognis I have spoken in former chapters. They
reproduce in part the moralizing vein of Simonidês, though with
a strong admixture of personal feeling and a direct application
to passing events. The mixture of political with social morality,
which we find in both, marks their more advanced age: Solon bears
in this respect the same relation to Simonidês, as his contemporary
Alkæus bears to Archilochus. His poems, as far as we can judge
by the fragments remaining, appear to have been short occasional
effusions,—with the exception of the epic poem respecting the
submerged island of Atlantis; which he began towards the close of
his life, but never finished. They are elegiac, trimeter iambic, and
trochaic tetrameter: in his hands certainly neither of these metres
can be said to have any special or separate character. If the poems
of Solon are short, those of Theognis are much shorter, and are
indeed so much broken (as they stand in our present collection), as
to read like separate epigrams or bursts of feeling, which the poet
had not taken the trouble to incorporate in any definite scheme or
series. They form a singular mixture of maxim and passion,—of general
precept with personal affection towards the youth Kyrnus,—which
surprises us if tried by the standard of literary composition, but
which seems a very genuine manifestation of an impoverished exile’s
complaints and restlessness. What remains to us of Phokylidês,
another of the gnomic poets nearly contemporary with Solon, is
nothing more than a few maxims in verse,—couplets, with the name of
the author in several cases embodied in them.

Amidst all the variety of rhythmical and metrical innovations which
have been enumerated, the ancient epic continued to be recited by the
rhapsodes as before, and some new epical compositions were added to
the existing stock: Eugammon of Kyrênê, about the 50th Olympiad, (580
B. C.) appears to be the last of the series. At Athens, especially,
both Solon and Peisistratus manifested great solicitude as well
for the recitation as for the correct preservation of the Iliad.
Perhaps its popularity may have been diminished by the competition
of so much lyric and choric poetry, more showy and striking in
its accompaniments, as well as more changeful in its rhythmical
character. Whatever secondary effect, however, this newer species
of poetry may have derived from such helps, its primary effect
was produced by real intellectual or poetical excellence,—by the
thoughts, sentiment, and expression, not by the accompaniment. For
a long time the musical composer and the poet continued generally
to be one and the same person; and besides those who have acquired
sufficient distinction to reach posterity, we cannot doubt that there
were many known only to their own contemporaries. But with all of
them the instrument and the melody constituted only the inferior part
of that which was known by the name of music,—altogether subordinate
to the “thoughts that breathe and words that burn.”[181] Exactness
and variety of rhythmical pronunciation gave to the latter their
full effect upon a delicate ear; but such pleasure of the ear was
ancillary to the emotion of mind arising out of the sense conveyed.
Complaints are made by the poets, even so early as 500 B. C., that
the accompaniment was becoming too prominent. But it was not until
the age of the comic poet Aristophanês, towards the end of the fifth
century B. C., that the primitive relation between the instrumental
accompaniment and the words was really reversed,—and loud were the
complaints to which it gave rise;[182] the performance of the flute
or harp then became more elaborate, showy, and overpowering, while
the words were so put together as to show off the player’s execution.
I notice briefly this subsequent revolution for the purpose of
setting forth, by contrast, the truly intellectual character of the
original lyric and choric poetry of Greece; and of showing how much
the vague sentiment arising from mere musical sound was lost in the
more definite emotion, and in the more lasting and reproductive
combinations, generated by poetical meaning.

  [181] Aristophan. Nubes, 536.

    Ἀλλ᾽ αὑτῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔπεσιν πιστεύουσ᾽ ἐλήλυθεν.

  [182] See Pratinas ap. Athenæum, xiv, p. 617, also p. 636, and
  the striking fragment of the lost comic poet Pherekratês, in
  Plutarch, De Musicâ, p. 1141, containing the bitter remonstrance
  of _Music_ (Μουσικὴ) against the wrong which she had suffered
  from the dithyrambist Melanippidês: compare also Aristophanês,
  Nubes, 951-972; Athenæus, xiv, p. 617; Horat. Art. Poetic. 205;
  and W. M. Schmidt, Diatribê in Dithyrambum, ch. viii, pp. 250-265.

  Τὸ σοβαρὸν καὶ περιττὸν—the character of the newer music
  (Plutarch, Agis, c. 10)—as contrasted with τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ
  ἀπερίεργον of the old music (Plutarch, De Musicâ, _ut sup._):
  ostentation and affected display, against seriousness and
  simplicity. It is by no means certain that these reproaches
  against the more recent music of the Greeks were well founded;
  we may well be rendered mistrustful of their accuracy when we
  hear similar remarks and contrasts advanced with regard to the
  music of our last three centuries. The character of Greek poetry
  certainly tended to degenerate after Euripidês.

The name and poetry of Solon, and the short maxims, or sayings,
of Phokylidês, conduct us to the mention of the Seven Wise Men of
Greece. Solon was himself one of the seven, and most if not all
of them were poets, or composers in verse.[183] To most of them
is ascribed also an abundance of pithy repartees, together with
one short saying, or maxim, peculiar to each, serving as a sort of
distinctive motto;[184] indeed, the test of an accomplished man
about this time was his talent for singing or reciting poetry, and
for making smart and ready answers. Respecting this constellation
of wise men,—who in the next century of Grecian history, when
philosophy came to be a matter of discussion and argumentation,
were spoken of with great eulogy,—all the statements are confused,
in part even contradictory. Neither the number, nor the names, are
given by all authors alike. Dikæarchus numbered ten, Hermippus
seventeen: the names of Solon the Athenian, Thalês the Milesian,
Pittakus the Mitylenean, and Bias the Prienean, were comprised in
all the lists,—and the remaining names as given by Plato[185] were,
Kleobulus of Lindus in Rhodes, Myson of Chênæ, and Cheilon of Sparta.
By others, however, the names are differently stated: nor can we
certainly distribute among them the sayings, or mottoes, upon which
in later days the Amphiktyons conferred the honor of inscription
in the Delphian temple: Know thyself,—Nothing too much,—Know thy
opportunity,—Suretyship is the precursor of ruin. Bias is praised
as an excellent judge, and Myson was declared by the Delphian
oracle to be the most discreet man among the Greeks, according to
the testimony of the satirical poet Hippônax. This is the oldest
testimony (540 B. C.) which can be produced in favor of any of the
seven; but Kleobulus of Lindus, far from being universally extolled,
is pronounced by the poet Simonidês to be a fool.[186] Dikæarchus,
however, justly observed, that these seven or ten persons were not
wise men, or philosophers, in the sense which those words bore in his
day, but persons of practical discernment in reference to man and
society,[187]—of the same turn of mind as their contemporary the
fabulist Æsop, though not employing the same mode of illustration.
Their appearance forms an epoch in Grecian history, inasmuch as
they are the first persons who ever acquired an Hellenic reputation
grounded on mental competency apart from poetical genius or effect,—a
proof that political and social prudence was beginning to be
appreciated and admired on its own account. Solon, Pittakus, Bias,
and Thalês, were all men of influence—the first two even men of
ascendency,[188]—in their respective cities. Kleobulus was despot
of Lindus, and Periander (by some numbered among the seven) of
Corinth. Thalês stands distinguished as the earliest name in physical
philosophy, with which the other contemporary wise men are not said
to have meddled; their celebrity rests upon moral, social, and
political wisdom exclusively, which came into greater honor as the
ethical feeling of the Greeks improved and as their experience became
enlarged.

  [183] Bias of Priênê composed a poem of two thousand verses,
  on the condition of Ionia (Diogen. Laërt. i, 85), from which,
  perhaps, Herodotus may have derived, either directly or
  indirectly, the judicious advice which he ascribes to that
  philosopher on the occasion of the first Persian conquest of
  Ionia (Herod. i, 170).

  Not merely Xenophanês the philosopher (Diogen. Laërt. viii, 36,
  ix, 20), but long after him Parmenidês and Empedoklês, composed
  in verse.

  [184] See the account given by Herodotus (vi, 128-129) of the
  way in which Kleisthenês of Sikyon tested the comparative
  education (παίδευσις) of the various suitors who came to woo
  his daughter,—οἱ δὲ μνήστηρες ἔριν εἶχον ἀμφί τε μουσικῇ καὶ τῷ
  λεγομένῳ ἐς τὸ μέσον.

  [185] Plato, Protagoras, c. 28, p. 343.

  [186] Hippônax, Fragm. 77, 34, ed. Bergk—καὶ δικάσσασθαι Βίαντος
  τοῦ Πριηνέος κρείττων.

    ... Καὶ Μύσων, ὃν ὡς πολλὼν
    Ἀνεῖπεν ἀνδρῶν σωφρονέστατον πάντων.

  Simonidês. Fr. 6, ed. Bergk—μωροῦ φωτὸς ἅδε βουλά. Diogen. Laërt.
  i, 6, 2.

  Simonidês treats Pittakus with more respect, though questioning
  an opinion delivered by him (Fragm. 8, ed. Bergk; Plato,
  Protagoras, c. 26, p. 339).

  [187] Dikæarchus ap. Diogen. Laërt. i. 40. συνετοὺς καὶ
  νομοθετικοὺς δεινότητα πολιτικὴν καὶ δραστήριον σύνεσιν.
  Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 2.

  About the story of the tripod, which is said to have gone the
  round of these Seven Wise Men, see Menage ad Diogen. Laërt. i,
  28, p. 17.

  [188] Cicero, De Republ. i, 7; Plutarch, in Delph. p. 385;
  Bernhardy, Grundriss der Griechischen Litteratur, vol. i, sect.
  66, not. 3.

In these celebrated names we have social philosophy in its early
and infantine state,—in the shape of homely sayings or admonitions,
either supposed to be self-evident, or to rest upon some great
authority divine or human, but neither accompanied by reasons nor
recognizing any appeal to inquiry and discussion as the proper
test of their rectitude. From such unsuspecting acquiescence,
the sentiment to which these admonitions owe their force, we are
partially liberated even in the poet Simonidês of Keôs, who (as
before alluded to) severely criticizes the song of Kleobulus as well
as its author. The half-century which followed the age of Simonidês
(the interval between about 480-430 B. C.) broke down that sentiment
more and more, by familiarizing the public with argumentative
controversy in the public assembly, the popular judicature, and even
on the dramatic stage. And the increased self-working of the Grecian
mind, thus created, manifested itself in Sokratês, who laid open all
ethical and social doctrines to the scrutiny of reason, and who first
awakened among his countrymen that love of dialectics which never
left them,—an analytical interest in the mental process of inquiring
out, verifying, proving, and expounding truth. To this capital item
of human progress, secured through the Greeks—and through them
only—to mankind generally, our attention will be called at a later
period of the history; at present, it is only mentioned in contrast
with the naked, dogmatical laconism of the Seven Wise Men, and with
the simple enforcement of the early poets: a state in which morality
has a certain place in the feelings,—but no root, even among the
superior minds, in the conscious exercise of reason.

The interval between Archilochus and Solon (660-580 B. C.) seems,
as has been remarked in my former volume, to be the period in which
writing first came to be applied to Greek poems,—to the Homeric poems
among the number; and shortly after the end of that period, commences
the era of compositions without metre or prose. The philosopher
Pherekydês of Syros, about 550 B. C., is called by some the earliest
prose-writer; but no prose-writer for a considerable time afterwards
acquired any celebrity,—seemingly none earlier than Hekatæus of
Milêtus,[189] about 510-490 B. C.,—prose being a subordinate and
ineffective species of composition, not always even perspicuous,
but requiring no small practice before the power was acquired of
rendering it interesting.[190] Down to the generation preceding
Sokratês, the poets continued to be the grand leaders of the Greek
mind: until then, nothing was taught to youth except to read, to
remember, to recite musically and rhythmically, and to comprehend
poetical composition. The comments of preceptors, addressed to their
pupils, may probably have become fuller and more instructive, but the
text still continued to be epic or lyric poetry. We must recollect
also that these poets, so enunciated, were the best masters for
acquiring a full command of the complicated accent and rhythm of
the Greek language,—essential to an educated man in ancient times,
and sure to be detected if not properly acquired. Not to mention
the Choliambist Hippônax, who seems to have been possessed with the
devil of Archilochus, and in part also with his genius,—Anakreon,
Ibykus, Pindar, Bacchylidês, Simonidês, and the dramatists of Athens,
continue the line of eminent poets without intermission. After the
Persian war, the requirements of public speaking created a class of
rhetorical teachers, while the gradual spread of physical philosophy
widened the range of instruction: so that prose composition, for
speech or for writing, occupied a larger and larger share of the
attention of men, and was gradually wrought up to high perfection,
such as we see for the first time in Herodotus. But before it became
thus improved, and acquired that style which was the condition of
wide-spread popularity, we may be sure that it had been silently
used as a means of recording information; and that neither the large
mass of geographical matter contained in the Periegêsis of Hekatæus,
nor the map first prepared by his contemporary, Anaximander, could
have been presented to the world, without the previous labors of
unpretending prose writers, who set down the mere results of their
own experience. The acquisition of prose-writing, commencing as it
does about the age of Peisistratus, is not less remarkable as an
evidence of past, than as a means of future, progress.

  [189] Pliny, H. N. vii, 57. Suidas v. Ἑκαταῖος.

  [190] H. Ritter (Geschichte der Philosophie, ch. vi, p. 243) has
  some good remarks on the difficulty and obscurity of the early
  Greek prose-writers, in reference to the darkness of expression
  and meaning universally charged upon the philosopher Herakleitus.

Of that splendid genius in sculpture and architecture, which shone
forth in Greece after the Persian invasion, the first lineaments
only are discoverable between 600-560 B. C., in Corinth, Ægina,
Samos, Chios, Ephesus, etc.,—enough, however, to give evidence
of improvement and progress. Glaukus of Chios is said to have
discovered the art of welding iron, and Rhœkus, or his son Theodôrus
of Samos, the art of casting copper or brass in a mould: both these
discoveries, as far as can be made out, appear to date a little
before 600 B. C.[191] The primitive memorial, erected in honor of
a god, did not even pretend to be an image, but was often nothing
more than a pillar, a board, a shapeless stone, a post, etc., fixed
so as to mark and consecrate the locality, and receiving from the
neighborhood respectful care and decoration, as well as worship.
Sometimes there was a real statue, though of the rudest character,
carved in wood; and the families of carvers,—who, from father to
son, exercised this profession, represented in Attica by the name of
Dædalus, and in the Ægina by the name of Smilis,—adhered long, with
strict exactness, to the consecrated type of each particular god.
Gradually, the wish grew up to change the material, as well as to
correct the rudeness, of such primitive idols; sometimes the original
wood was retained as the material, but covered in part with ivory
or gold,—in other cases, marble or metal was substituted. Dipœnos
and Skyllis of Krête acquired renown as workers in marble, about
the 50th Olympiad (580 B. C.), and from them downwards a series of
names may be traced, more or less distinguished; moreover, it seems
about the same period that the earliest temple-offerings, in works
of art, properly so called, commence,—the golden statue of Zeus, and
the large carved chest, dedicated by the Kypselids of Corinth at
Olympia.[192] The pious associations, however, connected with the
old type were so strong, that the hand of the artist was greatly
restrained in dealing with statues of the gods. It was in statues of
men, especially in those of the victors at Olympia and other sacred
games, that genuine ideas of beauty were first aimed at and in part
attained, from whence they passed afterwards to the statues of the
gods. Such statues of the athletes seem to commence somewhere between
Olympiad 53-58, (568-548 B. C.).

  [191] See O. Müller, Archäologie der Kunst, sect. 61; Sillig.
  Catalogus Artificium,—under Theodôrus and Teleklês.

  Thiersch (Epochen der Bildenden Kunst, pp. 182-190, 2nd edit.)
  places Rhœkus near the beginning of the recorded Olympiads;
  and supposes two artists named Theodôrus, one the grandson of
  the other; but this seems to me not sustained by any adequate
  authority (for the loose chronology of Pliny about the Samian
  school of artists is not more trustworthy than about the
  Chian school,—compare xxxv, 12, and xxxvi, 3), and, moreover,
  intrinsically improbable. Herodotus (i, 51) speaks of “_the_
  Samian Theodôrus,” and seems to have known only one person so
  called: Diodôrus (i, 98) and Pausanias (x, 38, 3) give different
  accounts of Theodôrus, but the positive evidence does not enable
  us to verify the genealogies either of Thiersch or O. Müller.
  Herodotus (iv, 152) mentions the Ἡραῖον at Samos in connection
  with events near Olymp. 37; but this does not prove that the
  great temple which he himself saw, a century and a half later,
  had been begun before Olymp. 37, as Thiersch would infer. The
  statement of O. Müller, that this temple was begun in Olymp. 35,
  is not authenticated (Arch. der Kunst. sect. 53).

  [192] Pausanias tells us distinctly that this chest was dedicated
  at Olympia by the Kypselids, descendants of Kypselus; and this
  seems credible enough. But he also tells us that this was the
  identical chest in which the infant Kypselus had been concealed,
  believing the story as told in Herodotus (v, 92). In this latter
  belief I cannot go along with him, nor do I think that there is
  any evidence for believing the chest to have been of more ancient
  date than the persons who dedicated it,—in spite of the opinions
  of O. Müller and Thiersch to the contrary (O. Müller, Archäol.
  der Kunst, sect. 57; Thiersch, Epochen der Griechischen Kunst, p.
  169, 2nd edit.: Pausan. v, 17, 2).

Nor is it until the same interval of time (between 600-550 B.
C.) that we find any traces of these architectural monuments, by
which the more important cities in Greece afterwards attracted
to themselves so much renown. The two greatest temples in Greece
known to Herodotus were, the Artemision at Ephesus, and the Heræon
at Samos: the former of these seems to have been commenced, by
the Samian Theodorus, about 600 B. C.,—the latter, begun by the
Samian Rhœkus, can hardly be traced to any higher antiquity. The
first attempts to decorate Athens by such additions proceeded from
Peisistratus and his sons, near the same time. As far as we can
judge, too, in the absence of all direct evidence, the temples of
Pæstum in Italy and Selinus in Sicily seem to fall in this same
century. Of painting, during these early centuries, nothing can
be affirmed; it never at any time reached the same perfection as
sculpture, and we may presume that its years of infancy were at least
equally rude.

The immense development of Grecian art subsequently, and the great
perfection of Grecian artists, are facts of great importance in the
history of the human race. And in regard to the Greeks themselves,
they not only acted powerfully on the taste of the people, but were
also valuable indirectly as the common boast of Hellenism, and
as supplying one bond of fraternal sympathy as well as of mutual
pride, among its widely-dispersed sections. It is the paucity and
weakness of these bonds which renders the history of Greece, prior
to 560 B. C., little better than a series of parallel, but isolated
threads, each attached to a separate city; and that increased range
of joint Hellenic feeling and action, upon which we shall presently
enter, though arising doubtless in great measure from new and common
dangers threatening many cities at once,—also springs in part from
those other causes which have been enumerated in this chapter as
acting on the Grecian mind. It proceeds from the stimulus applied to
all the common feelings in religion, art, and recreation,—from the
gradual formation of national festivals, appealing in various ways
to tastes and sentiments which animated every Hellenic bosom,—from
the inspirations of men of genius, poets, musicians, sculptors,
architects, who supplied more or less in every Grecian city,
education for the youth, training for the chorus, and ornament for
the locality,—from the gradual expansion of science, philosophy, and
rhetoric, during the coming period of this history, which rendered
one city the intellectual capital of Greece, and brought to Isokratês
and Plato pupils from the most distant parts of the Grecian world.
It was this fund of common tastes, tendencies, and aptitudes, which
caused the social atoms of Hellas to gravitate towards each other,
and which enabled the Greeks to become something better and greater
than an aggregate of petty disunited communities like the Thracians
or Phrygians. And the creation of such common, extra-political
Hellenism, is the most interesting phenomenon which the historian has
to point out in the early period now under our notice. He is called
upon to dwell upon it the more forcibly, because the modern reader
has generally no idea of national union without political union,—an
association foreign to the Greek mind. Strange as it may seem to find
a song-writer put forward as an active instrument of union among
his fellow-Hellens, it is not the less true, that those poets, whom
we have briefly passed in review, by enriching the common language,
and by circulating from town to town either in person or in their
compositions, contributed to fan the flame of Pan-Hellenic patriotism
at a time when there were few circumstances to coöperate with them,
and when the causes tending to perpetuate isolation seemed in the
ascendant.




CHAPTER XXX.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS DURING THE GOVERNMENT OF PEISISTRATUS AND HIS SONS AT
ATHENS.


We now arrive at what may be called the second period of Grecian
history, beginning with the rule of Peisistratus at Athens and of
Crœsus in Lydia.

It has been already stated that Peisistratus made himself despot
of Athens in 560 B. C.: he died in 527 B. C., and was succeeded by
his son Hippias, who was deposed and expelled in 510 B. C., thus
making an entire space of fifty years between the first exaltation of
the father and the final expulsion of the son. These chronological
points are settled on good evidence: but the thirty-three years
covered by the reign of Peisistratus are interrupted by two periods
of exile,—one of them lasting not less than ten years,—the other,
five years. And the exact place of the years of exile, being nowhere
laid down upon authority, has been differently determined by the
conjectures of chronologers.[193] Partly from this half-known
chronology, partly from a very scanty collection of facts, the
history of the half-century now before us can only be given very
imperfectly: nor can we wonder at our ignorance, when we find that
even among the Athenians themselves, only a century afterwards,
statements the most incorrect and contradictory respecting the
Peisistratids were in circulation, as Thucydidês distinctly, and
somewhat reproachfully, acquaints us.

  [193] Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. vol. ii, Appendix, c. 2,
  p. 201) has stated and discussed the different opinions on the
  chronology of Peisistratus and his sons.

More than thirty years had now elapsed since the promulgation of the
Solonian constitution, whereby the annual senate of Four Hundred had
been created, and the public assembly (preceded in its action as
well as aided and regulated by this senate) invested with a power of
exacting responsibility from the magistrates after their year of
office. The seeds of the subsequent democracy had thus been sown,
and no doubt the administration of the archons had been practically
softened by it; but nothing in the nature of a democratical sentiment
had yet been created. A hundred years hence, we shall find that
sentiment unanimous and potent among the enterprising masses of
Athens and Peiræeus, and shall be called upon to listen to loud
complaints of the difficulty of dealing with “that angry, waspish,
intractable little old man, Dêmus of Pnyx,”—so Aristophanes[194]
calls the Athenian people to their faces, with a freedom which shows
that _he_ at least counted on their good temper. But between 560-510
B. C. the people are as passive in respect to political rights and
securities as the most strenuous enemy of democracy could desire,
and the government is transferred from hand to hand by bargains
and cross-changes between two or three powerful men,[195] at the
head of partisans who echo their voices, espouse their personal
quarrels, and draw the sword at their command. It was this ancient
constitution—Athens as it stood before the Athenian democracy—which
the Macedonian Antipater professed to restore in 322 B. C., when he
caused the majority of the poorer citizens to be excluded altogether
from the political franchise.[196]

  [194]

    Ἀγροῖκος ὀργὴν, κυαμοτρὼξ, ἀκράχολος
    Δῆμος Πνυκίτης, δύσκολον γερόντιον.

      Aristoph. Equit. 41.

  I need hardly mention that the Pnyx was the place in which the
  Athenian public assemblies were held.

  [195] Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. c. 15, p. 858) is angry
  with Herodotus for imparting so petty and personal a character
  to the dissensions between the Alkmæônids and Peisistratus; his
  severe remarks in that treatise, however, tend almost always to
  strengthen rather than to weaken the credibility of the historian.

  [196] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 27, ἀπεκρίνατο φιλίαν ἔσεσθαι τοῖς
  Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ξυμμαχίαν, ἐκδοῦσι μὲν τοὺς περὶ Δημοσθένην
  καὶ Ὑπερείδην, πολιτευομένοις δὲ τὴν ~πάτριον~ ἀπὸ τιμήματος
  πολιτείαν, δεξαμένοις δὲ φρουρὰν εἰς τὴν Μουνυχίαν, ἔτι δὲ
  χρήματα τοῦ πολέμου καὶ ζημίαν προσεκτίσασιν. Compare Diodor.
  xviii, 18.

  Twelve thousand of the poorer citizens were disfranchised by this
  change (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 28).

By the stratagem recounted in a former chapter,[197] Peisistratus
had obtained from the public assembly a guard which he had employed
to acquire forcible possession of the acropolis. He thus became
master of the administration; but he employed his power honorably and
well, not disturbing the existing forms farther than was necessary
to insure to himself full mastery. Nevertheless, we may see by
the verses of Solon[198] (the only contemporary evidence which we
possess), that the prevalent sentiment was by no means favorable to
his recent proceeding, and that there was in many minds a strong
feeling both of terror and aversion, which presently manifested
itself in the armed coalition of his two rivals,—Megaklês at the head
of the Parali, or inhabitants of the sea-board, and Lykurgus at the
head of those in the neighboring plain. As the conjunction of the two
formed a force too powerful for Peisistratus to withstand, he was
driven into exile, after no long possession of his despotism.

  [197] See the preceding volume, ch. xi, p. 155.

  [198] Solon. Fragm. 10, ed. Bergk.—

    Εἰ δὲ πεπόνθατε λυγρὰ δι᾽ ὑμετέρην κακότητα,
      Μήτι θεοῖς τούτων μοῖραν ἐπαμφέρετε, etc.

But the time came, how soon we cannot tell, when the two rivals
who had expelled him quarrelled, and Megaklês made propositions to
Peisistratus, inviting him to resume the sovereignty, promising his
own aid, and stipulating that Peisistratus should marry his daughter.
The conditions being accepted, a plan was laid between the two new
allies for carrying them into effect, by a novel stratagem,—since
the simulated wounds and pretence of personal danger were not likely
to be played off a second time with success. The two conspirators
clothed a stately woman, six feet high, named Phyê, in the panoply
and costume of Athênê,—surrounded her with the processional
accompaniments belonging to the goddess,—and placed her in a chariot
with Peisistratus by her side. In this guise the exiled despot and
his adherents approached the city and drove up to the acropolis,
preceded by heralds, who cried aloud to the people: “Athenians,
receive ye cordially Peisistratus, whom Athênê has honored above
all other men, and is now bringing back into her own acropolis.”
The people in the city received the reputed goddess with implicit
belief and demonstrations of worship, while among the country cantons
the report quickly spread that Athênê had appeared in person to
restore Peisistratus, who thus found himself, without even a show of
resistance, in possession of the acropolis and of the government.
His own party, united with that of Megaklês, were powerful enough
to maintain him, when he had once acquired possession; and probably
all, except the leaders, sincerely believed in the epiphany of the
goddess, which came to be divulged as having been a deception, only
after Peisistratus and Megaklês had quarrelled.[199]

  [199] Herodot. i, 60, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄστεϊ πειθόμενοι τὴν γυναῖκα
  εἶναι ~αὐτὴν τὴν θεὸν~, προσεύχοντό τε τὴν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐδέκοντο
  τὸν Πεισίστρατον. A later statement (Athenæus, xiii, p. 609)
  represents Phyê to have become afterwards the wife of Hipparchus.

  Of this remarkable story, not the least remarkable part is the
  criticism with which Herodotus himself accompanies it. He treats
  it as a proceeding infinitely silly (πρῆγμα εὐηθέστατον, ὡς ἐγὼ
  εὐρίσκω, μακρῷ); he cannot conceive, how Greeks, so much superior
  to barbarians,—and even Athenians, the cleverest of all the
  Greeks,—could have fallen into such a trap. To him the story was
  told as a deception from the beginning, and he did not perhaps
  take pains to put himself into the state of feeling of those
  original spectators who saw the chariot approach, without any
  warning or preconceived suspicion. But even allowing for this,
  his criticism brings to our view the alteration and enlargement
  which had taken place in the Greek mind during the century
  between Peisistratus and Periklês. Doubtless, neither the latter
  nor any of his contemporaries could have succeeded in a similar
  trick.

  The fact, and the criticism upon it, now before us are remarkably
  illustrated by an analogous case recounted in a previous chapter,
  (vol. ii, p. 421, chap. viii.) Nearly at the same period as this
  stratagem of Peisistratus, the Lacedæmonians and the Argeians
  agreed to decide, by a combat of three hundred select champions,
  the dispute between them as to the territory of Kynuria. The
  combat actually took place, and the heroism of Othryades, sole
  Spartan survivor, has been already recounted. In the eleventh
  year of the Peloponnesian war, shortly after or near upon the
  period when we may conceive the history of Herodotus to have
  been finished, the Argeians concluded a treaty with Lacedæmon,
  and introduced as a clause into it the liberty of reviving their
  pretensions to Kynuria, and of again deciding the dispute by a
  combat of select champions. To the Lacedæmonians of that time
  this appeared extreme folly,—the very proceeding which had been
  actually resorted to a century before. Here is another case, in
  which the change in the point of view, and the increased positive
  tendencies in the Greek mind, are brought to our notice not less
  forcibly than by the criticism of Herodotus upon Phyê-Athênê.

  Istrus (one of the Atthido-graphers of the third century B.
  C.) and Antiklês published books respecting the personal
  manifestations or epiphanies of the gods,—Ἀπόλλωνος ἐπιφανεῖαι:
  see Istri Fragment. 33-37, ed. Didot. If Peisistratus and
  Megaklês had never quarrelled, their joint stratagem might have
  continued to pass for a genuine epiphany, and might have been
  included as such in the work of Istrus. I will add, that the real
  presence of the gods, at the festivals celebrated in their honor,
  was an idea continually brought before the minds of the Greeks.

  The Athenians fully believed the epiphany of the god Pan to
  Pheidippidês the courier, on his march to Sparta, a little before
  the battle of Marathôn (Herodot. vi, 105, καὶ ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι
  πιστεύσαντες εἶναι ἀληθέα), and even Herodotus himself does
  not controvert it, though he relaxes the positive character
  of history so far as to add—“as Pheidippidês himself said and
  recounted publicly to the Athenians.” His informants in this case
  were doubtless sincere believers; whereas, in the case of Phyê,
  the story was told to him at first as a fabrication.

  At Gela in Sicily, seemingly not long before this restoration
  of Peisistratus, Têlinês (ancestor of the despot Gelon) had
  brought back some exiles to Gela, “without any armed force, but
  merely through the sacred ceremonies and appurtenances of the
  subterranean goddesses,”—ἔχων οὐδεμίην ἀνδρῶν δύναμιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἱρὰ
  τουτέων τῶν θεῶν—τούτοισι δ᾽ ὦν πίσυνος ἐὼν, κατήγαγε (Herodot.
  vii, 153). Herodotus does not tell us the details which he
  had heard of the manner in which this restoration at Gela was
  brought about; but his general language intimates, that they were
  remarkable details, and they might have illustrated the story of
  Phyê Athênê.

The daughter of Megaklês, according to agreement, quickly became
the wife of Peisistratus, but she bore him no children; and it
became known that her husband, having already adult sons by a former
marriage, and considering that the Kylonian curse rested upon all
the Alkmæônid family, did not intend that she should become a
mother.[200] Megaklês was so incensed at this behavior, that he not
only renounced his alliance with Peisistratus, but even made his
peace with the third party, the adherents of Lykurgus,—and assumed so
menacing an attitude, that the despot was obliged to evacuate Attica.
He retired to Eretria in Eubœa, where he remained no less than ten
years; but a considerable portion of that time was employed in making
preparations for a forcible return, and he seems to have exercised,
even while in exile, a degree of influence much exceeding that of
a private man. He lent valuable aid to Lygdamis of Naxos,[201] in
constituting himself despot of that island, and he possessed, we
know not how, the means of rendering valuable service to different
cities, Thebes in particular. They repaid him by large contributions
of money to aid in his reëstablishment: mercenaries were hired from
Argos, and the Naxian Lygdamis came himself, both with money and with
troops. Thus equipped and aided, Peisistratus landed at Marathon in
Attica. How the Athenian government had been conducted during his
ten years’ absence, we do not know; but the leaders of it permitted
him to remain undisturbed at Marathon, and to assemble his partisans
both from the city and from the country: nor was it until he broke
up from Marathon and had reached Pallênê on his way to Athens, that
they took the field against him. Moreover, their conduct, even when
the two armies were near together, must have been either extremely
negligent or corrupt; for Peisistratus found means to attack them
unprepared, routing their forces almost without resistance. In fact,
the proceedings have altogether the air of a concerted betrayal: for
the defeated troops, though unpursued, are said to have dispersed and
returned to their homes forthwith, in obedience to the proclamation
of Peisistratus, who marched on to Athens, and found himself a third
time ruler.[202]

  [200] Herodot. i, 61. Peisistratus—ἐμίχθη οἱ οὐ κατὰ νόμον.

  [201] About Lygdamis, see Athenæus, viii, p. 348, and his
  citation from the lost work of Aristotle on the Grecian
  Πολιτεῖαι; also, Aristot. Politic. v, 5, 1.

  [202] Herodot. i, 63.

On this third successful entry, he took vigorous precautions for
rendering his seat permanent. The Alkmæônidæ and their immediate
partisans retired into exile; but he seized the children of those
who remained, and whose sentiments he suspected, as hostages for
the behavior of their parents, and placed them in Naxos, under the
care of Lygdamis. Moreover, he provided himself with a powerful
body of Thracian mercenaries, paid by taxes levied upon the
people:[203] nor did he omit to conciliate the favor of the gods
by a purification of the sacred island of Delos: all the dead
bodies which had been buried within sight of the temple of Apollo
were exhumed and reinterred farther off. At this time the Delian
festival,—attended by the Asiatic Ionians and the islanders, and
with which Athens was of course peculiarly connected,—must have
been beginning to decline from its pristine magnificence; for the
subjugation of the continental Ionic cities by Cyrus had been already
achieved, and the power of Samos, though increased under the despot
Polykratês, seems to have increased at the expense and to the ruin
of the smaller Ionic islands. From the same feelings, in part,
which led to the purification of Delos,—partly as an act of party
revenue,—Peisistratus caused the houses of the Alkmæônids to be
levelled with the ground, and the bodies of the deceased members of
that family to be disinterred and cast out of the country.[204]

  [203] Herodot. i, 64. ἐπικούροισί τε πολλοῖσι, καὶ χρημάτων
  συνόδοισι, τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρύμονος ποτάμου
  προσιόντων.

  [204] Isokratês, Or. xvi, De Bigis, c. 351.

This third and last period of the rule of Peisistratus lasted several
years, until his death in 527 B. C.: it is said to have been so
mild in its character, that he once even suffered himself to be
cited for trial before the Senate of Areopagus; yet as we know that
he had to maintain a large body of Thracian mercenaries out of the
funds of the people, we shall be inclined to construe this eulogium
comparatively rather than positively. Thucydidês affirms that both
he and his sons governed in a wise and virtuous spirit, levying
from the people only an income-tax of five per cent.[205] This is
high praise coming from such an authority, though it seems that
we ought to make some allowance for the circumstance of Thucydidês
being connected by descent with the Peisistratid family.[206] The
judgment of Herodotus is also very favorable respecting Peisistratus;
that of Aristotle favorable, yet qualified,—since he includes these
despots among the list of those who undertook public and sacred works
with the deliberate view of impoverishing as well as of occupying
their subjects. This supposition is countenanced by the prodigious
scale upon which the temple of Zeus Olympius at Athens was begun
by Peisistratus,—a scale much exceeding either the Parthenôn or
the temple of Athênê Polias, both of which were erected in later
times, when the means of Athens were decidedly larger,[207] and her
disposition to demonstrative piety certainly no way diminished. It
was left by him unfinished, nor was it ever completed until the Roman
emperor Hadrian undertook the task. Moreover, Peisistratus introduced
the greater Panathenaic festival, solemnized every four years, in the
third Olympic year: the annual Panathenaic festival, henceforward
called the Lesser, was still continued.

  [205] For the statement of Boeckh, Dr. Arnold, and Dr. Thirlwall,
  that Peisistratus had levied a tythe or tax of ten per cent.,
  and that his sons reduced it to the half, I find no sufficient
  warrant: certainly, the spurious letter of Peisistratus to Solon
  in Diogenes Laërtius (i, 53) ought not to be considered as
  proving anything. Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, B. iii, c.
  6 (i, 351 German); Dr. Arnold ad Thucyd. vi, 34; Dr. Thirlwall
  Hist. of Gr. ch. xi, pp. 72-74. Idomeneus (ap. Athenæ. xii, p.
  533) considers the sons of Peisistratus to have indulged in
  pleasures to an extent more costly and oppressive to the people
  than their father. Nor do I think that there is sufficient
  authority to sustain the statement of Dr. Thirlwall (p. 68),
  “He (Peisistratus) possessed lands on the Strymon in Thrace,
  which yielded a large revenue.” Herodotus (i, 64) tells us that
  Peisistratus brought mercenary soldiers from the Strymon, but
  that he levied the money to pay them in Attica—ἐῤῥίζωσε τὴν
  τυραννίδα ἐπικούροισί τε πολλοῖσι, καὶ χρημάτων συνόδοισι, τῶν
  μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρύμονος ποταμοῦ συνιόντων. It is,
  indeed, possible to construe this passage so as to refer both τῶν
  μὲν and τῶν δὲ to χρημάτων, which would signify that Peisistratus
  obtained his funds partly from the river Strymon, and thus serve
  as basis to the statement of Dr. Thirlwall. But it seems to me
  that the better way of construing the words is to refer τῶν μὲν
  to χρημάτων συνόδοισι, and τῶν δὲ to ἐπικούροισι,—treating both
  of them as genitives absolute. It is highly improbable that he
  should derive money from the Strymon: it is highly probable that
  his mercenaries came from thence.

  [206] Hermippus (ap. Marcellin. Vit. Thucyd. p. ix,) and the
  Scholiast on Thucyd. i, 20, affirm that Thucydidês was connected
  by relationship with the Peisistratidæ. His manner of speaking
  of them certainly lends countenance to the assertion; not merely
  as he twice notices their history, once briefly (i, 20) and
  again at considerable length (vi, 54-59), though it does not
  lie within the direct compass of his period,—but also as he so
  emphatically announces his own personal knowledge of their family
  relations,—Ὅτι δὲ πρεσβύτατος ὢν Ἱππίας ἦρξεν, ~εἰδὼς~ μὲν καὶ
  ἀκοῇ ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλων ἰσχυρίζομαι (vi, 55).

  Aristotle (Politic. v, 9, 21) mentions it as a report (φασι) that
  Peisistratus obeyed the summons to appear before the Areopagus;
  Plutarch adds that the person who had summoned him did not appear
  to bring the cause to trial (Vit. Solon, 31), which is not at all
  surprising: compare Thucyd. vi, 56, 57.

  [207] Aristot. Politic, v, 9, 4; Dikæarchus, Vita Græciæ, pp.
  140-166, ed. Fuhr; Pausan. i, 18, 8.

I have already noticed, at considerable length, the care which he
bestowed in procuring full and correct copies of the Homeric poems,
as well as in improving the recitation of them at the Panathenaic
festival,—a proceeding for which we owe him much gratitude, but which
has been shown to be erroneously interpreted by various critics. He
probably also collected the works of other poets,—called by Aulus
Gellius,[208] in language not well suited to the sixth century B.
C., a library thrown open to the public; and the service which he
thus rendered must have been highly valuable at a time when writing
and reading were not widely extended. His son Hipparchus followed up
the same taste, taking pleasure in the society of the most eminent
poets of the day,[209]—Simonidês, Anakreon, and Lasus; not to mention
the Athenian mystic Onomakritus, who, though not pretending to the
gift of prophecy himself, passed for the proprietor and editor of
the various prophecies ascribed to the ancient name of Musæus. The
Peisistratids were well versed in these prophecies, and set great
value upon them; but Onomakritus, being detected on one occasion
in the act of interpolating the prophecies of Musæus, was banished
by Hipparchus in consequence.[210] The statues of Hermês, erected
by this prince or by his personal friends in various parts of
Attica,[211] and inscribed with short moral sentences, are extolled
by the author of the Platonic dialogue called Hipparchus, with an
exaggeration which approaches to irony; but it is certain that
both the sons of Peisistratus, as well as himself, were exact in
fulfilling the religious obligations of the state, and ornamented the
city in several ways, especially the public fountain Kallirrhoê. They
are said to have maintained the preëxisting forms of law and justice,
merely taking care always to keep themselves and their adherents in
the effective offices of state, and in the full reality of power.
They were, moreover, modest and popular in their personal demeanor,
and charitable to the poor; yet one striking example occurs of
unscrupulous enmity, in their murder of Kimôn, by night, through the
agency of hired assassins.[212] There is good reason, however, for
believing that the government both of Peisistratus and of his sons
was in practice generally mild until after the death of Hipparchus
by the hands of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn, after which event the
surviving Hippias became alarmed, cruel, and oppressive during his
last four years. And the harshness of this concluding period left
upon the Athenian mind[213] that profound and imperishable hatred,
against the dynasty generally, which Thucydidês attests,—though he
labors to show that it was not deserved by Peisistratus, nor at first
by Hippias.

  [208] Aul. Gell. N. A. vi, 17.

  [209] Herodot. vii, 6; Pseudo-Plato, Hipparchus, p. 229.

  [210] Herodot. v, 93, VI, 6. Ὀνομάκριτον, χρησμολόγον καὶ
  διαθέτην τῶν χρησμῶν τῶν Μουσαίου. See Pausan. i, 22, 7. Compare,
  about the literary tendencies of the Peisistratids, Nitzsch, De
  Historiâ Homeri, ch. 30, p. 168.

  [211] Philochor. Frag. 69, ed. Didot; Plato, Hipparch. p. 230.

  [212] Herodot. vi, 38-103; Theopomp. ap. Athenæ. xii, p. 533.

  [213] Thucyd. vi, 53; Pseudo-Plato, Hipparch. p. 230; Pausan. i,
  23, 1.

Peisistratus left three legitimate sons,—Hippias, Hipparchus, and
Thessalus: the general belief at Athens among the contemporaries
of Thucydidês was, that Hipparchus was the eldest of the three and
had succeeded him; but the historian emphatically pronounces this
to be a mistake, and certifies, upon his own responsibility, that
Hippias was both eldest son and successor. Such an assurance from
him, fortified by certain reasons in themselves not very conclusive,
is sufficient ground for our belief,—the more so as Herodotus
countenances the same version. But we are surprised at such a degree
of historical carelessness in the Athenian public, and seemingly even
in Plato,[214] about a matter both interesting and comparatively
recent. In order to abate this surprise, and to explain how the name
of Hipparchus came to supplant that of Hippias in the popular talk,
Thucydidês recounts the memorable story of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn.

  [214] Thucyd. i, 20, about the general belief of the Athenian
  public in his time—Ἀθηναίων γοῦν τὸ πλῆθος οἴονται ὑφ᾽ Ἁρμοδίου
  καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος Ἵππαρχον τύραννον ὄντα ἀποθανεῖν, καὶ οὐκ
  ἴσασιν ὅτι Ἱππίας μὲν πρεσβύτατος ὢν ἦρχε τῶν Πεισιστράτου
  παιδῶν, etc.

  The Pseudo-Plato in the dialogue called Hipparchus adopts this
  belief, and the real Plato in his Symposion (c. 9, p. 182) seems
  to countenance it.

Of these two Athenian citizens,[215] both belonging to the ancient
gens called Gephyræi, the former was a beautiful youth, attached to
the latter by a mutual friendship and devoted intimacy, which Grecian
manners did not condemn. Hipparchus made repeated propositions to
Harmodius, which were repelled, but which, on becoming known to
Aristogeitôn, excited both his jealousy and his fears lest the
disappointed suitor should employ force,—fears justified by the
proceedings not unusual with Grecian despots,[216] and by the
absence of all legal protection against outrage from such a quarter.
Under these feelings, he began to look about, in the best way that
he could, for some means of putting down the despotism. Meanwhile
Hipparchus, though not entertaining any designs of violence, was so
incensed at the refusal of Harmodius, that he could not be satisfied
without doing something to insult or humiliate him. In order to
conceal the motive from which the insult really proceeded, he
offered it, not directly to Harmodius, but to his sister. He caused
this young maiden to be one day summoned to take her station in a
religious procession as one of the kanêphoræ, or basket carriers,
according to the practice usual at Athens; but when she arrived at
the place where her fellow-maidens were assembled, she was dismissed
with scorn as unworthy of so respectable a function, and the summons
addressed to her was disavowed.[217] An insult thus publicly offered
filled Harmodius with indignation, and still farther exasperated the
feelings of Aristogeitôn: both of them, resolving at all hazards to
put an end to the despotism, concerted means for aggression with
a few select associates. They awaited the festival of the Great
Panathenæa, wherein the body of the citizens were accustomed to march
up in armed procession, with spear and shield, to the acropolis;
this being the only day on which an armed body could come together
without suspicion. The conspirators appeared armed like the rest
of the citizens, but carrying concealed daggers besides. Harmodius
and Aristogeitôn undertook with their own hands to kill the two
Peisistratids, while the rest promised to stand forward immediately
for their protection against the foreign mercenaries; and though
the whole number of persons engaged was small, they counted upon
the spontaneous sympathies of the armed bystanders in an effort to
regain their liberties, so soon as the blow should once be struck.
The day of the festival having arrived, Hippias, with his foreign
body-guard around him, was marshalling the armed citizens for
procession, in the Kerameikus without the gates, when Harmodius and
Aristogeitôn approached with concealed daggers to execute their
purpose. On coming near, they were thunderstruck to behold one of
their own fellow-conspirators talking familiarly with Hippias, who
was of easy access to every man, and they immediately concluded that
the plot was betrayed. Expecting to be seized, and wrought up to
a state of desperation, they resolved at least not to die without
having revenged themselves on Hipparchus, whom they found within the
city gates near the chapel called the Leôkorion, and immediately
slew him. His attendant guards killed Harmodius on the spot; while
Aristogeitôn, rescued for the moment by the surrounding crowd, was
afterwards taken, and perished in the tortures applied to make him
disclose his accomplices.[218]

  [215] Herodot. v, 55-58. Harmodius is affirmed by Plutarch to
  have been of the deme Aphidnæ (Plutarch, Symposiacon, i, 10, p.
  628).

  It is to be recollected that he died before the introduction
  of the Ten Tribes, and before the recognition of the demes as
  political elements in the commonwealth.

  [216] For the terrible effects produced by this fear of ὕβρις εἰς
  τὴν ἡλικίαν, see Plutarch, Kimon, 1; Aristot. Polit. v, 9, 17.

  [217] Thucyd. vi, 56. Τὸν δ᾽ οὖν Ἁρμόδιον ἀπαρνηθέντα τὴν
  πείρασιν, ὥσπερ διενοεῖτο, προυπηλάκισεν· ἀδελφὴν γὰρ αὐτοῦ,
  κόρην, ἐπαγγείλαντες ἥκειν κανοῦν οἴσουσαν ἐν πομπῇ τινι,
  ἀπήλασαν, λέγοντες οὐδὲ ἐπαγγεῖλαι ἀρχὴν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀξίαν εἶναι.

  Dr. Arnold, in his note, supposes that this exclusion of the
  sister of Harmodius by the Peisistratids may have been founded on
  the circumstance that she belonged to the gens Gephyræi (Herodot.
  v, 57); her foreign blood, and her being in certain respects
  ἄτιμος, disqualified her (he thinks) from ministering to the
  worship of the gods of Athens.

  There is no positive reason to support the conjecture of Dr.
  Arnold, which seems, moreover, virtually discountenanced by the
  narrative of Thucydidês, who plainly describes the treatment
  of this young woman as a deliberate, preconcerted insult. Had
  there existed any assignable ground of exclusion, such as that
  which Dr. Arnold supposes, leading to the inference that the
  Peisistratids could not admit her without violating religious
  custom, Thucydidês would hardly have neglected to allude to
  it, for it would have lightened the insult; and indeed, on
  that supposition, the sending of the original summons might
  have been made to appear as an accidental mistake. I will add,
  that Thucydidês, though no way forfeiting his obligations to
  historical truth, is evidently not disposed to omit anything
  which can be truly said in favor of the Peisistratids.

  [218] Thucyd. vi, 58, οὐ ῥᾳδίως διετέθη: compare Polyæn. i, 22;
  Diodorus, Fragm. lib. x, p. 62, vol. iv, ed. Wess.; Justin, ii,
  9. See, also, a good note of Dr. Thirlwall on the passage, Hist.
  of Gr. vol. ii, ch. xi, p. 77, 2nd ed. I agree with him, that we
  may fairly construe the indistinct phrase of Thucydidês by the
  more precise statements of later authors, who mention the torture.

The news flew quickly to Hippias in the Kerameikus, who heard it
earlier than the armed citizens near him, awaiting his order for the
commencement of the procession. With extraordinary self-command,
he took advantage of this precious instant of foreknowledge, and
advanced towards them,—commanding them to drop their arms for a
short time, and assemble on an adjoining ground. They unsuspectingly
obeyed, and he immediately directed his guards to take possession of
the vacant arms. He was now undisputed master, and enabled to seize
the persons of all those citizens whom he mistrusted,—especially all
those who had daggers about them, which it was not the practice to
carry in the Panathenaic procession.

Such is the memorable narrative of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn,
peculiarly valuable inasmuch as it all comes from Thucydidês.[219]
To possess great power,—to be above legal restraint,—to inspire
extraordinary fear,—is a privilege so much coveted by the giants
among mankind, that we may well take notice of those cases in which
it brings misfortune even upon themselves. The fear inspired by
Hipparchus,—of designs which he did not really entertain, but was
likely to entertain, and competent to execute without hindrance,—was
here the grand cause of his destruction.

  [219] Thucyd. i, 20, vi, 54-59; Herodot. v, 55, 56, vi, 123;
  Aristot. Polit. v, 8, 9.

The conspiracy here detailed happened in 514 B. C., during the
thirteenth year of the reign of Hippias,—which lasted four years
longer, until 510 B. C. And these last four years, in the belief
of the Athenian public, counted for his whole reign; nay, many of
them made the still greater historical mistake of eliding these
last four years altogether, and of supposing that the conspiracy of
Harmodius and Aristogeitôn had deposed the Peisistratid government
and liberated Athens. Both poets and philosophers shared this faith,
which is distinctly put forth in the beautiful and popular Skolion
or song on the subject: the two friends are there celebrated as
the authors of liberty at Athens,—“they slew the despot and gave
to Athens equal laws.”[220] So inestimable a present was alone
sufficient to enshrine in the minds of the subsequent democracy
those who had sold their lives to purchase it: and we must farther
recollect that the intimate connection between the two, so repugnant
to the modern reader, was regarded at Athens with sympathy,—so that
the story took hold of the Athenian mind by the vein of romance
conjointly with that of patriotism. Harmodius and Aristogeitôn were
afterwards commemorated both as the winners and as the protomartyrs
of Athenian liberty. Statues were erected in their honor shortly
after the final expulsion of the Peisistratids; immunity from taxes
and public burdens was granted to the descendants of their families;
and the speaker who proposed the abolition of such immunities, at a
time when the number had been abusively multiplied, made his only
special exception in favor of this respected lineage.[221] And since
the name of Hipparchus was universally notorious as the person slain,
we discover how it was that he came to be considered by an uncritical
public as the predominant member of the Peisistratid family,—the
eldest son and successor of Peisistratus,—the reigning despot,—to the
comparative neglect of Hippias. The same public probably cherished
many other anecdotes,[222] not the less eagerly believed because
they could not be authenticated, respecting this eventful period.

  [220] See the words of the song:—

    Ὅτι τὸν τύραννον κτανέτην
      Ἰσονόμους τ᾽ Αθήνας ἐποιησάτην—

  ap. Athenæum, xv, p. 691.

  The epigram of the Keian Simonidês, (Fragm. 132, ed. Bergk—ap.
  Hephæstion. c. 14, p. 26, ed. Gaisf.) implies a similar belief:
  also, the passages in Plato, Symposion, p. 182, in Aristot.
  Polit. v, 8, 21, and Arrian, Exped. Alex. iv, 10, 3.

  [221] Herodot. vi, 109; Demosthen. adv. Leptin. c. 27, p. 495;
  cont. Meidiam, c. 47, p. 569; and the oath prescribed in the
  Psephism of Demophantus, Andokidês, De Mysteriis, p. 13; Pliny,
  H. N. xxxiv, 4-8; Pausan. i, 8, 5; Plutarch, Aristeidês, 27.

  The statues were carried away from Athens by Xerxês, and restored
  to the Athenians by Alexander after his conquest of Persia
  (Arrian, Ex. Al. iii, 14, 16; Pliny, H. N. xxxiv, 4-8).

  [222] One of these stories may be seen in Justin, ii, 9,—who
  gives the name of Dioklês to Hipparchus,—“Diocles, alter ex
  filiis, per vim stupratâ virgine, a fratre puellæ interficitur.”

Whatever may have been the moderation of Hippias before, indignation
at the death of his brother, and fear for his own safety,[223] now
induced him to drop it altogether. It is attested both by Thucydidês
and Herodotus, and admits of no doubt, that his power was now
employed harshly and cruelly,—that he put to death a considerable
number of citizens. We find also a statement, noway improbable in
itself, and affirmed both in Pausanias and in Plutarch,—inferior
authorities, yet still in this case sufficiently credible,—that
he caused Leæna, the mistress of Aristogeitôn, to be tortured to
death, in order to extort from her a knowledge of the secrets and
accomplices of the latter.[224] But as he could not but be sensible
that this system of terrorism was full of peril to himself, so he
looked out for shelter and support in case of being expelled from
Athens; and with this view he sought to connect himself with Darius
king of Persia,—a connection full of consequences to be hereafter
developed. Æantidês, son of Hippoklus the despot of Lampsakus on
the Hellespont, stood high at this time in the favor of the Persian
monarch, which induced Hippias to give him his daughter Archedikê
in marriage; no small honor to the Lampsakene, in the estimation of
Thucydidês.[225] To explain how Hippias came to fix upon this town,
however, it is necessary to say a few words on the foreign policy of
the Peisistratids.

  [223] Ἡ γὰρ δειλία φονικώτατόν ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν—observes
  Plutarch, (Artaxerxês, c. 25).

  [224] Pausan. i, 23, 2: Plutarch, De Garrulitate, p. 897; Polyæn.
  viii, 45; Athenæus, xiii. p. 596.

  [225] We can hardly be mistaken in putting this interpretation on
  the words of Thucydidês—Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, Λαμψακηνῷ ἔδωκε (vi, 59).

  Some financial tricks and frauds are ascribed to Hippias by the
  author of the Pseudo-Aristotelian second book of the Œconomica
  (ii, 4). I place little reliance on the statements in this
  treatise respecting persons of early date, such as Kypselus or
  Hippias; in respect to facts of the subsequent period of Greece,
  between 450-300 B. C., the author’s means of information will
  doubtless render him a better witness.

It has already been mentioned that the Athenians, even so far
back as the days of the poet Alkæus, had occupied Sigeium in the
Troad, and had there carried on war with the Mityleneans; so that
their acquisitions in these regions date much before the time of
Peisistratus. Owing probably to this circumstance, an application
was made to them in the early part of his reign from the Dolonkian
Thracians, inhabitants of the Chersonese on the opposite side of the
Hellespont, for aid against their powerful neighbors the Absinthian
tribe of Thracians; and opportunity was thus offered for sending out
a colony to acquire this valuable peninsula for Athens. Peisistratus
willingly entered into the scheme, and Miltiadês son of Kypselus, a
noble Athenian, living impatiently under his despotism, was no less
pleased to take the lead in executing it: his departure and that
of other malcontents as founders of a colony suited the purpose of
all parties. According to the narrative of Herodotus,—alike pious
and picturesque,—and doubtless circulating as authentic at the
annual games which the Chersonesites, even in his time, celebrated
to the honor of their œkist,—it is the Delphian god who directs the
scheme and singles out the individual. The chiefs of the distressed
Dolonkians went to Delphi to crave assistance towards procuring
Grecian colonists, and were directed to choose for their œkist the
individual who should first show them hospitality on their quitting
the temple. They departed and marched all along what was called the
Sacred Road, through Phocis and Bœotia to Athens, without receiving
a single hospitable invitation; at length they entered Athens, and
passed by the house of Miltiadês, while he himself was sitting in
front of it. Seeing men whose costume and arms marked them out as
strangers, he invited them into his house and treated them kindly:
they then apprized him that he was the man fixed upon by the oracle,
and abjured him not to refuse his concurrence. After asking for
himself personally the opinion of the oracle, and receiving an
affirmative answer, he consented; sailing as œkist, at the head of a
body of Athenian emigrants, to the Chersonese.[226]

  [226] Herodot. vi, 36-37.

Having reached this peninsula, and having been constituted despot
of the mixed Thracian and Athenian population, he lost no time in
fortifying the narrow isthmus by a wall reaching all across from
Kardia to Paktya, a distance of about four miles and a half; so that
the Absinthian invaders were for the time effectually shut out,[227]
though the protection was not permanently kept up. He also entered
into a war with Lampsakus, on the Asiatic side of the strait, but was
unfortunate enough to fall into an ambuscade and become a prisoner.
Nothing preserved his life except the immediate interference of
Crœsus king of Lydia, coupled with strenuous menaces addressed to
the Lampsakenes, who found themselves compelled to release their
prisoner; Miltiadês having acquired much favor with this prince, in
what manner we are not told. He died childless some time afterwards,
while his nephew Stesagoras, who succeeded him, perished by
assassination, some time subsequent to the death of Peisistratus at
Athens.[228]

  [227] Thus the Scythians broke into the Chersonese even
  during the government of Miltiadês son of Kimôn, nephew of
  Miltiadês the œkist, about forty years after the wall had been
  erected (Herodot. vi, 40). Again, Periklês reëstablished the
  cross-wall, on sending to the Chersonese a fresh band of one
  thousand Athenian settlers (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 19): lastly,
  Derkyllidas the Lacedæmonian built it anew, in consequence of
  loud complaints raised by the inhabitants of their defenceless
  condition,—about 397 B. C. (Xenophon. Hellen. iii, 2, 8-10). So
  imperfect, however, did the protection prove, that about half a
  century afterwards, during the first years of the conquests of
  Philip of Macedon, an idea was entertained of digging through
  the isthmus, and converting the peninsula into an island
  (Demosthenês, Philippic ii, 6, p. 92, and De Haloneso, c. 10, p.
  86); an idea, however, never carried into effect.

  [228] Herodot. vi, 38, 39.

The expedition of Miltiadês to the Chersonese must have occurred
early after the first usurpation of Peisistratus, since even his
imprisonment by the Lampsakenes happened before the ruin of Crœsus,
(546 B. C.). But it was not till much later,—probably during the
third and most powerful period of Peisistratus,—that the latter
undertook his expedition against Sigeium in the Troad. This
place appears to have fallen into the hands of the Mityleneans:
Peisistratus retook it,[229] and placed there his illegitimate son
Hegesistratus as despot. The Mityleneans may have been enfeebled
at this time (somewhere between 537-527 B. C.) not only by the
strides of Persian conquest on the mainland, but also by the ruinous
defeat which they suffered from Polykratês and the Samians.[230]
Hegesistratus maintained the place against various hostile attempts,
throughout all the reign of Hippias, so that the Athenian possessions
in those regions comprehended at this period both the Chersonese
and Sigeium.[231] To the former of the two, Hippias sent out
Miltiadês, nephew of the first œkist, as governor, after the death
of his brother Stesagoras. The new governor found much discontent
in the peninsula, but succeeded in subduing it by entrapping and
imprisoning the principal men in each town. He farther took into his
pay a regiment of five hundred mercenaries, and married Hegesipylê,
daughter of the Thracian king Olorus.[232] It appears to have
been about 515 B. C. that this second Miltiadês went out to the
Chersonese.[233] He seems to have been obliged to quit it for a time,
after the Scythian expedition of Darius, in consequence of having
incurred the hostility of the Persians; but he was there from the
beginning of the Ionic revolt until about 493 B. C., or two or three
years before the battle of Marathon, on which occasion we shall find
him acting commander of the Athenian army.

  [229] Herodot. v, 94. I have already said that I conceive this as
  a different war from that in which the poet Alkæus was engaged.

  [230] Herodot. iii, 39.

  [231] Herodot. vi, 104, 139, 140.

  [232] Herodot. vi, 39-103. Cornelius Nepos, in his Life of
  Miltiadês, confounds in one biography the adventures of two
  persons,—Miltiadês son of Kypselus, the œkist,—and Miltiadês son
  of Kimôn, the victor of Marathon,—the uncle and the nephew.

  [233] There is nothing that I know to mark the date except that
  it was earlier than the death of Hipparchus in 514 B. C., and
  also earlier than the expedition of Darius against the Scythians,
  about 516 B. C., in which expedition Miltiadês was engaged: see
  Mr. Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, and J. M. Schultz, Beitrag zu
  genaueren Zeitbestimmungen der Hellen. Geschichten von der 63sten
  bis zur 72sten Olympiade, p. 165, in the Kieler Philologische
  Studien 1841.

Both the Chersonese and Sigeium, though Athenian possessions, were
however now tributary and dependent on Persia. And it was to this
quarter that Hippias, during his last years of alarm, looked for
support in the event of being expelled from Athens: he calculated
upon Sigeium as a shelter, and upon Æantidês, as well as Darius, as
an ally. Neither the one nor the other failed him.

The same circumstances which alarmed Hippias, and rendered his
dominion in Attica at once more oppressive and more odious, tended
of course to raise the hopes of his enemies, the Athenian exiles,
with the powerful Alkmæônids at their head. Believing the favorable
moment to be come, they even ventured upon an invasion of Attica, and
occupied a post called Leipsydrion in the mountain range of Parnês,
which separates Attica from Bœotia.[234] But their schemes altogether
failed: Hippias defeated and drove them out of the country. His
dominion now seemed confirmed, for the Lacedæmonians were on terms of
intimate friendship with him; and Amyntas king of Macedon, as well as
the Thessalians, were his allies. Yet the exiles whom he had beaten
in the open field succeeded in an unexpected manœuvre, which, favored
by circumstances, proved his ruin.

  [234] Herodot. v, 62. The unfortunate struggle at Leipsydrion
  became afterwards the theme of a popular song (Athenæus, xv,
  p. 695): see Hesychius, v. Λειψύδριον, and Aristotle, Fragm.
  Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία, 37, ed. Neumann.

  If it be true that Alkibiadês, grandfather of the celebrated
  Alkibiadês, took part with Kleisthenês and the Alkmæonid exiles
  in this struggle (see Isokratês, De Bigis, Or. xvi, p. 351), he
  must have been a mere youth.

By an accident which had occurred in the year 548 B. C.,[235] the
Delphian temple was set on fire and burnt. To repair this grave loss
was an object of solicitude to all Greece; but the outlay required
was exceedingly heavy, and it appears to have been long before the
money could be collected. The Amphiktyons decreed that one-fourth
of the cost should be borne by the Delphians themselves, who found
themselves so heavily taxed by this assessment, that they sent envoys
throughout all Greece to collect subscriptions in aid, and received,
among other donations, from the Greek settlers in Egypt twenty minæ,
besides a large present of alum from the Egyptian king Amasis: their
munificent benefactor Crœsus fell a victim to the Persians in 546
B. C., so that his treasure was no longer open to them. The total
sum required was three hundred talents (equal probably to about one
hundred and fifteen thousand pounds sterling),[236]—a prodigious
amount to be collected from the dispersed Grecian cities, who
acknowledged no common sovereign authority, and among whom the
proportion reasonable to ask from each was so difficult to determine
with satisfaction to all parties. At length, however, the money
was collected, and the Amphiktyons were in a situation to make a
contract for the building of the temple. The Alkmæônids, who had
been in exile ever since the third and final acquisition of power by
Peisistratus, took the contract; and in executing it, they not only
performed the work in the best manner, but even went much beyond the
terms stipulated; employing Parian marble for the frontage, where
the material prescribed to them was coarse stone.[237] As was before
remarked in the case of Peisistratus when he was in banishment, we
are surprised to find exiles whose property had been confiscated so
amply furnished with money,—unless we are to suppose that Kleisthenês
the Alkmæônid, grandson of the Sikyonian Kleisthenês,[238] inherited
through his mother wealth independent of Attica, and deposited it in
the temple of the Samian Hêrê. But the fact is unquestionable, and
they gained signal reputation throughout the Hellenic world for their
liberal performance of so important an enterprise. That the erection
took considerable time, we cannot doubt. It seems to have been
finished, as far as we can conjecture, about a year or two after
the death of Hipparchus,—512 B. C.,—more than thirty years after the
conflagration.

  [235] Pausan. x, 5, 5.

  [236] Herodot. i, 50, ii, 180. I have taken the three hundred
  talents of Herodotus as being Æginæan talents, which are to
  Attic talents in the ratio of 5 : 3. The Inscriptions prove that
  the accounts of the temple were kept by the Amphiktyons on the
  Æginæan scale of money: see Corpus Inscrip. Boeckh, No. 1688, and
  Boeckh, Metrologie, vii, 4.

  [237] Herodot. vi, 62. The words of the historian would seem
  to imply that they only began to think of this scheme of
  building the temple after the defeat of Leipsydrion, and a year
  or two before the expulsion of Hippias; a supposition quite
  inadmissible, since the temple must have taken some years in
  building.

  The loose and prejudiced statement in Philochorus, affirming that
  the Peisistratids caused the Delphian temple to be burnt, and
  also that they were at last deposed by the victorious arm of the
  Alkmæônids (Philochori Fragment. 70, ed. Didot) makes us feel the
  value of Herodotus and Thucydidês as authorities.

  [238] Herodot. vi, 128; Cicero, De Legg. ii, 16. The deposit here
  mentioned by Cicero, which may very probably have been recorded
  in an inscription in the temple, must have been made before the
  time of the Persian conquest of Samos,—indeed, before the death
  of Polykratês in 522 B. C., after which period the island fell at
  once into a precarious situation, and very soon afterwards into
  the greatest calamities.

To the Delphians, especially, the rebuilding of their temple on
so superior a scale was the most essential of all services, and
their gratitude towards the Alkmæônids was proportionally great.
Partly through such a feeling, partly through pecuniary presents,
Kleisthenês was thus enabled to work the oracle for political
purposes, and to call forth the powerful arm of Sparta against
Hippias. Whenever any Spartan presented himself to consult the
oracle, either on private or public business, the answer of the
priestess was always in one strain, “Athens must be liberated.”
The constant repetition of this mandate at length extorted from
the piety of the Lacedæmonians a reluctant compliance. Reverence
for the god overcame their strong feeling of friendship towards
the Peisistratids, and Anchimolius son of Aster was despatched by
sea to Athens, at the head of a Spartan force to expel them. On
landing at Phalêrum, however, he found them already forewarned and
prepared, as well as farther strengthened by one thousand horse
specially demanded from their allies in Thessaly. Upon the plain of
Phalêrum, this latter force was found peculiarly effective, so that
the division of Anchimolius was driven back to their ships with great
loss and he himself slain.[239] The defeated armament had probably
been small, and its repulse only provoked the Lacedæmonians to send a
larger, under the command of their king Kleomenês in person, who on
this occasion marched into Attica by land. On reaching the plain of
Athens, he was assailed by the Thessalian horse, but repelled them
in so gallant a style, that they at once rode off and returned to
their native country; abandoning their allies with a faithlessness
not unfrequent in the Thessalian character. Kleomenês marched on to
Athens without farther resistance, and found himself, together with
the Alkmæônids and the malcontent Athenians generally, in possession
of the town. At that time there was no fortification except around
the acropolis, into which Hippias retired with his mercenaries and
the citizens most faithful to him; having taken care to provision it
well beforehand, so that it was not less secure against famine than
against assault. He might have defied the besieging force, which was
noway prepared for a long blockade; but, not altogether confiding in
his position, he tried to send his children by stealth out of the
country; and in this proceeding the children were taken prisoners. To
procure their restoration, Hippias consented to all that was demanded
of him, and withdrew from Attica to Sigeium in the Troad within the
space of five days.

  [239] Herodot. v, 62, 63.

Thus fell the Peisistratid dynasty in 510 B. C., fifty years after
the first usurpation of its founder.[240] It was put down through the
aid of foreigners,[241] and those foreigners, too, wishing well to
it in their hearts, though hostile from a mistaken feeling of divine
injunction. Yet both the circumstances of its fall, and the course
of events which followed, conspire to show that it possessed few
attached friends in the country, and that the expulsion of Hippias
was welcomed unanimously by the vast majority of Athenians. His
family and chief partisans would accompany him into exile,—probably
as a matter of course, without requiring any formal sentence of
condemnation; and an altar was erected in the acropolis, with a
column hard by, commemorating both the past iniquity of the dethroned
dynasty, and the names of all its members.[242]

  [240] Herodot. v, 64, 65.

  [241] Thucyd. vi, 56, 57.

  [242] Thucyd. vi, 55. ὡς ὅ τε βωμὸς σημαίνει, καὶ ἡ στήλη περὶ
  τῆς τῶν τυράννων ἀδικίας, ἡ ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλει σταθεῖσα.

  Dr. Thirlwall, after mentioning the departure of Hippias,
  proceeds as follows: “After his departure many severe measures
  were taken against his adherents, who appear to have been for a
  long time afterwards a formidable party. They were punished or
  repressed, some by death, others by exile or by the loss of their
  political privileges. The family of the tyrants was condemned to
  perpetual banishment, and appears to have been excepted from the
  most comprehensive decrees of amnesty passed in later times.”
  (Hist. of Gr. ch. xi, vol. ii, p. 81.)

  I cannot but think that Dr. Thirlwall has here been misled by
  insufficient authority. He refers to the oration of Andokidês
  de Mysteriis, sects. 106 and 78 (sect. 106 coincides in part
  with ch. 18, in the ed. of Dobree). An attentive reading of
  it will show that it is utterly unworthy of credit in regard
  to matters anterior to the speaker by one generation or more.
  The orators often permit themselves great license in speaking
  of past facts, but Andokidês in this chapter passes the bounds
  even of rhetorical license. First, he states something not
  bearing the least analogy to the narrative of Herodotus as to
  the circumstances preceding the expulsion of the Peisistratids,
  and indeed tacitly setting aside that narrative; next, he
  actually jumbles together the two capital and distinct exploits
  of Athens,—the battle of Marathon and the repulse of Xerxês
  ten years after it. I state this latter charge in the words of
  Sluiter and Valckenaer, before I consider the former charge:
  “Verissime ad hæc verba notat Valckenaerius—Confundere videtur
  Andocidês diversissima; Persica sub Miltiade et Dario et
  victoriam Marathoniam (v, 14)—quæque evenere sub Themistocle,
  Xerxis gesta. Hic urbem incendio delevit, non ille (v, 20).
  Nihil magis manifestum est, quam diversa ab oratore confundi.”
  (Sluiter, Lection. Andocideæ, p. 147.)

  The criticism of these commentators is perfectly borne out by the
  words of the orator, which are too long to find a place here.
  But immediately prior to those words he expresses himself as
  follows, and this is the passage which serves as Dr. Thirlwall’s
  authority: Οἱ γὰρ πατέρες οἱ ὑμέτεροι, γενομένων τῇ πόλει κακῶν
  μεγάλων, ὅτε οἱ τύραννοι εἶχον τὴν πόλιν, ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἔφυγε,
  νικήσαντες μαχόμενοι τοὺς τυράννους ἐπὶ Παλληνίῳ, στρατηγοῦντος
  Λεωγόρου τοῦ προπάππου τοῦ ἐμοῦ, καὶ Χαρίου οὗ ἐκεῖνος τὴν
  θυγατέρα εἶχεν ἐξ ἧς ὁ ἡμέτερος ἦν πάππος, κατελθόντες εἰς τὴν
  πατρίδα τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, τῶν δὲ φυγὴν κατέγνωσαν, τοὺς δὲ
  μένειν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐάσαντες ἠτίμωσαν.

  Both Sluiter (Lect. And. p. 8) and Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. p. 80)
  refer this alleged victory of Leogoras and the Athenian demus to
  the action described by Herodotus (v, 64) as having been fought
  by Kleomenês of Sparta against the Thessalian cavalry. But the
  two events have not a single circumstance in common, except
  that each is a victory over the Peisistratidæ or their allies:
  nor could they well be the same event, described in different
  terms, seeing that Kleomenês, marching from Sparta to Athens,
  could not have fought the Thessalians at Pallênê, which lay on
  the road from _Marathon_ to Athens. Pallênê was the place where
  Peisistratus, advancing from Marathon to Athens, on occasion of
  his second restoration, gained his complete victory over the
  opposing party, and marched on afterwards to Athens without
  farther resistance (Herodot. i, 63).

  If, then, we compare the statement given by Andokidês of the
  preceding circumstances, whereby the dynasty of the Peisistratids
  was put down, with that given by Herodotus, we shall see that
  the two are radically different; we cannot blend them together,
  but must make our election between them. Not less different are
  the representations of the two as to the circumstances which
  immediately ensued on the fall of Hippias: they would scarcely
  appear to relate to the same event. That “the adherents of the
  Peisistratidæ were punished or repressed, some by death, others
  by exile, or by the loss of their political privileges,” which
  is the assertion of Andokidês and Dr. Thirlwall, is not only
  not stated by Herodotus, but is highly improbable, if we accept
  the facts which he does state; for he tells us that Hippias
  capitulated and agreed to retire while possessing ample means of
  resistance,—simply from regard to the safety of his children. It
  is not to be supposed that he would leave his intimate partisans
  exposed to danger; such of them as felt themselves obnoxious
  would naturally retire along with him; and if this be what is
  meant by “many persons condemned to exile,” here is no reason to
  call it in question. But there is little probability that any
  one was put to death, and still less probability that any were
  punished by the loss of their political privileges. Within a year
  afterwards came the comprehensive constitution of Kleisthenês,
  to be described in the following chapter, and I consider it
  eminently unlikely that there were a considerable class of
  residents in Attica left out of this constitution, under the
  category of partisans of Peisistratus: indeed, the fact cannot be
  so, if it be true that the very first person banished under the
  Kleisthenean ostracism was a person named Hipparchus, a kinsman
  of Peisistratus (Androtion, Fr. 5, ed. Didot; Harpokration, v.
  Ἵππαρχος); and this latter circumstance depends upon evidence
  better than that of Andokidês. That there were a party in Attica
  attached to the Peisistratids, I do not doubt; but that they were
  “a powerful party,” (as Dr. Thirlwall imagines,) I see nothing to
  show; and the extraordinary vigor and unanimity of the Athenian
  people under the Kleisthenean constitution will go far to prove
  that such could not have been the case.

  I will add another reason to evince how completely Andokidês
  misconceives the history of Athens between 510-480 B. C. He
  says that when the Peisistratids were put down, many of their
  partisans were banished, many others allowed to stay at home with
  the loss of their political privileges; but that afterwards, when
  the overwhelming dangers of the Persian invasion supervened,
  the people passed a vote to restore the exiles and to remove
  the existing disfranchisements at home. He would thus have us
  believe that the exiled partisans of the Peisistratids were all
  restored, and the disfranchised partisans of the Peisistratids
  all enfranchised, just at the moment of the Persian invasion,
  and with the view of enabling Athens better to repel that grave
  danger. This is nothing less than a glaring mistake; for the
  first Persian invasion was undertaken with the express view of
  restoring Hippias, and with the presence of Hippias himself at
  Marathon; while the second Persian invasion was also brought
  on in part by the instigation of his family. Persons who had
  remained in exile or in a state of disfranchisement down to that
  time, in consequence of their attachment to the Peisistratids,
  could not in common prudence be called into action at the moment
  of peril, to help in repelling Hippias himself. It is very
  true that the exiles and the disfranchised were readmitted,
  shortly before the invasion of Xerxês, and under the then
  pressing calamities of the state. But these persons were not
  philo-Peisistratids; they were a number gradually accumulated
  from the sentences of exile and (atimy or) disfranchisement every
  year passed at Athens,—for these were punishments applied by the
  Athenian law to various crimes and public omissions,—the persons
  so sentenced were not politically disaffected, and their aid
  would then be of use in defending the state against a foreign
  enemy.

  In regard to “the exception of the family of Peisistratus from
  the most comprehensive decrees of amnesty passed in later
  times,” I will also remark that, in the decree of amnesty,
  there is no mention of them by name, nor any special exception
  made against them: among a list of various categories excepted,
  those are named “who have been condemned to death or exile
  either as murderers or as despots,” (ἢ σφαγεῦσιν ἢ τυράννοις,
  Andokid. c. 13.) It is by no means certain that the _descendants_
  of Peisistratus would be comprised in this exception, which
  mentions only the person himself condemned; but even if this were
  otherwise, the exception is a mere continuance of similar words
  of exception in the old Solonian law, anterior to Peisistratus;
  and, therefore, affords no indication of particular feeling
  against the Peisistratids.

  Andokidês is a useful authority for the politics of Athens in his
  own time (between 420-390 B. C.), but in regard to the previous
  history of Athens between 510-480 B. C., his assertions are so
  loose, confused, and unscrupulous, that he is a witness of no
  value. The mere circumstance noted by Valckenaer, that he has
  confounded together Marathon and Salamis, would be sufficient
  to show this; but when we add to such genuine ignorance his
  mention of his two great-grandfathers in prominent and victorious
  leadership, which it is hardly credible that they could ever have
  occupied,—when we recollect that the facts which he alleges to
  have preceded and accompanied the expulsion of the Peisistratids
  are not only at variance with those stated by Herodotus, but so
  contrived as to found a factitious analogy for the cause which
  he is himself pleading,—we shall hardly be able to acquit him of
  something worse than ignorance in his deposition.




CHAPTER XXXI.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE PEISISTRATIDS. —
REVOLUTION OF KLEISTHENES AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS.


With Hippias disappeared the mercenary Thracian garrison, upon which
he and his father before him had leaned for defence as well as for
enforcement of authority; and Kleomenês with his Lacedæmonian forces
retired also, after staying only long enough to establish a personal
friendship, productive subsequently of important consequences,
between the Spartan king and the Athenian Isagoras. The Athenians
were thus left to themselves, without any foreign interference to
constrain them in their political arrangements.

It has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, that the
Peisistratids had for the most part respected the forms of the
Solonian constitution: the nine archons, and the probouleutic or
preconsidering Senate of Four Hundred (both annually changed),
still continued to subsist, together with occasional meetings
of the people,—or rather of such portion of the people as was
comprised in the gentes, phratries, and four Ionic tribes. The
timocratic classification of Solon (or quadruple scale of income and
admeasurement of political franchises according to it) also continued
to subsist,—but all within the tether and subservient to the
purposes of the ruling family, who always kept one of their number
as real master, among the chief administrators, and always retained
possession of the acropolis as well as of the mercenary force.

That overawing pressure being now removed by the expulsion of
Hippias, the enslaved forms became at once endued with freedom and
reality. There appeared again, what Attica had not known for thirty
years, declared political parties, and pronounced opposition between
two men as leaders,—on one side, Isagoras son of Tisander, a person
of illustrious descent,—on the other, Kleisthenês the Alkmæônid,
not less illustrious, and possessing at this moment a claim on the
gratitude of his countrymen as the most persevering as well as the
most effective foe of the dethroned despots. In what manner such
opposition was carried on we are not told. It would seem to have been
not altogether pacific; but at any rate, Kleisthenês had the worst
of it, and in consequence of this defeat, says the historian, “he
took into partnership the people, who had been before excluded from
everything.”[243] His partnership with the people gave birth to the
Athenian democracy: it was a real and important revolution.

  [243] Herodot. v, 66-69 ἑσσούμενος δὲ ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον
  προσεταιρίζεται—ὡς γὰρ δὴ τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον, πρότερον ἀπωσμένον
  πάντων, τότε πρὸς τὴν ἑωϋτοῦ μοίρην προσεθήκατο, etc.

The political franchise, or the character of an Athenian citizen,
both before and since Solon, had been confined to the primitive
four Ionic tribes, each of which was an aggregate of so many close
corporations or quasi-families,—the gentes and the phratries. None
of the residents in Attica, therefore, except those included in
some gens or phratry, had any part in the political franchise. Such
non-privileged residents were probably at all times numerous, and
became more and more so by means of fresh settlers: moreover, they
tended most to multiply in Athens and Peiræus, where emigrants would
commonly establish themselves. Kleisthenês broke down the existing
wall of privilege, and imparted the political franchise to the
excluded mass. But this could not be done by enrolling them in new
gentes or phratries, created in addition to the old; for the gentile
tie was founded upon old faith and feeling, which, in the existing
state of the Greek mind, could not be suddenly conjured up as a
bond of union for comparative strangers: it could only be done by
disconnecting the franchise altogether from the Ionic tribes as well
as from the gentes which constituted them, and by redistributing the
population into new tribes with a character and purpose exclusively
political. Accordingly, Kleisthenês abolished the four Ionic tribes,
and created in their place ten new tribes founded upon a different
principle, independent of the gentes and phratries. Each of his
new tribes comprised a certain number of demes or cantons, with
the enrolled proprietors and residents in each of them. The demes
taken altogether included the entire surface of Attica, so that
the Kleisthenean constitution admitted to the political franchise
all the free native Athenians; and not merely these, but also many
Metics, and even some of the superior order of slaves.[244] Putting
out of sight the general body of slaves, and regarding only the
free inhabitants, it was in point of fact a scheme approaching to
universal suffrage, both political and judicial.

  [244] Aristot. Polit. iii, 1, 10; vi, 2, 11. Κλεισθένης,—πολλοῖς
  ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους.

  Several able critics, and Dr. Thirlwall among the number,
  consider this passage as affording no sense, and assume some
  conjectural emendation to be indispensable; though there is no
  particular emendation which suggests itself as preëminently
  plausible. Under these circumstances, I rather prefer to make
  the best of the words as they stand; which, though unusual,
  seem to me not absolutely inadmissible. The expression ξένος
  μέτοικος (which is a perfectly good one, as we find in Aristoph.
  Equit. 347,—εἴπου δικιδίον εἶπας εὖ κατὰ ξένου μετοίκου) may
  be considered as the correlative to δούλους μετοίκους,—the
  last word being construed both with δούλους and with ξένους. I
  apprehend that there always must have been in Attica a certain
  number of intelligent slaves living apart from their masters
  (χωρὶς οἰκοῦντες), in a state between slavery and freedom,
  working partly on condition of a fixed payment to him, partly for
  themselves, and perhaps continuing to pass nominally as slaves
  after they had bought their liberty by instalments. Such men
  would be δοῦλοι μέτοικοι: indeed, there are cases in which δοῦλοι
  signifies _freedmen_ (Meier, De Gentilitate Atticâ, p. 6): they
  must have been industrious and pushing men, valuable partisans to
  a political revolution. See K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griech.
  Staats Alterth. ch. 111, not. 15.

The slight and cursory manner in which Herodotus announces this
memorable revolution tends to make us overlook its real importance.
He dwells chiefly on the alteration in the number and names of the
tribes: Kleisthenês, he says, despised the Ionians so much, that he
would not tolerate the continuance in Attica of the four tribes which
prevailed in the Ionic cities,[245] deriving their names from the
four sons of Ion,—just as his grandfather, the Sikyonian Kleisthenês,
hating the Dorians, had degraded and nicknamed the three Dorian
tribes at Sikyôn. Such is the representation of Herodotus, who seems
himself to have entertained some contempt for the Ionians,[246]
and therefore to have suspected a similar feeling where it had no
real existence. But the scope of Kleisthenês was something far more
extensive: he abolished the four ancient tribes, not because they
were Ionic, but because they had become incommensurate with the
existing condition of the Attic people, and because such abolition
procured both for himself and for his political scheme new as well
as hearty allies. And indeed, if we study the circumstances of the
case, we shall see very obvious reasons to suggest the proceeding.
For more than thirty years—an entire generation—the old constitution
had been a mere empty formality, working only in subservience to the
reigning dynasty, and stripped of all real controlling power. We may
be very sure, therefore, that both the Senate of Four Hundred and
the popular assembly, divested of that free speech which imparted
to them not only all their value but all their charm, had come to
be of little public estimation, and were probably attended only
by a few partisans; and thus the difference between qualified
citizens and men not so qualified,—between members of the four old
tribes, and men not members,—became during this period practically
effaced. This, in fact, was the only species of good which a Grecian
despotism ever seems to have done: it confounded the privileged and
the non-privileged under one coercive authority common to both, so
that the distinction between the two was not easy to revive when the
despotism passed away. As soon as Hippias was expelled, the senate
and the public assembly regained their efficiency. But had they been
continued on the old footing, including none except members of the
four tribes, these tribes would have been reinvested with a privilege
which in reality they had so long lost, that its revival would have
seemed an odious novelty, and the remaining population would probably
not have submitted to it. If, in addition, we consider the political
excitement of the moment,—the restoration of one body of men from
exile, and the departure of another body into exile,—the outpouring
of long-suppressed hatred, partly against these very forms, by
the corruption of which the despot had reigned,—we shall see that
prudence as well as patriotism dictated the adoption of an enlarged
scheme of government. Kleisthenês had learned some wisdom during
his long exile; and as he probably continued, for some time after
the introduction of his new constitution, to be the chief adviser
of his countrymen, we may consider their extraordinary success as a
testimony to his prudence and skill not less than to their courage
and unanimity.

  [245] Herodot. v, 69. Κλεισθένης,—ὑπεριδὼν Ἴωνας, ἵνα μὴ σφισι αἱ
  αὐταὶ ἔωσι φυλαὶ καὶ Ἴωσι.

  [246] Such a disposition seems evident in Herodot. i, 143.

Nor does it seem unreasonable to give him credit for a more generous
forward movement than what is implied in the literal account of
Herodotus. Instead of being forced against his will to purchase
popular support by proposing this new constitution, Kleisthenês may
have proposed it before, during the discussions which immediately
followed the retirement of Hippias; so that the rejection of it
formed the ground of quarrel—and no other ground is mentioned—between
him and Isagoras. The latter doubtless found sufficient support, in
the existing senate and public assembly, to prevent it from being
carried without an actual appeal to the people, and his opposition
to it is not difficult to understand. For, necessary as the change
had become, it was not the less a shock to ancient Attic ideas.
It radically altered the very idea of a tribe, which now became
an aggregation of demes, not of gentes,—of fellow-demots, not of
fellow-gentiles; and it thus broke up those associations, religious,
social, and political, between the whole and the parts of the old
system, which operated powerfully on the mind of every old-fashioned
Athenian. The patricians at Rome, who composed the gentes and
curiæ,—and the plebs, who had no part in these corporations,—formed
for a long time two separate and opposing fractions in the same
city, each with its own separate organization. It was only by slow
degrees that the plebs gained ground, and the political value of the
patrician gens was long maintained alongside of and apart from the
plebeian tribe. So too in the Italian and German cities of the Middle
Ages, the patrician families refused to part with their own separate
political identity, when the guilds grew up by the side of them; even
though forced to renounce a portion of their power, they continued
to be a separate fraternity, and would not submit to be regimented
anew, under an altered category and denomination, along with the
traders who had grown into wealth and importance.[247] But the reform
of Kleisthenês effected this change all at once, both as to the name
and as to the reality. In some cases, indeed, that which had been the
name of a gens was retained as the name of a deme, but even then the
old gentiles were ranked indiscriminately among the remaining demots;
and the Athenian people, politically considered, thus became one
homogeneous whole, distributed for convenience into parts, numerical,
local, and politically equal. It is, however, to be remembered, that
while the four Ionic tribes were abolished, the gentes and phratries
which composed them were left untouched, and continued to subsist
as family and religious associations, though carrying with them no
political privilege.

  [247] In illustration of what is here stated, see the account of
  the modifications of the constitution of Zurich, in Blüntschli,
  Staats und Rechts Geschichte der Stadt Zurich, book iii. ch. 2,
  p. 322; also, Kortüm, Entstehungs Geschichte der Freistädtischen
  Bünde im Mittelalter, ch. 5, pp. 74-75.

The ten newly-created tribes, arranged in an established order of
precedence, were called,—Erechthêis, Ægêis, Pandiŏnis, Leontis,
Akamantis, Œnêis, Kekrŏpis, Hippothoöntis, Æantis, Antiochis; names
borrowed chiefly from the respected heroes of Attic legend.[248]
This number remained unaltered until the year 305 B. C., when it was
increased to twelve by the addition of two new tribes, Antigonias
and Demetrias, afterwards designated anew by the names of Ptolemais
and Attalis. The mere names of these last two, borrowed from living
kings, and not from legendary heroes, betray the change from
freedom to subservience at Athens. Each tribe comprised a certain
number of demes,—cantons, parishes, or townships,—in Attica. But
the total number of these demes is not distinctly ascertained; for
though we know that, in the time of Polemô (the third century B.
C.), it was one hundred and seventy-four, we cannot be sure that
it had always remained the same; and several critics construe the
words of Herodotus to imply that Kleisthenês at first recognized
exactly one hundred demes, distributed in equal proportion among his
ten tribes.[249] But such construction of the words is more than
doubtful, while the fact itself is improbable; partly because if the
change of number had been so considerable as the difference between
one hundred and one hundred and seventy-four, some positive evidence
of it would probably be found,—partly because Kleisthenês would,
indeed, have a motive to render the amount of citizen population
nearly equal, but no motive to render the number of demes equal,
in each of the ten tribes. It is well known how great is the force
of local habits, and how unalterable are parochial or cantonal
boundaries. In the absence of proof to the contrary, therefore, we
may reasonably suppose the number and circumscription of the demes,
as found or modified by Kleisthenês, to have subsisted afterwards
with little alteration, at least until the increase in the number of
the tribes.

  [248] Respecting these Eponymous Heroes of the Ten Tribes,
  and the legends connected with them, see chapter viii of the
  Ἐπιτάφιος Λόγος, erroneously ascribed to Demosthenês.

  [249] Herodot. v, 69. δέκα δὲ καὶ τοὺς δήμους κατένεμε ἐς τὰς
  φυλάς.

  Schömann contends that Kleisthenês established exactly one
  hundred demes to the ten tribes (De Comitiis Atheniensium, Præf.
  p. xv and p. 363, and Antiquitat. Jur. Pub. Græc. ch. xxii, p.
  260), and K. F. Hermann (Lehrbuch der Griech. Staats Alt. ch.
  111) thinks that this is what Herodotus meant to affirm, though
  he does not believe the fact to have really stood so.

  I incline, as the least difficulty in the case, to construe δέκα
  with φυλὰς and not with δήμους, as Wachsmuth (i, 1, p. 271) and
  Dieterich (De Clisthene, a treatise cited by K. F. Hermann, but
  which I have not seen) construe it.

There is another point, however, which is at once more certain, and
more important to notice. The demes which Kleisthenês assigned to
each tribe were in no case all adjacent to each other; and therefore
the tribe, as a whole, did not correspond with any continuous portion
of the territory, nor could it have any peculiar local interest,
separate from the entire community. Such systematic avoidance of
the factions arising out of neighborhood will appear to have been
more especially necessary, when we recollect that the quarrels of
the Parali, the Diakrii, the Pediaki, during the preceding century,
had all been generated from local feud, though doubtless artfully
fomented by individual ambition. Moreover, it was only by this same
precaution that the local predominance of the city, and the formation
of a city-interest distinct from that of the country, was obviated;
which could hardly have failed to arise had the city by itself
constituted either one deme or one tribe. Kleisthenês distributed
the city (or found it already distributed) into several demes, and
those demes among several tribes; while Peiræus and Phalêrum, each
constituting a separate deme, were also assigned to different tribes;
so that there were no local advantages either to bestow predominance,
or to create a struggle for predominance, of one tribe over the
rest.[250] Each deme had its own local interests to watch over; but
the tribe was a mere aggregate of demes for political, military, and
religious purposes, with no separate hopes or fears, apart from the
whole state. Each tribe had a chapel, sacred rites and festivals,
and a common fund for such meetings, in honor of its eponymous hero,
administered by members of its own choice;[251] and the statues of
all the ten eponymous heroes, fraternal patrons of the democracy,
were planted in the most conspicuous part of the agora of Athens.
In the future working of the Athenian government, we shall trace no
symptom of disquieting local factions,—a capital amendment, compared
with the disputes of the preceding century, and traceable, in part,
to the absence of border-relations between demes of the same tribe.

  [250] The deme _Melitê_ belonged to the tribe Kekropis;
  _Kollytus_, to the tribe Ægêis; _Kydathenæon_, to the tribe
  Pandionis; _Kerameis_ or _Kerameikus_, to the Akamantis;
  _Skambônidæ_, to the Leontis.

  All these five were demes within the city of Athens, and all
  belonged to different tribes.

  _Peiræus_ belonged to the Hippothoöntis; _Phalêrum_, to
  the Æantis; _Xypetê_, to the Kekropis; _Thymætadæ_, to the
  Hippothoöntis. These four demes, adjoining to each other,
  formed a sort of quadruple local union, for festivals and other
  purposes, among themselves; though three of them belonged to
  different tribes.

  See the list of the Attic demes, with a careful statement of
  their localities in so far as ascertained, in Professor Ross,
  Die Demen von Attika. Halle, 1846. The distribution of the
  city-demes, and of Peiræus and Phalêrum, among different tribes,
  appears to me a clear proof of the intention of the original
  distributors. It shows that they wished from the beginning
  to make the demes constituting each tribe discontinuous, and
  that they desired to prevent both the growth of separate
  tribe-interests and ascendency of one tribe over the rest. It
  contradicts the belief of those who suppose that the tribe was
  at first composed of continuous demes, and that the breach of
  continuity arose from subsequent changes.

  Of course there were many cases in which adjoining demes belonged
  to the same tribe; but not one of the ten tribes was made up
  altogether of adjoining demes.

  [251] See Boeckh, Corp. Inscriptt. Nos. 85, 128, 213, etc.:
  compare Demosthen. cont. Theokrin. c. 4. p. 1326 R.

The deme now became the primitive constituent element of the
commonwealth, both as to persons and as to property. It had its own
demarch, its register of enrolled citizens, its collective property,
its public meetings and religious ceremonies, its taxes levied and
administered by itself. The register of qualified citizens[252] was
kept by the demarch, and the inscription of new citizens took place
at the assembly of the demots, whose legitimate sons were enrolled
on attaining the age of eighteen, and their adopted sons at any time
when presented and sworn to by the adopting citizen. The citizenship
could only be granted by a public vote of the people, but wealthy
non-freemen were enabled sometimes to evade this law and purchase
admission upon the register of some poor deme, probably by means of
a fictitious adoption. At the meetings of the demots, the register
was called over, and it sometimes happened that some names were
expunged,—in which case the party thus disfranchised had an appeal to
the popular judicature.[253] So great was the local administrative
power, however, of these demes, that they are described as the
substitute,[254] under the Kleisthenean system, for the naukraries
under the Solonian and ante-Solonian. The trittyes and naukraries,
though nominally preserved, and the latter (as some affirm) augmented
in number from forty-eight to fifty, appear henceforward as of little
public importance.

  [252] We may remark that this register was called by a special
  name, the Lexiarchic register; while the primitive register of
  phrators and gentiles always retained, even in the time of the
  orators, its original name of the common register—Harpokration,
  v. Κοινὸν γραμματεῖον καὶ ληξιαρχικόν.

  [253] See Schömann, Antiq. Jur. P. Græc. ch. xxiv. The oration
  of Demosthenês against Eubulidês is instructive about these
  proceedings of the assembled demots: compare Harpokration, v.
  Διαψήφισις, and Meier, De Bonis Damnatorum, ch. xii, p. 78, etc.

  [254] Aristot. Fragment. de Republ., ed. Neumann.—Ἀθην. πολιτ.
  Fr. 40, p. 88; Schol. ad Aristophan. Ran. 37; Harpokration, v.
  Δήμαρχος—Ναυκραρικά; Photius, v. Ναυκραρία.

Kleisthenês preserved, but at the same time modified and expanded,
all the main features of Solon’s political constitution; the public
assembly, or ekklesia,—the preconsidering senate, composed of members
from all the tribes,—and the habit of annual election, as well as
annual responsibility of magistrates, by and to the ekklesia. The
full value must now have been felt of possessing such preëxisting
institutions to build upon, at a moment of perplexity and dissension.
But the Kleisthenean ekklesia acquired new strength, and almost a
new character, from the great increase of the number of citizens
qualified to attend it; while the annually-changed senate, instead
of being composed of four hundred members taken in equal proportion
from each of the old four tribes, was enlarged to five hundred,
taken equally from each of the new ten tribes. It now comes before
us, under the name of Senate of Five Hundred, as an active and
indispensable body throughout the whole Athenian democracy: and the
practice now seems to have begun (though the period of commencement
cannot be decisively proved), of determining the names of the
senators by lot. Both the senate thus constituted, and the public
assembly, were far more popular and vigorous than they had been under
the original arrangement of Solon.

The new constitution of the tribes, as it led to a change in the
annual senate, so it transformed, no less directly, the military
arrangements of the state, both as to soldiers and as to officers.
The citizens called upon to serve in arms were now marshalled
according to tribes,—each tribe having its own taxiarchs as officers
for the hoplites, and its own phylarch at the head of the horsemen.
Moreover, there were now created for the first time ten strategi, or
generals, one from each tribe; and two hipparchs, for the supreme
command of the horsemen. Under the prior Athenian constitution it
appears that the command of the military force had been vested in the
third archon, or polemarch, no strategi then existing; and even after
the latter had been created, under the Kleisthenean constitution,
the polemarch still retained a joint right of command along with
them,—as we are told at the battle of Marathon, where Kallimachus
the polemarch not only enjoyed an equal vote in the council of war
along with the ten strategi, but even occupied the post of honor on
the right wing.[255] The ten generals, annually changed, are thus
(like the ten tribes) a fruit of the Kleisthenean constitution, which
was at the same time powerfully strengthened and protected by such
remodelling of the military force. The functions of the generals
becoming more extensive as the democracy advanced, they seem to
have acquired gradually not merely the direction of military and
naval affairs, but also that of the foreign relations of the city
generally,—while the nine archons, including the polemarch, were by
degrees lowered down from that full executive and judicial competence
which they had once enjoyed, to the simple ministry of police and
preparatory justice. Encroached upon by the strategi on one side,
they were also restricted in efficiency by the rise of the popular
dikasteries or numerous jury-courts, on the other. We may be very
sure that these popular dikasteries had not been permitted to meet
or to act under the despotism of the Peisistratids, and that the
judicial business of the city must then have been conducted partly
by the Senate of Areopagus, partly by the archons; perhaps with a
nominal responsibility of the latter at the end of their year of
office to an acquiescent ekklesia. And if we even assume it to be
true, as some writers contend, that the habit of direct popular
judicature, over and above this annual trial of responsibility, had
been partially introduced by Solon, it must have been discontinued
during the long coercion exercised by the supervening dynasty. But
the outburst of popular spirit, which lent force to Kleisthenês,
doubtless carried the people into direct action as jurors in the
aggregate Heliæa, not less than as voters in the ekklesia,—and the
change was thus begun which contributed to degrade the archons from
their primitive character as judges, into the lower function of
preliminary examiners and presidents of a jury. Such convocation of
numerous juries, beginning first with the aggregate body of sworn
citizens above thirty years of age, and subsequently dividing them
into separate bodies or pannels, for trying particular causes, became
gradually more frequent and more systematized: until at length, in
the time of Periklês, it was made to carry a small pay, and stood out
as one of the most prominent features of Athenian life. We cannot
particularize the different steps whereby such final development was
attained, and the judicial competence of the archon cut down to the
mere power of inflicting a small fine; but the first steps of it are
found in the revolution of Kleisthenês, and it seems to have been
consummated by the reforms of Periklês. Of the function exercised by
the nine archons as well as by many other magistrates and official
persons at Athens, in convoking a dikastery, or jury-court, bringing
on causes for trial,—and presiding over the trial,—a function
constituting one of the marks of superior magistracy, and called the
Hegemony, or presidency of a dikastery,—I shall speak more at length
hereafter. At present, I wish merely to bring to view the increased
and increasing sphere of action on which the people entered at the
memorable turn of affairs now before us.

  [255] Herodot. vi, 109-111.

The financial affairs of the city underwent at this epoch as complete
a change as the military: in fact, the appointment of magistrates
and officers by tens, one from each tribe, seems to have become the
ordinary practice. A board of ten, called Apodektæ, were invested
with the supreme management of the exchequer, dealing with the
contractors as to those portions of the revenue which were farmed,
receiving all the taxes from the collectors, and disbursing them
under competent authority. The first nomination of this board is
expressly ascribed to Kleisthenês,[256] as a substitute for certain
persons called Kôlakretæ, who had performed the same function
before, and who were now retained only for subordinate services.
The duties of the apodektæ were afterwards limited to receiving
the public income, and paying it over to the ten treasurers of
the goddess Athênê, by whom it was kept in the inner chamber of
the Parthenon, and disbursed as needed; but this more complicated
arrangement cannot be referred to Kleisthenês. From his time forward
too, the Senate of Five Hundred steps far beyond its original
duty of preparing matters for the discussion of the ekklesia: it
embraces, besides, a large circle of administrative and general
superintendence, which hardly admits of any definition. Its sittings
become constant, with the exception of special holidays, and the year
is distributed into ten portions called Prytanies,—the fifty senators
of each tribe taking by turns the duty of constant attendance
during one prytany, and receiving during that time the title of
The Prytanes: the order of precedence among the tribes in these
duties was annually determined by lot. In the ordinary Attic year
of twelve lunar months, or three hundred and fifty-four days, six
of the prytanies contained thirty-five days, four of them contained
thirty-six: in the intercalated years of thirteen months, the number
of days was thirty-eight and thirty-nine respectively. Moreover, a
farther subdivision of the prytany into five periods of seven days
each, and of the fifty tribe-senators into five bodies of ten each,
was recognized: each body of ten presided in the senate for one
period of seven days, drawing lots every day among their number for
a new chairman, called Epistatês, to whom during his day of office
were confided the keys of the acropolis and the treasury, together
with the city seal. The remaining senators, not belonging to the
prytanizing tribe, might of course attend if they chose; but the
attendance of nine among them, one from each of the remaining nine
tribes, was imperatively necessary to constitute a valid meeting, and
to insure a constant representation of the collective people.

  [256] Harpokration, v. Ἀποδέκται.

During those later times known to us through the great orators,
the ekklesia, or formal assembly of the citizens, was convoked
four times regularly during each prytany, or oftener if necessity
required,—usually by the senate, though the stratêgi had also the
power of convoking it by their own authority. It was presided over by
the prytanes, and questions were put to the vote by their epistatês,
or chairman; but the nine representatives of the non-prytanizing
tribes were always present as a matter of course, and seem, indeed,
in the days of the orators, to have acquired to themselves the
direction of it, together with the right of putting questions for
the vote,[257]—setting aside wholly or partially the fifty prytanes.
When we carry our attention back, however, to the state of the
ekklesia, as first organized by Kleisthenês (I have already remarked
that expositors of the Athenian constitution are too apt to neglect
the distinction of times, and to suppose that what was the practice
between 400-330 B. C. had been always the practice), it will appear
probable that he provided one regular meeting in each prytany, and
no more; giving to the senate and the stratêgi power of convening
special meetings if needful, but establishing one ekklesia during
each prytany, or ten in the year, as a regular necessity of state.
How often the ancient ekklesia had been convoked during the interval
between Solon and Peisistratus, we cannot exactly say,—probably
but seldom during the year. But under the Peisistratids, its
convocation had dwindled down into an inoperative formality; and
the reëstablishment of it by Kleisthenês, not merely with plenary
determining powers, but also under full notice and preparation of
matters beforehand, together with the best securities for orderly
procedure, was in itself a revolution impressive to the mind of
every Athenian citizen. To render the ekklesia efficient, it was
indispensable that its meetings should be both frequent and free.
Men thus became trained to the duty both of speakers and hearers,
and each man, while he felt that he exercised his share of influence
on the decision, identified his own safety and happiness with the
vote of the majority, and became familiarized with the notion of
a sovereign authority which he neither could nor ought to resist.
This is an idea new to the Athenian bosom; and with it came the
feelings sanctifying free speech and equal law,—words which no
Athenian citizen ever afterwards heard unmoved: together with that
sentiment of the entire commonwealth as one and indivisible, which
always overruled, though it did not supplant, the local and cantonal
special ties. It is not too much to say that these patriotic and
ennobling impulses were a new product in the Athenian mind, to which
nothing analogous occurs even in the time of Solon. They were kindled
in part doubtless by the strong reaction against the Peisistratids,
but still more by the fact that the opposing leader, Kleisthenês,
turned that transitory feeling to the best possible account, and
gave to it a vigorous perpetuity, as well as a well-defined positive
object, by the popular elements conspicuous in his constitution. His
name makes less figure in history than we should expect, because
he passed for the mere renovator of Solon’s scheme of government
after it had been overthrown by Peisistratus. Probably he himself
professed this object, since it would facilitate the success of his
propositions: and if we confine ourselves to the letter of the case,
the fact is in a great measure true, since the annual senate and
the ekklesia are both Solonian,—but both of them under his reform
were clothed in totally new circumstances, and swelled into gigantic
proportions. How vigorous was the burst of Athenian enthusiasm,
altering instantaneously the position of Athens among the powers of
Greece, we shall hear presently from the lips of Herodotus, and shall
find still more unequivocally marked in the facts of his history.

  [257] See the valuable treatise of Schömann, De Comitiis,
  _passim_; also his Antiq. Jur. Publ. Gr. ch. xxxi; Harpokration,
  v. Κυρία Ἐκκλησία; Pollux, viii, 95.

But it was not only the people formally installed in their ekklesia,
who received from Kleisthenês the real attributes of sovereignty,—it
was by him also that the people were first called into direct action
as dikasts, or jurors. I have already remarked, that this custom may
be said, in a certain limited sense, to have begun in the time of
Solon, since that lawgiver invested the popular assembly with the
power of pronouncing the judgment of accountability upon the archons
after their year of office. Here, again, the building, afterwards
so spacious and stately, was erected on a Solonian foundation,
though it was not itself Solonian. That the popular dikasteries, in
the elaborate form in which they existed from Periklês downward,
were introduced all at once by Kleisthenês, it is impossible to
believe; yet the steps by which they were gradually wrought out
are not distinctly discoverable. It would rather seem, that at
first only the aggregate body of citizens above thirty years of
age exercised judicial functions, being specially convoked and
sworn to try persons accused of public crimes, and when so employed
bearing the name of the heliæa, or heliasts; private offences and
disputes between man and man being still determined by individual
magistrates in the city, and a considerable judicial power still
residing in the Senate of Areopagus. There is reason to believe that
this was the state of things established by Kleisthenês, and which
afterwards came to be altered by the greater extent of judicial
duty gradually accruing to the heliasts, so that it was necessary
to subdivide the collective heliæa. According to the subdivision,
as practised in the times best known, six thousand citizens above
thirty years of age were annually selected by lot out of the whole
number, six hundred from each of the ten tribes: five thousand of
these citizens were arranged in ten pannels or decuries of five
hundred each, the remaining one thousand being reserved to fill up
vacancies in case of death or absence among the former. The whole
six thousand took a prescribed oath, couched in very striking words,
and every man received a ticket inscribed with his own name as well
as with a letter designating his decury. When there were causes or
crimes ripe for trial, the thesmothets, or six inferior archons,
determined by lot, first, which decuries should sit, according to
the number wanted,—next, in which court, or under the presidency
of what magistrate, the decury B or E should sit, so that it could
not be known beforehand in what cause each would be judge. In the
number of persons who actually attended and sat, however, there
seems to have been much variety, and sometimes two decuries sat
together.[258] The arrangement here described, we must recollect, is
given to us as belonging to those times when the dikasts received a
regular pay, after every day’s sitting; and it can hardly have long
continued without that condition, which was not realized before
the time of Periklês. Each of these decuries sitting in judicature
was called _The Heliæa_,—a name which belongs properly to the
collective assembly of the people; this collective assembly having
been itself the original judicature. I conceive that the practice of
distributing this collective assembly, or heliæa, into sections of
jurors for judicial duty, may have begun under one form or another
soon after the reform of Kleisthenês, since the direct interference
of the people in public affairs tended more and more to increase. But
it could only have been matured by degrees into that constant and
systematic service which the pay of Periklês called forth at last in
completeness. Under the last-mentioned system the judicial competence
of the archons was annulled, and the third archon, or polemarch,
withdrawn from all military functions. Still, this had not been yet
done at the time of the battle of Marathon, in which Kallimachus the
polemarch not only commanded along with the stratêgi, but enjoyed a
sort of preëminence over them: nor had it been done during the year
after the battle of Marathon, in which Aristeidês was archon,—for
the magisterial decisions of Aristeidês formed one of the principal
foundations of his honorable surname, the Just.[259]

  [258] See in particular on this subject the treatise of Schömann,
  De Sortitione Judicum (Gripswald, 1820), and the work of the
  same author, Antiq. Jur. Publ. Græc. ch. 49-55, p. 264, _seqq._;
  also Heffter, Die Athenäische Gerichtsverfassung, part ii, ch.
  2, p. 51, _seqq._; Meier and Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, pp.
  127-135.

  The views of Schömann respecting the sortition of the Athenian
  jurors have been bitterly attacked, but in no way refuted, by F.
  V. Fritzsche (De Sortitione Judicum apud Athenienses Conmentatio,
  Leipsic, 1835).

  Two or three of these dikastic tickets, marking the name and the
  deme of the citizen, and the letter of the decury to which during
  that particular year he belonged, have been recently dug up near
  Athens:—

  Δ. Διόδωρος      Ε. Δεινίας
     Φρεάῤῥιος.       Ἀλαιεύς.

    (Boeckh, Corp. Inscrip. Nos. 207-208.)

  Fritzsche (p. 73) considers these to be tickets of senators, not
  of dikasts, contrary to all probability.

  For the Heliastic oath, and its remarkable particulars, see
  Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. p. 746. See also Aristophanês, Plutus,
  277 (with the valuable Scholia, though from different hands and
  not all of equal correctness) and 972; Ekklesiazusæ, 678, _seqq._

  [259] Plutarch, Arist. 7; Herodot. vi, 109-111.

With this question, as to the comparative extent of judicial power
vested by Kleisthenês in the popular dikastery and the archons, are
in reality connected two others in Athenian constitutional law;
relating, first, to the admissibility of all citizens for the post
of archon,—next, to the choosing of archons by lot. It is well known
that, in the time of Periklês, the archons, and various other
individual functionaries, had come to be chosen by lot,—moreover, all
citizens were legally admissible, and might give in their names to be
drawn for by lot, subject to what was called the dokimasy, or legal
examination into their status of citizen, and into various moral
and religious qualifications, before they took office; while at the
same time the function of the archon had become nothing higher than
preliminary examination of parties and witnesses for the dikastery,
and presidence over it when afterwards assembled, together with the
power of imposing by authority a fine of small amount upon inferior
offenders.

Now all these three political arrangements hang essentially together.
The great value of the lot, according to Grecian democratical ideas,
was that it equalized the chance of office between rich and poor. But
so long as the poor citizens were legally inadmissible, choice by lot
could have no recommendation either to the rich or to the poor; in
fact, it would be less democratical than election by the general mass
of citizens, because the poor citizen would under the latter system
enjoy an important right of interference by means of his suffrage,
though he could not be elected himself.[260] Again, choice by lot
could never under any circumstances be applied to those posts where
special competence, and a certain measure of attributes possessed
only by a few, could not be dispensed with without obvious peril,—nor
was it ever applied, throughout the whole history of democratical
Athens, to the stratêgi, or generals, who were always elected by
show of hands of the assembled citizens. Accordingly, we may regard
it as certain that, at the time when the archons first came to be
chosen by lot, the superior and responsible duties once attached
to that office had been, or were in course of being, detached from
it, and transferred either to the popular dikasts or to the ten
elected stratêgi: so that there remained to these archons only a
routine of police and administration, important indeed to the state,
yet such as could be executed by any citizen of average probity,
diligence, and capacity. At least there was no obvious absurdity
in thinking so; and the dokimasy excluded from the office men of
notoriously discreditable life, even after they might have drawn the
successful lot. Periklês,[261] though chosen stratêgus, year after
year successively, was never archon; and it may even be doubted
whether men of first-rate talents and ambition often gave in their
names for the office. To those of smaller aspirations[262] it was
doubtless a source of importance, but it imposed troublesome labor,
gave no pay, and entailed a certain degree of peril upon any archon
who might have given offence to powerful men, when he came to pass
through the trial of accountability which followed immediately upon
his year of office. There was little to make the office acceptable
either to very poor men, or to very rich and ambitious men; and
between the middling persons who gave in their names, any one might
be taken without great practical mischief, always assuming the two
guarantees of the dokimasy before, and accountability after, office.
This was the conclusion—in my opinion a mistaken conclusion, and such
as would find no favor at present—to which the democrats of Athens
were conducted by their strenuous desire to equalize the chances of
office for rich and poor. But their sentiment seems to have been
satisfied by a partial enforcement of the lot to the choice of some
offices,—especially the archons, as the primitive chief magistrates
of the state,—without applying it to all, or to the most responsible
and difficult. Nor would they have applied it to the archons, if it
had been indispensably necessary that these magistrates should retain
their original very serious duty of judging disputes and condemning
offenders.

  [260] Aristotle puts these two together; election of magistrates
  by the mass of the citizens, but only out of persons possessing
  a high pecuniary qualification; this he ranks as the least
  democratical democracy, if one may use the phrase (Politic.
  iii, 6-11), or a mean between democracy and oligarchy,—an
  ἀριστοκρατία, or πολιτεῖα, in his sense of the word (iv, 7, 3).
  He puts the employment of the lot as a symptom of decisive and
  extreme democracy, such as would never tolerate a pecuniary
  qualification of eligibility.

  So again Plato (Legg. iii, p. 692), after remarking that the
  legislator of Sparta first provided the senate, next the ephors,
  as a bridle upon the kings, says of the ephors that they were
  “something nearly approaching to an authority emanating from the
  lot,”—οἷον ψάλιον ἐνέβαλεν αὐτῇ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων δύναμιν, ἐγγὺς τῆς
  κληρωτῆς ἀγαγὼν δυνάμεως.

  Upon which passage there are some good remarks in Schömann’s
  edition of Plutarch’s Lives of Agis and Kleomenês (Comment. ad
  Ag. c. 8, p. 119). It is to be recollected that the actual mode
  in which the Spartan ephors were chosen, as I have already stated
  in my first volume, cannot be clearly made out, and has been much
  debated by critics:—

  “Mihi hæc verba, quum illud quidem manifestum faciant, quod etiam
  aliunde constat, sorte captos ephoros non esse, tum hoc alterum,
  quod Hermannus statuit, creationem sortitioni non absimilem
  fuisse, nequaquam demonstrare videntur. Nimirum nihil aliud nisi
  prope accedere ephororum magistratus ad cos dicitur, qui sortito
  capiantur. _Sortitis autem magistratibus hoc maxime proprium est,
  ut promiscue—non ex genere, censu, dignitate—a quolibet capi
  possint_: quamobrem quum ephori quoque fere promiscue fierent ex
  omni multitudine civium, poterat haud dubie magistratus eorum
  ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς δυνάμεως esse dici, etiamsi αἱρετοὶ essent—h.
  e. suffragiis creati. Et video Lachmannum quoque, p. 165, not. 1,
  de Platonis loco similiter judicare.”

  The employment of the lot, as Schömann remarks, implies universal
  admissibility of all citizens to office: though the converse does
  not hold good,—the latter does not of necessity imply the former.
  Now, as we know that universal admissibility did not become
  the law of Athens until after the battle of Platæa, so we may
  conclude that the employment of the lot had no place before that
  epoch,—_i. e._ had no place under the constitution of Kleisthenês.

  [261] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 9-16.

  [262] See a passage about such characters in Plato, Republic, v,
  p. 475 B.

I think, therefore, that these three points: 1. The opening of the
post of archon to all citizens indiscriminately; 2. The choice of
archons by lot; 3. The diminished range of the archon’s duties and
responsibilities, through the extension of those belonging to the
popular courts of justice on the one hand and to the stratêgi on the
other—are all connected together, and must have been simultaneous,
or nearly simultaneous, in the time of introduction: the enactment
of universal admissibility to office certainly not coming after the
other two, and probably coming a little before them.

Now in regard to the eligibility of all Athenians indiscriminately to
the office of archon, we find a clear and positive testimony as to
the time when it was first introduced. Plutarch tells us[263] that
the oligarchical,[264] but high-principled Aristeidês, was himself
the proposer of this constitutional change,—shortly after the battle
of Platæa, with the consequent expulsion of the Persians from Greece,
and the return of the refugee Athenians to their ruined city. Seldom
has it happened in the history of mankind, that rich and poor have
been so completely equalized as among the population of Athens in
that memorable expatriation and heroic struggle. Nor are we at all
surprised to hear that the mass of the citizens, coming back with
freshly-kindled patriotism as well as with the consciousness that
their country had only been recovered by the equal efforts of all,
would no longer submit to be legally disqualified from any office
of state. It was on this occasion that the constitution was first
made really “common” to all, and that the archons, stratêgi, and all
functionaries, first began to be chosen from all Athenians without
any difference of legal eligibility.[265] No mention is made of the
lot, in this important statement of Plutarch, which appears to me
every way worthy of credit, and which teaches us that, down to the
invasion of Xerxês, not only had the exclusive principle of the
Solonian law of qualification continued in force (whereby the first
three classes on the census were alone admitted to all individual
offices, and the fourth or Thêtic class excluded), but also the
archons had hitherto been elected by the citizens,—not taken by lot.

  [263] Plutarch, Arist. 22.

  [264] So at least the supporters of the constitution of
  Kleisthenês were called by the contemporaries of Periklês.

  [265] Plutarch, Arist. _ut sup._ γράφει ψήφισμα, κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν
  πολιτείαν, καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἱρεῖσθαι.

Now for financial purposes, the quadruple census of Solon was
retained long after this period, even beyond the Peloponnesian war
and the oligarchy of Thirty. But we thus learn that Kleisthenês in
his constitution retained it for political purposes also, in part at
least: he recognized the exclusion of the great mass of the citizens
from all individual offices,—such as the archon, the stratêgus, etc.
In his time, probably, no complaints were raised on the subject. His
constitution gave to the collective bodies—senate, ekklesia, and
heliæa, or dikastery—a degree of power and importance such as they
had never before known or imagined: and we may well suppose that the
Athenian people of that day had no objection even to the proclaimed
system and theory of being exclusively governed by men of wealth
and station as individual magistrates,—especially since many of the
newly-enfranchised citizens had been previously metics and slaves.
Indeed, it is to be added that, even under the full democracy of
later Athens, though the people had then become passionately attached
to the theory of equal admissibility of all citizens to office, yet,
in practice, poor men seldom obtained offices which were elected by
the general vote, as will appear more fully in the course of this
history.[266]

  [266] So in the Italian republics of the twelfth and thirteenth
  century, the nobles long continued to possess the exclusive right
  of being elected to the consulate and the great offices of state,
  even after those offices had come to be elected by the people:
  the habitual misrule and oppression of the nobles gradually put
  an end to this right, and even created in many towns a resolution
  positively to exclude them. At Milan, towards the end of the
  twelfth century, the twelve consuls, with the Podestat, possessed
  all the powers of government: these consuls were nominated by
  one hundred electors chosen by and among the people. Sismondi
  observes: “Cependant le peuple imposa lui-même a ces électeurs,
  la règle fondamentale de choisir tous les magistrats dans le
  corps de la noblesse. Ce n’étoit point encore la possession des
  magistratures que l’on contestoit aux gentilshommes: on demandoit
  seulement qu’ils fussent les mandataires immédiats de la nation.
  Mais plus d’une fois, en dépit du droit incontestable des
  citoyens, les consuls regnant s’attribuèrent l’élection de leurs
  successeurs.” (Sismondi, Histoire des Républiques Italiennes,
  chap. xii, vol. ii, p. 240.)

The choice of the stratêgi remained ever afterwards upon the footing
on which Aristeidês thus placed it. But the lot for the choice of
archon must have been introduced shortly after his proposition of
universal eligibility, and in consequence too of the same tide of
democratical feeling,—introduced as a farther corrective, because the
poor citizen, though he had become eligible, was nevertheless not
elected. And at the same time, I imagine, that elaborate distribution
of the Heliæa, or aggregate body of dikasts, or jurors, into separate
pannels, or dikasteries, for the decision of judicial matters, was
first regularized. It was this change that stole away from the
archons so important a part of their previous jurisdiction: it was
this change that Periklês more fully consummated by insuring pay
to the dikasts. But the present is not the time to enter into the
modifications which Athens underwent during the generation after the
battle of Platæa. They have been here briefly noticed for the purpose
of reasoning back, in the absence of direct evidence, to Athens as
it stood in the generation before that memorable battle, after the
reform of Kleisthenês. His reform, though highly democratical,
stopped short of the mature democracy which prevailed from Periklês
to Demosthenês, in three ways especially, among various others;
and it is therefore sometimes considered by the later writers as
an aristocratical constitution:[267] 1. It still recognized the
archons as judges to a considerable extent, and the third archon, or
polemarch, as joint military commander along with the stratêgi. 2.
It retained them as elected annually by the body of citizens, not as
chosen by lot.[268] 3. It still excluded the fourth class of the
Solonian census from all individual office, the archonship among the
rest. The Solonian law of exclusion, however, though retained in
principle, was mitigated in practice thus far,—that whereas Solon
had rendered none but members of the highest class on the census
(the Pentakosiomedimni) eligible to the archonship, Kleisthenês
opened that dignity to all the first three classes, shutting out
only the fourth. That he did this may be inferred from the fact that
Aristeidês, assuredly not a rich man, became archon.

  [267] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 15. τὴν ἐπὶ Κλεισθένους ἐγείρειν
  ἀριστοκρατίαν πειρωμένου: compare Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 2, and
  Isokratês, Areopagiticus, Or. vii, p. 143, p. 192, ed. Bek.

  [268] Herodotus speaks of Kallimachus the Polemarch, at Marathon,
  as ὁ τῷ κυάμῳ λαχὼν Πολέμαρχος (vi, 110).

  I cannot but think that in this case he transfers to the year
  490 B. C. the practice of his own time. The polemarch, at the
  time of the battle of Marathon, was in a certain sense the first
  stratêgus; and the stratêgi were never taken by lot, but always
  chosen by show of hands, even to the end of the democracy. It
  seems impossible to believe that the stratêgi were elected, and
  that the polemarch, at the time when his functions were the same
  as theirs, was chosen by lot.

  Herodotus seems to have conceived the choice of magistrates by
  lot as being of the essence of a democracy (Herodot. iii, 80).

  Plutarch also (Periklês, c. 9) seems to have conceived the
  choice of archons by lot as a very ancient institution of
  Athens: nevertheless, it results from the first chapter of his
  life of Aristeidês,—an obscure chapter, in which conflicting
  authorities are mentioned without being well discriminated,—that
  Aristeidês was _chosen archon by the people_,—not drawn by lot:
  an additional reason for believing this is, that he was archon in
  the year following the battle of Marathon, at which, he had been
  one of the ten generals. Idomeneus distinctly affirmed this to be
  the fact.—οὐ κυαμευτὸν, ἀλλ᾽ ἑλομένων Ἀθηναίων (Plutarch, Arist.
  c. 1).

  Isokratês also (Areopagit. Or. vii, p. 144, p. 195, ed. Bekker)
  conceived the constitution of Kleisthenês as including all
  the three points noticed in the text: 1. A high pecuniary
  qualification of eligibility for individual offices. 2. Election
  to these offices by all the citizens, and accountability to the
  same after office. 3. No employment of the lot.—He even contends
  that this election is more truly democratical than sortition;
  since the latter process might admit men attached to oligarchy,
  which would not happen under the former,—ἔπειτα καὶ δημοτικωτέραν
  ἐνόμιζον ταύτην τὴν κατάστασιν ἢ τὴν διὰ τοῦ λαγχάνειν
  γιγνομένην· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ κληρώσει τὴν τύχην βραβεύσειν, καὶ
  πολλάκις λήψεσθαι τὰς ἀρχὰς τοὺς τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιθυμοῦντας,
  etc. This would be a good argument if there were no pecuniary
  qualification for eligibility,—such pecuniary qualification is
  a provision which he lays down, but which he does not find it
  convenient to insist upon emphatically.

  I do not here advert to the γραφὴ παρανόμων, the νομοφύλακες, and
  the sworn νομόθεται,—all of them institutions belonging to the
  time of Periklês at the earliest; not to that of Kleisthenês.

I am also inclined to believe that the Senate of Five Hundred, as
constituted by Kleisthenês, was taken, not by election, but by lot,
from the ten tribes,—and that every citizen became eligible to it.
Election for this purpose—that is, the privilege of annually electing
a batch of fifty senators, all at once, by each tribe—would probably
be thought more troublesome than valuable; nor do we hear of separate
meetings of each tribe for purposes of election. Moreover, the office
of senator was a collective, not an individual office; the shock,
therefore, to the feelings of semi-democratized Athens, from the
unpleasant idea of a poor man sitting among the fifty prytanes, would
be less than if they conceived him as polemarch at the head of the
right wing of the army, or as an archon administering justice.

A farther difference between the constitution of Solon and that
of Kleisthenês is to be found in the position of the Senate of
Areopagus. Under the former, that senate had been the principal
body in the state, and he had even enlarged its powers; under the
latter, it must have been treated at first as an enemy, and kept
down. For as it was composed only of all the past archons, and as,
during the preceding thirty years, every archon had been a creature
of the Peisistratids, the Areopagites collectively must have been
both hostile and odious to Kleisthenês and his partisans,—perhaps a
fraction of its members might even retire into exile with Hippias.
Its influence must have been sensibly lessened by the change
of party, until it came to be gradually filled by fresh archons
springing from the bosom of the Kleisthenean constitution. But during
this important interval, the new-modelled Senate of Five Hundred,
and the popular assembly, stepped into that ascendency which they
never afterwards lost. From the time of Kleisthenês forward, the
Areopagites cease to be the chief and prominent power in the state:
yet they are still considerable; and when the second fill of the
democratical tide took place, after the battle of Platæa, they
became the focus of that which was then considered as the party of
oligarchical resistance. I have already remarked that the archons,
during the intermediate time (about 509-477 B. C.), were all elected
by the ekklesia, not chosen by lot,—and that the fourth (or poorest
and most numerous) class on the census were by law then ineligible;
while election at Athens, even when every citizen without exception
was an elector and eligible, had a natural tendency to fall upon
men of wealth and station. We thus see how it happened that the
past archons, when united in the Senate of Areopagus, infused into
that body the sympathies, prejudices, and interests of the richer
classes. It was this which brought them into conflict with the more
democratical party headed by Periklês and Ephialtês, in times when
portions of the Kleisthenean constitution had come to be discredited
as too much imbued with oligarchy.

One other remarkable institution, distinctly ascribed to Kleisthenês,
yet remains to be noticed,—the Ostracism; upon which I have already
made some remarks,[269] in touching upon the memorable Solonian
proclamation against neutrality in a sedition. It is hardly too much
to say that, without this protective process, none of the other
institutions would have reached maturity.

  [269] See above, chap. xi. vol. iii. p. 145.

By the ostracism, a citizen was banished without special accusation,
trial, or defence, for a term of ten years,—subsequently diminished
to five. His property was not taken away, nor his reputation
tainted; so that the penalty consisted solely in the banishment from
his native city to some other Greek city. As to reputation, the
ostracism was a compliment rather than otherwise;[270] and so it was
vividly felt to be, when, about ninety years after Kleisthenês, the
conspiracy between Nikias and Alkibiadês fixed it upon Hyperbolus.
The two former had both recommended the taking of an ostracizing
vote, each hoping to cause the banishment of the other; but before
the day arrived, they accommodated the difference. To fire off the
safety-gun of the republic against a person so little dangerous as
Hyperbolus, was denounced as the prostitution of a great political
ceremony: “it was not against such men as him (said the comic writer,
Plato),[271] that the oyster-shell (or potsherd) was intended to be
used.” The process of ostracism was carried into effect by writing
upon a shell, or potsherd, the name of the person whom a citizen
thought it prudent for a time to banish; which shell, when deposited
in the proper vessel, counted for a vote towards the sentence.

  [270] Aristeidês Rhetor. Orat. xlvi. vol ii. p. 317, ed. Dindorf.

  [271] Plutarch (Nikias, c. 11; Alkibiad. c. 13; Aristeid. c. 7):
  Thucyd. viii, 73. Plato Comicus said, respecting Hyperbolus—

    Οὐ γὰρ τοιούτων οὕνεκ᾽ ὄστραχ᾽ ηὑρέθη.

  Theophrastus had stated that Phæax, and not Nikias, was the rival
  of Alkibiadês on this occasion, when Hyperbolus was ostracized;
  but most authors, says Plutarch, represent Nikias as the person.
  It is curious that there should be any difference of statement
  about a fact so notorious, and in the best-known time of Athenian
  history.

  Taylor thinks that the oration which now passes as that of
  Andokidês against Alkibiadês, is really by Phæax, and was read
  by Plutarch as the oration of Phæax in an actual contest of
  ostracism between Phæax, Nikias, and Alkibiadês. He is opposed by
  Ruhnken and Valckenaer (see Sluiter’s preface to that oration, c.
  1, and Ruhnken, Hist. Critic. Oratt. Græcor. p. 135). I cannot
  agree with either: I cannot think with him, that it is a real
  oration of Phæax; nor with them, that it is a real oration in any
  genuine cause of ostracism whatever. It appears to me to have
  been composed after the ostracism had fallen into desuetude,
  and when the Athenians had not only become somewhat ashamed
  of it, but had lost the familiar conception of what it really
  was. For how otherwise can we explain the fact, that the author
  of that oration complains that he is about to be ostracized
  without any secret voting, in which the very essence of the
  ostracism consisted, and from which its name was borrowed (οὔτε
  διαψηφισαμένων κρυβδὴν, c. 2)? His oration is framed as if the
  audience whom he was addressing were about to ostracize one out
  of the three, by show of hands. But the process of ostracizing
  included no meeting and haranguing,—nothing but simple deposit of
  the shells in a cask; as may be seen by the description of the
  special railing-in of the agora, and by the story (true or false)
  of the unlettered country-citizen coming into the city to give
  his vote, and asking Aristeidês, without even knowing his person,
  to write the name for him on the shell (Plutarch, Aristeid. c.
  7). There was, indeed, previous discussion in the senate as
  well as in the ekklesia, whether a vote of ostracism should be
  entered upon at all; but the author of the oration to which I
  allude does not address himself to _that_ question; he assumes
  that the vote is actually about to be taken, and that one of the
  three—himself, Nikias, or Alkibiadês—must be ostracized (c. 1).
  Now, doubtless, in practice, the decision commonly lay between
  two formidable rivals; but it was not publicly or formally put so
  before the people: every citizen might write upon the shell such
  name as he chose. Farther, the open denunciation of the injustice
  of ostracism as a system (c. 2), proves an age later than the
  banishment of Hyperbolus. Moreover, the author having begun by
  remarking that he stands in contest with Nikias as well as with
  Alkibiadês, says nothing more about Nikias to the end of the
  speech.

I have already observed that all the governments of the Grecian
cities, when we compare them with that idea which a modern reader is
apt to conceive of the measure of force belonging to a government,
were essentially weak, the good as well as the bad,—the democratical,
the oligarchical, and the despotic. The force in the hands of any
government, to cope with conspirators or mutineers, was extremely
small, with the single exception of a despot surrounded by his
mercenary troop; so that no tolerably sustained conspiracy or usurper
could be put down except by the direct aid of the people in support
of the government; which amounted to a dissolution, for the time,
of constitutional authority, and was pregnant with reactionary
consequences such as no man could foresee. To prevent powerful men
from attempting usurpation was, therefore, of the greatest possible
moment; and a despot or an oligarchy might exercise preventive means
at pleasure,[272] much sharper than the ostracism, such as the
assassination of Kimon, mentioned in my last chapter, as directed
by the Peisistratids. At the very least, they might send away any
one, from whom they apprehended attack or danger, without incurring
even so much as the imputation of severity. But in a democracy,
where arbitrary action of the magistrate was the thing of all
others most dreaded, and where fixed laws, with trial and defence
as preliminaries to punishment, were conceived by the ordinary
citizen as the guarantees of his personal security and as the pride
of his social condition,—the creation of such an exceptional power
presented serious difficulty. If we transport ourselves to the times
of Kleisthenês, immediately after the expulsion of the Peisistratids,
when the working of the democratical machinery was as yet untried,
we shall find this difficulty at its maximum; but we shall also
find the necessity of vesting such a power somewhere absolutely
imperative. For the great Athenian nobles had yet to learn the lesson
of respect for any constitution; their past history had exhibited
continual struggles between the armed factions of Megaklês, Lykurgus,
and Peisistratus, put down after a time by the superior force and
alliances of the latter. And though Kleisthenês, the son of Megaklês,
might be firmly disposed to renounce the example of his father, and
to act as the faithful citizen of a fixed constitution,—he would know
but too well that the sons of his father’s companions and rivals
would follow out ambitious purposes without any regard to the limits
imposed by law, if ever they acquired sufficient partisans to present
a fair prospect of success. Moreover, when any two candidates for
power, with such reckless dispositions, came into a bitter personal
rivalry, the motives to each of them, arising as well out of fear
as out of ambition, to put down his opponent at any cost to the
constitution, might well become irresistible, unless some impartial
and discerning interference could arrest the strife in time. “If the
Athenians were wise (Aristeidês is reported to have said,[273] in the
height and peril of his parliamentary struggle with Themistoklês),
they would cast both Themistoklês and me into the barathrum.”[274]
And whoever reads the sad narrative of the Korkyræan sedition, in
the third book of Thucydidês, together with the reflections of the
historian upon it,[275] will trace the gradual exasperation of these
party feuds, beginning even under democratical forms, until at length
they break down the barriers of public as well as of private morality.

  [272] See the discussion of the ostracism in Aristot. Politic.
  iii, 8, where he recognizes the problem as one common to all
  governments.

  Compare, also, a good Dissertation—J. A. Paradys, De Ostracismo
  Atheniensium, Lugduni Batavor. 1793; K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der
  Griechischen Staatsalterthümer, ch. 130; and Schömann, Antiq.
  Jur. Pub. Græc. ch. xxxv, p. 233.

  [273] Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 3.

  [274] The barathrum was a deep pit, said to have had iron spikes
  at the bottom, into which criminals condemned to death were
  sometimes cast. Though probably an ancient Athenian punishment,
  it seems to have become at the very least extremely rare, if not
  entirely disused, during the times of Athens historically known
  to us; but the phrase continued in speech after the practice had
  become obsolete. The iron spikes depend on the evidence of the
  Schol. Aristophan. Plutus, 431,—a very doubtful authority, when
  we read the legend which he blends with his statement.

  [275] Thucyd. iii, 70, 81, 82.

Against this chance of internal assailants Kleisthenês had to protect
the democratical constitution,—first, by throwing impediments
in their way and rendering it difficult for them to procure the
requisite support; next, by eliminating them before any violent
projects were ripe for execution. To do either the one or the other,
it was necessary to provide such a constitution as would not only
conciliate the good-will, but kindle the passionate attachment,
of the mass of citizens, insomuch that not even any considerable
minority should be deliberately inclined to alter it by force. It was
necessary to create in the multitude, and through them to force upon
the leading ambitious men, that rare and difficult sentiment which
we may term a constitutional morality; a paramount reverence for the
forms of the constitution, enforcing obedience to the authorities
acting under and within those forms, yet combined with the habit of
open speech, of action subject only to definite legal control, and
unrestrained censure of those very authorities as to all their public
acts,—combined too with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every
citizen, amidst the bitterness of party contest, that the forms of
the constitution will be not less sacred in the eyes of his opponents
than in his own. This coexistence of freedom and self-imposed
restraint,—of obedience to authority with unmeasured censure of the
persons exercising it,—may be found in the aristocracy of England
(since about 1688) as well as in the democracy of the American United
States: and because we are familiar with it, we are apt to suppose
it a natural sentiment; though there seem to be few sentiments more
difficult to establish and diffuse among a community, judging by the
experience of history. We may see how imperfectly it exists at this
day in the Swiss cantons; and the many violences of the first French
revolution illustrate, among various other lessons, the fatal effects
arising from its absence, even among a people high in the scale of
intelligence. Yet the diffusion of such constitutional morality,
not merely among the majority of any community, but throughout the
whole, is the indispensable condition of a government at once free
and peaceable; since even any powerful and obstinate minority may
render the working of free institutions impracticable, without being
strong enough to conquer ascendency for themselves. Nothing less
than unanimity, or so overwhelming a majority as to be tantamount
to unanimity, on the cardinal point of respecting constitutional
forms, even by those who do not wholly approve of them, can render
the excitement of political passion bloodless, and yet expose all the
authorities in the state to the full license of pacific criticism.

At the epoch of Kleisthenês, which by a remarkable coincidence is the
same as that of the regifuge at Rome, such constitutional morality,
if it existed anywhere else, had certainly no place at Athens; and
the first creation of it in any particular society must be esteemed
an interesting historical fact. By the spirit of his reforms,—equal,
popular, and comprehensive, far beyond the previous experience of
Athenians,—he secured the hearty attachment of the body of citizens;
but from the first generation of leading men, under the nascent
democracy, and with such precedents as they had to look back upon, no
self-imposed limits to ambition could be expected: and the problem
required was to eliminate beforehand any one about to transgress
these limits, so as to escape the necessity of putting him down
afterwards, with all that bloodshed and reaction, in the midst of
which the free working of the constitution would be suspended at
least, if not irrevocably extinguished. To acquire such influence
as would render him dangerous under democratical forms, a man must
stand in evidence before the public, so as to afford some reasonable
means of judging of his character and purposes; and the security
which Kleisthenês provided, was, to call in the positive judgment
of the citizens respecting his future promise purely and simply, so
that they might not remain too long neutral between two formidable
political rivals,—pursuant in a certain way to the Solonian
proclamation against neutrality in a sedition, as I have already
remarked in a former chapter. He incorporated in the constitution
itself the principle of _privilegium_ (to employ the Roman phrase,
which signifies, not a peculiar favor granted to any one, but a
peculiar inconvenience imposed), yet only under circumstances solemn
and well defined, with full notice and discussion beforehand, and
by the positive secret vote of a large proportion of the citizens.
“No law shall be made against any single citizen, without the same
being made against _all_ Athenian citizens; unless it shall so seem
good to six thousand citizens voting secretly.”[276] Such was that
general principle of the constitution, under which the ostracism
was a particular case. Before the vote of ostracism could be taken,
a case was to be made out in the senate and the public assembly
to justify it. In the sixth prytany of the year, these two bodies
debated and determined whether the state of the republic was menacing
enough to call for such an exceptional measure.[277] If they decided
in the affirmative, a day was named, the agora was railed round, with
ten entrances left for the citizens of each tribe, and ten separate
casks or vessels for depositing the suffrages, which consisted of a
shell, or a potsherd, with the name of the person written on it whom
each citizen designed to banish. At the end of the day, the number
of votes was summed up, and if six thousand votes were found to have
been given against any one person, that person was ostracized; if
not, the ceremony ended in nothing.[278] Ten days were allowed to
him for settling his affairs, after which he was required to depart
from Attica for ten years, but retained his property, and suffered no
other penalty.

  [276] Andokidês, De Mysteriis, p. 12, c. 13. Μηδὲ νόμον ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ
  ἐξεῖναι θεῖναι, ἐὰν μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις· ἐὰν μὴ
  ἑξακισχιλίοις δόξῃ, κρυβδὴν ψηφιζομένοις. According to the usual
  looseness in dealing with the name of Solon, this has been called
  a law of Solon (see Petit. Leg. Att. p. 188), though it certainly
  cannot be older than Kleisthenês.

  “Privilegia ne irroganto,” said the law of the Twelve Tables at
  Rome (Cicero, Legg. iii, 4-19).

  [277] Aristotle and Philochorus, ap. Photium, App. p. 672 and
  675, ed. Porson.

  It would rather appear by that passage that the ostracism was
  never formally abrogated; and that even in the later times, to
  which the description of Aristotle refers, the form was still
  preserved of putting the question whether the public safety
  called for an ostracizing vote, long after it had passed both out
  of use and out of mind.

  [278] Philochorus, _ut supra_; Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 7; Schol.
  ad Aristophan. Equit. 851; Pollux, viii, 19.

  There is a difference of opinion among the authorities, as well
  as among the expositors, whether the minimum of six thousand
  applies to the votes given in all, or to the votes given against
  any one name. I embrace the latter opinion, which is supported
  by Philochorus, Pollux, and the Schol. on Aristophanês, though
  Plutarch countenances the former. Boeckh, in his Public Economy
  of Athens, and Wachsmuth, (i, 1, p. 272) are in favor of Plutarch
  and the former opinion; Paradys (Dissertat. De Ostr. p. 25),
  Platner, and Hermann (see K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Gr.
  Staatsalt. ch. 130, not. 6) support the other, which appears to
  me the right one.

  For the purpose, so unequivocally pronounced, of the general law
  determining the absolute minimum necessary for a _privilegium_,
  would by no means be obtained, if the simple majority of votes,
  among six thousand voters in all, had been allowed to take
  effect. A person might then be ostracized with a very small
  number of votes against him, and without creating any reasonable
  presumption that he was dangerous to the constitution; which
  was by no means either the purpose of Kleisthenês, or the
  well-understood operation of the ostracism, so long as it
  continued to be a reality.

It was not the maxim at Athens to escape the errors of the people,
by calling in the different errors, and the sinister interest
besides, of an extra-popular or privileged few; nor was any third
course open, since the principles of representative government were
not understood, nor indeed conveniently applicable to very small
communities. Beyond the judgment of the people—so the Athenians
felt—there was no appeal; and their grand study was to surround the
delivery of that judgment with the best securities for rectitude and
the best preservatives against haste, passion, or private corruption.
Whatever measure of good government could not be obtained in that
way, could not, in their opinion, be obtained at all. I shall
illustrate the Athenian proceedings on this head more fully when I
come to speak of the working of their mature democracy: meanwhile,
in respect to this grand protection of the nascent democracy,—the
vote of ostracism,—it will be found that the securities devised by
Kleisthenês, for making the sentence effectual against the really
dangerous man, and against no one else, display not less foresight
than patriotism. The main object was, to render the voting an
expression of deliberate public feeling, as distinguished from mere
factious antipathy: the large minimum of votes required, one-fourth
of the entire citizen population, went far to insure this effect,—the
more so, since each vote, taken as it was in a secret manner,
counted unequivocally for the expression of a genuine and independent
sentiment, and could neither be coerced nor bought. Then again,
Kleisthenês did not permit the process of ostracizing to be opened
against any one citizen exclusively. If opened at all, every one
without exception was exposed to the sentence; so that the friends of
Themistoklês could not invoke it against Aristeidês,[279] nor those
of the latter against the former, without exposing their own leader
to the same chance of exile. It was not likely to be invoked at all,
therefore, until exasperation had proceeded so far as to render
both parties insensible to this chance,—the precise index of that
growing internecive hostility, which the ostracism prevented from
coming to a head. Nor could it even then be ratified, unless a case
was shown to convince the more neutral portion of the senate and the
ekklesia: moreover, after all, the ekklesia did not itself ostracize,
but a future day was named, and the whole body of the citizens were
solemnly invited to vote. It was in this way that security was
taken not only for making the ostracism effectual in protecting
the constitution, but to hinder it from being employed for any
other purpose. And we must recollect that it exercised its tutelary
influence, not merely on those occasions when it was actually
employed, but by the mere knowledge that it might be employed, and by
the restraining effect which that knowledge produced on the conduct
of the great men. Again, the ostracism, though essentially of an
exceptional nature, was yet an exception sanctified and limited
by the constitution itself; so that the citizen, in giving his
ostracizing vote, did not in any way depart from the constitution
or lose his reverence for it. The issue placed before him—“Is there
any man whom you think vitally dangerous to the state? if so,
whom?”—though vague, was yet raised directly and legally. Had there
been no ostracism, it might probably have been raised both indirectly
and illegally, on the occasion of some special imputed crime of a
suspected political leader, when accused before a court of justice,
—a perversion, involving all the mischief of the ostracism, without
its protective benefits.

  [279] The practical working of the ostracism presents it as a
  struggle between two contending leaders, accompanied with chance
  of banishment to both—Periklês πρὸς τὸν Θουκυδίδην εἰς ἀγῶνα περὶ
  τοῦ ὀστράκου καταστὰς, καὶ διακινδυνεύσας, ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἐξέβαλε,
  κατέλυσε δὲ τὴν ἀντιτεταγμένην ἑταιρείαν (Plutarch, Periklês, c.
  14; compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11).

Care was taken to divest the ostracism of all painful consequence
except what was inseparable from exile; and this is not one of the
least proofs of the wisdom with which it was devised. Most certainly,
it never deprived the public of candidates for political influence:
and when we consider the small amount of individual evil which it
inflicted,—evil too diminished, in the cases of Kimon and Aristeidês,
by a reactionary sentiment which augmented their subsequent
popularity after return,—two remarks will be quite sufficient to
offer in the way of justification. First, it completely produced its
intended effect; for the democracy grew up from infancy to manhood
without a single attempt to overthrow it by force,[280]—a result,
upon which no reflecting contemporary of Kleisthenês could have
ventured to calculate. Next, through such tranquil working of the
democratical forms, a constitutional morality quite sufficiently
complete was produced among the leading Athenians, to enable the
people after a certain time to dispense with that exceptional
security which the ostracism offered.[281] To the nascent democracy,
it was absolutely indispensable; to the growing yet militant
democracy, it was salutary; but the full-grown democracy both could
and did stand without it. The ostracism passed upon Hyperbolus,
about ninety years after Kleisthenês, was the last occasion of its
employment. And even this can hardly be considered as a serious
instance: it was a trick concerted between two distinguished
Athenians (Nikias and Alkibiadês), to turn to their own political
account a process already coming to be antiquated. Nor would
such a manœuvre have been possible, if the contemporary Athenian
citizens had been penetrated with the same, serious feeling of the
value of ostracism as a safeguard of democracy, as had been once
entertained by their fathers and grandfathers. Between Kleisthenês
and Hyperbolus, we hear of about ten different persons as having
been banished by ostracism. First of all, Hipparchus of the deme
Cholargus, the son of Charmus, a relative of the recently-expelled
Peisistratid despots;[282] then Aristeidês, Themistoklês, Kimon, and
Thucydidês son of Melêsias, all of them renowned political leaders;
also Alkibiadês and Megaklês (the paternal and maternal grandfathers
of the distinguished Alkibiadês), and Kallias, belonging to another
eminent family at Athens;[283] lastly, Damôn, the preceptor of
Periklês in poetry and music, and eminent for his acquisitions in
philosophy.[284] In this last case comes out the vulgar side of
humanity, aristocratical as well as democratical; for with both, the
process of philosophy and the persons of philosophers are wont to
be alike unpopular. Even Kleisthenês himself is said to have been
ostracized under his own law, and Xanthippus; but both upon authority
too weak to trust.[285] Miltiadês was not ostracized at all, but
tried and punished for misconduct in his command.

  [280] It is not necessary in this remark to take notice, either
  of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, or that of Thirty, called the
  Thirty Tyrants, established during the closing years of the
  Peloponnesian war, and after the ostracism had been discontinued.
  Neither of these changes were brought about by the excessive
  ascendency of any one or few men: both of them grew out of the
  embarrassments and dangers of Athens in the latter period of her
  great foreign war.

  [281] Aristotle (Polit. iii, 8, 6) seems to recognize the
  political necessity of the ostracism, as applied even to obvious
  superiority of wealth, connection, etc. (which he distinguishes
  pointedly from superiority of merit and character), and upon
  principles of symmetry only, even apart from dangerous designs
  on the part of the superior mind. No painter, he observes, will
  permit a foot, in his picture of a man, to be of disproportionate
  size with the entire body, though separately taken it may be
  finely painted; nor will the chorus-master allow any one voice,
  however beautiful, to predominate beyond a certain proportion
  over the rest.

  His final conclusion is, however, that the legislator ought, if
  possible, so to construct his constitution, as to have no need of
  such exceptional remedy; but, if this cannot be done, then the
  second-best step is to apply the ostracism. Compare also v, 2, 5.

  The last century of the free Athenian democracy realized the
  first of these alternatives.

  [282] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11: Harpokration. v. Ἵππαρχος.

  [283] Lysias cont. Alkibiad. A. c. 11, p. 143: Harpokration. v.
  Ἀλκιβιάδης; Andokidês cont. Alkibiad. c. 11-12, pp. 129, 130:
  this last oration may afford evidence as to the facts mentioned
  in it, though I cannot imagine it to be either genuine, or
  belonging to the time to which it professes to refer, as has been
  observed in a previous note.

  [284] Plutarch, Periklês. c. 4; Plutarch. Aristeid. c. 1.

  [285] Ælian, V. H. xiii, 24; Herakleidês, περὶ Πολιτειῶν, c. 1,
  ed. Köhler.

I should hardly have said so much about this memorable and peculiar
institution of Kleisthenês, if the erroneous accusations against the
Athenian democracy,—of envy, injustice, and ill-treatment of their
superior men, had not been greatly founded upon it, and if such
criticisms had not passed from ancient times to modern with little
examination. In monarchical governments, a pretender to the throne,
numbering a certain amount of supporters, is, as a matter of course,
excluded from the country. The duke of Bordeaux cannot now reside in
France,—nor could Napoleon after 1815,—nor Charles Edward in England
during the last century. No man treats this as any extravagant
injustice, yet it is the parallel of the ostracism,—with a stronger
case in favor of the latter, inasmuch as the change from one regal
dynasty to another does not of necessity overthrow all the collateral
institutions and securities of the country. Plutarch has affirmed
that the ostracism arose from the envy and jealousy inherent in a
democracy,[286] and not from justifiable fears,—an observation often
repeated, yet not the less demonstrably untrue. Not merely because
ostracism so worked as often to increase the influence of that
political leader whose rival it removed,—but still more, because,
if the fact had been as Plutarch says, this institution would have
continued as long as the democracy; whereas it finished with the
banishment of Hyperbolus, at a period when the government was more
decisively democratical than it had been in the time of Kleisthenês.
It was, in truth, a product altogether of fear and insecurity,[287]
on the part both of the democracy and its best friends,—fear
perfectly well-grounded, and only appearing needless because the
precautions taken prevented attack. So soon as the diffusion of a
constitutional morality had placed the mass of the citizens above all
serious fear of an aggressive usurper the ostracism was discontinued.
And doubtless the feeling, that it might safely be dispensed with,
must have been strengthened by the long ascendency of Periklês,—by
the spectacle of the greatest statesman whom Athens ever produced,
acting steadily within the limits of the constitution; as well as by
the ill-success of his two opponents, Kimon and Thucydidês,—aided by
numerous partisans and by the great comic writers, at a period when
comedy was a power in the state such as it has never been before
or since,—in their attempts to get him ostracized. They succeeded
in fanning up the ordinary antipathy of the citizens towards
philosophers, so far as to procure the ostracism of his friend and
teacher Damôn: but Periklês himself, to repeat the complaint of his
bitter enemy, the comic poet Kratinus,[288] “was out of the reach of
the oyster-shell.” If Periklês was not conceived to be dangerous to
the constitution, none of his successors were at all likely to be so
regarded. Damôn and Hyperbolus were the two last persons ostracized:
both of them were cases, and the only cases, of an unequivocal abuse
of the institution, because, whatever the grounds of displeasure
against them may have been, it is impossible to conceive either
of them as menacing to the state,—whereas all the other known
sufferers were men of such position and power, that the six or
eight thousand citizens who inscribed each name on the shell, or at
least a large proportion of them, may well have done so under the
most conscientious belief that they were guarding the constitution
against real danger. Such a change, in the character of the persons
ostracized, plainly evinces that the ostracism had become dissevered
from that genuine patriotic prudence which originally rendered it
both legitimate and popular. It had served for two generations an
inestimable tutelary purpose,—it lived to be twice dishonored,—and
then passed, by universal acquiescence, into matter of history.

  [286] Plutarch, Themistoklês, 22; Plutarch, Aristeidês, 7,
  παραμυθία φθόνου καὶ κουφισμός. See the same opinions repeated by
  Wachsmuth, Hellenische Alterthumskunde, ch. 48, vol. i, p. 272,
  and by Platner, Prozess and Klagen bey den Attikern, vol. i, p.
  386.

  [287] Thucyd. viii, 73, διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον.

  [288] Kratinus ap. Plutarch, Periklês, 13.

    Ὁ σχινοκέφαλος Ζεὺς ὁδὶ προσέρχεται
    Περικλέης, τᾠδεῖον ἐπὶ τοῦ κρανíου
    Ἔχων, ἐπειδὴ τοὔστρακον παροίχεται.

  For the attacks of the comic writers upon Damôn, see Plutarch,
  Periklês, c. 4.

A process analogous to the ostracism subsisted at Argos,[289] at
Syracuse, and in some other Grecian democracies. Aristotle states
that it was abused for factious purposes: and at Syracuse, where it
was introduced after the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty, Diodorus
affirms that it was so unjustly and profusely applied, as to deter
persons of wealth and station from taking any part in public affairs;
for which reason it was speedily discontinued. We have no particulars
to enable us to appreciate this general statement. But we cannot
safely infer that because the ostracism worked on the whole well at
Athens, it must necessarily have worked well in other states,—the
more so, as we do not know whether it was surrounded with the same
precautionary formalities, nor whether it even required the same
large minimum of votes to make it effective. This latter guarantee,
so valuable in regard to an institution essentially easy to abuse, is
not noticed by Diodorus in his brief account of the Petalism,—so the
process was denominated at Syracuse.[290]

  [289] Aristot. Polit. iii, 8, 4; v, 2, 5.

  [290] Diodor. xi, 55-87. This author describes very imperfectly
  the Athenian ostracism, transferring to it apparently the
  circumstances of the Syracusan Petalism.

Such was the first Athenian democracy, engendered as well by the
reaction against Hippias and his dynasty as by the memorable
partnership, whether spontaneous or compulsory, between Kleisthenês
and the unfranchised multitude. It is to be distinguished, both
from the mitigated oligarchy established by Solon before, and from
the full-grown and symmetrical democracy which prevailed afterwards
from the beginning of the Peloponnesian war towards the close of the
career of Periklês. It was, indeed, a striking revolution, impressed
upon the citizen not less by the sentiments to which it appealed
than by the visible change which it made in political and social
life. He saw himself marshalled in the ranks of hoplites, alongside
of new companions in arms,—he was enrolled in a new register, and
his property in a new schedule, in his deme and by his demarch, an
officer before unknown,—he found the year distributed afresh, for
all legal purposes, into ten parts bearing the name of prytanies,
each marked by a solemn and free-spoken ekklesia, at which he had
a right to be present,—that ekklesia was convoked and presided by
senators called prytanes, members of a senate novel both as to
number and distribution,—his political duties were now performed as
member of a tribe, designated by a name not before pronounced in
common Attic life, connected with one of ten heroes whose statues
he now for the first time saw in the agora, and associating him
with fellow-tribemen from all parts of Attica. All these and many
others were sensible novelties, felt in the daily proceedings of the
citizen. But the great novelty of all was, the authentic recognition
of the ten new tribes as a sovereign dêmos, or people, apart from
all specialties of phratric or gentile origin, with free speech and
equal law; retaining no distinction except the four classes of the
Solonian property-schedule with their gradations of eligibility. To
a considerable proportion of citizens this great novelty was still
farther endeared by the fact that it had raised them out of the
degraded position of metics and slaves; and to the large majority of
all the citizens, it furnished a splendid political idea, profoundly
impressive to the Greek mind,—capable of calling forth the most
ardent attachment as well as the most devoted sense of active
obligation and obedience. We have now to see how their newly-created
patriotism manifested itself.

Kleisthenês and his new constitution carried with them so completely
the popular favor, that Isagoras had no other way of opposing
it except by calling in the interference of Kleomenês and the
Lacedæmonians. Kleomenês listened the more readily to this call, as
he was reported to have been on an intimate footing with the wife
of Isagoras. He prepared to come to Athens; but his first aim was
to deprive the democracy of its great leader Kleisthenês, who, as
belonging to the Alkmæônid family, was supposed to be tainted with
the inherited sin of his great-grandfather Megaklês, the destroyer
of the usurper Kylôn. Kleomenês sent a herald to Athens, demanding
the expulsion “of the accursed,”—so this family were called by their
enemies, and so they continued to be called eighty years afterwards,
when the same manœuvre was practised by the Lacedæmonians of that
day against Periklês. This requisition had been recommended by
Isagoras, and was so well-timed that Kleisthenês, not venturing to
disobey it, retired voluntarily, so that Kleomenês, though arriving
at Athens only with a small force, found himself master of the city.
At the instigation of Isagoras, he sent into exile seven hundred
families, selected from the chief partisans of Kleisthenês: his next
attempt was to dissolve the new Senate of Five Hundred and place
the whole government in the hands of three hundred adherents of the
chief whose cause he espoused. But now was seen the spirit infused
into the people by their new constitution. At the time of the first
usurpation of Peisistratus, the Senate of that day had not only not
resisted, but even lent themselves to the scheme. But the new Senate
of Kleisthenês resolutely refused to submit to dissolution, and the
citizens manifested themselves in a way at once so hostile and so
determined, that Kleomenês and Isagoras were altogether baffled.
They were compelled to retire into the acropolis and stand upon the
defensive; and this symptom of weakness was the signal for a general
rising of the Athenians, who besieged the Spartan king on the holy
rock. He had evidently come without any expectation of finding, or
any means of overpowering, resistance; for at the end of two days his
provisions were exhausted, and he was forced to capitulate. He and
his Lacedæmonians, as well as Isagoras, were allowed to retire to
Sparta; but the Athenians of the party captured along with him were
imprisoned, condemned,[291] and executed by the people.

  [291] Herodot. v, 70-72; compare Schol. ad Aristophan. Lysistr.
  274.

Kleisthenês, with the seven hundred exiled families, was immediately
recalled, and his new constitution materially strengthened by this
first success. Yet the prospect of renewed Spartan attack was
sufficiently serious to induce him to send envoys to Artaphernês, the
Persian satrap at Sardis, soliciting the admission of Athens into the
Persian alliance: he probably feared the intrigues of the expelled
Hippias in the same quarter. Artaphernês, having first informed
himself who the Athenians were, and where they dwelt,—replied that,
if they chose to send earth and water to the king of Persia, they
might be received as allies, but upon no other condition. Such were
the feelings of alarm under which the envoys had quitted Athens,
that they went the length of promising this unqualified token of
submission. But their countrymen, on their return, disavowed them
with scorn and indignation.[292]

  [292] Herodot. v, 73.

It was at this time that the first connection began between Athens
and the little Bœotian town of Platæa, situated on the northern
slope of the range of Kithæron, between that mountain and the river
Asôpus,—on the road from Athens to Thebes; and it is upon this
first occasion that we become acquainted with the Bœotians and
their polities. In one of my preceding volumes,[293] the Bœotian
federation has already been briefly described, as composed of some
twelve or thirteen autonomous towns under the headship of Thebes,
which was, or professed to have been, their mother-city. Platæa had
been, so the Thebans affirmed, their latest foundation;[294] it was
ill-used by them, and discontented with the alliance. Accordingly,
as Kleomenês was on his way back from Athens, the Platæans took the
opportunity of addressing themselves to him, craved the protection
of Sparta against Thebes, and surrendered their town and territory
without reserve. The Spartan king, having no motive to undertake a
trust which promised nothing but trouble, advised them to solicit
the protection of Athens, as nearer and more accessible for them in
case of need. He foresaw that this would embroil the Athenians with
Bœotia; and such anticipation was in fact his chief motive for giving
the advice, which the Platæans followed. Selecting an occasion of
public sacrifice at Athens, they dispatched thither envoys, who sat
down as suppliants at the altar, surrendered their town to Athens,
and implored protection against Thebes. Such an appeal was not to be
resisted, and protection was promised; it was soon needed, for the
Thebans invaded the Platæan territory, and an Athenian force marched
to defend it. Battle was about to be joined, when the Corinthians
interposed with their mediation, which was accepted by both parties.
They decided altogether in favor of Platæa, pronouncing that the
Thebans had no right to employ force against any seceding member of
the Bœotian federation.[295] But the Thebans, finding the decision
against them, refused to abide by it, and, attacking the Athenians on
their return, sustained a complete defeat: the latter avenged this
breach of faith by joining to Platæa the portion of Theban territory
south of the Asôpus, and making that river the limit between the
two. By such success, however, the Athenians gained nothing, except
the enmity of Bœotia,—as Kleomenês had foreseen. Their alliance with
Platæa, long continued, and presenting in the course of this history
several incidents touching to our sympathies, will be found, if we
except one splendid occasion,[296] productive only of burden to the
one party, yet insufficient as a protection to the other.

  [293] See vol. ii, p. 295, part ii, ch. 3.

  [294] Thucyd. iii, 61.

  [295] Herodot. vi, 108. ἐᾷν Θηβαίους Βοιωτῶν τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους
  ἐς Βοιωτοὺς τελέειν. This is an important circumstance in regard
  to Grecian political feeling: I shall advert to it hereafter.

  [296] Herodot. vi, 108. Thucydidês (iii, 58), when recounting
  the capture of Platæa by the Lacedæmonians in the third year of
  the Peloponnesian war, states that the alliance between Platæa
  and Athens was then in its 93rd year of date; according to which
  reckoning it would begin in the year 519 B. C., where Mr. Clinton
  and other chronologers place it.

  I venture to think that the immediate circumstances, as recounted
  in the text from Herodotus (whether Thucydidês conceived them
  in the same way, cannot be determined), which brought about the
  junction of Platæa with Athens, cannot have taken place in 519 B.
  C., but must have happened _after_ the expulsion of Hippias from
  Athens in 510 B. C.,—for the following reasons:—

  1. No mention is made of Hippias, who yet, if the event had
  happened in 519 B. C., must have been the person to determine
  whether the Athenians should assist Platæa or not. The Platæan
  envoys present themselves at a public sacrifice in the attitude
  of suppliants, so as to touch the feelings of the Athenian
  citizens generally: had Hippias been then despot, _he_ would have
  been the person to be propitiated and to determine for or against
  assistance.

  2. We know no cause which should have brought Kleomenês with a
  Lacedæmonian force near to Platæa in the year 519 B. C.: we know
  from the statement of Herodotus (v, 76) that no Lacedæmonian
  expedition against Attica took place at that time. But in the
  year to which I have referred the event, Kleomenês is on his
  march near the spot upon a known and assignable object. From the
  very tenor of the narrative, it is plain that Kleomenês and his
  army were not designedly in Bœotia, nor meddling with Bœotian
  affairs, at the time when the Platæans solicited his aid; he
  declines to interpose in the matter, pleading the great distance
  between Sparta and Platæa as a reason.

  3. Again, Kleomenês, in advising the Platæans to solicit
  Athens, does not give the advice through good-will towards
  them, but through a desire to harass and perplex the Athenians,
  by entangling them in a quarrel with the Bœotians. At the
  point of time to which I have referred the incident, this was
  a very natural desire: he was angry, and perhaps alarmed, at
  the recent events which had brought about his expulsion from
  Athens. But what was there to make him conceive such a feeling
  against Athens during the reign of Hippias? That despot was on
  terms of the closest intimacy with Sparta: the Peisistratids
  were (ξείνους—ξεινίους ταμάλιστα—Herod. v, 63, 90, 91) “the
  particular guests” of the Spartans, who were only induced to
  take part against Hippias from a reluctant obedience to the
  oracles procured, one after another, by Kleisthenês. The motive,
  therefore, assigned by Herodotus, for the advice given by
  Kleomenês to the Platæans, can have no application to the time
  when Hippias was still despot.

  4. That Herodotus did not conceive the victory gained by the
  Athenians over Thebes as having taken place _before_ the
  expulsion of Hippias, is evident from his emphatic contrast
  between their warlike spirit and success when liberated from the
  despots, and their timidity or backwardness while under Hippias
  (Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννευόμενοι μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων
  ἔσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων, μακρῷ πρῶτοι
  ἐγένοντο· δηλοῖ ὦν ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν, ἐθελοκάκεον,
  etc. v, 78). The man who wrote thus cannot have believed that,
  in the year 519 B. C., while Hippias was in full sway, the
  Athenians gained an important victory over the Thebans, cut off
  a considerable portion of the Theban territory for the purpose
  of joining it to that of the Platæans, and showed from that time
  forward their constant superiority over Thebes by protecting her
  inferior neighbor against her.

  These different reasons, taking them altogether, appear to me
  to show that the first alliance between Athens and Platæa, as
  Herodotus conceives and describes it, cannot have taken place
  before the expulsion of Hippias, in 510 B. C.; and induce me to
  believe, either that Thucydidês was mistaken in the date of that
  event, or that Herodotus has not correctly described the facts.
  Not seeing any reason to suspect the description given by the
  latter, I have departed, though unwillingly, from the date of
  Thucydidês.

  The application of the Platæans to Kleomenês, and his advice
  grounded thereupon, may be connected more suitably with his first
  expedition to Athens, after the expulsion of Hippias, than with
  his second.

Meanwhile Kleomenês had returned to Sparta full of resentment
against the Athenians, and resolved on punishing them, as well as on
establishing his friend Isagoras as despot over them. Having been
taught, however, by humiliating experience, that this was no easy
achievement, he would not make the attempt, without having assembled
a considerable force; he summoned allies from all the various states
of Peloponnesus, yet without venturing to inform them what he was
about to undertake. He at the same time concerted measures with the
Bœotians, and with the Chalkidians of Eubœa, for a simultaneous
invasion of Attica on all sides. It appears that he had greater
confidence in their hostile dispositions towards Athens than in those
of the Peloponnesians, for he was not afraid to acquaint them with
his design,—and probably the Bœotians were incensed with the recent
interference of Athens in the affair of Platæa. As soon as these
preparations were completed, the two kings of Sparta, Kleomenês and
Demaratus, put themselves at the head of the united Peloponnesian
force, marched into Attica, and advanced as far as Eleusis on the way
to Athens. But when the allies came to know the purpose for which
they were to be employed, a spirit of dissatisfaction manifested
itself among them. They had no unfriendly sentiment towards Athens;
and the Corinthians especially, favorably disposed rather than
otherwise towards that city, resolved to proceed no farther, withdrew
their contingent from the camp, and returned home. At the same time,
king Demaratus, either sharing in the general dissatisfaction, or
moved by some grudge against his colleague which had not before
manifested itself, renounced the undertaking also. And these two
examples, operating upon the preëxisting sentiment of the allies
generally, caused the whole camp to break up and return home without
striking a blow.[297]

  [297] Herodot. v, 75.

We may here remark that this is the first instance known in
which Sparta appears in act as recognized head of an obligatory
Peloponnesian alliance,[298] summoning contingents from the cities
to be placed under the command of her king. Her headship, previously
recognized in theory, passes now into act, but in an unsatisfactory
manner, so as to prove the necessity of precaution and concert
beforehand,—which will be found not long wanting.

  [298] Compare Kortüm, Zur Geschichte Hellenischer
  Staats-Verfassungen, p. 35 (Heidelberg, 1821).

  I doubt, however, his interpretation of the words in Herodotus
  (v, 63)—εἴτε ἰδίῳ στόλῳ, εἴτε δημοσίῳ χρησόμενοι.

Pursuant to the scheme concerted, the Bœotians and Chalkidians
attacked Attica at the same time that Kleomenês entered it. The
former seized Œnoê and Hysiæ, the frontier demes of Attica on the
side towards Platæa, while the latter assailed the north-eastern
frontier, which faces Eubœa. Invaded on three sides, the Athenians
were in serious danger, and were compelled to concentrate all their
forces at Eleusis against Kleomenês, leaving the Bœotians and
Chalkidians unopposed. But the unexpected breaking up of the invading
army from Peloponnesus proved their rescue, and enabled them to turn
the whole of their attention to the other frontier. They marched into
Bœotia to the strait called Euripus, which separates it from Eubœa,
intending to prevent the junction of the Bœotians and Chalkidians,
and to attack the latter first apart. But the arrival of the Bœotians
caused an alteration in their scheme; they attacked the Bœotians
first, and gained a victory of the most complete character,—killing
a large number, and capturing seven hundred prisoners. On the very
same day they crossed over to Eubœa, attacked the Chalkidians, and
gained another victory so decisive that it at once terminated the
war. Many Chalkidians were taken, as well as Bœotians, and conveyed
in chains to Athens, where after a certain detention they were at
last ransomed for two minæ per man; and the tenth of the sum thus
raised was employed in the fabrication of a chariot and four horses
in bronze, which was placed in the acropolis to commemorate the
victory. Herodotus saw this trophy when he was at Athens. He saw
too, what was a still more speaking trophy, the actual chains in
which the prisoners had been fettered, exhibiting in their appearance
the damage undergone when the acropolis was burnt by Xerxês: an
inscription of four lines described the offerings and recorded the
victory out of which they had sprung.[299]

  [299] Herodot. v, 77; Ælian, V. H. vi, 1; Pausan. i, 28, 2.

Another consequence of some moment arose out of this victory. The
Athenians planted a body of four thousand of their citizens as
klêruchs (lot-holders) or settlers upon the lands of the wealthy
Chalkidian oligarchy called the Hippobotæ,—proprietors probably in
the fertile plain of Lêlantum, between Chalkis and Eretria. This is
a system which we shall find hereafter extensively followed out by
the Athenians in the days of their power; partly with the view of
providing for their poorer citizens,—partly to serve as garrison
among a population either hostile or of doubtful fidelity. These
Attic klêruchs (I can find no other name by which to speak of them)
did not lose their birthright as Athenian citizens: they were not
colonists in the Grecian sense, and they are known by a totally
different name,—but they corresponded very nearly to the colonies
formally planted out on the conquered lands by Rome. The increase
of the poorer population was always more or less painfully felt in
every Grecian city. For though the aggregate population never seems
to have increased very fast, yet the multiplication of children in
poor families caused the subdivision of the smaller lots of land,
until at last they became insufficient for a maintenance; and the
persons thus impoverished found it difficult to obtain subsistence
in other ways, more especially as the labor for the richer classes
was so much performed by imported slaves. Doubtless some families
possessed of landed property became extinct; but this did not at
all benefit the smaller and poorer proprietors; for the lands thus
rendered vacant passed, not to them, but by inheritance, or bequest,
or intermarriage, to other proprietors, for the most part in easy
circumstances,—since one opulent family usually intermarried with
another. I shall enter more fully at a future opportunity into this
question,—the great and serious problem of population, as it affected
the Greek communities generally, and as it was dealt with in theory
by the powerful minds of Plato and Aristotle. At present it is
sufficient to notice that the numerous klêruchies sent out by Athens,
of which this to Eubœa was the first, arose in a great measure out of
the multiplication of the poorer population, which her extended power
was employed in providing for. Her subsequent proceedings with a view
to the same object will not be always found so justifiable as this
now before us, which grew naturally, according to the ideas of the
time, out of her success against the Chalkidians.

The war between Athens, however, and Thebes with her Bœotian allies,
still continued, to the great and repeated disadvantage of the
latter, until at length the Thebans in despair sent to ask advice of
the Delphian oracle, and were directed to “solicit aid from those
nearest to them.”[300] “How (they replied) are we to obey? Our
nearest neighbors, of Tanagra, Korôneia, and Thespiæ, are now, and
have been from the beginning, lending us all the aid in their power.”
An ingenious Theban, however, coming to the relief of his perplexed
fellow-citizens, dived into the depths of legend and brought up a
happy meaning. “Those nearest to us (he said) are the inhabitants of
Ægina: for Thêbê (the eponym of Thebes) and Ægina (the eponym of that
island) were both sisters, daughters of Asôpus: let us send to crave
assistance from the Æginetans.” If his subtle interpretation (founded
upon their descent from the same legendary progenitors) did not at
once convince all who heard it, at least no one had any better to
suggest; and envoys were at once sent to the Æginetans,—who, in reply
to a petition founded on legendary claims, sent to the help of the
Thebans a reinforcement of legendary, but venerated, auxiliaries,—the
Æakid heroes. We are left to suppose that their effigies are here
meant. It was in vain, however, that the glory and the supposed
presence of the Æakids Telamôn and Pêleus were introduced into the
Theban camp. Victory still continued on the side of Athens; and the
discouraged Thebans again sent to Ægina, restoring the heroes,[301]
and praying for aid of a character more human and positive. Their
request was granted, and the Æginetans commenced war against Athens
without even the decent preliminary of a herald and declaration.[302]

  [300] Herodot. v, 80.

  [301] In the expression of Herodotus, the Æakid heroes are
  _really_ sent from Ægina, and _really_ sent back by the Thebans
  (v, 80-81)—Οἱ δέ σφι αἰτέουσι ἐπικουρίην τοὺς Αἰακίδας συμπέμπειν
  ἔφασαν, αὖτις οἱ Θηβαῖοι πέμψαντες, ~τοὺς μὲν Αἰακίδας σφι
  ἀπεδίδοσαν, τῶν δὲ ἀνδρῶν ἐδέοντο~. Compare again v, 75; viii,
  64; and Polyb. vii, 9, 2. θεῶν τῶν συστρατευομένων.

  Justin gives a narrative of an analogous application from the
  Epizephyrian Lokrians to Sparta (xx, 3): “Territi Locrenses
  ad Spartanos decurrunt: auxilium supplices deprecantur: illi
  longinquâ militiâ gravati, auxilium a Castore et Polluce petere
  eos jubent. Neque legati responsum sociæ urbis spreverunt;
  profectique in proximum templum, facto sacrificio, auxilium
  deorum implorant. Litatis hostiis, _obtentoque, ut rebantur,
  quod petebant—haud secus læti quam si deos ipsos secum avecturi
  essent_—pulvinaria iis in navi componunt, faustisque profecti
  ominibus, _solatia suis pro auxiliis_ deportant.” In comparing
  the expressions of Herodotus with those of Justin, we see that
  the former believes the direct literal presence and action of the
  Æakid heroes (“the Thebans sent back the heroes, and asked for
  men”), while the latter explains away the divine intervention
  into a mere fancy and feeling on the part of those to whom it is
  supposed to be accorded. This was the tone of those later authors
  whom Justin followed: compare also Pausan. iii, 19, 2.

  [302] Herodot. v, 81-82.

This remarkable embassy first brings us into acquaintance with the
Dorians of Ægina,—oligarchical, wealthy, commercial, and powerful
at sea, even in the earliest days; more analogous to Corinth than
to any of the other cities called Dorian. The hostility which they
now began without provocation against Athens,—repressed by Sparta at
the critical moment of the battle of Marathon,—then again breaking
out,—and hushed for a while by the common dangers of the Persian
invasion under Xerxês, was appeased only with the conquest of the
island about twenty years after that event, and with the expulsion
and destruction of its inhabitants some years later. There had been
indeed, according to Herodotus,[303] a feud of great antiquity
between Athens and Ægina,—of which he gives the account in a singular
narrative, blending together religion, politics, exposition of
ancient customs, etc.; but at the time when the Thebans solicited
aid from Ægina, the latter was at peace with Athens. The Æginetans
employed their fleet, powerful for that day, in ravaging Phalêrum
and the maritime demes of Attica; nor had the Athenians as yet any
fleet to resist them.[304] It is probable that the desired effect was
produced, of diverting a portion of the Athenian force from the war
against Bœotia, and thus partially relieving Thebes. But the war of
Athens against both of them continued for a considerable time, though
we have no information respecting its details.

  [303] Herodot. v, 83-88.

  [304] Herodot. v, 81-89. μεγάλως Ἀθηναίους ἐσινέοντο.

Meanwhile the attention of Athens was called off from these combined
enemies by a more menacing cloud, which threatened to burst upon
her from the side of Sparta. Kleomenês and his countrymen, full of
resentment at the late inglorious desertion of Eleusis, were yet
more incensed by the discovery, which appears to have been then
recently made, that the injunctions of the Delphian priestess for the
expulsion of Hippias from Athens had been fraudulently procured.[305]
Moreover, Kleomenês, when shut up in the acropolis of Athens with
Isagoras, had found there various prophecies previously treasured
up by the Peisistratids, many of which foreshadowed events highly
disastrous to Sparta. And while the recent brilliant manifestations
of courage, and repeated victories, on the part of Athens, seemed to
indicate that such prophecies might perhaps be realized,—Sparta had
to reproach herself, that, from the foolish and mischievous conduct
of Kleomenês, she had undone the effect of her previous aid against
the Peisistratids, and thus lost that return of gratitude which the
Athenians would otherwise have testified. Under such impressions, the
Spartan authorities took the remarkable step of sending for Hippias
from his residence at Sigeium to Peloponnesus, and of summoning
deputies from all their allies to meet him at Sparta.

  [305] Herodot. v, 90.

The convocation thus summoned deserves notice as the commencement
of a new era in Grecian politics. The previous expedition of
Kleomenês against Attica presents to us the first known example
of Spartan headship passing from theory into act: that expedition
miscarried because the allies, though willing to follow, would
not follow blindly, nor be made the instruments of executing
purposes repugnant to their feelings. Sparta had now learned the
necessity, in order to insure their hearty concurrence, of letting
them know what she contemplated, so as to ascertain at least
that she had no decided opposition to apprehend. Here, then, is
the third stage in the spontaneous movement of Greece towards a
systematic conjunction, however imperfect, of its many autonomous
units. First we have Spartan headship suggested in theory, from a
concourse of circumstances which attract to her the admiration of
all Greece,—power, unrivalled training, undisturbed antiquity, etc.:
next, the theory passes into act, yet rude and shapeless: lastly, the
act becomes clothed with formalities, and preceded by discussion and
determination. The first convocation of the allies at Sparta, for the
purpose of having a common object submitted to their consideration,
may well be regarded as an important event in Grecian political
history. The proceedings at the convocation are no less important,
as an indication of the way in which the Greeks of that day felt and
acted, and must be borne in mind as a contrast with times hereafter
to be described.

Hippias having been presented to the assembled allies, the Spartans
expressed their sorrow for having dethroned him,—their resentment
and alarm at the new-born insolence of Athens,[306] already tasted
by her immediate neighbors, and menacing to every state represented
in the convocation,—and their anxiety to restore Hippias, not less
as a reparation for past wrong, than as a means, through his rule,
of keeping Athens low and dependent. But the proposition, though
emanating from Sparta, was listened to by the allies with one common
sentiment of repugnance. They had no sympathy for Hippias,—no
dislike, still less any fear, of Athens,—and a profound detestation
of the character of a despot. The spirit which had animated the armed
contingents at Eleusis now reappeared among the deputies at Sparta,
and the Corinthians again took the initiative. Their deputy Sosiklês
protested against the project in the fiercest and most indignant
strain: no language can be stronger than that of the long harangue
which Herodotus puts into his mouth, wherein the bitter recollections
prevalent at Corinth respecting Kypselus and Periander are poured
forth. “Surely, heaven and earth are about to change places,—the fish
are coming to dwell on dry land, and mankind going to inhabit the
sea,—when you, Spartans, propose to subvert the popular governments,
and to set up in the cities that wicked and bloody thing called
a Despot.[307] First try what it is, for yourselves at Sparta,
and then force it upon others if you can: you have not tasted its
calamities as we have, and you take very good care to keep it away
from yourselves. We adjure you, by the common gods of Hellas,—plant
not despots in her cities: if you persist in a scheme so wicked, know
that the Corinthians will not second you.”

  [306] Herodot. v, 90, 91.

  [307] Herodot. v, 92. ... τυραννίδας ἐς τὰς πόλις κατάγειν
  παρασκευάζεσθε, τοῦ οὔτε ἀδικώτερον ἐστὶ οὐδὲν κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπους
  οὔτε μιαιφονώτερον.

This animated appeal was received with a shout of approbation and
sympathy on the part of the allies. All with one accord united with
Sosiklês in adjuring the Lacedæmonians[308] “not to revolutionize any
Hellenic city.” No one listened to Hippias when he replied, warning
the Corinthians that the time would come, when they, more than any
one else, would dread and abhor the Athenian democracy, and wish the
Peisistratidæ back again. He knew well, says Herodotus, that this
would be, for he was better acquainted with the prophecies than any
man. But no one then believed him, and he was forced to take his
departure back to Sigeium: the Spartans not venturing to espouse his
cause against the determined sentiment of the allies.[309]

  [308] Herodot. v, 93. μὴ ποιέειν μηδὲν νεώτερον περὶ πόλιν Ἑλλάδα.

  [309] Herodot. v, 93-94.

That determined sentiment deserves notice, because it marks the
present period of the Hellenic mind: fifty years later it will
be found materially altered. Aversion to single-headed rule, and
bitter recollection of men like Kypselus and Periander, are now
the chords which thrill in an assembly of Grecian deputies: the
idea of a revolution, implying thereby a great and comprehensive
change, of which the party using the word disapproves, consists in
substituting a permanent One in place of those periodical magistrates
and assemblies which were the common attribute of oligarchy and
democracy: the antithesis between these last two is as yet in the
background, nor does there prevail either fear of Athens or hatred of
the Athenian democracy. But when we turn to the period immediately
before the Peloponnesian war, we find the order of precedence
between these two sentiments reversed. The anti-monarchical feeling
has not perished, but has been overlaid by other and more recent
political antipathies,—the antithesis between democracy and oligarchy
having become, not indeed the only sentiment, but the uppermost
sentiment, in the minds of Grecian politicians generally, and the
soul of active party-movement. Moreover, a hatred of the most deadly
character has grown up against Athens and her democracy, especially
in the grandsons of those very Corinthians who now stand forward
as her sympathizing friends. The remarkable change of feeling here
mentioned is nowhere so strikingly exhibited as when we contrast
the address of the Corinthian Sosiklês, just narrated, with the
speech of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta, immediately antecedent
to the Peloponnesian war, as given to us in Thucydidês.[310] It
will hereafter be fully explained by the intermediate events, by
the growth of Athenian power, and by the still more miraculous
development of Athenian energy.

  [310] Thucydid. i, 68-71, 120-124.

Such development, the fruit of the fresh-planted democracy as well
as the seed for its sustentation and aggrandizement, continued
progressive during the whole period just adverted to. But the first
unexpected burst of it, under the Kleisthenean constitution, and
after the expulsion of Hippias, is described by Herodotus in terms
too emphatic to be omitted. After narrating the successive victories
of the Athenians over both Bœotians and Chalkidians, that historian
proceeds: “Thus did the Athenians grow in strength. And we may find
proof, not merely in this instance but everywhere else, how valuable
a thing freedom is: since even the Athenians, while under a despot,
were not superior in war to any of their surrounding neighbors, but,
so soon as they got rid of their despots, became by far the first of
all. These things show that while kept down by one man, they were
slack and timid, like men working for a master; but when they were
liberated, every single man became eager in exertions for his own
benefit.” The same comparison reappears a short time afterwards,
where he tells us, that “the Athenians when free, felt themselves a
match for Sparta; but while kept down by any man under a despotism,
were feeble and apt for submission.”[311]

  [311] Herodot. v, 78-91. Ἀθηναῖοι μέν νυν ηὔξηντο· δηλοῖ
  δὲ οὐ κατ᾽ ἓν μόνον ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ, ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὡς ἔστι χρῆμα
  σπουδαῖον, εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννευόμενοι μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν
  σφέας περιοικεόντων ἔσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ
  τυράννων, μακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο· δηλοῖ ὦν ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι
  μὲν, ἐθελοκάκεον, ὡς δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ,
  αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωϋτῷ προθυμέετο κατεργάζεσθαι.

  (c. 91.) Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι—νόῳ λαβόντες, ὡς ἐλεύθερον μὲν ἐὸν τὸ
  γένος τὸ Ἀττικὸν, ἰσόῤῥοπον τῷ ἑωϋτῶν ἂν γένοιτο, κατεχόμενον δὲ
  ὑπό του τυραννίδι, ἀσθενὲς καὶ πειθαρχέεσθαι ἐτοῖμον.

Stronger expressions cannot be found to depict the rapid improvement
wrought in the Athenian people by their new democracy. Of course
this did not arise merely from suspension of previous cruelties, or
better laws, or better administration. These, indeed, were essential
conditions, but the active transforming cause here was, the principle
and system of which such amendments formed the detail: the grand
and new idea of the sovereign People, composed of free and equal
citizens,—or liberty and equality, to use words which so profoundly
moved the French nation half a century ago. It was this comprehensive
political idea which acted with electric effect upon the Athenians,
creating within them a host of sentiments, motives, sympathies, and
capacities, to which they had before been strangers. Democracy in
Grecian antiquity possessed the privilege, not only of kindling an
earnest and unanimous attachment to the constitution in the bosoms of
the citizens, but also of creating an energy of public and private
action, such as could never be obtained under an oligarchy, where
the utmost that could be hoped for was a passive acquiescence and
obedience. Mr. Burke has remarked that the mass of the people are
generally very indifferent about theories of government; but such
indifference—although improvements in the practical working of all
governments tend to foster it—is hardly to be expected among any
people who exhibit decided mental activity and spirit on other
matters; and the reverse was unquestionably true, in the year 500 B.
C., among the communities of ancient Greece. Theories of government
were there anything but a dead letter: they were connected with
emotions of the strongest as well as of the most opposite character.
The theory of a permanent ruling One, for example, was universally
odious: that of a ruling Few, though acquiesced in, was never
positively attractive, unless either where it was associated with the
maintenance of peculiar education and habits, as at Sparta, or where
it presented itself as the only antithesis to democracy, the latter
having by peculiar circumstances become an object of terror. But the
theory of democracy was preëminently seductive; creating in the mass
of the citizens an intense positive attachment, and disposing them
to voluntary action and suffering on its behalf, such as no coercion
on the part of other governments could extort. Herodotus,[312] in
his comparison of the three sorts of government, puts in the front
rank of the advantages of democracy, “its most splendid name and
promise,”—its power of enlisting the hearts of the citizens in
support of their constitution, and of providing for all a common
bond of union and fraternity. This is what even democracy did not
always do: but it was what no other government in Greece _could_ do:
a reason alone sufficient to stamp it as the best government, and
presenting the greatest chance of beneficent results, for a Grecian
community. Among the Athenian citizens, certainly, it produced a
strength and unanimity of positive political sentiment, such as
has rarely been seen in the history of mankind, which excites our
surprise and admiration the more when we compare it with the apathy
which had preceded,—and which is even implied as the natural state of
the public mind in Solon’s famous proclamation against neutrality in
a sedition.[313] Because democracy happens to be unpalatable to most
modern readers, they have been accustomed to look upon the sentiment
here described only in its least honorable manifestations,—in the
caricatures of Aristophanês, or in the empty common-places of
rhetorical declaimers. But it is not in this way that the force,
the earnestness, or the binding value, of democratical sentiment at
Athens is to be measured. We must listen to it as it comes from the
lips of Periklês,[314] while he is strenuously enforcing upon the
people those active duties for which it both implanted the stimulus
and supplied the courage; or from the oligarchical Nikias in the
harbor of Syracuse, when he is endeavoring to revive the courage
of his despairing troops for one last death-struggle, and when he
appeals to their democratical patriotism as to the only flame yet
alive and burning even in that moment of agony.[315] From the time
of Kleisthenês downward, the creation of this new mighty impulse
makes an entire revolution in the Athenian character. And if the
change still stood out in so prominent a manner before the eyes of
Herodotus, much more must it have been felt by the contemporaries
among whom it occurred.

  [312] Herodot. iii, 80. Πλῆθος δὲ ἄρχον, ~πρῶτα μὲν, οὔνομα
  πάντων κάλλιστον ἔχει, ἰσονομίην~· δεύτερα δὲ, τούτων τῶν ὁ
  μόναρχος, ποιέει οὐδέν· πάλῳ μὲν ἀρχὰς ἄρχει, ὑπεύθυνον δὲ ἀρχὴν
  ἔχει, βουλεύματα δὲ πάντα ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἀναφέρει.

  The democratical speaker at Syracuse, Athenagoras, also puts this
  name and promise in the first rank of advantages—(Thucyd. vi,
  39)—ἐγὼ δέ φημι, ~πρῶτα μὲν~, δῆμον ξύμπαν ὠνόμασθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν
  δὲ, μέρος, etc.

  [313] See the preceding chapter xi, of this History, vol. iii, p.
  145, respecting the Solonian declaration here adverted to.

  [314] See the two speeches of Periklês in Thucyd. ii, 35-46, and
  ii, 60-64. Compare the reflections of Thucydidês upon the two
  democracies of Athens and Syracuse, vi, 69 and vii, 21-55.

  [315] Thucyd. vii, 69. Πατρίδος τε τῆς ἐλευθερωτάτης ὑπομιμνήσκων
  καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνεπιτακτοῦ πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν δίαιταν ἐξουσίας, etc.

The attachment of an Athenian citizen to his democratical
constitution comprised two distinct veins of sentiment: first,
his rights, protection, and advantages derived from it,—next,
his obligations of exertion and sacrifice towards it and with
reference to it. Neither of these two veins of sentiment was ever
wholly absent; but according as the one or the other was present
at different times in varying proportions, the patriotism of the
citizen was a very different feeling. That which Herodotus remarks
is, the extraordinary efforts of heart and hand which the Athenians
suddenly displayed,—the efficacy of the active sentiment throughout
the bulk of the citizens; and we shall observe even more memorable
evidences of the same phenomenon in tracing down the history from
Kleisthenês to the end of the Peloponnesian war: we shall trace
a series of events and motives eminently calculated to stimulate
that self-imposed labor and discipline which the early democracy
had first called forth. But when we advance farther down, from the
restoration of the democracy after the Thirty Tyrants to the time
of Demosthenês,—I venture upon this brief anticipation, in the
conviction that one period of Grecian history can only be thoroughly
understood by contrasting it with another,—we shall find a sensible
change in Athenian patriotism. The active sentiment of obligation is
comparatively inoperative,—the citizen, it is true, has a keen sense
of the value of the democracy as protecting him and insuring to him
valuable rights, and he is, moreover, willing to perform his ordinary
sphere of legal duties towards it; but he looks upon it as a thing
established, and capable of maintaining itself in a due measure of
foreign ascendency, without any such personal efforts as those which
his forefathers cheerfully imposed upon themselves. The orations
of Demosthenês contain melancholy proofs of such altered tone of
patriotism,—of that languor, paralysis, and waiting for others to
act, which preceded the catastrophe of Chæroneia, notwithstanding
an unabated attachment to the democracy as a source of protection
and good government.[316] That same preternatural activity which the
allies of Sparta, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, both
denounced and admired in the Athenians, is noted by the orator as now
belonging to their enemy Philip.

  [316] Compare the remarkable speech of the Corinthian envoys
  at Sparta (Thucyd. i, 68-71), with the φιλοπραγμοσύνη which
  Demosthenês so emphatically notices in Philip (Olynthiac. i, 6,
  p. 13): also Philippic. i, 2, and the Philippics and Olynthiacs
  generally.

Such variations in the scale of national energy pervade history,
modern as well as ancient, but in regard to Grecian history,
especially, they can never be overlooked. For a certain measure,
not only of positive political attachment, but also of active
self-devotion, military readiness, and personal effort, was
the indispensable condition of maintaining Hellenic autonomy,
either in Athens or elsewhere; and became so more than ever when
the Macedonians were once organized under an enterprising and
semi-Hellenized prince. The democracy was the first creative cause
of that astonishing personal and many-sided energy which marked the
Athenian character, for a century downward from Kleisthenês. That the
same ultra-Hellenic activity did not longer continue, is referable to
other causes, which will be hereafter in part explained. No system
of government, even supposing it to be very much better and more
faultless than the Athenian democracy, can ever pretend to accomplish
its legitimate end apart from the personal character of the people,
or to supersede the necessity of individual virtue and vigor. During
the half-century immediately preceding the battle of Chæroneia, the
Athenians had lost that remarkable energy which distinguished them
during the first century of their democracy, and had fallen much more
nearly to a level with the other Greeks, in common with whom they
were obliged to yield to the pressure of a foreign enemy. I here
briefly notice their last period of languor, in contrast with the
first burst of democratical fervor under Kleisthenês, now opening,—a
feeling which will be found, as we proceed, to continue for a longer
period than could have been reasonably anticipated, but which was
too high-strung to become a perpetual and inherent attribute of any
community.




CHAPTER XXXII.

RISE OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE. — CYRUS.


In the preceding chapter, I have followed the history of Central
Greece very nearly down to the point at which the history of the
Asiatic Greeks becomes blended with it, and after which the two
streams begin to flow to a great degree in the same channel. I now
revert to the affairs of the Asiatic Greeks, and of the Asiatic kings
as connected with them, at the point in which they were left in my
seventeenth chapter.

The concluding facts recounted in that chapter were of sad and
serious moment to the Hellenic world. The Ionic and Æolic Greeks
on the Asiatic coast had been conquered and made tributary by the
Lydian king Crœsus: “down to that time (says Herodotus) all Greeks
had been free.” Their conqueror Crœsus, who ascended the throne in
560 B. C., appeared to be at the summit of human prosperity and
power in his unassailable capital, and with his countless treasures
at Sardis. His dominions comprised nearly the whole of Asia Minor,
as far as the river Halys to the east; on the other side of that
river began the Median monarchy under his brother-in-law Astyagês,
extending eastward to some boundary which we cannot define, but
comprising in a south-eastern direction Persis proper, or Farsistan,
and separated from the Kissians and Assyrians on the west by the line
of Mount Zagros—the present boundary-line between Persia and Turkey.
Babylonia, with its wondrous city, between the Euphrates and the
Tigris, was occupied by the Assyrians, or Chaldæans, under their king
Labynêtus: a territory populous and fertile, partly by nature, partly
by prodigies of labor, to a degree which makes us mistrust even an
honest eye-witness who describes it afterwards in its decline,—but
which was then in its most flourishing condition. The Chaldæan
dominion under Labynêtus reached to the borders of Egypt, including,
as dependent territories, both Judæa and Phenicia. In Egypt reigned
the native king Amasis, powerful and affluent, sustained in his
throne by a large body of Grecian mercenaries, and himself favorably
disposed to Grecian commerce and settlement. Both with Labynêtus and
with Amasis, Crœsus was on terms of alliance; and as Astyagês was
his brother-in-law, the four kings might well be deemed out of the
reach of calamity. Yet within the space of thirty years or a little
more, the whole of their territories had become embodied in one vast
empire, under the son of an adventurer as yet not known even by name.

The rise and fall of Oriental dynasties has been in all times
distinguished by the same general features. A brave and adventurous
prince, at the head of a population at once poor, warlike, and
greedy, acquires dominion,—while his successors, abandoning
themselves to sensuality and sloth, probably also to oppressive
and irascible dispositions, become in process of time victims
to those same qualities in a stranger which had enabled their
own father to seize the throne. Cyrus, the great founder of the
Persian empire, first the subject and afterwards the dethroner of
the Median Astyagês, corresponds to this general description, as
far at least as we can pretend to know his history. For in truth,
even the conquests of Cyrus, after he became ruler of Media, are
very imperfectly known, whilst the facts which preceded his rise
up to that sovereignty cannot be said to be known at all: we have
to choose between different accounts at variance with each other,
and of which the most complete and detailed is stamped with all the
character of romance. The Cyropædia of Xenophon is memorable and
interesting, considered with reference to the Greek mind, and as a
philosophical novel:[317] that it should have been quoted so largely
as authority on matters of history, is only one proof among many how
easily authors have been satisfied as to the essentials of historical
evidence. The narrative given by Herodotus of the relations between
Cyrus and Astyagês, agreeing with Xenophon in little more than the
fact that it makes Cyrus son of Kambysês and Mandanê, and grandson
of Astyagês, goes even beyond the story of Romulus and Remus in
respect to tragical incident and contrast. Astyagês, alarmed by a
dream, condemns the new-born infant of his daughter Mandanê to be
exposed: Harpagus, to whom the order is given, delivers the child to
one of the royal herdsmen, who exposes it in the mountains, where
it is miraculously suckled by a bitch.[318] Thus preserved, and
afterwards brought up as the herdsman’s child, Cyrus manifests great
superiority both physical and mental, is chosen king in play by the
boys of the village, and in this capacity severely chastises the
son of one of the courtiers; for which offence he is carried before
Astyagês, who recognizes him for his grandson, but is assured by
the Magi that his dream is out, and that he has no farther danger
to apprehend from the boy,—and therefore permits him to live. With
Harpagus, however, Astyagês is extremely incensed, for not having
executed his orders: he causes the son of Harpagus to be slain, and
served up to be eaten by his unconscious father at a regal banquet.
The father, apprized afterwards of the fact, dissembles his feelings,
but conceives a deadly vengeance against Astyagês for this Thyestean
meal. He persuades Cyrus, who has been sent back to his father and
mother in Persia, to head a revolt of the Persians against the
Medes; whilst Astyagês—to fill up the Grecian conception of madness
as a precursor to ruin—sends an army against the revolters, commanded
by Harpagus himself. Of course the army is defeated,—Astyagês, after
a vain resistance, is dethroned,—Cyrus becomes king in his place,—and
Harpagus repays the outrage which he has undergone by the bitterest
insults.

  [317] Among the lost productions of Antisthenês the contemporary
  of Xenophon and Plato, and emanating like them from the tuition
  of Sokratês, was one Κῦρος, ἢ περὶ Βασιλείας (Diogenes Laërt. vi,
  15).

  [318] That this was the real story—a close parallel of Romulus
  and Remus—we may see by Herodotus, i, 122. Some rationalizing
  Greeks or Persians transformed it into a more plausible
  tale,—that the herdsman’s wife who suckled the boy Cyrus was
  named Κυνώ (Κυών is a dog, male or female); contending that this
  latter was the real basis of fact, and that the intervention of
  the bitch was an exaggeration built upon the name of the woman,
  in order that the divine protection shown to Cyrus might be still
  more manifest,—οἱ δὲ τοκέες παραλαβόντες τὸ οὔνομα τοῦτ (~ἵνα
  θειοτέρως δοκέῃ τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι περιεῖναί σφι ὁ παῖς~), κατέβαλον
  φάτιν ὡς ἐκκείμενον Κῦρον κύων ἐξέθρεψε· ἐνθεῦτεν μὲν ἡ φάτις
  αὐτὴ κεχωρήκεε.

  In the first volume of this History, I have noticed various
  transformations operated by Palæphatus and others upon the Greek
  mythes,—the ram which carried Phryxus and Hellê across the
  Hellespont is represented to us as having been in _reality_ a man
  _named Krius_, who aided their flight,—the winged horse which
  carried Bellerophon was a ship _named_ Pegasus, etc.

  This same operation has here been performed upon the story of the
  suckling of Cyrus; for we shall run little risk in affirming that
  the miraculous story is the older of the two. The feelings which
  welcome a miraculous story are early and primitive; those which
  break down the miracle into a common-place fact are of subsequent
  growth.

Such are the heads of a beautiful narrative which is given at
some length in Herodotus. It will probably appear to the reader
sufficiently romantic, though the historian intimates that he had
heard three other narratives different from it, and that all were
more full of marvels, as well as in wider circulation, than his
own, which he had borrowed from some unusually sober-minded Persian
informants.[319] In what points the other three stories departed from
it, we do not hear.

  [319] Herodot. i, 95. Ὡς ὦν Περσέων ~μετεξέτεροι~ λέγουσιν, οἱ
  ~μὴ βουλόμενοι σεμνοῦν~ τὰ περὶ Κῦρον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐόντα λέγειν
  λόγον, κατὰ ταῦτα γράψω· ἐπιστάμενος περὶ Κύρου καὶ ~τριφασίας
  ἄλλας~ λόγων ὁδοὺς φῆναι. His informants were thus select
  persons, who differed from the Persians generally.

  The long narrative respecting the infancy and growth of Cyrus is
  contained in Herodot. i, 107-129.

To the historian of Halikarnassus, we have to oppose the physician
of the neighboring town Knidus,—Ktêsias, who contradicted Herodotus,
not without strong terms of censure, on many points, and especially
upon that which is the very foundation of the early narrative
respecting Cyrus; for he affirmed that Cyrus was noway related to
Astyagês.[320] However indignant we may be with Ktêsias, for the
disparaging epithets which he presumed to apply to an historian
whose work is to us inestimable,—we must nevertheless admit that as
surgeon, in actual attendance on king Artaxerxês Mnêmon, and healer
of the wound inflicted on that prince at Kunaxa by his brother Cyrus
the younger,[321] he had better opportunities even than Herodotus of
conversing with sober-minded Persians; and that the discrepancies
between the two statements are to be taken as a proof of the
prevalence of discordant, yet equally accredited, stories. Herodotus
himself was in fact compelled to choose one out of four. So rare and
late a plant is historical authenticity.

  [320] See the Extracts from the lost Persian History of Ktêsias,
  in Photius Cod. lxxii, also appended to Schweighaüser’s edition
  of Herodotus, vol. iv, p. 345. Φησὶ δὲ (Ktêsias) αὐτὸν τῶν
  πλειόνων ἃ ἱστορεῖ αὐτόπτην γενόμενον, ἢ παρ᾽ αὐτῶν Περσῶν (ἔνθα
  τὸ ὁρᾷν μὴ ἐνεχώρει) αὐτήκοον καταστάντα, οὕτως τὴν ἱστορίαν
  συγγράψαι.

  To the discrepancies between Xenophon, Herodotus, and Ktêsias, on
  the subject of Cyrus, is to be added the statement of Æschylus
  (Persæ, 747), the oldest authority of them all, and that of the
  Armenian historians: see Bähr ad Ktesiam, p. 85: comp. Bähr’s
  comments on the discrepancies, p. 87.

  [321] Xenophon, Anabas. i, 8, 26.

That Cyrus was the first Persian conqueror, and that the space which
he overran covered no less than fifty degrees of longitude, from
the coast of Asia Minor to the Oxus and the Indus, are facts quite
indisputable; but of the steps by which this was achieved, we know
very little. The native Persians, whom he conducted to an empire so
immense, were an aggregate of seven agricultural and four nomadic
tribes,—all of them rude, hardy, and brave,[322]—dwelling in a
mountainous region, clothed in skins, ignorant of wine or fruit, or
any of the commonest luxuries of life, and despising the very idea
of purchase or sale. Their tribes were very unequal in point of
dignity, probably also in respect to numbers and powers, among one
another: first in estimation among them stood the Pasargadæ; and the
first phratry, or clan, among the Pasargadæ were the Achæmenidæ, to
whom Cyrus himself belonged. Whether his relationship to the Median
king whom he dethroned was a matter of fact, or a politic fiction,
we cannot well determine. But Xenophon, in noticing the spacious
deserted cities, Larissa and Mespila,[323] which he saw in his march
with the Ten Thousand Greeks on the eastern side of the Tigris,
gives us to understand that the conquest of Media by the Persians was
reported to him as having been an obstinate and protracted struggle.
However this may be, the preponderance of the Persians was at last
complete: though the Medes always continued to be the second nation
in the empire, after the Persians, properly so called; and by early
Greek writers the great enemy in the East is often called “the
Mede,[324]” as well as “the Persian.” Ekbatana always continued to
be one of the capital cities, and the usual summer residence, of the
kings of Persia; Susa on the Choaspês, on the Kissian plain farther
southward, and east of the Tigris, being their winter abode.

  [322] Herodot. i, 71-153; Arrian, v, 4; Strabo, xv, p. 727;
  Plato, Legg. iii, p. 695.

  [323] Xenophon, Anabas. iii, 3, 6; iii, 4, 7-12. Strabo had read
  accounts which represented the last battle between Astyagês and
  Cyrus to have been fought near Pasargadæ (xv, p. 730).

  It has been rendered probable by Ritter, however, that the
  ruined city which Xenophon called Mespila was the ancient
  Assyrian Nineveh, and the other deserted city which Xenophon
  calls Larissa, situated as it was on the Tigris, must have
  been originally Assyrian, and not Median. See about Nineveh,
  above,—the Chapter on the Babylonians, vol. iii, ch. xix, p. 305,
  note.

  The land east of the Tigris, in which Nineveh and Arbêla were
  situated, seems to have been called Aturia,—a dialectic variation
  of Assyria (Strabo, xvi, p. 737; Dio Cass. lxviii, 28).

  [324] Xenophanês, Fragm. p. 39, ap. Schneidewin, Delectus Poett.
  Elegiac. Græc.—

    Πήλικος ἦσθ᾽ ὅθ᾽ ὁ Μῆδος ἀφίκετο;

  compare Theognis, v, 775, and Herodot. i, 163.

The vast space of country comprised between the Indus on the east,
the Oxus and Caspian sea to the north, the Persian gulf and Indian
ocean to the south, and the line of Mount Zagros to the west,
appears to have been occupied in these times by a great variety
of different tribes and people, but all or most of them belonging
to the religion of Zoroaster, and speaking dialects of the Zend
language.[325] It was known amongst its inhabitants by the common
name of Iran, or Aria: it is, in its central parts at least, a high,
cold plateau, totally destitute of wood and scantily supplied with
water; much of it, indeed, is a salt and sandy desert, unsusceptible
of culture. Parts of it are eminently fertile, where water can be
procured and irrigation applied; and scattered masses of tolerably
dense population thus grew up. But continuity of cultivation is not
practicable, and in ancient times, as at present, a large proportion
of the population of Iran seems to have consisted of wandering or
nomadic tribes, with their tents and cattle. The rich pastures,
and the freshness of the summer climate, in the region of mountain
and valley near Ekbatana, are extolled by modern travellers, just
as they attracted the Great King in ancient times, during the hot
months. The more southerly province called Persis proper (Farsistan)
consists also in part of mountain land interspersed with valley and
plain, abundantly watered, and ample in pasture, sloping gradually
down to low grounds on the sea-coast which are hot and dry. The
care bestowed, both by Medes and Persians, on the breeding of
their horses, was remarkable.[326] There were doubtless material
differences between different parts of the population of this
vast plateau of Iran. Yet it seems that, along with their common
language and religion, they had also something of a common character,
which contrasted with the Indian population east of the Indus,
the Assyrians west of Mount Zagros, and the Massagetæ and other
Nomads of the Caspian and the sea of Aral,—less brutish, restless,
and bloodthirsty, than the latter,—more fierce, contemptuous, and
extortionate, and less capable of sustained industry, than the two
former. There can be little doubt, at the time of which we are now
speaking, when the wealth and cultivation of Assyria were at their
maximum, that Iran also was far better peopled than ever it has been
since European observers have been able to survey it; especially the
north-eastern portion, Baktria and Sogdiana: so that the invasions of
the nomads from Turkestan and Tartary, which have been so destructive
at various intervals since the Mohammedan conquest, were before that
period successfully kept back.

  [325] Strabo, xv, p. 724. ὁμόγλωττοι παρὰ μικρόν. See Heeren,
  Ueber den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part i, book i, pp. 320-340,
  and Ritter, Erdkunde, West-Asien, b. iii, Abtheil. ii, sects. 1
  and 2, pp. 17-84.

  [326] About the province of Persis, see Strabo, xv, p. 727;
  Diodor. xix, 21; Quintus Curtius, v, 13, 14, pp. 432-434, with
  the valuable explanatory notes of Mützell (Berlin, 1841).
  Compare, also, Morier’s Second Journey in Persia, pp. 49-120, and
  Ritter, Erdkunde, West Asien, pp. 712-738.

The general analogy among the population of Iran probably enabled the
Persian conqueror with comparative ease to extend his empire to the
east, after the conquest of Ekbatana, and to become the full heir of
the Median kings. And if we may believe Ktêsias, even the distant
province of Baktria had been before subject to those kings: it at
first resisted Cyrus, but finding that he had become son-in-law of
Astyagês as well as master of his person, it speedily acknowledged
his authority.[327]

  [327] Ktêsias, Persica, c. 2.

According to the representation of Herodotus, the war between Cyrus
and Crœsus of Lydia began shortly after the capture of Astyagês,
and before the conquest of Baktria.[328] Crœsus was the assailant,
wishing to avenge his brother-in-law, to arrest the growth of the
Persian conqueror, and to increase his own dominions: his more
prudent councillors in vain represented to him that he had little
to gain, and much to lose, by war with a nation alike hardy and
poor. He is represented, as just at that time recovering from the
affliction arising out of the death of his son. To ask advice of
the oracle, before he took any final decision, was a step which no
pious king would omit; but in the present perilous question, Crœsus
did more,—he took a precaution so extreme, that, if his piety had
not been placed beyond all doubt by his extraordinary munificence
to the temples, he might have drawn upon himself the suspicion of a
guilty skepticism.[329] Before he would send to ask advice respecting
the project itself, he resolved to test the credit of some of the
chief surrounding oracles,—Delphi, Dôdôna, Branchidæ near Milêtus,
Amphiaraus at Thebes, Trophônius at Lebadeia, and Ammôn in Libya. His
envoys started from Sardis on the same day, and were all directed on
the hundredth day afterwards to ask at the respective oracles how
Crœsus was at that precise moment employed. This was a severe trial:
of the manner in which it was met by four out of the six oracles
consulted, we have no information, and it rather appears that their
answers were unsatisfactory. But Amphiaraus maintained his credit
undiminished, and Apollo at Delphi, more omniscient than Apollo at
Branchidæ, solved the question with such unerring precision, as
to afford a strong additional argument against persons who might
be disposed to scoff at divination. No sooner had the envoys put
the question to the Delphian priestess, on the day named, “What is
Crœsus now doing?” than she exclaimed, in the accustomed hexameter
verse,[330] “I know the number of grains of sand, and the measures
of the sea; I understand the dumb, and I hear the man who speaks
not. The smell reaches me of a hard-skinned tortoise boiled in a
copper with lamb’s flesh,—copper above and copper below.” Crœsus
was awestruck on receiving this reply. It described with the
utmost detail that which he had been really doing, insomuch that
he accounted the Delphian oracle and that of Amphiaraus the only
trustworthy oracles on earth,—following up these feelings with a
holocaust of the most munificent character, in order to win the favor
of the Delphian god. Three thousand cattle were offered up, and upon
a vast sacrificial pile were placed the most splendid purple robes
and tunics, together with couches and censers of gold and silver:
besides which he sent to Delphi itself the richest presents in
gold and silver,—ingots, statues, bowls, jugs, etc., the size and
weight of which we read with astonishment; the more so as Herodotus
himself saw them a century afterwards at Delphi.[331] Nor was Crœsus
altogether unmindful of Amphiaraus, whose answer had been creditable,
though less triumphant than that of the Pythian priestess. He sent
to Amphiaraus a spear and shield of pure gold, which were afterwards
seen at Thebes by Herodotus: this large donative may help the reader
to conceive the immensity of those which he sent to Delphi.

  [328] Herodot. i, 153.

  [329] That this point of view should not be noticed in Herodotus,
  may appear singular, when we read his story (vi, 86) about
  the Milesian Glaukus, and the judgment that overtook him for
  having tested the oracle; but it is put forward by Xenophon as
  constituting part of the guilt of Crœsus (Cyropæd. vii, 2, 17).

  [330] Herodot. i, 47-50.

  [331] Herodot. i, 52-54.

The envoys who conveyed these gifts were instructed to ask, at the
same time, whether Crœsus should undertake an expedition against
the Persians,—and, if so, whether he should prevail on any allies
to assist him. In regard to the second question, the answer both of
Apollo and Amphiaraus was decisive, recommending him to invite the
alliance of the most powerful Greeks. In regard to the first and most
momentous question, their answer was as remarkable for circumspection
as it had been before for detective sagacity: they told Crœsus that,
if he invaded the Persians, he would subvert a mighty monarchy. The
blindness of Crœsus interpreted this declaration into an unqualified
promise of success. He sent farther presents to the oracle, and again
inquired whether his kingdom would be durable. “When a mule shall
become king of the Medes (replied the priestess), then must thou run
away,—be not ashamed.”[332]

  [332] Herodot. i, 55.

More assured than ever by such an answer, Crœsus sent to Sparta,
under the kings Anaxandridês and Aristo, to tender presents and
solicit their alliance.[333] His propositions were favorably
entertained,—the more so, as he had before gratuitously furnished
some gold to the Lacedæmonians, for a statue to Apollo. The alliance
now formed was altogether general,—no express effort being as yet
demanded from them, though it soon came to be. But the incident is to
be noted, as marking the first plunge of the leading Grecian state
into Asiatic politics; and that too without any of the generous
Hellenic sympathy which afterwards induced Athens to send her
citizens across the Ægean. Crœsus was the master and tribute-exactor
of the Asiatic Greeks, and their contingents seem to have formed part
of his army for the expedition now contemplated; which army consisted
principally, not of native Lydians, but of foreigners.

  [333] Herodot. i, 67-70.

The river Halys formed the boundary at this time between the Median
and Lydian empires: and Crœsus, marching across that river into the
territory of the Syrians or Assyrians of Kappadokia, took the city of
Pteria and many of its surrounding dependencies, inflicting damage
and destruction upon these distant subjects of Ekbatana. Cyrus lost
no time in bringing an army to their defence considerably larger than
that of Crœsus, and at the same time tried, though unsuccessfully,
to prevail on the Ionians to revolt from him. A bloody battle took
place between the two armies, but with indecisive result: and Crœsus,
seeing that he could not hope to accomplish more with his forces as
they stood, thought it wise to return to his capital, in order to
collect a larger army for the next campaign. Immediately on reaching
Sardis, he despatched envoys to Labynêtus king of Babylon; to Amasis
king of Egypt; to the Lacedæmonians, and to other allies; calling
upon all of them to send auxiliaries to Sardis during the course
of the fifth coming month. In the mean time, he dismissed all the
foreign troops who had followed him into Kappadokia.[334]

  [334] Herodot. i, 77.

Had these allies appeared, the war might perhaps have been prosecuted
with success; and on the part of the Lacedæmonians at least, there
was no tardiness; for their ships were ready and their troops almost
on board, when the unexpected news reached them that Crœsus was
already ruined.[335] Cyrus had foreseen and forestalled the defensive
plan of his enemy. He pushed on with his army to Sardis without
delay, compelling the Lydian prince to give battle with his own
unassisted subjects. The open and spacious plain before that town was
highly favorable to the Lydian cavalry, which at that time, Herodotus
tells us, was superior to the Persian. But Cyrus devised a stratagem
whereby this cavalry was rendered unavailable,—placing in front of
his line the baggage camels, which the Lydian horses could not endure
either to smell or to behold.[336] The horsemen of Crœsus were thus
obliged to dismount; nevertheless, they fought bravely on foot, and
were not driven into the town till after a sanguinary combat.

  [335] Herodot. i, 83.

  [336] The story about the successful employment of the camels
  appears also in Xenophon, Cyropæd. vii, 1, 47.

Though confined within the walls of his capital, Crœsus had still
good reason for hoping to hold out until the arrival of his allies,
to whom he sent pressing envoys of acceleration: for Sardis was
considered impregnable,—one assault had already been repulsed,
and the Persians would have been reduced to the slow process of
blockade. But on the fourteenth day of the siege, accident did for
the besiegers that which they could not have accomplished either
by skill or force. Sardis was situated on an outlying peak of the
northern side of Tmôlus; it was well-fortified everywhere except
towards the mountain; and on that side, the rock, was so precipitous
and inaccessible, that fortifications were thought unnecessary, nor
did the inhabitants believe assault to be possible. But Hyrœades,
a Persian soldier, having accidentally seen one of the garrison
descending this precipitous rock to pick up his helmet, which had
rolled down, watched his opportunity, tried to climb up, and found
it not impracticable. Others followed his example, the strong-hold
was thus seized first, and the whole city was speedily taken by
storm.[337]

  [337] Herodot. i, 84.

Cyrus had given especial orders to spare the life of Crœsus, who was
accordingly made prisoner. But preparations were made for a solemn
and terrible spectacle. The captive king was destined to be burnt in
chains, together with fourteen Lydian youths, on a vast pile of wood:
and we are even told that the pile was already kindled and the victim
beyond the reach of human aid, when Apollo sent a miraculous rain to
preserve him. As to the general fact of supernatural interposition,
in one way or another, Herodotus and Ktêsias both agree, though they
describe differently the particular miracles wrought.[338] It is
certain that Crœsus, after some time, was released and well treated
by his conqueror, and lived to become the confidential adviser of the
latter as well as of his son Kambysês:[339] Ktêsias also acquaints us
that a considerable town and territory near Ekbatana, called Barênê,
was assigned to him, according to a practice which we shall find not
unfrequent with the Persian kings.

  [338] Compare Herodot. i, 84-87, and Ktêsias, Persica, c. 4;
  which latter seems to have been copied by Polyænus, vii, 6, 10.

  It is remarkable that among the miracles enumerated by Ktêsias,
  no mention is made of fire or of the pile of wood kindled:
  we have the chains of Crœsus miraculously struck off, in the
  midst of thunder and lightning, but no _fire_ mentioned. This
  is deserving of notice, as illustrating the fact that Ktêsias
  derived his information from _Persian_ narrators, who would not
  be likely to impute to Cyrus the use of fire for such a purpose.
  The Persians worshipped fire as a god, and considered it impious
  to burn a dead body (Herodot. iii, 16). Now Herodotus seems to
  have heard the story, about the burning, from Lydian informants
  (λέγεται ὑπὸ Λυδῶν, Herodot. i, 87): whether the Lydians regarded
  fire in the same point of view as the Persians, we do not know;
  but even if they did, they would not be indisposed to impute to
  Cyrus an act of gross impiety, just as the Egyptians imputed
  another act equally gross to Kambysês, which Herodotus himself
  treats as a falsehood (iii, 16).

  The long narrative given by Nikolaus Damaskênus of the treatment
  of Crœsus by Cyrus, has been supposed by some to have been
  borrowed from the Lydian historian Xanthus, elder contemporary
  of Herodotus. But it seems to me a mere compilation, not well
  put together, from Xenophon’s Cyropædia, and from the narrative
  of Herodotus, perhaps including some particular incidents out of
  Xanthus (see Nikol. Damas. Fragm. ed. Orell. pp. 57-70, and the
  Fragments of Xanthus in Didot’s Historic. Græcor. Fragm. p. 40).

  [339] Justin (i, 7) seems to copy Ktêsias, about the treatment of
  Crœsus.

The prudent counsel and remarks as to the relations between Persians
and Lydians, whereby Crœsus is said by Herodotus to have first
earned this favorable treatment, are hardly worth repeating; but the
indignant remonstrance sent by Crœsus to the Delphian god is too
characteristic to be passed over. He obtained permission from Cyrus
to lay upon the holy pavement of the Delphian temple the chains with
which he had at first been bound. The Lydian envoys were instructed,
after exhibiting to the god these humiliating memorials, to ask
whether it was his custom to deceive his benefactors, and whether he
was not ashamed to have encouraged the king of Lydia in an enterprise
so disastrous? The god, condescending to justify himself by the lips
of the priestess, replied: “Not even a god can escape his destiny.
Crœsus has suffered for the sin of his fifth ancestor (Gygês), who,
conspiring with a woman, slew his master and wrongfully seized the
sceptre. Apollo employed all his influence with the Mœræ (Fates) to
obtain that this sin might be expiated by the children of Crœsus, and
not by Crœsus himself; but the Mœræ would grant nothing more than a
postponement of the judgment for three years. Let Crœsus know that
Apollo has thus procured for him a reign three years longer than
his original destiny,[340] after having tried in vain to rescue him
altogether. Moreover, he sent that rain which at the critical moment
extinguished the burning pile. Nor has Crœsus any right to complain
of the prophecy by which he was encouraged to enter on the war; for
when the god told him, that he would subvert _a great empire_, it was
his duty to have again inquired which empire the god meant; and if he
neither understood the meaning, nor chose to ask for information, he
has himself to blame for the result. Besides, Crœsus neglected the
warning given to him, about the acquisition of the Median kingdom by
a mule: Cyrus was that mule,—son of a Median mother of royal breed,
by a Persian father, at once of different race and of lower position.”

  [340] Herodot. i, 91. Προθυμεομένου δὲ Λοξίεω ὅκως ἂν κατὰ τοὺς
  παῖδας τοὺς Κροίσου γένοιτο τὸ Σαρδίων πάθος, καὶ μὴ κατ᾽ αὐτὸν
  Κροῖσον, οὐκ οἷόν τε ἐγένετο παραγαγεῖν Μοίρας· ὅσον δὲ ἐνέδωκαν
  αὗται, ἠνύσατο, καὶ ἐχαρίσατό οἱ· τρία γὰρ ἔτεα ἐπανεβάλετο τὴν
  Σαρδίων ἅλωσιν. Καὶ τοῦτο ἐπιστάσθω Κροῖσος, ὡς ὕστερον τοῖσι
  ἔτεσι τούτοισι ἁλοὺς τῆς πεπρωμένης.

This triumphant justification extorted even from Crœsus himself
a full confession, that the sin lay with him, and not with the
god.[341] It certainly illustrates, in a remarkable manner, the
theological ideas of the time; and it shows us how much, in the
mind of Herodotus, the facts of the centuries preceding his own,
unrecorded as they were by any contemporary authority, tended to
cast themselves into a sort of religious drama; the threads of the
historical web being in part put together, in part originally spun,
for the purpose of setting forth the religious sentiment and doctrine
woven in as a pattern. The Pythian priestess predicts to Gygês
that the crime which he had committed in assassinating his master
would be expiated by his fifth descendant, though, as Herodotus
tells us, no one took any notice of this prophecy until it was at
last fulfilled:[342] we see thus that the history of the first
Mermnad king is made up after the catastrophe of the last. There
was something in the main facts of the history of Crœsus profoundly
striking to the Greek mind: a king at the summit of wealth and
power,—pious in the extreme, and munificent towards the gods,—the
first destroyer of Hellenic liberty in Asia,—then precipitated, at
once and on a sudden, into the abyss of ruin. The sin of the first
parent helped much towards the solution of this perplexing problem,
as well as to exalt the credit of the oracle, when made to assume the
shape of an unnoticed prophecy. In the affecting story (discussed
in a former chapter[343]) of Solon and Crœsus, the Lydian king is
punished with an acute domestic affliction, because he thought
himself the happiest of mankind,—the gods not suffering anyone to be
arrogant except themselves;[344] and the warning of Solon is made
to recur to Crœsus after he has become the prisoner of Cyrus, in
the narrative of Herodotus. To the same vein of thought belongs the
story, just recounted, of the relations of Crœsus with the Delphian
oracle. An account is provided, satisfactory to the religious
feelings of the Greeks, how and why he was ruined,—but nothing less
than the overruling and omnipotent Mœræ could be invoked to explain
so stupendous a result.

  [341] Herodot. i, 91. Ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας συνέγνω ἑωϋτοῦ εἶναι τὴν
  ἁμαρτάδα, καὶ οὐ τοῦ θεοῦ.

  Xenophon also, in the Cyropædia (vii, 2, 16-25), brings Crœsus to
  the same result of confession and humiliation, though by steps
  somewhat different.

  [342] Herodot. i, 13.

  [343] See above, chap, xi, vol. iii, pp. 149-153.

  [344] Herodot. vii, 10. οὐ γὰρ ἐᾷ φρονέειν ἄλλον μέγα ὁ θεὸς ἢ
  ἑωϋτόν.

It is rarely that these supreme goddesses, or hyper-goddesses—since
the gods themselves must submit to them—are brought into such
distinct light and action. Usually, they are kept in the dark, or
are left to be understood as the unseen stumbling-block in cases of
extreme incomprehensibility; and it is difficult clearly to determine
(as in the case of some complicated political constitutions) where
the Greeks conceived sovereign power to reside, in respect to the
government of the world. But here the sovereignty of the Mœræ, and
the subordinate agency of the gods, are unequivocally set forth.[345]
Yet the gods are still extremely powerful, because the Mœræ comply
with their requests up to a certain point, not thinking it proper
to be wholly inexorable; but their compliance is carried no farther
than they themselves choose. Nor would they, even in deference to
Apollo,[346] alter the original sentence of punishment for the
sin of Gygês in the person of his fifth descendant,—a sentence,
moreover, which Apollo himself had formally prophesied shortly after
the sin was committed; so that, if the Mœræ had listened to his
intercession on behalf of Crœsus, his own prophetic credit would have
been endangered. Their unalterable resolution has predetermined the
ruin of Crœsus, and the grandeur of the event is manifested by the
circumstance, that even Apollo himself cannot prevail upon them to
alter it, or to grant more than a three years’ respite. The religious
element must here be viewed as giving the form—the historical element
as giving the matter only, and not the whole matter—of the story; and
these two elements will be found conjoined more or less throughout
most of the history of Herodotus, though, as we descend to later
times, we shall find the historical element in constantly increasing
proportion. His conception of history is extremely different from
that of Thucydidês, who lays down to himself the true scheme and
purpose of the historian, common to him with the philosopher,—to
recount and interpret the past, as a rational aid towards the
prevision of the future.[347]

  [345] In the oracle reported in Herodot. vii, 141, as delivered
  by the Pythian priestess to Athens on occasion of the approach
  of Xerxês, Zeus is represented in the same supreme position as
  the present oracle assigns to the Mœræ, or Fates: Pallas in vain
  attempts to propitiate him in favor of Athens, just as, in this
  case, Apollo tries to mitigate the Mœræ in respect to Crœsus—

    Οὐ δύναται Παλλὰς Δί᾽ Ὀλύμπιον ἐξιλάσασθαι,
    Λισσομένη πολλοῖσι λόγοις καὶ μήτιδι πυκνῇ, etc.

  Compare also viii, 109, and ix, 16.

  O. Müller (Dissertation on the Eumenides of Æschylus, p. 222,
  Eng. Transl.) says: “On no occasion does Zeus Soter exert his
  influence directly, like Apollo, Minerva, and the Erinnyes;
  but whereas Apollo is prophet and exegetes by virtue of wisdom
  derived from him, and Minerva is indebted to him for her sway
  over states and assemblies,—nay, the very Erinnyes exercise their
  functions in his name,—this Zeus stands always in the background,
  and has in reality only to settle a conflict existing within
  himself. For with Æschylus, as with all men of profound feeling
  among the Greeks from the earliest times, Jupiter is the only
  real god, in the higher sense of the word. Although he is, in
  the spirit of ancient theology, a generated god, arisen out of
  an imperfect state of things, and not produced till the third
  stage of a development of nature,—still he is, at the time we are
  speaking of, the spirit that pervades and governs the universe.”

  To the same purpose Klausen expresses himself (Theologumena
  Æschyli, pp. 6-69).

  It is perfectly true that many passages may be produced from
  Greek authors which ascribe to Zeus the supreme power here
  noted. But it is equally true that this conception is not
  uniformly adhered to, and that sometimes the Fates, or Mœræ are
  represented as supreme; occasionally represented as the stronger
  and Zeus as the weaker (Promêtheus, 515). The whole tenor of
  that tragedy, in fact, brings out the conception of a Zeus
  τύραννος,—whose power is not supreme, even for the time; and
  is not destined to continue permanently, even at its existing
  height. The explanations given by Klausen of this drama appear to
  me incorrect; nor do I understand how it is to be reconciled with
  the above passage quoted from O. Müller.

  The two oracles here cited from Herodotus exhibit plainly the
  fluctuation of Greek opinion on this subject: in the one, the
  supreme determination, and the inexorability which accompanies
  it, are ascribed to Zeus,—in the other, to the Mœræ. This double
  point of view adapted itself to different occasions, and served
  as a help for the interpretation of different events. Zeus was
  supposed to have certain sympathies for human beings; misfortunes
  happened to various men which he not only did not wish to bring
  on, but would have been disposed to avert; here the Mœræ, who had
  no sympathies, were introduced as an explanatory cause, tacitly
  implied as overruling Zeus. “Cum Furiis Æschylus Parcas tantum
  non ubique conjungit,” says Klausen (Theol. Æsch. p. 39); and
  this entire absence of human sympathies constitutes the common
  point of both,—that in which the Mœræ and the Erinnyes differ
  from all the other gods,—πέφρικα τὰν ὠλεσίοικον θεὰν, οὐ θεοῖς
  ὁμοίαν (Æschyl. Sept. ad Theb. 720): compare Eumenid. 169, 172,
  and, indeed, the general strain of that fearful tragedy.

  In Æschylus, as in Herodotus, Apollo is represented as exercising
  persuasive powers over the Mœræ (Eumenid. 724),—Μοίρας ἔπεισας
  ἀφθίτους θεῖναι βροτούς.

  [346] The language of Herodotus deserves attention. Apollo tells
  Crœsus: “I applied to the Mœræ to get the execution of the
  judgment postponed from your time to that of your children,—but
  I could not prevail upon them; but as much as they would yield
  _of their own accord_, I procured for you.” (ὅσον δὲ ~ἐνέδωκαν
  αὗται~, ἐχαρίσατό οἱ—i, 91.)

  [347] Thucyd. i, 22.

The destruction of the Lydian monarchy, and the establishment of the
Persians at Sardis—an event pregnant with consequences to Hellas
generally—took place in 546 B. C.[348] Sorely did the Ionic Greeks
now repent that they had rejected the propositions made to them
by Cyrus for revolting from Crœsus,—though at the time when these
propositions were made, it would have been highly imprudent to listen
to them, since the Lydian power might reasonably be looked upon as
the stronger. As soon as Sardis had fallen, they sent envoys to the
conqueror, entreating that they might be enrolled as his tributaries,
on the footing which they had occupied under Crœsus. The reply was
a stern and angry refusal, with the exception of the Milesians, to
whom the terms which they asked were granted:[349] why this favorable
exception was extended to them, we do not know. The other continental
Ionians and Æolians (exclusive of Milêtus, and exclusive also of the
insular cities which the Persians had no means of attacking), seized
with alarm, began to put themselves in a condition of defence: it
seems that the Lydian king had caused their fortifications to be
wholly or partially dismantled, for we are told that they now began
to erect walls; and the Phôkæans especially devoted to that purpose
a present which they had received from the Iberian Arganthônius,
king of Tartêssus. Besides thus strengthening their own cities, they
thought it advisable to send a joint embassy entreating aid from
Sparta; they doubtless were not unapprized that the Spartans had
actually equipped an army for the support of Crœsus. Their deputies
went to Sparta, where the Phôkæan Pythermus, appointed by the rest
to be spokesman, clothing himself in a purple robe,[350] in order
to attract the largest audience possible, set forth their pressing
need of succor against the impending danger. The Lacedæmonians
refused the prayer; nevertheless, they despatched to Phôkæa some
commissioners to investigate the state of affairs,—who perhaps,
persuaded by the Phôkæans, sent Lakrinês, one of their number, to
the conqueror at Sardis, to warn him that he should not lay hands on
any city of Hellas,—for the Lacedæmonians would not permit it. “Who
are these Lacedæmonians? (inquired Cyrus from some Greeks who stood
near him)—how many are there of them, that they venture to send me
such a notice?” Having received the answer, wherein it was stated
that the Lacedæmonians had a city and a regular market at Sparta, he
exclaimed: “I have never yet been afraid of men like these, who have
a set place in the middle of their city, where they meet to cheat one
another and forswear themselves. If I live, they shall have troubles
of their own to talk about, apart from the Ionians.” To buy or sell,
appeared to the Persians a contemptible practice; for they carried
out consistently, one step farther, the principle upon which even
many able Greeks condemned the lending of money on interest; and the
speech of Cyrus was intended as a covert reproach of Grecian habits
generally.[351]

  [348] This important date depends upon the evidence of Solinus
  (Polyhistor, i, 112) and Sosikratês (ap. Diog. Laërt. i, 95): see
  Mr. Clinton’s Fasti Hellen. ad ann. 546, and his Appendix, ch.
  17, upon the Lydian kings.

  Mr. Clinton and most of the chronologists accept the date without
  hesitation, but Volney (Recherches sur l’Histoire Ancienne,
  vol. i, pp. 306-308; Chronologie des Rois Lydiens) rejects it
  altogether; considering the capture of Sardis to have occurred
  in 557 B. C., and the reign of Crœsus to have begun in 571 B.
  C. He treats very contemptuously the authority of Solinus and
  Sosikratês, and has an elaborate argumentation to prove that the
  date which he adopts is borne out by Herodotus. This latter does
  not appear to me at all satisfactory: I adopt the date of Solinus
  and Sosikratês, though agreeing with Volney that such positive
  authority is not very considerable, because there is nothing to
  contradict them, and because the date which they give seems in
  consonance with the stream of the history.

  Volney’s arguments suppose in the mind of Herodotus a degree of
  chronological precision altogether unreasonable, in reference
  to events anterior to contemporary records. He, like other
  chronologists, exhausts his ingenuity to find a proper point of
  historical time for the supposed conversation between Solon and
  Crœsus (p. 320).

  [349] Herodot. i, 141.

  [350] Herodot. i, 152. The purple garment, so attractive a
  spectacle amid the plain clothing universal at Sparta, marks the
  contrast between Asiatic and European Greece.

  [351] Herodot. i, 153. ταῦτα ἐς τοὺς πάντας Ἕλληνας ἀπέῤῥιψε ὁ
  Κῦρος τὰ ἔπεα, etc.

This blank menace of Lakrinês, an insulting provocation to the
enemy rather than a real support to the distressed, was the only
benefit which the Ionic Greeks derived from Sparta. They were left
to defend themselves as best they could against the conqueror;
who presently, however, quitted Sardis to prosecute in person his
conquests in the East, leaving the Persian Tabalus with a garrison
in the citadel, but consigning both the large treasure captured, and
the authority over the Lydian population, to the Lydian Paktyas.
As he carried away Crœsus along with him, he probably considered
himself sure of the fidelity of those Lydians whom the deposed
monarch recommended. But he had not yet arrived at his own capital,
when he received the intelligence that Paktyas had revolted, arming
the Lydian population, and employing the treasure in his charge to
hire fresh troops. On hearing this news, Cyrus addressed himself
to Crœsus, according to Herodotus, in terms of much wrath against
the Lydians, and even intimated that he should be compelled to sell
them all as slaves. Upon which Crœsus, full of alarm for his people,
contended strenuously that Paktyas alone was in fault, and deserving
of punishment; but he at the same time advised Cyrus to disarm the
Lydian population, and to enforce upon them effeminate attire,
together with habits of playing on the harp and shopkeeping. “By this
process (he said) you will soon see them become women instead of
men.”[352] This suggestion is said to have been accepted by Cyrus,
and executed by his general Mazarês. The conversation here reported,
and the deliberate plan for enervating the Lydian character supposed
to be pursued by Cyrus, is evidently an hypothesis imagined by some
of the contemporaries or predecessors of Herodotus,—to explain the
contrast between the Lydians whom they saw before them, after two or
three generations of slavery, and the old irresistible horsemen of
whom they heard in fame, at the time when Crœsus was lord from the
Halys to the Ægean sea.

  [352] Herodot. i, 155.

To return to Paktyas,—he had commenced his revolt, come down to the
sea-coast, and employed the treasures of Sardis in levying a Grecian
mercenary force, with which he invested the place and blocked up
the governor Tabalus. But he manifested no courage worthy of so
dangerous an enterprise; for no sooner had he heard that the Median
general Mazarês was approaching at the head of an army dispatched
by Cyrus against him, than he disbanded his force and fled to Kymê
for protection as a suppliant. Presently, arrived a menacing summons
from Mazarês, demanding that he should be given up forthwith, which
plunged the Kymæans into profound dismay; for the idea of giving
up a suppliant to destruction was shocking to Grecian sentiment.
They sent to solicit advice from the holy temple of Apollo, at
Branchidæ near Milêtus; and the reply directed, that Paktyas should
be surrendered. Nevertheless, so ignominious did such a surrender
appear, that Aristodikus and some other Kymæan citizens denounced the
messengers as liars, and required that a more trustworthy deputation
should be sent to consult the god. Aristodikus himself, forming one
of the second body, stated the perplexity to the oracle, and received
a repetition of the same answer; whereupon he proceeded to rob the
birds’-nests which existed in abundance in and about the temple.
A voice from the inner oracular chamber speedily arrested him,
exclaiming: “Most impious of men, how darest thou to do such things?
Wilt thou snatch my suppliants from the temple itself?” Unabashed
by the rebuke, Aristodikus replied: “Master, thus dost _thou_ help
suppliants thyself: and dost thou command the Kymæans to give up a
suppliant?” “Yes, I do command it[353] (rejoined the god forthwith),
in order that the crime may bring destruction upon you the sooner,
and that you may not in future come to consult the oracle upon the
surrender of suppliants.”

  [353] Herodot. i, 159.

The ingenuity of Aristodikus completely nullified the oracular
response, and left the Kymæans in their original perplexity. Not
choosing to surrender Paktyas, nor daring to protect him against a
besieging army, they sent him away to Mitylênê, whither the envoys of
Mazarês followed and demanded him; offering a reward so considerable,
that the Kymæans became fearful of trusting them, and again conveyed
away the suppliant to Chios, where he took refuge in the temple of
Athênê Poliuchus. But here again the pursuers followed, and the
Chians were persuaded to drag him from the temple and surrender
him, on consideration of receiving the territory of Atarneus (a
district on the continent over against the island of Lesbos) as
purchase-money. Paktyas was thus seized and sent prisoner to Cyrus,
who had given the most express orders for this capture: hence the
unusual intensity of the pursuit. But it appears that the territory
of Atarneus was considered as having been ignominiously acquired by
the Chians; none even of their own citizens would employ any article
of its produce for holy or sacrificial purposes.[354]

  [354] Herodot. i, 160. The short fragment from Charôn of
  Lampsakus, which Plutarch (De Malignitat. Herod. p. 859) cites
  here, in support of one among his many unjust censures on
  Herodotus, is noway inconsistent with the statement of the
  latter, but rather tends to confirm it.

  In writing this treatise on the alleged ill-temper of Herodotus,
  we see that Plutarch had before him the history of Charôn of
  Lampsakus, more ancient by one generation than the historian
  whom he was assailing, and also belonging to Asiatic Greece. Of
  course, it suited the purpose of his work to produce all the
  contradictions to Herodotus which he could find in Charôn: the
  fact that he has produced none of any moment, tends to strengthen
  our faith in the historian of Halikarnassus, and to show that in
  the main his narrative was in accordance with that of Charôn.

Mazarês next proceeded to the attack and conquest of the Greeks on
the coast; an enterprise which, since he soon died of illness, was
completed by his successor Harpagus. The towns assailed successively
made a gallant but ineffectual resistance: the Persian general by
his numbers drove the defenders within their walls, against which
he piled up mounds of earth, so as either to carry the place by
storm or to compel surrender. All of them were reduced, one after
the other: with all, the terms of subjection were doubtless harder
than those which had been imposed upon them by Crœsus, because Cyrus
had already refused to grant these terms to them, with the single
exception of Milêtus, and because they had since given additional
offence by aiding the revolt of Paktyas. The inhabitants of Priênê
were sold into slavery: they were the first assailed by Mazarês, and
had perhaps been especially forward in the attack made by Paktyas on
Sardis.[355]

  [355] Herodot. i, 161-169.

Among these unfortunate towns, thus changing their master and passing
out into a harsher subjection, two deserve especial notice,—Teôs and
Phôkæa. The citizens of the former, so soon as the mound around
their walls had rendered farther resistance impossible, embarked and
emigrated, some to Thrace, where they founded Abdêra,—others to the
Cimmerian Bosphorus, where they planted Phanagoria; a portion of
them, however, must have remained to take the chances of subjection,
since the town appears in after-times still peopled and still
Hellenic.[356]

  [356] Herodot. i, 168; Skymnus Chius, Fragm. v, 153; Dionys.
  Perieg. v, 553.

The fate of Phôkæa, similar in the main, is given to us with more
striking circumstances of detail, and becomes the more interesting,
since the enterprising mariners who inhabited it had been the
torch-bearers of Grecian geographical discovery in the west. I have
already described their adventurous exploring voyages of former days
into the interior of the Adriatic, and along the whole northern
and western coasts of the Mediterranean as far as Tartêssus (the
region around and adjoining to Cadiz),—together with the favorable
reception given to them by old Arganthônius, king of the country,
who invited them to emigrate in a body to his kingdom, offering
them the choice of any site which they might desire. His invitation
was declined, though probably the Phôkæans may have subsequently
regretted the refusal; and he then manifested his good-will towards
them by a large present to defray the expense of constructing
fortifications round their town.[357] The walls, erected in part, by
this aid, were both extensive and well built; yet they could not
hinder Harpagus from raising his mounds of earth up against them,
while he was politic enough at the same time to tempt them with
offers of a moderate capitulation; requiring only that they should
breach their walls in one place by pulling down one of the towers,
and consecrate one building in the interior of the town as a token
of subjection. To accept these terms, was to submit themselves to
the discretion of the besieger, for there could be no security that
they would be observed; and the Phôkæans, while they asked for one
day to deliberate upon their reply, entreated that, during that
day, Harpagus should withdraw his troops altogether from the walls.
With this demand the latter complied, intimating, at the same time,
that he saw clearly through the meaning of it. The Phôkæans had
determined that the inevitable servitude impending over their town
should not be shared by its inhabitants, and they employed their day
of grace in preparation for collective exile, putting on ship-board
their wives and children as well as their furniture and the movable
decorations of their temples. They then set sail for Chios, leaving
to the conqueror a deserted town for the occupation of a Persian
garrison.[358]

  [357] Herodot. i, 163. Ὁ δὲ πυθόμενος παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τὸν Μῆδον ὡς
  αὔξοιτο, ἐδίδου σφι χρήματα τεῖχος περιβαλέσθαι τὴν πόλιν.

  I do not understand why the commentators debate what or who is
  meant by τὸν Μῆδον: it plainly means the Median or Persian power
  generally: but the chronological difficulty is a real one, if
  we are to suppose that there was time between the first alarm
  conceived of the Median power of the Ionians, and the siege of
  Phôkæa by Harpagus, to inform Arganthônius of the circumstances,
  and to procure from him this large aid as well as to build the
  fortifications. The Ionic Greeks neither actually did conceive,
  nor had reason to conceive, any alarm respecting Persian power,
  until the arrival of Cyrus before Sardis; and within a month from
  that time Sardis was in his possession. If we are to suppose
  communication with Arganthônius, grounded upon this circumstance,
  at the distance of Tartêssus, and under the circumstances of
  ancient navigation, we must necessarily imagine, also, that the
  attack made by Harpagus upon Phôkæa—which city he assailed before
  any of the rest—was postponed for at least two or three years.
  Such postponement is not wholly impossible, yet it is not in the
  spirit of the Herodotean narrative, nor do I think it likely. It
  is much more probable that the informants of Herodotus made a
  slip in chronology, and ascribed the donations of Arganthônius to
  a motive which did not really dictate them.

  As to the fortifications (which Phôkæa and the other Ionic cities
  are reported to have erected after the conquest of Sardis by the
  Persians), the case may stand thus. While these cities were all
  independent, before they were first conquered by Crœsus, they
  must undoubtedly have had fortifications. When Crœsus conquered
  them, he directed the demolition of the fortifications; but
  demolition does not necessarily mean pulling down the entire
  walls: when one or a few breaches are made, the city is laid
  open, and the purpose of Crœsus would thus be answered. Such may
  well have been the state of the Ionian cities at the time when
  they first thought it necessary to provide defences against the
  Persians at Sardis: they repaired and perfected the breached
  fortifications.

  The conjecture of Larcher (see the Notes both of Larcher
  and Wesseling),—τὸν Λυδὸν instead of τὸν Μῆδον,—is not an
  unreasonable one, if it had any authority: the donation of
  Arganthônius would then be transferred to the period anterior
  to the Lydian conquest: it would get rid of the chronological
  difficulty above adverted to, but it would introduce some new
  awkwardness into the narrative.

  [358] Herodot. i, 164.

It appears that the fugitives were not very kindly received at Chios;
at least, when they made a proposition for purchasing from the Chians
the neighboring islands of Œnussæ as a permanent abode, the latter
were induced to refuse by apprehensions of commercial rivalry. It
was necessary to look farther for a settlement: and Arganthônius
their protector, being now dead, Tartêssus was no longer inviting.
Twenty years before, however, the colony of Alalia in the island of
Corsica had been founded from Phôkæa by the direction of the oracle,
and thither the general body of Phôkæans now resolved to repair.
Having prepared their ships for this distant voyage, they first
sailed back to Phôkæa, surprised the Persian garrison whom Harpagus
had left in the town, and slew them: they then sunk in the harbor a
great lump of iron, and bound themselves by a solemn and unanimous
oath never again to see Phôkæa until that iron should come up to the
surface. Nevertheless, in spite of the oath, the voyage of exile had
been scarcely begun when more than half of them repented of having
so bound themselves,—and became homesick.[359] They broke their vow
and returned to Phôkæa. But as Herodotus does not mention any divine
judgment as having been consequent on the perjury, we may, perhaps,
suspect that some gray-headed citizen, to whom transportation to
Corsica might be little less than a sentence of death, both persuaded
himself, and certified to his companions, that he had seen the
sunken lump of iron raised up and floating for a while buoyant upon
the waves. Harpagus must have been induced to pardon the previous
slaughter of his Persian garrison, or at least to believe that it
had been done by those Phôkæans who still persisted in exile. He
wanted tribute-paying subjects, not an empty military post, and the
repentant home-seekers were allowed to number themselves among the
slaves of the Great King.

  [359] Herodot. i, 165. ὑπερημίσεας τῶν ἀστῶν ἔλαβε πόθος τε
  καὶ οἶκτος τῆς πόλιος καὶ τῶν ἠθέων τῆς χώρης· ψευδόρκιοί τε
  γενόμενοι, etc. The colloquial term which I have ventured to
  place in the text expresses exactly, as well as briefly, the
  meaning of the historian. A public oath, taken by most of the
  Greek cities with similar ceremony of lumps of iron thrown into
  the sea, is mentioned in Plutarch, Aristid. c. 25.

Meanwhile the smaller but more resolute half of the Phôkæans executed
their voyage to Alalia in Corsica, with their wives and children,
in sixty pentekontêrs, or armed ships, and established themselves
along with the previous settlers. They remained there for five
years,[360] during which time their indiscriminate piracies had
become so intolerable (even at that time, piracy committed against
a foreign vessel seems to have been both frequent and practised
without much disrepute), that both the Tyrrhenian seaports along
the Mediterranean coast of Italy, and the Carthaginians, united to
put them down. There subsisted particular treaties between these
two, for the regulation of the commercial intercourse between
Africa and Italy, of which the ancient treaty preserved by Polybius
between Rome and Carthage (made in 509 B. C.) may be considered as a
specimen.[361] Sixty Carthaginian and as many Tuscan ships attacked
the sixty Phôkæan ships near Alalia, and destroyed forty of them,
yet not without such severe loss to themselves that the victory was
said to be on the side of the latter; who, however, in spite of this
Kadmeian victory (so a battle was denominated in which the victors
lost more than the vanquished), were compelled to carry back their
remaining twenty vessels to Alalia, and to retire with their wives
and families, in so far as room could be found for them, to Rhegium.
At last, these unhappy exiles found a permanent home by establishing
the new settlement of Elea, or Velia, in the gulf of Policastro, on
the Italian coast (then called Œnôtrian) southward from Poseidônia,
or Pæstum. It is probable that they were here joined by other exiles
from Ionia, in particular by the Kolophonian philosopher and poet
Xenophanês, from whom what was afterwards called the Eleatic school
of philosophy, distinguished both for bold consistency and dialectic
acuteness, took its rise. The Phôkæan captives, taken prisoners in
the naval combat by Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, were stoned to
death; but a divine judgment overtook the Tyrrhenian town of Agylla,
in consequence of this cruelty; and even in the time of Herodotus,
a century afterwards, the Agyllæans were still expiating the sin by
a periodical solemnity and agon, pursuant to the penalty which the
Delphian oracle had imposed upon them.[362]

  [360] Herodot. i, 166.

  [361] Aristot. Polit. iii, 5, 11; Polyb. iii, 22.

  [362] Herodot. i, 167.

Such was the fate of the Phôkæan exiles, while their brethren
at home remained as subjects of Harpagus, in common with all the
other Ionic and Æolic Greeks except Milêtus. For even the insular
inhabitants of Lesbos and Chios, though not assailable by sea,
since the Persians had no fleet, thought it better to renounce
their independence and enrol themselves as Persian subjects,—both
of them possessing strips of the mainland which they were unable
to protect otherwise. Samos, on the other hand, maintained its
independence, and even reached, shortly after this period, under
the despotism of Polykratês, a higher degree of power than ever.
Perhaps the humiliation of the other maritime Greeks around may have
rather favored the ambition of this unscrupulous prince, to whom I
shall revert presently. But we may readily conceive that the public
solemnities in which the Ionic Greeks intermingled, in place of
those gay and richly-decked crowds which the Homeric hymn describes
in the preceding century as assembled at Delos, presented scenes of
marked despondency: one of their wisest men, indeed, Bias of Priênê,
went so far as to propose, at the Pan-Ionic festival, a collective
emigration of the entire population of the Ionic towns to the island
of Sardinia. Nothing like freedom, he urged, was now open to them
in Asia; but in Sardinia, one great Pan-Ionic city might be formed,
which would not only be free herself, but mistress of her neighbors.
The proposition found no favor; the reason of which is sufficiently
evident from the narrative just given respecting the unconquerable
local attachment on the part of the Phôkæan majority. But Herodotus
bestows upon it the most unqualified commendation, and regrets that
it was not acted upon.[363] Had such been the case, the subsequent
history of Carthage, Sicily, and even Rome, might have been sensibly
altered.

  [363] Herodot. i, 170. Πυνθάνομαι γνώμην Βίαντα ἄνδρα Πριηνέα
  ἀποδέξασθαι Ἴωσι χρησιμωτάτην, τῇ εἰ ἐπείθοντο, παρεῖχε ἂν σφι
  εὐδαιμονέειν Ἑλλήνων μάλιστα.

Thus subdued by Harpagus, the Ionic and Æolic Greeks were employed as
auxiliaries to him in the conquest of the south-western inhabitants
of Asia Minor,—Karians, Kaunians, Lykians, and Doric Greeks of Knidus
and Halikarnassus. Of the fate of the latter town, Herodotus tells
us nothing, though it was his native place. The inhabitants of
Knidus, a place situated on a long outlying tongue of land, at first
tried to cut through the narrow isthmus which joined them to the
continent, but abandoned the attempt with a facility which Herodotus
explains by referring it to a prohibition of the oracle:[364] nor did
either the Karians or the Kaunians offer any serious resistance. The
Lykians only, in their chief town Xanthus, made a desperate defence.
Having in vain tried to repel the assailants in the open field, and
finding themselves blocked up in their city, they set fire to it
with their own hands; consuming in the flames their women, children,
and servants, while the armed citizens marched out and perished to
a man in combat with the enemy.[365] Such an act of brave and even
ferocious despair is not in the Grecian character. In recounting,
however, the languid defence and easy submission of the Greeks of
Knidus, it may surprise us to call to mind that they were Dorians
and colonists from Sparta. So that the want of steadfast courage,
often imputed to Ionic Greeks as compared to Dorian, ought properly
to be charged on Asiatic Greeks as compared with European; or rather
upon that mixture of indigenous with Hellenic population, which all
the Asiatic colonies, in common with most of the other colonies,
presented, and which in Halikarnassus was particularly remarkable;
for it seems to have been half Karian, half Dorian, and was even
governed by a line of Karian despots.

  [364] Herodot. i, 174.

  [365] Herodot. i, 176. The whole population of Xanthus perished,
  except eighty families accidentally absent: the subsequent
  occupants of the town were recruited from strangers. Nearly five
  centuries afterwards, their descendants in the same city slew
  themselves in the like desperate and tragical manner, to avoid
  surrendering to the Roman army under Marcus Brutus (Plutarch,
  Brutus, c. 31).

Harpagus and the Persians thus mastered, without any considerable
resistance, the western and southern portions of Asia Minor;
probably, also, though we have no direct account of it, the entire
territory within the Halys which had before been ruled by Crœsus. The
tributes of the conquered Greeks were transmitted to Ekbatana instead
of to Sardis. While Harpagus was thus employed, Cyrus himself had
been making still more extensive conquests in Upper Asia and Assyria,
of which I shall speak in the coming chapter.




CHAPTER XXXIII.

GROWTH OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.


In the preceding chapter an account has been given, the best which we
can pick out from Herodotus, of the steps by which the Asiatic Greeks
became subject to Persia. And if his narrative is meagre, on a matter
which vitally concerned not only so many of his brother Greeks, but
even his own native city, we can hardly expect that he should tell us
much respecting the other conquests of Cyrus. He seems to withhold
intentionally various details which had come to his knowledge, and
merely intimates in general terms that while Harpagus was engaged
on the coast of the Ægean, Cyrus himself assailed and subdued all
the nations of Upper Asia, “not omitting any one of them.”[366]
He alludes to the Baktrians and the Sakæ,[367] who are also named
by Ktêsias as having become subject partly by force, partly by
capitulation; but he deems only two of the exploits of Cyrus worthy
of special notice,—the conquest of Babylon, and the final expedition
against the Massagetæ. In the short abstract which we now possess
of the lost work of Ktêsias, no mention appears of the important
conquest of Babylon; but his narrative, as far as the abstract
enables us to follow it, diverges materially from that of Herodotus,
and must have been founded on data altogether different.

  [366] Herodot. i, 177.

  [367] Herodot. i, 153.

“I shall mention (says Herodotus)[368] those conquests which gave
Cyrus most trouble, and are most memorable: after he had subdued all
the rest of the continent, he attacked the Assyrians.” Those who
recollect the description of Babylon and its surrounding territory,
as given in a former chapter, will not be surprised to learn that
the capture of it gave the Persian aggressor much trouble: their
only surprise will be, how it could ever have been taken at
all,—or, indeed, how a hostile army could have even reached it.
Herodotus informs us that the Babylonian queen Nitôkris—mother of
that very Labynêtus who was king when Cyrus attacked the place—had
been apprehensive of invasion from the Medes after their capture of
Nineveh, and had executed many laborious works near the Euphratês
for the purpose of obstructing their approach. Moreover, there
existed what was called the wall of Media (probably built by her,
but certainly built prior to the Persian conquest), one hundred
feet high and twenty feet thick,[369] across the entire space of
seventy-five miles which joined the Tigris with one of the canals of
the Euphratês. And the canals themselves, as we may see by the march
of the Ten Thousand Greeks after the battle of Kunaxa, presented
means of defence altogether insuperable by a rude army such as that
of the Persians. On the east, the territory of Babylonia was defended
by the Tigris, which cannot be forded lower than the ancient Nineveh
or the modern Mosul.[370] In addition to these ramparts, natural as
well as artificial, to protect the territory,—populous, cultivated,
productive, and offering every motive to its inhabitants to resist
even the entrance of an enemy,—we are told that the Babylonians
were so thoroughly prepared for the inroad of Cyrus that they had
accumulated a store of provisions within the city walls for many
years.

  [368] Herodot. i, 177. τὰ δὲ οἱ πάρεσχε πόνον τε πλεῖστον, καὶ
  ἀξιαπηγητότατά ἐστι, τούτων ἐπιμνήσομαι.

  [369] See Xenophon, Anabas. i, 7, 15; ii, 4, 12. For the
  inextricable difficulties in which the Ten Thousand Greeks were
  involved, after the battle of Kunaxa, and the insurmountable
  obstacles which impeded their march, assuming any resisting force
  whatever, see Xenoph. Anab. ii, 1, 11; ii, 2, 3; ii, 3, 10; ii,
  4, 12-13. These obstacles, doubtless, served as a protection to
  them against attack, not less than as an impediment to their
  advance; and the well-supplied villages enabled them to obtain
  plenty of provisions: hence the anxiety of the Great King to
  help them across the Tigris out of Babylonia. But it is not easy
  to see how, in the face of such difficulties, any invading army
  could reach Babylon.

  Ritter represents the wall of Media as having reached across from
  the Euphratês to the Tigris at the point where they come nearest
  together, about two hundred stadia or twenty-five miles across.
  But it is nowhere stated, so far as I can find, that this wall
  reached to the Euphratês,—still less that its length was two
  hundred stadia, for the passages of Strabo cited by Ritter do not
  prove either point (ii, 80; xi, 529). And Xenophon (ii, 4, 12)
  gives the length of the wall as I have stated it in the text, =
  20 parasangs = 600 stadia = 75 miles.

  The passage of the Anabasis (i, 7, 15) seems to connect the
  Median wall with the canals, and not with the river Euphratês.
  The narrative of Herodotus, as I have remarked in a former
  chapter, leads us to suppose that he descended that river to
  Babylon; and if we suppose that the wall did not reach the
  Euphratês, this would afford some reason why he makes no mention
  of it. See Ritter, West Asien, b. iii, Abtheilung iii, Abschn. i,
  sect. 29, pp. 19-22.

  [370] Ὁ Τίγρης μέγας τε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ διαβατὸς ἔς τε ἐπὶ τὴν
  ἐκβολὴν (Arrian, vii, 7, 7). By which he means, that it is not
  fordable below the ancient Nineveh, or Mosul; for a little above
  that spot, Alexander himself forded it with his army, a few days
  before the battle of Arbêla—not without very great difficulty
  (Arrian, iii, 7, 8; Diodor. xvii, 55).

Strange as it may seem, we must suppose that the king of Babylon,
after all the cost and labor spent in providing defences for the
territory, voluntarily neglected to avail himself of them, suffered
the invader to tread down the fertile Babylonia without resistance,
and merely drew out the citizens to oppose him when he arrived under
the walls of the city,—if the statement of Herodotus is correct.[371]
And we may illustrate this unaccountable omission by that which we
know to have happened in the march of the younger Cyrus to Kunaxa
against his brother Artaxerxês Mnêmon. The latter had caused to be
dug, expressly in preparation for this invasion, a broad and deep
ditch, thirty feet wide and eight feet deep, from the wall of Media
to the river Euphratês, a distance of twelve parasangs, or forty-live
English miles, leaving only a passage of twenty feet broad close
alongside of the river. Yet when the invading army arrived at this
important pass, they found not a man there to defend it, and all of
them marched without resistance through the narrow inlet. Cyrus the
younger, who had up to that moment felt assured that his brother
would fight, now supposed that he had given up the idea of defending
Babylon:[372] instead of which, two days afterwards, Artaxerxês
attacked him on an open plain of ground, where there was no advantage
of position on either side; though the invaders were taken rather
unawares in consequence of their extreme confidence, arising from
recent unopposed entrance within the artificial ditch.

  [371] Herodot. i, 190. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο ἐλαύνων ἀγχοῦ τῆς πόλιος,
  συνέβαλόν τε οἱ Βαβυλώνιοι, καὶ ἑσσωθέντες τῇ μάχῃ, κατειλήθησαν
  ἐς τὸ ἄστυ.

  Just as if Babylon was as easy to be approached as Sardis,—οἷά τε
  ἐπιστάμενοι ἔτι πρότερον τὸν Κῦρον οὐκ ἀτρεμίζοντα, ἀλλ᾽ ὁρέοντες
  αὐτὸν παντὶ ὁμοίως ἔθνεϊ ἐπιχειρέοντα, προεσάξαντο σίτια ἐτέων
  κάρτα πολλῶν.

  [372] Xenophon, Anabas. i, 7, 14-20; Diodor. xiv, 22; Plutarch,
  Artaxerxês, c. 7. I follow Xenophon without hesitation, where he
  differs from these two latter.

This anecdote is the more valuable as an illustration, because all
its circumstances are transmitted to us by a discerning eye-witness.
And both the two incidents here brought into comparison demonstrate
the recklessness, changefulness, and incapacity of calculation,
belonging to the Asiatic mind of that day,—as well as the great
command of hands possessed by these kings, and their prodigal waste
of human labor.[373] We shall see, as we advance in this history,
farther evidences of the same attributes, which it is essential to
bear in mind, for the purpose of appreciating both Grecian dealing
with Asiatics, and the comparative absence of such defects in the
Grecian character. Vast walls and deep ditches are an inestimable
aid to a brave and well commanded garrison; but they cannot be made
entirely to supply the want of bravery and intelligence.

  [373] Xenophon, Cyropæd. iii, 3, 26, about the πολυχειρία of the
  barbaric kings.

In whatever manner the difficulties of approaching Babylon may have
been overcome, the fact that they were overcome by Cyrus is certain.
On first setting out for this conquest, he was about to cross the
river Gyndês (one of the affluents from the East which joins the
Tigris near the modern Bagdad, and along which lay the high road
crossing the pass of Mount Zagros from Babylon to Ekbatana), when
one of the sacred white horses, which accompanied him, insulted the
river[374] so far as to march in and try to cross it by himself.
The Gyndês resented this insult, and the horse was drowned: upon
which Cyrus swore in his wrath that he would so break the strength
of the river as that women in future should pass it without wetting
their knees. Accordingly, he employed his entire army, during the
whole summer season, in digging three hundred and sixty artificial
channels to disseminate the unity of the stream. Such, according to
Herodotus, was the incident which postponed for one year the fall of
the great Babylon; but in the next spring Cyrus and his army were
before the walls, after having defeated and driven in the population
who came out to fight. But the walls were artificial mountains (three
hundred feet high, seventy-five feet thick, and forming a square
of fifteen miles to each side), within which the besieged defied
attack, and even blockade, having previously stored up several years’
provision. Through the midst of these walls, however, flowed the
Euphratês; and this river, which had been so laboriously trained
to serve for protection, trade, and sustenance to the Babylonians,
was now made the avenue of their ruin. Having left a detachment of
his army at the two points where the Euphratês enters and quits
the city, Cyrus retired with the remainder to the higher part of
its course, where an ancient Babylonian queen had prepared one of
the great lateral reservoirs for carrying off in case of need the
superfluity of its water. Near this point Cyrus caused another
reservoir and another canal of communication to be dug, by means of
which he drew off the water of the Euphrates to such a decree that
it became not above the height of a man’s thigh. The period chosen
was that of a great Babylonian festival, when the whole population
were engaged in amusement and revelry; and the Persian troops left
near the town, watching their opportunity, entered from both sides
along the bed of the river, and took it by surprise with scarcely
any resistance. At no other time, except during a festival, could
they have done this, says Herodotus, had the river been ever so low;
for both banks throughout the whole length of the town were provided
with quays, with continuous walls, and with gates at the end of every
street which led down to the river at right angles: so that if the
population had not been disqualified by the influences of the moment,
they would have caught the assailants in the bed of the river “as a
trap,” and overwhelmed them from the walls alongside. Within a square
of fifteen miles to each side, we are not surprised to hear that both
the extremities were already in the power of the besiegers before the
central population heard of it, and while they were yet absorbed in
unconscious festivity.[375]

  [374] Herodot. i, 189-202. ἐνθαῦτά οἱ τῶν τις ἱρῶν ἵππων τῶν
  λευκῶν ὑπὸ ὕβριος ἐσβὰς ἐς τὸν ποταμὸν, διαβαίνειν ἐπειρᾶτο....
  Κάρτα τε δὴ ἐχαλέπαινε τῷ ποταμῷ ὁ Κῦρος τοῦτο ὑβρίσαντι, etc.

  [375] Herodot. i, 191. This latter portion of the story, if we
  may judge from the expression of Herodotus, seems to excite
  more doubt in his mind than all the rest, for he thinks it
  necessary to add, “as the residents at Babylon say,” ὡς λέγεται
  ὑπὸ τῶν ταύτῃ οἰκημένων. Yet if we assume the size of the place
  to be what he has affirmed, there seems nothing remarkable in
  the fact that the people in the centre did not at once hear of
  the capture; for the first business of the assailants would be
  to possess themselves of the walls and gates. It is a lively
  illustration of prodigious magnitude, and as such it is given by
  Aristotle (Polit. iii, 1, 12); who, however, exaggerates it by
  giving as a report that the inhabitants in the centre did not
  hear of the capture until the third day. No such exaggeration as
  this appears in Herodotus.

  Xenophon, in the Cyropædia (vii, 5, 7-18), following the story
  that Cyrus drained off the Euphratês, represents it as effected
  in a manner differing from Herodotus. According to him, Cyrus
  dug two vast and deep ditches, one on each side round the town,
  from the river above the town to the river below it: watching the
  opportunity of a festival day in Babylon, he let the water into
  both of these side ditches, which fell into the main stream again
  below the town: hence the main stream in its passage through
  the town became nearly dry. The narrative of Xenophon, however,
  betrays itself, as not having been written from information
  received on the spot, like that of Herodotus; for he talks of
  αἱ ἄκραι of Babylon, just as he speaks of the ἄκραι of the
  hill-towns of Karia (compare Cyropædia, vii, 4, 1, 7, with vii,
  5, 34). There were no ἄκραι on the dead flat of Babylon.

Such is the account given by Herodotus of the circumstances which
placed Babylon—the greatest city of western Asia—in the power of the
Persians. To what extent the information communicated to him was
incorrect, or exaggerated, we cannot now decide; but the way in which
the city was treated would lead us to suppose that its acquisition
cannot have cost the conqueror either much time or much loss. Cyrus
comes into the list as king of Babylon, and the inhabitants with
their whole territory become tributary to the Persians, forming the
richest satrapy in the empire; but we do not hear that the people
were otherwise ill-used, and it is certain that the vast walls and
gates were left untouched. This was very different from the way in
which the Medes had treated Nineveh, which seems to have been ruined
and for a long time absolutely uninhabited, though reoccupied on a
reduced scale under the Parthian empire; and very different also from
the way in which Babylon itself was treated twenty years afterwards
by Darius, when reconquered after a revolt.

The importance of Babylon, marking as it does one of the
peculiar forms of civilization belonging to the ancient world
in a state of full development, gives an interest even to the
half-authenticated stories respecting its capture; but the other
exploits ascribed to Cyrus,—his invasion of India, across the desert
of Arachosia,[376]—and his attack upon the Massagetæ, nomads ruled
by queen Tomyris, and greatly resembling the Scythians, across the
mysterious river which Herodotus calls Araxês,—are too little known
to be at all dwelt upon. In the latter he is said to have perished,
his army being defeated in a bloody battle.[377] He was buried at
Pasargadæ, in his native province of Persis proper, where his tomb
was honored and watched until the breaking up of the empire,[378]
while his memory was held in profound veneration among the Persians.

  [376] Arrian, vi, 24, 4.

  [377] Herodot. i, 205-214; Arrian, v, 4, 14; Justin, i, 8;
  Strabo, xi, p. 512.

  According to Ktêsias, Cyrus was slain in an expedition against
  the Derbikes, a people in the Caucasian regions,—though his army
  afterwards prove victorious and conquer the country (Ktesiæ
  Persica, c. 8-9),—see the comment of Bähr on the passage, in his
  edition of Ktêsias.

  [378] Strabo, xv, pp. 730, 731; Arrian, vi, 29.

Of his real exploits, we know little except their results; but in
what we read respecting him there seems, though amidst constant
fighting, very little cruelty. Xenophon has selected his life as
the subject of a moral romance, which for a long time was cited
as authentic history, and which even now serves as an authority,
expressed or implied, for disputable and even incorrect conclusions.
His extraordinary activity and conquests admit of no doubt. He left
the Persian empire[379] extending from Sogdiana and the rivers
Jaxartês and Indus eastward, to the Hellespont and the Syrian coast
westward, and his successors made no permanent addition to it except
that of Egypt. Phenicia and Judæa were dependencies of Babylon, at
the time when he conquered it, with their princes and grandees in
Babylonian captivity. They seem to have yielded to him, and become
his tributaries,[380] without difficulty; and the restoration of
their captives was conceded to them. It was from Cyrus that the
habits of the Persian kings took commencement, to dwell at Susa in
the winter, and Ekbatana during the summer; the primitive territory
of Persis, with its two towns of Persepolis and Pasargadæ, being
reserved for the burial-place of the kings and the religious
sanctuary of the empire. How or when the conquest of Susiana was
made, we are not informed; it lay eastward of the Tigris, between
Babylonia and Persis proper, and its people, the Kissians, as far as
we can discern, were of Assyrian and not of Arian race. The river
Choaspês, near Susa, was supposed to furnish the only water fit for
the palate of the Great King, and is said to have been carried about
with him wherever he went.[381]

  [379] The town Kyra, or Kyropolis, on the river Sihon, or
  Jaxartês, was said to have been founded by Cyrus,—it was
  destroyed by Alexander (Strabo, xi, pp. 517, 518; Arrian, iv, 2,
  2; Curtius, vii, 6, 16).

  [380] Herodot. iii, 19.

  [381] Herodot. i, 188; Plutarch, Artaxerxês, c. 3; Diodor. xvii,
  71.

While the conquests of Cyrus contributed to assimilate the distinct
types of civilization in western Asia,—not by elevating the worse,
but by degrading the better,—upon the native Persians themselves
they operated as an extraordinary stimulus, provoking alike their
pride, ambition, cupidity, and warlike propensities. Not only did the
territory of Persis proper pay no tribute to Susa or Ekbatana,—being
the only district so exempted between the Jaxartês and the
Mediterranean,—but the vast tributes received from the remaining
empire were distributed to a great degree among its inhabitants.
Empire to them meant,—for the great men, lucrative satrapies, or
pachalics, with powers altogether unlimited, pomp inferior only to
that of the Great King, and standing armies which they employed
at their own discretion, sometimes against each other,[382]—for
the common soldiers, drawn from their fields or flocks, constant
plunder, abundant maintenance, and an unrestrained license, either
in the suite of one of the satraps, or in the large permanent troop
which moved from Susa to Ekbatana with the Great King. And if the
entire population of Persis proper did not migrate from their abodes
to occupy some of those more inviting spots which the immensity of
the imperial dominion furnished,—a dominion extending (to use the
language of Cyrus the younger, before the battle of Kunaxa)[383] from
the region of insupportable heat to that of insupportable cold,—this
was only because the early kings discouraged such a movement, in
order that the nation might maintain its military hardihood,[384] and
be in a situation to furnish undiminished supplies of soldiers.

  [382] Xenophon, Anabas. i, 1, 8.

  [383] Xenophon, Anabas. i, 7, 6; Cyropæd. viii, 6, 19.

  [384] Herodot. ix, 122.

The self-esteem and arrogance of the Persians was no less remarkable
than their avidity for sensual enjoyment. They were fond of wine to
excess; their wives and their concubines were both numerous; and
they adopted eagerly from foreign nations new fashions of luxury as
well as of ornament. Even to novelties in religion, they were not
strongly averse; for though they were disciples of Zoroaster, with
magi as their priests, and as indispensable companions of their
sacrifices, worshipping Sun, Moon, Earth, Fire, etc., and recognizing
neither image, temple, nor altar,—yet they had adopted the voluptuous
worship of the goddess Mylitta from the Assyrians and Arabians. A
numerous male offspring was the Persian’s boast, and his warlike
character and consciousness of force were displayed in the education
of these youths, who were taught, from five years old to twenty,
only three things,—to ride, to shoot with the bow, and to speak the
truth.[385] To owe money, or even to buy and sell, was accounted
among the Persians disgraceful,—a sentiment which they defended by
saying, that both the one and the other imposed the necessity of
telling falsehood. To exact tribute from subjects, to receive pay or
presents from the king, and to give away without forethought whatever
was not immediately wanted, was their mode of dealing with money.
Industrious pursuits were left to the conquered, who were fortunate
if by paying a fixed contribution, and sending a military contingent
when required, they could purchase undisturbed immunity for their
remaining concerns.[386] They could not thus purchase safety for the
family hearth, since we find instances of noble Grecian maidens torn
from their parents for the harem of the satrap.[387]

  [385] The modern Persians at this day exhibit almost matchless
  skill in shooting with the firelock, as well as with the bow, on
  horseback. See Sir John Malcolm, Sketches of Persia, ch. xvii, p.
  201; see also Kinneir, Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire,
  p. 32.

  [386] About the attributes of the Persian character, see Herodot.
  i, 131-140: compare i, 153.

  He expresses himself very strongly as to the facility with which
  the Persians imbibed foreign customs, and especially foreign
  luxuries (i, 135),—ξεινικὰ δὲ νόμαια Πέρσαι προσίενται ἀνδρῶν
  μάλιστα,—καὶ εὐπαθείας τε παντοδαπὰς πυνθανόμενοι ἐπιτηδεύουσι.

  That rigid tenacity of customs and exclusiveness of tastes,
  which mark the modern Orientals, appear to be of the growth of
  Mohammedanism, and to distinguish them greatly from the old
  Zoroastrian Persians.

  [387] Herodot. ix, 76; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 26.

To a people of this character, whose conceptions of political society
went no farther than personal obedience to a chief, a conqueror like
Cyrus would communicate the strongest excitement and enthusiasm of
which they were capable. He had found them slaves, and made them
masters; he was the first and greatest of national benefactors,[388]
as well as the most forward of leaders in the field; they followed
him from one conquest to another, during the thirty years of his
reign, their love of empire growing with the empire itself. And this
impulse of aggrandizement continued unabated during the reigns of
his three next successors,—Kambysês, Darius, and Xerxês,—until it
was at length violently stifled by the humiliating defeats of Platæa
and Salamis; after which the Persians became content with defending
themselves at home, and playing a secondary game. But at the time
when Kambysês son of Cyrus succeeded to his father’s sceptre, Persian
spirit was at its highest point, and he was not long in fixing upon
a prey both richer and less hazardous than the Massagetæ, at the
opposite extremity of the empire. Phenicia and Judæa being already
subject to him, he resolved to invade Egypt, then highly flourishing
under the long and prosperous reign of Amasis. Not much pretence
was needed to color the aggression, and the various stories which
Herodotus mentions as causes of the war, are only interesting
inasmuch as they imply a vein of Egyptian party feeling,—affirming
that the invasion was brought upon Amasis by a daughter of Apriês,
and was thus a judgment upon him for having deposed the latter. As to
the manner in which she had produced this effect, indeed, the most
contradictory stories were circulated.[389]

  [388] Herodot. i, 210; iii, 159.

  [389] Herodot. iii, 1-4.

Kambysês summoned the forces of his empire for this new enterprise,
and among them both the Phenicians and the Asiatic Greeks, Æolic
as well as Ionic,[390] insular as well as continental,—nearly all
the maritime force and skill of the Ægean sea. He was apprized by a
Greek deserter from the mercenaries in Egypt, named Phanês, of the
difficulties of the march, and the best method of surmounting them;
especially the three days of sandy desert, altogether without water,
which lay between Egypt and Judæa. By the aid of the neighboring
Arabians,—with whom he concluded a treaty, and who were requited
for this service with the title of equal allies, free from all
tribute,—he was enabled to surmount this serious difficulty, and to
reach Pelusium at the eastern mouth of the Nile, where the Ionian
and Karian troops in the Egyptian service, as well as the Egyptian
military, were assembled to oppose him.[391]

  [390] Herodot. iii, 1, 19, 44.

  [391] The narrative of Ktêsias is, in respect both to the
  Egyptian expedition and to the other incidents of Persian
  history, quite different in its details from that of Herodotus,
  agreeing only in the main events (Ktêsias, Persica, c. 7). To
  blend the two together is impossible.

  Tacitus (Histor. i, 11) notes the difficulty of approach for an
  invading army to Egypt: “Egyptum, provinciam aditu difficilem,
  annonæ fecundam, superstitione ac lasciviâ discordem et mobilem,”
  etc.

Fortunately for himself, the Egyptian king Amasis had died during
the interval of the Persian preparations, a few months before the
expedition took place,—after forty-four years of unabated prosperity.
His death, at this critical moment, was probably the main cause of
the easy conquest which followed; his son Psammenitus succeeding
to his crown, but neither to his abilities nor his influence. The
result of the invasion was foreshadowed, as usual, by a menacing
prodigy,—rain falling at Thebes in Upper Egypt; and was brought about
by a single victory, though bravely disputed, at Pelusium,—followed
by the capture of Memphis, with the person of king Psammenitus, after
a siege of some duration. Kambysês had sent forward a Mitylenæan ship
to Memphis, with heralds to summon the city; but the Egyptians, in a
paroxysm of fury, rushed out of the walls, destroyed the vessel, and
tore the crew into pieces,—a savage proceeding, which drew upon them
severe retribution after the capture. Psammenitus, after being at
first treated with harshness and insult, was at length released, and
even allowed to retain his regal dignity as a dependent of Persia.
But being soon detected, or at least believed to be concerned, in
raising revolt against the conquerors, he was put to death, and Egypt
was placed under a satrap.[392]

  [392] Herodot. iii, 10-16. About the Arabians, between Judæa and
  Egypt, see iii, c. 5, 88-91.

There yet lay beyond Egypt territories for Kambysês to
conquer,—though Kyrênê and Barka, the Greek colonies near the coast
of Libya, placed themselves at once out of the reach of danger by
sending to him tribute and submission at Memphis. He projected three
new enterprises: one against Carthage, by sea; the other two, by
land, against the Ethiopians, far to the southward up the course of
the Nile, and against the oracle and oasis of Zeus Ammon, amidst the
deserts of Libya. Towards Ethiopia he himself conducted his troops,
but was compelled to bring them back without reaching it, since they
were on the point of perishing with famine; while the division which
he sent against the temple of Ammon is said to have been overwhelmed
by a sand-storm in the desert. The expedition against Carthage was
given up, for a reason which well deserves to be commemorated.
The Phenicians, who formed the most efficient part of his navy,
refused to serve against their kinsmen and colonists, pleading the
sanctity of mutual oaths as well as the ties both of relationship and
traffic.[393] Even the frantic Kambysês was compelled to accept, and
perhaps to respect, this honorable refusal, which was not imitated
by the Ionic Greeks when Darius and Xerxês demanded the aid of their
ships against Athens,—we must add, however, that they were then in
a situation much more exposed and helpless than that in which the
Phenicians stood before Kambysês.

  [393] Herodot. iii, 19.

Among the sacred animals so numerous and so different throughout the
various nomes of Egypt, the most venerated of all was the bull Apis.
Yet such peculiar conditions were required by the Egyptian religion
as to the birth, the age, and the marks of this animal, that, when
he died, it was difficult to find a new calf properly qualified to
succeed him. Much time was sometimes spent in the search, and when
an unexceptionable successor was at last found, the demonstrations
of joy in Memphis were extravagant and universal. At the moment
when Kambysês returned to Memphis from his Ethiopian expedition,
full of humiliation for the result, it so happened that a new Apis
was just discovered; and as the population of the city gave vent
to their usual festival pomp and delight, he construed it into an
intentional insult towards his own recent misfortunes. In vain did
the priests and magistrates explain to him the real cause of these
popular manifestations; he persisted in his belief, punished some
of them with death and others with stripes, and commanded every man
seen in holiday attire to be slain. Furthermore,—to carry his outrage
against Egyptian feeling to the uttermost pitch,—he sent for the
newly-discovered Apis, and plunged his dagger into the side of the
animal, who shortly afterwards died of the wound.[394]

  [394] Herodot. iii, 29.

After this brutal deed,—calculated to efface in the minds of the
Egyptian priests the enormities of Cheops and Chephrên, and doubtless
unparalleled in all the twenty-four thousand years of their anterior
history,—Kambysês lost every spark of reason which yet remained to
him, and the Egyptians found in this visitation a new proof of the
avenging interference of their gods. Not only did he commit every
variety of studied outrage against the conquered people among whom
he was tarrying, as well as their temples and their sepulchres,—but
he also dealt his blows against his Persian friends and even his
nearest blood-relations. Among these revolting atrocities, one of the
greatest deserves peculiar notice, because the fate of the empire was
afterwards materially affected by it. His younger brother Smerdis had
accompanied him into Egypt, but had been sent back to Susa, because
the king became jealous of the admiration which his personal strength
and qualities called forth.[395] That jealousy was aggravated into
alarm and hatred by a dream, portending dominion and conquest to
Smerdis; so that the frantic Kambysês sent to Susa secretly a
confidential Persian, Prexaspês, with express orders to get rid of
his brother. Prexaspês fulfilled his commission effectively, burying
the slain prince with his own hands,[396] and keeping the deed
concealed from all except a few of the chiefs at the regal residence.

  [395] Ktêsias calls the brother Tanyoxarkês, and says that
  Cyrus had left him satrap, without tribute, of Baktria and the
  neighboring regions (Persica, c. 8). Xenophon, in the Cyropædia,
  also calls him Tanyoxarkês, but gives him a different satrapy
  (Cyropæd. viii, 7, 11).

  [396] Herodot. iii, 30-62.

Among these few chiefs, however, there was one, the Median
Patizeithês, belonging to the order of the Magi, who saw in it a
convenient stepping-stone for his own personal ambition, and made use
of it as a means of covertly supplanting the dynasty of the great
Cyrus. Enjoying the full confidence of Kambysês, he had been left
by that prince, on departing for Egypt, in the entire management of
the palace and treasures, with extensive authority.[397] Moreover,
he happened to have a brother extremely resembling in person the
deceased Smerdis; and as the open and dangerous madness of Kambysês
contributed to alienate from him the minds of the Persians, he
resolved to proclaim this brother king in his room, as if it were
the younger son of Cyrus succeeding to the disqualified elder. On
one important point, the false Smerdis differed from the true. He
had lost his ears, which Cyrus himself had caused to be cut off for
an offence; but the personal resemblance, after all, was of little
importance, since he was seldom or never allowed to show himself
to the people.[398] Kambysês, having heard of this revolt in Syria
on his return from Egypt, was mounting his horse in haste for the
purpose of going to suppress it, when an accident from his sword
put an end to his life. Herodotus tells us that, before his death,
he summoned the Persians around him, confessed that he had been
guilty of putting his brother to death, and apprized them that the
reigning Smerdis was only a Median pretender,—conjuring them at
the same time not to submit to the disgrace of being ruled by any
other than a Persian and an Achæmenid. But if it be true that he
ever made known the facts, no one believed him. For Prexaspês, on
his part, was compelled by regard to his own safety, to deny that
he had imbrued his hands in the blood of a son of Cyrus;[399] and
thus the opportune death of Kambysês placed the false Smerdis without
opposition at the head of the Persians, who all, or for the most
part, believed themselves to be ruled by a genuine son of Cyrus.
Kambysês had reigned for seven years and five months.

  [397] Herodot. iii, 61-63.

  [398] Herodot. iii, 68-69.—“Auribus decisis vivere jubet,” says
  Tacitus, about a case under the Parthian government (Annal. xii,
  14),—nor have the Turkish authorities given up the infliction
  of it at the present moment, or at least down to a very recent
  period.

  [399] Herodot. iii, 64-66.

For seven months did Smerdis reign without opposition, seconded
by his brother Patizeithês; and if he manifested his distrust of
the haughty Persians around him, by neither inviting them into his
palace nor showing himself out of it, he at the same time studiously
conciliated the favor of the subject provinces, by remission of
tribute and of military service for three years.[400] Such a
departure from the Persian principle of government was in itself
sufficient to disgust the warlike and rapacious Achæmenids at Susa.
But it seems that their suspicions as to his genuine character had
never been entirely set at rest, and in the eighth month those
suspicions were converted into certainty. According to what seems
to have been the Persian usage, he had taken to himself the entire
harem of his predecessor, among whose wives was numbered Phædymê,
daughter of a distinguished Persian, named Otanês. At the instance
of her father, Phædymê undertook the dangerous task of feeling the
head of Smerdis while he slept, and thus detected the absence of
ears.[401] Otanês, possessed of the decisive information, lost no
time in concerting, with five other noble Achæmenids, means for
ridding themselves of a king who was at once a Mede, a Magian, and a
man without ears;[402] Darius, son of Hystaspês, the satrap of Persis
proper, arriving just in time to join the conspiracy as the seventh.
How these seven noblemen slew Smerdis in his palace at Susa,—how they
subsequently debated among themselves whether they should establish
in Persia a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a democracy,—how, after the
first of the three had been resolved upon, it was determined that the
future king, whichever he might be, should be bound to take his wives
only from the families of the seven conspirators,—how Darius became
king, from the circumstance of his horse being the first to neigh
among those of the conspirators at a given spot, by the stratagem of
the groom Œbarês,—how Otanês, standing aside beforehand from this
lottery for the throne, reserved for himself as well as for his
descendants perfect freedom and exemption from the rule of the future
king, whichsoever might draw the prize,—all these incidents may be
found recounted by Herodotus with his usual vivacity, but with no
small addition of Hellenic ideas as well as of dramatic ornament.

  [400] Herodot. iii, 67.

  [401] Herodot. iii, 68-69.

  [402] Herodot. iii, 69-73. ἀρχόμεθα μὲν ἐόντες Πέρσαι, ὑπὸ Μήδου
  ἀνδρὸς μάγου, καὶ τούτου ὦτα οὐκ ἔχοντος.

  Compare the description of the insupportable repugnance of the
  Greeks of Kyrênê to be governed by the _lame_ Battus (Herodot.
  iv, 161).

It was thus that the upright tiara, the privileged head-dress of
the Persian kings,[403] passed away from the lineage of Cyrus, yet
without departing from the great phratry of the Achæmenidæ,—to
which Darius and his father Hystaspês, as well as Cyrus, belonged.
That important fact is unquestionable, and probably the acts
ascribed to the seven conspirators are in the main true, apart from
their discussions and intentions. But on this as well as on other
occasions, we must guard ourselves against an illusion which the
historical manner of Herodotus is apt to create. He presents to us
with so much descriptive force the personal narrative,—individual
action and speech, with all its accompanying hopes, fears, doubts,
and passions,—that our attention is distracted from the political
bearing of what is going on; which we are compelled often to gather
up from hints in the speeches of performers, or from consequences
afterwards indirectly noticed. When we put together all the
incidental notices which he lets drop, it will be found that the
change of sceptre from Smerdis to Darius was a far larger political
event than his direct narrative would seem to announce. Smerdis
represents preponderance to the Medes over the Persians, and
comparative degradation to the latter; who, by the installation of
Darius, are again placed in the ascendent. The Medes and the Magians
are in this case identical; for the Magians, though indispensable
in the capacity of priests to the Persians, were essentially one of
the seven Median tribes.[404] It thus appears that though Smerdis
ruled as a son of the great Cyrus, yet he ruled by means of Medes
and Magians, depriving the Persians of that supreme privilege and
predominance to which they had become accustomed.[405] We see this by
what followed immediately after the assassination of Smerdis and his
brother in the palace. The seven conspirators, exhibiting the bloody
heads of both these victims as an evidence of their deed, instigated
the Persians in Susa to a general massacre of the Magians, many
of whom were actually slain, and the rest only escaped by flight,
concealment, or the hour of night. And the anniversary of this day
was celebrated afterwards among the Persians by a solemnity and
festival, called the Magophonia; no Magian being ever allowed on that
day to appear in public.[406] The descendants of the Seven maintained
a privileged name and rank,[407] even down to the extinction of the
monarchy by Alexander the Great.

  [403] Compare Aristophan. Aves, 487, with the Scholia, and
  Herodot. vii, 61; Arrian, iv, 6, 29. The cap of the Persians
  generally was loose, low, clinging about the head in folds; that
  of the king was high and erect above the head. See the notes of
  Wesseling and Schweighaüser, upon πῖλοι ἀπαγέες in Herodot. _l.
  c._

  [404] Herodot. i, 101-120.

  [405] In the speech which Herodotus puts into the mouth of
  Kambysês on his deathbed, addressed to the Persians around him
  in a strain of prophetic adjuration (iii, 65), he says: Καὶ δὴ
  ὑμῖν τάδε ἐπισκήπτω, θεοὺς τοὺς βασιληΐους ἐπικαλέων, καὶ πᾶσιν
  ὑμῖν καὶ μάλιστα Ἀχαιμενιδέων τοῖσι παρεοῦσι, μὴ περιϊδεῖν
  τὴν ἡγεμονίην αὖτις ἐς Μήδους περιελθοῦσαν· ἀλλ᾽ εἴτε δόλῳ
  ἔχουσι αὐτὴν κτησάμενοι (the personification of the deceased
  son of Cyrus), δόλῳ ἀπαιρεθῆναι ὑπὸ ὑμέων· εἴτε καὶ σθένεϊ τεῷ
  κατεργασάμενοι, σθένεϊ κατὰ τὸ κάρτερον ἀνασώσασθαι (the forcible
  opposition of the Medes to Darius, which he put down by superior
  force on the Persian side): compare the speech of Gobryas, one of
  the seven Persian conspirators (iii, 73), and that of Prexaspês
  (iii, 75); also Plato, Legg. iii, 12, p. 695.

  Heeren has taken a correct view of the reign of Smerdis the
  Magian, and its political character (Ideen über den Verkehr,
  etc., der Alten Welt, part i, abth. i, p. 431).

  [406] Herodot. iii, 79. Σπασάμενοι δὲ τὰ ἐγχειρίδια, ἔκτεινον
  ὅκου τινὰ μάγον εὕρισκον· εἰ δὲ μὴ νὺξ ἐπελθοῦσα ἔσχε, ἔλιπον ἂν
  οὐδένα μάγον. Ταύτην τὴν ἡμέρην θεραπεύουσι Πέρσαι κοινῇ μάλιστα
  τῶν ἡμερέων· καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ὁρτὴν μεγάλην ἀνάγουσι, ἣ κέκληται ὑπὸ
  Περσέων Μαγοφόνια.

  The periodical celebration of the Magophonia is attested by
  Ktêsias,—one of the few points of complete agreement with
  Herodotus. He farther agrees in saying that a Magian usurped the
  throne, through likeness of person to the deceased son of Cyrus,
  whom Kambysês had slain,—but all his other statements differ from
  Herodotus (Ktêsias, 10-14).

  [407] Even at the battle of Arbela,—“Summæ Orsines præerat, a
  septem Persis oriundus, ad Cyrum quoque, nobilissimum regem,
  originem sui referens.” (Quintus Curtius, iv, 12, 7, or iv, 45,
  7, Zumpt.): compare Strabo, xi, p. 531; Florus, iii, 5, 1.

Furthermore, it appears that the authority of Darius was not readily
acknowledged throughout the empire, and that an interval of confusion
ensued before it became so.[408] The Medes actually revolted, and
tried to maintain themselves by force against Darius, who however
found means to subdue them: though, when he convoked his troops from
the various provinces, he did not receive from the satraps universal
obedience. The powerful Orœtês, especially, who had been appointed
by Cyrus satrap of Lydia and Ionia, not only sent no troops to the
aid of Darius against the Medes,[409] but even took advantage of
the disturbed state of the government to put to death his private
enemy Mitrobatês satrap of Phrygia, and appropriate that satrapy
in addition to his own. Aryandês also, the satrap nominated by
Kambysês in Egypt, comported himself as the equal of Darius rather
than as his subject.[410] The subject provinces generally, to whom
Smerdis had granted remission of tribute and military service for
the space of three years, were grateful and attached to his memory,
and noway pleased with the new dynasty; moreover, the revolt of the
Babylonians, conceived a year or two before it was executed, took its
rise from the feelings of this time.[411] But the renewal of the old
conflict between the two principal sections of the empire, Medes and
Persians, is doubtless the most important feature in this political
revolution. The false Smerdis with his brother, both of them Medes
and Magians, had revived the Median nationality to a state of
supremacy over the Persian, recalling the memory of what it had been
under Astyagês; while Darius,—a pure Persian, and not (like the mule
Cyrus) half Mede and half Persian,—replaced the Persian nationality
in its ascendent condition, though not without the necessity of
suppressing by force a rebellion of the Medes.[412]

  [408] Herodot. iii, 127. Δαρεῖος—ἅτε οἰδεόντων οἱ ἔτι τῶν
  πρηγμάτων, etc.,—mention of the ταραχή (iii, 126, 150).

  [409] Herodot. iii, 126. Μετὰ γὰρ τὸν Καμβύσεω θάνατον, καὶ τῶν
  Μάγων τὴν βασιληΐην, μένων ἐν τῇσι Σάρδισι Ὀροίτης, ὠφέλει μὲν
  οὐδὲν Πέρσας, ~ὑπὸ Μήδων ἀπαραιρημένους τὴν ἀρχήν~· ὁ δὲ ἐν
  ταύτῃ τῇ ταραχῇ κατὰ μὲν ἔκτεινε Μιτροβάτεα ... ἄλλα τε ἐξύβρισε
  παντοῖα, etc.

  [410] Herodot. iv, 166. Ὁ δὲ Ἀρυάνδης ἦν οὗτος τῆς Αἰγύπτου
  ὕπαρχος ὑπὸ Καμβύσεω κατεστεώς· ὃς ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ παρισεύμενος
  Δαρείῳ διεφθάρη.

  [411] Herodot. iii, 67-150.

  [412] Herodot. i, 130. Ἀστυάγης μέν νυν βασιλεύσας ἐπ᾽ ἔτεα πέντε
  καὶ τριήκοντα, οὕτω τῆς ἀρχῆς κατεπαύσθη. Μῆδοι δὲ ὑπέκυψαν
  Πέρσῃσι διὰ τὴν τούτου πικρότητα.... Ὑστέρῳ μέντοι χρόνῳ
  μετεμέλησέ τέ σφι ταῦτα ποιήσασι, καὶ ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ Δαρείου·
  ἀποστάντες δὲ, ὀπίσω κατεστράφθησαν, μάχῃ νικηθέντες· τότε δὲ,
  ἐπὶ Ἀστυάγεος, οἱ Πέρσαι τε καὶ ὁ Κῦρος ἐπαναστάντες τοῖσι
  Μήδοισι, ἦρχον τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου τῆς Ἀσίης.

  This passage—asserting that the Medes, some time after the
  deposition of Astyagês and the acquisition of Persian supremacy
  by Cyrus, repented of having suffered their discontent
  against Astyagês to place this supremacy in the hands of
  the Persians, revolted from Darius, and were reconquered
  after a contest—appears to me to have been misunderstood by
  chronologists. Dodwell, Larcher, and Mr. Fynes Clinton (indeed,
  most, if not all, of the chronologists) explain it as alluding
  to a revolt of the Medes against the Persian king Darius Nothus,
  mentioned in the Hellenica of Xenophon (i, 2, 12), and belonging
  to the year 408 B. C. See Larcher ad Herodot. i, 130, and his Vie
  d’Hérodote, prefixed to his translation (p. lxxxix); also Mr.
  Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, ad ann. 408 and 455, and his Appendix,
  c, 18, p. 316.

  The revolt of the Medes alluded to by Herodotus is, in my
  judgment, completely distinct from the revolt mentioned by
  Xenophon: to identify the two, as these eminent chronologists do,
  is an hypothesis not only having nothing to recommend it, but
  open to grave objection. The revolt mentioned by Herodotus was
  against Darius son of Hystaspês, not against Darius Nothus; and
  I have set forth with peculiar care the circumstances connected
  with the conspiracy and accession of the former, for the purpose
  of showing that they all decidedly imply that conflict between
  Median and Persian supremacy, which Herodotus directly announces
  in the passage now before us.

  1. When Herodotus speaks of Darius, without any adjective
  designation, why should we imagine that he means any other than
  Darius the son of Hystaspês, on whom he dwells so copiously in
  his narrative? Once only in the course of his history (ix, 108)
  another Darius (the young prince, son of Xerxês the First) is
  mentioned; but with this exception, Darius son of Hystaspês is
  uniformly, throughout the work, spoken of under his simple name:
  Darius Nothus is never alluded to at all.

  2. The deposition of Astyagês took place in 559 B. C.; the
  beginning of the reign of Darius occurred in 520 B. C.; now
  repentance on the part of the Medes, for what they had done at
  the former of those two epochs, might naturally prompt them to
  try to repair it in the latter. But between the deposition of
  Astyagês in 559 B. C., and the revolt mentioned by Xenophon
  against Darius Nothus in 408 B. C., the interval is more than one
  hundred and fifty years. To ascribe a revolt which took place in
  408 B. C., to repentance for something which had occurred one
  hundred and fifty years before, is unnatural and far-fetched, if
  not positively inadmissible.

  The preceding arguments go to show that the natural construction
  of the passage in Herodotus points to Darius son of Hystaspês,
  and not to Darius Nothus; but this is not all. There are yet
  stronger reasons why the reference to Darius Nothus should be
  discarded.

  The supposed mention, in Herodotus, of a fact so late as 408 B.
  C., perplexes the whole chronology of his life and authorship.
  According to the usual statement of his biography, which every
  one admits, and which there is no reason to call in question,
  he was born in 484 B. C. Here, then, is an event alluded to in
  his history, which occurred when the historian was seventy-six
  years old, and the allusion to which he must be presumed to
  have written when about eighty years old, if not more; for his
  mention of the fact by no means implies that it was particularly
  recent. Those who adopt this view, do not imagine that he wrote
  his whole history at that age; but they maintain that he made
  later additions, of which they contend that this is one. I do
  not say that this is impossible: we know that Isokratês composed
  his Panathenaic oration at the age of ninety-four; but it must
  be admitted to be highly improbable,—a supposition which ought
  not to be advanced without some cogent proof to support it. But
  here no proof whatever is produced. Herodotus mentions a revolt
  of the Medes against Darius,—Xenophon also mentions a revolt of
  the Medes against Darius; hence, chronologists have taken it as
  a matter of course, that both authors must allude to the same
  event; though the supposition is unnatural as regards the text,
  and still more unnatural as regards the biography, of Herodotus.

  In respect to that biography, Mr. Clinton appears to me to have
  adopted another erroneous opinion; in which, however, both
  Larcher and Wesseling are against him, though Dahlmann and Heyse
  agree with him. He maintains that the passage in Herodotus
  (iii, 15), wherein it is stated that Pausiris succeeded his
  father Amyrtæus by consent of the Persians in the government of
  Egypt, is to be referred to a fact which happened subsequent to
  the year 414 B. C., or the tenth year of Darius Nothus; since
  it was in that year that Amyrtæus acquired the government of
  Egypt. But this opinion rests altogether upon the assumption
  that a certain Amyrtæus, whose name and date occur in Manetho
  (see Eusebius, Chronicon), is the same person as the Amyrtæus
  mentioned in Herodotus; which identity is not only not proved,
  but is extremely improbable, since Mr. Clinton himself admits
  (F. H. Appendix, p. 317), while maintaining the identity: “He
  (Amyrtæus) had conducted a war against the Persian government
  _more than fifty years before_.” This, though not impossible, is
  surely very improbable; it is at least equally probable that the
  Amyrtæus of Manetho was a different person from (perhaps even the
  _grandson_ of) that Amyrtæus in Herodotus, who had carried on war
  against the Persians more than fifty wars before; it appears to
  me, indeed, that this is the more reasonable hypothesis of the
  two.

  I have permitted myself to prolong this note to an unusual
  length, because the supposed mention of such recent events in the
  history of Herodotus, as those in the reign of Darius Nothus, has
  introduced very gratuitous assumptions as to the time and manner
  in which that history was composed. It cannot be shown that there
  is a single event of precise and ascertained date, alluded to in
  his history, later than the capture of the Lacedæmonian heralds
  in the year 430 B. C. (Herodot. vii, 137: see Larcher, Vie
  d’Hérodote, p. lxxxix); and this renders the composition of his
  history as an entire work much more smooth and intelligible.

  It may be worth while to add, that whoever reads attentively
  Herodotus, vi, 98,—and reflects at the same time that the
  destruction of the Athenian armament at Syracuse (the greatest
  of all Hellenic disasters, hardly inferior, for its time, to the
  Russian campaign of Napoleon, and especially impressive to one
  living at Thurii, as may be seen by the life of Lysias, Plutarch,
  Vit. x, Oratt. p. 835) happened during the reign of Darius Nothus
  in 413 B. C.,—will not readily admit the hypothesis of additions
  made to the history during the reign of the latter, or so late
  as 408 B. C. Herodotus would hardly have dwelt so expressly and
  emphatically upon mischief done by Greeks to each other in the
  reigns of Darius son of Hystaspês, Xerxês, and Artaxerxês, if he
  had lived to witness the greater mischiefs so inflicted during
  the reign of Darius Nothus, and had kept his history before him
  for the purpose of inserting new events. The destruction of the
  Athenians before Syracuse would have been a thousand times more
  striking to his imagination than the revolt of the Medes against
  Darius Nothus, and would have impelled him with much greater
  force to alter or enlarge the chapter vi, 98.

  The sentiment too which Herodotus places in the mouth of
  Demaratus respecting the Spartans (vii, 104) appears to have been
  written _before_ the capture of the Spartans in Sphakteria, in
  425 B. C., rather than _after_ it: compare Thucyd. iv, 40.

  Dahlmann (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, vol. ii,
  pp. 41-47) and Heyse (Quæstiones Herodoteæ, pp. 74-77, Berlin,
  1827) both profess to point out six passages in Herodotus
  which mark events of later date than 430 B. C. But none of
  the chronological indications which they adduce appear to me
  trustworthy.

It has already been observed that the subjugation of the recusant
Medes was not the only embarrassment of the first years of Darius.
Orœtês, satrap of Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia, ruling seemingly the
entire western coast of Asia Minor,—possessing a large military
force and revenue, and surrounded by a body-guard of one thousand
native Persians,—maintained a haughty independence. He secretly made
away with couriers sent to summon him to Susa, and even wreaked his
vengeance upon some of the principal Persians who had privately
offended him. Darius, not thinking it prudent to attack him by open
force, proposed to the chief Persians at Susa, the dangerous problem
of destroying him by stratagem. Thirty among them volunteered to
undertake it, and Bagæus, son of Artontês, to whom on drawing lots
the task devolved, accomplished it by a manœuvre which might serve
as a lesson to the Ottoman government, in its embarrassments with
contumacious Pashas. Having proceeded to Sardis, furnished with
many different royal ordinances, formally set forth and bearing
the seal of Darius,—he was presented to Orœtês in audience, with
the public secretary of the satrapy close at hand, and the Persian
guards standing around. He presented his ordinances to be read aloud
by the secretary, choosing first those which related to matters of
no great importance; but when he saw that the guards listened with
profound reverence, and that the king’s name and seal imposed upon
them irresistibly, he ventured upon the real purport of his perilous
mission. An ordinance was handed to the secretary, and read by him
aloud, as follows: “Persians, king Darius forbids you to serve any
longer as guards to Orœtês.” The obedient guards at once delivered
up their spears, when Bagæus caused the final warrant to be read to
them: “King Darius commands the Persians in Sardis to kill Orœtês.”
The guards drew their swords and killed him on the spot: his large
treasure was conveyed to Susa: Darius became undisputed master, and
probably Bagæus satrap.[413]

  [413] Herodot. iii, 127, 128.

Another devoted adherent, and another yet more memorable piece
of cunning, laid prostrate before Darius the mighty walls and
gates of the revolted Babylon. The inhabitants of that city had
employed themselves assiduously,—both during the lax provincial
superintendence of the false Smerdis, and during the period of
confusion and conflict which elapsed before Darius became firmly
established and obeyed,—in making every preparation both for
declaring and sustaining their independence. Having accumulated a
large store of provisions and other requisites for a long siege,
without previous detection, they at length proclaimed their
independence openly. And such was the intensity of their resolution
to maintain it, that they had recourse to a proceeding, which, if
correctly reported by Herodotus, forms one of the most frightful
enormities recorded in his history. To make their provisions last
out longer, they strangled all the women in the city, reserving
only their mothers, and one woman to each family for the purpose of
baking.[414] We cannot but suppose that this has been magnified from
a partial into an universal destruction. Yet taking it even with
such allowance, it illustrates that ferocious force of will,—and
that predominance of strong nationality, combined with antipathy to
foreigners, over all the gentler sympathies,—which seems to mark
the Semitic nations, and which may be traced so much in the Jewish
history of Josephus.

  [414] Herodot. iii, 150.

Darius, assembling all the forces in his power, laid siege to the
revolted city, but could make no impression upon it, either by force
or by stratagem. He tried to repeat the proceeding by which Cyrus
had taken it at first; but the besieged were found this time on
their guard. The siege had lasted twenty months without the smallest
progress, and the Babylonians derided the besiegers from the height
of their impregnable walls, when a distinguished Persian nobleman
Zopyrus,—son of Megabyzus, who had been one of the seven conspirators
against Smerdis,—presented himself one day before Darius in a state
of frightful mutilation: his nose and ears were cut off, and his body
misused in every way. He had designedly so maimed himself, “thinking
it intolerable that Assyrians should thus laugh the Persians to
scorn,”[415] in the intention which he presently intimated to Darius,
of passing into the town as a deserter, with a view of betraying
it,—for which purpose measures were concerted. The Babylonians,
seeing a Persian of the highest rank in so calamitous a condition,
readily believed his assurance, that he had been thus punished by
the king’s order, and that he came over to them as the only means of
procuring for himself single vengeance. They intrusted him with the
command of a detachment, with which he gained several advantages in
different sallies, according to previous concert with Darius, until
at length, the confidence of the Babylonians becoming unbounded,
they placed in his hands the care of the principal gates. At the
critical moment these gates were thrown open, and the Persians became
masters of the city.[416]

  [415] Herodot. iii, 155. δεινόν τι ποιεύμενος, Ἀσσυρίους Πέρσῃσι
  καταγελᾷν. Compare the speech of Mardonius, vii, 9.

  The horror of Darius, at the first sight of Zopyrus in this
  condition, is strongly dramatized by Herodotus.

  [416] Herodot. iii, 154-158.

Thus was the impregnable Babylon a second time reduced,[417] and
Darius took precautions on this occasion to put it out of condition
for resisting a third time. He caused the walls and gates to be
demolished, and three thousand of the principal citizens to be
crucified: the remaining inhabitants were left in the dismantled
city, fifty thousand women being levied by assessment upon the
neighboring provinces, to supply the place of the women strangled
when it first revolted.[418] Zopyrus was appointed satrap of the
territory for life, with enjoyment of its entire revenues, receiving
besides every additional reward which it was in the power of Darius
to bestow, and generous assurances from the latter that he would
rather have Zopyrus without wounds than the possession of Babylon.
I have already intimated in a former chapter that the demolition
of the walls here mentioned is not to be regarded as complete and
continuous, nor was there any necessity that it should be so. Partial
demolition would be quite sufficient to leave the city without
defence; and the description given by Herodotus of the state of
things as they stood at the time of his visit, proves that portions
of the walls yet subsisted. One circumstance is yet to be added in
reference to the subsequent condition of Babylon under the Persian
empire. The city with the territory belonging to it constituted a
satrapy, which not only paid a larger tribute (one thousand Euboic
talents of silver) and contributed a much larger amount of provisions
in kind for the maintenance of the Persian court, than any other
among the twenty satrapies of the empire, but furnished besides an
annual supply of five hundred eunuch youths.[419] We may presume that
this was intended in part as a punishment for the past revolt, since
the like obligation was not imposed upon any other satrapy.

  [417] Ktêsias represents the revolt and recapture of Babylon
  to have taken place, not under Darius, but under his son and
  successor Xerxês. He says that the Babylonians, revolting,
  slew their satrap Zopyrus; that they were besieged by Xerxês,
  and that Megabyzus son of Zopyrus caused the city to be taken
  by practising that very stratagem which Herodotus ascribes to
  Zopyrus himself (Persica, c. 20-22).

  This seems inconsistent with the fact, that Megabyzus was general
  of the Persian army in Egypt in the war with the Athenians,
  about 460 B. C. (Diodor. Sic. xi, 75-77): he would hardly have
  been sent on active service had he been so fearfully mutilated;
  moreover, the whole story of Ktêsias appears to me far less
  probable than that of Herodotus; for on this, as on other
  occasions, to blend the two together is impossible.

  [418] Herodot. iii, 159, 160. “From the women thus introduced
  (says Herodotus) the present Babylonians are sprung.”

  To crucify subdued revolters by thousands is, fortunately, so
  little in harmony with modern European manners, that it may
  not be amiss to strengthen the confidence of the reader in the
  accuracy of Herodotus, by producing an analogous narrative of
  incidents far more recent. Voltaire gives, from the MS. of
  General Lefort, one of the principal and confidential officers of
  Peter the Great, the following account of the suppression of the
  revolted Strelitzes at Moscow, in 1698: these Strelitzes were the
  old native militia, or Janissaries, of the Russian Czars, opposed
  to all the reforms of Peter.

  “Pour étouffer ces troubles, le czar part secrètement de
  Vienne, arrive enfin à Moscou, et surprend tout le monde par sa
  présence: il récompense les troupes qui ont vaincu les Strélitz:
  les prisons étaient pleines de ces malheureux. Si leur crime
  était grand, le châtiment le fut aussi. Leurs chefs, plusieurs
  officiers, et quelques prêtres, furent condamnés à la mort:
  quelques-uns furent roués, deux femmes enterrées vives. On pendit
  autour des murailles de la ville et on fit périr dans d’autres
  supplices deux mille Strélitz; leurs corps restèrent deux jours
  exposés sur les grands chemins, et surtout autour du monastère
  où résidaient les princesses Sophie et Eudoxe. On érigea des
  colonnes de pierre où le crime et le châtiment furent gravés.
  Un très-grand nombre qui avaient leurs femmes et leurs enfans
  furent dispersés avec leurs familles dans la Sibérie, dans le
  royaume d’Astrakhan, dans le pays d’Azof: par là du moins leur
  punition fut utile à l’état: ils servirent à défricher des terres
  qui manquaient d’habitans et de culture.” (Voltaire, Histoire
  de Russie, part i, ch. x, tom. 31, of the Œuvres Complètes de
  Voltaire, p. 148, ed. Paris, 1825.)

  [419] Herodot. iii, 92.

Thus firmly established on the throne, Darius occupied it for
thirty-six years, and his reign was one of organization, different
from that of his two predecessors; a difference which the Persians
well understood and noted, calling Cyrus the father, Kambysês the
master, and Darius the retail-trader, or huckster.[420] In the
mouth of the Persians this latter epithet must be construed as no
insignificant compliment, since it intimates that he was the first to
introduce some methodical order into the imperial administration and
finances. Under the two former kings there was no definite amount of
tribute levied upon the subject provinces: which furnished what were
called presents, subject to no fixed limit except such as might be
satisfactory to the satrap in each district. But Darius—succeeding
as he did to Smerdis, who had rendered himself popular with the
provinces by large financial exemptions, and having farther to
encounter jealousy and dissatisfaction from Persians, his former
equals in rank—probably felt it expedient to relieve the provinces
from the burden of undefined exactions. He distributed the whole
empire into twenty departments, imposing upon each a fixed annual
tax, and a fixed contribution for the maintenance of the court. This
must doubtless have been a great improvement, though the limitation
of the sum which the Great King at Susa would require, did not at all
prevent the satrap in his own province from indefinite requisitions
beyond it. The latter was a little king, who acted nearly as he
pleased in the internal administration of his province,—subject only
to the necessity of sending up the imperial tribute, of keeping off
foreign enemies, and of furnishing an adequate military contingent
for the foreign enterprises of the Great King. To every satrap was
attached a royal secretary, or comptroller, of the revenue,[421]
who probably managed the imperial finances in the province, and to
whom the court of Susa might perhaps look as a watch upon the satrap
himself. It is not to be supposed that the Persian authorities in
any province meddled with the details of taxation, or contribution,
as they bore upon individuals. The court having fixed the entire
sum payable by the satrapy in the aggregate, the satrap or the
secretary apportioned it among the various component districts,
towns, or provinces, leaving to the local authorities in each of
these latter the task of assessing it upon individual inhabitants.
From necessity, therefore, as well as from indolence of temper and
political incompetence, the Persians were compelled to respect
authorities which they found standing both in town and country,
and to leave in their hands a large measure of genuine influence;
frequently overruled, indeed, by oppressive interference on the part
of the satrap, whenever any of his passions prompted,—but never
entirely superseded. In the important towns and stations, Persian
garrisons were usually kept, and against the excesses of the military
there was probably little or no protection to the subject people.
Yet still, the provincial governments were allowed to continue, and
often even the petty kings who had governed separate districts during
their state of independence prior to the Persian conquest, retained
their title and dignity as tributaries to the court of Susa.[422]
The empire of the Great King was thus an aggregate of heterogeneous
elements, connected together by no tie except that of common fear and
subjection,—noway coherent nor self-supporting, nor pervaded by any
common system or spirit of nationality. It resembled, in its main
political features, the Turkish and Persian empires of the present
day,[423] though distinguished materially by the many differences
arising out of Mohammedanism and Christianity, and apparently not
reaching the same extreme of rapacity, corruption, and cruelty in
detail.

  [420] Herodot. iii, 89. What the Persian denomination was,
  which Herodotus or his informants translated κάπηλος, we do not
  know; but this latter word was used often by Greeks to signify
  a cheat, or deceiver generally: see Etymologic. Magn. p. 490,
  11, and Suidas, v. Κάπελος. Ὁ δ᾽ Αἴσχυλος τὰ δόλια πáντα καλεῖ
  κάπηλα—“Κάπηλα προσφέρων τεχνήματα.” (Æschylus, Fragment. 328,
  ed. Dindorf: compare Euripid. Hippolyt. 953.)

  [421] Herodot. iii, 128. This division of power, and double
  appointment by the Great King, appears to have been retained
  until the close of the Persian empire: see Quintus Curtius, v,
  l, 17-20 (v, 3, 19-21, Zumpt). The present Turkish government
  nominates a Defterdar as finance administrator in each province,
  with authority derived directly from itself, and professedly
  independent of the Pacha.

  [422] Herodot. iii, 15.

  [423] Respecting the administration of the modern Persian empire,
  see Kinneir, Geograph. Memoir of Persia, pp. 29, 43, 47.

Darius distributed the Persian empire into twenty satrapies, each
including a certain continuous territory, and one or more nations
inhabiting it, the names of which Herodotus sets forth. The amount
of tribute payable by each satrapy was determined: payable in gold,
according to the Euboic talent, by the Indians in the easternmost
satrapy,—in silver, according to the Babylonian, or larger talent,
by the remaining nineteen. Herodotus computes the ratio of gold to
silver as 13 : 1. From the nineteen satrapies which paid in silver,
there was levied annually the sum of seven thousand seven hundred
and forty Babylonian talents, equal to something about two million
nine hundred and sixty-four thousand pounds sterling: from the
Indians, who alone paid in gold, there was received a sum equal (at
the rate of 1 : 13) to four thousand six hundred and eighty Euboic
talents of silver, or to about one million two hundred and ninety
thousand pounds sterling.[424]

  [424] Herodot. iii, 95. The text of Herodotus contains an
  erroneous summing up of items, which critics have no means of
  correcting with certainty. Nor is it possible to trust the huge
  sum which he alleges to have been levied from the Indians, though
  all the other items, included in the nineteen silver-paying
  divisions, seem within the probable truth; and indeed both
  Rennell and Robertson think the total too small: the charges on
  some of the satrapies are decidedly smaller than the reality.

  The vast sum of fifty thousand talents is said to have been
  found by Alexander the Great, laid up by successive kings at
  Susa alone, besides the treasures at Persepolis, Pasargadæ,
  and elsewhere (Arrian, iii, 16, 12; Plutarch, Alexand. 37).
  Presuming these talents to be Babylonian or Æginæan talents (in
  the proportion 5 : 3 to Attic talents), fifty thousand talents
  would be equal to nineteen million pounds sterling; if they were
  Attic talents, it would be equal to eleven million six hundred
  thousand pounds sterling. The statements of Diodorus give even
  much larger sums (xvii, 66-71: compare Curtius, v, 2, 8; v, 6, 9;
  Strabo, xv, p. 730). It is plain that the numerical affirmations
  were different in different authors, and one cannot pretend to
  pronounce on the trustworthiness of such large figures without
  knowing more of the original returns on which they were founded.
  That there were prodigious sums of gold and silver, is quite
  unquestionable. Respecting the statement of the Persian revenue
  given by Herodotus, see Boeckh, Metrologie, ch. v, 1-2.

  Amedée Jaubert, in 1806, estimated the population of the modern
  Persian empire at about seven million souls; of which about
  six million were settled population, the rest nomadic: he also
  estimated the Schah’s revenue at about two million nine hundred
  thousand tomans, or one million five hundred thousand pounds
  sterling. Others calculated the population higher, at nearer
  twelve million souls. Kinneir gives the revenue at something more
  than three million pounds sterling: he thinks that the whole
  territory between the Euphratês and the Indus does not contain
  above eighteen millions of souls (Geogr. Memoir of Persia, pp.
  44-47: compare Ritter, West Asien, Abtheil. ii, Abschn. iv, pp.
  879-889).

  The modern Persian empire contains not so much as the eastern
  half of the ancient, which covered all Asiatic Turkey and Egypt
  besides.

To explain how it happened that this one satrapy was charged with
a sum equal to two-fifths of the aggregate charge on the other
nineteen, Herodotus dwells upon the vast population, the extensive
territory, and the abundant produce in gold, among those whom he
calls Indians,—the easternmost inhabitants of the earth, since
beyond them there was nothing but uninhabitable sand,—reaching, as
far as we can make it out, from Baktria southward along the Indus
to its mouth, but how far eastward we cannot determine. Darius is
said to have undertaken an expedition against them and subdued them:
moreover, he is affirmed to have constructed and despatched vessels
down the Indus, from the city of Kaspatyri and the territory of
the Paktyes, in its upper regions, all the way down to its mouth:
then into the Indian ocean, round the peninsula of Arabia, and up
the Red Sea to Egypt. The ships were commanded by Skylax,—a Greek
of Karyanda on the south-western coast of Asia Minor;[425] who, if
this statement be correct, executed a scheme of nautical enterprise
not only one hundred and seventy years earlier, but also far more
extensive, than the famous voyage of Nearchus, admiral of Alexander
the Great,—since the latter only went from the Indus to the Persian
gulf. The eastern portions of the Persian empire remained so unknown
and unvisited until the Macedonian invasion, that we are unable to
criticize these isolated statements of Herodotus. None of the Persian
kings subsequent to Darius appear to have visited them, and whether
the prodigious sum demandable from them according to the Persian
rent-roll was ever regularly levied, may reasonably be doubted. At
the same time, we may reasonably believe that the mountains in the
northern parts of Persian India—Cabul and Little Thibet—were at that
time extremely productive in gold, and that quantities of that metal,
such as now appear almost fabulous, may have been often obtained. It
appears that the produce of gold in all parts of the earth, as far
as hitherto known, is obtained exclusively near the surface; so that
a country once rich in that metal may well have been exhausted of its
whole supply, and left at a later period without any gold at all.

  [425] Herodot. iii, 102; iv, 44. See the two Excursus of Bähr
  on these two chapters, vol. ii, pp. 648-671 of his edit. of
  Herodotus.

  It certainly is singular that neither Nearchus, nor Ptolemy,
  nor Aristobulus, nor Arrian, take any notice of this remarkable
  voyage distinctly asserted by Herodotus to have been
  accomplished. Such silence, however, affords no sufficient reason
  for calling the narrative in question. The attention of the
  Persian kings, successors to Darius, came to be far more occupied
  with the western than with the eastern portions of their empire.

Of the nineteen silver-paying satrapies, the most heavily imposed was
Babylonia, which paid one thousand talents: the next in amount of
charge was Egypt, paying seven hundred talents, besides the produce
of the fish from the lake of Mœris. The remaining satrapies varied
in amount, down as low as one hundred and seventy talents, which
was the sum charged on the seventh satrapy (in the enumeration of
Herodotus), comprising the Sattagydæ, the Gandarii, the Dodikæ, and
the Aparytæ. The Ionians, Æolians, Magnesians on the Mæander, and on
Mount Sipylus, Karians, Lykians, Milyans, and Pamphylians,—including
the coast of Asia Minor, southward of Kanê, and from thence round
the southern promontory to Phasêlis,—were rated as one division,
paying four hundred talents. But we may be sure that much more than
this was really taken from the people, when we read that Magnesia
alone afterwards paid to Themistoklês a revenue of fifty talents
annually.[426] The Mysians and Lydians were included, with some
others, in another division, and the Hellespontine Greeks in a
third, with Phrygians, Bithynians, Paphlagonians, Mariandynians, and
Syrians, paying three hundred and sixty talents,—nearly the same as
was paid by Syria proper, Phenicia, and Judæa, with the island of
Cyprus. Independent of this regular tribute, and the undefined sums
extorted over and above it,[427] there were some dependent nations,
which, though exempt from tribute, furnished occasional sums called
presents; and farther contributions were exacted for the maintenance
of the vast suite who always personally attended the king. One entire
third of this last burden was borne by Babylonia alone in consequence
of its exuberant fertility.[428] It was paid in produce, as indeed
the peculiar productions of every part of the empire seem to have
been sent up for the regal consumption.

  [426] Thucyd. i, 138.

  [427] Herodot. iii, 117.

  [428] Herodot. i, 192. Compare the description of the dinner and
  supper of the Great King, in Polyænus, iv, 3, 32; also Ktêsias
  and Deinôn ap Athenæum, ii, p. 67.

However imperfectly we are now able to follow the geographical
distribution of the subject nations as given by Herodotus, it is
extremely valuable as the only professed statistics remaining, of
the entire Persian empire. The arrangement of satrapies, which he
describes, underwent modification in subsequent times; at least
it does not harmonize with various statements in the Anabasis of
Xenophon, and in other authors who recount Persian affairs belonging
to the fourth century B. C. But we find in no other author except
Herodotus any entire survey and distribution of the empire. It is,
indeed, a new tendency which now manifests itself in the Persian
Darius, compared with his predecessors: not simply to conquer, to
extort, and to give away,—but to do all this with something like
method and system,[429] and to define the obligations of the satraps
towards Susa. Another remarkable example of the same tendency is to
be found in the fact, that Darius was the first Persian king who
coined money: his coin, both in gold and silver, the Daric, was the
earliest produce of a Persian mint.[430] The revenue, as brought
to Susa in metallic money of various descriptions, was melted down
separately, and poured in a fluid state into jars or earthenware
vessels; when the metal had cooled and hardened, the jar was broken,
leaving a standing solid mass, from which portions were cut off as
the occasion required.[431] And in addition to these administrative,
financial, and monetary arrangements, of which Darius was the first
originator, we may probably ascribe to him the first introduction
of that system of roads, resting-places, and permanent relays of
couriers, which connected both Susa and Ekbatana with the distant
portions of the empire. Herodotus describes in considerable detail
the imperial road from Sardis to Susa, a journey of ninety days,
crossing the Halys, the Euphratês, the Tigris, the Greater and Lesser
Zab, the Gyndês, and the Choaspês. And we may see by this account
that in his time it was kept in excellent order, with convenience for
travellers.[432]

  [429] Plato, Legg. iii, 12, p. 695.

  [430] Herodot. iv, 166; Plutarch, Kimon, 10.

  The gold Daric, of the weight of two Attic drachmæ; (Stater
  Daricus), equivalent to twenty Attic silver drachmæ (Xenoph.
  Anab. i, 7, 18), would be about 16_s._ 3_d._ English. But it
  seems doubtful whether that ratio between gold and silver (10 :
  1) can be reckoned upon as the ordinary ratio in the fifth and
  fourth centuries B. C. Mr. Hussey calculates the golden Daric as
  equal to £1, 1_s._ 3_d._ English (Hussey, Essay on the Ancient
  Weights and Money, Oxford, 1836, ch. iv, s. 8, p. 68; ch. vii, s.
  3, p. 103).

  I cannot think, with Mr. Hussey, that there is any reason for
  believing either the name or the coin _Daric_ to be older than
  Darius son of Hystaspês. Compare Boeckh, Metrologie, ix, 5, p.
  129.

  Particular statements respecting the value of gold and silver,
  as exchanged one against the other, are to be received with some
  reserve as the basis of any general estimate, since we have not
  the means of comparing a great many such statements together.
  For the process of coinage was imperfectly performed, and the
  different pieces, both of gold and silver, in circulation,
  differed materially in weight one with the other. Herodotus gives
  the ratio of gold to silver as 13 : 1.

  [431] Herodot. iii, 96.

  [432] Herodot. v, 52-53; viii, 98. “It appears to be a favorite
  idea with all barbarous princes, that the badness of the roads
  adds considerably to the natural strength of their dominions. The
  Turks and Persians are undoubtedly of this opinion: the public
  highways are, therefore, neglected, and particularly so towards
  the frontiers.” (Kinneir, Geog. Mem. of Pers. p. 43.)

  The description of Herodotus contrasts favorably with the picture
  here given by Mr. Kinneir.

It was Darius also who first completed the conquest of the Ionic
Greeks by the acquisition of the important island of Samos. That
island had maintained its independence, at the time when the Persian
general Harpagus effected the conquest of Ionia. It did not yield
voluntarily when Chios and Lesbos submitted, and the Persians had
no fleet to attack it; nor had the Phenicians yet been taught to
round the Triopian cape. Indeed, the depression which overtook the
other cities of Ionia, tended rather to the aggrandizement of Samos,
under the energetic and unscrupulous despotism of Polykratês. That
ambitious Samian, about ten years after the conquest of Sardis
by Cyrus (seemingly between 536-532 B. C.), contrived to seize
by force or fraud the government of his native island, with the
aid of his brothers Pantagnôtus and Sylosôn, and a small band of
conspirators.[433] At first, the three brothers shared the supreme
power; but presently Polykratês put to death Pantagnôtus, banished
Sylosôn, and made himself despot alone. In this station, his
ambition, his perfidy, and his good fortune, were alike remarkable.
He conquered several of the neighboring islands, and even some towns
on the mainland; he carried on successful war against Milêtus; and
signally defeated the Lesbian ships which came to assist Milêtus; he
got together a force of one hundred armed ships called pentekonters,
and one thousand mercenary bowmen,—aspiring to nothing less than the
dominion of Ionia, with the islands in the Ægean. Alike terrible
to friend and foe by his indiscriminate spirit of aggression, he
acquired a naval power which seems at that time to have been the
greatest in the Grecian world.[434] He had been in intimate alliance
with Amasis, king of Egypt, who, however, ultimately broke with
him. Considering his behavior towards allies, such rupture is not
at all surprising; but Herodotus ascribes it to the alarm which
Amasis conceived at the uninterrupted and superhuman good fortune of
Polykratês,—a degree of good fortune sure to draw down ultimately
corresponding intensity of suffering from the hands of the envious
gods. Indeed, Herodotus,—deeply penetrated with this belief in an
ever-present nemesis, which allows no man to be very happy, or long
happy, with impunity,—throws it into the form of an epistolary
warning from Amasis to Polykratês, advising him to inflict upon
himself some seasonable mischief or suffering; in order, if possible,
to avert the ultimate judgment,—to let blood in time, so that the
plethora of happiness might not end in apoplexy.[435] Pursuant to
such counsel, Polykratês threw into the sea a favorite ring, of
matchless price and beauty; but unfortunately, in a few days, the
ring reappeared in the belly of a fine fish, which a fisherman had
sent to him as a present. Amasis now foresaw that the final apoplexy
was inevitable, and broke off the alliance with Polykratês without
delay,—a well-known story, interesting as evidence of ancient belief,
and not less to be noted as showing the power of that belief to beget
fictitious details out of real characters, such as I have already
touched upon in the history of Solon and Crœsus, and elsewhere.

  [433] Herodot. iii, 120.

  [434] Herodot. iii, 39; Thucyd. i, 13.

  [435] Herodot. iii, 40-42. ... ἤν δὲ μὴ ἐναλλὰξ ἤδη τὠπὸ τούτου
  αἱ εὐτυχίαι τοι τοιαύταισι πάθαισι προσπίπτωσι, τρόπῳ τῷ ἐξ ἐμεῦ
  ὑποκειμένῳ ~ἀκέο~: compare vii, 203, and i, 32.

The facts mentioned by Herodotus rather lead us to believe that it
was Polykratês, who, with characteristic faithlessness, broke off his
friendship with Amasis;[436] finding it suitable to his policy to
cultivate the alliance of Kambysês, when that prince was preparing
for his invasion of Egypt. In that invasion, the Ionic subjects of
Persia were called upon to serve, and Polykratês, deeming it a good
opportunity to rid himself of some Samian malcontents, sent to the
Persian king to tender auxiliaries from himself. Kambysês, having
eagerly caught at the prospect of aid from the first naval potentate
in the Ægean, forty Samian triremes were sent to the Nile, having on
board the suspected persons, as well as conveying a secret request to
the Persian king that they might never be suffered to return. Either
they never went to Egypt, however, or they found means to escape;
very contradictory stories had reached Herodotus. But they certainly
returned to Samos, attacked Polykratês at home, and were driven off
by his superior force without making any impression. Whereupon they
repaired to Sparta to entreat assistance.[437]

  [436] Herodot. iii, 44.

  [437] Herodot. iii, 44.

We may here notice the gradually increasing tendency in the Grecian
world to recognize Sparta as something like a head, protector, or
referee, in cases either of foreign danger or internal dispute. The
earliest authentic instance known to us, of application to Sparta
in this character, is that of Crœsus against Cyrus: next, that of
the Ionic Greeks against the latter: the instance of the Samians now
before us, is the third. The important events connected with, and
consequent upon, the expulsion of the Peisistratidæ from Athens,
manifesting yet more formally the headship of Sparta, occur fifteen
years after the present event; they have been already recounted in
a previous chapter, and serve as a farther proof of progress in the
same direction. To watch the growth of these new political habits, is
essential to a right understanding of Grecian history.

On reaching Sparta, the Samian exiles, borne down with despondency
and suffering, entered at large into the particulars of their case.
Their long speaking annoyed instead of moving the Spartans, who
said, or are made to say: “We have forgotten the first part of the
speech, and the last part is unintelligible to us.” Upon which the
Samians appeared the next day, simply with an empty wallet, saving:
“Our wallet has no meal in it.” “Your wallet is superfluous,” (said
the Spartans;) _i. e._ the words would have been sufficient without
it.[438] The aid which they implored was granted.

  [438] Herodot. iii, 46. τῷ θυλάκῳ περιείργασθαι.

We are told that both the Lacedæmonians and the Corinthians,—who
joined them in the expedition now contemplated,—had separate
grounds of quarrel with the Samians,[439] which operated as a
more powerful motive than the simple desire to aid the suffering
exiles. But it rather seems that the subsequent Greeks generally
construed the Lacedæmonian interference against Polykratês as an
example of standing Spartan hatred against despots. Indeed, the only
facts which we know, to sustain this anti-despotic sentiment for
which the Lacedæmonians had credit, are, their proceedings against
Polykratês and Hippias; there may have been other analogous cases,
but we cannot specify them with certainty. However this may be,
a joint Lacedæmonian and Corinthian force accompanied the exiles
back to Samos, and assailed Polykratês in the city. They did their
best to capture it, for forty days, and were at one time on the
point of succeeding, but were finally obliged to retire without any
success. “The city would have been taken,” says Herodotus, “if all
the Lacedæmonians had acted like Archias and Lykôpas,”—who, pressing
closely upon the retreating Samians, were shut within the town-gates,
and perished. The historian had heard this exploit in personal
conversation with Archias, grandson of the person above mentioned, in
the deme Pitana at Sparta,—whose father had been named Samius, and
who respected the Samians above any other Greeks, because they had
bestowed upon the two brave warriors, slain within their town, an
honorable and public funeral.[440] It is rarely that Herodotus thus
specifies his informants: had he done so more frequently the value
as well as the interest of his history would have been materially
increased.

  [439] Herodot. iii, 47, 48, 52.

  [440] Herodot. iii, 54-56.

On the retirement of the Lacedæmonian force, the Samian exiles were
left destitute; and looking out for some community to plunder,
weak as well as rich, they pitched upon the island of Siphnos. The
Siphnians of that day were the wealthiest islanders in the Ægean,
from the productiveness of their gold and silver mines,—the produce
of which was annually distributed among the citizens, reserving a
tithe for the Delphian temple.[441] Their treasure-chamber was among
the most richly furnished of which that holy place could boast, and
they themselves, probably, in these times of early prosperity, were
numbered among the most brilliant of the Ionic visitors at the Delian
festival. The Samians landing at Siphnos, demanded a contribution,
under the name of a loan, of ten talents: which being refused, they
proceeded to ravage the island, inflicting upon the inhabitants
a severe defeat, and ultimately extorting from them one hundred
talents. They next purchased from the inhabitants of Hermionê, in
the Argolic peninsula, the neighboring island of Hydrea, famous in
modern Greek warfare. But it appears that their plans must have been
subsequently changed, for, instead of occupying it, they placed it
under the care of the Trœzenians, and repaired themselves to Krete,
for the purpose of expelling the Zakynthian settlers at Kydônia. In
this they succeeded, and were induced to establish themselves in that
place. But after they had remained there five years, the Kretans
obtained naval aid from Ægina, whereby the place was recovered, and
the Samian intruders finally sold into slavery.[442]

  [441] Herodot. iii, 57. νησιωτέων μάλιστα ἐπλούτεον.

  [442] Herodot. iii, 58, 59.

Such was the melancholy end of the enemies of Polykratês: meanwhile,
that despot himself was more powerful and prosperous than ever.
Samos, under him, was “the first of all cities, Hellenic or
barbaric:[443]” and the great works admired by Herodotus in the
island,[444]—an aqueduct for the city, tunnelled through a mountain
for the length of seven furlongs,—a mole to protect the harbor, two
furlongs long and twenty fathoms deep, and the vast temple of Hêrê,
may probably have been enlarged and completed, if not begun, by
him. Aristotle quotes the public works of Polykratês as instances of
the profound policy of despots, to occupy as well as to impoverish
their subjects.[445] The earliest of all Grecian thalassokrats,
or sea-kings,—master of the greatest naval force in the Ægean, as
well as of many among its islands,—he displayed his love of letters
by friendship to Anakreon, and his piety by consecrating to the
Delian Apollo[446] the neighboring island of Rhêneia. But while
thus outshining all his contemporaries, victorious over Sparta and
Corinth, and projecting farther aggrandizement, he was precipitated
on a sudden into the abyss of ruin;[447] and that too, as if to
demonstrate unequivocally the agency of the envious gods, not from
the revenge of any of his numerous victims, but from the gratuitous
malice of a stranger whom he had never wronged and never even seen.
The Persian satrap Orœtês, on the neighboring mainland, conceived
an implacable hatred against him: no one could tell why,—for he
had no design of attacking the island; and the trifling reasons
conjecturally assigned, only prove that the real reason, whatever it
might be, was unknown. Availing himself of the notorious ambition
and cupidity of Polykratês, Orœtês sent to Samos a messenger,
pretending that his life was menaced by Kambysês, and that he was
anxious to make his escape with his abundant treasures. He proposed
to Polykratês a share in this treasure, sufficient to make him master
of all Greece, as far as that object could be achieved by money,
provided the Samian prince would come over to convey him away.
Mæandrius, secretary of Polykratês, was sent over to Magnêsia on
the Mæander, to make inquiries; he there saw the satrap with eight
large coffers full of gold,—or rather apparently so, being in reality
full of stones, with a layer of gold at the top,[448]—tied up ready
for departure. The cupidity of Polykratês was not proof against so
rich a bait: he crossed over to Magnêsia with a considerable suite,
and thus came into the power of Orœtês, in spite of the warnings of
his prophets and the agony of his terrified daughter, to whom his
approaching fate had been revealed in a dream. The satrap slew him
and crucified his body; releasing all the Samians who accompanied
him, with an intimation that they ought to thank him for procuring
them a free government,—but retaining both the foreigners and the
slaves as prisoners.[449] The death of Orœtês himself, which ensued
shortly afterwards, has already been described. It is considered
by Herodotus as a judgment for his flagitious deed in the case of
Polykratês.[450]

  [443] Herodot. iii, 139. πολίων πασέων πρώτην Ἑλληνίδων καὶ
  βαρβάρων.

  [444] Herodot. iii, 60.

  [445] Aristot. Polit. v, 9, 4. τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργα Πολυκράτεια·
  πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα δύναται ταὐτὸν, ἀσχολίαν καὶ πενίαν τῶν ἀρχομένων.

  [446] Thucyd. i, 14; iii, 104.

  [447] Herodot. iii, 120.

  [448] Compare the trick of Hannibal at Gortyn in Krete,—Cornelius
  Nepos (Hannibal, c. 9).

  [449] Herodot. iii, 124, 125.

  [450] Herodot. iii, 126. Ὀροίτεα Πολυκράτεος τίσιες μετῆλθον.

At the departure of the latter from Samos, in anticipation of a
speedy return, Mæandrius had been left as his lieutenant at Samos;
and the unexpected catastrophe of Polykratês filled him with surprise
and consternation. Though possessed of the fortresses, the soldiers,
and the treasures, which had constituted the machinery of his
powerful master, he knew the risk of trying to employ them on his
own account. Partly from this apprehension, partly from the genuine
political morality which prevailed with more or less force in every
Grecian bosom, he resolved to lay down his authority and enfranchise
the island. “He wished (says the historian, in a remarkable
phrase)[451] to act like the justest of men; but he was not allowed
to do so.” His first proceeding was to erect in the suburbs an altar
in honor of Zeus Eleutherius, and to inclose a piece of ground as
a precinct, which still existed in the time of Herodotus: he next
convened an assembly of the Samians. “You know (says he) that the
whole power of Polykratês is now in my hands, nor is there anything
to hinder me from continuing to rule over you. Nevertheless, what
I condemn in another I will not do myself,—and I have always
disapproved of Polykratês, and others like him, for seeking to rule
over men as good as themselves. Now that Polykratês has come to the
end of his destiny, I at once lay down the command, and proclaim
among you equal law; reserving to myself as privileges, first, six
talents out of the treasures of Polykratês,—next, the hereditary
priesthood of Zeus Eleutherius for myself and my descendants forever.
To him I have just set apart a sacred precinct, as the God of that
freedom which I now hand over to you.”

  [451] Herodot. iii, 142. τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ ἀνδρῶν βουλομένῳ γενέσθαι,
  οὐκ ἐξεγένετο. Compare his remark on Kadmus, who voluntarily
  resigned the despotism at Kôs (vii, 164).

This reasonable and generous proposition fully justifies the epithet
of Herodotus. But very differently was it received by the Samian
hearers. One of the chief men among them, Telesarchus, exclaimed,
with the applause of the rest, “_You_ rule us, low-born and scoundrel
as you are! you are not worthy to rule: don’t think of that, but give
us some account of the money which you have been handling.”[452]

  [452] Herodot. iii, 142. Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἄξιος εἶ σύ γε ἡμέων ἄρχειν,
  γεγονώς τε κακὸς, καὶ ἐὼν ὄλεθρος· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅκως λόγον δώσεις
  τῶν ἐνεχείρισας χρημάτων.

Such an unexpected reply caused a total revolution in the mind
of Mæandrius. It left him no choice but to maintain dominion at
all hazards,—which he accordingly resolved to do. Retiring into
the acropolis, under pretence of preparing his money-accounts for
examination, he sent for Telesarchus and his chief political enemies,
one by one,—intimating that they were open to inspection. As fast as
they arrived they were put in chains, while Mæandrius remained in
the acropolis, with his soldiers and his treasures, as the avowed
successor of Polykratês. And thus the Samians, after a short hour
of insane boastfulness, found themselves again enslaved. “It seemed
(says Herodotus) that they were not willing to be free.”[453]

  [453] Herodot. iii, 143. οὐ γὰρ δὴ, ὡς οἴκασι, ἐβουλέατο εἶναι
  ἐλεύθεροι.

We cannot but contrast their conduct on this occasion with that
of the Athenians about twelve years afterwards, on the expulsion
of Hippias, which has been recounted in a previous chapter. The
position of the Samians was far the more favorable of the two, for
the quiet and successful working of a free government; for they had
the advantage of a voluntary as well as a sincere resignation from
the actual despot. Yet the thirst for reactionary investigation
prevented them even from taking a reasonable estimate of their own
power of enforcing it: they passed at once from extreme subjection
to overbearing and ruinous rashness. Whereas the Athenians, under
circumstances far less promising, avoided the fatal mistake of
sacrificing the prospects of the future to recollections of the
past; showed themselves both anxious to acquire the rights, and
willing to perform the obligations, of a free community; listened
to wise counsels, maintained unanimous action, and overcame, by
heroic efforts, forces very greatly superior. If we compare the
reflections of Herodotus on the one case and on the other,[454] we
shall be struck with the difference which those reflections imply
between the Athenians and the Samians,—a difference partly referable,
doubtless, to the pure Hellenism of the former, contrasted with the
half-Asiatized Hellenism of the latter,—but also traceable in a great
degree to the preliminary lessons of the Solonian constitution,
overlaid, but not extinguished, during the despotism of the
Peisistratids which followed.

  [454] Herodot. v, 78, and iii, 142, 143.

The events which succeeded in Samos are little better than a series
of crimes and calamities. The prisoners, whom Mæandrius had detained
in the acropolis, were slain during his dangerous illness, by his
brother Lykarêtus, under the idea that this would enable him more
easily to seize the sceptre. But Mæandrius recovered, and must have
continued as despot for a year or two: it was, however, a weak
despotism, contested more or less in the island, and very different
from the iron hand of Polykratês. In this untoward condition, the
Samians were surprised by the arrival of a new claimant for their
sceptre and acropolis,—and, what was much more formidable, a Persian
army to back him.

Sylosôn, the brother of Polykratês, having taken part originally in
his brother’s conspiracy and usurpation, had been at first allowed
to share the fruits of it, but quickly found himself banished. In
this exile he remained during the whole life of Polykratês, and
until the accession of Darius to the Persian throne, which followed
about a year after the death of Polykratês. He happened to be at
Memphis, in Egypt, during the time when Kambysês was there with his
conquering army, and when Darius, then a Persian of little note,
was serving among his guards. Sylosôn was walking in the agora of
Memphis, wearing a scarlet cloak, to which Darius took a great
fancy, and proposed to buy it. A divine inspiration prompted Sylosôn
to reply,[455] “I cannot for any price sell it; but I give it you
for nothing, if it must be yours.” Darius thanked him, and accepted
the cloak; and for some years the donor accused himself of a silly
piece of good-nature.[456] But as events came round, Sylosôn at
length heard with surprise that the unknown Persian, whom he had
presented with the cloak at Memphis, was installed as king in the
palace at Susa. He went thither, proclaimed himself as a Greek, as
well as benefactor of the new king, and was admitted to the regal
presence. Darius had forgotten his person, but perfectly remembered
the adventure of the cloak, when it was brought to his mind,—and
showed himself forward to requite, on the scale becoming the Great
King, former favors, though small, rendered to the simple soldier
at Memphis. Gold and silver were tendered to Sylosôn in profusion,
but he rejected them,—requesting that the island of Samos might be
conquered and handed over to him, without slaughter or enslavement of
inhabitants. His request was complied with. Otanês, the originator
of the conspiracy against Smerdis, was sent down to the coast of
Ionia with an army, carried Sylosôn over to Samos, and landed him
unexpectedly on the island.[457]

  [455] Herodot. iii, 139. Ὁ δὲ Συλοσῶν, ὁρέων τὸν Δαρεῖον μεγάλως
  ἐπιθυμέοντα τῆς χλάνιδος, θείῃ τύχῃ χρεώμενος, λέγει, etc.

  [456] Herodot. iii, 140. ἠπίστατό οἱ τοῦτο ἀπολωλέναι δι᾽ εὐηθίην.

  [457] Herodot. iii, 141-144.

Mæandrius was in no condition to resist the invasion, nor were the
Samians generally disposed to sustain him. He accordingly concluded a
convention with Otanês, whereby he agreed to make way for Sylosôn, to
evacuate the island, and to admit the Persians at once into the city;
retaining possession, however—for such time as might be necessary
to embark his property and treasures—of the acropolis, which had a
separate landing-place, and even a subterranean passage and secret
portal for embarkation,—probably one of the precautionary provisions
of Polykratês. Otanês willingly granted these conditions, and
himself with his principal officers entered the town, the army being
quartered around; while Sylosôn seemed on the point of ascending the
seat of his deceased brother without violence or bloodshed. But the
Samians were destined to a fate more calamitous. Mæandrius had a
brother named Charilaus, violent in his temper, and half a madman,
whom he was obliged to keep in confinement. This man looking out
of his chamber-window, saw the Persian officers seated peaceably
throughout the town and even under the gates of the acropolis,
unguarded, and relying upon the convention: it seems that these were
the chief officers, whose rank gave them the privilege of being
carried about on their seats.[458] The sight inflamed both his wrath
and his insane ambition; he clamored for liberty and admission to his
brother, whom he reviled as a coward no less than a tyrant. “Here
are you, worthless man, keeping me, your own brother, in a dungeon,
though I have done no wrong worthy of bonds; while you do not dare
to take your revenge on the Persians, who are casting you out as a
houseless exile, and whom it would be so easy to put down. If you are
afraid of them, give me your guards; I will make the Persians repent
of their coming here, and I will send you safely out of the island
forthwith.”[459]

  [458] Herodot. iii, 146. τῶν Περσέων τοὺς διφροφορευμένους καὶ
  λόγου πλείστου ἀξίους.

  [459] Herodot. iii, 145. Ἐμὲ μὲν, ὦ κάκιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐόντα σεωϋτοῦ
  ἀδελφεὸν, καὶ ἀδικήσαντα οὐδὲν ἄξιον δεσμοῦ, δήσας γοργύρης
  ἠξίωσας· ὁρέων δὲ τοὺς Πέρσας ἐκβάλλοντάς τέ σε καὶ ἄνοικον
  ποιεῦντας, οὐ τολμᾷς τίσασθαι, οὕτω δή τι ἐόντας εὐπετέας
  χειρωθῆναι.

  The highly dramatic manner of Herodotus cannot be melted down
  into smooth historical recital.

Mæandrius, on the point of quitting Samos forever, had little
personal motive to care what became of the population. He had
probably never forgiven them for disappointing his honorable
intentions after the death of Polykratês, nor was he displeased to
hand over to Sylosôn an odious and blood-stained sceptre, which he
foresaw would be the only consequence of his brother’s mad project.
He therefore sailed away with his treasures, leaving the acropolis
to his brother Charilaus; who immediately armed the guards, sallied
forth from his fortress, and attacked the unsuspecting Persians.
Many of the great officers were slain without resistance before
the army could be got together; but at length Otanês collected his
troops and drove the assailants back into the acropolis. While he
immediately began the siege of that fortress, he also resolved, as
Mæandrius had foreseen, to take a signal revenge for the treacherous
slaughter of so many of his friends and companions. His army, no
less incensed than himself, were directed to fall upon the Samian
people and massacre them without discrimination,—man and boy, on
ground sacred as well as profane. The bloody order was too faithfully
executed, and Samos was handed over to Sylosôn, stripped of its male
inhabitants.[460] Of Charilaus and the acropolis we hear no farther,
perhaps he and his guards may have escaped by sea. Lykarêtus,[461]
the other brother of Mæandrius, must have remained either in the
service of Sylosôn or in that of the Persians; for we find him some
years afterwards intrusted by the latter with an important command.

  [460] Herodot. iii, 149. ἔρημον ἐοῦσαν ἀνδρῶν.

  [461] Herodot. v, 27.

Sylosôn was thus finally installed as despot of an island peopled
chiefly, if not wholly, with women and children: we may, however,
presume, that the deed of blood has been described by the historian
as more sweeping than it really was. It seems, nevertheless, to have
sat heavily on the conscience of Otanês, who was induced sometime
afterwards, by a dream and by a painful disease, to take measures
for repeopling the island.[462] From whence the new population came,
we are not told: but wholesale translations of inhabitants from one
place to another were familiar to the mind of a Persian king or
satrap.

  [462] Herodot. iii, 148.

Mæandrius, following the example of the previous Samian exiles
under Polykratês, went to Sparta and sought aid for the purpose
of reëstablishing himself at Samos. But the Lacedæmonians had no
disposition to repeat an attempt which had before turned out so
unsuccessfully, nor could he seduce king Kleomenês by the display of
his treasures and finely-wrought gold plate. The king, however, not
without fear that such seductions might win over some of the Spartan
leading men, prevailed with the ephors to send Mæandrius away.[463]

  [463] Herodot. iii, 149.

Sylosôn seems to have remained undisturbed at Samos, as a tributary
of Persia, like the Ionic cities on the continent: some years
afterwards we find his son Æakês reigning in the island.[464]
Strabo states that it was the harsh rule of Sylosôn which caused
the depopulation of the island. But the cause just recounted out
of Herodotus is both very different and sufficiently plausible in
itself; and as Strabo seems in the main to have derived his account
from Herodotus, we may suppose that on this point he has incorrectly
remembered his authority.[465]

  [464] Herodot. vi, 13.

  [465] Strabo, xiv, p. 638. He gives a proverbial phrase about the
  depopulation of the island—

    Ἕκητι Συλοσῶντος εὐρυχορίη,

  which is perfectly consistent with the narrative of Herodotus.




CHAPTER XXXIV.

DEMOKEDES. — DARIUS INVADES SCYTHIA.


Darius had now acquired full authority throughout the Persian empire,
having put down the refractory satrap Orœtês, as well as the revolted
Medes and Babylonians. He had, moreover, completed the conquest of
Ionia, by the important addition of Samos; and his dominion thus
comprised all Asia Minor, with its neighboring islands. But this
was not sufficient for the ambition of a Persian king, next but one
in succession to the great Cyrus. The conquering impulse was yet
unabated among the Persians, who thought it incumbent upon their
king, and whose king thought it incumbent upon himself, to extend the
limits of the empire. Though not of the lineage of Cyrus, Darius had
taken pains to connect himself with it by marriage; he had married
Atossa and Artystonê, daughters of Cyrus,—and Parmys, daughter of
Smerdis, the younger son of Cyrus. Atossa had been first the wife of
her brother Kambysês; next, of the Magian Smerdis, his successor;
and thirdly of Darius, to whom she bore four children.[466] Of those
children the eldest was Xerxês, respecting whom more will be said
hereafter.

  [466] Herodot. iii, 88; vii, 2.

Atossa, mother of the only Persian king who ever set foot in Greece,
the Sultana Validi of Persia during the reign of Xerxês, was a person
of commanding influence in the reign of her last husband,[467] as
well as in that of her son, and filled no inconsiderable space even
in Grecian imagination, as we may see both by Æschylus and Herodotus.
Had her influence prevailed, the first conquering appetites of Darius
would have been directed, not against the steppes of Scythia, but
against Attica and Peloponnesus; at least, so Herodotus assures us.
The grand object of the latter in his history is to set forth the
contentions of Hellas with the barbarians or non-Hellenic world;
and with an art truly epical, which manifests itself everywhere
to the careful reader of his nine books, he preludes to the real
dangers which were averted at Marathon and Platæa, by recounting the
first conception of an invasion of Greece by the Persians,—how it
originated, and how it was abandoned. For this purpose,—according
to his historical style, wherein general facts are set forth as
subordinate and explanatory accompaniments to the adventures of
particular persons,—he give us the interesting, but romantic, history
of the Krotoniate surgeon Dêmokêdês.

  [467] Herodot. vii, 3. ἡ γὰρ Ἄτοσσα εἶχε τὸ πᾶν κράτος. Compare
  the description given of the ascendency of the savage Sultana
  Parysatis over her son Artaxerxês Mnêmon (Plutarch, Artaxerxês,
  c. 16, 19, 23).

Dêmokêdês, son of a citizen of Krotôn named Kalliphôn, had turned
his attention in early youth to the study and practice of medicine
and surgery (for that age, we can make no difference between the
two), and had made considerable progress in it. His youth coincides
nearly with the arrival of Pythagoras at Krotôn, (550-520,) where the
science of the surgeon, as well as the art of the gymnastic trainer,
seem to have been then prosecuted more actively than in any part
of Greece. His father Kalliphôn, however, was a man of such severe
temper, that the son ran away from him, and resolved to maintain
himself by his talents elsewhere. He went to Ægina, and began to
practice in his profession; and so rapid was his success, even in his
first year,—though very imperfectly equipped with instruments and
apparatus,[468]—that the citizens of the island made a contract with
him to remain there for one year, at a salary of one talent (about
three hundred and eighty-three pounds sterling, an Æginæan talent).
The year afterwards he was invited to come to Athens, then under the
Peisistratids, at a salary of one hundred minæ, or one and two-thirds
of a talent; and in the following year, Polykratês of Samos tempted
him by the offer of two talents. With that despot he remained, and
accompanied him in his last calamitous visit to the satrap Orœtês: on
the murder of Polykratês, being seized among the slaves and foreign
attendants, he was left to languish with the rest in imprisonment and
neglect. When again, soon after, Orœtês himself was slain, Dêmokêdês
was numbered among his slaves and chattels and sent up to Susa.

  [468] Herodot. iii, 131. ἀσκευής περ ἐὼν, καὶ ἔχων οὐδὲν τῶν
  ὅσα περὶ τὴν τέχνην ἔστιν ἐργαλήϊα,—the description refers to
  surgical rather than to medical practice.

  That curious assemblage of the cases of particular patients
  with remarks, known in the works of Hippokratês, under the
  title Ἐπιδήμιαι (Notes of visits to different cities), is very
  illustrative of what Herodotus here mentions about Dêmokêdês.
  Consult, also, the valuable Prolegomena of M. Littré, in his
  edition of Hippokratês now in course of publication, as to
  the character, means of action, and itinerant habits of the
  Grecian ἰατροί: see particularly the preface to vol. v, p. 12,
  where he enumerates the various places visited and noted by
  Hippokratês. The greater number of the Hippokratic observations
  refer to various parts of Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly; but
  there are some, also, which refer to patients in the islands of
  Syros and Delos, at Athens, Salamis, Elis, Corinth, and Œniadæ
  in Akarnania. “On voit par là combien étoit juste le nom de
  Periodeutes ou voyageurs donnés à ces anciens médecins.”

  Again, M. Littré, in the same preface, p. 25, illustrates
  the proceedings and residence of the ancient ἰατρός: “On se
  tromperoit si on se représentoit la demeure d’un médecin d’alors
  comme celle d’un médecin d’aujourd’hui. La maison du médecin
  de l’antiquité, du moins au temps d’Hippocrate et aux époques
  voisines, renfermoit un local destiné à la pratique d’un grand
  nombre d’opérations, contenant les machines et les instrumens
  nécessaires, et de plus étant aussi une boutique de pharmacie.
  Ce local se nommait ἰατρεῖον.” See Plato, Legg. i, p. 646, iv,
  p. 720. Timæus accused Aristotle of having begun as a surgeon,
  practising to great profit in surgery, or ἰατρεῖον, and having
  quitted this occupation late in life, to devote himself to the
  study of science,—σοφιστὴν ὀψιμαθῆ καὶ μισητὸν ὑπάρχοντα, καὶ τὸ
  πολυτίμητον ἰατρεῖον ἀρτίως ἀποκεκλεικότα (Polyb. xii, 9).

  See, also, the Remarques Retrospectives attached by M. Littré
  to volume iv, of the same work (pp. 654-658), where he dwells
  upon the intimate union of surgical and medical practice in
  antiquity. At the same time, it must be remarked that a passage
  in the remarkable medical oath, published in the collection of
  Hippokratic treatises, recognizes in the plainest manner the
  distinction between the physician and the operator,—the former
  binds himself by this oath not to perform the operation “even
  of lithotomy, but to leave it to the operators, or workmen:”
  Οὐ τεμέω δὲ οὐδὲ μὴν λιθιῶντας, ἐκχωρήσω δὲ ἐργάστῃσιν ἀνδράσι
  πρήξιος τῆσδε (Œuvres d’Hippocrate, vol. iv, p. 630, ed. Littré).
  M. Littré (p. 617) contests this explanation, remarking that the
  various Hippokratic treatises represent the ἰατρός as performing
  all sorts of operations, even such as require violent and
  mechanical dealing. But the words of the oath are so explicit,
  that it seems more reasonable to assign to the oath itself a
  later date than the treatises, when the habits of practitioners
  may have changed.

He had not been long at that capital, when Darius, leaping from his
horse in the chase, sprained his foot badly, and was carried home
in violent pain. The Egyptian surgeons, supposed to be the first
men in their profession,[469] whom he habitually employed, did
him no good, but only aggravated his torture; for seven days and
nights he had no sleep, and he as well as those around him began to
despair. At length, some one who had been at Sardis, accidentally
recollected that he had heard of a Greek surgeon among the slaves
of Orœtês: search was immediately made, and the miserable slave
was brought, in chains as well as in rags,[470] into the presence
of the royal sufferer. Being asked whether he understood surgery,
he affected ignorance; but Darius, suspecting this to be a mere
artifice, ordered out the scourge and the pricking instrument, to
overcome it. Dêmokêdês now saw that there was no resource, admitted
that he had acquired some little skill, and was called upon to do his
utmost in the case before him. He was fortunate enough to succeed
perfectly, in alleviating the pain, in procuring sleep for the
exhausted patient, and ultimately in restoring the foot to a sound
state. Darius, who had abandoned all hopes of such a cure, knew no
bounds to his gratitude. As a first reward, he presented him with
two sets of chains in solid gold,—a commemoration of the state in
which Dêmokêdês had first come before him,—he next sent him into the
harem to visit his wives. The conducting eunuchs introduced him as
the man who had restored the king to life, and the grateful sultanas
each gave to him a saucer full of golden coins called staters;[471]
in all so numerous, that the slave Skitôn, who followed him, was
enriched by merely picking up the pieces which dropped on the floor.
Nor was this all. Darius gave him a splendid house and furniture,
made him the companion of his table, and showed him every description
of favor. He was about to crucify the Egyptian surgeons who had been
so unsuccessful in their attempts to cure him; but Dêmokêdês had
the happiness of preserving their lives, as well as of rescuing an
unfortunate companion of his imprisonment,—an Eleian prophet, who had
followed the fortunes of Polykratês.

  [469] About the Persian habit of sending to Egypt for surgeons,
  compare Herodot. iii, 1.

  [470] Herodot iii, 129. τὸν δὲ ὡς ἐξεῦρον ἐν τοῖσι Ὀροίτεω
  ἀνδραπόδοισι ὅκου δὴ ἀπημελημένον, παρῆγον ἐς μέσον, πέδας τε
  ἕλκοντα καὶ ῥάκεσιν ἐσθημένον.

  [471] Herodot. iii, 130. The golden stater was equal to about
  1_l._ 1_s._ 3_d._ English money (Hussey, Ancient Weights, vii, 3,
  p. 103).

  The ladies in a Persian harem appear to have been less
  unapproachable and invisible than those in modern Turkey; in
  spite of the observation of Plutarch, Artaxerxês, c. 27.

But there was one favor which Darius would on no account grant; yet
upon this one Dêmokêdês had set his heart,—the liberty of returning
to Greece. At length accident, combined with his own surgical skill,
enabled him to escape from the splendor of his second detention, as
it had before extricated him from the misery of the first. A tumor
formed upon the breast of Atossa; at first, she said nothing to any
one, but as it became too bad for concealment, she was forced to
consult Dêmokêdês. He promised to cure her, but required from her
a solemn oath that she would afterwards do for him anything which
he should ask,—pledging himself at the same time to ask nothing
indecent.[472] The cure was successful, and Atossa was required to
repay it by procuring his liberty. He knew that the favor would
be refused, even to her, if directly solicited, but he taught her
a stratagem for obtaining under false pretences the consent of
Darius. She took an early opportunity, Herodotus tells us,[473] in
bed, of reminding Darius that the Persians expected from him some
positive addition to the power and splendor of the empire; and when
Darius, in answer, acquainted her that he contemplated a speedy
expedition against the Scythians, she entreated him to postpone it,
and to turn his forces first against Greece: “I have heard (she
said) about the maidens of Sparta, Athens, Argos, and Corinth, and
I want to have some of them as slaves to serve me—(we may conceive
the smile of triumph with which the sons of those who had conquered
at Platæa and Salamis would hear this part of the history read by
Herodotus);—you have near you the best person possible to give
information about Greece,—that Greek who cured your foot.” Darius
was induced by this request to send some confidential Persians into
Greece to procure information, along with Dêmokêdês. Selecting
fifteen of them, he ordered them to survey the coasts and cities
of Greece, under guidance of Dêmokêdês, but with peremptory orders
upon no account to let him escape or to return without him. He next
sent for Dêmokêdês himself, explained to him what he wanted, and
enjoined him imperatively to return as soon as the business had been
completed; he farther desired him to carry away with him all the
ample donations which he had already received, as presents to his
father and brothers, promising that on his return fresh donations
of equal value should make up the loss: lastly, he directed that a
storeship, “filled with all manner of good things,” should accompany
the voyage. Dêmokêdês undertook the mission with every appearance of
sincerity. The better to play his part, he declined to take away what
he already possessed at Susa,—saying, that he should like to find his
property and furniture again on coming back, and that the storeship
alone, with its contents, would be sufficient both for the voyage and
for all necessary presents.

  [472] Herodot. iii, 133. δεήσεσθαι δὲ οὐδενὸς τῶν ὅσα αἰσχύνην
  ἐστὶ φέροντα. Another Greek physician at the court of Susa, about
  seventy years afterwards,—Apollonidês of Kôs,—in attendance on a
  Persian princess, did not impose upon himself the same restraint:
  his intrigue was divulged, and he was put to death miserably
  (Ktêsias, Persica, c. 42).

  [473] Herodot. iii, 134.

Accordingly, he and the fifteen Persian envoys went down to Sidon
in Phenicia, where two armed triremes were equipped, with a large
storeship in company; and the voyage of survey into Greece was
commenced. They visited and examined all the principal places in
Greece,—probably beginning with the Asiatic and insular Greeks,
crossing to Eubœa, circumnavigating Attica and Peloponnesus, then
passing to Korkyra and Italy. They surveyed the coasts and cities,
taking memoranda[474] of everything worthy of note which they saw:
this Periplûs, if it had been preserved, would have been inestimable,
as an account of the actual state of the Grecian world about 518
B. C. As soon as they arrived at Tarentum, Dêmokêdês—now within
a short distance of his own home, Krotôn—found an opportunity of
executing what he had meditated from the beginning. At his request
Aristophilidês, the king of Tarentum, seized the fifteen Persians,
and detained them as spies, at the same time taking the rudders
from off their ships,—while Dêmokêdês himself made his escape to
Krotôn. As soon as he had arrived there, Aristophilidês released the
Persians, and suffered them to pursue their voyage: they went on to
Krotôn, found Dêmokêdês in the market-place, and laid hands upon him.
But his fellow-citizens released him, not without opposition from
some who were afraid of provoking the Great King, and in spite of
remonstrances, energetic and menacing, from the Persians themselves:
indeed, the Krotôniates not only protected the restored exile, but
even robbed the Persians of their storeship. The latter, disabled
from proceeding farther, as well by this loss as by the secession
of Dêmokêdês, commenced their voyage homeward, but unfortunately
suffered shipwreck near the Iapygian cape, and became slaves in
that neighborhood. A Tarentine exile, named Gillus, ransomed them
and carried them up to Susa,—a service for which Darius promised
him any recompense that he chose. Restoration to his native city
was all that Gillus asked; and that too, not by force, but by the
mediation of the Asiatic Greeks of Knidus, who were on terms of
intimate alliance with the Tarentines. This generous citizen,—an
honorable contrast to Dêmokêdês, who had not scrupled to impel the
stream of Persian conquest against his country, in order to procure
his own release,—was unfortunately disappointed of his anticipated
recompense. For though the Knidians, at the injunction of Darius,
employed all their influence at Tarentum to procure a revocation
of the sentence of exile, they were unable to succeed, and force
was out of the question.[475] The last words addressed by Dêmokêdês
at parting to his Persian companions, exhorted them to acquaint
Darius that he (Dêmokêdês) was about to marry the daughter of the
Krotoniate Milo,—one of the first men in Krotôn, as well as the
greatest wrestler of his time. The reputation of Milo was very great
with Darius,—probably from the talk of Dêmokêdês himself: moreover,
gigantic muscular force could be appreciated by men who had no relish
either for Homer or Solon. And thus did this clever and vainglorious
Greek, sending back his fifteen Persian companions to disgrace, and
perhaps to death, deposit in their parting ears a braggart message,
calculated to create for himself a factitious name at Susa. He paid
a large sum to Milo as the price of his daughter, for this very
purpose.[476]

  [474] Herodot. iii, 136. προσίσχοντες δὲ αὐτῆς τὰ παραθαλάσσια
  ἐθήσαντο καὶ ἀπεγράφοντο.

  [475] Herodot. iii, 137, 138.

  [476] Herodot. iii, 137. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτό μοι σπεῦσαι δοκέει τὸν
  γάμον τοῦτον τελέσας χρήματα μεγάλα Δημοκήδης, ἵνα φανῇ πρὸς
  Δαρείου ἐὼν καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑωϋτοῦ δόκιμος.

Thus finishes the history of Dêmokêdês, and of the “first Persians
(to use the phrase of Herodotus) who ever came over from Asia into
Greece.”[477] It is a history well deserving of attention, even
looking only to the liveliness of the incidents, introducing us as
they do into the full movement of the ancient world,—incidents which
I see no reason for doubting, with a reasonable allowance for the
dramatic amplification of the historian. Even at that early date,
Greek medical intelligence stands out in a surpassing manner, and
Dêmokêdês is the first of those many able Greek surgeons who were
seized, carried up to Susa,[478] and there detained for the Great
King, his court, and harem.

  [477] Herodot. iii, 138.

  [478] Xenophon, Memorab. iv, 2, 33. Ἄλλους δὲ πόσους οἴει (says
  Sokratês) διὰ σοφίαν ἀναρπάστους πρὸς βασιλέα γεγονέναι, καὶ ἐκεῖ
  δουλεύειν;

  We shall run little risk in conjecturing that, among the
  intelligent and able men thus carried off, surgeons and
  physicians would be selected as the first and most essential.

  Apollônidês of Kôs—whose calamitous end has been alluded to in
  a previous note—was resident as surgeon, or physician, with
  Artaxerxês Longimanus (Ktêsias, Persica, c. 30), and Polykritus
  of Mendê, as well as Ktêsias himself, with Artaxerxês Mnêmon
  (Plutarch, Artaxerxês, c. 31).

But his history suggests, in another point of view, far more serious
reflections. Like the Milesian Histiæus (of whom I shall speak
hereafter,) he cared not what amount of risk he brought upon his
country in order to procure his own escape from a splendid detention
at Susa. And the influence which he originated and brought to bear
was on the point of precipitating upon Greece the whole force of
the Persian empire, at a time when Greece was in no condition to
resist it. Had the first aggressive expedition of Darius, with his
own personal command and fresh appetite for conquest, been directed
against Greece instead of against Scythia (between 516-514 B. C.),
Grecian independence would have perished almost infallibly. For
Athens was then still governed by the Peisistratids; what she was,
under them, we have had occasion to notice in a former chapter.
She had then no courage for energetic self-defence, and probably
Hippias himself, far from offering resistance, would have found it
advantageous to accept Persian dominion as a means of strengthening
his own rule, like the Ionian despots: moreover, Grecian habit of
coöperation was then only just commencing. But fortunately, the
Persian invader did not touch the shore of Greece until more than
twenty years afterwards, in 490 B. C.; and during that precious
interval, the Athenian character had undergone the memorable
revolution which has been before described. Their energy and their
organization had been alike improved, and their force of resistance
had become decupled; moreover, their conduct had so provoked the
Persian that resistance was then a matter of necessity with them,
and submission on tolerable terms an impossibility. When we come
to the grand Persian invasion of Greece, we shall see that Athens
was the life and soul of all the opposition offered. We shall see
farther, that with all the efforts of Athens, the success of the
defence was more than once doubtful; and would have been converted
into a very different result, if Xerxês had listened to the best of
his own counsellors. But had Darius, at the head of the very same
force which he conducted into Scythia, or even an inferior force,
landed at Marathon in 514 B. C., instead of sending Datis in 490 B.
C.,—he would have found no men like the victors of Marathon to meet
him. As far as we can appreciate the probabilities, he would have met
with little resistance except from the Spartans singly, who would
have maintained their own very defensible territory against all his
efforts,—like the Mysians and Pisidians in Asia Minor, or like the
Mainots of Laconia in later days; but Hellas generally would have
become a Persian satrapy. Fortunately, Darius, while bent on invading
some country, had set his mind on the attack of Scythia, alike
perilous and unprofitable. His personal ardor was wasted on those
unconquerable regions, where he narrowly escaped the disastrous fate
of Cyrus,—nor did he ever pay a second visit to the coasts of the
Ægean. Yet the amorous influences of Atossa, set at work by Dêmokêdês
might well have been sufficiently powerful to induce Darius to assail
Greece instead of Scythia,—a choice in favor of which all other
recommendations concurred; and the history of free Greece would then
probably have stopped at this point, without unrolling any of the
glories which followed. So incalculably great has been the influence
of Grecian development, during the two centuries between 500-300 B.
C., on the destinies of mankind, that we cannot pass without notice a
contingency which threatened to arrest that development in the bud.
Indeed, it may be remarked that the history of any nation, considered
as a sequence of causes and effects, affording applicable knowledge,
requires us to study not merely real events, but also imminent
contingencies,—events which were on the point of occurring, but yet
did not occur. When we read the wailings of Atossa in the Persæ of
Æschylus, for the humiliation which her son Xerxês had just undergone
in his flight from Greece,[479] we do not easily persuade ourselves
to reverse the picture, and to conceive the same Atossa twenty years
earlier, numbering as her slaves at Susa the noblest Hêrakleid and
Alkmæônid maidens from Greece. Yet the picture would really have
been thus reversed,—the wish of Atossa would have been fulfilled,
and the wailings would have been heard from enslaved Greek maidens
in Persia,—if the mind of Darius had not happened to be preoccupied
with a project not less insane even than those of Kambysês against
Ethiopia and the Libyan desert. Such at least is the moral of the
story of Dêmokêdês.

  [479] Æschyl. Pers. 435-845, etc.

That insane expedition across the Danube into Scythia comes now
to be recounted. It was undertaken by Darius for the purpose of
avenging the inroad and devastation of the Scythians in Media and
Upper Asia, about a century before. The lust of conquest imparted
unusual force to this sentiment of wounded dignity, which in the
case of the Scythians could hardly be connected with any expectation
of plunder or profit. In spite of the dissuading admonition of his
brother Artabanus,[480] Darius summoned the whole force of his
empire, army and navy, to the Thracian Bosphorus,—a force not less
than seven hundred thousand horse and foot, and six hundred ships,
according to Herodotus. On these prodigious numbers we can lay no
stress. But it appears that the names of all the various nations
composing the host were inscribed on two pillars, erected by order
of Darius on the European side of the Bosphorus, and afterwards seen
by Herodotus himself in the city of Byzantium,—the inscriptions
were bilingual, in Assyrian characters as well as Greek. The Samian
architect Mandroklês had been directed to throw a bridge of boats
across the Bosphorus, about half-way between Byzantium and the mouth
of the Euxine. So peremptory were the Persian kings that their orders
for military service should be punctually obeyed, and so impatient
were they of the idea of exemptions, that when a Persian father named
Œobazus entreated that one of his three sons, all included in the
conscription, might be left at home, Darius replied that all three of
them should be left at home,—an answer which the unsuspecting father
heard with delight. They were indeed all left at home,—for they were
all put to death.[481] A proceeding similar to this is ascribed
afterwards to Xerxês;[482] whether true or not as matters of fact,
both tales illustrate the wrathful displeasure with which the Persian
kings were known to receive such petitions for exemption.

  [480] Herodot. iv, 1, 83. There is nothing to mark the precise
  year of the Scythian expedition; but as the accession of Darius
  is fixed to 521 B. C., and as the expedition is connected with
  the early part of his reign, we may conceive him to have entered
  upon it as soon as his hands were free; that is, as soon as he
  had put down the revolted satraps and provinces, Orœtês, the
  Medes, Babylonians, etc. Five years seems a reasonable time to
  allow for these necessities of the empire, which would bring
  the Scythian expedition to 516-515 B. C. There is reason for
  supposing it to have been before 514 B. C., for in that year
  Hipparchus was slain at Athens, and Hippias the surviving
  brother, looking out for securities and alliances abroad, gave
  his daughter in marriage to Æantidês son of Hippoklus, despot
  of Lampsakus, “perceiving that Hippoklus and his son had great
  influence with Darius,” (Thucyd. vi, 59.) Now Hippoklus could
  not well have acquired this influence _before_ the Scythian
  expedition; for Darius came down then for the first time to the
  western sea; Hippoklus served upon that expedition (Herodot. iv,
  138), and it was probably then that his favor was acquired, and
  farther confirmed during the time that Darius stayed at Sardis
  after his return from Scythia.

  Professor Schultz (Beiträge zu genaueren Zeitbestimmungen der
  Hellen. Geschicht. von der 63n bis zur 72n Olympiade, p. 168, in
  the Kieler Philolog. Studien) places the expedition in 513 B.
  C.; but I think a year or two earlier is more probable. Larcher,
  Wesseling, and Bähr (ad Herodot. iv, 145) place it in 508 B. C.,
  which is later than the truth; indeed, Larcher himself places the
  reduction of Lemnos and Imbros by Otanês in 511 B. C., though
  that event decidedly came after the Scythian expedition (Herodot.
  v, 27; Larcher, Table Chronologique, Trad. d’Hérodot. t. vii, pp.
  633-635).

  [481] Herodot. iv, 84.

  [482] Herodot. vii, 39.

The naval force of Darius seems to have consisted entirely of subject
Greeks, Asiatic and insular; for the Phenician fleet was not brought
into the Ægean until the subsequent Ionic revolt. At this time all
or most of the Asiatic Greek cities were under despots, who leaned
on the Persian government for support, and who appeared with their
respective contingents to take part in the Scythian expedition.[483]
Of Ionic Greeks were seen,—Strattis, despot of Chios; Æakês son
of Sylosôn, despot of Samos; Laodamas, of Phôkæa; and Histiæus,
of Milêtus. From the Æolic towns, Aristagoras of Kymê; from the
Hellespontine Greeks, Daphnis of Abydus, Hippoklus of Lampsakus,
Hêrophantus of Parium, Metrodôrus of Prokonnêsus, Aristagoras of
Kyzikus, and Miltiadês of the Thracian Chersonese. All these are
mentioned, and there were probably more. This large fleet, assembled
at the Bosphorus, was sent forward into the Euxine to the mouth of
the Danube,—with orders to sail up the river two days’ journey,
above the point where its channel begins to divide, and to throw a
bridge of boats over it; while Darius, having liberally recompensed
the architect Mandroklês, crossed the bridge over the Bosphorus,
and began his march through Thrace, receiving the submission of
various Thracian tribes in his way, and subduing others,—especially
the Getæ north of Mount Hæmus, who were compelled to increase still
farther the numbers of his vast army.[484] On arriving at the Danube,
he found the bridge finished and prepared for his passage by the
Ionians: we may remark here, as on so many other occasions, that all
operations requiring intelligence are performed for the Persians
either by Greeks or by Phenicians,—more usually by the former. He
crossed this greatest of all earthly rivers,[485]—for so the Danube
was imagined to be in the fifth century B. C.,—and directed his march
into Scythia.

  [483] Herodot. iv, 97, 137, 138.

  [484] Herodot. iv, 89-93.

  [485] Herod. iv, 48-50. Ἴστρος—μέγιστος ποταμῶν πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς
  ἴδμεν, etc.

As far as the point now attained, our narrative runs smoothly and
intelligibly: we know that Darius marched his army into Scythia,
and that he came back with ignominy and severe loss. But as to all
which happened between his crossing and recrossing the Danube,
we find nothing approaching to authentic statement,—nothing even
which we can set forth as the probable basis of truth on which
exaggerating fancy has been at work. All is inexplicable mystery.
Ktêsias indeed says that Darius marched for fifteen days into the
Scythian territory,—that he then exchanged bows with the king of
Scythia, and discovered the Scythian bow to be the largest,—and that,
being intimidated by such discovery, he fled back to the bridge by
which he had crossed the Danube, and recrossed the river with the
loss of one-tenth part of his army,[486] being compelled to break
down the bridge before all had passed. The length of march is here
the only thing distinctly stated; about the direction nothing is
said. But the narrative of Ktêsias, defective as it is, is much
less perplexing than that of Herodotus, who conducts the immense
host of Darius as it were through fairy-land,—heedless of distance,
large intervening rivers, want of all cultivation or supplies,
destruction of the country—in so far as it could be destroyed—by
the retreating Scythians, etc. He tells us that the Persian army
consisted chiefly of foot,—that there were no roads nor agriculture;
yet his narrative carries it over about twelve degrees of longitude
from the Danube to the country east of the Tanais, across the rivers
Tyras (Dniester), Hypanis (Bog), Borysthenês (Dnieper), Hypakyris.
Gerrhos, and Tanais.[487] How these rivers could have been passed in
the face of enemies by so vast a host, we are left to conjecture,
since it was not winter time, to convert them into ice: nor does
the historian even allude to them as having been crossed either in
the advance or in the retreat. What is not less remarkable is, that
in respect to the Greek settlement of Olbia, or Borysthenês, and
the agricultural Scythians and Mix-hellenes between the Hypanis and
the Borysthenês, across whose country it would seem that this march
of Darius must have carried him,—Herodotus does not say anything;
though we should have expected that he would have had better means of
informing himself about this part of the march than about any other,
and though the Persians could hardly have failed to plunder or put in
requisition this, the only productive portion of Scythia.

  [486] Ktêsias, Persica. c. 17. Justin (ii, 5—compare also
  xxxviii, 7) seems to follow the narrative of Ktêsias.

  Æschylus (Persæ. 864), who presents the deceased Darius as a
  glorious contrast with the living Xerxês, talks of the splendid
  conquests which he made by means of others,—“without crossing the
  Halys himself, nor leaving his home.” We are led to suppose, by
  the language which Æschylus puts into the mouth of the Eidôlon of
  Darius (v, 720-745), that he had forgotten, or had never heard
  of, the bridge thrown across the Bosphorus by order of Darius;
  for the latter is made to condemn severely the impious insolence
  of Xerxês in bridging over the Hellespont.

  [487] Herodot. iv, 136. ἅτε δὲ τοῦ Περσικοῦ πολλοῦ ἐόντος πεζοῦ
  στρατοῦ, καὶ τὰς ὁδοὺς οὐκ ἐπισταμένου, ὥστε οὐ τετμημένων
  τῶν ὁδῶν, τοῦ δὲ Σκυθικοῦ, ἱππότεω, καὶ τὰ σύντομα τῆς ὁδοῦ
  ἐπισταμένου, etc. Compare c. 128.

  The number and size of the rivers are mentioned by Herodotus as
  the principal wonder of Scythia, c. 82—Θωϋμάσια δὲ ἡ χώρη αὐτὴ
  οὐκ ἔχει, χωρὶς ἢ ὅτι ποτάμους τε πολλῷ μεγίστους καὶ ἀριθμὸν
  πλείστους, etc. He ranks the Borysthenês as the largest of all
  rivers except the Nile and the Danube (c. 53). The Hypanis also
  (Bog) is ποταμὸς ἐν ὀλίγοισι μέγας (c. 52).

  But he appears to forget the existence of these rivers when he is
  describing the Persian march.

The narrative of Herodotus in regard to the Persian march north of
the Ister seems indeed destitute of all the conditions of reality.
It is rather an imaginative description, illustrating the desperate
and impracticable character of Scythian warfare, and grouping in
the same picture, according to that large sweep of the imagination
which is admissible in epical treatment, the Scythians, with all
their barbarous neighbors from the Carpathian mountains to the river
Wolga. The Agathyrsi, the Neuri, the Androphagi, the Melanchlæni,
the Budini, the Gelôni, the Sarmatians, and the Tauri,—all of them
bordering on that vast quadrangular area of four thousand stadia
for each side, called Scythia, as Herodotus conceives it,[488]—are
brought into deliberation and action in consequence of the Persian
approach. And Herodotus takes that opportunity of communicating
valuable particulars respecting the habits and manners of each. The
kings of these nations discuss whether Darius is justified in his
invasion, and whether it be prudent in them to aid the Scythians.
The latter question is decided in the affirmative by the Sarmatians,
the Budini, and the Gelôni, all eastward of the Tanais,[489]—in the
negative by the rest. The Scythians, removing their wagons with
their wives and children out of the way northward, retreat and draw
Darius after them from the Danube all across Scythia and Sarmatia
to the north-eastern extremity of the territory of the Budini,[490]
several days’ journey eastward of the Tanais. Moreover, they destroy
the wells and ruin the herbage as much as they can, so that during
all this long march, says Herodotus, the Persians “found nothing to
damage, inasmuch as the country was barren;” it is therefore not easy
to see what they could find to live upon. It is in the territory
of the Budini, at this easternmost terminus on the borders of the
desert, that the Persians perform the only positive acts which are
ascribed to them throughout the whole expedition. They burn the
wooden wall before occupied, but now deserted, by the Gelôni, and
they build, or begin to build, eight large fortresses near the river
Oarus. For what purpose these fortresses could have been intended,
Herodotus gives no intimation; but he says that the unfinished work
was yet to be seen even in his day.[491]

  [488] Herodot. iv, 101.

  [489] Herodot. iv, 118, 119.

  [490] Herodot. iv, 120-122.

  [491] Herodot. iv, 123. Ὅσον μὲν δὴ χρόνον οἱ Πέρσαι ἤϊσαν διὰ
  τῆς Σκυθικῆς καὶ τῆς Σαυρομάτιδος χώρης, οἳ δὲ εἶχον οὐδὲν
  σίνεσθαι, ἅτε τῆς χώρης ἐούσης χέρσου· ἐπεὶ δὲ τε ἐς τὴν τῶν
  Βουδίνων χώρην ἐσέβαλον, etc. See Rennell, Geograph. System of
  Herodotus, p. 114, about the Oarus.

  The erections, whatever they were, which were supposed to mark
  the extreme point of the march of Darius, may be compared to
  those evidences of the extreme advance of Dionysus, which the
  Macedonian army saw on the north of the Jaxartês—“Liberi patris
  terminos.” Quintus Curtius, vii, 9, 15, (vii, 37, 16, Zumpt.)

Having thus been carried all across Scythia and the other territories
above mentioned in a north-easterly direction, Darius and his army
are next marched back a prodigious distance in a north-westerly
direction, through the territories of the Melanchlæni, the
Androphagi, and the Neuri, all of whom flee affrighted into the
northern desert, having been thus compelled against their will to
share in the consequences of the war. The Agathyrsi peremptorily
require the Scythians to abstain from drawing the Persians
into _their_ territory, on pain of being themselves treated as
enemies:[492] the Scythians in consequence respect the boundaries of
the Agathyrsi, and direct their retreat in such a manner as to draw
the Persians again southward into Scythia. During all this long march
backwards and forwards, there are partial skirmishes and combats of
horse, but the Scythians steadily refuse any general engagement.
And though Darius challenges them formally, by means of a herald,
with taunts of cowardice, the Scythian king Idanthyrsus not only
refuses battle, but explains and defends his policy, and defies the
Persian to come and destroy the tombs of their fathers,—it will then,
he adds, be seen whether the Scythians are cowards or not.[493]
The difficulties of Darius have by this time become serious, when
Idanthyrsus sends to him the menacing presents of a bird, a mouse, a
frog, and five arrows: the Persians are obliged to commence a rapid
retreat towards the Danube, leaving, in order to check and slacken
the Scythian pursuit, the least effective and the sick part of their
army encamped, together with the asses which had been brought with
them,—animals unknown to the Scythians, and causing great alarm by
their braying.[494] However, notwithstanding some delay thus caused,
as well as the anxious haste of Darius to reach the Danube, the
Scythians, far more rapid in their movements, arrive at the river
before him, and open a negotiation with the Ionians left in guard of
the bridge, urging them to break it down and leave the Persian king
to his fate,—inevitable destruction with his whole army.[495]

  [492] Herodot. iv, 125. Hekatæus ranks the Melanchlæni as a
  Scythian ἔθνος (Hekat. Fragment. 154, ed. Klausen): he also
  mentions several other subdivisions of Scythians, who cannot be
  farther authenticated (Fragm. 155-160).

  [493] Herodot. iv, 126, 127.

  [494] Herodot. iv, 128-132. The bird, the mouse, the frog, and
  the arrows, are explained to mean: Unless you take to the air
  like a bird, to the earth like a mouse, or to the water like a
  frog, you will become the victim of the Scythian arrows.

  [495] Herodot. iv, 133.

Here we reënter the world of reality, at the north bank of the
Danube, the place where we before quitted it. All that is reported
to have passed in the interval, if tried by the tests of historical
matter of fact, can be received as nothing better than a perplexing
dream. It only acquires value when we consider it as an illustrative
fiction, including, doubtless, some unknown matter of fact, but
framed chiefly to exhibit in action those unattackable Nomads, who
formed the north-eastern barbarous world of a Greek, and with whose
manners Herodotus was profoundly struck. “The Scythians[496] (says
he) in regard to one of the greatest of human matters, have struck
out a plan cleverer than any that I know. In other respects I do
not admire them; but they have contrived this great object, that no
invader of their country shall ever escape out of it, or shall ever
be able to find out and overtake them, unless they themselves choose.
For when men have neither walls nor established cities, but are all
house-carriers and horse-bowmen,—living, not from the plough, but
from cattle, and having their dwellings on wagons,—how can they be
otherwise than unattackable and impracticable to meddle with?” The
protracted and unavailing chase ascribed to Darius,—who can neither
overtake his game nor use his arms, and who hardly even escapes in
safety,—embodies in detail this formidable attribute of the Scythian
Nomads. That Darius actually marched into the country, there can be
no doubt. Nothing else is certain, except his ignominious retreat out
of it to the Danube; for of the many different guesses,[497] by which
critics have attempted to cut down the gigantic sketch of Herodotus
into a march with definite limits and direction, not one rests upon
any positive grounds, or carries the least conviction. We can trace
the pervading idea in the mind of the historian, but cannot find out
what were his substantive data.

  [496] Herodot. iv. 46. Τῷ δὲ Σκυθικῷ γένεϊ ἓν μὲν τὸ μέγιστον τῶν
  ἀνθρωπηΐων πρηγμάτων σοφώτατα πάντων ἐξεύρηται, τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν·
  τὰ μέντοι ἄλλα οὐκ ἄγαμαι. Τὸ δὲ μέγιστον οὕτω σφι ἀνεύρηται,
  ὥστε ἀποφυγέειν τε μηδένα ἐπελθόντα ἐπὶ σφέας, μὴ βουλομένους τε
  ἐξευρεθῆναι, καταλαβεῖν μὴ οἷον τε εἶναι. Τοῖσι γὰρ μήτε ἄστεα
  μήτε τείχεα ᾖ ἐκτισμένα, ἀλλὰ φερέοικοι ἐόντες πάντες, ἔωσι
  ἱπποτοξόται, ζῶντες μὴ ἀπ᾽ ἀρότου, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ κτηνέων, οἰκήματα δέ
  σφι ᾖ ἐπὶ ζευγέων, κῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴησαν οὗτοι ἄμαχοί τε καὶ ἄποροι
  προσμίσγειν;

  Ἐξεύρηται δέ σφι ταῦτα, τῆς τε γῆς ἐούσης ἐπιτηδέης, καὶ τῶν
  ποταμῶν ἐόντων σφι συμμάχων, etc.

  Compare this with the oration of the Scythian envoys to Alexander
  the Great, as it stands in Quintus Curtius, vii, 8, 22 (vii, 35,
  22, Zumpt).

  [497] The statement of Strabo (vii, p. 305), which restricts the
  march of Darius to the country between the Danube and the Tyras
  (Dniester) is justly pronounced by Niebuhr (Kleine Schriften,
  p. 372) to be a mere supposition suggested by the probabilities
  of the case, because it could not be understood how his large
  army should cross even the Dniester: it is not to be treated as
  an affirmation resting upon any authority. “As Herodotus tells
  us what is impossible (adds Niebuhr), we know nothing at all
  historically respecting the expedition.”

  So again the conjecture of Palmerius (Exercitationes ad Auctores
  Græcos, p. 21) carries on the march somewhat farther than the
  Dniester,—to the Hypanis, or _perhaps_ to the Borysthenês.
  Rennell, Klaproth, and Reichard, are not afraid to extend the
  march on to the Wolga. Dr. Thirlwall stops within the Tanais,
  admitting, however, that no correct historical account can be
  given of it. Eichwald supposes a long march up the Dniester into
  Volhynia and Lithuania.

  Compare Ukert, Skythien, p. 26; Dahlmann, Historische
  Forschungen, ii, pp. 159-164; Schaffarik, Slavische Alterthümer,
  i, 10, 3, i, 13, 4-5; and Mr. Kenrick, Remarks on the Life and
  Writings of Herodotus, prefixed to his Notes on the Second Book
  of Herodotus, p. xxi. The latter is among those who cannot swim
  the Dniester: he says: “Probably the Dniester (Tyras) was the
  real limit of the expedition, and Bessarabia, Moldavia, and the
  Bukovina, the scene of it.”

The adventures which took place at the passage of that river, both on
the out-march and the home-march, wherein the Ionians are concerned,
are far more within the limits of history. Here Herodotus possessed
better means of information, and had less of a dominant idea to
illustrate. That which passed between Darius and the Ionians on his
first crossing is very curious: I have reserved it until the present
moment, because it is particularly connected with the incidents which
happened on his return.

On reaching the Danube from Thrace, he found the bridge of boats
ready, and when the whole army had passed over, he ordered the
Ionians to break it down, as well as to follow him in his land-march
into Scythia;[498] the ships being left with nothing but the rowers
and seamen essential to navigate them homeward. His order was on the
point of being executed, when, fortunately for him, the Mitylenæan
general Kôês ventured to call in question the prudence of it, having
first asked whether it was the pleasure of the Persian king to listen
to advice. He urged that the march on which they were proceeding
might prove perilous, and retreat possibly unavoidable; because the
Scythians, though certain to be defeated if brought to action, might
perhaps not suffer themselves to be approached or even discovered.
As a precaution against all contingencies, it was prudent to leave
the bridge standing and watched by those who had constructed it.
Far from being offended at the advice, Darius felt grateful for it,
and desired that Kôês would ask him after his return for a suitable
reward,—which we shall hereafter find granted. He then altered his
resolution, took a cord, and tied sixty knots in it. “Take this cord
(said he to the Ionians), untie one of the knots in it each day after
my advance from the Danube into Scythia. Remain here and guard the
bridge until you shall have untied all the knots; but if by that time
I shall not have returned, then depart and sail home.”[499] After
such orders he began his march into the interior.

  [498] Herodot. iv, 97. Δαρεῖος ἐκέλευσε τοὺς Ἴωνας τὴν σχεδίην
  λύσαντας ἕπεσθαι κατ᾽ ἤπειρον ἑωϋτῷ, καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν νέων στρατόν.

  [499] Herodot. iv, 98. ἢν δὲ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ μὴ παρέω, ἀλλὰ
  διέλθωσι ὑμῖν αἱ ἡμέραι τῶν ἁμμάτων, ἀποπλέετε ἐς τὴν ὑμετέρην
  αὐτέων· μέχρι δὲ τούτου, ἐπεί τε οὕτω μετέδοξε, φυλάσσετε τὴν
  σχεδίην.

This anecdote is interesting, not only as it discloses the simple
expedients for numeration and counting of time then practised, but
also as it illustrates the geographical ideas prevalent. Darius did
not intend to come back over the Danube, but to march round the
Mæotis, and to return into Persia on the eastern side of the Euxine.
No other explanation can be given of his orders. At first, confident
of success, he orders the bridge to be destroyed forthwith: he
will beat the Scythians, march through their country, and reënter
Media from the eastern side of the Euxine. When he is reminded that
possibly he may not be able to find the Scythians, and may be obliged
to retreat, he still continues persuaded that this must happen within
sixty days, if it happens at all; and that, should he remain absent
more than sixty days, such delay will be a convincing proof that he
will take the other road of return instead of repassing the Danube.
The reader who looks at a map of the Euxine and its surrounding
territories may be startled at so extravagant a conception. But he
should recollect that there was no map of the same or nearly the
same accuracy before Herodotus, much less before the contemporaries
of Darius. The idea of entering Media by the north from Scythia and
Sarmatia over the Caucasus, is familiar to Herodotus in his sketch
of the early marches of the Scythians and Cimmerians: moreover,
he tells us that after the expedition of Darius, there came some
Scythian envoys to Sparta, proposing an offensive alliance against
Persia, and offering on their part to march across the Phasis into
Media from the north,[500] while the Spartans were invited to land
on the shores of Asia Minor, and advance across the country to meet
them from the west. When we recollect that the Macedonians and their
leader, Alexander the Great, having arrived at the river Jaxartês, on
the north of Sogdiana, and on the east of the sea of Aral, supposed
that they had reached the Tanais, and called the river by that
name,[501]—we shall not be astonished at the erroneous estimation of
distance implied in the plan conceived by Darius.

  [500] Herodot. vi, 84. Compare his account of the marches of
  the Cimmerians and of the Scythians into Asia Minor and Media
  respectively (Herodot. i, 103, 104, iv, 12).

  [501] Arrian, Exp. Al. iii, 6, 15; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 45;
  Quint. Curt. vii, 7, 4, vii, 8, 30 (vii, 29, 5, vii, 36, 7,
  Zumpt).

The Ionians had already remained in guard of the bridge beyond the
sixty days commanded, without hearing anything of the Persian army,
when they were surprised by the appearance, not of that army, but
of a body of Scythians, who acquainted them that Darius was in full
retreat and in the greatest distress, and that his safety with the
whole army depended upon that bridge. They endeavored to prevail
upon the Ionians, since the sixty days included in their order to
remain had now elapsed, to break the bridge and retire; assuring
them that, if this were done, the destruction of the Persians was
inevitable,—of course, the Ionians themselves would then be free. At
first, the latter were favorably disposed towards the proposition,
which was warmly espoused by the Athenian Miltiadês, despot, or
governor, of the Thracian Chersonese.[502] Had he prevailed, the
victor of Marathon—for such we shall hereafter find him—would have
thus inflicted a much more vital blow on Persia than even that
celebrated action, and would have brought upon Darius the disastrous
fate of his predecessor Cyrus. But the Ionian princes, though
leaning at first towards his suggestion, were speedily converted
by the representations of Histiæus of Milêtus, who reminded them
that the maintenance of his own ascendency over the Milesians, and
that of each despot in his respective city, was assured by means of
Persian support alone,—the feeling of the population being everywhere
against them: consequently, the ruin of Darius would be their ruin
also. This argument proved conclusive. It was resolved to stay and
maintain the bridge, but to pretend compliance with the Scythians,
and prevail upon them to depart, by affecting to destroy it. The
northern portion of the bridge was accordingly destroyed, for the
length of a bow-shot, and the Scythians departed under the persuasion
that they had succeeded in depriving their enemies of the means of
crossing the river.[503] It appears that they missed the track of the
retreating host, which was thus enabled, after the severest privation
and suffering, to reach the Danube in safety. Arriving during the
darkness of the night, Darius was at first terrified to find the
bridge no longer joining the northern bank: an Egyptian herald, of
stentorian powers of voice, was ordered to call as loudly as possible
the name of Histiæus the Milesian. Answer being speedily made, the
bridge was reëstablished, and the Persian army passed over before the
Scythians returned to the spot.[504]

  [502] Herodot. iv, 133, 136, 137.

  [503] Herodot. iv, 137-139.

  [504] Herodot. iv, 140, 141.

There can be no doubt that the Ionians here lost an opportunity
eminently favorable, such as never again returned, for emancipating
themselves from the Persian dominion. Their despots, by whom the
determination was made, especially the Milesian Histiæus, were
not induced to preserve the bridge by any honorable reluctance to
betray the trust reposed in them, but simply by selfish regard to
the maintenance of their own unpopular dominion. And we may remark
that the real character of this impelling motive, as well as the
deliberation accompanying it, may be assumed as resting upon very
good evidence, since we are now arrived within the personal knowledge
of the Milesian historian Hekatæus, who took an active part in the
Ionic revolt a few years afterwards, and who may, perhaps, have been
personally engaged in this expedition. He will be found reviewing
with prudence and sobriety the chances of that unfortunate revolt,
and distrusting its success from the beginning; while Histiæus of
Milêtus will appear on the same occasion as the fomenter of it,
in order to procure his release from an honorable detention at
Susa, near the person of Darius. The selfishness of this despot
having deprived his countrymen of that real and favorable chance of
emancipation which the destruction of the bridge would have opened to
them, threw them into perilous revolt a few years afterwards against
the entire and unembarrassed force of the Persian king and empire.

Extricated from the perils of Scythian warfare, Darius marched
southward from the Danube through Thrace to the Hellespont, where he
crossed from Sestus into Asia. He left, however, a considerable army
in Europe, under the command of Megabazus, to accomplish the conquest
of Thrace. Perinthus on the Propontis made a brave resistance,[505]
but was at length subdued, and it appears that all the Thracian
tribes, and all the Grecian colonies between the Hellespont and
the Strymon, were forced to submit, giving earth and water, and
becoming subject to tribute.[506] Near the lower Strymon, was the
Edonian town of Myrkinus, which Darius ordered to be made over to
Histiæus of Milêtus; for both this Milesian, and Kôês of Mitylênê,
had been desired by the Persian king to name their own reward for
their fidelity to him on the passage over the Danube.[507] Kôês
requested that he might be constituted despot of Mitylênê, which was
accomplished by Persian authority; but Histiæus solicited that the
territory near Myrkinus might be given to him for the foundation of
a colony. As soon as the Persian conquests extended thus far, the
site in question was presented to Histiæus, who entered actively upon
his new scheme. We shall find the territory near Myrkinus eminent
hereafter as the site of Amphipolis. It offered great temptation to
settlers, as fertile, well wooded, convenient for maritime commerce,
and near to auriferous and argentiferous mountains.[508] It seems,
however, that the Persian dominion in Thrace was disturbed by an
invasion of the Scythians, who, in revenge for the aggression of
Darius, overran the country as far as the Thracian Chersonese, and
are even said to have sent envoys to Sparta proposing a simultaneous
invasion of Persia from different sides, by Spartans and Scythians.
The Athenian Miltiadês, who was despot, or governor, of the
Chersonese, was forced to quit it for some time, and Herodotus
ascribes his retirement to the incursion of these Nomads. But we
may be permitted to suspect that the historian has misconceived the
real cause of such retirement. Miltiadês could not remain in the
Chersonese after he had incurred the deadly enmity of Darius by
exhorting the Ionians to destroy the bridge over the Danube.[509]

  [505] Herodot. iv, 143, 144, v, 1, 2.

  [506] Herodot. v, 2.

  [507] Herodot. v, 11.

  [508] Herodot. v, 23.

  [509] Herodot. vi, 40-84. That Miltiadês could have remained
  in the Chersonese undisturbed, during the interval between the
  Scythian expedition of Darius and the Ionic revolt,—when the
  Persians were complete masters of those regions, and when Otanês
  was punishing other towns in the neighborhood for evasion of
  service under Darius, after he had declared so pointedly against
  the Persians on a matter of life and death to the king and
  army,—appears to me, as it does to Dr. Thirlwall (History of
  Gr. vol. ii, App. ii, p. 486, ch. xiv, pp. 226-249), eminently
  improbable. So forcibly does Dr. Thirlwall feel the difficulty,
  that he suspects the reported conduct and exhortations of
  Miltiadês at the bridge over the Danube to have been a falsehood,
  fabricated by Miltiadês himself, twenty years afterwards, for
  the purpose of acquiring popularity at Athens during the time
  immediately preceding the battle of Marathon.

  I cannot think this hypothesis admissible. It directly
  contradicts Herodotus on a matter of fact very conspicuous, and
  upon which good means of information seem to have been within his
  reach. I have already observed that the historian Hekatæus must
  have possessed personal knowledge of all the relations between
  the Ionians and Darius, and that he very probably may have been
  even present at the bridge: all the information given by Hekatæus
  upon these points would be open to the inquiries of Herodotus.
  The unbounded gratitude of Darius towards Histiæus shows that
  some one or more of the Ionic despots present at the bridge must
  have powerfully enforced the expediency of breaking it down.
  That the name of the despot who stood forward as prime mover of
  this resolution should have been forgotten and not mentioned
  at the time, is highly improbable; yet such must have been the
  case if a fabrication by Miltiadês twenty years afterwards
  could successfully fill up the blank with his own name. The two
  most prominent matters talked of, after the retreat of Darius,
  in reference to the bridge, would probably be the name of the
  leader who urged its destruction, and the name of Histiæus, who
  preserved it. Indeed, the mere fact of the mischievous influence
  exercised by the latter afterwards would be pretty sure to keep
  these points of the case in full view.

  There are means of escaping from the difficulty of the case,
  I think, without contradicting Herodotus on any matter of
  fact important and conspicuous, or indeed on any matter of
  fact whatever. We see by vi, 40, that Miltiadês _did quit the
  Chersonese_ between the close of the Scythian expedition of
  Darius and the Ionic revolt; Herodotus, indeed, tells us that he
  quitted it in consequence of an incursion of the Scythians: but
  without denying the fact of such an incursion, we may reasonably
  suppose the historian to have been mistaken in assigning it as
  the cause of the flight of Miltiadês. The latter was prevented
  from living in the Chersonese continuously, during the interval
  between the Persian invasion of Scythia and the Ionic revolt, by
  fear of Persian enmity. It is not necessary for us to believe
  that he was never there at all, but his residence there must have
  been interrupted and insecure. The chronological data in Herodot.
  vi, 40, are exceedingly obscure and perplexing; but it seems to
  me that the supposition which I suggest introduces a plausible
  coherence into the series of historical facts, with the slightest
  possible contradiction to our capital witness.

  The only achievement of Miltiadês, between the affair on the
  Danube and his return to Athens shortly before the battle of
  Marathon, is the conquest of Lemnos; and _that_ must have taken
  place evidently while the Persians were occupied by the Ionic
  revolt, (between 502-494 B. C.) There is nothing in his recorded
  deeds inconsistent with the belief, therefore, that between
  515-502 B. C. he may not have resided in the Chersonese at all,
  or at least not for very long together: and the statement of
  Cornelius Nepos, that he quitted it immediately after the return
  from Scythia, from fear of the Persians, may be substantially
  true. Dr. Thirlwall observes (p. 487)—“As little would it appear
  that when the Scythians invaded the Chersonese, Miltiadês was
  conscious of having endeavored to render them an important
  service. He flies before them, though he had been so secure while
  the Persian arms were in his neighborhood.” He has here put
  his finger on what I believe to be the error of Herodotus,—the
  supposition that Miltiadês fled from the Chersonese to avoid the
  Scythians, whereas he really left it to avoid the Persians.

  The story of Strabo (xiii, p. 591), that Darius caused the Greek
  cities on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont to be burnt down,
  in order to hinder them from affording means of transport to the
  Scythians into Asia, seems to me highly improbable. These towns
  appear in their ordinary condition, Abydus among them, at the
  time of the Ionic revolt a few years afterwards (Herodot. v,
  117).

Nor did the conquests of Megabazus stop at the western bank of the
Strymon. He carried his arms across that river, conquering the
Pæonians, and reducing the Macedonians under Amyntas to tribute. A
considerable number of the Pæonians were transported across into
Asia, by express order of Darius; whose fancy had been struck by
seeing at Sardis a beautiful Pæonian woman carrying a vessel on her
head, leading a horse to water, and spinning flax, all at the same
time. This woman had been brought over, we are told, by her two
brothers, Pigrês and Mantyês, for the express purpose of arresting
the attention of the Great King. They hoped by this means to be
constituted despots of their countrymen, and we may presume that
their scheme succeeded, for such part of the Pæonians as Megabazus
could subdue were conveyed across to Asia and planted in some
villages in Phrygia. Such violent transportations of inhabitants were
in the genius of the Persian government.[510]

  [510] Herodot. v, 13-16. Nikolaus Damaskênus (Fragm. p. 36, ed.
  Orell.) tells a similar story about the means by which a Mysian
  woman attracted the notice of the Lydian king Alyattês. Such
  repetition of a striking story, in reference to different people
  and times, has many parallels in ancient history.

From the Pæonian lake Prasias, seven eminent Persians were sent as
envoys into Macedonia, to whom Amyntas readily gave the required
token of submission, inviting them to a splendid banquet. When
exhilarated with wine, they demanded to see the women of the regal
family, who, being accordingly introduced, were rudely dealt with by
the strangers. At length, the son of Amyntas, Alexander, resented the
insult, and exacted for it a signal vengeance. Dismissing the women,
under pretence that they should return after a bath, he brought back
in their place youths in female attire, armed with daggers: the
Persians, proceeding to repeat their caresses, were all put to death.
Their retinue and splendid carriages and equipment which they had
brought with them disappeared at the same time, without any tidings
reaching the Persian army. And when Bubarês, another eminent Persian,
was sent into Macedonia to institute researches, Alexander contrived
to hush up the proceeding by large bribes, and by giving him his
sister Gygæa in marriage.[511]

  [511] Herodot. v, 20, 21.

Meanwhile Megabazus crossed over into Asia, carrying with him the
Pæonians from the river Strymon. Having been in those regions, he
had become alarmed at the progress of Histiæus with his new city
of Myrkinus, and communicated his apprehensions to Darius; who was
prevailed upon to send for Histiæus, retaining him about his person,
and carrying him to Susa as counsellor and friend, with every mark
of honor, but with the secret intention of never letting him revisit
Asia Minor. The fears of the Persian general were probably not
unreasonable; but this detention of Histiæus at Susa, became in the
sequel an important event.[512]

  [512] Herodot. v, 23, 24.

On departing for his capital, Darius nominated his brother
Artaphernês satrap of Sardis, and Otanês, general of the forces on
the coast, in place of Megabazus. The new general dealt very severely
with various towns near the Propontis, on the ground that they had
evaded their duty in the late Scythian expedition, and had even
harassed the army of Darius in its retreat. He took Byzantium and
Chalkêdon, as well as Antandrus in the Troad, and Lampônium; and
with the aid of a fleet from Lesbos, he achieved a new conquest,—the
islands of Lemnos and Imbros, at that time occupied by a Pelasgic
population, seemingly without any Greek inhabitants at all.

These Pelasgi were of cruel and piratical character, if we may judge
by the tenor of the legends respecting them; Lemnian misdeeds being
cited as a proverbial expression for atrocities.[513] They were
distinguished also for ancient worship of Hêphæstus, together with
mystic rites in honor of the Kabeiri, and even human sacrifices to
their Great Goddess. In their two cities,—Hephæstias on the east of
the island, and Myrina on the west,—they held out bravely against
Otanês, nor did they submit until they had undergone long and severe
hardship. Lykarêtus, brother of that Mæandrius whom we have already
noticed as despot of Samos, was named governor of Lemnos; but he
soon after died.[514] It is probable that the Pelasgic population
of the islands was greatly enfeebled during this struggle, and we
even hear that their king Hermon voluntarily emigrated, from fear of
Darius.[515]

  [513] Herodot. vi, 138. Æschyl. Choêphor. 632; Stephan. Byz. v.
  Λῆμνος.

  The mystic rites in honor of the Kabeiri at Lemnos and Imbros
  are particularly noticed by Pherekydês (ap. Strabo, x, p. 472):
  compare Photius, v. Κάβειροι, and the remarkable description of
  the periodical Lemnian solemnity in Philostratus (Heroi. p. 740).

  The volcanic mountain Mosychlus, in the north-eastern portion
  of the island, was still burning in the fourth century B. C.
  (Antimach. Fragment. xviii, p. 103, Düntzer Epicc. Græc. Fragm.)

  Welcker’s Dissertation (Die Æschylische Trilogie, p. 248,
  _seqq._) enlarges much upon the Lemnian and Samothracian worship.

  [514] Herodot. v, 26, 27. The twenty-seventh chapter is extremely
  perplexing. As the text reads at present, we ought to make
  Lykarêtus the subject of certain predications which yet seem
  properly referable to Otanês. We must consider the words from
  Οἱ μὲν δὴ Λήμνιοι—down to τελευτᾷ—as parenthetical, which is
  awkward; but it seems the least difficulty in the case, and the
  commentators are driven to adopt it.

  [515] Zenob. Proverb. iii, 85.

Lemnos and Imbros thus became Persian possessions, held by a
subordinate prince as tributary. A few years afterwards their lot was
again changed,—they passed into the hands of Athens, the Pelasgic
inhabitants were expelled, and fresh Athenian settlers introduced.
They were conquered by Miltiadês from the Thracian Chersonese; from
Elæus at the south of that peninsula to Lemnos being within less
than one day’s sail with a north wind. The Hephæstieans abandoned
their city and evacuated the island with little resistance; but the
inhabitants of Myrina stood a siege,[516] and were not expelled
without difficulty: both of them found abodes in Thrace, on and near
the peninsula of Mount Athos. Both these islands, together with that
of Skyros (which was not taken until after the invasion of Xerxês),
remained connected with Athens in a manner peculiarly intimate. At
the peace of Antalkidas (387 B. C.),—which guaranteed universal
autonomy to every Grecian city, great and small,—they were specially
reserved, and considered as united with Athens.[517] The property
in their soil was held by men who, without losing their Athenian
citizenship, became Lemnian kleruchs, and as such were classified
apart among the military force of the state; while absence in Lemnos
or Imbros seems to have been accepted as an excuse for delay before
the courts of justice, so as to escape the penalties of contumacy, or
departure from the country.[518] It is probable that a considerable
number of poor Athenian citizens were provided with lots of land in
these islands, though we have no direct information of the fact, and
are even obliged to guess the precise time at which Miltiadês made
the conquest. Herodotus, according to his usual manner, connects the
conquest with an ancient oracle, and represents it as the retribution
for ancient legendary crime committed by certain Pelasgi, who, many
centuries before, had been expelled by the Athenians from Attica,
and had retired to Lemnos. Full of this legend, he tells us nothing
about the proximate causes or circumstances of the conquest, which
must probably have been accomplished by the efforts of Athens,
jointly with Miltiadês from the Chersonese, daring the period that
the Persians were occupied in quelling the Ionic revolt, between
502-494 B. C.,—since it is hardly to be supposed that Miltiadês would
have ventured thus to attack a Persian possession during the time
that the satraps had their hands free. The acquisition was probably
facilitated by the fact, that the Pelasgic population of the islands
had been weakened, as well by their former resistance to the Persian
Otanês, as by some years passed under the deputy of a Persian satrap.

  [516] Herodot. vi, 140. Charax ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Ἡφαιστíα.

  [517] Xenophon, Hellen. v, 1, 31. Compare Plato, Menexenus, c.
  17, p. 245, where the words ἡμετέραι ἀποίκιαι doubtless mean
  Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros.

  [518] Thucyd. iv, 23, v, 8, vii, 57; Phylarchus ap. Athenæum,
  vi, p. 255; Dêmosthen. Philippic. 1, c. 12, p. 17, R.: compare
  the Inscription, No. 1686, in the collection of Boeckh, with his
  remarks, p. 297.

  About the stratagems resorted to before the Athenian dikastery,
  to procure delay by pretended absence in Lemnos or Skyros, see
  Isæus, Or. vi, p. 58 (p. 80, Bek.); Pollux, viii, 7, 81; Hesych.
  v. Ἴμβριος; Suidas, v. Λημνία δίκη: compare also Carl Rhode, Res
  Lemnicæ, p. 50 (Wratislaw 1829).

  It seems as if εἰς Λῆμνον πλεῖν had come to be a proverbial
  expression at Athens for getting out of the way,—evading the
  performance of duty: this seems to be the sense of Dêmosthenês,
  Philipp. i, c. 9, p. 14. ἀλλ᾽ εἰς μὲν Λῆμνον τὸν παρ᾽ ὑμῶν
  ἵππαρχον δεῖ πλεῖν, τῶν δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τῶν τῆς πόλεως κτημάτων
  ἀγωνιζομένων Μενέλαον ἱππαρχεῖν.

  From the passage of Isæus above alluded to, which Rhode seems to
  me to construe incorrectly, it appears that there was a legal
  _connubium_ between Athenian citizens and Lemnian women.

In mentioning the conquest of Lemnos by the Athenians and Miltiadês,
I have anticipated a little on the course of events, because that
conquest,—though coinciding in point of time with the Ionic revolt
(which will be recounted in the following chapter), and indirectly
caused by it, in so far as it occupied the attention of the
Persians,—lies entirely apart from the operations of the revolted
Ionians. When Miltiadês was driven out of the Chersonese by the
Persians, on the suppression of the Ionic revolt, his fame, derived
from having subdued Lemnos,[519] contributed both to neutralize the
enmity which he had incurred as governor of the Chersonese, and to
procure his election as one of the ten generals for the year of the
Marathonian combat.

  [519] Herodot. vi, 136.




CHAPTER XXXV.

IONIC REVOLT.


Hitherto, the history of the Asiatic Greeks has flowed in a stream
distinct from that of the European Greeks. The present chapter will
mark the period of confluence between the two.

At the time when Darius quitted Sardis on his return to Susa,
carrying with him the Milesian Histiæus, he left Artaphernês, his
brother, as satrap of Sardis, invested with the supreme command of
Western Asia Minor. The Grecian cities on the coast, comprehended
under his satrapy, appear to have been chiefly governed by native
despots in each; and Milêtus especially, in the absence of Histiæus,
was ruled by his son-in-law Aristagoras. That city was now in the
height of power and prosperity,—in every respect the leading city of
Ionia. The return of Darius to Susa may be placed seemingly about 512
B. C., from which time forward the state of things above described
continued, without disturbance, for eight or ten years,—“a respite
from suffering,” to use the significant phrase of the historian.[520]

  [520] Herodot. v, 28. Μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον, ἄνεως κακῶν ἦν—or
  ἄνεσις κακῶν—if the conjecture of some critics be adopted. Mr.
  Clinton, with Larcher and others (see Fasti Hellen. App. 18, p.
  314), construe this passage as if the comma were to be placed
  after μετὰ δὲ, so that the historian would be made to affirm that
  the period of repose lasted only a short time. It appears to me
  that the comma ought rather to be placed after χρόνον, and that
  the “short time” refers to those evils which the historian had
  been describing before. There must have been an interval of eight
  years at least, if not of ten years, between the events which the
  historian had been describing—the evils inflicted by the attacks
  of Otanês—and the breaking out of the Ionic revolt; which latter
  event no one places earlier than 504 B. C., though some prefer
  502 B. C., others even 500 B. C.

  If, indeed, we admitted with Wesseling (ad Herodot. vi, 40; and
  Mr. Clinton seems inclined towards the same opinion, see p.
  314, _ut sup._) that the Scythian expedition is to be placed in
  508-507 B. C., then indeed the interval between the campaign of
  Otanês and the Ionic revolt would be contracted into one or two
  years. But I have already observed that I cannot think 508 B. C.
  a correct date for the Scythian expedition: it seems to me to
  belong to about 515 B. C. Nor do I know what reason there is for
  determining the date as Wesseling does, except this very phrase
  οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον, which is on every supposition exceedingly
  vague, and which he appears to me not to have construed in the
  best way.

It was about the year 506 B. C., that the exiled Athenian despot
Hippias, after having been repelled from Sparta by the unanimous
refusal of the Lacedæmonian allies to take part in his cause,
presented himself from Sigeium as a petitioner to Artaphernês at
Sardis. He now, doubtless, found the benefit of the alliance which he
had formed for his daughter with the despot Æantidês of Lampsakus,
whose favor with Darius would stand him in good stead. He made
pressing representations to the satrap, with a view of procuring
restoration to Athens, on condition of holding it under Persian
dominion; and Artaphernês was prepared, if an opportunity offered,
to aid him in his design. So thoroughly had he resolved on espousing
actively the cause of Hippias, that when the Athenians despatched
envoys to Sardis, to set forth the case of the city against its
exiled pretender, he returned to them an answer not merely of denial,
but of menace,—bidding them receive Hippias back again, if they
looked for safety.[521] Such a reply was equivalent to a declaration
of war, and so it was construed at Athens. It leads us to infer that
he was even then revolving in his mind an expedition against Attica,
in conjunction with Hippias; but, fortunately for the Athenians,
other projects and necessities intervened to postpone for several
years the execution of the scheme.

  [521] Herodot. v, 96. Ὁ δὲ Ἀρταφέρνης ἐκέλευέ σφεας εἰ βουλοίατο
  σόοι εἶναι, καταδέκεσθαι ὀπίσω τὸν Ἱππίην.

Of these new projects, the first was that of conquering the island of
Naxos. Here, too, as in the case of Hippias, the instigation arose
from Naxian exiles,—a rich oligarchy which had been expelled by a
rising of the people. This island, like all the rest of the Cyclades,
was as yet independent of the Persians.[522] It was wealthy,
prosperous, possessing a large population both of freemen and slaves,
and defended as well by armed ships as by a force of eight thousand
heavy-armed infantry. The exiles applied for aid to Aristagoras,
who saw that he could turn them into instruments of dominion for
himself in the island, provided he could induce Artaphernês to embark
in the project along with him,—his own force not being adequate by
itself. Accordingly, he went to Sardis, and laid his project before
the satrap, intimating that as soon as the exiles should land with
a powerful support, Naxos would be reduced with little trouble:
that the neighboring islands of Paros, Andros, Tênos, and the other
Cyclades, could not long hold out after the conquest of Naxos, nor
even the large and valuable island of Eubœa. He himself engaged,
if a fleet of one hundred ships were granted to him, to accomplish
all these conquests for the Great King, and to bear the expenses of
the armament besides. Artaphernês warmly entered into the scheme,
loaded him with praise, and promised him in the ensuing spring two
hundred ships instead of one hundred. A messenger despatched to Susa,
having brought back the ready consent of Darius, a large armament was
forthwith equipped, under the command of the Persian Megabatês, to be
placed at the disposal of Aristagoras,—composed both of Persians and
of all the tributaries near the coast.[523]

  [522] Herodot. v, 31. Plutarch says that Lygdamis, established as
  despot at Naxos by Peisistratus (Herodot. i, 64), was expelled
  from this post by the Lacedæmonians (De Herodot. Malignitat. c.
  21, p. 859). I confess that I do not place much confidence in the
  statements of that treatise, as to the many despots expelled by
  Sparta: we neither know the source from whence Plutarch borrowed
  them, nor any of the circumstances connected with them.

  [523] Herodot. v, 30, 31.

With this force Aristagoras and the Naxian exiles set sail from
Milêtus, giving out that they were going to the Hellespont. On
reaching Chios, they waited in its western harbor of Kaukasa for
a fair wind to carry them straight across to Naxos. No suspicion
was entertained in that island of its real purpose, nor was any
preparation made for resistance, and the success of Aristagoras
would have been complete, had it not been defeated by an untoward
incident ending in dispute. Megabatês, with a solicitude which we
are surprised to discern in a Persian general, personally made the
tour of his fleet, to see that every ship was under proper watch,
and discovered a ship from Myndus (an Asiatic Dorian city near
Halikarnassus), left without a single man on board. Incensed at this
neglect, he called before him Skylax, the commander of the ship, and
ordered him to be put in chains, with his head projecting outwards
through one of the apertures for oars in the ship’s side. Skylax
was a guest and friend of Aristagoras, who, on hearing of this
punishment, interceded with Megabatês for his release; but finding
the request refused, took upon him to release the prisoner himself.
He even went so far as to treat the remonstrance of Megabatês with
disdain, reminding him that, according to the instructions of
Artaphernês, he was only second and himself (Aristagoras) first. The
pride of Megabatês could not endure such treatment: as soon as night
arrived, he sent a private intimation to Naxos of the coming of the
fleet, warning the islanders to be on their guard. The warning thus
fortunately received was turned by the Naxians to the best account.
They carried in their property, laid up stores, and made every
preparation for a siege, so that when the fleet, probably delayed by
the dispute between its leaders, at length arrived, it was met by a
stout resistance, remained on the shore of the island for four months
in prosecution of an unavailing siege, and was obliged to retire
without accomplishing anything beyond the erection of a fort, as
lodgment for the Naxian exiles. After a large cost incurred, not only
by the Persians, but also by Aristagoras himself, the unsuccessful
armament was brought back to the coast of Ionia.[524]

  [524] Herodot. v, 34, 35.

The failure of this expedition threatened Aristagoras with entire
ruin. He had incensed Megabatês, deceived Artaphernês, and incurred
an obligation, which he knew not how to discharge, of indemnifying
the latter for the costs of the fleet. He began to revolve in his
mind the scheme of revolting from Persia, when it so happened
that there arrived nearly at the same moment a messenger from his
father-in-law, Histiæus, who was detained at the court of Susa,
secretly instigating him to this very resolution. Not knowing whom
to trust with this dangerous message, Histiæus had caused the
head of a faithful slave to be shaved,—branded upon it the words
necessary,—and then despatched him, so soon as his hair had grown,
to Milêtus, with a verbal intimation to Aristagoras that his head
was to be again shaved and examined.[525] Histiæus sought to provoke
this perilous rising, simply as a means of procuring his own release
from Susa, and in the calculation that Darius would send him down to
the coast to reëstablish order. His message, arriving at so critical
a moment, determined the faltering resolution of Aristagoras, who
convened his principal partisans at Milêtus, and laid before them
the formidable project of revolt. All of them approved it, with one
remarkable exception,—the historian Hekatæus of Milêtus; who opposed
it as altogether ruinous, and contended that the power of Darius
was too vast to leave them any prospect of success. When he found
direct opposition fruitless, he next insisted upon the necessity of
at once seizing the large treasures in the neighboring temple of
Apollo, at Branchidæ, for the purpose of carrying on the revolt. By
this means alone, he said, could the Milesians, too feeble to carry
on the contest with their own force alone, hope to become masters at
sea,—while, if _they_ did not take these treasures, the victorious
enemy surely would. Neither of these recommendations, both of them
indicating sagacity and foresight in the proposer, were listened to.
Probably the seizure of the treasures,—though highly useful for the
impending struggle, and though in the end they fell into the hands
of the enemy, as Hekatæus anticipated,—would have been insupportable
to the pious feelings of the people, and would thus have proved more
injurious than beneficial:[526] perhaps, indeed, Hekatæus himself may
have urged it with the indirect view of stifling the whole project.
We may remark that he seems to have urged the question as if Milêtus
were to stand alone in the revolt; not anticipating, as indeed no
prudent man could then anticipate, that the Ionic cities generally
would follow the example.

  [525] Herodot. v, 35: compare Polyæn. i, 24, and Aulus Gellius,
  N. A. xvii, 9.

  [526] Herodot. v, 36.

Aristagoras and his friends resolved forthwith to revolt, and their
first step was to conciliate popular favor throughout Asiatic
Greece by putting down the despots in all the various cities,—the
instruments not less than the supports of Persian ascendency, as
Histiæus had well urged at the bridge of the Danube. The opportunity
was favorable for striking this blow at once on a considerable scale.
The fleet, recently employed at Naxos, had not yet dispersed, but
was still assembled at Myus, with many of the despots present at
the head of their ships. Iatragoras was despatched from Milêtus,
at once to seize as many of them as he could, and to stir up the
soldiers to revolt. This decisive proceeding was the first manifesto
against Darius. Iatragoras was successful: the fleet went along
with him, and many of the despots fell into his hands,—among them
Histiæus (a second person so named) of Termera, Oliatus of Mylasa
(both Karians),[527] Kôês of Mitylênê, and Aristagoras (also a
second person so named) of Kymê. At the same time the Milesian
Aristagoras himself, while he formally proclaimed revolt against
Darius, and invited the Milesians to follow him, laid down his own
authority, and affected to place the government in the hands of the
people. Throughout most of the towns of Asiatic Greece, insular and
continental, a similar revolution was brought about; the despots
were expelled, and the feelings of the citizens were thus warmly
interested in the revolt. Such of these despots as fell into the
hands of Aristagoras were surrendered into the hands of their former
subjects, by whom they were for the most part quietly dismissed, and
we shall find them hereafter active auxiliaries to the Persians. To
this treatment the only exception mentioned is Kôês, who was stoned
to death by the Mitylenæans.[528]

  [527] Compare Herodotus, v, 121, and vii, 98. Oliatus was son of
  Ibanôlis, as was also the Mylasian Herakleidês mentioned in v,
  121.

  [528] Herodot. v, 36, 37; vi, 9.

By these first successful steps the Ionic revolt was made to assume
an extensive and formidable character; much more so, probably, than
the prudent Hekatæus had anticipated as practicable. The naval force
of the Persians in the Ægean was at once taken away from them, and
passed to their opponents, who were thus completely masters of the
sea; and would in fact have remained so, if a second naval force had
not been brought up against them from Phenicia,—a proceeding never
before resorted to, and perhaps at that time not looked for.

Having exhorted all the revolted towns to name their generals, and
to put themselves in a state of defence, Aristagoras crossed the
Ægean to obtain assistance from Sparta, then under the government of
king Kleomenês; to whom he addressed himself, “holding in his hand a
brazen tablet, wherein was engraved the circuit of the entire earth,
with the whole sea and all the rivers.” Probably this was the first
map or plan which had ever been seen at Sparta, and so profound was
the impression which it made, that it was remembered there even
in the time of Herodotus.[529] Having emphatically entreated the
Spartans to step forth in aid of their Ionic brethren, now engaged
in a desperate struggle for freedom,—he proceeded to describe the
wealth and abundance (gold, silver, brass, vestments, cattle,
and slaves), together with the ineffective weapons and warfare of
the Asiatics. The latter, he said, could be at once put down, and
the former appropriated, by military training such as that of the
Spartans,—whose long spear, brazen helmet and breastplate, and ample
shield, enabled them to despise the bow, the short javelin, the
light wicker target, the turban and trowsers, of a Persian.[530] He
then traced out on his brazen plan the road from Ephesus to Susa,
indicating the intervening nations, all of them affording a booty
more or less rich; but he magnified especially the vast treasures at
Susa: “Instead of fighting your neighbors, he concluded, Argeians,
Arcadians, and Messenians, from whom you get hard blows and small
reward, why do you not make yourself ruler of all Asia,[531] a prize
not less easy than lucrative?” Kleomenês replied to these seductive
instigations by desiring him to come for an answer on the third day.
When that day arrived, he put to him the simple question, how far it
was from Susa to the sea? To which Aristagoras answered, with more
frankness than dexterity, that it was a three months’ journey; and
he was proceeding to enlarge upon the facilities of the road when
Kleomenês interrupted him: “Quit Sparta before sunset, Milesian
stranger; you are no friend to the Lacedæmonians, if you want to
carry them a three months’ journey from the sea.” In spite of this
peremptory mandate, Aristagoras tried a last resource: he took in
his hand the bough of supplication, and again went to the house of
Kleomenês, who was sitting with his daughter Gorgô, a girl of eight
years old. He requested Kleomenês to send away the child, but this
was refused, and he was desired to proceed; upon which he began to
offer to the Spartan king a bribe for compliance, bidding continually
higher and higher from ten talents up to fifty. At length, the little
girl suddenly exclaimed, “Father, the stranger will corrupt you, if
you do not at once go away.” The exclamation so struck Kleomenês,
that he broke up the interview, and Aristagoras forthwith quitted
Sparta.[532]

  [529] Herodot. v, 49. Τῷ δὴ (Κλεομένεϊ) ἐς λόγους ἤϊε, ~ὡς
  Λακεδαιμόνιοι λέγουσι~, ἔχων χάλκεον πίνακα, ἐν τῷ γῆς ἁπάσης
  περίοδος ἐνετέτμητο, καὶ θάλασσά τε πᾶσα καὶ ποταμοὶ πάντες.

  The earliest map of which mention is made was prepared by
  Anaximander in Ionia, apparently not long before this period: see
  Strabo, i, p. 7; Agathemerus, 1, c. 1; Diogen. Laërt. ii, 1.

  Grosskurd, in his note on the above passage of Strabo, as well
  as Larcher and other critics, appear to think, that though this
  tablet or chart of Anaximander was the earliest which embraced
  the whole known earth, there were among the Greeks others still
  earlier, which described particular countries. There is no proof
  of this, nor can I think it probable: the passage of Apollonius
  Rhodius (iv, 279) with the Scholia to it, which is cited as
  evidence, appears to me unworthy of attention.

  Among the Roman Agrimensores, it was the ancient practice to
  engrave their plans, of land surveyed, upon tablets of brass,
  which were deposited in the public archives, and of which copies
  were made for private use, though the original was referred
  to in case of legal dispute (Siculus Flaccus ap. Rei Agrariæ
  Scriptores, p. 16, ed. Goes: compare Giraud, Recherches sur le
  Droit de Propriété, p. 116, Aix, 1838).

  [530] Herodot. v, 49. δεικνὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἔλεγε ἐς τὴν τῆς γῆς
  περίοδον, τὴν ἐφέρετο ἐν τῷ πίνακι ἐντετμημένην.

  [531] Herodot. v, 49. πάρεχον δὲ τῆς Ἀσίης πάσης ἄρχειν εὐπετέως,
  ἄλλο τι αἱρήσεσθε;

  [532] Herodot. v, 49, 50, 51. Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm.
  Laconic. p. 240.

  We may remark, both in this instance and throughout all the life
  and time of Kleomenês, that the Spartan king has the active
  management and direction of foreign affairs,—subject, however,
  to trial and punishment by the ephors in case of misbehavior
  (Herodot. vi, 82). We shall hereafter find the ephors gradually
  taking into their own hands, more and more, the actual management.

Doubtless Herodotus heard the account of this interview from
Lacedæmonian informants. But we may be permitted to doubt, whether
any such suggestions were really made, or any such hopes held out,
as those which he places in the mouth of Aristagoras,—suggestions
and hopes which might well be conceived in 450-440 B. C., after
a generation of victories over the Persians, but which have no
pertinence in the year 502 B. C. Down even to the battle of Marathon,
the name of the Medes was a terror to the Greeks, and the Athenians
are highly and justly extolled as the first who dared to look them
in the face.[533] To talk about an easy march up to the treasures of
Susa and the empire of all Asia, at the time of the Ionic revolt,
would have been considered as a proof of insanity. Aristagoras may
very probably have represented, that the Spartans were more than a
match for Persians in the field; but even thus much would have been
considered, in 502 B. C., rather as the sanguine hope of a petitioner
than as the estimate of a sober looker-on.

  [533] Herodot. vi, 112. πρῶτοί τε ἀνέσχοντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν
  ὁρέοντες, καὶ ἄνδρας ταύτην ἐσθημένους· τέως δὲ ἦν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι
  καὶ τὸ οὔνομα τὸ Μήδων φόβος ἀκοῦσαι.

The Milesian chief had made application to Sparta, as the presiding
power of Hellas,—a character which we thus find more and more
recognized and passing into the habitual feeling of the Greeks.
Fifty years previously to this, the Spartans had been flattered by
the circumstance, that Crœsus singled them out from all other Greeks
to invite as allies: now they accepted such priority as a matter of
course.[534]

  [534] Aristagoras says to the Spartans (v, 49)—τὰ κατήκοντα γάρ
  ἐστι ταῦτα· Ἰώνων παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ᾽ ἐλευθέρων, ὄνειδος
  καὶ ἄλγος μέγιστον μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν,
  ὅσῳ προεστέατε τῆς Ἑλλάδος (Herodotus, v, 49). In reference to
  the earlier incident (Herodot. i, 70)—Τουτέων τε ὦν εἵνεκεν οἱ
  Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὴν συμμαχίην ἐδέξαντο, καὶ ὅτι ἐκ πάντων σφέας
  προκρίνας Ἑλλήνων, αἱρέετο φίλους (Crœsus).

  An interval of rather more than forty years separates the two
  events, during which both the feelings of the Spartans, and the
  feelings of others towards them, had undergone a material change.

Rejected at Sparta, Aristagoras proceeded to Athens, now decidedly
the second power in Greece. And here he found an easier task, not
only as it was the metropolis, or mother-city, of Asiatic Ionia,
but also as it had already incurred the pronounced hostility of the
Persian satrap, and might look to be attacked as soon as the project
came to suit his convenience, under the instigation of Hippias:
whereas the Spartans had not only no kindred with Ionia, beyond
that of common Hellenism, but were in no hostile relations with
Persia, and would have been provoking a new enemy by meddling in the
Asiatic war. The promises and representations of Aristagoras were
accordingly received with great favor by the Athenians: who, over and
above the claims of sympathy, had a powerful interest in sustaining
the Ionic revolt as an indirect protection to themselves,—and to
whom the abstraction of the Ionic fleet from the Persians afforded
a conspicuous and important relief. The Athenians at once resolved
to send a fleet of twenty ships, under Melanthius, as an aid to the
revolted Ionians,—ships which are styled by Herodotus, “the beginning
of the mischiefs between Greeks and barbarians,”—as the ships in
which Paris crossed the Ægean had before been called in the Iliad
of Homer. Herodotus farther remarks that it seems easier to deceive
many men together than one,—since Aristagoras, after having failed
with Kleomenês, thus imposed upon the thirty thousand citizens of
Athens.[535] But on this remark two comments suggest themselves.
First, the circumstances of Athens and Sparta were not the same in
regard to the Ionic quarrel,—an observation which Herodotus himself
had made a little while before: the Athenians had a material interest
in the quarrel, political as well as sympathetic, while the Spartans
had none. Secondly, the ultimate result of their interference,
as it stood in the time of Herodotus, though purchased by severe
intermediate hardship, was one eminently gainful and glorifying, not
less to Athens than to Greece.[536]

  [535] Herodot. v, 97. πολλοὺς γὰρ οἶκε εἶναι εὐπετέστερον
  διαβάλλειν ἢ ἕνα, εἰ Κλεομένεα μὲν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον μοῦνον οὐκ
  οἷός τε ἐγένετο διαβαλέειν, τρεῖς δὲ μυριάδας Ἀθηναίων ἐποίησε
  τοῦτο.

  [536] Herodot. v, 98; Homer, Iliad, v, 62. The criticism of
  Plutarch (De Malignitat. Herodot. p. 861) on this passage, is
  rather more pertinent than the criticisms in that ill-tempered
  composition generally are.

When Aristagoras returned, he seems to have found the Persians
engaged in the siege of Milêtus. The twenty Athenian ships soon
crossed the Ægean, and found there five Eretrian ships which had also
come to the succor of the Ionians; the Eretrians generously taking
this opportunity to repay assistance formerly rendered to them by
the Milesians in their ancient war with Chalkis. On the arrival of
these allies, Aristagoras organized an expedition from Ephesus up to
Sardis, under the command of his brother Charopinus, with others. The
ships were left at Korêssus,[537] a mountain and seaport five miles
from Ephesus, while the troops marched up under Ephesian guides,
first, along the river Kayster, next, across the mountain range of
Tmôlus to Sardis. Artaphernês had not troops enough to do more than
hold the strong citadel, so that the assailants possessed themselves
of the town without opposition. But he immediately recalled his
force near Miletus,[538] and summoned Persians and Lydians from
all the neighboring districts, thus becoming more than a match
for Charopinus; who found himself, moreover, obliged to evacuate
Sardis, owing to an accidental conflagration. Most of the houses in
that city were built in great part with reeds or straw, and all of
them had thatched roofs; hence it happened that a spark touching
one of them set the whole city in flame. Obliged to abandon their
dwellings by this accident, the population of the town congregated
in the market-place,—and as reinforcements were hourly crowding
in, the position of the Ionians and Athenians became precarious:
they evacuated the town, took up a position on Mount Tmôlus, and,
when night came, made the best of their way to the sea-coast. The
troops of Artaphernês pursued, overtook them near Ephesus, and
defeated them completely. Eualkidês, the Eretrian general, a man of
eminence and a celebrated victor at the solemn games, perished in the
action, together with a considerable number of troops. After this
unsuccessful commencement, the Athenians betook themselves to their
vessels and sailed home, in spite of pressing instances on the part
of Aristagoras to induce them to stay. They took no farther part in
the struggle;[539] a retirement at once so sudden and so complete,
that they must probably have experienced some glaring desertion on
the part of their Asiatic allies, similar to that which brought so
much danger upon the Spartan general Derkyllidas, in 396 B. C. Unless
such was the case, they seem open to censure rather for having too
soon withdrawn their aid, than for having originally lent it.[540]

  [537] About Korêssus, see Diodor. xiv, 99, and Xenophon, Hellen.
  i, 2, 7.

  [538] Charôn of Lampsakus, and Lysanias in his history of
  Eretria, seem to have mentioned this first siege of Milêtus, and
  the fact of its being raised in consequence of the expedition to
  Sardis; see Plutarch, de Herodot. Malignit. p. 861,—though the
  citation is given there confusedly, so that we cannot make much
  out of it.

  [539] Herodot. v, 102, 103. It is a curious fact that Charôn of
  Lampsakus made no mention of this defeat of the united Athenian
  and Ionian force: see Plutarch, de Herodot. Malign. _ut sup._

  [540] About Derkyllidas, see Xenophon, Hellen. iii, 2, 17-19.

The burning of a place so important as Sardis, however, including
the temples of the local goddess Kybêbê, which perished with
the remaining buildings, produced a powerful effect on both
sides,—encouraging the revolters, as well as incensing the Persians.
Aristagoras despatched ships along the coast, northward as far as
Byzantium, and southward as far as Cyprus. The Greek cities near
the Hellespont and the Propontis were induced, either by force or
by inclination, to take part with him: the Karians embraced his
cause warmly; even the Kaunians, who had not declared themselves
before, joined him as soon as they heard of the capture of Sardis;
while the Greeks in Cyprus, with the single exception of the town of
Amathûs, at once renounced the authority of Darius, and prepared for
a strenuous contest. Onesilus of Salamis, the most considerable city
in the island,—finding the population willing, but his brother, the
despot Gorgus, reluctant,—shut the latter out of the gates, took the
command of the united forces of Salamis and other revolting cities,
and laid siege to Amathûs. These towns of Cyprus were then, and seem
always afterwards to have continued, under the government of despots;
who, however, unlike the despots in Ionia generally, took part along
with their subjects in the revolt against Persia.[541]

  [541] Herodot. v, 103, 104, 108. Compare the proceedings in
  Cyprus against Artaxerxês Mnêmon, under the energetic Evagoras of
  Salamis (Diodor. xiv, 98, xv, 2), about 386 B. C.: most of the
  petty princes of the island became for the time his subjects,
  but in 351 B. C. there were nine of them independent (Diodor.
  xvi, 42), and seemingly quite as many at the time when Alexander
  besieged Tyre (Arrian, ii, 20, 8).

The rebellion had now assumed a character more serious than ever, and
the Persians were compelled to put forth their strongest efforts to
subdue it. From the number of different nations comprised in their
empire, they were enabled to make use of the antipathies of one
against the other; and the old adverse feeling of Phenicians against
Greeks was now found extremely serviceable. After a year spent in
getting together forces,[542] the Phenician fleet was employed to
transport into Cyprus the Persian general Artybius with a Kilikian
and Egyptian army,[543]—while the force under Artaphernês at Sardis
was so strengthened as to enable him to act at once against all the
coast of Asia Minor, from the Propontis to the Triopian promontory.
On the other side, the common danger had for the moment brought the
Ionians into a state of union foreign to their usual habit, and we
hear now, for the first and the last time, of a tolerably efficient
Pan-Ionic authority.[544]

  [542] Herodot. v, 116. Κύπριοι μὲν δὴ, ἐνιαυτὸν ἐλεύθεροι
  γενόμενοι, αὖτις ἐκ νέης κατεδεδούλωντο.

  [543] Herodot. vi, 6. Κίλικες καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι.

  [544] Herodot. v, 109. Ἡμέας δὲ ἀπέπεμψε ~τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἰώνων~
  φυλάξοντας τὴν θάλασσαν, etc.: compare vi, 7.

Apprized of the coming of Artybius with the Phenician fleet, Onesilus
and his Cyprian supporters solicited the aid of the Ionic fleet,
which arrived shortly after the disembarkation of the Persian force
in the island. Onesilus offered to the Ionians their choice, whether
they would fight the Phenicians at sea or the Persians on land. Their
natural determination was in favor of the seafight, and they engaged
with a degree of courage and unanimity which procured for them a
brilliant victory; the Samians being especially distinguished.[545]
But the combat on land, carried on at the same time, took a different
turn. Onesilus and the Salaminians brought into the field, after
the fashion of Orientals rather than of Greeks, a number of scythed
chariots, destined to break the enemy’s ranks; while on the other
hand the Persian general Artybius was mounted on a horse, trained to
rise on his hind legs and strike out with his fore legs against an
opponent on foot. In the thick of the fight, Onesilus and his Karian
shield-bearer came into personal conflict with this general and his
horse; and by previous concert, when the horse so reared as to get
his fore legs over the shield of Onesilus, the Karian with a scythe
severed the legs from his body, while Onesilus with his own hand
slew Artybius. But the personal bravery of the Cypriots was rendered
useless by treachery in their own ranks. Stêsênor, despot of Kurium,
deserted in the midst of the battle, and even the scythed chariots
of Salamis followed his example. The brave Onesilus, thus weakened,
perished in the total rout of his army, along with Aristokyprus
despot of Soli, on the north coast of the island: this latter being
son of that Philokyprus who had been immortalized more than sixty
years before, in the poems of Solon. No farther hopes now remained
for the revolters, and the victorious Ionian fleet returned home.
Salamis relapsed under the sway of its former despot Gorgus, while
the remaining cities in Cyprus were successively besieged and taken:
not without a resolute defence, however, since Soli alone held out
five months.[546]

  [545] Herodot. v, 112.

  [546] Herodot. v, 112-115. It is not uninteresting to compare,
  with this reconquest of Cyprus by the Persians, the conquest of
  the same island by the Turks in 1570, when they expelled from it
  the Venetians. See the narrative of that conquest (effected in
  the reign of Selim the Second by the Seraskier Mustapha-Pasha),
  in Von Hammer, Geschichte des Osmannischen Reichs, book xxxvi,
  vol. iii, pp. 578-589. Of the two principal towns, Nikosia in
  the centre of the island, and Famagusta on the north-eastern
  coast, the first, after a long siege, was taken by storm, and the
  inhabitants of every sex and age either put to death or carried
  into slavery; while the second, after a most gallant defence, was
  allowed to capitulate. But the terms of the capitulation were
  violated in the most flagitious manner by the Seraskier, who
  treated the brave Venetian governor, Bragadino, with frightful
  cruelty, cutting off his nose and ears, exposing him to all sorts
  of insults, and ultimately causing him to be flayed alive. The
  skin of this unfortunate general was conveyed to Constantinople
  as a trophy, but in after-times found its way to Venice.

  We read of nothing like this treatment of Bragadino in the
  Persian reconquest of Cyprus, though it was a subjugation after
  revolt; indeed, nothing like it in all Persian warfare.

  Von Hammer gives a short sketch (not always very accurate as to
  ancient times) of the condition of Cyprus under its successive
  masters,—Persians, Græco-Egyptians, Romans, Arabians, the dynasty
  of Lusignan, Venetians, and Turks,—the last seems decidedly the
  worst of all.

  In reference to the above-mentioned piece of cruelty, I may
  mention that the Persian king Kambysês caused one of the royal
  judges (according to Herodotus v, 25), who had taken a bribe
  to render an iniquitous judgment, to be flayed alive, and his
  skin to be stretched upon the seat on which his son was placed
  to succeed him; as a lesson of justice to the latter. A similar
  story is told respecting the Persian king Artaxerxês Mnêmon; and
  what is still more remarkable, the same story is also recounted
  in the Turkish history, as an act of Mohammed the Second (Von
  Hammer, Geschichte des Osmannisch. Reichs, book xvii, vol. ii, p.
  209; Diodorus, xv, 10). Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiii, 6) had good
  reason to treat the reality of the fact as problematical.

Meanwhile the principal force of Darius having been assembled
at Sardis,—Daurisês, Hymeas, and other generals who had married
daughters of the Great King, distributed their efforts against
different parts of the western coast. Daurisês attacked the
towns near the Hellespont,[547]—Abydus, Perkôtê, Lampsakus, and
Pæsus,—which made little resistance. He was then ordered southward
into Karia, while Hymeas, who, with another division, had taken Kios
on the Propontis, marched down to the Hellespont and completed the
conquest of the Troad as well as of the Æolic Greeks in the region
of Ida. Artaphernês and Otanês attacked the Ionic and Æolic towns on
the coast,—the former taking Klazomenæ,[548] the latter Kymê. There
remained Karia, which, with Milêtus in its neighborhood, offered
a determined resistance to Daurisês. Forewarned of his approach,
the Karians assembled at a spot called the White Pillars, near the
confluence of the rivers Mæander and Marsyas. Pixodarus, one of their
chiefs, recommended the desperate expedient of fighting with the
river at their back, so that all chance of flight might be cut off;
but most of the chiefs decided in favor of a contrary policy,[549]—to
let the Persians pass the river, in hopes of driving them back into
it and thus rendering their defeat total. Victory, however, after a
sharp contest, declared in favor of Daurisês, chiefly in consequence
of his superior numbers: two thousand Persians, and not less than
ten thousand Karians, are said to have perished in the battle. The
Karian fugitives, reunited after the flight, in the grove of noble
plane-trees consecrated to Zeus Stratius, near Labranda,[550] were
deliberating whether they should now submit to the Persians or
emigrate forever, when the appearance of a Milesian reinforcement
restored their courage. A second battle was fought, and a second
time they were defeated, the loss on this occasion falling chiefly
on the Milesians.[551] The victorious Persians now proceeded to
assault Karian cities, but Herakleidês of Mylasa laid an ambuscade
for them with so much skill and good fortune, that their army was
nearly destroyed, and Daurisês with other Persian generals perished.
This successful effort, following upon two severe defeats, does honor
to the constancy of the Karians, upon whom Greek proverbs generally
fasten a mean reputation. It saved for the time the Karian towns,
which the Persians did not succeed in reducing until after the
capture of Milêtus.[552]

  [547] Herodot. v, 117.

  [548] Herodot. v, 122-124.

  [549] Herodot. v, 118. On the topography of this spot, as
  described in Herodotus, see a good note in Weissenborn, Beyträge
  zur genaueren Erforschung der alt. Griechischen Geschichte, p.
  116, Jena, 1844.

  He thinks, with much reason, that the river Marsyas here
  mentioned cannot be that which flows through Kelænæ, but another
  of the same name which flows into the Mæander from the southwest.

  [550] About the village of Labranda and the temple of Zeus
  Stratius, see Strabo, xiv, p. 659. Labranda was a village in
  the territory of, and seven miles distant from, the inland town
  of Mylasa; it was Karian at the time of the Ionic revolt, but
  partially Hellenized before the year 350 B. C. About this latter
  epoch, three rural tribes of Mylasa—constituting along with the
  citizens of the town, the Mylasene community—were, Ταρκόνδαρα,
  Ὀτώρκονδα, Λάβρανδα,—see the Inscription in Boeckh’s Collection,
  No. 2695, and in Franz, Epigraphicê Græca, No. 73, p. 191. In
  the Lydian language, λάβρυς is said to have signified a hatchet
  (Plutarch, Quæst. Gr. c. 45, p. 314).

  [551] Herodot. v, 118, 119.

  [552] Herodot. v, 120, 121; vi, 25.

On land, the revolters were thus everywhere worsted, though at sea
the Ionians still remained masters. But the unwarlike Aristagoras
began to despair of success, and to meditate a mean desertion of
the companions and countrymen whom he had himself betrayed into
danger. Assembling his chief advisers, he represented to them the
unpromising state of affairs, and the necessity of securing some
place of refuge, in case they were expelled from Milêtus. He then put
the question to them, whether the island of Sardinia, or Myrkinus in
Thrace, near the Strymon (which Histiæus had begun some time before
to fortify, as I have mentioned in the preceding chapter), appeared
to them best adapted to the purpose. Among the persons consulted
was Hekatæus the historian, who approved neither the one nor the
other scheme, but suggested the erection of a fortified post in the
neighboring island of Leros; a Milesian colony, wherein a temporary
retirement might be sought, should it prove impossible to hold
Milêtus, but which permitted an easy return to that city, so soon
as opportunity offered.[553] Such an opinion must doubtless have
been founded on the assumption, that they would be able to maintain
superiority at sea. And it is important to note such confident
reliance upon this superiority in the mind of a sagacious man, not
given to sanguine hopes, like Hekatæus,—even under circumstances
very unprosperous on land. Emigration to Myrkinus, as proposed by
Aristagoras, presented no hope of refuge at all; since the Persians,
if they regained their authority in Asia Minor, would not fail again
to extend it to the Strymon. Nevertheless, the consultation ended
by adopting this scheme, since, probably, no Ionians could endure
the immeasurable distance of Sardinia as a new home. Aristagoras
set sail for Myrkinus, taking with him all who chose to bear him
company; but he perished not long after landing, together with nearly
all his company, in the siege of a neighboring Thracian town.[554]
Though making profession to lay down his supreme authority at the
commencement of the revolt, he had still contrived to retain it in
great measure; and on departing for Myrkinus, he devolved it on
Pythagoras, a citizen in high esteem. It appears however that the
Milesians, glad to get rid of a leader who had brought them nothing
but mischief,[555] paid little obedience to his successor, and made
their government from this period popular in reality as well as in
profession. The desertion of Aristagoras, with the citizens whom
he carried away, must have seriously damped the spirits of those
who remained: nevertheless, it seems that the cause of the Ionic
revolters was quite as well conducted without him.

  [553] Herodot. v, 125; Strabo, xiv, p. 635.

  [554] Herodot. v, 126.

  [555] Herodot. vi, 5. Οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι, ἄσμενοι ἀπαλλαχθέντες καὶ
  Ἀρισταγόρεῳ, οὐδαμῶς ἕτοιμοι ἔσαν ἄλλον τύραννον δέκεσθαι ἐς τὴν
  χώρην, οἷά τε ἐλευθερίης γευσάμενοι.

Not long after his departure, another despot—Histiæus of Milêtus,
his father-in-law, and jointly with him the fomenter of the
revolt—presented himself at the gates of Milêtus for admission. The
outbreak of the revolt had enabled him, as he had calculated, to
procure leave of departure from Darius. That prince had been thrown
into violent indignation by the attack and burning of Sardis, and
by the general revolt of Ionia, headed (so the news reached him)
by the Milesian Aristagoras, but carried into effect by the active
coöperation of the Athenians. “The Athenians (exclaimed Darius),
who are _they_?” On receiving the answer, he asked for his bow,
placed an arrow on the string, and shot as high as he could towards
the heavens, saying: “Grant me, Zeus, to revenge myself on the
Athenians.” He at the same time desired an attendant to remind him
thrice every day at dinner: “Master, remember the Athenians;” for as
to the Ionians, he felt assured that their hour of retribution would
come speedily and easily enough.[556]

  [556] Herodot. v, 105. Ὦ Ζεῦ, ἐκγενέσθαί μοι Ἀθηναίους τίσασθαι.
  Compare the Thracian practice of communicating with the gods by
  shooting arrows high up into the air (Herodot. iv, 94).

This Homeric incident deserves notice as illustrating the epical
handling of Herodotus. His theme is, the invasions of Greece by
Persia: he has now arrived at the first eruption, in the bosom of
Darius, of that passion which impelled the Persian forces towards
Marathon and Salamis,—and he marks the beginning of the new phase
by act and word both alike significant. It may be compared to the
libation and prayer addressed by Achilles in the Iliad to Zeus, at
the moment when he is sending forth Patroklus and the Myrmidons to
the rescue of the despairing Greeks.

At first, Darius had been inclined to ascribe the movement in Ionia
to the secret instigation of Histiæus, whom he called into his
presence and questioned. But the latter found means to satisfy him,
and even to make out that no such mischief would have occurred, if
he, Histiæus, had been at Milêtus instead of being detained at Susa.
“Send me down to the spot, he asseverated, and I engage not merely
to quell the revolt, and put into your hands the traitor who heads
it, but also, not to take off this tunic from my body, before I
shall have added to your empire the great island of Sardinia.” An
expedition to Sardinia, though never realized, appears to have been
among the favorite fancies of the Ionic Greeks of that day.[557] By
such boasts and assurances he obtained his liberty, and went down to
Sardis, promising to return as soon as he should have accomplished
them.[558]

  [557] Herodot. v, 107, vi, 2. Compare the advice of Bias of
  Priênê to the Ionians, when the Persian conqueror Cyrus was
  approaching, to found a Pan-Ionic colony in Sardinia (Herodot. i,
  170): the idea started by Aristagoras has been alluded to just
  above (Herodot. v, 124).

  Pausanias (iv, 23, 2) puts into the mouth of Mantiklus, son of
  Aristomenês, a recommendation to the Messenians, when conquered a
  second time by the Spartans, to migrate to Sardinia.

  [558] Herodot. v, 106, 107.

But on reaching Sardis he found the satrap Artaphernês better
informed than the Great King at Susa. Though Histiæus, when
questioned as to the causes which had brought on the outbreak,
affected nothing but ignorance and astonishment, Artaphernês detected
his evasions, and said: “I will tell you how the facts stand,
Histiæus: it is you that have stitched this shoe, and Aristagoras
has put it on.”[559] Such a declaration promised little security
to the suspected Milesian who heard it; and accordingly, as soon
as night arrived, he took to flight, went down to the coast, and
from thence passed over to Chios. Here he found himself seized on
the opposite count, as the confidant of Darius and the enemy of
Ionia: he was released, however, on proclaiming himself not merely a
fugitive escaping from Persian custody, but also as the prime author
of the Ionic revolt. And he farther added, in order to increase
his popularity, that Darius had contemplated the translation of the
Ionian population to Phenicia, as well as that of the Phenician
population to Ionia,—to prevent which translation he, Histiæus, had
instigated the revolt. This allegation, though nothing better than
a pure fabrication, obtained for him the good-will of the Chians,
who carried him back to Milêtus. But before he departed, he avenged
himself on Artaphernês by despatching to Sardis some false letters,
implicating many distinguished Persians in a conspiracy jointly with
himself: these letters were so managed as to fall into the hands
of the satrap himself, who became full of suspicion, and put to
death several of the parties, to the great uneasiness of all around
him.[560]

  [559] Herodot. vi, 1. Οὕτω τοι, Ἱστίαιε, ἔχει κατὰ ταῦτα
  τὰ πρήγματα· τοῦτο τὸ ὑπόδημα ἔῤῥαψας μὲν σὺ, ὑπεδήσατο δὲ
  Ἀρισταγόρης.

  [560] Herodot. vi, 2-5.

On arriving at Milêtus, Histiæus found Aristagoras no longer present,
and the citizens altogether adverse to the return of their old
despot. Nevertheless, he tried to force his way by night into the
town, but was repulsed and even wounded in the thigh. He returned
to Chios, but the Chians refused him the aid of any of their ships:
he next passed to Lesbos, from the inhabitants of which island he
obtained eight triremes, and employed them to occupy Byzantium,
pillaging and detaining the Ionian merchant-ships as they passed
into or out of the Euxine.[561] The few remaining piracies of this
worthless traitor, mischievous to his countrymen down to the day of
his death, hardly deserve our notice, amidst the last struggles and
sufferings of the subjugated Ionians, to which we are now hastening.

  [561] Herodot. vi, 5-26.

A vast Persian force, both military and naval, was gradually
concentrating itself near Milêtus, against which city Artaphernês had
determined to direct his principal efforts. Not only the whole army
of Asia Minor, but also the Kilikian and Egyptian troops fresh from
the conquest of Cyprus, and even the conquered Cypriots themselves,
were brought up as reinforcements; while the entire Phenician fleet,
no less than six hundred ships strong, coöperated on the coast.[562]
To meet such a land-force in the field, being far beyond the strength
of the Ionians, the joint Pan-Ionic council resolved that the
Milesians should be left to defend their own fortifications, while
the entire force of the confederate cities should be mustered on
board the ships. At sea they had as yet no reason to despair, having
been victorious over the Phenicians near Cyprus, and having sustained
no defeat. The combined Ionic fleet, including the Æolic Lesbians,
amounting in all to the number of three hundred and fifty-three
ships, was accordingly mustered at Ladê,—then a little island near
Milêtus, but now joined on to the coast, by the gradual accumulation
of land in the bay at the mouth of the Mæander. Eighty Milesian ships
formed the right wing, one hundred Chian ships the centre, and sixty
Samian ships the left wing; while the space between the Milesians and
the Chians was occupied by twelve ships from Priênê, three from Myus,
and seventeen from Teôs,—the space between the Chians and Samians was
filled by eight ships from Erythræ, three from Phôkæa, and seventy
from Lesbos.[563]

  [562] Herodot. vi, 6-9.

  [563] Herodot. vi, 8.

The total armament thus made up was hardly inferior in number to that
which, fifteen years afterwards, gained the battle of Salamis against
a far larger Persian fleet than the present. Moreover, the courage of
the Ionians, on ship-board, was equal to that of their contemporaries
on the other side of the Ægean; while in respect of disagreement
among the allies, we shall hereafter find the circumstances preceding
the battle of Salamis still more menacing than those before the
coming battle of Ladê. The chances of success, therefore, were at
least equal between the two; and indeed the anticipations of the
Persians and Phenicians on the present occasion were full of doubt,
so that they thought it necessary to set on foot express means for
disuniting the Ionians,—it was fortunate for the Greeks that Xerxês
at Salamis could not be made to conceive the prudence of aiming at
the same object. There were now in the Persian camp all those various
despots whom Aristagoras, at the beginning of the revolt, had driven
out of their respective cities. At the instigation of Artaphernês,
each of these men despatched secret communications to their citizens
in the allied fleet, endeavoring to detach them severally from
the general body, by promises of gentle treatment in the event of
compliance, and by threats of extreme infliction from the Persians
if they persisted in armed efforts. Though these communications were
sent to each without the knowledge of the rest, yet the answer from
all was one unanimous negative.[564] And the confederates at Ladê
seemed more one, in heart and spirit, than the Athenians, Spartans,
and Corinthians will hereafter prove to be at Salamis.

  [564] Herodot. vi, 9-10.

But there was one grand difference which turned the scale,—the
superior energy and ability of the Athenian leaders at Salamis,
coupled with the fact that they _were_ Athenians,—that is, in command
of the largest and most important contingent throughout the fleet.

At Ladê, unfortunately, this was quite otherwise: each separate
contingent had its own commander, but we hear of no joint commander
at all. Nor were the chiefs who came from the larger cities—Milesian,
Chian, Samian, or Lesbian—men like Themistoklês, competent and
willing to stand forward as self-created leaders, and to usurp for
the moment, with the general consent and for the general benefit, a
privilege not intended for them. The only man of sufficient energy
and forwardness to do this, was the Phôkæan Dionysius,—unfortunately,
the captain of the smallest contingent of the fleet, and therefore
enjoying the least respect. For Phôkæa, once the daring explorer of
the western waters, had so dwindled down since the Persian conquest
of Ionia, that she could now furnish no more than three ships;
and her ancient maritime spirit survived only in the bosom of her
captain. When Dionysius saw the Ionians assembled at Ladê, willing,
eager, full of talk and mutual encouragement, but untrained and
taking no thought of discipline, or nautical practice, or coöperation
in the hour of battle,—he saw the risk which they ran for want of
these precautions, and strenuously remonstrated with them: “Our fate
hangs on the razor’s edge, men of Ionia: either to be freemen or
slaves,—and slaves too, caught after running away. Set yourself at
once to work and duty,—you will then have trouble indeed at first,
with certain victory and freedom afterwards. But if you persist
in this carelessness and disorder, there is no hope for you to
escape the king’s revenge for your revolt. Be persuaded and commit
yourself to me; and I pledge myself, if the gods only hold an equal
balance, that your enemies either will not fight, or will be severely
beaten.”[565]

  [565] Herodot. vi, 11. Ἐπὶ ξυροῦ γὰρ ἀκμῆς ἔχεται ἡμῖν τὰ
  πρήγματα, ἄνδρες Ἴωνες, ἢ εἶναι ἐλευθέροισι ἢ δούλοισι, καὶ
  τούτοισι ὡς δρηπέτῃσι· νῦν ὦν ὑμέες, ἢν μὲν βούλησθε ταλαιπωρίας
  ἐνδέκεσθαι, τὸ παραχρῆμα μὲν πόνος ὑμῖν ἔσται, οἷοί τε δὲ ἔσεσθε,
  ὑπερβαλλόμενοι τοὺς ἐναντίους, εἶναι ἐλεύθεροι, etc.

The wisdom of this advice was so apparent, that the Ionians, quitting
their comfortable tents on the shore of Ladê and going on board
their ships, submitted themselves to the continuous nautical labors
and manœuvres imposed upon them by Dionysius. The rowers, and the
hoplites on the deck, were exercised in their separate functions, and
even when they were not so employed, the ships were kept at anchor,
and the crews on board, instead of on shore; so that the work lasted
all day long, under a hot summer’s sun. Such labor, new to the Ionian
crews, was endured for seven successive days, after which they broke
out with one accord into resolute mutiny and refusal: “Which of the
gods have we offended, to bring upon ourselves such a retribution
as this? madmen as we are, to put ourselves into the hands of this
Phôkæan braggart, who has furnished only three ships![566] He has
now got us, and is ruining us without remedy: many of us are already
sick, many others are sickening; we had better make up our minds to
Persian slavery, or any other mischiefs, rather than go on with these
present sufferings. Come, we will not obey this man any longer.” And
they forthwith refused to execute his orders, resuming their tents
on shore, with the enjoyments of shade, rest, and inactive talk, as
before.

  [566] Herodot. vi, 12. Οἱ Ἴωνες, οἷα ἀπαθέες ἐόντες πόνων
  τοιούτων, τετρυμένοι τε ταλαιπωρίῃσί τε καὶ ἡελίῳ, ἔλεξαν πρὸς
  ἑωϋτοὺς τάδε—Τίνα δαιμόνων παραβάντες, τάδε ἀναπίμπλαμεν, οἵτινες
  παραφρονήσαντες, καὶ ἐκπλώσαντες ἐκ τοῦ νόου, ἀνδρὶ Φωκαέει
  ἀλαζόνι, παρεχομένῳ νέας τρεῖς, ἐπιτρέψαντες ἡμέας αὐτοὺς ἔχομεν,
  etc.

I have not chosen to divest this instructive scene of the dramatic
liveliness with which it is given in Herodotus,—the more so as it
has all the air of reality, and as Hekatæus, the historian, was
probably present in the island of Ladê, and may have described
what he actually saw and heard. When we see the intolerable
hardship which these nautical manœuvres and labors imposed upon the
Ionians, though men not unaccustomed to ordinary ship-work,—and
when we witness their perfect incapacity to submit themselves to
such a discipline, even with extreme danger staring them in the
face,—we shall be able to appreciate the severe and unremitting toil
whereby the Athenian seaman afterwards purchased that perfection
of nautical discipline which characterized him at the beginning
of the Peloponnesian war. It will appear, as we proceed with this
history, that the full development of the Athenian democracy worked
a revolution in Grecian military marine, chiefly by enforcing upon
the citizen seaman a strict continuous training, such as was only
surpassed by the Lacedæmonian drill on land,—and by thus rendering
practicable a species of nautical manœuvring which was unknown even
at the time of the battle of Salamis. I shall show this more fully
hereafter: at present, I contrast it briefly with the incapacity of
the Ionians at Ladê, in order that it may be understood how painful
such training really was. The reader of Grecian history is usually
taught to associate only ideas of turbulence and anarchy with the
Athenian democracy; but the Athenian navy, the child and champion
of that democracy, will be found to display an indefatigable labor
and obedience nowhere else witnessed in Greece, and of which even
the first lessons, as in the case now before us, prove to others so
irksome as to outweigh the prospect of extreme and imminent peril.
The same impatience of steady toil and discipline, which the Ionians
displayed to their own ruin before the battle of Ladê, will be found
to characterize them fifty years afterwards as allies of Athens, as
I shall have occasion to show when I come to describe the Athenian
empire.

Ending in this abrupt and mutinous manner, the judicious suggestions
of the Phôkæan leader did more harm than good. Perhaps his manner of
dealing may have been unadvisedly rude, but we are surprised to see
that no one among the leaders of the larger contingents had the good
sense to avail himself of the first readiness of the Ionians, and to
employ his superior influence in securing the continuance of a good
practice once begun. Not one such superior man did this Ionic revolt
throw up. From the day on which the Ionians discarded Dionysius,
their camp became a scene of disunion and mistrust. Some of them
grew so reckless and unmanageable, that the better portion despaired
of maintaining any orderly battle; and the Samians in particular
now repented that they had declined the secret offers made to them
by their expelled despot,[567]—Æakês, son of Sylosôn. They sent
privately to renew the negotiation, received a fresh promise of the
same indulgence, and agreed to desert when the occasion arrived. On
the day of battle, when the two fleets were on the point of coming
to action, the sixty Samian ships all sailed off, except eleven,
whose captains disdained such treachery. Other Ionians followed their
example; yet amidst the reciprocal crimination which Herodotus had
heard, he finds it difficult to determine who was most to blame,
though he names the Lesbians as among the earliest deserters.[568]
The hundred ships from Chios, constituting the centre of the
fleet—each ship carrying forty chosen soldiers fully armed—formed
a brilliant exception to the rest; they fought with the greatest
fidelity and resolution, inflicting upon the enemy, and themselves
sustaining, heavy loss. Dionysius, the Phôkæan, also behaved in a
manner worthy of his previous language,—capturing with his three
ships the like number of Phenicians. But these examples of bravery
did not compensate the treachery or cowardice of the rest, and the
defeat of the Ionians at Ladê was complete as well as irrecoverable.
To the faithful Chians, the loss was terrible, both in the battle and
after it. For though some of their vessels escaped from the defeat
safely to Chios, others were so damaged as to be obliged to run
ashore close at hand on the promontory of Mykalê, where the crews
quitted them, with the intention of marching northward, through the
Ephesian territory, to the continent opposite their own island. We
hear with astonishment that, at that critical moment, the Ephesian
women were engaged in solemnizing the Thesmophoria,—a festival
celebrated at night, in the open air, in some uninhabited portion of
the territory, and without the presence of any male person. As the
Chian fugitives entered the Ephesian territory by night, their coming
being neither known nor anticipated,—it was believed that they were
thieves or pirates coming to seize the women, and under this error
they were attacked by the Ephesians and slain.[569] It would seem
from this incident that the Ephesians had taken no part in the Ionic
revolt, nor are they mentioned amidst the various contingents. Nor is
anything said either of Kolophon, or Lebedus, or Eræ.[570]

  [567] Herodot. vi, 13.

  [568] Herodot. vi, 14, 15.

  [569] Herodot. vi, 16.

  [570] Thucyd. viii, 14.

The Phôkæan Dionysius, perceiving that the defeat of Ladê was the
ruin of the Ionic cause, and that his native city was again doomed
to Persian subjection, did not think it prudent even to return home.
Immediately after the battle he set sail, not for Phôkæa, but for the
Phenician coast, at this moment stripped of its protecting cruisers.
He seized several Phenician merchantmen, out of which considerable
profit was obtained: then setting sail for Sicily, he undertook the
occupation of a privateer against the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians,
abstaining from injury towards Greeks.[571] Such an employment seems
then to have been perfectly admissible. A considerable body of
Samians also migrated to Sicily, indignant at the treachery of their
admirals in the battle, and yet more indignant at the approaching
restoration of their despot Æakês. How these Samian emigrants became
established in the Sicilian town of Zanklê,[572] I shall mention as a
part of the course of Sicilian events, which will come hereafter.

  [571] Herodot. vi, 17. ληϊστὴς κατεστήκεε Ἑλλήνων μὲν οὐδενὸς,
  Καρχηδονίων δὲ καὶ Τυρσηνῶν.

  [572] Herodot. vi, 22-25.

The victory of Ladê enabled the Persians to attack Milêtus by sea as
well as by land; they prosecuted the siege with the utmost vigor, by
undermining the walls, and by various engines of attack: in which
department their resources seem to have been enlarged since the
days of Harpagus. In no long time the city was taken by storm, and
miserable was the fate reserved to it. The adult male population was
chiefly slain; while such of them as were preserved, together with
the women and children, were sent in a body to Susa, to await the
orders of Darius,—who assigned to them a residence at Ampê, not far
from the mouth of the Tigris. The temple at Branchidæ was burned and
pillaged, as Hekatæus had predicted at the beginning of the revolt:
the large treasures therein contained must have gone far to defray
the costs of the Persian army. The Milesian territory is said to
have been altogether denuded of its former inhabitants,—the Persians
retaining for themselves the city with the plain adjoining to it,
and making over the mountainous portions to the Karians of Pedasa.
Some few of the Milesians found a place among the Samian emigrants
to Sicily.[573] It is certain, however, that new Grecian inhabitants
must have been subsequently admitted into Milêtus; for it appears
ever afterwards as a Grecian town, though with diminished power and
importance.

  [573] Herodot. vi, 18, 19, 20, 22.

    Μίλητος μέν νυν Μιλησίων ἠρήμωτο.

The capture of Milêtus, in the sixth year from the commencement
of the revolt,[574] carried with it the rapid submission of the
neighboring towns in Karia.[575] During the next summer,—the
Phenician fleet having wintered at Milêtus,—the Persian forces
by sea and land reconquered all the Asiatic Greeks, insular as
well as continental. Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos,—the towns in the
Chersonese,—Selymbria and Perinthus in Thrace,—Prokonnêsus and Artakê
in the Propontis,—all these towns were taken or sacked by the Persian
and Phenician fleet.[576] The inhabitants of Byzantium and Chalkêdôn
fled for the most part, without even awaiting its arrival, to
Mesembria, and the Athenian Miltiadês only escaped Persian captivity
by a rapid flight from his abode in the Chersonese to Athens. His
pursuers were indeed so close upon him, that one of his ships, with
his son Metiochus on board, fell into their hands. As Miltiadês had
been strenuous in urging the destruction of the bridge over the
Danube, on the occasion of the Scythian expedition, the Phenicians
were particularly anxious to get possession of his person, as the
most acceptable of all Greek prisoners to the Persian king; who,
however, when Metiochus the son of Miltiadês was brought to Susa, not
only did him no harm, but treated him with great kindness, and gave
him a Persian wife with a comfortable maintenance.[577]

  [574] Herodot. vi, 18, αἱρέουσι κατ᾽ ἄκρης, ἐν τῷ ἑκτῷ ἔτεϊ ἀπὸ
  τῆς ἀποστάσιος τῆς Ἀρισταγόρεω. This is almost the only distinct
  chronological statement which we find in Herodotus respecting the
  Ionic revolt. The other evidences of time in his chapters are
  more or less equivocal: nor is there sufficient testimony before
  us to enable us to arrange the events, between the commencement
  of the Ionic revolt, and the battle of Marathon, into the precise
  years to which they belong. The battle of Marathon stands fixed
  for August or September, 490 B. C.: the siege of Milêtus may
  probably have been finished in 496-495 B. C., and the Ionic
  revolt may have begun in 502-501 B. C. Such are the dates which,
  on the whole, appear to me most probable, though I am far from
  considering them as certain.

  Chronological critics differ considerably in their arrangement of
  the events here alluded to among particular years. See Appendix,
  No. 5, p. 244, in Mr. Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici; Professor
  Schultz, Beyträge zu genaueren Zeitbestimmungen von der 63n zur
  72n Olympiade, pp. 177-183, in the Kieler Philologische Studien;
  and Weissenborn, Beyträge zur genaueren Erforschung der alten
  Griechischen Geschichte, Jena, 1844, p. 87, _seqq._: not to
  mention Reiz and Larcher. Mr. Clinton reckons only ten years from
  the beginning of the Ionic revolt to the battle of Marathon;
  which appears to me too short; though, on the other hand,
  the fourteen years reckoned by Larcher—much more the sixteen
  years reckoned by Reiz—are too long. Mr. Clinton compresses
  inconveniently the latter portion of the interval,—that portion
  which elapsed between the siege of Milêtus and the battle of
  Marathon. And the very improbable supposition to which he is
  obliged to resort,—of a confusion in the language of Herodotus
  between Attic and Olympic years,—indicates that he is pressing
  the text of the historian too closely, when he states, “that
  Herodotus specifies a term of three years between the capture of
  Milêtus, and the expedition of Datis:” see F. H. ad ann. 499. He
  places the capture of Milêtus in 494 B. C.; which I am inclined
  to believe a year later—if not two years later—than the reality.
  Indeed, as Mr. Clinton places the expedition of Aristagoras
  against Naxos (which was _immediately before_ the breaking out of
  the revolt, since Aristagoras seized the Ionic despots while that
  fleet yet remained congregated immediately at the close of the
  expedition) in 501 B. C., and as Herodotus expressly says that
  Milêtus was taken in the sixth year after the revolt, it would
  follow that this capture ought to belong to 495, and not to 494
  B. C. I incline to place it either in 496, or in 495; and the
  Naxian expedition in 502 or 501, leaning towards the earlier of
  the two dates: Schultz agrees with Larcher in placing the Naxian
  expedition in 504 B. C., yet he assigns the capture of Milêtus
  to 496 B. C.,—whereas, Herodotus states that the last of these
  two events was in the sixth year after the revolt, which revolt
  immediately succeeded on the first of the two, within the same
  summer. Weissenborn places the capture of Milêtus in 496 B. C.,
  and the expedition to Naxos in 499,—suspecting that the text in
  Herodotus—ἑκτῷ ἔτεϊ—is incorrect, and that it ought to be τετάρτῳ
  ἔτεϊ, the fourth year (p. 125: compare the chronological table
  in his work, p. 222). He attempts to show that the particular
  incidents composing the Ionic revolt, as Herodotus recounts
  it, cannot be made to occupy more than four years; but his
  reasoning is, in my judgment, unsatisfactory, and the conjecture
  inadmissible. The distinct affirmation of the historian, as to
  the entire interval between the two events, is of much more
  evidentiary value than our conjectural summing up of the details.

  It is vain, I think, to try to arrange these details according to
  precise years: this can only be done very loosely.

  [575] Herodot. vi, 25.

  [576] Herodot. vi, 31-33. It may perhaps be to this burning and
  sacking of the cities in the Propontis, and on the Asiatic side
  of the Hellespont, that Strabo (xiii, p. 591) makes allusion;
  though he ascribes the proceeding to a different cause,—to the
  fear of Darius that the Scythians would cross into Asia to avenge
  themselves upon him for attacking them, and that the towns on the
  coast would furnish them with vessels for the passage.

  [577] Herodot. vi, 41.

Far otherwise did the Persian generals deal with the reconquered
cities on and near the coast. The threats which had been held out
before the battle of Ladê were realized to the full. The most
beautiful Greek youths and virgins were picked out, to be distributed
among the Persian grandees as eunuchs, or inmates of the harems; the
cities with their edifices, sacred as well as profane, were made
a prey to the flames; and in the case of the islands, Herodotus
even tells us, that a line of Persians was formed from shore to
shore, which swept each territory from north to south, and drove
the inhabitants out of it.[578] That much of this hard treatment is
well founded, there can be no doubt. But it must be exaggerated as
to extent of depopulation and destruction, for these islands and
cities appear ever afterwards as occupied by a Grecian population,
and even as in a tolerable, though reduced, condition. Samos was made
an exception to the rest, and completely spared by the Persians, as
a reward to its captains for setting the example of desertion at the
battle of Ladê; at the same time, Æakês the despot of that island
was reinstated in his government.[579] It appears that several other
despots were also replaced in their respective cities, though we are
not told which.

  [578] Herodot. vi, 31, 32, 33.

  [579] Herodot. vi, 25.

Amidst the sufferings endured by so many innocent persons, of
every age and of both sexes, the fate of Histiæus excites but
little sympathy. Having learned, while carrying on his piracies at
Byzantium, the surrender of Milêtus, he thought it expedient to sail
with his Lesbian vessels to Chios, where admittance was refused to
him. But the Chians, weakened as they had been by the late battle,
were in little condition to resist, so that he defeated their troops
and despoiled the island. During the present break-up of the Asiatic
Greeks, there were doubtless many who, like the Phôkæan Dionysius,
did not choose to return home to an enslaved city, yet had no fixed
plan for a new abode: of these exiles, a considerable number put
themselves under the temporary command of Histiæus, and accompanied
him to the plunder of Thasos.[580] While besieging that town, he
learned the news that the Phenician fleet had quitted Milêtus to
attack the remaining Ionic towns; and he left his designs on Thasos
unfinished, in order to go and defend Lesbos. But in this latter
island the dearth of provisions was such, that he was forced to cross
over to the continent to reap the standing corn around Atarneus and
in the fertile plain of Mysia near the river Kaïkus. Here he fell
in with a considerable Persian force under Harpagus,—was beaten,
compelled to flee, and taken prisoner. On his being carried to
Sardis, Artaphernês the satrap caused him to be at once crucified:
partly, no doubt, from genuine hatred, but partly also under the
persuasion that, if he were sent up as a prisoner to Susa, he might
again become dangerous,—since Darius would even now spare his life,
under an indelible sentiment of gratitude for the maintenance of
the bridge over the Danube. The head of Histiæus was embalmed and
sent up to Susa, where Darius caused it to be honorably buried,
condemning this precipitate execution of a man who had once been his
preserver.[581]

  [580] Herodot. vi, 26-28. ἄγων Ἰώνων καὶ Αἰολέων συχνούς.

  [581] Herodot. vi, 28, 29, 30.

We need not wonder that the capture of Milêtus excited the strongest
feeling, of mixed sympathy and consternation, among the Athenians.
In the succeeding year (so at least we are led to think, though
the date cannot be positively determined), it was selected as the
subject of a tragedy,—The Capture of Milêtus,—by the dramatic poet
Phrynichus; which, when performed, so painfully wrung the feelings
of the Athenian audience, that they burst into tears in the theatre,
and the poet was condemned to pay a fine of one thousand drachmæ, as
“having recalled to them their own misfortunes.”[582] The piece was
forbidden to be afterwards acted, and has not come down to us. Some
critics have supposed that Herodotus has not correctly assigned the
real motive which determined the Athenians to impose this fine.[583]
For it is certain that the subjects usually selected for tragedy were
portions of heroic legend, and not matters of recent history; so that
the Athenians might complain of Phrynichus on the double ground,—for
having violated an established canon of propriety, as well as for
touching their sensibilities too deeply. Still, I see no reason
for doubting that the cause assigned by Herodotus is substantially
the true one; but it is very possible that Phrynichus, at an age
when tragic poetry had not yet reached its full development, might
touch this very tender subject with a rough and offensive hand,
before a people who had fair reason to dread the like cruel fate for
themselves. Æschylus, in his Persæ, would naturally carry with him
the full tide of Athenian sympathy, while dwelling on the victories
of Salamis and Platæa. But to interest the audience in Persian
success and Grecian suffering, was a task in which much greater poets
than Phrynichus would have failed,—and which no judicious poet would
have undertaken. The sack of Magdeburg, by Count Tilly, in the Thirty
Years’ war, was not likely to be endured as the subject of dramatic
representation in any Protestant town of Germany.

  [582] Herodot. vi, 21, ὡς ἀναμνήσαντα οἰκηΐα κακὰ: compare vii,
  152; also, Kallisthenês ap. Strabo, xiv, p. 635, and Plutarch,
  Præcept. Reipubl. Gerend. p. 814.

  [583] See Welcker Griechische Tragödien, vol. i, p. 25.




CHAPTER XXXVI.

FROM THE IONIC REVOLT TO THE BATTLE OF MARATHON.


In the preceding chapter, I indicated the point of confluence between
the European and Asiatic streams of Grecian history,—the commencement
of a decided Persian intention to conquer Attica; manifested first
in the form of a threat by Artaphernês the satrap, when he enjoined
the Athenians to take back Hippias as the only condition of safety,
and afterwards converted into a passion in the bosom of Darius
in consequence of the burning of Sardis. From this time forward,
therefore, the affairs of Greece and Persia came to be in direct
relation one with the other, and capable of being embodied, much more
than before, into one continuous narrative.

The reconquest of Ionia being thoroughly completed, Artaphernês
proceeded to organize the future government of it, with a degree of
prudence and forethought not often visible in Persian proceedings.
Convoking deputies from all the different cities, he compelled them
to enter into a permanent convention, for the amicable settlement
of disputes, so as to prevent all employment of force by any one
against the others. Moreover, he caused the territory of each city to
be measured by parasangs (each parasang was equal to thirty stadia,
or about three miles and a half), and arranged the assessments
of tribute according to this measurement, without any material
departure, however, from the sums which had been paid before the
revolt.[584]

  [584] Herodot. vi, 42.

Unfortunately, Herodotus is unusually brief in his allusion to this
proceeding, which it would have been highly interesting to be able
to comprehend perfectly. We may, however, assume it as certain,
that both the population and the territory of many among the Ionic
cities, if not of all, were materially altered in consequence of the
preceding revolt, and still more in consequence of the cruelties
with which the suppression of the revolt had been accompanied. In
regard to Milêtus, Herodotus tells us that the Persians retained
for themselves the city with its circumjacent plain, but gave
the mountain portion of the Milesian territory to the Karians of
Pêdasa.[585] Such a proceeding would naturally call for a fresh
measurement and assessment of tribute; and there may have been
similar transfers of land elsewhere. I have already observed that
the statements which we find in Herodotus, of utter depopulation and
destruction falling upon the cities, cannot be credited in their
full extent; for these cities are all peopled, and all Hellenic,
afterwards. But there can be no doubt that they are partially true,
and that the miseries of those days, as stated in the work of
Hekatæus, as well as by contemporary informants with whom Herodotus
had probably conversed, must have been extreme. New inhabitants would
probably be admitted in many of them, to supply the loss sustained;
and such infusion of fresh blood would strengthen the necessity for
the organization introduced by Artaphernês, in order to determine
clearly the obligations due from the cities both to the Persian
government and towards each other. Herodotus considers that the
arrangement was extremely beneficial to the Ionians, and so it must
unquestionably have appeared, coming as it did immediately after
so much previous suffering. He farther adds, that the tribute then
fixed remained unaltered until his own day,—a statement requiring
some comment, which I reserve until the time arrives for describing
the condition of the Asiatic Greeks after the repulse of Xerxês from
Greece proper.

  [585] Herodot. vi, 20.

Meanwhile, the intentions of Darius for the conquest of Greece were
now effectively manifested: Mardonius, invested with the supreme
command, and at the head of a large force, was sent down in the
ensuing spring for the purpose. Having reached Kilikia in the course
of the march, he himself got on ship-board and went by sea to
Ionia, while his army marched across Asia Minor to the Hellespont.
His proceeding in Ionia surprises us, and seems to have appeared
surprising as well to Herodotus himself as to his readers. Mardonius
deposed the despots throughout the various Greek cities,[586] and
left the people of each to govern themselves, subject to the Persian
dominion and tribute. This was a complete reversal of the former
policy of Persia, and must be ascribed to a new conviction, doubtless
wise and well founded, which had recently grown up among the Persian
leaders, that on the whole their unpopularity was aggravated, more
than their strength was increased, by employing these despots as
instruments. The phenomena of the late Ionic revolt were well
calculated to teach such a lesson; but we shall not often find the
Persians profiting by experience, throughout the course of this
history.

  [586] Herodot. vi, 43. In recounting this deposition of the
  despots by Mardonius, Herodotus reasons from it as an analogy
  for the purpose of vindicating the correctness of another of
  his statements, which, he acquaints us, many persons disputed;
  namely, the discussion which he reports to have taken place among
  the seven conspirators, after the death of the Magian Smerdis,
  whether they should establish a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a
  democracy,—ἐνθαῦτα μέγιστον θώϋμα ἐρέω τοῖσι μὴ ἀποδεκομένοισι
  τῶν Ἑλλήνων, Περσέων τοῖσι ἕπτα Ὀτάνεα γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι, ὡς
  χρέων εἴη δημοκρατέεσθαι Πέρσας· τοὺς γὰρ τυράννους τῶν Ἰώνων
  καταπαύσας πάντας ὁ Μαρδόνιος, δημοκρατίας κατίστα ἐς τὰς πόλιας.
  Such passages as this let us into the controversies of the time,
  and prove that Herodotus found many objectors to his story about
  the discussion on theories of government among the seven Persian
  conspirators (iii, 80-82).

Mardonius did not remain long in Ionia, but passed on with his
fleet to the Hellespont, where the land-force had already arrived.
He transported it across into Europe, and began his march through
Thrace; all of which had already been reduced by Megabazus, and
does not seem to have participated in the Ionic revolt. The island
of Thasus surrendered to the fleet without any resistance, and the
land-force was conveyed across the Strymon to the Greek city of
Akanthus, on the western coast of the Strymonic gulf. From hence
his land-force marched into Macedonia, and subdued a considerable
portion of its inhabitants, perhaps some of those not comprised in
the dominion of Amyntas, since that prince had before submitted to
Megabazus. Meanwhile, he sent his fleet to double the promontory of
Mount Athos, and to join the land-force again at the gulf of Therma,
with a view of conquering as much of Greece as he could, and even
of prosecuting the march as far as Athens and Eretria;[587] so that
the expedition afterwards accomplished by Xerxês would have been
tried at least by Mardonius, twelve or thirteen years earlier, had
not a terrible storm completely disabled the fleet. The sea near
Athos was then, and is now, full of peril to navigators. One of the
hurricanes, so frequent in its neighborhood, overtook the Persian
fleet, destroyed three hundred ships, and drowned or cast ashore
not less than twenty thousand men: of those who reached the shore,
many died of cold, or were devoured by the wild beasts on that
inhospitable tongue of land. This disaster checked altogether the
farther progress of Mardonius, who also sustained considerable loss
with his land-army, and was himself wounded, in a night attack made
upon him by the tribe of Thracians called Brygi. Though strong enough
to repel and avenge this attack, and to subdue the Brygi, he was yet
in no condition to advance farther. Both the land-force and the fleet
were conveyed back to the Hellespont, and from thence across to Asia,
with all the shame of failure. Nor was Mardonius again employed by
Darius, though we cannot make out that the fault was imputable to
him.[588] We shall hear of him again under Xerxês.

  [587] Herodot. vi, 43, 44, ἐπορεύοντο δὲ ἐπί τε Ἐρετρίαν καὶ
  Ἀθήνας.

  [588] Herodot. vi, 44-94. Charon of Lampsakus had noticed the
  storm near Mount Athos, and the destruction of the fleet of
  Mardonius (Charonis Fragment. 3, ed. Didot; Athenæ. ix, p. 394).

The ill-success of Mardonius seems to have inspired the Thasians,
so recently subdued, with the idea of revolting. At least, they
provoked the suspicion of Darius by making active preparations for
defence, building war-ships, and strengthening their fortifications.
The Thasians were at this time in great opulence, chiefly from their
gold and silver mines, both in their island and in their mainland
territory opposite. Their mines at Skaptê Hylê, in Thrace, yielded
to them an annual income of eighty talents; and altogether their
surplus revenue—after defraying all the expenses of government, so
that the inhabitants were entirely untaxed—was two hundred talents
(forty-six thousand pounds, if Attic talents; more, if either Euboic
or Æginæan). With these large means, they were enabled soon to make
preparations which excited notice among their neighbors, many of whom
were doubtless jealous of their prosperity, and perhaps inclined
to dispute with them possession of the profitable mines of Skaptê
Hylê. As in other cases, so in this: the jealousies among subject
neighbors often procured revelations to the superior power: the
proceedings of the Thasians were made known, and they were forced to
raze their fortifications as well as to surrender all their ships to
the Persians at Abdêra.[589]

  [589] Herodot. vi, 46-48. See a similar case of disclosure
  arising from jealousy between Tenedos and Lesbos (Thucyd. iii, 2).

Though dissatisfied with Mardonius, Darius was only the more eagerly
bent on his project of conquering Greece, and Hippias was at his
side to keep alive his wrath against the Athenians.[590] Orders were
despatched to the maritime cities of his empire to equip both ships
of war and horse-transports for a renewed attempt. His intentions
were probably known in Greece itself by this time, from the recent
march of his army to Macedonia; but he thought it advisable to send
heralds round to most of the Grecian cities, in order to require
from each the formal token of submission,—earth and water; and thus
to ascertain what extent of resistance his intended expedition was
likely to experience. The answers received were to a high degree
favorable. Many of the continental Greeks sent their submission,
as well as all those islanders to whom application was made. Among
the former, we are probably to reckon the Thebans and Thessalians,
though Herodotus does not particularize them. Among the latter,
Naxos, Eubœa, and some of the smaller islands, are not included; but
Ægina, at that time the first maritime power of Greece, is expressly
included.[591]

  [590] Herodot. vi, 94.

  [591] Herodot. vi, 48-49; viii, 46.

Nothing marks so clearly the imminent peril in which the liberties
of Greece were now placed, and the terror inspired by the Persians
after their reconquest of Ionia, as this abasement on the part of
the Æginetans, whose commerce with the Asiatic islands and continent
doubtless impressed them strongly with the melancholy consequences
of unsuccessful resistance to the Great King. But on the present
occasion, their conduct was dictated as much by antipathy to Athens
as by fear, so that Greece was thus threatened with the intrusion
of the Persian arm as ally and arbiter in her internal contests: a
contingency which, if it had occurred now in the dispute between
Ægina and Athens, would have led to the certain enslavement of
Greece,—though when it did occur nearly a century afterwards,
towards the close of the Peloponnesian war, and in consequence of
the prolonged struggle between Lacedæmon and Athens, Greece had
become strong enough in her own force to endure it without the loss
of substantial independence. The war between Thebes and Ægina on
one side, and Athens on the other,—begun several years before, and
growing out of the connection between Athens and Platæa,—had never
yet been terminated. The Æginetans had taken part in that war from
gratuitous feeling, either of friendship for Thebes, or of enmity
to Athens, without any direct ground of quarrel,[592] and they had
begun the war even without the formality of notice. Though a period
apparently not less than fourteen years (from about 506-492 B. C.)
had elapsed since it began, the state of hostility still continued;
and we may well conceive that Hippias, the great instigator of
Persian attack upon Greece, would not fail to enforce upon all the
enemies of Athens the prudence of seconding, or at least of not
opposing, the efforts of the Persian to reinstate him in that city.
It was partly under this feeling, combined with genuine alarm, that
both Thebes and Ægina manifested submissive dispositions towards the
heralds of Darius.

  [592] Herodot. v, 81-89. See above, chapter xxxi. The legendary
  story there given as the provocation of Ægina to the war is
  evidently not to be treated as a real and historical cause of
  war: a state of quarrel causes all such stories to be raked up,
  and some probably to be invented. It is like the old alleged
  quarrel between the Athenians and the Pelasgi of Lemnos (vi,
  137-140).

Among these heralds, some had gone both to Athens and to Sparta,
for the same purpose of demanding earth and water. The reception
given to them at both places was angry in the extreme. The Athenians
cast the herald into the pit called the barathrum,[593] into which
they sometimes precipitated public criminals: the Spartans threw
the herald who came to them into a well, desiring the unfortunate
messenger to take earth and water from thence to the king. The
inviolability of heralds was so ancient and undisputed in Greece,
from the Homeric times downward, that nothing short of the fiercest
excitement could have instigated any Grecian community to such
an outrage. But to the Lacedæmonians, now accustomed to regard
themselves as the first of all Grecian states, and to be addressed
always in the character of superiors, the demand appeared so gross an
insult as to banish from their minds for the time all recollection of
established obligations. They came subsequently, however, to repent
of the act as highly criminal, and to look upon it as the cause of
misfortunes which overtook them thirty or forty years afterwards: how
they tried at that time to expiate it, I shall hereafter recount.[594]

  [593] It is to this treatment of the herald that the story in
  Plutarch’s Life of Themistoklês must allude, if that story
  indeed be true; for the Persian king was not likely to send a
  second herald, after such treatment of the first. An interpreter
  accompanied the herald, speaking Greek as well as his own native
  language. Themistoklês proposed and carried a vote that he should
  be put to death, for having employed the Greek language as medium
  for barbaric dictation (Plutarch, Themist. c. 6). We should be
  glad to know from whom Plutarch copied this story.

  Pausanias states that it was Miltiadês who proposed the putting
  to death of the heralds at Athens (iii, 12, 6); and that the
  divine judgment fell upon his family in consequence of it. From
  whom Pausanias copied this statement I do not know: certainly not
  from Herodotus, who does not mention Miltiadês in the case, and
  expressly says that he does not know in what manner the divine
  judgment overtook the Athenians for the crime, “except (says he)
  that their city and country was afterwards laid waste by Xerxês;
  but I do not think that this happened on account of the outrage
  on the heralds.” (Herodot. vii, 133.)

  The belief that there must have been a divine judgment of
  some sort or other, presented a strong stimulus to invent or
  twist some historical fact to correspond with it. Herodotus
  has sufficient regard for truth to resist this stimulus and to
  confess his ignorance; a circumstance which goes, along with
  others, to strengthen our confidence in his general authority.
  His silence weakens the credibility, but does not refute the
  allegation of Pausanias with regard to Miltiadês,—which is
  certainly not intrinsically improbable.

  [594] Herodot. vii, 133.

But if, on the one hand, the wounded dignity of the Spartans hurried
them into the commission of this wrong, it was on the other hand
of signal use to the general liberties of Greece, by rousing them
out of their apathy as to the coming invader, and placing them with
regard to him in the same state of inexpiable hostility as Athens
and Eretria. We see at once the bonds drawn closer between Athens
and Sparta. The Athenians, for the first time, prefer a complaint
at Sparta against the Æginetans for having given earth and water to
Darius,—accusing them of having done this with views of enmity to
Athens, and in order to invade Attica conjointly with the Persian.
This they represented “as treason to Hellas,” calling upon Sparta
as head of Greece to interfere. And in consequence of their appeal,
Kleomenês king of Sparta went over to Ægina, to take measures against
the authors of the late proceeding, “for the general benefit of
Hellas.”[595]

  [595] Herodot. vi, 49. Ποιήσασι δέ σφι (Αἰγιμήταις) ταῦτα, ἰθέως
  Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπεκέατο, δοκέοντες ἐπὶ σφίσι ἔχοντας τοὺς Αἰγινήτας
  δεδωκέναι (γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ), ὡς ἅμα τῷ Πέρσῃ ἐπὶ σφέας στρατεύωνται.
  Καὶ ἄσμενοι προφάσιος ἐπελάβοντο· ~φοιτέοντές τε ἐς τὴν Σπάρτην,
  κατηγόρεον τῶν Αἰγινητέων τὰ πεποιήκοιεν, προδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα~.
  Compare viii, 144, ix, 7. ~τὴν Ἑλλάδα δεινὸν ποιούμενοι
  προδοῦναι~—a new and very important phrase.

  vi, 61. Τότε δὲ τὸν Κλεομένεα, ἐόντα ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ, ~καὶ κοινὰ τῇ
  Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ προεργαζόμενον~, etc.

The proceeding now before us is of very great importance in the
progress of Grecian history. It is the first direct and positive
historical manifestation of Hellas as an aggregate body, with Sparta
as its chief, and obligations of a certain sort on the part of its
members, the neglect or violation of which constitutes a species
of treason. I have already pointed out several earlier incidents,
showing how the Greek political mind, beginning from entire severance
of states, became gradually prepared for this idea of a permanent
league with mutual obligations and power of enforcement vested in
a permanent chief,—an idea never fully carried into practice, but
now distinctly manifest and partially operative. First, the great
acquired power and territory of Sparta, her military training, her
undisturbed political traditions, create an unconscious deference
towards her, such as was not felt towards any other state: next, she
is seen in the proceedings against Athens, after the expulsion of
Hippias, as summoning and conducting to war a cluster of self-obliged
Peloponnesian allies, with certain formalities which gave to the
alliance an imposing permanence and solemnity: thirdly, her position
becomes recognized as first power or president of Greece, both
by foreigners who invite alliance (Crœsus), or by Greeks who seek
help, such as the Platæans against Thebes, or the Ionians against
Persia. But Sparta has not been hitherto found willing to take
on herself the performance of this duty of protector-general.
She refused the Ionians and the Samian Mæandrius, as well as the
Platæans, in spite of their entreaties founded on common Hellenic
lineage: the expedition which she undertook against Polykratês of
Samos, was founded upon private motives of displeasure, even in the
estimation of the Lacedæmonians themselves: moreover, even if all
these requests had been granted, she might have seemed to be rather
obeying a generous sympathy than performing a duty incumbent upon
her as superior. But in the case now before us, of Athens against
Ægina, the latter consideration stands distinctly prominent. Athens
is not a member of the cluster of Spartan allies, nor does she claim
the compassion of Sparta, as defenceless against an overpowering
Grecian neighbor. She complains of a Pan-Hellenic obligation as
having been contravened by the Æginetans to her detriment and danger,
and calls upon Sparta to enforce upon the delinquents respect to
these obligations. For the first time in Grecian history, such a call
is made; for the first time in Grecian history, it is effectively
answered. We may reasonably doubt, whether it would have been thus
answered,—considering the tardy, unimpressible, and home-keeping
character of the Spartans, with their general insensibility to
distant dangers,[596]—if the adventure of the Persian herald had not
occurred to gall their pride beyond endurance; to drive them into
unpardonable hostility with the Great King; and to cast them into the
same boat with Athens for keeping off an enemy who threatened the
common liberties of Hellas.

  [596] Thucyd. i, 70-118. ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς (_i. e._ the Spartans)
  μελλητὰς καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους.

From this time, then, we may consider that there exists a
recognized political union of Greece against the Persians,[597]—or
at least something as near to a political union as Grecian temper
will permit,—with Sparta as its head for the present. To such a
preëminence of Sparta, Grecian history had been gradually tending;
but the final event which placed it beyond dispute, and which humbled
for the time her ancient and only rival—Argos—is now to be noticed.

  [597] Herodot. vii, 145-148. Οἱ συνωμόται Ἑλλήνων ἐπὶ τῷ Πέρσῃ.

It was about three or four years before the arrival of these Persian
heralds in Greece, and nearly at the time when Milêtus was besieged
by the Persian generals, that a war broke out between Sparta and
Argos,[598]—on what grounds Herodotus does not inform us. Kleomenês,
encouraged by a promise of the oracle that he should take Argos, led
the Lacedæmonian troops to the banks of the Erasinus, the border
river of the Argeian territory. But the sacrifices, without which
no river could be crossed, were so unfavorable, that he altered
his course, extorted some vessels from Ægina and Sikyon,[599] and
carried his troops by sea to Nauplia, the seaport belonging to Argos,
and to the territory of Tiryns. The Argeians having marched their
forces down to resist him, the two armies joined battle at Sêpeia,
near Tiryns: Kleomenês, by a piece of simplicity on the part of his
enemies, which we find it difficult to credit in Herodotus, was
enabled to attack them unprepared, and obtained a decisive victory.
For the Argeians, it is stated, were so afraid of being overreached
by stratagem, in the post which their army occupied over against
the enemy, that they listened for the commands proclaimed aloud by
the Lacedæmonian herald, and performed with their own army the same
order which they thus heard given. This came to the knowledge of
Kleomenês, who communicated private notice to his soldiers, that
when the herald proclaimed orders to go to dinner, they should not
obey, but immediately stand to their arms. We are to presume that the
Argeian camp was sufficiently near to that of the Lacedæmonians to
enable them to hear the voice of the herald, yet not within sight,
from the nature of the ground. Accordingly, so soon as the Argeians
heard the herald in the enemy’s camp proclaim the word to go to
dinner,[600] they went to dinner themselves; and in this disorderly
condition they were easily overthrown by the Spartans. Many of them
perished in the field, while the fugitives took refuge in a thick
grove consecrated to their eponymous hero Argus. Kleomenês pursued
and inclosed them therein; but thinking it safer to employ deceit
rather than force, he ascertained from deserters the names of the
chief Argeians thus shut up, and then invited them out successively
by means of a herald,—pretending that he had received their ransom,
and that they were released. As fast as each man came out, he was
put to death; the fate of these unhappy sufferers being concealed
from their comrades within the grove by the thickness of the foliage,
until some one climbing to the top of a tree detected and proclaimed
the destruction going on,—after about fifty of the victims had
perished. Unable to entice any more of the Argeians from their
consecrated refuge, which they still vainly hoped would protect them,
Kleomenês set fire to the grove, and burnt it to the ground, insomuch
that the persons within it appear to have been destroyed, either by
fire or by sword.[601] After the conflagration had begun, he inquired
for the first time to whom the grove belonged, and learnt that it
belonged to the hero Argus.

  [598] That which marks the siege of Milêtus, and the defeat of
  the Argeians by Kleomenês, as contemporaneous, or nearly so, is,
  the common oracular dictum delivered in reference to both: in the
  same prophecy of the Pythia, one half alludes to the sufferings
  of Milêtus, the other half to those of Argos (Herodot. vi, 19-77).

  Χρεωμένοισι γὰρ Ἀργείοισι ἐν Δελφοῖσι περὶ σωτηρίης τῆς πόλιος
  τῆς σφετέρης, τὸ μὲν ἐς αὐτοὺς τοὺς Ἀργείους φέρον, τὴν δὲ
  παρενθήκην ἔχρησε ἐς Μιλησίους.

  I consider this evidence of date to be better than the statement
  of Pausanias. That author places the enterprise against Argos
  immediately (αὔτικα—Paus. iii, 4, 1) after the accession of
  Kleomenês, who, as he was king when Mæandrius came from Samos
  (Herodot. iii, 148), must have come to the throne not later than
  518 or 517 B. C. This would be thirty-seven years prior to 480 B.
  C.; a date much too early for the war between Kleomenês and the
  Argeians, as we may see by Herodotus (vii, 149).

  [599] Herodot. vi, 92.

  [600] Herodot. vi, 78; compare Xenophon, Rep. Laced. xii, 6.
  Orders for evolutions in the field, in the Lacedæmonian military
  service, were not proclaimed by the herald, but transmitted
  through the various gradations of officers (Thucyd. v, 66).

  [601] Herodot. vi, 79, 80.

Not less than six thousand citizens, the flower and strength of
Argos, perished in this disastrous battle and retreat. And so
completely was the city prostrated, that Kleomenês might easily have
taken it, had he chosen to march thither forthwith and attack it
with vigor. If we are to believe later historians whom Pausanias,
Polyænus, and Plutarch have copied, he did march thither and attack
it, but was repulsed by the valor of the Argeian women; who, in the
dearth of warriors occasioned by the recent defeat, took arms along
with the slaves, headed by the poetess Telesilla, and gallantly
defended the walls.[602] This is probably a mythe, generated by a
desire to embody in detail the dictum of the oracle a little before,
about “the female conquering the male.”[603] Without meaning to
deny that the Argeian women might have been capable of achieving so
patriotic a deed, if Kleomenês had actually marched to the attack of
their city, we are compelled, by the distinct statement of Herodotus,
to affirm that he never did attack it. Immediately after the burning
of the sacred grove of Argos, he dismissed the bulk of his army to
Sparta, retaining only one thousand choice troops,—with whom he
marched up to the Hêræum, or great temple of Hêrê, between Argos and
Mykênæ, to offer sacrifice. The priest in attendance forbade him
to enter, saying that no stranger was allowed to offer sacrifice
in the temple. But Kleomenês had once already forced his way into
the sanctuary of Athênê, on the Athenian acropolis, in spite of the
priestess and her interdict,—and he now acted still more brutally
towards the Argeian priest, for he directed his helots to drag him
from the altar and scourge him. Having offered sacrifice, Kleomenês
returned with his remaining force to Sparta.[604]

  [602] Pausan. ii, 20, 7; Polyæn. viii, 33; Plutarch, De Virtut.
  Mulier, p. 245; Suidas, v. Τελέσιλλα.

  Plutarch cites the historian Sokratês of Argos for this story
  about Telesilla; an historian, or perhaps composer of a
  περιήγησις Ἄργους, of unknown date: compare Diogen. Laërt. ii,
  5, 47, and Plutarch, Quæstion. Romaic. pp. 270-277. According to
  his representation, Kleomenês and Demaratus jointly assaulted
  the town of Argos, and Demaratus, after having penetrated into
  the town and become master of the Pamphyliakon, was driven out
  again by the women. Now Herodotus informs us that Kleomenês and
  Demaratus were never employed upon the same expedition, after the
  disagreement in their march to Attica (v, 75; vi, 64).

  [603] Herodot. vi, 77.

    Ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἡ θηλεῖα τὸν ἄρσενα νικήσασα
    Ἐξελάσῃ, καὶ κῦδος ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἄρηται, etc.

  If this prophecy can be said to have any distinct meaning, it
  probably refers to Hêrê, as protectress of Argos, repulsing the
  Spartans.

  Pausanias (ii, 20, 7) might well doubt whether Herodotus
  understood this oracle in the same sense as he did: it is plain
  that Herodotus could not have so understood it.

  [604] Herodot. vi, 80, 81: compare v, 72.

But the army whom he had sent home returned with a full persuasion
that Argos might easily have been taken,—that the king alone was
to blame for having missed the opportunity. As soon as he himself
returned, his enemies—perhaps his colleague Demaratus—brought him
to trial before the ephors, on a charge of having been bribed,
against which he defended himself as follows: He had invaded the
hostile territory on the faith of an assurance from the oracle that
he should take Argos; but so soon as he had burnt down the sacred
grove of the hero Argus,—without knowing to whom it belonged,—he
became at once sensible that this was all that the god meant by
_taking Argos_, and therefore that the divine promise had been
fully realized. Accordingly, he did not think himself at liberty
to commence any fresh attack, until he had ascertained whether the
gods would approve it and would grant him success. It was with this
view that he sacrificed in the Hêræum. But though his sacrifice was
favorable, he observed that the flame kindled on the altar flashed
back from the bosom of the statue of Hêrê, and not from her head. If
the flame had flashed from her head, he would have known at once that
the gods intended him to take the city by storm;[605] but the flash
from her bosom plainly indicated that the topmost success was out
of his reach, and that he had already reaped all the glories which
they intended for him. We may see that Herodotus, though he refrains
from criticizing this story, suspects it to be a fabrication. Not
so the Spartan ephors: to them it appeared not less true as a story
than triumphant as a defence, insuring to Kleomenês an honorable
acquittal.[606]

  [605] Herodot. vi, 82. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ~ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς~ τοῦ ἀγάλματος
  ἐξέλαμψε, αἱρέειν ἂν ~κατ᾽ ἀκρῆς~ τὴν πόλιν· ἐκ τῶν στηθέων δὲ
  λάμψαντος, πᾶν οἱ πεποιῆσθαι ὅσον ὁ θεὸς ἤθελε.

  For the expression αἱρέειν κατ᾽ ἀκρῆς, compare Herodot. vi, 21,
  and Damm. Lex. Homer. v. ἀκρός. In this expression, as generally
  used, the last words κατ᾽ ἀκρῆς have lost their primitive and
  special sense, and do little more than intensify the simple
  αἱρέειν,—equivalent to something like “de fond en comble:” for
  Kleomenês is accused by his enemies,—φάμενοί μιν δωροδοκήσαντα,
  οὐκ ἑλέειν τὸ Ἄργος, παρέον εὐπετέως μιν ἑλεῖν. But in the story
  recounted by Kleomenês, the words κατ᾽ ἀκρῆς come back to their
  primitive meaning, and serve as the foundation for his religious
  inference, from type to thing typified: if the light had shone
  from the head or _top_ of the statue, this would have intimated
  that the gods meant him to take the city “_from top to bottom_.”

  In regard to this very illustrative story,—which there seems no
  reason for mistrusting,—the contrast between the point of view
  of Herodotus and that of the Spartan ephors deserves notice. The
  former, while he affirms distinctly that it was the real story
  told by Kleomenês, suspects its truth, and utters as much of
  skepticism as his pious fear will permit him; the latter find
  it in complete harmony, both with their canon of belief and
  with their religious feeling,—Κλεομένης δέ σφι ἔλεξε, οὔτε εἰ
  ψευδόμενος οὔτε εἰ ἀληθέα λέγων, ἔχω σαφηνέως εἶπαι· ἔλεξε δ᾽
  ὦν.... Ταῦτα δὲ λέγων, πιστά τε καὶ οἴκοτα ἐδόκεε Σπαρτιήτῃσι
  λέγειν, καὶ ἀπέφυγε πολλὸν τοὺς διώκοντας.

  [606] Compare Pausanias, ii, 20, 8.

Though this Spartan king lost the opportunity of taking Argos, his
victories already gained had inflicted upon her a blow such as she
did not recover for a generation, and put her for a time out of all
condition to dispute the primacy of Greece with Lacedæmon. I have
already mentioned that both in legend and in earliest history, Argos
stands forth as the first power in Greece, with legendary claims to
headship, and decidedly above Lacedæmon; who gradually usurps from
her, first the reality of superior power, next the recognition of
preëminence,—and is now, at the period which we have reached, taking
upon herself both the rights and the duties of a presiding state
over a body of allies who are bound both to her and to each other.
Her title to this honor, however, was never admitted at Argos, and
it is very probable that the war just described grew in some way or
other out of the increasing presidential power which circumstances
were tending to throw into her hands. And the complete temporary
prostration of Argos was an essential condition to the quiet
acquisition of this power by Sparta. Occurring as it did two or three
years before the above-recounted adventure of the heralds, it removed
the only rival at that time both willing and able to compete with
Sparta,—a rival who might well have prevented any effective union
under another chief, though she could no longer have secured any
Pan-Hellenic ascendency for herself,—a rival who would have seconded
Ægina in her submission to the Persians, and would thus have lamed
incurably the defensive force of Greece. The ships which Kleomenês
had obtained from the Æginetans as well as from the Sikyonians,
against their own will, for landing his troops at Nauplia, brought
upon both these cities the enmity of Argos, which the Sikyonians
compromised by paying a sum of money, while the Æginetans refused
to do so.[607] And thus the circumstances of the Kleomenic war had
the effect not only of enfeebling Argos, but of alienating her from
natural allies and supporters, and clearing the ground for undisputed
Spartan primacy.

  [607] Herodot. vi, 92.

Returning now to the complaint preferred by Athens to the Spartans
against the traitorous submission of Ægina to Darius, we find that
king Kleomenês passed immediately over to that island for the purpose
of inquiry and punishment. He was proceeding to seize and carry away
as prisoners several of the leading Æginetans, when Krius and some
others among them opposed to him a menacing resistance, telling him
that he came without any regular warrant from Sparta and under the
influence of Athenian bribes,—that, in order to carry authority, both
the Spartan kings ought to come together. It was not of their own
accord that the Æginetans ventured to adopt so dangerous a course.
Demaratus, the colleague of Kleomenês in the junior or Prokleid line
of kings, had suggested to them the step and promised to carry them
through it safely.[608] Dissension between the two coördinate kings
was no new phenomenon at Sparta; but in the case of Demaratus and
Kleomenês, it had broken out some years previously on the occasion of
the march against Attica; and Demaratus, hating his colleague more
than ever, entered into the present intrigue with the Æginetans with
the deliberate purpose of frustrating his intervention. He succeeded,
and Kleomenês was compelled to return to Sparta; not without
unequivocal menace against Krius and the other Æginetans who had
repelled him,[609] and not without a thorough determination to depose
Demaratus.

  [608] Herodot. vi, 50. Κρῖος—ἔλεγε δὲ ταῦτα ἐξ ἐπιστολῆς τῆς
  Δημαρήτου. Compare Pausan. iii, 4, 3.

  [609] Herodot. vi, 50-61, 64. Δημάρητος—φθόνῳ καὶ ἄγῃ χρεώμενος.

It appears that suspicions had always attached to the legitimacy of
Demaratus’s birth. His reputed father Aristo had had no offspring
by two successive wives: at last, he became enamored of the wife of
his friend Agêtus,—a woman of surpassing beauty,—and entrapped him
into an agreement, whereby each solemnly bound himself to surrender
anything belonging to him which the other might ask for. That which
Agêtus asked from Aristo was at once given: in return, the latter
demanded to have the wife of Agêtus, who was thunderstruck at the
request, and indignantly complained of having been cheated into a
sacrifice of all others the most painful: nevertheless, the oath was
peremptory, and he was forced to comply. The birth of Demaratus took
place so soon after this change of husbands, that when it was first
made known to Aristo, as he sat upon a bench along with the ephors,
he counted on his fingers the number of months since his marriage,
and exclaimed with an oath, “The child cannot be mine.” He soon,
however, retracted his opinion, and acknowledged the child, who grew
up without any question being publicly raised as to his birth, and
succeeded his father on the throne. But the original words of Aristo
had never been forgotten, and private suspicions were still cherished
that Demaratus was really the son of his mother’s first husband.[610]

  [610] Herodot. vi, 61, 62, 63.

Of these suspicions, Kleomenês now resolved to avail himself,
exciting Leotychidês, the next heir in the Prokleid line of kings,
to impugn publicly the legitimacy of Demaratus; engaging to second
him with all his influence as next in order for the crown, and
exacting in return a promise that he would support the intervention
against Ægina. Leotychidês was animated not merely by ambition, but
also by private enmity against Demaratus, who had disappointed him
of his intended bride: he warmly entered into the scheme, arraigned
Demaratus as no true Herakleid, and produced evidence to prove
the original doubts expressed by Aristo. A serious dispute was
thus raised at Sparta, and Kleomenês, espousing the pretensions of
Leotychidês, recommended that the question as to the legitimacy of
Demaratus should be decided by reference to the Delphian oracle.
Through the influence of Kobôn, a powerful native of Delphi, he
procured from the Pythian priestess an answer pronouncing that
Demaratus was not the son of Aristo.[611] Leotychidês thus became
king of the Prokleid line, while Demaratus descended into a private
station, and was elected at the ensuing solemnity of the Gymnopædia
to an official function. The new king, unable to repress a burst
of triumphant spite, sent an attendant to ask him, in the public
theatre, how he felt as an officer after having once been a king.
Stung with this insult, Demaratus replied that he himself had tried
them both, and that Leotychidês might in time come to try them both
also: the question, he added, shall bear its fruit,—great evil, or
great good, to Sparta. So saying, he covered his face and retired
home from the theatre,—offered a solemn farewell sacrifice at the
altar of Zeus Herkeios, and solemnly adjured his mother to declare to
him who his real father was,—then at once quitted Sparta for Elis,
under pretence of going to consult the Delphian oracle.[612]

  [611] Herodot. vi, 65, 66. In an analogous case afterwards,
  where the succession was disputed between Agesilaus the brother,
  and Leotychidês the reputed son of the deceased king Agis, the
  Lacedæmonians appear to have taken upon themselves to pronounce
  Leotychidês illegitimate; or rather to assume tacitly such
  illegitimacy by choosing Agesilaus in preference, without the
  aid of the oracle (Xenophon, Hellen. iii, 3, 1-4; Plutarch,
  Agesilaus, c. 3). The previous oracle from Delphi, however,
  φυλάξασθαι τὴν χωλὴν βασιλείαν, was cited on the occasion, and
  the question was, in what manner it should be interpreted.

  [612] Herodot. vi, 68, 69. The answer made by the mother to this
  appeal—informing Demaratus that he is the son either of king
  Aristo, or of the hero Astrabakus—is extremely interesting as an
  evidence of Grecian manners and feeling.

Demaratus was well known to be a high-spirited and ambitious
man,—noted, among other things, as the only Lacedæmonian king down
to the time of Herodotus who had ever gained a chariot victory at
Olympia; and Kleomenês and Leotychidês became alarmed at the mischief
which he might do them in exile. By the law of Sparta, no Herakleid
was allowed to establish his residence out of the country, on pain of
death: this marks the sentiment of the Lacedæmonians, and Demaratus
was not the less likely to give trouble because they had pronounced
him illegitimate.[613] Accordingly they sent in pursuit of him, and
seized him in the island of Zakynthus. But the Zakynthians would not
consent to surrender him, so that he passed unobstructed into Asia,
where he presented himself to Darius, and was received with abundant
favors and presents.[614] We shall hereafter find him the companion
of Xerxês, giving to that monarch advice such as, if it had been
acted upon, would have proved the ruin of Grecian independence; to
which, however, he would have been even more dangerous, if he had
remained at home as king of Sparta.

  [613] Plutarch, Agis, c. 11. κατὰ δή τινα νόμον παλαιὸν, ὃς
  οὐκ ἐᾷ τὸν Ἡρακλείδην ἐκ γυναικὸς ἀλλοδαπῆς τεκνοῦσθαι, τὸν δ᾽
  ἀπελθόντα τῆς Σπάρτης ἐπὶ μετοικισμῷ πρὸς ἑτέρους ἀποθνήσκειν
  κελεύει.

  [614] Herodot. vi, 70.

Meanwhile Kleomenês, having obtained a consentient colleague in
Leotychidês, went with him over to Ægina, eager to revenge himself
for the affront which had been put upon him. To the requisition and
presence of the two kings jointly, the Æginetans did not dare to
oppose any resistance. Kleomenês made choice of ten citizens, eminent
for wealth, station, and influence, among whom were Krius and another
person named Kasambus, the two most powerful men in the island.
Conveying them away to Athens, he deposited them as hostages in the
hands of the Athenians.[615]

  [615] Herodot. vi, 78.

It was in this state that the affairs of Athens and of Greece
generally were found by the Persian armament which landed at
Marathon, the progress of which we are now about to follow. And the
events just recounted were of material importance, considered in
their indirect bearing upon the success of that armament. Sparta had
now, on the invitation of Athens, assumed to herself for the first
time a formal Pan-Hellenic primacy, her ancient rival Argos being too
much broken to contest it,—her two kings, at this juncture unanimous,
employ their presiding interference in coercing Ægina, and placing
Æginetan hostages in the hands of Athens. The Æginetans would not
have been unwilling to purchase victory over a neighbor and rival at
the cost of submission to Persia, and it was the Spartan interference
only which restrained them from assailing Athens conjointly with the
Persian invaders; thus leaving the hands of the latter free, and her
courage undiminished, for the coming trial.

Meanwhile, a vast Persian force, brought together in consequence of
the preparation made during the last two years in every part of the
empire, had assembled in the Aleïan plain of Kilikia, near the sea. A
fleet of six hundred armed triremes, together with many transports,
both of men and horses, was brought hither for their embarkation:
the troops were put on board, and sailed along the coast to Samos in
Ionia. The Ionic and Æolic Greeks constituted an important part of
this armament, and the Athenian exile Hippias was on board as guide
and auxiliary in the attack of Attica. The generals were Datis, a
Median,[616]—and Artaphernês, son of the satrap of Sardis, so named,
and nephew of Darius. We may remark that Datis is the first person
of Median lineage who is mentioned as appointed to high command
after the accession of Darius, which had been preceded and marked,
as I have noticed in a former chapter, by an outbreak of hostile
nationality between the Medes and Persians. Their instructions were,
generally, to reduce to subjection and tribute all such Greeks as
had not already given earth and water. But Darius directed them
most particularly to conquer Eretria and Athens, and to bring the
inhabitants as slaves into his presence.[617] These orders were
literally meant, and probably neither the generals nor the soldiers
of this vast armament doubted that they would be literally executed;
and that before the end of the year, the wives, or rather the
widows, of men like Themistoklês and Aristeidês would be seen among
a mournful train of Athenian prisoners, on the road from Sardis to
Susa, thus accomplishing the wish expressed by queen Atossa at the
instance of Dêmokêdês.

  [616] Herodot. vi, 94. Δᾶτίν τε, ἐόντα Μῆδον γένος, etc.

  Cornelius Nepos (Life of Pausanias, c. 1) calls Mardonius a Mede;
  which cannot be true, since he was the son of Gobryas, one of the
  seven Persian conspirators (Herodot. vi, 43).

  [617] Herodot. vi, 94. ἐντειλάμενος δὲ ἀπέπεμπε,
  ἐξανδραποδίσαντας Ἐρετρίαν καὶ Ἀθήνας, ἄγειν ἑωϋτῷ ἐς ὄψιν τὰ
  ἀνδράποδα.

  According to the Menexenus of Plato (c. 17, p. 245), Darius
  ordered Datis to fulfil this order on peril of his own head; no
  such harshness appears in Herodotus.

The recent terrific storm near Mount Athos deterred the Persians
from following the example of Mardonius, and taking their course by
the Hellespont and Thrace. It was resolved to strike straight across
the Ægean[618] (the mode of attack which intelligent Greeks like
Themistoklês most feared, even after the repulse of Xerxês), from
Samos to Eubœa, attacking the intermediate islands in the way. Among
those islands was Naxos, which ten years before had stood a long
siege, and gallantly repelled the Persian Megabatês with the Milesian
Aristagoras. It was one of the main objects of Datis to efface this
stain on the Persian arms, and to take a signal revenge on the
Naxians.[619] Crossing from Samos to Naxos, he landed his army on the
island, which was found an easier prize than he had expected. The
terrified citizens, abandoning their town, fled with their families
to the highest summits of their mountains; while the Persians,
seizing as slaves a few who had been dilatory in flight, burnt the
undefended town with its edifices sacred and profane.

  [618] Thucyd. i, 93.

  [619] Herodot. vi, 95, 96. ἐπὶ ταύτην (Naxos) γὰρ δὴ πρώτην
  ἐπεῖχον στρατεύεσθαι οἱ Πέρσαι, μεμνημένοι τῶν πρότερον.

Immense, indeed, was the difference in Grecian sentiment towards
the Persians, created by the terror-striking reconquest of Ionia,
and by the exhibition of a large Phenician fleet in the Ægean. The
strength of Naxos was the same now as it had been before the Ionic
revolt, and the successful resistance then made might have been
supposed likely to nerve the courage of its inhabitants. Yet such is
the fear now inspired by a Persian armament, that the eight thousand
Naxian hoplites abandon their town and their gods without striking a
blow,[620] and think of nothing but personal safety for themselves
and their families. A sad augury for Athens and Eretria!

  [620] The historians of Naxos affirmed that Datis had been
  repulsed from the island. We find this statement in Plutarch, De
  Malign. Herodot. c. 36, p. 869, among his violent and unfounded
  contradictions of Herodotus.

From Naxos, Datis despatched his fleet round the other Cyclades
islands, requiring from each, hostages for fidelity and a contingent
to increase his army. With the sacred island of Delos, however,
he dealt tenderly and respectfully. The Delians had fled before
his approach to Tênos, but Datis sent a herald to invite them back
again, promised to preserve their persons and property inviolate,
and proclaimed that he had received express orders from the Great
King to reverence the island in which Apollo and Artemis were born.
His acts corresponded with this language; for the fleet was not
allowed to touch the island, and he himself, landing with only a
few attendants, offered a magnificent sacrifice at the altar. A
large portion of his armament consisted of Ionic Greeks, and this
pronounced respect to the island of Delos may probably be ascribed
to the desire of satisfying their religious feelings; for in their
days of early freedom, this island had been the scene of their solemn
periodical festivals, as I have already more than once remarked.

Pursuing his course without resistance along the islands, and
demanding reinforcements as well as hostages from each, Datis at
length touched the southernmost portion of Eubœa,—the town of
Karystus and its territory.[621] The Karystians, though at first
refusing either to give hostages or to furnish any reinforcements
against their friends and neighbors, were speedily compelled to
submission by the aggressive devastation of the invaders. This was
the first taste of resistance which Datis had yet experienced; and
the facility with which it was overcome gave him a promising omen as
to his success against Eretria, whither he soon arrived.

  [621] Herodot. vi, 99.

The destination of the armament was no secret to the inhabitants of
this fated city, among whom consternation, aggravated by intestine
differences, was the reigning sentiment. They made application to
Athens for aid, which was readily and conveniently afforded to them
by means of those four thousand kleruchs, or out-citizens, whom
the Athenians had planted sixteen years before in the neighboring
territory of Chalkis. Notwithstanding this reinforcement, however,
many of them despaired of defending the city, and thought only of
seeking shelter on the unassailable summits of the island, as the
more numerous and powerful Naxians had already done before them;
while another party, treacherously seeking their own profit out of
the public calamity, lay in wait for an opportunity of betraying the
city to the Persians.[622] Though a public resolution was taken to
defend the city, yet so manifest was the absence of that stoutness
of heart which could alone avail to save it, that a leading Eretrian
named Æschinês was not ashamed to forewarn the four thousand Athenian
allies of the coming treason, and urge them to save themselves before
it was too late. They followed his advice and passed over to Attica
by way of Orôpus; while the Persians disembarked their troops, and
even their horses, in expectation that the Eretrians would come
out and fight, at Tamynæ and other places in the territory. As the
Eretrians did not come out, they proceeded to lay siege to the city,
and for some days met with a brave resistance, so that the loss on
both sides was considerable. At length two of the leading citizens,
Euphorbus and Philagrus, with others, betrayed Eretria to the
besiegers; its temples were burnt, and its inhabitants dragged into
slavery.[623] It is impossible to credit the exaggerated statement
of Plato, which is applied by him to the Persians at Eretria, as it
had been before applied by Herodotus to the Persians at Chios and
Samos,—that they swept the territory clean of inhabitants by joining
hands and forming a line across its whole breadth.[624] Evidently,
this is an idea illustrating the possible effects of numbers and
ruinous conquest, which has been woven into the tissue of historical
statements, like so many other illustrative ideas in the writings
of Greek authors. That a large proportion of the inhabitants were
carried away as prisoners, there can be no doubt. But the traitors
who betrayed the town were spared and rewarded by the Persians,[625]
and we see plainly that either some of the inhabitants must have been
left or new settlers introduced, when we find the Eretrians reckoned
ten years afterwards among the opponents of Xerxês.

  [622] Herodot. vi, 100. Τῶν δὲ Ἐρετριέων ἦν ἄρα οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς
  βούλευμα, οἳ μετεπέμποντο μὲν Ἀθηναίους, ἐφρόνεον δὲ διφασίας
  ἰδέας· οἳ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐβουλεύοντο ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἐς τὰ ἄκρα
  τῆς Εὐβοίης, ἄλλοι δὲ αὐτῶν ἴδια κέρδεα προσδεκόμενοι παρὰ τοῦ
  Πέρσεω οἴσεσθαι προδοσίην ἐσκευάζοντο.

  Allusion to this treason among the Eretrians is to be found in a
  saying of Themistoklês (Plutarch, Themist. c. 11).

  The story told by Hêrakleidês Ponticus (ap. Athenæ. xii, p. 536),
  of an earlier Persian armament which had assailed Eretria and
  failed, cannot be at all understood; it rather looks like a mythe
  to explain the origin of the great wealth possessed by the family
  of Kallias at Athens,—the Λακκόπλουτος. There is another story,
  having the same explanatory object, in Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 5.

  [623] Herodot. vi, 101, 102.

  [624] Plato, Legg. iii, p. 698, and Menexen. c. 10, p. 240;
  Diogen. Laërt. iii, 33; Herodot. vi, 31: compare Strabo, x, p.
  446, who ascribes to Herodotus the statement of Plato about the
  σαγήνευσις of Eretria. Plato says nothing about the betrayal of
  the city.

  It is to be remarked that, in the passage of the Treatise de
  Legibus, Plato mentions this story (about the Persians having
  swept the territory of Eretria clean of its inhabitants)
  with some doubt as to its truth, and as if it were a rumor
  intentionally circulated by Datis with a view to frighten the
  Athenians. But in the Menexenus, the story is given as if it were
  an authentic historical fact.

  [625] Plutarch, De Garrulitate, c. 15, p. 510. The descendants of
  Gongylus the Eretrian, who passed over to the Persians on this
  occasion, are found nearly a century afterwards in possession of
  a town and district in Mysia, which the Persian king had bestowed
  upon their ancestor. Herodotus does not mention Gongylus (Xenoph.
  Hellen. iii, 1, 6).

  This surrender to the Persians drew upon the Eretrians bitter
  remarks at the time of the battle of Salamis (Plutarch,
  Themistoklês, c. 11).

Datis had thus accomplished with little or no resistance one of the
two express objects commanded by Darius, and his army was elated
with the confident hope of soon completing the other. Alter halting
a few days at Eretria, and depositing in the neighboring islet of
Ægilia the prisoners recently captured, he reëmbarked his army to
cross over to Attica, and landed in the memorable bay of Marathon
on the eastern coast,—the spot indicated by the despot Hippias, who
now landed along with the Persians, twenty years after his expulsion
from the government. Forty-seven years had elapsed since he had
made as a young man this same passage, from Eretria to Marathon, in
conjunction with his father Peisistratus, on the occasion of the
second restoration of the latter. On that previous occasion, the
force accompanying the father had been immeasurably inferior to that
which now seconded the son; yet it had been found amply sufficient
to carry him in triumph to Athens, with feeble opposition from
citizens alike irresolute and disunited. And the march of Hippias
from Marathon to Athens would now have been equally easy, as it was
doubtless conceived to be by himself, both in his waking hopes and
in the dream which Herodotus mentions,—had not the Athenians whom he
found been men radically different from those whom he had left.

To that great renewal of the Athenian character, under the
democratical institutions which had subsisted since the dispossession
of Hippias, I have already pointed attention in a former chapter.
The modifications introduced by Kleisthenês in the constitution
had now existed eighteen or nineteen years, without any attempt
to overthrow them by violence. The Ten Tribes, each with its
constituent demes, had become a part of the established habits of
the country, and the citizens had become accustomed to exercise a
genuine and self-determined decision in their assemblies, political
as well as judicial; while even the senate of Areopagus, renovated
by the nine annual archons successively chosen who passed into it
after their year of office, had also become identified in feeling
with the constitution of Kleisthenês. Individual citizens, doubtless,
remained partisans in secret, and perhaps correspondents of Hippias;
but the mass of citizens, in every scale of life, could look upon
his return with nothing but terror and aversion. With what degree
of newly-acquired energy the democratical Athenians could act in
defence of their country and institutions, has already been related
in a former chapter; though unfortunately we possess few particulars
of Athenian history during the decade preceding 490 B. C., nor can
we follow in detail the working of the government. The new form,
however, which Athenian politics had assumed becomes partially
manifest, when we observe the three leaders who stand prominent at
this important epoch,—Miltiadês, Themistoklês, and Aristeidês.

The first of the three had returned to Athens, three or four years
before the approach of Datis, after six or seven years’ absence in
the Chersonesus of Thrace, whither he had been originally sent by
Hippias about the year 517-516 B. C., to inherit the property as
well as the supremacy of his uncle the œkist Miltiadês. As despot
of the Chersonese, and as one of the subjects of Persia, he had
been among the Ionians who accompanied Darius to the Danube in his
Scythian expedition, and he had been the author of that memorable
recommendation which Histiæus and the other despots did not think it
their interest to follow,—of destroying the bridge and leaving the
Persian king to perish. Subsequently, he had been unable to remain
permanently in the Chersonese, for reasons which have before been
noticed; yet he seems to have occupied it during the period of the
Ionic revolt.[626] What part he took in that revolt we do not know.
But he availed himself of the period while the Persian satraps were
employed in suppressing it, and deprived of the mastery of the sea,
to expel, in conjunction with forces from Athens, both the Persian
garrison and Pelasgic inhabitants from the islands of Lemnos and
Imbros. The extinction of the Ionic revolt threatened him with ruin;
so that when the Phenician fleet, in the summer following the capture
of Milêtus, made its conquering appearance in the Hellespont, he
was forced to escape rapidly to Athens with his immediate friends
and property, and with a small squadron of five ships. One of these
ships, commanded by his son Metiochus, was actually captured between
the Chersonese and Imbros; and the Phenicians were most eager to
capture himself,[627]—inasmuch as he was personally odious to Darius
from his strenuous recommendation to destroy the bridge over the
Danube. On arriving at Athens, after his escape from the Phenician
fleet, he was brought to trial before the judicial popular assembly
for alleged misgovernment in the Chersonese, or for what Herodotus
calls “his despotism” there exercised.[628] Nor is it improbable,
that the Athenian citizens settled in that peninsula may have had
good reason to complain of him,—the more so as he had carried out
with him the maxims of government prevalent at Athens under the
Peisistratids, and had in his pay a body of Thracian mercenaries.
However, the people at Athens honorably acquitted him, probably
in part from the reputation which he had obtained as conqueror of
Lemnos;[629] and he was one of the ten annually-elected generals of
the republic, during the year of this Persian expedition,—chosen at
the beginning of the Attic year, shortly after the summer solstice,
at a time when Datis and Hippias had actually sailed, and were known
to be approaching.

  [626] The chapter of Herodotus (vi, 40) relating to the
  adventures of Miltiadês is extremely perplexing, as I have
  already remarked in a former note: and Wesseling considers that
  it involves chronological difficulties which our present MSS.
  do not enable us to clear up. Neither Schweighäuser, nor the
  explanation cited in Bähr’s note, is satisfactory.

  [627] Herodot. vi, 43-104.

  [628] Herodot. vi, 39-104.

  [629] Herodot. vi, 132. Μιλτιάδης, καὶ πρότερον εὐδοκιμέων—_i.
  e._ before the battle of Marathon. How much his reputation had
  been heightened by the conquest of Lemnos, see Herodot. vi, 136.

The character of Miltiadês is one of great bravery and
decision,—qualities preëminently useful to his country on the present
crisis, and the more useful as he was under the strongest motive to
put them forth, from the personal hostility of Darius towards him;
but he does not peculiarly belong to the democracy of Kleisthenês,
like his younger contemporaries Themistoklês and Aristeidês. The
two latter are specimens of a class of men new at Athens since the
expulsion of Hippias, and contrasting forcibly with Peisistratus,
Lykurgus, and Megaklês, the political leaders of the preceding
generation. Themistoklês and Aristeidês, different as they were in
disposition, agree in being politicians of the democratical stamp,
exercising ascendency by and through the people,—devoting their time
to the discharge of public duties, and to the frequent discussions
in the political and judicial meetings of the people,—manifesting
those combined powers of action, comprehension, and persuasive
speech, which gradually accustomed the citizens to look to them
as advisers as well as leaders,—but always subject to criticism
and accusation from unfriendly rivals, and exercising such rivalry
towards each other with an asperity constantly increasing. Instead of
Attica, disunited and torn into armed factions, as it had been forty
years before,—the Diakrii under one man, and the Parali and Pedieis
under others,—we have now Attica one and indivisible; regimented
into a body of orderly hearers in the Pnyx, appointing and holding
to accountability the magistrates, and open to be addressed by
Themistoklês, Aristeidês, or any other citizen who can engage their
attention.

Neither Themistoklês nor Aristeidês could boast of a lineage of gods
and heroes, like the Æakid Miltiadês:[630] both were of middling
station and circumstances. Aristeidês, son of Lysimachus, was on
both sides of pure Athenian blood. But the wife of Neoklês, father
of Themistoklês, was a foreign woman of Thrace or of Karia: and such
an alliance is the less surprising, since Themistoklês must have
been born during the dynasty of the Peisistratids, when the status
of an Athenian citizen had not yet acquired its political value.
There was a marked contrast between these two eminent men,—those
points which stood most conspicuous in the one, being comparatively
deficient in the other. In the description of Themistoklês, which we
have the advantage of finding briefly sketched by Thucydidês, the
circumstance most emphatically brought out is, his immense force
of spontaneous invention and apprehension, without any previous aid
either from teaching or gradual practice. The might of unassisted
nature[631] was never so strikingly exhibited as in him: he conceived
the complications of a present embarrassment, and divined the chances
of a mysterious future, with equal sagacity and equal quickness:
the right expedient seemed to flash upon his mind extempore, even
in the most perplexing contingencies, without the least necessity
for premeditation. Nor was he less distinguished for daring and
resource in action. When engaged on any joint affairs, his superior
competence marked him out as the leader for others to follow, and
no business, however foreign to his experience, ever took him by
surprise, or came wholly amiss to him. Such is the remarkable picture
which Thucydidês draws of a countryman whose death nearly coincided
in time with his own birth: the untutored readiness and universality
of Themistoklês probably formed in his mind a contrast to the more
elaborate discipline, and careful preliminary study, with which the
statesmen of his own day—and Periklês especially, the greatest of
them—approached the consideration and discussion of public affairs.
Themistoklês had received no teaching from philosophers, sophists,
and rhetors, who were the instructors of well-born youth in the
days of Thucydidês, and whom Aristophanês, the contemporary of the
latter, so unmercifully derides,—treating such instruction as worse
than nothing, and extolling, in comparison with it, the unlettered
courage, with mere gymnastic accomplishments, of the victors at
Marathon.[632] There is no evidence in the mind of Thucydidês of any
such undue contempt towards his own age. Though the same terms of
contrast are tacitly present to his mind, he seems to treat the great
capacity of Themistoklês as the more a matter of wonder, since it
sprung up without that preliminary cultivation which had gone to the
making of Periklês.

  [630] Herodot. vi, 35.

  [631] Thucyd. i, 138. ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς βεβαιότατα δὴ ~φύσεως
  ἰσχὺν~ δηλώσας καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἑτέρων ἄξιος
  θαυμάσαι· ~οἰκείᾳ γὰρ συνέσει καὶ οὔτε προμαθὼν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν
  οὔτ᾽ ἐπιμαθὼν~, τῶν τε παραχρῆμα δι᾽ ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς κράτιστος
  γνώμων, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος
  εἰκαστής. Καὶ ἃ μὲν μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχοι, καὶ ἐξηγήσασθαι οἷός τε·
  ὧν δὲ ἄπειρος εἴη, κρῖναι ἱκανῶς οὐκ ἀπήλλακτο. Τό τε ἄμεινον ἢ
  χεῖρον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ἔτι προεώρα μάλιστα· καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν,
  ~φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει, μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι, κράτιστος δὴ οὗτος
  αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο~.

  [632] See the contrast of the old and new education, as set forth
  in Aristophanês, Nubes, 957-1003; also Ranæ, 1067.

  About the training of Themistoklês, compared with that of the
  contemporaries of Periklês, see also Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 2.

The general character given of Plutarch,[633] though many of his
anecdotes are both trifling and apocryphal, is quite consistent with
the brief sketch just cited from Thucydidês. Themistoklês had an
unbounded passion,—not merely for glory, insomuch that the laurels
of Miltiadês acquired at Marathon deprived him of rest,—but also
for display of every kind. He was eager to vie with men richer
than himself in showy exhibition,—one great source, though not the
only source, of popularity at Athens,—nor was he at all scrupulous
in procuring the means of doing so. Besides being assiduous in
attendance at the ekklesia and the dikastery, he knew most of
the citizens by name, and was always ready with advice to them
in their private affairs. Moreover, he possessed all the tactics
of an expert party-man in conciliating political friends and in
defeating political enemies; and though he was in the early part of
his life sincerely bent upon the upholding and aggrandizement of
his country, and was on some most critical occasions of unspeakable
value to it,—yet on the whole his morality was as reckless as his
intelligence was eminent. He will be found grossly corrupt in the
exercise of power, and employing tortuous means, sometimes indeed
for ends in themselves honorable and patriotic, but sometimes also
merely for enriching himself. He ended a glorious life by years
of deep disgrace, with the forfeiture of all Hellenic esteem and
brotherhood,—a rich man, an exile, a traitor, and a pensioner of
the Great King, pledged to undo his own previous work of liberation
accomplished at the victory of Salamis.

  [633] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 3, 4, 5; Cornelius Nepos,
  Themist. c. 1.

Of Aristeidês we possess unfortunately no description from the hand
of Thucydidês; yet his character is so simple and consistent, that we
may safely accept the brief but unqualified encomium of Herodotus and
Plato, expanded as it is in the biography of Plutarch and Cornelius
Nepos,[634] however little the details of the latter can be trusted.
Aristeidês was inferior to Themistoklês in resource, quickness,
flexibility, and power of coping with difficulties; but incomparably
superior to him, as well as to other rivals and contemporaries, in
integrity, public as well as private; inaccessible to pecuniary
temptations, as well as to other seductive influences, and deserving
as well as enjoying the highest measure of personal confidence. He is
described as the peculiar friend of Kleisthenês, the first founder
of the democracy,[635]—as pursuing a straight and single-handed
course in political life, with no solicitude for party ties, and with
little care either to conciliate friends or to offend enemies,—as
unflinching in the exposure of corrupt practices, by whomsoever
committed or upheld,—as earning for himself the lofty surname of the
Just, not less by his judicial decisions in the capacity of archon,
than by his equity in private arbitrations, and even his candor in
political dispute,—and as manifesting throughout a long public life,
full of tempting opportunities, an uprightness without flaw and
beyond all suspicion, recognized equally by his bitter contemporary
the poet Timokreon,[636] and by the allies of Athens, upon whom
he first assessed the tribute. Few of the leading men in any part
of Greece were without some taint on their reputation, deserved
or undeserved, in regard to pecuniary probity; but whoever became
notoriously recognized as possessing this vital quality, acquired
by means of it a firmer hold on the public esteem than even eminent
talents could confer. Thucydidês ranks conspicuous probity among the
first of the many ascendent qualities possessed by Periklês;[637] and
Nikias, equal to him in this respect, though immeasurably inferior in
every other, owed to it a still larger proportion of that exaggerated
confidence which the Athenian people continued so long to repose in
him. The abilities of Aristeidês, though apparently adequate to every
occasion on which he was engaged, and only inferior when we compare
him with so remarkable a man as Themistoklês, were put in the shade
by this incorruptible probity, which procured for him, however, along
with the general esteem, no inconsiderable amount of private enmity
from jobbers whom he exposed, and even some jealousy from persons who
heard it proclaimed with offensive ostentation.

  [634] Herodot. viii, 79; Plato, Gorgias, c. 172. ἄριστον ἄνδρα ἐν
  Ἀθήνῃσι καὶ δικαιότατον.

  [635] Plutarch (Aristeidês, c. 1-4; Themistoklês, c. 3; An Seni
  sit gerenda respublica, c. 12, p. 790; Præcepta Reip. Gerend. c.
  ii, p. 805).

  [636] Timokreon ap. Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 21.

  [637] Thucyd. ii, 65.

We are told that a rustic and unlettered citizen gave his ostracizing
vote, and expressed his dislike against Aristeidês,[638] on the
simple ground that he was tired of hearing him always called the
Just. Now the purity of the most honorable man will not bear to be
so boastfully talked of as if he were the only honorable man in the
country: the less it is obtruded, the more deeply and cordially
will it be felt: and the story just alluded to, whether true or
false, illustrates that natural reaction of feeling, produced by
absurd encomiasts, or perhaps by insidious enemies under the mask
of encomiasts, who trumpeted forth Aristeidês as _The_ Just man at
Attica, so as to wound the legitimate dignity of every one else.
Neither indiscreet friends nor artful enemies, however, could rob
him of the lasting esteem of his countrymen; which he enjoyed, with
intervals of their displeasure, to the end of his life. Though he
was ostracized during a part of the period between the battle of
Marathon and Salamis,—at a time when the rivalry between him and
Themistoklês was so violent that both could not remain at Athens
without peril,—yet the dangers of Athens during the invasion of
Xerxês brought him back before the ten years of exile were expired.
His fortune, originally very moderate, was still farther diminished
during the course of his life, so that he died very poor, and the
state was obliged to lend aid to his children.

  [638] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 7.

Such were the characters of Themistoklês and Aristeidês, the two
earliest leaders thrown up by the Athenian democracy. Half a
century before, Themistoklês would have been an active partisan in
the faction of the Parali or the Pedieis, while Aristeidês would
probably have remained an unnoticed citizen. At the present period
of Athenian history, the characters of the soldier, the magistrate,
and the orator, were intimately blended together in a citizen who
stood forward for eminence, though they tended more and more to
divide themselves during the ensuing century and a half. Aristeidês
and Miltiadês were both elected among the ten generals, each for
his respective tribe, in the year of the expedition of Datis across
the Ægean, and probably even after that expedition was known to be
on its voyage. Moreover, we are led to suspect from a passage in
Plutarch, that Themistoklês also was general of his tribe on the
same occasion,[639] though this is doubtful; but it is certain that
he fought at Marathon. The ten generals had jointly the command of
the army, each of them taking his turn to exercise it for a day: in
addition to the ten, moreover, the third archon, or polemarch, was
considered as eleventh in the military council. The polemarch of this
year was Kallimachus of Aphidnæ.[640] Such were the chiefs of the
military force, and to a great degree the administrators of foreign
affairs, at the time when the four thousand Athenian kleruchs, or
settlers planted in Eubœa,—escaping from Eretria, now invested by
the Persians,—brought word to their countrymen at home that the fall
of that city was impending. It was obvious that the Persian host
would proceed from Eretria forthwith against Athens, and a few days
afterwards Hippias disembarked them at Marathon, whither the Athenian
army marched to meet them.

  [639] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 5.

  [640] Herodot. vi, 109, 110.

Of the feeling which now prevailed at Athens we have no details, but
doubtless the alarm was hardly inferior to that which had been felt
at Eretria: dissenting opinions were heard as to the proper steps
to be taken, nor were suspicions of treason wanting. Pheidippidês
the courier was sent to Sparta immediately to solicit assistance;
and such was his prodigious activity, that he performed this journey
of one hundred and fifty miles, on foot, in forty-eight hours.[641]
He revealed to the ephors that Eretria was already enslaved, and
entreated their assistance to avert the same fate from Athens,
the most ancient city in Greece. The Spartan authorities readily
promised their aid, but unfortunately it was now the ninth day of the
moon: ancient law or custom forbade them to march, in this month at
least, during the last quarter before the full moon; but after the
full they engaged to march without delay. Five days’ delay at this
critical moment might prove the utter ruin of the endangered city;
yet the reason assigned seems to have been no pretence on the part
of the Spartans. It was mere blind tenacity of ancient habit, which
we shall find to abate, though never to disappear, as we advance in
their history.[642] Indeed, their delay in marching to rescue Attica
from Mardonius, eleven years afterwards, at the imminent hazard of
alienating Athens and ruining the Hellenic cause, marks the same
selfish dulness. But the reason now given certainly looked very like
a pretence, so that the Athenians could indulge no certain assurance
that the Spartan troops would start even when the full moon arrived.

  [641] Mr. Kinneir remarks that the Persian Cassids, or
  foot-messengers, will travel for several days successively at
  the rate of sixty or seventy miles a day (Geographical Memoir of
  Persia, p. 44).

  [642] Herodot. ix, 7-10.

In this respect the answer brought by Pheidippidês was mischievous,
as it tended to increase that uncertainty and indecision which
already prevailed among the ten generals, as to the proper steps for
meeting the invaders. Partly, perhaps, in reliance on this expected
Spartan help, five out of the ten generals were decidedly averse to
an immediate engagement with the Persians; while Miltiadês with the
remaining four strenuously urged that not a moment should be lost in
bringing the enemy to action, without leaving time to the timid and
the treacherous to establish correspondence with Hippias, and to take
some active step for paralyzing all united action on the part of the
citizens. This most momentous debate, upon which the fate of Athens
hung, is represented by Herodotus to have occurred at Marathon, after
the army had marched out and taken post there within sight of the
Persians; while Cornelius Nepos describes it as having been raised
before the army quitted the city,—upon the question, whether it was
prudent to meet the enemy at all in the field, or to confine the
defence to the city and the sacred rock. Inaccurate as this latter
author generally is, his statement seems more probable here than that
of Herodotus. For the ten generals would scarcely march out of Athens
to Marathon without having previously resolved to fight: moreover,
the question between fighting in the field or resisting behind the
walls, which had already been raised at Eretria, seems the natural
point on which the five mistrustful generals would take their stand.
And probably indeed Miltiadês himself, if debarred from immediate
action, would have preferred to hold possession of Athens, and
prevent any treacherous movement from breaking out there,—rather than
to remain inactive on the hills, watching the Persians at Marathon,
with the chance of a detachment from their numerous fleet sailing
round to Phalêrum, and thus distracting, by a double attack, both the
city and the camp.

However this may be, the equal division of opinion among the
ten generals, whether manifested at Marathon or at Athens, is
certain,—so that Miltiadês had to await the casting-vote of the
polemarch Kallimachus. To him he represented emphatically the danger
of delay, and the chance of some traitorous intrigue occurring to
excite disunion and aggravate the alarms of the citizens. Nothing
could prevent such treason from breaking out, with all its terrific
consequences of enslavement to the Persians and to Hippias, except
a bold, decisive, and immediate attack,—the success of which he
(Miltiadês) was prepared to guarantee. Fortunately for Athens, the
polemarch embraced the opinion of Miltiadês, and the seditious
movements which were preparing did not show themselves until after
the battle had been gained. Aristeidês and Themistoklês are both
recorded to have seconded Miltiadês warmly in this proposal,—while
all the other generals agreed in surrendering to Miltiadês their days
of command, so as to make him, as much as they could, the sole leader
of the army. It is said that the latter awaited the day of his own
regular turn before he fought the battle.[643] Yet considering the
eagerness which he displayed to bring on an immediate and decisive
action, we cannot suppose that he would have admitted any serious
postponement upon such a punctilio.

  [643] Herodot. vi, 110.

While the army were mustered on the ground sacred to Heraklês near
Marathon, with the Persians and their fleet occupying the plain and
shore beneath, and in preparation for immediate action, they were
joined by the whole force of the little town of Platæa, consisting
of about one thousand hoplites, who had marched directly from
their own city to the spot, along the southern range of Kithærôn
and passing through Dekeleia. We are not told that they had been
invited, and very probably the Athenians had never thought of
summoning aid from this unimportant neighbor, in whose behalf they
had taken upon themselves a lasting feud with Thebes and the Bœotian
league.[644] Their coming on this important occasion seems to have
been a spontaneous effort of gratitude which ought not to be the
less commended because their interests were really wrapped up in
those of Athens,—since if the latter had been conquered, nothing
could have saved Platæa from being subdued by the Thebans,—yet many
a Grecian town would have disregarded both generous impulse and
rational calculation, in the fear of provoking a new and terrific
enemy. If we summon up to our imaginations all the circumstances
of the case,—which it requires some effort to do, because our
authorities come from the subsequent generations, after Greece had
ceased to fear the Persians,—we shall be sensible that this volunteer
march of the whole Platæan force to Marathon is one of the most
affecting incidents of all Grecian history. Upon Athens generally
it produced an indelible impression, commemorated ever afterwards
in the public prayers of the Athenian herald,[645] and repaid by a
grant to the Platæans of the full civil rights—seemingly without
the political rights—of Athenian citizens. Upon the Athenians then
marshalled at Marathon its effect must have been unspeakably powerful
and encouraging, as a proof that they were not altogether isolated
from Greece, and as an unexpected countervailing stimulus under
circumstances so full of hazard.

  [644] Herodot. vi, 108-112.

  [645] Thucyd. iii, 55.

Of the two opposing armies at Marathon, we are told that the
Athenians were ten thousand hoplites, either including or besides
the one thousand who came from Platæa.[646] Nor is this statement
in itself improbable, though it does not come from Herodotus, who
is our only really valuable authority on the case, and who mentions
no numerical total. Indeed, the number named seems smaller than we
should have expected, considering that no less than four thousand
kleruchs, or out-settled citizens, had just come over from Eubœa. A
sufficient force of citizens must of course have been left behind
to defend the city. The numbers of the Persians we cannot be said
to know at all, nor is there anything certain except that they were
greatly superior to the Greeks. We hear from Herodotus that their
armament originally consisted of six hundred ships of war, but we
are not told how many separate transports there were; and, moreover,
reinforcements had been procured as they came across the Ægean from
the islands successively conquered. The aggregate crews on board of
all their ships must have been between one hundred and fifty thousand
and two hundred thousand men; but what proportion of these were
fighting men, or how many actually did fight at Marathon, we have
no means of determining.[647] There were a certain proportion of
cavalry, and some transports expressly prepared for the conveyance of
horses: moreover, Herodotus tells us that Hippias selected the plain
of Marathon for a landing place, because it was the most convenient
spot in Attica for cavalry movements,—though it is singular, that in
the battle the cavalry are not mentioned.

  [646] Justin states ten thousand Athenians, besides one thousand
  Platæans. Cornelius Nepos, Pausanias, and Plutarch give ten
  thousand as the sum total of both. Justin, ii, 9; Corn. Nep.
  Miltiad. c. 4; Pausan. iv, 25, 5; x, 20, 2: compare also Suidas,
  v. Ἱππίας.

  Heeren (De Fontibus Trogi Pompeii, Dissertat. ii, 7) affirms that
  Trogus, or Justin, follows Herodotus in matters concerning the
  Persian invasions of Greece. He cannot have compared the two very
  attentively; for Justin not only states several matters which are
  not to be found in Herodotus, but is at variance with the latter
  on some particulars not unimportant.

  [647] Justin (ii, 9) says that the total of the Persian army was
  six hundred thousand, and that two hundred thousand perished.
  Plato (Menexen. p. 240) and Lysias (Orat. Funebr. c. 7) speak
  of the Persian total as five hundred thousand men. Valerius
  Maximus (v, 3), Pausanias (iv, 25), and Plutarch (Parallel. Græc.
  ad init.), give three hundred thousand men. Cornelius Nepos
  (Miltiadês, c. 5) gives the more moderate total of one hundred
  and ten thousand men.

  See the observations on the battle of Marathon, made both by
  Colonel Leake and by Mr. Finlay, who have examined and described
  the locality; Leake, on the Demi of Attica, in Transactions of
  the Royal Society of Literature, vol. ii, p. 160, _seq._; and
  Finlay, on the Battle of Marathon, in the same Transactions, vol.
  iii, pp. 360-380, etc.

  Both have given remarks on the probable numbers of the armies
  assembled; but there are really no materials, even for a probable
  guess, in respect to the Persians. The silence of Herodotus
  (whom we shall find hereafter very circumstantial as to the
  numbers of the army under Xerxês) seems to show that he had no
  information which he could trust. His account of the battle of
  Marathon presents him in honorable contrast with the loose and
  boastful assertors who followed him; for though he does not tell
  us much, and falls lamentably short of what we should like to
  know, yet all that he does say is reasonable and probable as to
  the proceedings of both armies and the little which he states
  becomes more trustworthy on that very account,—because it _is_ so
  little,—showing that he keeps strictly within his authorities.

  There is nothing in the account of Herodotus to make us believe
  that he had ever visited the ground of Marathon.

Marathon, situated near to a bay on the eastern coast of Attica, and
in a direction E.N.E. from Athens, is divided by the high ridge of
Mount Pentelikus from the city, with which it communicated by two
roads, one to the north, another to the south of that mountain. Of
these two roads, the northern, at once the shortest and the most
difficult, is twenty-two miles in length: the southern—longer but
more easy, and the only one practicable for chariots—is twenty-six
miles in length, or about six and a half hours of computed march.
It passed between mounts Pentelikus and Hymettus, through the
ancient demes of Gargêttus and Pallênê, and was the road by which
Peisistratus and Hippias, when they landed at Marathon forty-seven
years before, had marched to Athens. The bay of Marathon, sheltered
by a projecting cape from the northward, affords both deep water and
a shore convenient for landing; while “its plain (says a careful
modern observer[648]) extends in a perfect level along this fine
bay, and is in length about six miles, in breadth never less than
about one mile and a half. Two marshes bound the extremities of the
plain: the southern is not very large, and is almost dry at the
conclusion of the great heats; but the northern, which generally
covers considerably more than a square mile, offers several parts
which are at all seasons impassable. Both, however, leave a broad,
firm, sandy beach between them and the sea. The uninterrupted
flatness of the plain is hardly relieved by a single tree; and an
amphitheatre of rocky hills and rugged mountains separates it from
the rest of Attica, over the lower ridges of which some steep and
difficult paths communicate with the districts of the interior.”

  [648] See Mr. Finlay on the Battle of Marathon, Transactions,
  etc., vol. iii, pp. 364, 368, 383, _ut suprà_: compare Hobhouse,
  Journey in Albania, i, p. 432.

  Colonel Leake thinks that the ancient town of Marathon was not
  on the exact site of the modern Marathon, but at a place called
  Vraná, a little to the south of Marathon (Leake, on the Demi of
  Attica, in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature,
  1829, vol. ii, p. 166).

  “Below these two points,” he observes, “(the tumuli of Vraná and
  the hill of Kotróni,) the plain of Marathon expands to the shore
  of the bay, which is near two miles distant from the opening of
  the valley of Vraná. It is moderately well cultivated with corn,
  and is one of the most fertile spots in Attica, though rather
  inconveniently subject to inundations from the two torrents
  which cross it, particularly that of Marathóna. From Lucian (in
  Icaro-Menippo) it appears that the parts about Œnoê were noted
  for their fertility, and an Egyptian poet of the fifth century
  has celebrated the vines and olives of Marathon. It is natural
  to suppose that the vineyards occupied the rising grounds: and
  it is probable that the olive-trees were chiefly situated in the
  two valleys, where some are still growing: for as to the plain
  itself, the circumstances of the battle incline one to believe
  that it was anciently as destitute of trees as it is at the
  present day.” (Leake, on the Demi of Attica, Trans. of Roy. Soc.
  of Literature, vol. ii, p. 162.)

  Colonel Leake farther says, respecting the fitness of the
  Marathonian ground for cavalry movements: “As I rode across the
  plain of Marathon with a peasant of Vraná, he remarked to me that
  it was a fine place for cavalry to fight in. None of the modern
  Marathonii were above the rank of laborers: they have heard that
  a great battle was once fought there, but that is all they know.”
  (Leake, _ut sup._ ii, p. 175.)

The position occupied by Miltiadês before the battle, identified as
it was to all subsequent Athenians by the sacred grove of Hêraklês
near Marathon, was probably on some portion of the high ground above
this plain, and Cornelius Nepos tells us that he protected it from
the attacks of the Persian cavalry by felled trees obstructing the
approach. The Persians occupied a position on the plain; while their
fleet was ranged along the beach, and Hippias himself marshalled them
for the battle.[649] The native Persians and Sakæ, the best troops in
the whole army, were placed in the centre, which they considered as
the post of honor,[650] and which was occupied by the Persian king
himself, when present at a battle. The right wing was so regarded by
the Greeks, and the polemarch Kallimachus had the command of it; the
hoplites being arranged in the order of their respective tribes from
right to left, and at the extreme left stood the Platæans. It was
necessary for Miltiadês to present a front equal, or nearly equal,
to that of the more numerous Persian host, in order to guard himself
from being taken in flank: and with this view he drew up the central
tribes, including the Leontis and Antiochis, in shallow files, and
occupying a large breadth of ground; while each of the wings was in
stronger and deeper order, so as to make his attack efficient on
both sides. His whole army consisted of hoplites, with some slaves
as unarmed or light-armed attendants, but without either bowmen or
cavalry. Nor could the Persians have been very strong in this latter
force, seeing that their horses had to be transported across the
Ægean. But the elevated position of Miltiadês enabled them to take
some measure of the numbers under his command, and the entire absence
of cavalry among their enemies could not but confirm the confidence
with which a long career of uninterrupted victory had impressed their
generals.

  [649] Herodot. vi, 107.

  [650] Plutarch, Symposiac. i, 3, p. 619; Xenophon, Anabas. i, 8,
  21; Arrian, ii, 8, 18; iii, 11, 16.

  We may compare, with this established battle-array of the Persian
  armies, that of the Turkish armies, adopted and constantly
  followed ever since the victorious battle of Ikonium, in 1386,
  gained by Amurath the First over the Karamanians. The European
  troops, or those of Rum, occupy the left wing: the Asiatic
  troops, or those of Anatoli, the right wing: the Janissaries are
  in the centre. The Sultan, or the Grand Vizir, surrounded by the
  national cavalry, or Spahis, is in the central point of all (Von
  Hammer, Geschichte des Osmannischen Reichs, book v, vol. i, p.
  199).

  About the honor of occupying the right wing in a Grecian army,
  see in particular the animated dispute between the Athenians and
  the Tegeates before the battle of Platæa (Herodot. ix, 27): it
  is the post assigned to the heroic kings of legendary warfare
  (Eurip. Supplices, 657).

At length the sacrifices in the Greek camp were favorable for battle,
and Miltiadês, who had everything to gain by coming immediately to
close quarters, ordered his army to advance at a running step over
the interval of one mile which separated the two armies. This rapid
forward movement, accompanied by the war-cry, or pæan, which always
animated the charge of the Greek soldier, astounded the Persian
army; who construed it as an act of desperate courage, little short
of insanity, in a body not only small but destitute of cavalry or
archers,—but who, at the same time, felt their conscious superiority
sink within them. It seems to have been long remembered also among
the Greeks as the peculiar characteristic of the battle of Marathon,
and Herodotus tells us that the Athenians were the first Greeks who
ever charged at a run.[651] It doubtless operated beneficially in
rendering the Persian cavalry and archers comparatively innocuous,
but we may reasonably suppose that it also disordered the Athenian
ranks, and that when they reached the Persian front, they were both
out of breath and unsteady in that line of presented spears and
shields which constituted their force. On the two wings, where the
files were deep, this disorder produced no mischievous effect: the
Persians, after a certain resistance, were overborne and driven back.
But in the centre, where the files were shallow, and where, moreover,
the native Persians and other choice troops of the army were posted,
the breathless and disordered Athenian hoplites found themselves in
far greater difficulties. The tribes Leontis and Antiochis, with
Themistoklês and Aristeidês among them, were actually defeated,
broken, driven back, and pursued by the Persians and Sakæ.[652]
Miltiadês seems to have foreseen the possibility of such a check,
when he found himself compelled to diminish so materially the depth
of his centre: for his wings, having routed the enemies opposed to
them, were stayed from pursuit until the centre was extricated, and
the Persians and Sakæ put to flight along with the rest. The pursuit
then became general, and the Persians were chased to their ships
ranged in line along the shore: some of them became involved in the
impassable marsh and there perished.[653] The Athenians tried to
set the ships on fire, but the defence here was both vigorous and
successful,—several of the forward warriors of Athens were slain,—and
only seven ships out of the numerous fleet destroyed.[654] This
part of the battle terminated to the advantage of the Persians.
They repulsed the Athenians from the sea-shore, and secured a safe
reëmbarkation; leaving few or no prisoners, but a rich spoil of tents
and equipments which had been disembarked and could not be carried
away.

  [651] Herodot. vi, 112. Πρῶτοι μὲν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς
  ἴδμεν, δρόμῳ ἐς πολεμίους ἐχρήσαντο.

  The running pace of the charge was obviously one of the most
  remarkable events connected with the battle. Colonel Leake and
  Mr. Finlay seem disposed to reduce the run to a quick march;
  partly on the ground that the troops must have been disordered
  and out of breath by running a mile. The probability is, that
  they really were so, and that such was the great reason of the
  defeat of the centre. It is very probable that a part of the
  mile run over consisted of declivity. I accept the account of
  Herodotus literally, though whether the distance be exactly
  stated, we cannot certainly say: indeed the fact is, that it
  required some steadiness of discipline to prevent the step of
  hoplites, when charging, from becoming accelerated into a run.
  See the narrative of the battle of Kunaxa in Xenoph. Anabas. i,
  8, 18; Diodor. xiv, 23: compare Polyæn. ii, 2, 3. The passage
  of Diodorus here referred to contrasts the advantages with the
  disadvantages of the running charge.

  Both Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay try to point out the exact
  ground occupied by the two armies: they differ in the spot
  chosen, and I cannot think that there is sufficient evidence
  to be had in favor of any spot. Leake thinks that the Persian
  commanders were encamped in the plain of Tricorythos, separated
  from that of Marathon by the great marsh, and communicating with
  it only by means of a causeway (Leake, Transact. ii, p. 170).

  [652] Herodot. vi, 113. Κατὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ἐνίκων οἱ βάρβαροι,
  καὶ ῥήξαντες ἐδίωκον ἐς τὴν μεσόγαιαν.

  Herodotus here tells us the whole truth without disguise:
  Plutarch (Aristeidês, c. 3) only says that the Persian centre
  made a longer resistance, and gave the tribes in the Grecian
  centre more trouble to overthrow.

  [653] Pausan. i, 32, 6.

  [654] Herodot. vi, 113-115.

Herodotus estimates the number of those who fell on the Persian side
in this memorable action at six thousand four hundred men: the number
of Athenian dead is accurately known, since all were collected for
the last solemn obsequies,—they were one hundred and ninety-two.
How many were wounded, we do not hear. The brave Kallimachus the
polemarch, and Stesilaus, one of the ten generals, were among the
slain; together with Kynegeirus son of Euphorion, who, in laying hold
on the poop-staff of one of the vessels, had his hand cut off by an
axe,[655] and died of the wound. He was brother of the poet Æschylus,
himself present at the fight; to whose imagination this battle at
the ships must have emphatically recalled the fifteenth book of the
Iliad. Both these Athenian generals are said to have perished in the
assault of the ships, apparently the hottest part of the combat. The
statement of the Persian loss as given by Herodotus appears moderate
and reasonable,[656] but he does not specify any distinguished
individuals as having fallen.

  [655] Herodot. vi, 114. This is the statement of Herodotus
  respecting Kynegeirus. How creditably does his character as an
  historian contrast with that of the subsequent romancers! Justin
  tells us that Kynegeirus first seized the vessel with his right
  hand: that was cut off, and he held the vessel with his left:
  when he had lost that also, he seized the ship with his teeth,
  “like a wild beast,” (Justin, ii, 9)—Justin seems to have found
  this statement in many different authors: “Cynegiri militis
  virtus, multis scriptorum laudibus celebrata.”

  [656] For the exaggerated stories of the numbers of Persians
  slain, see Xenophon, Anabas. iii, 2, 12; Plutarch, De Malign.
  Herodot. c. 26, p. 862; Justin, ii, 9; and Suidas, v. Ποικίλη.

  In the account of Ktêsias, Datis was represented as having been
  killed in the battle, and it was farther said that the Athenians
  refused to give up his body for interment; which was one of the
  grounds whereupon Xerxês afterwards invaded Greece. It is evident
  that in the authorities which Ktêsias followed, the alleged
  death of Datis at Marathon was rather emphatically dwelt upon.
  See Ktêsias, Persica, c. 18-21, with the note of Bähr, who is
  inclined to defend the statement, against Herodotus.

But the Persians, though thus defeated and compelled to abandon
the position of Marathon, were not yet disposed to relinquish
altogether their chances against Attica. Their fleet was observed
to take the direction of Cape Sunium,—a portion being sent to take
up the Eretrian prisoners and the stores which had been left in the
island of Ægilia. At the same time a shield, discernible from its
polished surface afar off, was seen held aloft upon some high point
of Attica,[657]—perhaps on the summit of Mount Pentelikus, as Colonel
Leake supposes with much plausibility. The Athenians doubtless saw
it as well as the Persians; and Miltiadês did not fail to put the
right interpretation upon it, taken in conjunction with the course
of the departing fleet. The shield was a signal put up by partisans
in the country, to invite the Persians round to Athens by sea, while
the Marathonian army was absent. Miltiadês saw through the plot, and
lost not a moment in returning to Athens. On the very day of the
battle, the Athenian army marched back with the utmost speed from the
precinct of Hêraklês at Marathon to the precinct of the same god at
Kynosarges, close to Athens, which they reached before the arrival of
the Persian fleet.[658] Datis soon came off the port of Phalêrum,
but the partisans of Hippias had been dismayed by the rapid return of
the Marathonian army, and he did not therefore find those aids and
facilities which he had anticipated for a fresh disembarkation in the
immediate neighborhood of Athens. Though too late, however, it seems
that he was not much too late: the Marathonian army had only just
completed their forced return-march. A little less quickness on the
part of Miltiadês in deciphering the treasonable signal and giving
the instant order of march,—a little less energy on the part of the
Athenian citizens in superadding a fatiguing march to a no less
fatiguing combat,—and the Persians, with the partisans of Hippias,
might have been found in possession of Athens. As the facts turned
out, Datis, finding at Phalêrum no friendly movement to encourage
him, but, on the contrary, the unexpected presence of the soldiers
who had already vanquished him at Marathon,—made no attempt again to
disembark in Attica, and sailed away, after a short delay, to the
Cyclades.

  [657] Herodot. vi, 124. Ἀνεδέχθη μὲν γὰρ ἄσπις, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ
  ἔστι ἄλλως εἰπεῖν· ἐγένετο γάρ· ὃς μέντοι ἦν ὁ ἀναδέξας οὐκ ἔχω
  προσωτέρω εἰπεῖν τουτέων.

  [658] Herodot. vi, 116. Οὗτοι μὲν δὴ περιέπλωον Σούνιον. Ἀθηναῖοι
  δὲ, ~ὡς ποδῶν εἶχον, τάχιστα~ ἐβοήθεον ἐς τὸ ἄστυ· καὶ ἔφθησάν τε
  ἀπικόμενοι, πρὶν ἢ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἥκειν, καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο
  ἀπιγμένοι ἐξ Ἡρακληΐου τοῦ ἐν Μαραθῶνι ἐς ἄλλο Ἡρακληΐον το ἐν
  Κυνοσάργει.

  Plutarch (Bellone an Pace clariores fuerint Athenienses, c. 8,
  p. 350) represents Miltiadês as returning to Athens on the _day
  after_ the battle: it must have been on the same afternoon,
  according to the account of Herodotus.

Thus was Athens rescued, for this time at least, from a danger
not less terrible than imminent. Nothing could have rescued her
except that decisive and instantaneous attack which Miltiadês so
emphatically urged. The running step on the field of Marathon might
cause some disorder in the ranks of the hoplites; but extreme haste
in bringing on the combat was the only means of preventing disunion
and distraction in the minds of the citizens. Imperfect as the
account is which Herodotus gives of this most interesting crisis, we
see plainly that the partisans of Hippias had actually organized a
conspiracy, and that it only failed by coming a little too late. The
bright shield uplifted on Mount Pentelikus, apprizing the Persians
that matters were prepared for them at Athens, was intended to have
come to their view before any action had taken place at Marathon,
and while the Athenian army were yet detained there; so that Datis
might have sent a portion of his fleet round to Phalêrum, retaining
the rest for combat with the enemy before him. If it had once become
known to the Marathonian army that a Persian detachment had landed at
Phalêrum,[659]—where there was a good plain for cavalry to act in,
prior to the building of the Phalêric wall, as had been seen in the
defeat of the Spartan Anchimolius by the Thessalian cavalry, in 510
B. C.,—that it had been joined by timid or treacherous Athenians,
and had perhaps even got possession of the city,—their minds would
have been so distracted by the double danger, and by fears for their
absent wives and children, that they would have been disqualified
for any unanimous execution of military orders, and generals as well
as soldiers would have become incurably divided in opinion,—perhaps
even mistrustful of each other. The citizen-soldier of Greece
generally, and especially of Athens, possessed in a high degree both
personal bravery and attachment to order and discipline; but his
bravery was not of that equal, imperturbable, uninquiring character,
which belonged to the battalions of Wellington or Napoleon,—it was
fitful, exalted or depressed by casual occurrences, and often more
sensitive to dangers absent and unseen, than to enemies immediately
in his front. Hence the advantage, so unspeakable in the case before
us, and so well appreciated by Miltiadês, of having one undivided
Athenian army,—with one hostile army, and only one, to meet in the
field. When we come to the battle of Salamis, ten years later, it
will be seen that the Greeks of that day enjoyed the same advantage:
though the wisest advisers of Xerxês impressed upon him the prudence
of dividing his large force, and of sending detachments to assail
separate Greek states—which would infallibly produce the effect of
breaking up the combined Grecian host, and leaving no central or
coöperating force for the defence of Greece generally. Fortunately
for the Greeks, the childish insolence of Xerxês led him to despise
all such advice, as implying conscious weakness. Not so Datis and
Hippias. Sensible of the prudence of distracting the attention of
the Athenians by a double attack, they laid a scheme, while the main
army was at Marathon, for rallying the partisans of Hippias, with a
force to assist them, in the neighborhood of Athens,—and the signal
was upheld by these partisans as soon as their measures were taken.
But the rapidity of Miltiadês so precipitated the battle, that this
signal came too late, and was only given, “when the Persians were
already in their ships,”[660] after the Marathonian defeat. Even then
it might have proved dangerous, had not the movements of Miltiadês
been as rapid after the victory as before it: but if time had been
allowed for the Persian movement on Athens before the battle of
Marathon had been fought, the triumph of the Athenians might well
have been exchanged for a calamitous servitude. To Miltiadês belongs
the credit of having comprehended the emergency from the beginning,
and overruled the irresolution of his colleagues by his own
single-hearted energy. The chances all turned out in his favor,—for
the unexpected junction of the Platæans in the very encampment
of Marathon must have wrought up the courage of his army to the
highest pitch: and not only did he thus escape all the depressing
and distracting accidents, but he was fortunate enough to find this
extraneous encouragement immediately preceding the battle, from a
source on which he could not have calculated.

  [659] Herodot. v, 62, 63.

  [660] Herodot. vi, 115. Τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι ἀναδέξαι ἀσπίδα, ~ἐοῦσι ἤδη
  ἐν τῇσι νηυσί~.

I have already observed that the phase of Grecian history best
known to us, amidst which the great authors from whom we draw our
information lived, was one of contempt for the Persians in the
field. And it requires some effort of imagination to call back
previous feelings after the circumstances have been altogether
reversed: perhaps even Æschylus the poet, at the time when he
composed his tragedy of the Persæ, to celebrate the disgraceful
flight of the invader Xerxês, may have forgotten the emotions with
which he and his brother Kynegeirus must have marched out from
Athens fifteen years before, on the eve of the battle of Marathon.
It must therefore be again mentioned that, down to the time when
Datis landed in the bay of Marathon, the tide of Persian success had
never yet been interrupted,—and that especially during the ten years
immediately preceding, the high-handed and cruel extinction of the
Ionic revolt had aggravated to the highest pitch the alarm of the
Greeks. To this must be added the successes of Datis himself, and
the calamities of Eretria, coming with all the freshness of novelty
as an apparent sentence of death to Athens. The extreme effort of
courage required in the Athenians, to encounter such invaders, is
attested by the division of opinion among the ten generals. Putting
all the circumstances together, it is without a parallel in Grecian
history, surpassing even the combat of Thermopylæ, as will appear
when I come to describe that memorable event. And the admirable
conduct of the five dissentient generals, when outvoted by the
decision of the polemarch against them, in coöperating heartily for
the success of a policy which they deprecated,—proves how much the
feelings of a constitutional democracy, and that entire acceptance
of the pronounced decision of the majority on which it rests, had
worked themselves into the Athenian mind. The combat of Marathon was
by no means a very decisive defeat, but it was a defeat,—and the
first which the Persians had ever received from Greeks in the field.
If the battle of Salamis, ten years afterwards, could be treated
by Themistoklês as a hair-breadth escape for Greece, much more is
this true of the battle of Marathon;[661] which first afforded
reasonable proof, even to discerning and resolute Greeks, that the
Persians might be effectually repelled, and the independence of
European Greece maintained against them,—a conviction of incalculable
value in reference to the formidable trials destined to follow.
Upon the Athenians themselves, the first to face in the field
successfully the terrific look of a Persian army, the effect of
the victory was yet more stirring and profound.[662] It supplied
them with resolution for the far greater actual sacrifices which
they cheerfully underwent ten years afterwards, at the invasion of
Xerxês, without faltering in their Pan-Hellenic fidelity; and it
strengthened them at home by swelling the tide of common sentiment
and patriotic fraternity in the bosom of every individual citizen.
It was the exploit of Athenians alone, but of all Athenians without
dissent or exception,—the boast of orators, repeated until it almost
degenerated into common-place, though the people seem never to have
become weary of allusions to their single-handed victory over a host
of forty-six nations.[663] It had been purchased without a drop of
intestine bloodshed,—for even the unknown traitors who raised the
signal-shield on Mount Pentelikus, took care not to betray themselves
by want of apparent sympathy with the triumph: lastly, it was the
final guarantee of their democracy, barring all chance of restoration
of Hippias for the future. Themistoklês[664] is said to have been
robbed of his sleep by the trophies of Miltiadês, and this is cited
in proof of his ambitious temperament; but without supposing either
jealousy or personal love of glory, the rapid transit from extreme
danger to unparalleled triumph might well deprive of rest even the
most sober-minded Athenian.

  [661] Herodot. viii, 109. ἡμεῖς δὲ, εὕρημα γὰρ εὑρήκαμεν ἡμέας τε
  καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, νέφος τοσοῦτον ἀνθρώπων ἀνωσάμενοι.

  [662] Pausanias, i, 14, 4; Thucyd. i, 73. φαμὲν γὰρ Μαραθῶνί τε
  ~μόνοι προκινδυνεῦσαι~ τῷ βαρβάρῳ, etc.

  Herodot. vi, 112. πρῶτοι τε ἀνέσχοντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν ὁρέοντες,
  καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ταύτην ἐσθημένους· τέως δὲ ἦν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι καὶ τὸ
  οὔνομα τὸ Μήδων φόβος ἀκοῦσαι.

  It is not unworthy of remark, that the memorable oath in the
  oration of Demosthenês, de Coronâ, wherein he adjures the
  warriors of Marathon, copies the phrase of Thucydidês,—οὐ μὰ τοὺς
  ἐν Μαραθῶνι ~προκινδυνεύσαντας~ τῶν προγόνων, etc. (Demosthen. de
  Coronâ, c. 60.)

  [663] So the computation stands in the language of Athenian
  orators (Herodot. ix, 27.) It would be unfair to examine it
  critically.

  [664] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 3. According to Cicero (Epist.
  ad Attic. ix, 10) and Justin (ii, 9) Hippias was killed at
  Marathon. Suidas (v. Ἱππίας) says that he died afterwards at
  Lemnos. Neither of these statements seems probable. Hippias would
  hardly go to Lemnos, which was an Athenian possession; and had
  he been slain in the battle, Herodotus would have been likely to
  mention it.

Who it was that raised the treacherous signal-shield to attract
the Persians to Athens was never ascertained: very probably, in
the full exultation of success, no investigation was made. Of
course, however, the public belief would not be satisfied without
singling out some persons as the authors of such a treason; and the
information received by Herodotus (probably about 450-440 B. C.,
forty or fifty years after the Marathonian victory) ascribed the deed
to the Alkmæônids; nor does he notice any other reported authors,
though he rejects the allegation against them upon very sufficient
grounds. They were a race religiously tainted, ever since the
Kylonian sacrilege, and were therefore convenient persons to brand
with the odium of an anonymous crime; while party feud, if it did
not originally invent, would at least be active in spreading and
certifying such rumors. At the time when Herodotus knew Athens, the
political enmity between Periklês son of Xanthippus, and Kimon son
of Miltiadês, was at its height: Periklês belonged by his mother’s
side to the Alkmæônid race, and we know that such lineage was made
subservient to political manœuvres against him by his enemies.[665]
Moreover, the enmity between Kimon and Periklês had been inherited by
both from their fathers; for we shall find Xanthippus, not long after
the battle of Marathon, the prominent accuser of Miltiadês. Though
Xanthippus was not an Alkmæônid, his marriage with Agaristê connected
himself indirectly, and his son Periklês directly, with that race.
And we may trace in this standing political feud a probable origin
for the false reports as to the treason of the Alkmæônids, on that
great occasion which founded the glory of Miltiadês; for that
the reports were false, the intrinsic probabilities of the case,
supported by the judgment of Herodotus, afford ample ground for
believing.

  [665] Thucyd. i, 126.

When the Athenian army made its sudden return-march from Marathon to
Athens, Aristeidês with his tribe was left to guard the field and
the spoil; but the speedy retirement of Datis from Attica left the
Athenians at full liberty to revisit the scene and discharge the
last duties to the dead. A tumulus was erected on the spot[666]—such
distinction was never conferred by Athens except in this case
only—to the one hundred and ninety-two Athenian citizens who had
been slain. Their names were inscribed on ten pillars erected at
the spot, one for each tribe: there was also a second tumulus for
the slain Platæans, a third for the slaves, and a separate funeral
monument to Miltiadês himself. Six hundred years after the battle,
Pausanias saw the tumulus, and could still read on the pillars the
names of the immortalized warriors;[667] and even now a conspicuous
tumulus exists about half a mile from the sea-shore, which Colonel
Leake believes to be the same.[668] The inhabitants of the deme of
Marathon worshipped these slain warriors as heroes, along with their
own eponymus, and with Hêraklês.

  [666] Thucyd. ii, 34.

  [667] Pausan. i, 32, 3. Compare the elegy of Kritias ap. Athenæ.
  i, p. 28.

  [668] The tumulus now existing is about thirty feet high, and two
  hundred yards in circumference. (Leake, on the Demi of Attica;
  Transactions of Royal Soc. of Literat. ii, p. 171.)

So splendid a victory had not been achieved, in the belief of the
Athenians, without marked supernatural aid. The god Pan had met
the courier Pheidippidês on his hasty route from Athens to Sparta,
and had told him that he was much hurt that the Athenians had as
yet neglected to worship him;[669] in spite of which neglect,
however, he promised them effective aid at Marathon. The promise
was faithfully executed, and the Athenians repaid it by a temple
with annual worship and sacrifice. Moreover, the hero Theseus was
seen strenuously assisting in the battle; and an unknown warrior,
in rustic garb and armed only with a ploughshare, dealt destruction
among the Persian ranks: after the battle he could not be found;
and the Athenians, on asking at Delphi who he was, were directed to
worship the hero Echetlus.[670] Even in the time of Pausanias, this
memorable battle-field was heard to resound every night with the
noise of combatants and the snorting of horses. “It is dangerous
(observes that pious author) to go to the spot with the express
purpose of seeing what is passing; but if a man finds himself there
by accident, without having heard anything about the matter, the gods
will not be angry with him.” The gods, it seems, could not pardon
the inquisitive mortal who deliberately pried into their secrets.
Amidst the ornaments with which Athens was decorated during the
free working of her democracy, the glories of Marathon of course
occupied a conspicuous place. The battle was painted on one of the
compartments of the portico called Pœkilê, wherein, amidst several
figures of gods and heroes,—Athênê, Hêraklês, Theseus, Echetlus, and
the local patron of Marathon,—were seen honored and prominent the
polemarch Kallimachus and the general Miltiadês, while the Platæans
were distinguished by their Bœotian leather casques.[671] And the
sixth of the month Boëdromion, the anniversary of the battle,
was commemorated by an annual ceremony, even down to the time of
Plutarch.[672]

  [669] Herodot. vi, 105; Pausan. i, 28, 4.

  [670] Plutarch, Theseus, c. 24; Pausan. i, 32, 4.

  [671] Pausan. i, 15, 4; Dêmosthen. cont. Neær. c. 25.

  [672] Herodot. vi, 120; Plutarch, Camill. c. 19; De Malignit.
  Herodoti, c. 26, p. 862; and De Gloriâ Atheniensium, c. 7.

  Boëdromion was the third month of the Attic year, which year
  began near about the summer solstice. The first three Attic
  months, Hekatombæon, Metageitnion, Boëdromion, approach (speaking
  in a loose manner) nearly to our July, August, September;
  probably the month Hekatombæon began usually at some day in the
  latter half of June.

  From the fact that the courier Pheidippidês reached Sparta on
  the ninth day of the moon, and that the two thousand Spartans
  arrived in Attica on the third day after the full moon, during
  which interval the battle took place, we see that the sixth day
  of Boëdromion could not be the sixth day of the moon. The Attic
  months, though professedly lunar months, did not at this time
  therefore accurately correspond with the course of the moon. See
  Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hellen. ad an. 490 B. C. Plutarch (in the
  Treatise De Malign. Herodoti, above referred to) appears to have
  no conception of this discrepancy between the Attic month and
  the course of the moon. A portion of the censure which he casts
  on Herodotus is grounded on the assumption that the two must
  coincide.

  M. Boeckh, following Fréret and Larcher, contests the statement
  of Plutarch, that the battle was fought on the sixth of the month
  Boëdromion, but upon reasons which appear to me insufficient.
  His chief argument rests upon another statement of Plutarch
  (derived from some lost verses of Æschylus), that the tribe
  Æantis had the right wing or post of honor at the battle; and
  that the public vote, pursuant to which the army was led out
  of Athens, was passed during the prytany of the tribe Æantis.
  He assumes, that the reason why this tribe was posted on the
  right wing, must have been, that it had drawn by lot the first
  prytany in that particular year: if this be granted, then the
  vote for drawing out the army must have been passed in the first
  prytany, or within the first thirty-five or thirty-six days of
  the Attic year, during the space between the first of Hekatombæon
  and the fifth or sixth of Metageitnion. But it is certain that
  the interval, which took place between the army leaving the
  city and the battle, was much less than one month,—we may even
  say less than one week. The battle, therefore, must have been
  fought between the sixth and tenth of Metageitnion. (Plutarch,
  Symposiac. i, 10, 3, and Ideler, Handbuch der Chronologie,
  vol. i, p. 291.) Herodotus (vi, 111) says that the tribes were
  arranged in line ὡς ἠριθμέοντο,—“as they were numbered,”—which
  is contended to mean necessarily the arrangement between them,
  determined by lot for the prytanies of that particular year. “In
  acie instruendâ (says Boeckh, Comment. ad Corp. Inscript. p. 299)
  Athenienses non constantem, sed variabilem secundum prytanias,
  ordinem secatos esse, ita ut tribus ex hoc ordine inde a dextro
  cornu disponerentur, docui in Commentatione de pugnâ Marathoniâ.”
  Proœmia Lect. Univ. Berolin. æstiv. a. 1816.

  The Proœmia here referred to I have not been able to consult,
  and they may therefore contain additional reasons to prove the
  point advanced, viz., that the order of the ten tribes in line
  of battle, beginning from the right wing, was conformable to
  their order in prytanizing, as drawn by lot for the year; but
  I think the passages of Herodotus and Plutarch now before us
  insufficient to establish this point. From the fact that the
  tribe Æantis had the right wing at the battle of Marathon, we
  are by no means warranted in inferring that that tribe had drawn
  by lot the earliest prytany in the year. Other reasons, in my
  judgment equally probable, may be assigned in explanation of the
  circumstance: one reason, I think, decidedly _more_ probable.
  This reason is, that the battle was fought during the prytany of
  the tribe Æantis, which may be concluded from the statement of
  Plutarch, that the vote for marching out the army from Athens
  was passed during the prytany of that tribe; for the interval,
  between the march of the army out of the city and the battle,
  must have been only a very few days. Moreover, the deme Marathon
  belonged to the tribe Æantis (see Boeckh, ad Inscript. No. 172,
  p. 309): the battle being fought in their deme, the Marathonians
  may perhaps have claimed on this express ground the post of
  honor for their tribe; just as we see that at the first battle
  of Mantineia against the Lacedæmonians, the Mantineians were
  allowed to occupy the right wing or post of honor, “because
  the battle was fought in their territory,” (Thucyd. v, 67.)
  Lastly, the deme Aphidnæ also belonged to the tribe Æantis (see
  Boeckh, _l. c._): now the polemarch Kallimachus was an Aphidnæan
  (Herodot. vi, 109), and Herodotus expressly tells us, “the law
  or custom _then_ stood among the Athenians, that the polemarch
  should have the right wing,”—ὁ γὰρ νόμος τότε εἶχε οὕτω τοῖσι
  Ἀθηναίοισι, τὸν πολέμαρχον ἔχειν κέρας τὸ δέξιον (vi, 111). Where
  the polemarch stood, there his tribe would be likely to stand:
  and the language of Herodotus indeed seems directly to imply
  that he identifies the tribe of the polemarch with the polemarch
  himself,—ἡγεομένου δὲ τούτου, ἐξεδέκοντο ὡς ἀριθμέοντο αἱ φυλαὶ,
  ἐχόμεναι ἀλλήλων,—meaning that the order of tribes began by that
  of the polemarch being in the leading position, and was then
  “taken up” by the rest “in numerical sequence,”—_i. e._ in the
  order of their prytanizing sequence for the year.

  Here are a concurrence of reasons to explain why the tribe Æantis
  had the right wing at the battle of Marathon, even though it may
  not have been first in the order of prytanizing tribes for the
  year. Boeckh, therefore, is not warranted in inferring the second
  of these two facts from the first.

  The concurrence of these three reasons, all in favor of the same
  conclusion, and all independent of the reason supposed by Boeckh,
  appears to me to have great weight; but I regard the first of the
  three, even singly taken, as more probable than his reason. If my
  view of the case be correct, the sixth day of Boëdromion, the day
  of battle as given by Plutarch, is not to be called in question.
  That day comes in the second prytany of the year, which begins
  about the sixth of Metageitnion, and ends about the twelfth of
  Boëdromion, and which must in this year have fallen to the lot of
  the tribe Æantis. On the first or second day of Boëdromion, the
  vote for marching out the army may have passed; on the sixth the
  battle was fought; both during the prytany of this tribe.

  I am not prepared to carry these reasons farther than the
  particular case of the battle of Marathon, and the vindication
  of the day of that battle as stated by Plutarch; nor would I
  apply them to later periods, such as the Peloponnesian war. It
  is certain that the army regulations of Athens were considerably
  modified between the battle of Marathon and the Peloponnesian
  war, as well in other matters as in what regards the polemarch;
  and we have not sufficient information to enable us to determine
  whether in that later period the Athenians followed any known
  or perpetual rule in the battle-order of the tribes. Military
  considerations, connected with the state of the particular army
  serving, must have prevented the constant observance of any rule:
  thus we can hardly imagine that Nikias, commanding the army
  before Syracuse, could have been tied down to any invariable
  order of battle among the tribes to which his hoplites belonged.
  Moreover, the expedition against Syracuse lasted more than
  one Attic year: can it be believed that Nikias, on receiving
  information from Athens of the sequence in which the prytanies
  of the tribes had been drawn by lot during the second year of
  his expedition, would be compelled to marshal his army in a new
  battle-order conformably to it? As the military operations of the
  Athenians became more extensive, they would find it necessary to
  leave such dispositions more and more to the general serving in
  every particular campaign. It may well be doubted whether during
  the Peloponnesian war _any_ established rule was observed in
  marshalling the tribes for battle.

  One great motive which induces critics to maintain that the
  battle was fought in the Athenian month Metageitnion, is, that
  that month coincides with the Spartan month Karneius, so that
  the refusal of the Spartans to march before the full moon,
  is construed to apply only to the peculiar sanctity of this
  last-mentioned month, instead of being a constant rule for the
  whole year. I perfectly agree with these critics, that the
  answer, given by the Spartans to the courier Pheidippidês, cannot
  be held to prove a regular, invariable Spartan maxim, applicable
  throughout the whole year, not to begin a march in the second
  quarter of the moon: very possibly, as Boeckh remarks, there may
  have been some festival impending during the particular month in
  question, upon which the Spartan refusal to march was founded.
  But no inference can be deduced from hence to disprove the sixth
  of Boëdromion as the day of the battle of Marathon: for though
  the months of every Grecian city were professedly lunar, yet they
  never coincided with each other exactly or long together, because
  the systems of intercalation adopted in different cities were
  different: there was great irregularity and confusion (Plutarch,
  Aristeidês, c. 19; Aristoxenus, Harmon. ii, p. 30: compare also
  K. F. Hermann, Ueber die Griechische Monatskunde, p. 26, 27.
  Göttingen, 1844; and Boeckh, ad Corp. Inscript. t. i, p. 734).

  Granting, therefore, that the answer given by the Spartans to
  Pheidippidês is to be construed, not as a general rule applicable
  to the whole year, but as referring to the particular month in
  which it was given,—no inference can be drawn from hence as to
  the day of the battle of Marathon, because either one of the two
  following suppositions is possible: 1. The Spartans may have had
  solemnities on the day of the full moon, or on the day before it,
  in _other months_ besides Karneius; 2. Or the full moon of the
  Spartan Karneius may actually have fallen, in the year 490 B. C.,
  on the fifth or sixth of the Attic month Boëdromion.

  Dr. Thirlwall appears to adopt the view of Boeckh, but does not
  add anything material to the reasons in its favor (Hist. of Gr.
  vol. ii, Append. iii, p. 488).

Two thousand Spartans, starting from their city, immediately after
the full moon, reached the frontier of Attica, on the third day of
their march,—a surprising effort, when we consider that the total
distance from Sparta to Athens was about one hundred and fifty
miles. They did not arrive, however, until the battle had been
fought, and the Persians departed; but curiosity led them to the
field of Marathon to behold the dead bodies of the Persians, after
which they returned home, bestowing well-merited praise on the
victors.

Datis and Artaphernês returned across the Ægean with their Eretrian
prisoners to Asia; stopping for a short time at the island of
Mykonos, where discovery was made of a gilt image of Apollo carried
off as booty in a Phenician ship. Datis went himself to restore it
to Dêlos, requesting the Delians to carry it back to the Delium,
or temple of Apollo, on the eastern coast of Bœotia: the Delians,
however, chose to keep the statue until it was reclaimed from them
twenty years afterwards by the Thebans. On reaching Asia, the Persian
generals conducted their prisoners up to the court of Susa, and
into the presence of Darius. Though he had been vehemently incensed
against them, yet when he saw them in his power, his wrath abated,
and he manifested no desire to kill or harm them. They were planted
at a spot called Arderikka, in the Kissian territory, one of the
resting-places on the road from Sardis to Susa, and about twenty-six
miles distant from the latter place: Herodotus seems himself to
have seen their descendants there on his journey between the two
capitals, and to have had the satisfaction of talking to them in
Greek,—which we may well conceive to have made some impression upon
him, at a spot distant by nearly three months’ journey from the coast
of Ionia.[673]

  [673] Herodot. vi, 119. Darius—σφέας τῆς Κισσίης χώρης κατοίκισε
  ἐν σταθμῷ ἑωϋτοῦ τῷ οὔνομα ἐστὶ Ἀρδέρικκα—ἐνθαῦτα τοὺς Ἐρετριέας
  κατοίκισε Δαρεῖος, οἳ καὶ μέχρι ἐμέο εἶχον τὴν χώρην ταύτην,
  φυλάσοντες τὴν ἀρχαίην γλῶσσαν. The meaning of the word σταθμὸς
  is explained by Herodot. v, 52. σταθμὸς ἑωϋτοῦ is the same as
  σταθμὸς βασιλήϊος: the particulars which Herodotus recounts about
  Arderikka, and its remarkable well, or pit of bitumen, salt, and
  oil, give every reason to believe that he had himself stopped
  there.

  Strabo places the captive Eretrians in Gordyênê, which would be
  considerably higher up the Tigris; upon whose authority, we do
  not know (Strabo, xv, p. 747).

  The many particulars which are given respecting the descendants
  of these Eretrians in Kissia, by Philostratus, in his Life of
  Apollonius of Tyana, as they are alleged to have stood even in
  the first century of the Christian era, cannot be safely quoted.
  With all the fiction there contained, some truth may perhaps
  be mingled; but we cannot discriminate it (Philostratus, Vit.
  Apollon. i, c. 24-30).

Happy would it have been for Miltiadês if he had shared the honorable
death of the polemarch Kallimachus,—“animam exhalasset opimam,”—in
seeking to fire the ships of the defeated Persians at Marathon. The
short sequel of his history will be found in melancholy contrast with
the Marathonian heroism.

His reputation had been great before the battle, and after it
the admiration and confidence of his countrymen knew no bounds:
it appears, indeed, to have reached such a pitch that his head
was turned, and he lost both his patriotism and his prudence. He
proposed to his countrymen to incur the cost of equipping an armament
of seventy ships, with an adequate armed force, and to place it
altogether at his discretion; giving them no intimation whither
he intended to go, but merely assuring them that, if they would
follow him, he would conduct them to a land where gold was abundant,
and thus enrich them. Such a promise, from the lips of the recent
victor of Marathon, was sufficient, and the armament was granted,
no man except Miltiadês knowing what was its destination. He sailed
immediately to the island of Paros, laid siege to the town, and sent
in a herald to require from the inhabitants a contribution of one
hundred talents, on pain of entire destruction. His pretence for
this attack was, that the Parians had furnished a trireme to Datis
for the Persian fleet at Marathon; but his real motive, so Herodotus
assures us,[674] was vindictive animosity against a Parian citizen
named Lysagoras, who had exasperated the Persian general Hydarnês
against him. The Parians amused him at first with evasions, until
they had procured a little delay to repair the defective portions of
their wall, after which they set him at defiance; and Miltiadês in
vain prosecuted hostilities against them for the space of twenty-six
days: he ravaged the island, but his attacks made no impression
upon the town.[675] Beginning to despair of success in his military
operations, he entered into some negotiation—such at least was the
tale of the Parians themselves—with a Parian woman named Timô,
priestess or attendant in the temple of Dêmêtêr, near the town-gates.
This woman, promising to reveal to him a secret which would place
Paros in his power, induced him to visit by night a temple to which
no male person was admissible. He leaped the exterior fence, and
approached the sanctuary; but on coming near, was seized with a
panic terror and ran away, almost out of his senses: on leaping the
same fence to get back, he strained or bruised his thigh badly, and
became utterly disabled. In this melancholy state he was placed on
ship-board; the siege being raised, and the whole armament returning
to Athens.

  [674] Herodot. vi, 133. ἔπλεε ἐπὶ Πάρον, πρόφασιν ἔχων ὡς οἱ
  Πάριοι ὕπηρξαν πρότεροι στρατευόμενοι τριήρεϊ ἐς Μαραθῶνα ἅμα τῷ
  Πέρσῃ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ πρόσχημα τοῦ λόγου ἦν· ἀτάρ τινα καὶ ἔγκοτον
  εἶχε τοῖσι Παρίοισι διὰ Λυσαγόρεα τὸν Τισίεω, ἐόντα γένος Πάριον,
  διαβαλόντα μιν πρὸς Ὑδάρνεα τὸν Πέρσην.

  [675] Ephorus (Fragm. 107, ed. Didot; ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Πάρος)
  gave an account of this expedition in several points different
  from Herodotus, which latter I here follow. The authority of
  Herodotus is preferable in every respect; the more so, since
  Ephorus gives his narrative as a sort of explanation of the
  peculiar phrase ἀναπαριάζειν. Explanatory narratives of that sort
  are usually little worthy of attention.

Vehement was the indignation both of the armament and of the
remaining Athenians against Miltiadês on his return;[676] and
Xanthippus, father of the great Periklês, became the spokesman of
this feeling. He impeached Miltiadês before the popular judicature as
having been guilty of deceiving the people, and as having deserved
the penalty of death. The accused himself, disabled by his injured
thigh, which even began to show symptoms of gangrene, was unable
to stand, or to say a word in his own defence: he lay on his couch
before the assembled judges, while his friends made the best case
they could in his behalf. Defence, it appears, there was none; all
they could do, was to appeal to his previous services: they reminded
the people largely and emphatically of the inestimable exploit of
Marathon, coming in addition to his previous conquest of Lemnos. The
assembled dikasts, or jurors, showed their sense of these powerful
appeals by rejecting the proposition of his accuser to condemn him to
death; but they imposed on him the penalty of fifty talents “for his
iniquity.”

  [676] Herodot. vi, 136. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἐκ Πάρου Μιλτιάδεα
  ἀπονοστήσαντα ἔσχον ἐν στόμασι, οἵ τε ἄλλοι, καὶ μάλιστα
  Ξάνθιππος ὁ Ἀρίφρονος· ὃς θανάτου ὑπαγαγὼν ὑπὸ τὸν δῆμον
  Μιλτιάδεα, ἐδίωκε τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀπάτης εἵνεκεν. Μιλτιάδης δὲ,
  αὐτὸς μὲν παρεὼν, οὐκ ἀπελογέετο· ἦν γὰρ ἀδύνατος, ὥστε σηπομένου
  τοῦ μηροῦ. Προκειμένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐν κλίνῃ, ὑπεραπελογέοντο
  οἱ φίλοι, τῆς μάχης τε τῆς ἐν Μαραθῶνι γενομένης πολλὰ
  ἐπιμεμνημένοι, καὶ τὴν Λήμνου αἵρεσιν· ὡς ἑλὼν Λῆμνόν τε καὶ
  τισάμενος τοὺς Πελασγοὺς, παρέδωκε Ἀθηναίοισι. Προσγενομένου
  δὲ τοῦ δήμου αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τοῦ θανάτου, ζημιώσαντος
  δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀδικίην πεντήκοντα ταλάντοισι, Μιλτιάδης μὲν μετὰ
  ταῦτα, σφακελίσαντός τε τοῦ μηροῦ καὶ σαπέντος, τελευτᾷ· τὰ δὲ
  πεντήκοντα τάλαντα ἐξέτισεν ὁ πάϊς αὐτοῦ Κίμων.

  Plato (Gorgias, c. 153, p. 516) says that the Athenians passed a
  vote to cast Miltiadês into the barathrum (ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο),
  and that he would have been actually thrown in, if it had not
  been for the prytanis, _i. e._ the president, by turn for that
  day, of the prytanizing senators and of the ekklesia. The
  prytanis may perhaps have been among those who spoke to the
  dikastery on behalf of Miltiadês, deprecating the proposition
  made by Xanthippus; but that he should have caused a vote once
  passed to be actually rescinded, is incredible. The Scholiast
  on Aristeidês (cited by Valckenaer ad Herodot. vi, 136) reduces
  the exaggeration of Plato to something more reasonable—Ὅτε γὰρ
  ἐκρίνετο Μιλτιάδης ἐπὶ τῇ Πάρῳ, ~ἠθέλσαν~ αὐτὸν κατακρημνίσαι· ὁ
  δὲ πρύτανις εἰσελθὼν ~ἐξῃτήσατο~ αὐτὸν.

Cornelius Nepos affirms that these fifty talents represented the
expenses incurred by the state in fitting out the armament; but we
may more probably believe, looking to the practice of the Athenian
dikastery in criminal cases, that fifty talents was the minor
penalty actually proposed by the defenders of Miltiadês themselves,
as a substitute for the punishment of death. In those penal cases at
Athens, where the punishment was not fixed beforehand by the terms of
the law, if the person accused was found guilty, it was customary to
submit to the jurors, subsequently and separately, the question as to
amount of punishment: first, the accuser named the penalty which he
thought suitable; next, the accused person was called upon to name
an amount of penalty for himself, and the jurors were constrained to
take their choice between these two,—no third gradation of penalty
being admissible for consideration.[677] Of course, under such
circumstances, it was the interest of the accused party to name,
even in his own case, some real and serious penalty,—something which
the jurors might be likely to deem not wholly inadequate to his crime
just proved; for if he proposed some penalty only trifling, he drove
them to prefer the heavier sentence recommended by his opponent.
Accordingly, in the case of Miltiadês, his friends, desirous of
inducing the jurors to refuse their assent to the punishment of
death, proposed a fine of fifty talents as the self-assessed penalty
of the defendant; and perhaps they may have stated, as an argument in
the case, that such a sum would suffice to defray the costs of the
expedition. The fine was imposed, but Miltiadês did not live to pay
it; his injured limb mortified, and he died, leaving the fine to be
paid by his son Kimon.

  [677] That this was the habitual course of Attic procedure in
  respect to public indictments, wherever a positive amount of
  penalty was not previously determined, appears certain. See
  Platner, Prozess und Klagen bei den Attikern, Abschn. vi, vol.
  i, p. 201; Heffter, Die Athenäische Gerichtsverfassung, p.
  334. Meier and Schömann (Der Attische Prozess, b. iv, p. 725)
  maintain that any one of the dikasts might propose a third
  measure of penalty, distinct from that proposed by the accuser
  as well as the accused. In respect to public indictments, this
  opinion appears decidedly incorrect; but where the sentence to
  be pronounced involved a compensation for private wrong and an
  estimate of damages, we cannot so clearly determine whether there
  was not sometimes a greater latitude in originating propositions
  for the dikasts to vote upon. It is to be recollected that
  these dikasts were several hundred, sometimes even more, in
  number,—that there was no discussion or deliberation among
  them,—and that it was absolutely necessary for some distinct
  proposition to be laid before them to take a vote upon. In regard
  to some offences, the law expressly permitted what was called a
  προστíμημα; that is, after the dikasts had pronounced the full
  penalty demanded by the accuser, any other citizen who thought
  the penalty so imposed insufficient, might call for a certain
  limited amount of additional penalty, and require the dikasts to
  vote upon it,—ay or no. The votes of the dikasts were given, by
  depositing pebbles in two casks, under certain arrangements of
  detail.

  The ἀγὼν τιμητὸς, δίκη τιμητὸς, or trial including this separate
  admeasurement of penalty,—as distinguished from the δίκη
  ἀτίμητος, or trial where the penalty was predetermined, and
  where was no τίμησις, or vote of admeasurement of penalty,—is
  an important line of distinction in the subject-matter of Attic
  procedure; and the practice of calling on the accused party,
  after having been pronounced guilty, to impose upon himself a
  _counter-penalty_ or _under-penalty_ (ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι or ὑποτιμᾶθαι)
  in contrast with that named by the accuser, was a convenient
  expedient for bringing the question to a substantive vote of the
  dikasts. Sometimes accused persons found it convenient to name
  very large penalties on themselves, in order to escape a capital
  sentence invoked by the accuser (see Dêmosthen. cont. Timokrat.
  c. 34, p. 743, R). Nor was there any fear, as Platner imagines,
  that in the generality of cases the dikasts would be left under
  the necessity of choosing between an extravagant penalty and
  something merely nominal; for the interest of the accused party
  himself would prevent this from happening. Sometimes we see him
  endeavoring by entreaties to prevail upon the accuser voluntarily
  to abate something of the penalty which he had at first named;
  and the accuser might probably do this, if he saw that the
  dikasts were not likely to go along with that first proposition.

  In one particular case, of immortal memory, that which Platner
  contemplates actually did happen; and the death of Sokratês was
  the effect of it. Sokratês, having been found guilty, only by a
  small majority of votes among the dikasts, was called upon to
  name a penalty upon himself, in opposition to that of death,
  urged by Melêtus. He was in vain entreated by his friends to name
  a fine of some tolerable amount, which they would at once have
  paid in his behalf; but he would hardly be prevailed upon to name
  any penalty at all, affirming that he had deserved honor rather
  than punishment: at last, he named a fine so small in amount, as
  to be really tantamount to an acquittal. Indeed, Xenophon states
  that he would not name any counter-penalty at all; and in the
  speech ascribed to him, he contended that he had even merited the
  signal honor of a public maintenance in the prytaneium (Plato,
  Apol. Sok. c. 27; Xenoph. Apol. Sok. 23; Diogen. Laërt. ii, 41).
  Plato and Xenophon do not agree; but taking the two together, it
  would seem that he must have named a very small fine. There can
  be little doubt that this circumstance, together with the tenor
  of his defence, caused the dikasts to vote for the proposition of
  Melêtus.

According to Cornelius Nepos, Diodorus, and Plutarch, he was put
in prison, after having been fined, and there died.[678] But
Herodotus does not mention this imprisonment, and the fact appears
to me improbable: he would hardly have omitted to notice it, had
it come to his knowledge. Immediate imprisonment of a person fined
by the dikastery, until his fine was paid, was not the natural and
ordinary course of Athenian procedure, though there were particular
cases in which such aggravation was added. Usually, a certain
time was allowed for payment,[679] before absolute execution was
resorted to, but the person under sentence became disfranchised and
excluded from all political rights, from the very instant of his
condemnation as a public debtor, until the fine was paid. Now in
the instance of Miltiadês, the lamentable condition of his wounded
thigh rendered escape impossible,—so that there would be no special
motive for departing from the usual practice, and imprisoning him
forthwith: moreover, if he was not imprisoned forthwith, he would
not be imprisoned at all, since he cannot have lived many days
after his trial.[680] To carry away the suffering general in his
couch, incapable of raising himself even to plead for his own life,
from the presence of the dikasts to a prison, would not only have
been a needless severity, but could hardly have failed to imprint
itself on the sympathies and the memory of all the beholders; so
that Herodotus would have been likely to hear and mention it, if it
had really occurred. I incline to believe therefore that Miltiadês
died at home: all accounts concur in stating that he died of the
mortal bodily hurt which already disabled him even at the moment
of his trial, and that his son Kimon paid the fifty talents after
his death. If _he_ could pay them, probably his father could have
paid them also. And this is an additional reason for believing that
there was no imprisonment,—for nothing but non-payment could have
sent him to prison; and to rescue the suffering Miltiadês from being
sent thither, would have been the first and strongest desire of all
sympathizing friends.

  [678] Cornelius Nepos, Miltiadês, c. 7; and Kimon, c. 1;
  Plutarch, Kimon, c. 4; Diodorus, Fragment. lib. x. All these
  authors probably drew from the same original fountain; perhaps
  Ephorus (see Marx, ad Ephori Fragmenta, p. 212); but we have no
  means of determining. Respecting the alleged imprisonment of
  Kimon, however, they must have copied from different authorities,
  for their statements are all different. Diodorus states, that
  Kimon put himself voluntarily into prison after his father had
  died there, because he was not permitted on any other condition
  to obtain the body of his deceased father for burial. Cornelius
  Nepos affirms that he was imprisoned, as being legally liable to
  the state for the unpaid fine of his father. Lastly, Plutarch
  does not represent him as having been put into prison at all.
  Many of the Latin writers follow the statement of Diodorus: see
  the citations in Bos’s note on the above passage of Cornelius
  Nepos.

  There can be no hesitation in adopting the account of Plutarch
  as the true one. Kimon neither was, nor could be, in prison,
  by the Attic law, for an unpaid fine of his father; but after
  his father’s death, he became liable for the fine, in this
  sense,—that he remained disfranchised (ἄτιμος) and excluded from
  his rights as a citizen, until the fine was paid: see Dêmosthen.
  cont. Timokrat. c. 46, p. 762, R.

  [679] See Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, b. iii, ch. 13, p.
  390, Engl. Transl. (vol. i, p. 420, Germ.); Meier und Schömann,
  Attisch. Prozess, p. 744. Dr. Thirlwall takes a different view
  of this point, with which I cannot concur (Hist. Gr. vol. iii,
  Append. ii, p. 488); though his general remarks on the trial of
  Miltiadês are just and appropriate (ch. xiv, p. 273).

  Cornelius Nepos (Miltiadês, c. 8; Kimon, c. 3) says that the
  misconduct connected with Paros was only a pretence with the
  Athenians for punishing Miltiadês; their real motive, he affirms,
  was envy and fear, the same feelings which dictated the ostracism
  of Kimon. How little there is to justify this fancy, may be seen
  even from the nature of the punishment inflicted. Fear would have
  prompted them to send away or put to death Miltiadês, not to fine
  him. The ostracism, which was dictated by fear, was a temporary
  banishment.

  [680] The interval between his trial and his decease is expressed
  in Herodotus (vi, 136) by the difference between the present
  participle σηπομένου and the past participle σαπέντος τοῦ μηροῦ.

Thus closed the life of the conqueror of Marathon. The last act
of it produces an impression so mournful, and even shocking,—his
descent from the pinnacle of glory to defeat, mean tampering with a
temple-servant, mortal bodily hurt, undefended ignominy, and death
under a sentence of heavy fine, is so abrupt and unprepared,—that
readers, ancient and modern, have not been satisfied without finding
some one to blame for it: we must except Herodotus, our original
authority, who recounts the transaction without dropping a single
hint of blame against any one. To speak ill of the people, as
Machiavel has long ago observed,[681] is a strain in which every one
at all times, even under a democratical government, indulges with
impunity and without provoking any opponent to reply; and in this
instance, the hard fate of Miltiadês has been imputed to the vices of
the Athenians and their democracy,—it has been cited in proof, partly
of their fickleness, partly of their ingratitude. But however such
blame may serve to lighten the mental sadness arising from a series
of painful facts, it will not be found justified if we apply to those
facts a reasonable criticism.

  [681] Machiavel, Discorsi sopra Tito Livio, cap. 58. “L’ opinione
  contro ai popoli nasce, perchè dei popoli ciascun dice male senza
  paura, e liberamente ancora mentre che regnano: dei principi si
  parla sempre con mille timori e mille rispetti.”

What is called the fickleness of the Athenians on this occasion is
nothing more than a rapid and decisive change in their estimation of
Miltiadês; unbounded admiration passing at once into extreme wrath.
To censure them for fickleness is here an abuse of terms; such a
change in their opinion was the unavoidable result of his conduct.
His behavior in the expedition of Paros was as reprehensible as at
Marathon it had been meritorious, and the one succeeded immediately
after the other: what else could ensue except an entire revolution in
the Athenian feelings? He had employed his prodigious ascendency over
their minds to induce them to follow him without knowing whither,
in the confidence of an unknown booty: he had exposed their lives
and wasted their substance in wreaking a private grudge: in addition
to the shame of an unprincipled project, comes the constructive
shame of not having succeeded in it. Without doubt, such behavior,
coming from a man whom they admired to excess, must have produced
a violent and painful revulsion in the feelings of his countrymen.
The idea of having lavished praise and confidence upon a person who
forthwith turns it to an unworthy purpose, is one of the greatest
torments of the human bosom; and we may well understand that the
intensity of the subsequent displeasure would be aggravated by this
reactionary sentiment, without accusing the Athenians of fickleness.
If an officer, whose conduct has been such as to merit the highest
encomiums, comes on a sudden to betray his trust, and manifests
cowardice or treachery in a new and important undertaking confided
to him, are we to treat the general in command as fickle, because
his opinion as well as his conduct undergoes an instantaneous
revolution,—which will be all the more vehement in proportion to his
previous esteem? The question to be determined is, whether there be
sufficient ground for such a change; and in the case of Miltiadês,
that question must be answered in the affirmative.

In regard to the charge of ingratitude against the Athenians, this
last-mentioned point—sufficiency of reason—stands tacitly admitted.
It is conceded that Miltiadês deserved punishment for his conduct in
reference to the Parian expedition, but it is nevertheless maintained
that gratitude for his previous services at Marathon ought to have
exempted him from punishment. But the sentiment upon which, after
all, this exculpation rests, will not bear to be drawn out and stated
in the form of a cogent or justifying reason. For will any one really
contend, that a man who has rendered great services to the public,
is to receive in return a license of unpunished misconduct for the
future? Is the general, who has earned applause by eminent skill
and important victories, to be recompensed by being allowed the
liberty of betraying his trust afterwards, and exposing his country
to peril, without censure or penalty? This is what no one intends
to vindicate deliberately; yet a man must be prepared to vindicate
it, when he blames the Athenians for ingratitude towards Miltiadês.
For if all that be meant is, that gratitude for previous services
ought to pass, not as a receipt in full for subsequent crime, but
as an extenuating circumstance in the measurement of the penalty,
the answer is, that it was so reckoned in the Athenian treatment of
Miltiadês.[682] His friends had nothing whatever to urge, against
the extreme penalty proposed by his accuser, except these previous
services,—which influenced the dikasts sufficiently to induce them to
inflict the lighter punishment instead of the heavier. Now the whole
amount of punishment inflicted consisted in a fine which certainly
was not beyond his reasonable means of paying, or of prevailing
upon friends to pay for him, since his son Kimon actually did pay
it. And those who blame the Athenians for ingratitude,—unless they
are prepared to maintain the doctrine that previous services are to
pass as full acquittal for future crime,—have no other ground left
except to say that the fine was too high; that instead of being fifty
talents, it ought to have been no more than forty, thirty, twenty,
or ten talents. Whether they are right in this, I will not take upon
me to pronounce. If the amount was named on behalf of the accused
party, the dikastery had no legal power of diminishing it; but it
is within such narrow limits that the question actually lies, when
transferred from the province of sentiment to that of reason. It will
be recollected that the death of Miltiadês arose neither from his
trial nor his fine, but from the hurt in his thigh.

  [682] Machiavel will not even admit so much as _this_, in the
  clear and forcible statement which he gives of the question here
  alluded to: he contends that the man who has rendered services
  ought to be recompensed for them, but that he ought to be
  punished for subsequent crime just as if the previous services
  had not been rendered. He lays down this position in discussing
  the conduct of the Romans towards the victorious survivor of
  the three Horatii, after the battle with the Curiatii: “Erano
  stati i meriti di Orazio grandissimi, avendo con la sua virtù
  vinti i Curiazi. Era stato il fallo suo atroce, avendo morto la
  sorella. Nondimeno dispiacque tanto tale omicidio ai Romani,
  che lo condussero a disputare della vita, non ostante che gli
  meriti suoi fussero tanto grandi e si freschi. La qual cosa, a
  chi superficialmente la considerasse, parrebbe uno esempio d’
  ingratitudine popolare. Nondimeno chi lo esaminerà meglio, e con
  migliore considerazione ricercherà quali debbono essere gli’
  ordini delle republiche, biasimearà quel popolo piuttosto per
  averlo assoluto, che per averlo voluto condannare: e la ragione
  è questa, che nessuna republica bene ordinata, non mai cancellò
  i demeriti con gli meriti dei suoi cittadini: ma avendo ordinati
  i premi ad una buona opera, e le pene ad una cattiva, ed avendo
  premiato uno per aver bene operato, se quel medesimo opera dipoi
  male, lo gastiga senza avere riguardo alcuno alle sue buone
  opere. E quando questi ordini sono bene osservati, una città vive
  libera molto tempo: altrimenti sempre rovinera presto. _Perchè
  se, ad un cittadino che abbia fatto qualche egregia opere per
  la città, si aggiunge oltre alla riputazione, che quella cosa
  gli arreca, una audacia e confidenza di potere senza temer pena,
  far qualche opera non buona, diventerà in breve tempo tanto
  insolente, che si risolverà ogni civiltà._”—Machiavel, Discorsi
  sop. Tit. Livio, ch. 24.

The charge of ingratitude against the Athenian popular juries really
amounts to this,—that, in trying a person accused of present crime
or fault, they were apt to confine themselves too strictly and
exclusively to the particular matter of charge, either forgetting,
or making too little account of, past services which he might have
rendered. Whoever imagines that such was the habit of Athenian
dikasts, must have studied the orators to very little purpose. Their
real defect was the very opposite: they were too much disposed to
wander from the special issue before them, and to be affected by
appeals to previous services and conduct.[683] That which an accused
person at Athens usually strives to produce is, an impression in the
minds of the dikasts favorable to his general character and behavior.
Of course, he meets the particular allegation of his accuser as well
as he can, but he never fails also to remind them emphatically, how
well he has performed his general duties of a citizen,—how many times
he has served in military expeditions,—how many trierarchies and
liturgies he has performed, and performed with splendid efficiency.
In fact, the claim of an accused person to acquittal is made to
rest too much on his prior services, and too little upon innocence
or justifying matter as to the particular indictment. When we come
down to the time of the orators, I shall be prepared to show that
such indisposition to confine themselves to a special issue was one
of the most serious defects of the assembled dikasts at Athens. It
is one which we should naturally expect from a body of private,
non-professional citizens assembled for the occasion, and which
belongs more or less to the system of jury-trial everywhere; but it
is the direct reverse of that ingratitude, or habitual insensibility
to prior services, for which they have been so often denounced.

  [683] Machiavel, in the twenty-ninth chapter of his Discorsi
  sopra T. Livio, examines the question, “Which of the two is more
  open to the charge of being ungrateful,—a popular government, or
  a king?” He thinks that the latter is more open to it. Compare
  chapter fifty-nine of the same work, where he again supports a
  similar opinion.

  M. Sismondi also observes, in speaking of the long attachment of
  the city of Pisa to the cause of the emperors and to the Ghibelin
  party: “Pise montra dans plus d’une occasion, par sa constance à
  supporter la cause des empereurs au milieu des revers, combien la
  reconnoissance lie un peuple libre d’une manière plus puissante
  et plus durable qu’elle ne sauroit lier le peuple gouverné par un
  seul homme.” (Histoire des Républ. Italiennes, ch. xiii, tom. ii,
  p. 302.)

The fate of Miltiadês, then, so far from illustrating either the
fickleness or the ingratitude of his countrymen, attests their just
appreciation of deserts. It also illustrates another moral, of no
small importance to the right comprehension of Grecian affairs; it
teaches us the painful lesson, how perfectly maddening were the
effects of a copious draught of glory on the temperament of an
enterprising and ambitious Greek. There can be no doubt, that the
rapid transition, in the course of about one week, from Athenian
terror before the battle to Athenian exultation after it, must have
produced demonstrations towards Miltiadês such as were never paid
towards any other man in the whole history of the commonwealth. Such
unmeasured admiration unseated his rational judgment, so that his
mind became abandoned to the reckless impulses of insolence, and
antipathy, and rapacity;—that distempered state, for which (according
to Grecian morality) the retributive Nemesis was ever on the watch,
and which, in his case, she visited with a judgment startling in
its rapidity, as well as terrible in its amount. Had Miltiadês
been the same man before the battle of Marathon as he became after
it, the battle might probably have turned out a defeat instead of
a victory. Dêmosthenês, indeed,[684] in speaking of the wealth
and luxury of political leaders in his own time, and the profuse
rewards bestowed upon them by the people, pointed in contrast to
the house of Miltiadês as being noway more splendid than that of a
private man. But though Miltiadês might continue to live in a modest
establishment, he received from his countrymen marks of admiration
and deference such as were never paid to any citizen before or after
him; and, after all, admiration and deference constitute the precious
essence of popular reward. No man except Miltiadês ever dared to
raise his voice in the Athenian assembly, and say: “Give me a fleet
of ships: do not ask what I am going to do with them, but only
follow me, and I will enrich you.” Herein we may read the unmeasured
confidence which the Athenians placed in their victorious general,
and the utter incapacity of a leading Greek to bear it without mental
depravation; while we learn from it to draw the melancholy inference,
that one result of success was to make the successful leader one
of the most dangerous men in the community. We shall presently be
called upon to observe the same tendency in the case of the Spartan
Pausanias, and even in that of the Athenian Themistoklês. It is,
indeed, fortunate that the reckless aspirations of Miltiadês did not
take a turn more noxious to Athens than the comparatively unimportant
enterprise against Paros. For had he sought to acquire dominion and
gratify antipathies against enemies at home, instead of directing
his blow against a Parian enemy, the peace and security of his
country might have been seriously endangered.

  [684] Dêmosthenês, Olynth. iii, c. 9, p. 35, R.

Of the despots who gained power in Greece, a considerable proportion
began by popular conduct, and by rendering good service to their
fellow-citizens: having first earned public gratitude, they abused
it for purposes of their own ambition. There was far greater danger,
in a Grecian community, of dangerous excess of gratitude towards
a victorious soldier, than of deficiency in that sentiment: hence
the person thus exalted acquired a position such that the community
found it difficult afterwards to shake him off. Now there is a
disposition almost universal among writers and readers to side
with an individual, especially an eminent individual, against the
multitude; and accordingly those who under such circumstances suspect
the probable abuse of an exalted position, are denounced as if they
harbored an unworthy jealousy of superior abilities. But the truth
is, that the largest analogies of the Grecian character justified
that suspicion, and required the community to take precautions
against the corrupting effects of their own enthusiasm. There is
no feature which more largely pervades the impressible Grecian
character, than a liability to be intoxicated and demoralized by
success: there was no fault from which so few eminent Greeks were
free: there was hardly any danger, against which it was at once
so necessary and so difficult for the Grecian governments to take
security,—especially the democracies, where the manifestations of
enthusiasm were always the loudest. Such is the real explanation of
those charges which have been urged against the Grecian democracies,
that they came to hate and ill-treat previous benefactors; and the
history of Miltiadês illustrates it in a manner no less pointed than
painful.

I have already remarked that the fickleness, which has been so
largely imputed to the Athenian democracy in their dealings with
him, is nothing more than a reasonable change of opinion on the
best grounds. Nor can it be said that fickleness was in any case
an attribute of the Athenian democracy. It is a well-known fact,
that feelings, or opinions, or modes of judging, which have once
obtained footing among a large number of people, are more lasting and
unchangeable than those which belong only to one or a few; insomuch
that the judgments and actions of the many admit of being more
clearly understood as to the past, and more certainly predicted as to
the future. If we are to predicate any attribute of the multitude,
it will rather be that of undue tenacity than undue fickleness; and
there will occur nothing in the course of this history to prove that
the Athenian people changed their opinions on insufficient grounds
more frequently than an unresponsible one or few would have changed.

But there were two circumstances in the working of the Athenian
democracy which imparted to it an appearance of greater fickleness,
without the reality: First, that the manifestations and changes
of opinion were all open, undisguised, and noisy: the people gave
utterance to their present impression, whatever it was, with perfect
frankness; if their opinions were really changed, they had no shame
or scruple in avowing it. Secondly,—and this is a point of capital
importance in the working of democracy generally,—the _present_
impression, whatever it might be, was not merely undisguised in its
manifestations, but also had a tendency to be exaggerated in its
intensity. This arose from their habit of treating public affairs
in multitudinous assemblages, the well-known effect of which is,
to inflame sentiment in every man’s bosom by mere contact with a
sympathizing circle of neighbors. Whatever the sentiment might
be,—fear, ambition, cupidity, wrath, compassion, piety, patriotic
devotion, etc,[685]—and whether well-founded or ill-founded, it was
constantly influenced more or less by such intensifying cause.
This is a defect which of course belongs in a certain degree to
all exercise of power by numerous bodies, even though they be
representative bodies,—especially when the character of the people,
instead of being comparatively sedate and slow to move, like the
English, is quick, impressible, and fiery, like Greeks or Italians;
but it operated far more powerfully on the self-acting Dêmos
assembled in the Pnyx. It was in fact the constitutional malady
of the democracy, of which the people were themselves perfectly
sensible,—as I shall show hereafter from the securities which
they tried to provide against it,—but which no securities could
ever wholly eradicate. Frequency of public assemblies, far from
aggravating the evil, had a tendency to lighten it. The people
thus became accustomed to hear and balance many different views
as a preliminary to ultimate judgment; they contracted personal
interest and esteem for a numerous class of dissentient speakers;
and they even acquired a certain practical consciousness of their
own liability to error. Moreover, the diffusion of habits of public
speaking, by means of the sophists and the rhetors, whom it has been
so much the custom to disparage, tended in the same direction,—to
break the unity of sentiment among the listening crowd, to multiply
separate judgments, and to neutralize the contagion of mere
sympathizing impulse. These were important deductions, still farther
assisted by the superior taste and intelligence of the Athenian
people: but still, the inherent malady remained,—excessive and
misleading intensity of present sentiment. It was this which gave
such inestimable value to the ascendency of Periklês, as depicted by
Thucydidês: his hold on the people was so firm, that he could always
speak with effect against excess of the reigning tone of feeling.
“When Periklês (says the historian) saw the people in a state of
unseasonable and insolent confidence, he spoke so as to cow them into
alarm; when again they were in groundless terror, he combated it, and
brought them back to confidence.”[686] We shall find Dêmosthenês,
with far inferior ascendency, employed in the same honorable task:
the Athenian people often stood in need of such correction, but
unfortunately did not always find statesmen, at once friendly and
commanding, to administer it.

  [685] This is the general truth, which ancient authors often
  state, both partially, and in exaggerated terms as to degree:
  “Hæc est natura multitudinis (says Livy); aut humiliter servit
  aut superbe dominatur.” Again, Tacitus: “Nihil in vulgo modicum;
  terrere, ni paveant; ubi pertimuerint, impune contemni.” (Annal.
  i, 29.) Herodotus, iii, 81. ὠθέει δὲ (ὁ δῆμος) ἐμπεσὼν τὰ
  πρήγματα ἄνευ νοῦ, χειμάῤῥῳ ποταμῷ ἴκελος.

  It is remarkable that Aristotle, in his Politica, takes little or
  no notice of this attribute belonging to every numerous assembly.
  He seems rather to reason as if the aggregate intelligence of
  the multitude was represented by the sum total of each man’s
  separate intelligence in all the individuals composing it (Polit.
  iii, 6, 4, 10, 12); just as the property of the multitude, taken
  collectively, would be greater than that of the few rich. He
  takes no notice of the difference between a number of individuals
  judging jointly and judging separately: I do not, indeed, observe
  that such omission leads him into any positive mistake, but it
  occurs in some cases calculated to surprise us, and where the
  difference here adverted to is important to notice: see Politic.
  iii, 10, 5, 6.

  [686] Thucyd. ii, 65. Ὅποτε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν
  ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησσεν πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι· καὶ
  δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν.

These two attributes, then, belonged to the Athenian democracy;
first, their sentiments of every kind were manifested loudly and
openly; next, their sentiments tended to a pitch of great present
intensity. Of course, therefore, when they changed, the change
of sentiment stood prominent, and forced itself upon every one’s
notice,—being a transition from one strong sentiment past to another
strong sentiment present.[687] And it was because such alterations,
when they did take place, stood out so palpably to remark, that
the Athenian people have drawn upon themselves the imputation of
fickleness: for it is not at all true, I repeat, that changes of
sentiment were more frequently produced in them by frivolous or
insufficient causes, than changes of sentiment in other governments.

  [687] Such swing of the mind, from one intense feeling to
  another, is always deprecated by the Greek moralists, from the
  earliest to the latest: even Demokritus, in the fifth century B.
  C., admonishes against it,—Αἱ ἐκ μεγάλων διαστημάτων κινεόμεναι
  τῶν ψυχῶν οὔτε εὐσταθέες εἰσὶν, οὔτε εὔθυμοι. (Democriti
  Fragmenta, lib. iii, p. 168, ed. Mullach ap. Stobæum, Florileg.
  i, 40.)




CHAPTER XXXVII.

IONIC PHILOSOPHERS. — PYTHAGORAS. — KROTON AND SYBARIS.


The history of the powerful Grecian cities in Italy and Sicily,
between the accession of Peisistratus and the battle of Marathon,
is for the most part unknown to us. Phalaris, despot of Agrigentum
in Sicily, made for himself an unenviable name during this obscure
interval. His reign seems to coincide in time with the earlier part
of the rule of Peisistratus (about 560-540 B. C.), and the few
and vague statements which we find respecting it,[688] merely show
us that it was a period of extortion and cruelty, even beyond the
ordinary licence of Grecian despots. The reality of the hollow bull
of brass, which Phalaris was accustomed to heat in order to shut up
his victims in it and burn them, appears to be better authenticated
than the nature of the story would lead us to presume: for it is
not only noticed by Pindar, but even the actual instrument of this
torture, the brazen bull itself,[689]—which had been taken away from
Agrigentum as a trophy by the Carthaginians when they captured the
town, was restored by the Romans, on the subjugation of Carthage, to
its original domicile. Phalaris is said to have acquired the supreme
command, by undertaking the task of building a great temple[690] to
Zeus Polieus on the citadel rock; a pretence whereby he was enabled
to assemble and arm a number of workmen and devoted partisans, whom
he employed, at the festival of the Thesmophoria, to put down the
authorities. He afterwards disarmed the citizens by a stratagem,
and committed cruelties which rendered him so abhorred, that a
sudden rising of the people, headed by Têlemachus (ancestor of the
subsequent despot, Thêro), overthrew and slew him. A severe revenge
was taken on his partisans after his fall.[691]

  [688] The letters of Bentley against Boyle, discussing the
  pretended Epistles of Phalaris,—full of acuteness and learning,
  though beyond measure excursive,—are quite sufficient to teach us
  that little can be safely asserted about Phalaris. His date is
  very imperfectly ascertained. Compare Bentley, pp. 82, 83, and
  Seyfert, Akragas und sein Gebiet, p. 60: the latter assigns the
  reign of Phalaris to the years 570-554 B. C. It is surprising
  to see Seyfert citing the letters of the pseudo-Phalaris as an
  authority, after the exposure of Bentley.

  [689] Pindar. Pyth. 1 _ad fin_, with the Scholia, p. 310, ed.
  Boeckh; Polyb. xii, 25; Diodor. xiii, 99; Cicero cont. Verr.
  iv, 33. The contradiction of Timæus is noway sufficient to make
  us doubt the authenticity of the story. Ebert (Σικελίων, part
  ii, pp. 41-84, Königsberg, 1829) collects all the authorities
  about the bull of Phalaris. He believes the matter of fact
  substantially. Aristotle (Rhetoric, ii, 20) tells a story of the
  fable, whereby Stêsichorus the poet dissuaded the inhabitants
  of Himera from granting a guard to Phalaris: Conon (Narrat.
  42 ap. Photium) recounts the same story with the name of
  Hiero substituted for that of Phalaris. But it is not likely
  that either the one or the other could ever have been in such
  relations with the citizens of _Himera_. Compare Polybius, vii,
  7, 2.

  [690] Polyæn. v, 1, 1; Cicero de Officiis, ii, 7.

  [691] Plutarch, Philosophand. cum Principibus, c. 3, p. 778.

During the interval between 540-500 B. C., events of much importance
occurred among the Italian Greeks,—especially at Kroton and
Sybaris,—events, unhappily, very imperfectly handed down. Between
these two periods fall both the war between Sybaris and Kroton, and
the career and ascendency of Pythagoras. In connection with this
latter name, it will be requisite to say a few words respecting the
other Grecian philosophers of the sixth century B. C.

I have, in a former chapter, noticed and characterized those
distinguished persons called the Seven Wise Men of Greece, whose
celebrity falls in the first half of this century,—men not so much
marked by scientific genius as by practical sagacity and foresight in
the appreciation of worldly affairs, and enjoying a high degree of
political respect from their fellow-citizens. One of them, however,
the Milesian Thalês, claims our notice, not only on this ground, but
also as the earliest known name in the long line of Greek scientific
investigators. His life, nearly contemporary with that of Solon,
belongs seemingly to the interval about 640-550 B. C.: the stories
mentioned in Herodotus—perhaps borrowed in part from the Milesian
Hekatæus—are sufficient to show that his reputation for wisdom, as
well as for science, continued to be very great, even a century after
his death, among his fellow-citizens. And he marks an important
epoch in the progress of the Greek mind, as having been the first
man to depart both in letter and spirit from the Hesiodic Theogony,
introducing the conception of substances with their transformations
and sequences, in place of that string of persons and quasi-human
attributes which had animated the old legendary world. He is the
father of what is called the Ionic philosophy, which is considered
as lasting from his time down to that of Sokratês; and writers,
ancient as well as modern, have professed to trace a succession of
philosophers, each one the pupil of the preceding, between these two
extreme epochs. But the appellation is, in truth, undefined, and
even incorrect, since nothing entitled to the name of a school, or
sect, or succession,—like that of the Pythagoreans, to be noticed
presently,—can be made out. There is, indeed, a certain general
analogy in the philosophical vein of Thalês, Hippo, Anaximenês, and
Diogenês of Apollonia, whereby they all stand distinguished from
Xenophanês of Elea, and his successors, the Eleatic dialecticians,
Parmenidês and Zeno; but there are also material differences between
their respective doctrines,—no two of them holding the same. And if
we look to Anaximander, the person next in order of time to Thalês,
as well as to Herakleitus, we find them departing, in a great degree,
even from that character which all the rest have in common, though
both the one and the other are usually enrolled in the list of Ionic
philosophers.

Of the old legendary and polytheistic conception of nature, which
Thalês partially discarded, we may remark that it is a state of the
human mind in which the problems suggesting themselves to be solved,
and the machinery for solving them, bear a fair proportion one to
the other. If the problems be vast, indeterminate, confused, and
derived rather from the hopes, fears, love, hatred, astonishment,
etc., of men, than from any genuine desire of knowledge,—so also
does the received belief supply invisible agents in unlimited
number, and with every variety of power and inclination. The means
of explanation are thus multiplied and diversified as readily as the
phenomena to be explained. And though no future events or states can
be predicted on trustworthy grounds, in such manner as to stand the
scrutiny of subsequent verification,—yet there is little difficulty
in rendering a specious and plausible account of matters past, of any
and all things alike; especially as, at such a period, matters of
fact requiring explanation are neither collated nor preserved with
care. And though no event or state, which has not yet occurred, can
be predicted, there is little difficulty in rendering a plausible
account of everything which has occurred in the past. Cosmogony, and
the prior ages of the world, were conceived as a sort of personal
history, with intermarriages, filiation, quarrels, and other
adventures, of these invisible agents; among whom some one or more
were assumed as unbegotten and self-existent,—the latter assumption
being a difficulty common to all systems of cosmogony, and from which
even this flexible and expansive hypothesis is not exempt.

Now when Thalês disengaged Grecian philosophy from the old mode of
explanation, he did not at the same time disengage it from the old
problems and matters propounded for inquiry. These he retained,
and transmitted to his successors, as vague and vast as they
were at first conceived; and so they remained, though with some
transformations and modifications, together with many new questions
equally insoluble, substantially present to the Greeks throughout
their whole history, as the legitimate problems for philosophical
investigation. But these problems, adapted only to the old elastic
system of polytheistic explanation and omnipresent personal agency,
became utterly disproportioned to any impersonal hypotheses such
as those of Thalês and the philosophers after him,—whether assumed
physical laws, or plausible moral and metaphysical dogmas, open to
argumentative attack, and of course requiring the like defence. To
treat the visible world as a whole, and inquire when and how it
began, as well as into all its past changes,—to discuss the first
origin of men, animals, plants, the sun, the stars, etc.,—to assign
some comprehensive reason why motion or change in general took place
in the universe,—to investigate the destinies of the human race, and
to lay down some systematic relation between them and the gods,—all
these were topics admitting of being conceived in many different
ways, and set forth with eloquent plausibility, but not reducible to
any solution either resting on scientific evidence, or commanding
steady adherence under a free scrutiny.[692]

  [692] The less these problems are adapted for rational solution,
  the more nobly do they present themselves in the language of a
  great poem; see as a specimen, Euripidês, Fragment. 101, ed.
  Dindorf.

    Ὄλβιος ὅστις τῆς ἱστορίας
    Ἔσχε μάθησιν, μήτε πολιτῶν
    Ἐπὶ πημοσύνῃ, μήτ᾽ εἰς ἀδίκους
    Πράξεις ὁρμῶν·
    Ἀλλ᾽ ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως
    Κόσμον ἀγήρω, πῆ τε συνέστη
    Καὶ ὅπη καὶ ὅπως.
    Τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις οὐδέποτ᾽ αἰσχρῶν
    Ἔργων μελέτημα προσίζει.

At the time when the power of scientific investigation was scanty
and helpless, the problems proposed were thus such as to lie out
of the reach of science in its largest compass. Gradually, indeed,
subjects more special and limited, and upon which experience, or
deductions from experience, could be brought to bear, were added
to the list of _quæsita_, and examined with great profit and
instruction: but the old problems, with new ones, alike unfathomable,
were never eliminated, and always occupied a prominent place in
the philosophical world. Now it was this disproportion, between
questions to be solved and means of solution, which gave rise
to that conspicuous characteristic of Grecian philosophy,—the
antagonist force of suspensive skepticism, passing in some minds
into a broad negation of the attainability of general truth,—which
it nourished from its beginning to its end; commencing as early
as Xenophanês, continuing to manifest itself seven centuries
afterwards in Ænesidêmus and Sextus Empiricus, and including in
the interval between these two extremes some of the most powerful
intellects in Greece. The present is not the time for considering
these Skeptics, who bear an unpopular name, and have not often been
fairly appreciated; the more so, as it often suited the purpose of
men, themselves essentially skeptical, like Sokratês and Plato, to
denounce professed skepticism with indignation. But it is essential
to bring them into notice at the first spring of Grecian philosophy
under Thalês, because the circumstances were then laid which so soon
afterwards developed them.

Though the celebrity of Thalês in antiquity was great and universal,
scarcely any distinct facts were known respecting him: it is certain
that he left nothing in writing. Extensive travels in Egypt and
Asia are ascribed to him, and as a general fact these travels are
doubtless true, since no other means of acquiring knowledge were
then open. At a time when the brother of the Lesbian Alkæus was
serving in the Babylonian army, we may easily conceive that an
inquisitive Milesian would make his way to that wonderful city
wherein stood the temple-observatory of the Chaldæan priesthood;
nor is it impossible that he may have seen the still greater city
of Ninus, or Nineveh, before its capture and destruction by the
Medes. How great his reputation was in his lifetime, the admiration
expressed by his younger contemporary, Xenophanês, assures us; and
Herakleitus, in the next generation, a severe judge of all other
philosophers, spoke of him with similar esteem. To him were traced,
by the Grecian inquirers of the fourth century B. C., the first
beginnings of geometry, astronomy, and physiology in its large and
really appropriate sense, the scientific study of nature: for the
Greek word denoting nature (φύσις), first comes into comprehensive
use about this time (as I have remarked in an earlier chapter),[693]
with its derivatives _physics_ and _physiology_, as distinguished
from the _theology_ of the old poets. Little stress can be laid on
those elementary propositions in geometry which are specified as
discovered, or as first demonstrated, by Thalês,—still less upon the
solar eclipse respecting which, according to Herodotus, he determined
beforehand the year of occurrence.[694] But the main doctrine of his
physiology,—using that word in its larger Greek sense,—is distinctly
attested. He stripped Oceanus and Tethys, primeval parents of the
gods in the Homeric theogony, of their personality,—and laid down
water, or fluid substance, as the single original element from
which everything came, and into which everything returned.[695] The
doctrine of one eternal element, remaining always the same in its
essence, but indefinitely variable in its manifestations to sense,
was thus first introduced to the discussion of the Grecian public.
We have no means of knowing the reasons by which Thalês supported
this opinion, nor could even Aristotle do more than conjecture
what they might have been; but one of the statements urged on
behalf of it,—that the earth itself rested on water,[696]—we may
safely refer to the Milesian himself, for it would hardly have been
advanced at a later age. Moreover, Thalês is reported to have held,
that everything was living and full of gods; and that the magnet,
especially, was a living thing. Thus the gods, as far as we can
pretend to follow opinions so very faintly transmitted, are conceived
as active powers, and causes of changeful manifestation, attached
to the primeval substance:[697] the universe being assimilated to an
organized body or system.

  [693] Vol. i, ch. xvi.

  [694] Diogen. Laërt. i, 23; Herodot. i, 75; Apuleius, Florid. iv,
  p. 144, Bip.

  Proclus, in his Commentary on Euclid, specifies several
  propositions said to have been discovered by Thalês (Brandis,
  Handbuch der Gr. Philos. ch. xxviii, p. 110).

  [695] Aristotel. Metaphys. i, 3; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. i,
  3, p. 875. ὃς ἐξ ὔδατος φησὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ εἰς ὕδωρ πάντα
  ἀναλύεσθαι.

  [696] Aristotel. _ut supra_, and De Cœlo, ii, 13.

  [697] Aristotel. De Animâ, i, 2-5; Cicero, De Legg. ii, 11;
  Diogen. Laërt. i, 24.

Respecting Hippo,—who reproduced the theory of Thalês under a more
generalized form of expression, substituting, in place of water,
moisture, or something common to air and water,[698]—we do not know
whether he belonged to the sixth or the fifth century B. C. But
Anaximander, Xenophanês, and Pherekydês belong to the latter half of
the sixth century. Anaximander, the son of Praxiadês, was a native
of Milêtus,—Xenophanês, a native of Kolophon; the former, among the
earliest expositors of doctrine in prose,[699] while the latter
committed his opinions to the old medium of verse. Anaximander seems
to have taken up the philosophical problem, while he materially
altered the hypothesis of his predecessor Thalês. Instead of the
primeval fluid of the latter, he supposed a primeval principle,
without any actual determining qualities whatever, but including all
qualities potentially, and manifesting them in an infinite variety
from its continually self-changing nature,—a principle, which was
nothing in itself, yet had the capacity of producing any and all
manifestations, however contrary to each other,[700]—a primeval
something, whose essence it was to be eternally productive of
different phenomena,—a sort of mathematical point, which counts for
nothing in itself, but is vigorous in generating lines to any extent
that may be desired. In this manner, Anaximander professed to give
a comprehensive explanation of change in general, or generation,
or destruction,—how it happened that one sensible thing began and
another ceased to exist,—according to the vague problems which these
early inquirers were in the habit of setting to themselves.[701] He
avoided that which the first philosophers especially dreaded, the
affirmation that generation could take place out of Nothing; yet the
primeval Something, which he supposed was only distinguished from
nothing by possessing this very power of generation.

  [698] Aristotel. De Animâ, i, 2; Alexander Aphrodis. in
  Aristotel. Metaphys. 1, 3.

  [699] Apollodorus, in the second century B. C., had before him
  some brief expository treatises of Anaximander (Diogen. Laërt.
  ii, 2): Περὶ Φύσεως, Γῆς Περίοδον, Περὶ τῶν Ἀπλανῶν καὶ Σφαῖραν
  καὶ ἄλλα τινά. Suidas, v. Ἀναξίμανδρος. Themistius. Orat. xxv,
  p. 317: ἐθάῤῥησε πρῶτος ὦν ἴσμεν Ἐλλήνων λόγον ἐξενεγκεῖν περὶ
  Φύσεως συγγεγραμμένον.

  [700] Irenæus, ii, 19, (14) ap. Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte
  der Griech. Röm. Philos. ch. xxxv, p. 133: “Anaximander hoc
  quod immensum est, omnium initium subjecit, seminaliter habens
  in semetipso omnium genesin, ex quo immensos mundos constare
  ait.” Aristotel. Physic. Auscult. iii, 4, p. 203, Bek. οὔτε γὰρ
  μάτην αὐτὸ οἶόν τε εἶναι (τὸ ἄπειρον), οὔτε ἄλλην ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ
  δύναμιν, πλὴν ὡς ἀρχήν. Aristotle subjects this ἄπειρον to an
  elaborate discussion, in which he says very little more about
  Anaximander, who appears to have assumed it without anticipating
  discussion or objections. Whether Anaximander called his
  ἄπειρον divine, or god, as Tennemann (Gesch. Philos. i, 2, p.
  67) and Panzerbieter affirm (ad Diogenis Apolloniat. Fragment.
  c. 13, p. 16,) I think doubtful: this is rather an inference
  which Aristotle elicits from his language. Yet in another
  passage, which is difficult to reconcile, Aristotle ascribes
  to Anaximander the water-doctrine of Thalês, (Aristotel. de
  Xenophane, p. 975. Bek.)

  Anaximander seems to have followed speculations analogous to
  those of Thalês, in explaining the first production of the human
  race (Plutarch Placit. Philos. v, 19, p. 908), and in other
  matters (ibid. iii, 16, p. 896).

  [701] Aristotel. De Generat. et Destruct. c. 3, p. 317, Bek. ὃ
  μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διετέλεσαν οἱ πρῶτοι φιλοσοφήσαντες, τὸ ἐκ
  μηδενὸς γίνεσθαι προϋπάρχοντος· compare Physic. Auscultat. i, 4,
  p. 187, Bek.

In his theory, he passed from the province of physics into that
of metaphysics. He first introduced into Grecian philosophy that
important word which signifies a beginning or a principle,[702] and
first opened that metaphysical discussion, which was carried on in
various ways throughout the whole period of Grecian philosophy, as
to the one and the many—the continuous and the variable—that which
exists eternally, as distinguished from that which comes and passes
away in ever-changing manifestations. His physiology, or explanation
of nature, thus conducted the mind into a different route from that
suggested by the hypothesis of Thalês, which was built upon physical
considerations, and was therefore calculated to suggest and stimulate
observations of physical phenomena for the purpose of verifying or
confuting it,—while the hypothesis of Anaximander admitted only of
being discussed dialectically, or by reasonings expressed in general
language; reasonings sometimes, indeed, referring to experience for
the purpose of illustration, but seldom resting on it, and never
looking out for it as a necessary support. The physical explanation
of nature, however, once introduced by Thalês, although deserted by
Anaximander, was taken up by Anaximenês and others afterwards, and
reproduced with many divergences of doctrine,—yet always more or
less entangled and perplexed with metaphysical additions, since the
two departments were never clearly parted throughout all Grecian
philosophy. Of these subsequent physical philosophers I shall speak
hereafter: at present, I confine myself to the thinkers of the sixth
century B. C., among whom Anaximander stands prominent, not as the
follower of Thalês, but as the author of an hypothesis both new and
tending in a different direction.

  [702] Simplicius in Aristotel. Physic. fol. 6, 32. πρῶτος αὐτὸς
  Ἀρχὴν ὀνομάσας τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

It was not merely as the author of this hypothesis, however, that
Anaximander enlarged the Greek mind and roused the powers of thought:
we find him also mentioned as distinguished in astronomy and
geometry. He is said to have been the first to establish a sun-dial
in Greece, to construct a sphere, and to explain the obliquity of
the ecliptic;[703] how far such alleged authorship really belongs
to him, we cannot be certain,—but there is one step of immense
importance which he is clearly affirmed to have made. He was the
first to compose a treatise on the geography of the land and sea
within his cognizance, and to construct a chart or map founded
thereupon,—seemingly a tablet of brass. Such a novelty, wondrous even
to the rude and ignorant, was calculated to stimulate powerfully
inquisitive minds, and from it may be dated the commencement of
Grecian rational geography,—not the least valuable among the
contributions of this people to the stock of human knowledge.

  [703] Diogen. Laërt. ii, 81, 2. He agreed with Thalês in
  maintaining that the earth was stationary, (Aristotel. de Cœlo,
  ii, 13, p. 295, ed. Bekk.)

Xenophanês of Kolophon, somewhat younger than Anaximander, and
nearly contemporary with Pythagoras (seemingly from about 570-480
B. C.), migrated from Kolophon[704] to Zanklê and Katana in Sicily
and Elea in Italy, soon after the time when Ionia became subject
to the Persians, (540-530 B. C.) He was the founder of what is
called the Eleatic school of philosophers,—a real school, since it
appears that Parmenidês, Zeno, and Melissus, pursued and developed,
in a great degree, the train of speculation which had been begun by
Xenophanês,—doubtless with additions and variations of their own,
but especially with a dialectic power which belongs to the age of
Periklês, and is unknown in the sixth century B. C. He was the author
of more than one poem of considerable length, one on the foundation
of Kolophon and another on that of Elea; besides his poem on Nature,
wherein his philosophical doctrines were set forth.[705] His manner
appears to have been controversial and full of asperity towards
antagonists; but what is most remarkable is the plain-spoken manner
in which he declared himself against the popular religion, and in
which he denounced as abominable the descriptions of the gods given
by Homer and Hesiod.[706]

  [704] Diogen. Laërt. ix, 18.

  [705] Diogen. Laërt. ix, 22; Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i, p. 294.

  [706] Sextus Empiricus, adv. Mathem. ix, 193.

He is said to have controverted the doctrines both of Thalês and
Pythagoras: this is probable enough; but he seems to have taken his
start from the philosophy of Anaximander,—not, however, to adopt it,
but to reverse it,—and to set forth an opinion which we may call its
contrary. Nature, in the conception of Anaximander, consisted of a
Something having no other attribute except the unlimited power of
generating and cancelling phenomenal changes: in this doctrine, the
something or substratum existed only in and for those changes, and
could not be said to exist at all in any other sense: the permanent
was thus merged and lost in the variable,—the one in the many.
Xenophanês laid down the exact opposite: he conceived Nature as one
unchangeable and indivisible whole, spherical, animated, endued with
reason, and penetrated by or indeed identical with God: he denied
the objective reality of all change, or generation, or destruction,
which he seems to have considered as only changes or modifications in
the percipient, and perhaps different in one percipient and another.
That which exists, he maintained, could not have been generated, nor
could it ever be destroyed: there was neither real generation nor
real destruction of anything; but that which men took for such,
was the change in their own feelings and ideas. He thus recognized
the permanent without the variable,[707]—the one without the many.
And his treatment of the received religious creed was in harmony
with such physical or metaphysical hypothesis; for while he held
the whole of Nature to be God, without parts or change, he at the
same time pronounced the popular gods to be entities of subjective
fancy, imagined by men after their own model: if oxen or lions were
to become religious, he added, they would in like manner provide for
themselves gods after their respective shapes and characters.[708]
This hypothesis, which seemed to set aside altogether the study of
the sensible world as a source of knowledge, was expounded briefly,
and as it should seem, obscurely and rudely, by Xenophanês; at
least we may infer thus much from the slighting epithet applied to
him by Aristotle.[709] But his successors, Parmenidês and Zeno,
in the succeeding century, expanded it considerably, supported it
with extraordinary acuteness of dialectics, and even superadded a
second part, in which the phenomena of sense—though considered only
as appearances, not partaking in the reality of the one Ens—were
yet explained by a new physical hypothesis; so that they will be
found to exercise great influence over the speculations both of
Plato and Aristotle. We discover in Xenophanês, moreover, a vein
of skepticism, and a mournful despair as to the attainability of
certain knowledge,[710] which the nature of his philosophy was well
calculated to suggest, and in which the sillograph Timon of the third
century B. C., who seems to have spoken of Xenophanês better than of
most of the other philosophers, powerfully sympathized.

  [707] Aristot. Metaphys. i, 5, p. 986, Bek. Ξενοφάνης δὲ πρῶτος
  τούτων ~ἑνίσας~, οὐθὲν διεσαφήνισεν, οὐδὲ τῆς φύσεως τούτων
  (τοῦ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην) οὐδετέρας ἔοικε
  θιγεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἓν εἶναί φησι τὸν
  θεόν.

  Plutarch. ap. Eusebium Præparat. Evangel. i, 8. Ξενοφάνης δὲ ὁ
  Κολοφώνιος ἰδίαν μέν τινα ὁδὸν πεπορευμένος καὶ παρηλλαχυῖαν
  πάντας τοὺς προειρημένους, οὔτε γένεσιν οὔτε φθορὰν ἀπολείπει,
  ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι λέγει τὸ πᾶν ἀεὶ ὅμοιον. Compare Timon ap. Sext.
  Empiric. Pyrrh. Hypotyp. i, 224, 225. ἐδογμάτιζε δὲ ὁ Ξενοφάνης
  παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων προλήψεις, ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ
  τὸν θεὸν συμφυῆ τοῖς πᾶσιν· εἶναι δὲ σφαιροειδὴ καὶ ἀπαθῆ καὶ
  ἀμετάβλητον καὶ λογικόν, (Airstot. de Xenoph. c. 3, p. 977,
  Bek.). Ἀδύνατόν φησιν (ὁ Ξενοφάνης) εἶναι, εἴ τι ἐστὶν, γενέσθαι,
  etc.

  One may reasonably doubt whether all the arguments ascribed to
  Xenophanês, in the short but obscure treatise last quoted, really
  belong to him.

  [708] Clemens Alexand. Stromat. v, p. 601, vii, p. 711.

  [709] Aristot. Metaphysic. i, 5, p. 986, Bek. μικρὸν ἀγροικότερος.

  [710] Xenophanês, Fr. xiv, ed. Mullach; Sextus Empiric. adv.
  Mathematicos, vii, 49-110; and Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i, 224; Plutarch
  adv. Colôtên, p. 1114; compare Karsten ad Parmenidis Fragmenta,
  p. 146.

The cosmogony of Pherekydês of Syrus, contemporary of Anaximander
and among the teachers of Pythagoras, seems, according to the
fragments preserved, a combination of the old legendary fancies
with Orphic mysticism,[711] and probably exercised little influence
over the subsequent course of Grecian philosophy. By what has been
said of Thalês, Anaximander, and Xenophanês, it will be seen that
the sixth century B. C. witnessed the opening of several of those
roads of intellectual speculation which the later philosophers
pursued farther, or at least from which they branched off. Before
the year 500 B. C. many interesting questions were thus brought
into discussion, which Solon, who died about 558 B. C., had never
heard of,—just as he may probably never have seen the map of
Anaximander. But neither of these two distinguished men—Anaximander
or Xenophanês—was anything more than a speculative inquirer. The
third eminent name of this century, of whom I am now about to
speak,—Pythagoras, combined in his character disparate elements which
require rather a longer development.

  [711] See Brandis, Handbuch der Griech. Röm. Philosophie, ch.
  xxii.

Pythagoras was founder of a brotherhood, originally brought together
by a religious influence, and with observances approaching to
monastic peculiarity,—working in a direction at once religious,
political, and scientific, and exercising for some time a real
political ascendency,—but afterwards banished from government and
state affairs into a sectarian privacy with scientific pursuits,
not without, however, still producing some statesmen individually
distinguished. Amidst the multitude of false and apocryphal
statements which circulated in antiquity respecting this celebrated
man, we find a few important facts reasonably attested and deserving
credence. He was a native of Samos,[712] son of an opulent merchant
named Mnêsarchus,—or, according to some of his later and more fervent
admirers, of Apollo; born, as far as we can make out, about the 50th
Olympiad, or 580 B. C. On the many marvels recounted respecting
his youth, it is unnecessary to dwell. Among them may be numbered
his wide-reaching travels, said to have been prolonged for nearly
thirty years, to visit the Arabians, the Syrians, the Phenicians,
the Chaldæans, the Indians, and the Gallic Druids. But there is
reason to believe that he really visited Egypt[713]—perhaps also
Phenicia—and Babylon, then Chaldæan and independent. At the time
when he saw Egypt, between 560-540 B. C., about one century earlier
than Herodotus, it was under Amasis, the last of its own kings, with
its peculiar native character yet unimpaired by foreign conquest,
and only slightly modified by the admission during the preceding
century of Grecian mercenary troops and traders. The spectacle of
Egyptian habits, the conversation of the priests, and the initiation
into various mysteries or secret rites and stories not accessible
to the general public, may very naturally have impressed the mind
of Pythagoras, and given him that turn for mystic observance,
asceticism, and peculiarity of diet and clothing,—which manifested
itself from the same cause among several of his contemporaries, but
which was not a common phenomenon in the primitive Greek religion.
Besides visiting Egypt, Pythagoras is also said to have profited
by the teaching of Thalês, of Anaximander, and of Pherekydês of
Syros.[714] Amidst the towns of Ionia, he would, moreover, have an
opportunity of conversing with many Greek navigators who had visited
foreign countries, especially Italy and Sicily. His mind seems to
have been acted upon and impelled by this combined stimulus,—partly
towards an imaginative and religious vein of speculation, with a life
of mystic observance,—partly towards that active exercise, both of
mind and body, which the genius of an Hellenic community so naturally
tended to suggest.

  [712] Herodot. iv, 95. The place of his nativity is certain
  from Herodotus, but even this fact was differently stated by
  other authors, who called him a Tyrrhenian of Lemnos or Imbros
  (Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. c. 1-10), a Syrian, a Phliasian, etc.

  Cicero (De Repub. ii, 15: compare Livy, i, 18) censures the
  chronological blunder of those who made Pythagoras the preceptor
  of Numa; which certainly is a remarkable illustration how much
  confusion prevailed among literary men of antiquity about the
  dates of events even of the sixth century B. C. Ovid follows this
  story without hesitation: see Metamorph. xv, 60, with Burmann’s
  note.

  [713] Cicero de Fin. v, 29; Diogen. Laërt. viii, 3; Strabo, xiv,
  p. 638; Alexander Polyhistor ap. Cyrill. cont. Julian. iv, p.
  128, ed. Spanh. For the vast reach of his supposed travels, see
  Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. 11; Jamblic 14, _seqq._

  The same extensive journeys are ascribed to Demokritus, Diogen.
  Laërt. ix, 35.

  [714] The connection of Pythagoras with Pherekydês is noticed
  by Aristoxenus ap. Diogen. Laërt. i, 118, viii, 2; Cicero de
  Divinat. i, 13.

Of the personal doctrines or opinions of Pythagoras, whom we must
distinguish from Philolaus and the subsequent Pythagoreans, we have
little certain knowledge, though doubtless the first germ of their
geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, etc. must have proceeded from him.
But that he believed in the metempsychosis or transmigration of the
souls of deceased men into other men, as well as into animals, we
know, not only by other evidence, but also by the testimony of his
contemporary, the philosopher Xenophanês of Elea. Pythagoras, seeing
a dog beaten, and hearing him howl, desired the striker to desist,
saying: “It is the soul of a friend of mine, whom I recognized by his
voice.” This—together with the general testimony of Hêrakleitus, that
Pythagoras was a man of extensive research and acquired instruction,
but artful for mischief and destitute of sound judgment—is all that
we know about him from contemporaries. Herodotus, two generations
afterwards, while he conceives the Pythagoreans as a peculiar
religious order, intimates that both Orpheus and Pythagoras had
derived the doctrine of the metempsychosis from Egypt, but had
pretended to it as their own without acknowledgment.[715]

  [715] Xenophanês, Fragm. 7, ed. Schneidewin; Diogen. Laërt. viii,
  36: compare Aulus Gellius, iv, 11 (we must remark that this or a
  like doctrine is not peculiar to Pythagoreans, but believed by
  the poet Pindar, Olymp. ii, 68, and Fragment, Thren. x, as well
  as by the philosopher Pherekydês, Porphyrius de Antro Nympharum,
  c. 31).

    Καί ποτέ μιν στυφελιζομένου σκύλακος παριόντα
      Φασὶν ἐποικτεῖραι, καὶ τόδε φάσθαι ἔπος—
    Παῦσαι, μηδὲ ῥάπιζ᾽· ἐπείη φίλου ἄνερός ἐστι
      Ψυχὴ, τὴν ἔγνων φθεγξαμένης ἀΐων.

  Consult also Sextus Empiricus, viii, 286, as to the κοινωνία
  between gods, men and animals, believed both by Pythagoras and
  Empedoklês. That Herodotus (ii, 123) alludes to Orpheus and
  Pythagoras, though refraining designedly from mentioning names,
  there can hardly be any doubt: compare ii, 81; also Aristotle, De
  Animâ, i, 3, 23.

  The testimony of Hêrakleitus is contained in Diogenes Laërtius,
  viii, 6; ix, 1. Ἡρακλεῖτος γοῦν ὁ φυσικὸς μονονουχὶ κέκραγε καί
  φησι· Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα
  πάντων, καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφὰς, ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ
  ~σοφίην, πολυμαθείην, κακοτεχνίην~. Again, Πολυμαθίη νόον
  οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αὖθις δὲ
  Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον.

  Dr. Thirlwall conceives Xenophanês as having intended in the
  passage above cited to treat the doctrine of the metempsychosis
  “with deserved ridicule.” (Hist. of Greece, ch. xii, vol. ii, p.
  162.) Religious opinions are so apt to appear ridiculous to those
  who do not believe them, that such a suspicion is not unnatural;
  yet I think, if Xenophanês had been so disposed, he would have
  found more ridiculous examples among the many which this doctrine
  might suggest. Indeed, it seems hardly possible to present the
  metempsychosis in a more touching or respectable point of view
  than that which the lines of his poem set forth. The particular
  animal selected is that one between whom and man the sympathy is
  most marked and reciprocal, while the doctrine is made to enforce
  a practical lesson against cruelty.

Pythagoras combines the character of a sophist (a man of large
observation, and clever, ascendent, inventive mind,—the original
sense of the word Sophist, prior to the polemics of the Platonic
school, and the only sense known to Herodotus[716]) with that of
an inspired teacher, prophet, and worker of miracles,—approaching
to and sometimes even confounded with the gods,—and employing all
these gifts to found a new special order of brethren, bound together
by religious rites and observances peculiar to themselves. In his
prominent vocation, analogous to that of Epimenidês, Orpheus, or
Melampus, he appears as the revealer of a mode of life calculated
to raise his disciples above the level of mankind, and to recommend
them to the favor of the gods; the Pythagorean life, like the
Orphic life,[717] being intended as the exclusive prerogative
of the brotherhood,—approached only by probation and initiatory
ceremonies which were adapted to select enthusiasts rather than to
an indiscriminate crowd,—and exacting entire mental devotion to the
master.[718] In these lofty pretensions the Agrigentine Empedoklês
seems to have greatly copied him, though with some varieties, about
half a century afterwards.[719] While Aristotle tells us that the
Krotoniates identified Pythagoras with the Hyperborean Apollo, the
satirical Timon pronounced him to have been “a juggler of solemn
speech, engaged in fishing for men.”[720] This is the same character,
looked at from the different points of view of the believer and the
unbeliever. There is, however, no reason for regarding Pythagoras as
an impostor, because experience seems to show, that while in certain
ages it is not difficult for a man to persuade others that he is
inspired, it is still less difficult for him to contract the same
belief himself.

  [716] Herodot. i, 29; ii, 49; iv, 95. Ἑλλήνων οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ
  σοφιστῇ Πυθαγόρῃ. Hippokratês distinguishes the σοφιστὴς from
  the ἰητρὸς, though both of them had handled the subject of
  medicine,—the general from the special habits of investigation.
  (Hippokratês, Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰητρικῆς, c. 20, vol. i, p. 620,
  Littré.)

  [717] See Lobeck’s learned and valuable treatise, Aglaophamus,
  Orphica, lib. ii, pp. 247, 698, 900; also Plato, Legg. vi, 782,
  and Euripid. Hippol. 946.

  [718] Plato’s conception of Pythagoras (Republ. x, p. 600)
  depicts him as something not unlike St. Benedict, or St. Francis,
  (or St. Elias, as some Carmelites have tried to make out: see
  Kuster ad Jamblich. c. 3)—Ἀλλὰ δὴ, εἰ μὴ δημοσίᾳ, ἰδίᾳ τισὶν
  ἡγεμὼν παιδείας αὐτὸς ζῶν λέγεται Ὅμηρος γενέσθαι, οἱ ἐκεῖνον
  ἠγάπων ἐπὶ συνουσίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ὑστέροις ὁδόν τινα βίου παρέδοσαν
  Ὁμηρικήν· ὥσπερ Πυθαγόρας αὐτός τε διαφερόντως ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἠγαπήθη,
  καὶ οἱ ὕστερον ἔτι καὶ νῦν Πυθαγορεῖον τροπὸν ἐπονομάζοντες τοῦ
  βίου διαφανεῖς πῃ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.

  The description of Melampus, given in Herodot. ii, 49, very much
  fills up the idea of Pythagoras, as derived from ii, 81-123,
  and iv, 95. Pythagoras, as well as Melampus, was said to have
  pretended to divination and prophecy (Cicero, Divinat. i, 3,
  46; Porphyr. Vit. Pyth. c. 29: compare Krische, De Societate a
  Pythagorâ in urbe Crotoniatarum conditâ Commentatio, ch. v, p.
  72, Göttingen, 1831).

  [719] Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch. Rom.
  Philosophie, part i, sect. xlvii, p. 191.

  [720] Ælian. V. H. ii, 26; Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 31, 140;
  Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. c. 20; Diodorus, Fragm. lib. x, vol. iv, p.
  56, Wess.: Timon ap. Diogen. Laërt. viii, 36; and Plutarch, Numa,
  c. 8.

    Πυθαγόρην τε γόητος ἀποκλίναντ᾽ ἐπὶ δόξαν
    Θήρῃ ἐπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων, σεμνηγορίης ὀαριστὴν.

Looking at the general type of Pythagoras, as conceived by witnesses
in and nearest to his own age,—Xenophanês, Hêrakleitus, Herodotus,
Plato, Aristotle, Isokratês,[721]—we find in him chiefly the
religious missionary and schoolmaster, with little of the politician.
His efficiency in the latter character, originally subordinate,
first becomes prominent in those glowing fancies which the later
Pythagoreans communicated to Aristoxenus and Dikæarchus. The
primitive Pythagoras inspired by the gods to reveal a new mode of
life,[722]—the Pythagorean life,—and to promise divine favor to a
select and docile few, as the recompense of strict ritual obedience,
of austere self-control, and of laborious training, bodily as well
as mental. To speak with confidence of the details of his training,
ethical or scientific, and of the doctrines which he promulgated,
is impossible; for neither he himself nor any of his disciples
anterior to Philolaus—who was separated from him by about one
intervening generation—left any memorials in writing.[723] Numbers
and lines, studied partly in their own mutual relations, partly
under various symbolizing fancies, presented themselves to him as
the primary constituent elements of the universe, and as a sort
of magical key to phenomena, physical as well as moral. And these
mathematical tendencies in his teaching, expanded by Pythagoreans,
his successors, and coinciding partly also, as has been before
stated, with the studies of Anaximander and Thalês, acquired more
and more development, so as to become one of the most glorious and
profitable manifestations of Grecian intellect. Living as Pythagoras
did at a time when the stock of experience was scanty, the license
of hypothesis unbounded, and the process of deduction without rule
or verifying test,—he was thus fortunate enough to strike into
that track of geometry and arithmetic, in which, from data of
experience few, simple, and obvious, an immense field of deductive
and verifiable investigation may be travelled over. We must at the
same time remark, however, that in his mind this track, which now
seems so straightforward and well defined, was clouded by strange
fancies which it is not easy to understand, and from which it was but
partially cleared by his successors. Of his spiritual training much
is said, though not upon very good authority. We hear of his memorial
discipline, his monastic self-scrutiny, his employment of music to
soothe disorderly passions,[724] his long novitiate of silence,
his knowledge of physiognomy, which enabled him to detect even
without trial unworthy subjects, his peculiar diet, and his rigid
care for sobriety as well as for bodily vigor. He is also said to
have inculcated abstinence from animal food, and this feeling is so
naturally connected with the doctrine of the metempsychosis, that we
may well believe him to have entertained it, as Empedoklês also did
after him.[725] It is certain that there were peculiar observances,
and probably a certain measure of self-denial embodied in the
Pythagorean life; but on the other hand, it seems equally certain
that the members of the order cannot have been all subjected to the
same diet, or training, or studies. For Milo the Krotoniate was among
them,[726] the strongest man and the unparalleled wrestler of his
age,—who cannot possibly have dispensed with animal food and ample
diet (even setting aside the tales about his voracious appetite),
and is not likely to have bent his attention on speculative study.
Probably Pythagoras did not enforce the same bodily or mental
discipline on all, or at least knew when to grant dispensations. The
order, as it first stood under him, consisted of men different both
in temperament and aptitude, but bound together by common religious
observances and hopes, common reverence for the master, and mutual
attachment as well as pride in each other’s success; and it must
thus be distinguished from the Pythagoreans of the fourth century B.
C., who had no communion with wrestlers, and comprised only ascetic,
studious men, generally recluse, though in some cases rising to
political distinction.

  [721] Isokratês, Busiris, p. 402, ed. Auger. Πυθαγόρας ὁ Σάμιος,
  ἀφικόμενος εἰς Αἴγυπτον, καὶ μαθητὴς τῶν ἱερέων γενόμενος, τήν τε
  ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτος εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκόμισε, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς
  θυσίας καὶ τὰς ἁγιστείας ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐπιφανέστερον τῶν ἄλλων
  ἐσπούδασε.

  Compare Aristotel. Magn. Moralia, i, 1, about Pythagoras as
  an ethical teacher. Dêmokritus, born about 460 B. C., wrote
  a treatise (now lost) respecting Pythagoras, whom he greatly
  admired: as far as we can judge, it would seem that he too must
  have considered Pythagoras as an ethical teacher (Diogen. Laërt.
  xi, 38; Mullach, Democriti Fragmenta, lib. ii, p. 113; Cicero de
  Orator. iii, 15).

  [722] Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 64, 115, 151, 199: see also the
  idea ascribed to Pythagoras, of divine inspirations coming on men
  (ἐπίπνοια παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου). Aristoxenus apud Stobæum, Eclog.
  Physic. p. 206; Diogen. Laërt. viii, 32.

  Meiners establishes it as probable that the stories respecting
  the miraculous powers and properties of Pythagoras got into
  circulation either during his lifetime, or at least not long
  after his death (Geschichte der Wissenschaften, b. iii, vol. i,
  pp. 504, 505).

  [723] Respecting Philolaus, see the valuable collection of
  his fragments, and commentary on them, by Boeckh (Philolaus
  des Pythagoreers Leben, Berlin, 1819). That Philolaus was the
  first who composed a work on Pythagorean science, and thus made
  it known beyond the limits of the brotherhood—among others to
  Plato—appears well established (Boeckh, Philolaus, p. 22; Diogen.
  Laërt. viii, 15-55; Jamblichus, c. 119). Simmias and Kebês,
  fellow-disciples of Plato under Sokratês, had held intercourse
  with Philolaus at Thebes (Plato, Phædon, p. 61), perhaps about
  420 B. C. The Pythagorean brotherhood had then been dispersed in
  various parts of Greece, though the attachment of its members to
  each other seems to have continued long afterwards.

  [724] Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid. p. 384, ad fin. Quintilian,
  Instit. Oratt. ix, 4.

  [725] Empedoklês, ap. Aristot. Rhetoric. i, 14, 2; Sextus
  Empiric. ix, 127; Plutarch, De Esu Carnium, pp. 993, 996, 997;
  where he puts Pythagoras and Empedoklês together, as having both
  held the doctrine of the metempsychosis, and both prohibited the
  eating of animal food. Empedoklês supposed that plants had souls,
  and that the souls of human beings passed after death into plants
  as well as into animals. “I have been myself heretofore (said he)
  a boy, a girl, a shrub, a bird, and a fish of the sea.”

    ἤδη γάρ ποτ᾽ ἐγὼ γενόμην κοῦρός τε κόρη τε,
    θάμνος τ᾽, οἴωνός τε καὶ ἐξ ἁλὸς ἔμπυρος ἰχθύς.

  (Diogen. L. viii, 77; Sturz. ad Empedokl. Frag. p. 466.)
  Pythagoras is said to have affirmed that he had been not only
  Euphorbus in the Grecian army before Troy, but also a tradesman,
  a courtezan, etc., and various other human characters, before
  his actual existence; he did not, however, extend the same
  intercommunion to plants, in any case.

  The abstinence from animal food was an Orphic precept as well as
  a Pythagorean (Aristophan. Ran. 1032).

  [726] Strabo, vi, p. 263; Diogen. L. viii, 40.

The succession of these Pythagoreans, never very numerous, seems
to have continued until about 300 B. C., and then nearly died out;
being superseded by other schemes of philosophy more suited to
cultivated Greeks of the age after Sokratês. But during the time of
Cicero, two centuries afterwards, the orientalizing tendency—then
beginning to spread over the Grecian and Roman world, and becoming
gradually stronger and stronger—caused the Pythagorean philosophy
to be again revived. It was revived too, with little or none of its
scientific tendencies, but with more than its primitive religious and
imaginative fanaticism,—Apollonius of Tyana constituting himself a
living copy of Pythagoras. And thus, while the scientific elements
developed by the disciples of Pythagoras had become disjoined from
all peculiarity of sect, and passed into the general studious
world,—the original vein of mystic and ascetic fancy belonging to
the master, without any of that practical efficiency of body and
mind which had marked his first followers, was taken up anew into
the pagan world, along with the disfigured doctrines of Plato.
Neo-Pythagorism, passing gradually into Neo-Platonism, outlasted
the other more positive and masculine systems of pagan philosophy,
as the contemporary and rival of Christianity. A large proportion
of the false statements concerning Pythagoras come from these
Neo-Pythagoreans, who were not deterred by the want of memorials from
illustrating, with ample latitude of fancy, the ideal character of
the master.

That an inquisitive man like Pythagoras, at a time when there were
hardly any books to study, would visit foreign countries, and
converse with all the Grecian philosophical inquirers within his
reach, is a matter which we should presume, even if no one attested
it; and our witnesses carry us very little beyond this general
presumption. What doctrines he borrowed, or from whom, we are unable
to discover. But, in fact, his whole life and proceedings bear the
stamp of an original mind, and not of a borrower,—a mind impressed
both with Hellenic and with non-Hellenic habits and religion, yet
capable of combining the two in a manner peculiar to himself; and
above all, endued with those talents for religion and personal
ascendency over others, which told for much more than the intrinsic
merit of his ideas. We are informed that after extensive travels and
inquiries he returned to Samos, at the age of about forty: he then
found his native island under the despotism of Polykratês, which
rendered it an unsuitable place either for free sentiments or for
marked individuals. Unable to attract hearers, or found any school
or brotherhood, in his native island, he determined to expatriate.
And we may presume that at this period (about 535-530 B. C.) the
recent subjugation of Ionia by the Persians was not without influence
on his determination. The trade between the Asiatic and the Italian
Greeks,—and even the intimacy between Milêtus and Knidus on the one
side, and Sybaris and Tarentum on the other,—had been great and of
long standing, so that there was more than one motive to determine
him to the coast of Italy; in which direction also his contemporary
Xenophanês, the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy,
emigrated, seemingly, about the same time,—from Kolophon to Zanklê,
Katana, and Elea.[727]

  [727] Diogen. Laërt. ix, 18.

Kroton and Sybaris were at this time in their fullest
prosperity,—among the first and most prosperous cities of the
Hellenic name. To the former of the two Pythagoras directed his
course. A council of one thousand persons, taken from among the
heirs and representatives of the principal proprietors at its first
foundation, was here invested with the supreme authority: in what
manner the executive offices were filled, we have no information.
Besides a great extent of power, and a numerous population, the large
mass of whom had no share in the political franchise, Kroton stood
at this time distinguished for two things,—the general excellence of
the bodily habit of the citizens, attested, in part, by the number of
conquerors furnished to the Olympic games,—and the superiority of its
physicians, or surgeons.[728] These two points were, in fact, greatly
connected with each other. For the therapeutics of the day consisted
not so much of active remedies as of careful diet and regimen; while
the trainer, who dictated the life of an athlete during his long and
fatiguing preparation for an Olympic contest, and the professional
superintendent of the youths who frequented the public gymnasia,
followed out the same general views, and acted upon the same basis of
knowledge, as the physician who prescribed for a state of positive
bad health.[729] Of medical education properly so called, especially
of anatomy, there was then little or nothing. The physician acquired
his knowledge from observation of men sick as well as healthy, and
from a careful notice of the way in which the human body was acted
upon by surrounding agents and circumstances: and this same knowledge
was not less necessary for the trainer; so that the same place
which contained the best men in the latter class was also likely
to be distinguished in the former. It is not improbable that this
celebrity of Kroton may have been one of the reasons which determined
Pythagoras to go thither; for among the precepts ascribed to him,
precise rules as to diet and bodily regulation occupy a prominent
place. The medical or surgical celebrity of Dêmokêdês (son-in-law of
the Pythagorean Milo), to whom allusion has been made in a former
chapter, is contemporaneous with the presence of Pythagoras at
Kroton; and the medical men of Magna Græcia maintained themselves in
credit, as rivals of the schools of the Asklepiads at Kôs and Knidus,
throughout all the fifth and fourth centuries B. C.

  [728] Herodot. iii, 131; Strabo, vi, p. 261: Menander de
  Encomiis, p. 96, ed. Heeren. Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ ἀγαλματοποιΐα τε καὶ
  ζωγραφικῇ, καὶ Κροτωνιάτας ἐπὶ ἰατρικῇ, μέγα φρονῆσαι, etc.

  The Krotoniate Alkmæon, a younger contemporary of Pythagoras
  (Aristotel. Metaph. i, 5), is among the earliest names mentioned
  as philosophizing upon physical and medical subjects. See
  Brandis, Handbuch der Geschicht. der Philos. sect. lxxxiii, p.
  508, and Aristotel. De Generat. Animal. iii, 2, p. 752, Bekker.

  The medical art in Egypt, at the time when Pythagoras visited
  that country, was sufficiently far advanced to excite the
  attention of an inquisitive traveller,—the branches of it
  minutely subdivided and strict rules laid down for practice
  (Herodot. ii, 84; Aristotel. Politic, iii, 10, 4).

  [729] See the analogy of the two strikingly brought out in the
  treatise of Hippokratês Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰητρικῆς, c. 3, 4, 7, vol.
  i, p. 580-584, ed. Littré.

  Ἔτι γοῦν καὶ νῦν οἱ τῶν γυμνασίων τε καὶ ἀσκησίων ἐπιμελόμενοι
  αἰεί τι προσεξευρίσκουσι, καὶ τὴν αὐτέην ὁδὸν ζητέοντες ὅ,τι ἔδων
  καὶ πίνων ἐπικρατήσει τε αὐτέων μάλιστα, καὶ ἰσχυρότερος αὐτὸς
  ἑωϋτοῦ ἔσται (p. 580); again, p. 584: Τί οὖν φαίνεται ἑτεροῖον
  διανοηθεὶς ὁ καλεύμενος ἰητρὸς καὶ ὁμολογεομένως χειροτέχνης, ὃς
  ἐξεῦρε τὴν ἀμφὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας δίαιτάν καὶ τροφὴν, ἢ κεῖνος ὁ ἀπ᾽
  ἀρχῆς τοῖσι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισι τροφὴν, ᾗ νῦν χρεόμεθα, ἐξ ἐκείνης
  τῆς ἀγρίης τε καὶ θηριώδεος εὑρών τε καὶ παρασκευάσας διαίτης:
  compare another passage, not less illustrative, in the treatise
  of Hippokratês Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων, c. 3, vol. ii, p. 245, ed.
  Littré.

  Following the same general idea, that the theory and practice of
  the physician is a farther development and variety of that of
  the gymnastic trainer, I transcribe some observations from the
  excellent Remarques Rétrospectives of M. Littré, at the end of
  the fourth volume of his edition of Hippokratês (p. 662).

  After having observed (p. 659) that physiology may be considered
  as divided into two parts,—one relating to the mechanism of the
  functions; the other, to the effects produced upon the human
  body by the different influences which act upon it and the media
  by which it is surrounded; and after having observed that on
  the first of these two branches the ancients could never make
  progress from their ignorance of anatomy,—he goes on to state,
  that respecting the second branch they acquired a large amount of
  knowledge:—

  “Sur la physiologie des influences extérieures, la Grèce du
  temps d’Hippocrate et après lui fut le théâtre d’expériences en
  grand, les plus importantes et les plus instructives. Toute la
  population (la population libre, s’entend) étoit soumise à un
  système régulier d’éducation physique (N. B. this is a little too
  strongly stated): dans quelques cités, à Lacédémone par exemple,
  les femmes n’en étoient pas exemptées. Ce système se composoit
  d’exercices et d’une alimentation, que combinèrent l’empirisme
  d’abord, puis une théorie plus savante: il concernoit (comme
  dit Hippocrate lui-même, en ne parlant, il est vrai, que de la
  partie alimentaire), il concernoit et les malades pour leur
  rétablissement, et les gens bien portans pour la conservation de
  leur santé, et les personnes livrées aux exercices gymnastiques
  pour l’accroissement de leurs forces. On savoit au juste ce
  qu’il falloit pour conserver seulement le corps en bon état ou
  pour traiter un malade—pour former un militaire ou pour faire un
  athlète—et en particulier, un lutteur, un coureur, un sauteur,
  un pugiliste. Une classe d’hommes, les maîtres des gymnases,
  étoient exclusivement adonnés à la culture de cet art, auquel
  les médecins participoient dans les limites de leur profession,
  et Hippocrate, qui dans les Aphorismes, invoque l’exemple des
  athlètes, nous parle dans le Traité des Articulations des
  personnes maigres, qui n’ayant pas été amaigris par un procédé
  régulier de l’art, ont les chairs muqueuses. Les anciens
  médecins savoient, comme on le voit, procurer l’amaigrissement
  conformément à l’art, et reconnoitre à ses effets un
  amaigrissement irrégulier: toutes choses auxquelles nos médecins
  sont étrangers, et dont on ne retrouve l’analogue que parmi les
  _entraineurs_ Anglois. Au reste cet ensemble de connoissances
  empiriques et théoriques doit être mis au rang des pertes
  fâcheuses qui ont accompagné la longue et turbulente transition
  du monde ancien an monde moderne. Les admirables institutions
  destinées dans l’antiquité à développer et affermir le corps,
  ont disparu: l’hygiène publique est déstituée à cet égard de
  toute direction scientifique et générale, et demeure abandonnée
  complètement au hasard.”

  See also the remarks of Plato respecting Herodikus, De Republicâ,
  iii, p. 406; Aristotel. Politic. iii, 11, 6; iv, 1, 1; viii, 4, 1.

The biographers of Pythagoras tell us that his arrival there, his
preaching, and his conduct, produced an effect almost electric
upon the minds of the people, with an extensive reform, public as
well as private. Political discontent was repressed, incontinence
disappeared, luxury became discredited, and the women, hastened to
exchange their golden ornaments for the simplest attire. No less
than two thousand persons were converted at his first preaching;
and so effective were his discourses to the youth, that the Supreme
Council of One Thousand invited him into their assembly, solicited
his advice, and even offered to constitute him their prytanis, or
president, while his wife and daughter were placed at the head of
the religious processions of females.[730] Nor was his influence
confined to Kroton. Other towns in Italy and Sicily,—Sybaris,
Metapontum, Rhêgium, Katana, Himera, etc., all felt the benefit of
his exhortations, which extricated some of them even from slavery.
Such are the tales of which the biographers of Pythagoras are
full.[731] And we see that even the disciples of Aristotle, about
the year 300 B. C.,—Aristoxenus, Dikæarchus, Herakleidês of Pontus,
etc., are hardly less charged with them than the Neo-Pythagoreans of
three or four centuries later: they doubtless heard them from their
contemporary Pythagoreans,[732] the last members of a declining
sect, among whom the attributes of the primitive founder passed for
godlike, but who had no memorials, no historical judgment, and no
means of forming a true conception of Kroton as it stood in 530 B.
C.[733]

  [730] Valerius Maxim. viii, 15, xv, 1; Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c.
  45; Timæus, Fragm. 78, ed. Didot.

  [731] Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. c. 21-54; Jamblich. 33-35, 166.

  [732] The compilations of Porphyry and Jamblichus on the life
  of Pythagoras, copied from a great variety of authors, will
  doubtless contain some truth amidst their confused heap of
  statements, many incredible, and nearly all unauthenticated. But
  it is very difficult to single out what these portions of truth
  really are. Even Aristoxenus and Dikæarchus, the best authors
  from whom these biographers quote, lived near two centuries
  after the death of Pythagoras, and do not appear to have had
  any early memorials to consult, nor any better informants than
  the contemporary Pythagoreans,—the last of an expiring sect,
  and probably among the least eminent for intellect, since the
  philosophers of the Sokratic school in its various branches
  carried off the acute and aspiring young men of that time.

  Meiners, in his Geschichte der Wissenschaften (vol. i, b. iii, p.
  191, _seq._), has given a careful analysis of the various authors
  from whom the two biographers have borrowed, and a comparative
  estimate of their trustworthiness. It is an excellent piece of
  historical criticism, though the author exaggerates both the
  merits and the influence of the first Pythagoreans: Kiessling, in
  the notes to his edition of Jamblichus, has given some extracts
  from it, but by no means enough to dispense with the perusal
  of the original. I think Meiners allows too much credit, on
  the whole, to Aristoxenus (see p. 214), and makes too little
  deduction for the various stories, difficult to be believed, of
  which Aristoxenus is given as the source: of course the latter
  could not furnish better matter than he heard from his own
  witnesses. Where Meiners’s judgment is more severe, it is also
  better borne out, especially respecting Porphyry himself, and his
  scholar Jamblichus. These later Pythagorean philosophers seem to
  have set up as a formal canon of credibility, that which many
  religious men of antiquity acted upon from a mere unconscious
  sentiment and fear of giving offence to the gods,—That it was
  _not right to disbelieve any story_ recounted respecting the
  gods, and wherein the divine agency was introduced: no one could
  tell but what it _might be true_: to deny its truth, was to
  set bounds to the divine omnipotence. Accordingly, they made
  no difficulty in believing what was recounted about Aristæus,
  Abaris, and other eminent subjects of mythes (Jamblichus, Vit.
  Pyth. c. 138-148)—καὶ τοῦτό γε πάντες οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ὅμως ἔχουσι
  πιστευτικῶς, οἶον περὶ Ἀρισταίου καὶ Ἀβάριδος τὰ μυθολογούμενα
  καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα λέγεται ... τῶν τοιούτων δὲ τῶν δοκούντων
  μυθικῶν ἀπομνημονεύουσιν, ~ὡς οὐδὲν ἀπιστοῦντες ὅτι ἂν εἰς τὸ
  θεῖον ἀναγηται~. Also, not less formally laid down in Jamblichus,
  Adhortatio ad Philosophiam, as the fourth Symbolum, p. 324, ed.
  Kiessling. Περὶ θεῶν μηδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἀπιστεῖ, μηδὲ περὶ θείων
  δογμάτων. Reasoning from their principles, this was a consistent
  corollary to lay down; but it helps us to estimate their value as
  selectors and discriminators of accounts respecting Pythagoras.
  The extravagant compliments paid by the emperor Julian in his
  letters to Jamblichus will not suffice to establish the authority
  of the latter as a critic and witness: see the Epistolæ 34, 40,
  41, in Heyler’s edit. of Julian’s letters.

  [733] Aulus Gell. N. A. iv, 11. Apollonius (ap. Jamblich. c. 262)
  alludes to τὰ ὑπομνήματα τῶν Κροτωνιατῶν: what the date of these
  may be, we do not know, but there is no reason to believe them
  anterior to Aristoxenus.

To trace these tales to a true foundation is impossible: but we
may entertain reasonable belief that the success of Pythagoras,
as a person favored by the gods and patentee of divine secrets,
was very great,—that he procured to himself both the reverence of
the multitude and the peculiar attachment and obedience of many
devoted adherents, chiefly belonging to the wealthy and powerful
classes,—that a select body of these adherents, three hundred in
number, bound themselves by a sort of vow both to Pythagoras and to
each other, and adopted a peculiar diet, ritual, and observances,
as a token of union,—though without anything like community of
property, which some have ascribed to them. Such a band of men,
standing high in the city for wealth and station, and bound together
by this intimate tie, came by almost unconscious tendency to mingle
political ambition with religious and scientific pursuits. Political
clubs with sworn members, under one form or another, were a constant
phenomenon in the Grecian cities,[734] and the Pythagorean order at
its first formation was the most efficient of all clubs; since it
presented an intimacy of attachment among its members, as well as a
feeling of haughty exclusiveness against the public without, such
as no other fraternity could parallel.[735] The devoted attachment
of Pythagoreans towards each other is not less emphatically set
forth than their contempt for every one else. In fact, these two
attributes of the order seem the best ascertained, as well as the
most permanent of all: moreover, we may be sure that the peculiar
observances of the order passed for exemplary virtues in the eyes
of its members, and exalted ambition into a duty, by making them
sincerely believe that they were the only persons fit to govern.
It is no matter of surprise, then, to learn that the Pythagoreans
gradually drew to themselves great ascendency in the government of
Kroton. And as similar clubs, not less influential, were formed at
Metapontum and other places, so the Pythagorean order spread its net
and dictated the course of affairs over a large portion of Magna
Græcia. Such ascendency of the Pythagoreans must have procured for
the master himself some real, and still more supposed, influence over
the march of government at Kroton and elsewhere, of a nature not
then possessed by any of his contemporaries throughout Greece.[736]
But his influence was probably exercised in the background, through
the medium of the brotherhood who reverenced him: for it is hardly
conformable to Greek manners that a stranger of his character should
guide personally and avowedly the political affairs of any Grecian
city.

  [734] Thucyd. viii, 54. τὰς ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον
  οὖσαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, ἁπάσας ἐπελθὼν, etc.

  On this important passage, in which Thucydidês notes the
  political clubs of Athens as sworn societies,—numerous,
  notorious, and efficient,—I shall speak farther in a future stage
  of the history. Dr. Arnold has a good note on the passage.

  [735] Justin, xx, 4. “Sed trecenti ex juvenibus cum sodalitii
  juris sacramento quodam nexi, separatam a ceteris civibus vitam
  exercerent, quasi cœtum clandestinæ conjurationis haberent,
  civitatem in se converterunt.”

  Compare Diogen. Laërt. viii, 3; Apollonius ap. Jamblich. c. 254;
  Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. c. 33.

  The story of the devoted attachments of the two Pythagoreans
  Damon and Phintias appears to be very well attested: Aristoxenus
  heard it from the lips of the younger Dionysius the despot, whose
  sentence had elicited such manifestation of friendship (Porphyry,
  Vit. Pyth. c. 59-62, Cicero, De Officiis, iii, 10; and Davis ad
  Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v, 22).

  [736] Plutarch, Philosoph. cum Principib. c. i, p. 777. ἂν
  δ᾽ ἄρχοντος ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πρακτικοῦ καθάψηται (ὁ
  φιλόσοφος) καὶ τοῦτον ἀναπλήσῃ καλοκᾳγαθίας, πολλοὺς δι᾽
  ἑνὸς ὠφέλησεν, ὡς Πυθαγόρας τοῖς πρωτεύουσι τῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν
  συγγενόμενος.

Nor are we to believe that Pythagoras came originally to Kroton with
the express design of creating for himself an ascendent political
position,—still less that he came for the purpose of realizing a
great preconceived political idea, and transforming Kroton into a
model-city of pure Dorism, as has been supposed by some eminent
modern authors. Such schemes might indeed be ascribed to him by
Pythagoreans of the Platonic age, when large ideas of political
amelioration were rife in the minds of speculative men,—by men
disposed to forego the authorship of their own opinions, and
preferring to accredit them as traditions handed down from a founder
who had left no memorials; but it requires better evidence than
theirs to make us believe that any real Greek born in 580 B. C.
actually conceived such plans. We cannot construe the scheme of
Pythagoras as going farther than the formation of a private, select
order of brethren, embracing his religious fancies, ethical tone,
and germs of scientific idea,—and manifesting adhesion by those
observances which Herodotus and Plato call the Pythagorean orgies
and mode of life. And his private order became politically powerful,
because he was skilful or fortunate enough to enlist a sufficient
number of wealthy Krotoniates, possessing individual influence
which they strengthened immensely by thus regimenting themselves in
intimate union. The Pythagorean orgies or religious ceremonies were
not inconsistent with public activity, bodily as well as mental:
probably the rich men of the order may have been rendered even more
active, by being fortified against the temptations of a life of
indulgence. The character of the order as it first stood, different
from that to which it was afterwards reduced, was indeed religious
and exclusive, but also active and domineering; not despising any
of those bodily accomplishments which increased the efficiency of
the Grecian citizen, and which so particularly harmonized with the
preëxisting tendencies of Kroton.[737] Niebuhr and O. Müller have
even supposed that the select Three Hundred Pythagoreans constituted
a sort of smaller senate at that city,[738]—an hypothesis no way
probable; we may rather conceive them as a powerful private club,
exercising ascendency in the interior of the senate, and governing
through the medium of the constituted authorities. Nor can we
receive without great allowance the assertion of Varro,[739] who,
assimilating Pythagoras to Plato, tells us that he confined his
instructions on matters of government to chosen disciples, who had
gone through a complete training, and had reached the perfection
of wisdom and virtue. It seems more probable that the political
Pythagoreans were those who were most qualified for action, and
least for speculation. And we may reasonably suppose in the general
of the order that skill in turning to account the aptitudes of
individuals, which two centuries ago was so conspicuous in the
Jesuits; to whom, in various ways, the Pythagoreans bear considerable
resemblance. All that we can be said to know about their political
principles is, that they were exclusive and aristocratical, adverse
to the control and interference of the people; a circumstance no
way disadvantageous to them, since they coincided in this respect
with the existing government of the city,—had not their own conduct
brought additional odium on the old aristocracy, and raised up an
aggravated democratical opposition, carried to the most deplorable
lengths of violence.

  [737] I transcribe here the summary given by Krische, at the
  close of his Dissertation on the Pythagorean order, p. 101:
  “Societatis scopus fuit mere politicus, ut lapsam optimatium
  potestatem non modo in pristinum restitueret, sed firmaret
  amplificaretque: cum summo hoc scopo duo conjuncti fuerunt;
  moralis alter, alter ad literas spectans. Discipulos suos bonos
  probosque homines reddere voluit Pythagoras, et ut civitatem
  moderantes potestate suâ non abuterentur ad plebem opprimendam;
  et ut plebs, intelligens suis commodis consuli, conditione suâ
  contenta esset. Quoniam vero bonum sapiensque moderamen nisi
  a prudente literisque exculto viro exspectari (non) licet,
  philosophiæ studium necessarium duxit Samius iis, qui ad
  civitatis clavum tenendum se accingerent.”

  This is the general view (coinciding substantially with that
  of O. Müller,—Dorians, iii, 9, 16) given by an author who has
  gone through the evidences with care and learning. It differs
  on some important points from the idea which I conceive of the
  primitive master and his contemporary brethren. It leaves out
  the religious ascendency, which I imagine to have stood first
  among the means as well as among the premeditated purposes
  of Pythagoras, and sets forth a reformatory political scheme
  as directly contemplated by him, of which there is no proof.
  Though the political ascendency of the early Pythagoreans is
  the most prominent feature in their early history, it is not to
  be considered as the manifestation of any peculiar or settled
  political idea,—it is rather a result of their position and means
  of union. Ritter observes, in my opinion more justly: “We must
  not believe that the mysteries of the Pythagorean order were of
  a simply political character: the most probable accounts warrant
  us in considering that its central point was a mystic religious
  teaching,” (Geschicht. der Philosophie, b. iv, ch. i, vol. i, pp.
  365-368:) compare Hoeck. Kreta, vol. iii, p. 223.

  Krische (p. 32) as well as Boeckh (Philolaus, pp. 39-42) and O.
  Müller assimilate the Pythagorean life to the Dorian or Spartan
  habits, and call the Pythagorean philosophy the expression
  of Grecian Dorism, as opposed to the Ionians and the Ionic
  philosophy. I confess that I perceive no analogy between the two,
  either in action or speculation. The Spartans stand completely
  distinct from other Dorians; and even the Spartan habits of
  life, though they present some points of resemblance with the
  bodily training of the Pythagoreans, exhibit still more important
  points of difference, in respect to religious peculiarity and
  mysticism, as well as to scientific element embodied with it. The
  Pythagorean philosophy, and the Eleatic philosophy, were both
  equally opposed to the Ionic; yet neither of them is in any way
  connected with Dorian tendencies. Neither Elea nor Kroton were
  Doric cities; moreover, Xenophanês as well as Pythagoras were
  both Ionians.

  The general assertions respecting Ionic mobility and inconstancy,
  contrasted with Doric constancy and steadiness, will not be found
  borne out by a study of facts. The Dorism of Pythagoras appears
  to me a complete fancy. O. Müller even turns Kroton into a Dorian
  city, contrary to all evidence.

  [738] Niebuhr, Römisch. Gesch. i, p. 165, 2nd edit.; O. Müller,
  Hist of Dorians, iii, 9, 16: Krische is opposed to this idea,
  sect. v, p. 84.

  [739] Varro ap. Augustin. de Ordine, ii, 30; Krische, p. 77.

All the information which we possess, apocryphal as it is, respecting
this memorable club, is derived from its warm admirers; yet even
their statements are enough to explain how it came to provoke deadly
and extensive enmity. A stranger coming to teach new religious
dogmas and observances, with a tincture of science and some new
ethical ideas and phrases, though he would obtain some zealous
votaries, would also bring upon himself a certain measure of
antipathy. Extreme strictness of observances, combined with the art
of touching skilfully the springs of religious terror in others,
would indeed do much both to fortify and to exalt him. But when
it was discovered that science, philosophy, and even the mystic
revelations of religion, whatever they were, remained confined to the
private talk and practice of the disciples, and were thus thrown
into the background, while all that was seen and felt without, was
the political predominance of an ambitious fraternity,—we need not
wonder that Pythagorism in all its parts became odious to a large
portion of the community. Moreover, we find the order represented not
merely as constituting a devoted and exclusive political party, but
also as manifesting an ostentatious self-conceit throughout their
personal demeanor,[740]—refusing the hand of fellowship to all except
the brethren, and disgusting especially their own familiar friends
and kinsmen. So far as we know Grecian philosophy, this is the only
instance in which it was distinctly abused for political and party
objects: the early days of the Pythagorean order stand distinguished
for such perversion, which, fortunately for the progress of
philosophy, never presented itself afterwards in Greece.[741] Even
at Athens, however, we shall hereafter see that Sokratês, though
standing really aloof from all party intrigue, incurred much of his
unpopularity from supposed political conjunction with Kritias and
Alkibiadês,[742] to which, indeed, the orator Æschinês distinctly
ascribes his condemnation, speaking about sixty years after the
event. Had Sokratês been known as the founder of a band holding
together intimately for ambitious purposes, the result would have
been eminently pernicious to philosophy, and probably much sooner
pernicious to himself.

  [740] Apollonius ap. Jamblichum, V. P. c. 254, 255, 256, 257.
  ἡγεμόνες δὲ ἐγένοντο τῆς διαφορᾶς οἱ ταῖς συγγενείαις καὶ ταῖς
  ~οἰκειότησιν~ ἐγγύτατα καθεστηκότες τῶν Πυθαγορείων. Αἴτιον δ᾽
  ἦν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν πολλὰ αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει τῶν πραττομένων, etc.: compare
  also the lines descriptive of Pythagoras, c. 259. Τοὺς μὲν
  ἑταίρους ἧγεν ἴσους μακάρεσσι θεοῖσι. Τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους ἡγεῖτ᾽ οὔτ᾽
  ἐν λόγῳ, ἐν ἀριθμῷ.

  That this Apollonius, cited both by Jamblichus and by Porphyry,
  is Apollonius of Tyana, has been rendered probable by Meiners
  (Gesch. der Wissensch. v. i, pp. 239-245): compare Welcker,
  Prolegomena ad Theognid. pp. xlv, xlvi.

  When we read the life of Apollonius by Philostratus, we see that
  the former was himself extremely communicative: he might be the
  rather disposed therefore to think that the seclusion and reserve
  of Pythagoras was a defect, and to ascribe to it much of the
  mischief which afterwards overtook the order.

  [741] Schleiermacher observes, that “Philosophy among the
  Pythagoreans was connected with political objects, and their
  school with a practical brotherly partnership, such as was never
  on any other occasion seen in Greece.” (Introduction to his
  Translation of Plato, p. 12.) See also Theopompus, Fr. 68, ed.
  Didot, apud Athenæum, v, p. 213, and Euripidês, Mêdêa, 294.

  [742] Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 12; Æschines, cont. Timarch. c.
  34. ὑμεῖς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, Σωκράτην μὲν τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείνατε, ὅτι
  Κριτίαν ἐφάνη πεπαιδευκὼς, ἕνα τῶν τριάκοντα.

It was this cause which brought about the complete and violent
destruction of the Pythagorean order. Their ascendency had provoked
such wide-spread discontent, that their enemies became emboldened
to employ extreme force against them. Kylon and Ninon—the former
of whom is said to have sought admittance into the order, but to
have been rejected on account of his bad character—took the lead
in pronounced opposition to the Pythagoreans; and the odium which
the latter had incurred extended itself farther to the Senate of
One Thousand, through the medium of which their ascendency had been
exercised. Propositions were made for rendering the government more
democratical, and for constituting a new senate, taken by lot from
all the people, before which the magistrates should go through their
trial of accountability after office; an opportunity being chosen
in which the Senate of One Thousand had given signal offence by
refusing to divide among the people the recently conquered territory
of Sybaris.[743] In spite of the opposition of the Pythagoreans,
this change of government was carried through. Ninon and Kylon,
their principal enemies, made use of it to exasperate the people
still farther against the order, until they provoked actual popular
violence against it. The Pythagoreans were attacked when assembled
in their meeting-house near the temple of Apollo, or, as some said,
in the house of Milo: the building was set on fire, and many of
the members perished;[744] none but the younger and more vigorous
escaping. Similar disturbances, and the like violent suppression
of the order, with destruction of several among the leading
citizens, are said to have taken place in other cities of Magna
Græcia,—Tarentum, Metapontum, Kaulonia. And we are told that these
cities remained for some time in a state of great disquietude and
commotion from which they were only rescued by the friendly mediation
of the Peloponnesian Achæans, the original founders of Sybaris and
Kroton,—assisted, indeed, by mediators from other parts of Greece.
The cities were at length pacified, and induced to adopt an amicable
congress, with common religious festivals at a temple founded
expressly for the purpose, and dedicated to Zeus Homarius.[745]

  [743] This is stated in Jamblichus, c. 255; yet it is difficult
  to believe; for if the fact had been so, the destruction of the
  Pythagoreans would naturally have produced an allotment and
  permanent occupation of the Sybaritan territory,—which certainly
  did not take place, for Sybaris remained without resident
  possessors until the foundation of Thurii.

  [744] Jamblichus, c, 255-259; Porphyry, c. 54-57; Diogen. Laërt.
  viii, 39; Diodor. x, Fragm. vol. iv, p. 56, Wess.

  [745] Polyb. ii, 39; Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, c. 13, p. 583;
  Aristoxenus, ap. Jamblich. c. 250. That the enemies of the order
  attacked it by setting fire to the house in which the members
  were assembled, is the circumstance in which all accounts agree.
  On all other points there is great discrepancy, especially
  respecting the names and dates of the Pythagoreans who escaped:
  Boeckh (Philolaus, p. 9, _seq._) and Brandis (Handbuch der Gesch.
  Philos. ch. lxxiii, p. 432) try to reconcile these discrepancies.

  Aristophanês introduces Strepsiadês, at the close of the Nubes,
  as setting fire to the meeting-house (φροντιστήριον) of Sokratês
  and his disciples possibly the Pythagorean conflagration may have
  suggested this.

Thus perished the original Pythagorean order. Respecting Pythagoras
himself, there were conflicting accounts; some representing that he
was burnt in the temple with his disciples;[746] others, that he
had died a short time previously; others again affirmed that he was
alive at the time, but absent, and that he died not long afterwards
in exile, after forty days of voluntary abstinence from food. His
tomb was still shown at Metapontum in the days of Cicero.[747] As
an active brotherhood, the Pythagoreans never revived; but the
dispersed members came together as a sect, for common religious
observances and common pursuit of science. They were readmitted,
after some interval, into the cities of Magna Græcia,[748] from which
they had been originally expelled, but to which the sect is always
considered as particularly belonging,—though individual members of it
are found besides at Thebes and other cities of Greece. Indeed, some
of these later Pythagoreans sometimes even acquired great political
influence, as we see in the case of the Tarentine Archytas, the
contemporary of Plato.

  [746] “Pythagoras Samius suspicione dominatûs injustâ vivus in
  fano concrematus est.” (Arnobius adv. Gentes, lib. i, p. 23, ed.
  Elmenhorst.)

  [747] Cicero, De Finib. v, 2 (who seems to have copied from
  Dikæarchus: see Fuhr. ad Dikæarchi Fragment. p. 55); Justin, xx,
  4; Diogen. Laërt. viii, 40; Jamblichus, V. P. c. 249.

  O. Müller says (Dorians, iii, 9, 16), that “the influence of
  the Pythagorean league upon the administration of the Italian
  states was of the most beneficial kind, which continued for many
  generations after the dissolution of the league itself.”

  The first of these two assertions cannot be made out, and depends
  only on the statements of later encomiasts, who even supply
  materials to contradict their own general view. The judgment
  of Welcker respecting the influence of the Pythagoreans, much
  less favorable, is at the same time more probable. (Præfat. ad
  Theognid. p. xlv.)

  The second of the two assertions appears to me quite incorrect;
  the influence of the Pythagorean order on the government of
  Magna Græcia ceased altogether, as far as we are able to judge.
  An individual Pythagorean like Archytas might obtain influence,
  but this is not the influence of the order. Nor ought O. Müller
  to talk about the Italian Greeks giving up the Doric customs and
  adopting an Achæan government. There is nothing to prove that
  Kroton ever had Doric customs.

  [748] Aristotel. de Cœlo, ii, 13. οἱ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καλούμενοι
  δὲ Πυθαγορεῖοι. “Italici philosophi quondam nominati.” (Cicero,
  De Senect. c. 21.)

It has already been stated that the period when Pythagoras arrived
at Kroton may be fixed somewhere between B. C. 540-530; and his
arrival is said to have occurred at a time of great depression in
the minds of the Krotoniates. They had recently been defeated by
the united Lokrians and Rhegians, vastly inferior to themselves in
number, at the river Sagra; and the humiliation thus brought upon
them is said to have rendered them docile to the training of the
Samian missionary.[749] As the birth of the Pythagorean order is thus
connected with the defeat of the Krotoniates at the Sagra, so its
extinction is also connected with their victory over the Sybarites at
the river Traeis, or Trionto, about twenty years afterwards.

  [749] Heyne places the date of the battle of Sagra about 560
  B. C.; but this is very uncertain. See his Opuscula, vol. ii,
  Prolus. ii, pp. 53, and Prolus. x, p. 184. See also Justin, xx,
  3, and Strabo, vi, pp. 261-263. It will be seen that the latter
  conceives the battle of the Sagra as having happened after the
  destruction of Sybaris by the Krotoniates; for he states twice
  that the Krotoniates lost so many citizens at the Sagra, that
  the city did not long survive so terrible a blow: he cannot,
  therefore, have supposed that the complete triumph of the
  Krotoniates over the great Sybaris was gained afterwards.

Of the history of these two great Achæan cities we unfortunately
know very little. Though both were powerful, yet down to the period
of 510 B. C., Sybaris seems to have been decidedly the greatest: of
its dominion as well as of its much-denounced luxury I have spoken
in a former chapter.[750] It was at that time that the war broke
out between them which ended in the destruction of Sybaris. It is
certain that the Sybaritans were aggressors in the war; but by what
causes it had been preceded in their own town, or what provocation
they had received, we make out very indistinctly. There had been
a political revolution at Sybaris, we are told, not long before,
in which a popular leader named Têlys had headed a rising against
the oligarchical government, and induced the people to banish five
hundred of the leading rich men, as well as to confiscate their
properties. He had acquired the sovereignty and become despot of
Sybaris;[751] and it appears that he, or his rule at Sybaris, was
much abhorred at Kroton,—since the Krotoniate Philippus, a man of
splendid muscular form and an Olympic victor, was exiled for having
engaged himself to marry the daughter of Têlys.[752] According to
the narrative given by the later Pythagoreans, those exiles, whom
Têlys had driven from Sybaris, took refuge at Kroton, and cast
themselves as suppliants on the altars for protection. It may well
be, indeed, that they were in part Pythagoreans of Sybaris. A body
of powerful exiles, harbored in a town so close at hand, naturally
inspired alarm, and Têlys demanded that they should be delivered up,
threatening war in case of refusal. This demand excited consternation
at Kroton, since the military strength of Sybaris was decidedly
superior. The surrender of the exiles was much debated, and almost
decreed, by the Krotoniates, until at length the persuasion of
Pythagoras himself is said to have determined them to risk any hazard
sooner than incur the dishonor of betraying suppliants.

  [750] See above, vol. iii, chap. xxii.

  [751] Diodor. xii, 9. Herodotus calls Têlys in one place βασιλῆα,
  in another τύραννον of Sybaris (v, 44): this is not at variance
  with the story of Diodorus.

  The story given by Athenæus, out of Herakleidês Ponticus,
  respecting the subversion of the dominion of Têlys, cannot be
  reconciled either with Herodotus or Diodorus (Athenæus, xii,
  p. 522). Dr. Thirlwall supposes the deposition of Têlys to
  have occurred between the defeat at the Traeis and the capture
  of Sybaris; but this is inconsistent with the statement of
  Herakleidês, and not countenanced by any other evidence.

  [752] Herodot. v, 47.

On the demand of the Sybarites being refused, Têlys marched against
Kroton, at the head of a force which is reckoned at three hundred
thousand men.[753] He marched, too, in defiance of the strongest
religious warnings against the enterprise,—for the sacrifices,
offered on his behalf by the Iamid prophet Kallias of Elis, were
decisively unfavorable, and the prophet himself fled in terror
to Kroton.[754] Near the river Traeis, or Trionto, he was met by
the forces of Kroton, consisting, we are informed, of one hundred
thousand men, and commanded by the great athlete and Pythagorean
Milo; who was clothed, we are told, in the costume and armed with
the club of Hêraklês. They were farther reinforced, however, by
a valuable ally, the Spartan Dorieus, younger brother of king
Kleomenês, then coasting along the gulf of Tarentum with a body
of colonists, intending to found a settlement in Sicily. A bloody
battle was fought, in which the Sybarites were totally worsted, with
prodigious slaughter; while the victors, fiercely provoked and giving
no quarter, followed up the pursuit so warmly that they took the
city, dispersed its inhabitants, and crushed its whole power[755] in
the short space of seventy days. The Sybarites fled in great part to
Laos and Skidros,[756] their settlements planted on the Mediterranean
coast, across the Calabrian peninsula. And so eager were the
Krotoniates to render the site of Sybaris untenable, that they turned
the course of the river Krathis so as to overwhelm and destroy it:
the dry bed in which the river had originally flowed was still
visible in the time of Herodotus,[757] who was among the settlers in
the town of Thurii, afterwards founded, nearly adjoining.

  [753] Diodor. xii, 9; Strabo, vi, p. 263; Jamblichus, Vit.
  Pythag. c. 260; Skymn. Chi. v, 340.

  [754] Herodot. v, 44.

  [755] Diodor. xii, 9, 10; Strabo, vi, p. 263.

  [756] Herodot. vi, 21; Strabo, vi, p. 253.

  [757] Herodot. v, 45; Diodor. xii, 9, 10; Strabo, vi, p. 263.
  Strabo mentions expressly the turning of the river for the
  purpose of overwhelming the city,—ἐλόντες γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ἐπήγαγον
  τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ κατέκλυσαν. It is to this change in the channel
  of the river that I refer the expression in Herodotus,—τέμενός
  τε καὶ νηὸν ἐόντα ~παρὰ τὸν ξηρὸν~ Κρᾶθιν. It was natural
  that the old deserted bed of the river should be called “_the
  dry Krathis_:” whereas, if we suppose that there was only one
  channel, the expression has no appropriate meaning. For I do not
  think that any one can be well satisfied with the explanation
  of Bähr “Vocatur Crathis hoc loco ξηρὸς _siccus_, ut qui hieme
  fluit, æstatis vero tempore exsiccatus est: quod adhuc in multis
  Italiæ inferioris fluviis observant.” I doubt whether this be
  true, as a matter of fact, respecting the river Krathis (see my
  preceding volume, ch. xxii), but even if the fact were true, the
  epithet in Bähr’s sense has no especial significance for the
  purpose contemplated by Herodotus, who merely wishes to describe
  the site of the temple erected by Dorieus. “Near the Krathis,” or
  “near the dry Krathis,” would be equivalent expressions, if we
  adopted Bähr’s construction; whereas to say, “near the deserted
  channel of the Krathis,” would be a good local designation.

It appears, however, that the Krotoniates for a long time kept the
site of Sybaris deserted, refusing even to allot the territory among
the body of their own citizens: from which circumstances, as has
been before noticed, the commotion against the Pythagorean order
is said to have arisen. They may perhaps have been afraid of the
name and recollections of the city; wherein no large or permanent
establishment was ever formed, until Thurii was established by
Athens about sixty-five years afterwards. Nevertheless, the name
of the Sybarites did not perish. Having maintained themselves at
Laos, Skidros, and elsewhere, they afterwards formed the privileged
Old-citizens among the colonists of Thurii; but misbehaved themselves
in that capacity, and were mostly either slain or expelled. Even
after that, however, the name of Sybaris still remained on a reduced
scale in some portion of the territory. Herodotus recounts what he
was told by the Sybarites, and we find subsequent indications of them
even as late as Theokritus.

The conquest and destruction of the original Sybaris—perhaps in 510
B. C. the greatest of all Grecian cities—appears to have excited a
strong sympathy in the Hellenic world. In Milêtus, especially, with
which it had maintained intimate union, the grief was so vehement,
that all the Milesians shaved their heads in token of mourning.[758]
The event happened just at the time of the expulsion of Hippias from
Athens, and must have made a sensible revolution in the relations of
the Greek cities on the Italian coast with the rustic population of
the interior. The Krotoniates might destroy Sybaris, and disperse
its inhabitants, but they could not succeed to its wide dominion
over dependent territory; and the extinction of this great aggregate
power, stretching across the peninsula from sea to sea, lessened the
means of resistance against the Oscan movements from the inland.
From this time forward, the cities of Magna Græcia, as well as those
of Ionia, tend to decline in consequence, while Athens, on the
other hand, becomes both more conspicuous and more powerful. At the
invasion of Greece by Xerxês, thirty years after this conquest of
Sybaris, Sparta and Athens send to ask for aid both from Sicily and
Korkyra,—but not from Magna Græcia.

  [758] Herodot. vi, 21.

It is much to be regretted that we do not possess fuller information
respecting these important changes among the Greco-Italian cities,
but we may remark that even Herodotus,—himself a citizen of Thurii,
and dwelling on the spot not more than eighty years after the
capture of Sybaris,—evidently found no written memorials to consult;
and could obtain from verbal conversation nothing better than
statements both meagre and contradictory. The material circumstance,
for example, of the aid rendered by the Spartan Dorieus and his
colonists, though positively asserted by the Sybarites, was as
positively denied by the Krotoniates, who alleged that they had
accomplished the conquest by themselves, and with their own unaided
forces. There can be little hesitation in crediting the affirmative
assertion of the Sybarites, who showed to Herodotus a temple and
precinct erected by the Spartan prince in testimony of his share
in the victory, on the banks of the dry, deserted channel, out of
which the Krathis had been turned, and in honor of the Krathian
Athênê.[759] This of itself forms a proof, coupled with the positive
assertion of the Sybarites, sufficient for the case. But they
produced another indirect argument to confirm it, which deserves
notice. Dorieus had attacked Sybaris while he was passing along the
coast of Italy to go and found a colony in Sicily, under the express
mandate and encouragement of the oracle; and after tarrying awhile
at Sybaris, he pursued his journey to the south-western portion of
Sicily, where he and nearly all his companions perished in a battle
with the Carthaginians and Egestæans,—though the oracle had promised
him that he should acquire and occupy permanently the neighboring
territory near Mount Eryx. Now the Sybarites deduced from this
fatal disaster of Dorieus and his expedition, combined with the
favorable promise of the oracle beforehand, a confident proof of the
correctness of their own statement that he had fought at Sybaris. For
if he had gone straight to the territory marked out by the oracle,
they argued, without turning aside for any other object, the prophecy
on which his hopes were founded would have been unquestionably
realized, and he would have succeeded; but the ruinous disappointment
which actually overtook him was at once explained, and the truth of
prophecy vindicated, when it was recollected that he had turned aside
to help the Krotoniates against Sybaris, and thus set at nought the
conditions prescribed to him. Upon this argument, Herodotus tells us,
the Sybarites of his day especially insisted.[760] And while we note
their pious and literal faith in the communications of an inspired
prophet, we must at the same time observe how perfectly that faith
supplied the place of historical premises,—how scanty their stock was
of such legitimate evidence,—and how little they had yet learned to
appreciate its value.

  [759] Herodot. v, 45.

  [760] Herodot. v, 45. Τοῦτο δὲ, αὐτοῦ Δωριέος τὸν θάνατον
  μαρτύριον μέγιστον ποιεῦνται (Συβαρῖται), ὅτι παρὰ τὰ
  μεμαντευμένα ποιέων διεφθάρῃ. Εἰ γὰρ δὴ μὴ παρέπρηξε μηδὲν, ἐπ᾽
  ᾧ δὲ ἐστάλη ἐποίεε, εἷλε ἂν τὴν Ἐρυκίνην χώρην καὶ ἑλὼν κάτεσχε,
  οὐδ᾽ ἂν αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ στρατιὴ διεφθάρῃ.

It is to be remarked, that Herodotus, in his brief mention of the
fatal war between Sybaris and Kroton, does not make the least
allusion to Pythagoras or his brotherhood. The least which we can
infer from such silence is, that the part which they played in
reference to the war, and their general ascendency in Magna Græcia,
was in reality less conspicuous and overruling than the Pythagorean
historians set forth. Even making such allowance, however, the
absence of all allusion in Herodotus, to the commotions which
accompanied the subversion of the Pythagoreans, is a surprising
circumstance. Nor can I pass over a perplexing statement in
Polybius, which seems to show that he too must have conceived
the history of Sybaris in a way different from that in which it
is commonly represented. He tells us that after much suffering in
Magna Græcia, from the troubles which followed the expulsion of the
Pythagoreans, the cities were induced by Achæan mediation to come to
an accommodation, and even to establish something like a permanent
league, with a common temple and sacrifices. Now the three cities
which he specifies as having been the first to do this, are Kroton,
Sybaris, and Kaulonia.[761] But according to the sequence of events
and the fatal war, just described, between Kroton and Sybaris, the
latter city must have been at that time in ruins; little, if at all,
inhabited. I cannot but infer from this statement of Polybius, that
he followed different authorities respecting the early history of
Magna Græcia in the beginning of the fifth century B. C.

  [761] Polyb. ii, 39. Heyne thinks that the agreement here
  mentioned by Polybius took place Olymp. 80, 3; or, indeed, after
  the repopulation of the Sybaritan territory by the foundation
  of Thurii (Opuscula, vol. ii; Prolus. x, p. 189). But there
  seems great difficulty in imagining that the state of violent
  commotion—which, according to Polybius, was only appeased by this
  agreement—can possibly have lasted so long as half a century; the
  received date of the overthrow of the Pythagoreans being about
  504 B. C.

Indeed, the early history of these cities gives us little more
than a few isolated facts and names. With regard to their
legislators, Zaleukus and Charondas, nothing is made out except
their existence,—and even that fact some ancient critics contested.
Of Zaleukus, whom chronologists place in 664 B. C., I have already
spoken; the date of Charondas cannot be assigned, but we may perhaps
presume that it was at some time between 600-500 B. C. He was a
citizen of middling station, born in the Chalkidic colony of Katana
in Sicily,[762] and he framed laws not only for his own city, but for
the other Chalkidic cities in Sicily and Italy,—Leontini, Naxos,
Zanklê, and Rhêgium. The laws and the solemn preamble ascribed to
him by Diodorus and Stobæus, belong to a later day,[763] and we are
obliged to content ourselves with collecting the brief hints of
Aristotle, who tells us that the laws of Charondas descended to great
minuteness of distinction and specification, especially in graduating
the fine for offences according to the property of the guilty person
fined,[764]—but that there was nothing in his laws strictly original
and peculiar, except that he was the first to introduce the solemn
indictment against perjured witnesses before justice. The perjured
witness, in Grecian ideas, was looked upon as having committed
a crime half religious, half civil; and the indictment raised
against him, known by a peculiar name, partook of both characters,
approaching in some respects to the procedure against a murderer.
Such distinct form of indictment against perjured testimony—with its
appropriate name,[765] which we shall find maintained at Athens
throughout the best-known days of Attic law—was first enacted by
Charondas.

  [762] Aristot. Politic. ii, 9, 6; iv, 9, 10. Heyne puts Charondas
  much earlier than the foundation of Thurii, in which, I think,
  he is undoubtedly right: but without determining the date more
  exactly (Opuscul. vol. ii; Prolus. ix, p. 160), Charondas must
  certainly have been earlier than Anaxilas of Rhêgium and the
  great Sicilian despots; which will place him higher than 500 B.
  C.: but I do not know that any more precise mark of time can be
  found.

  [763] Diodorus, xii, 35; Stobæus, Serm. xliv, 20-40; Cicero
  de Legg. ii, 6. See K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griech.
  Staatsalterthümer, ch. 89; Heyne, Opuscul. vol. ii, pp. 72-164.
  Brandis (Geschichte der Röm. Philosophie, ch. xxvi, p. 102) seems
  to conceive these prologues as genuine.

  The mistakes and confusion made by ancient writers respecting
  these lawgivers—even by writers earlier than Aristotle (Politic.
  ii, 9, 5)—are such as we have no means of clearing up.

  Seneca (Epist. 90) calls both Zaleukus and Charondas disciples
  of Pythagoras. That the former was so, is not to be believed;
  but it is not wholly impossible that the latter may have been
  so,—or at least that he may have been a companion of the earliest
  Pythagoreans.

  [764] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 9, 8. Χαρώνδου δ᾽ ἴδιον μὲν οὐδέν
  ἐστι πλὴν αἱ δίκαι τῶν ψευδομαρτύρων· πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν
  ἐπίσκηψιν· τῇ δ᾽ ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρώτερος καὶ τῶν νῦν
  νομοθετῶν. To the fulness and precision predicated respecting
  Charondas in the latter part of this passage, I refer the other
  passage in Politic. iv, 10, 6, which is not to be construed as
  if it meant that Charondas had graduated fines on the rich and
  poor with a distinct view to that political trick (of indirectly
  eliminating the poor from public duties) which Aristotle had been
  just adverting to,—but merely means that Charondas had been nice
  and minute in graduating pecuniary penalties generally, having
  reference to the wealth or poverty of the person sentenced.

  [765] Πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ~ἐπίσκηψιν~ (Aristot. Politic. ii,
  9, 8). See Harpokration, v. Ἐπεσκήψατο, and Pollux, viii, 33;
  Demosthenês cont. Stephanum, ii, c. 5; cont. Euerg. et Mnêsibul.
  c. 1. The word ἐπίσκηψις carries with it the solemnity of meaning
  adverted to it in the text, and seems to have been used specially
  with reference to an action or indictment against perjured
  witnesses: which indictment was permitted to be brought with a
  less degree of risk or cost to the accuser than most others in
  the Attic dikasteries, (Dêmosth. cont. Euerg. et Mn. _l. c._)







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