Transcriber’s Note: A number of obvious printer’s errors (u for n, inconsistent spelling of Senators’ and Representatives’ names, punctuation, etc) have been amended. Other than that, the original text remains unchanged.

[1]

ABRIDGMENT
OF THE
DEBATES OF CONGRESS,
FROM 1789 TO 1856.

FROM GALES AND SEATON’S ANNALS OF CONGRESS; FROM THEIR
REGISTER OF DEBATES; AND FROM THE OFFICIAL
REPORTED DEBATES, BY JOHN C. RIVES.

BY
THE AUTHOR OF THE THIRTY YEARS’ VIEW.

VOL. III.

NEW YORK
D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 443 & 445 BROADWAY.
1861

[2]

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1856, by
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY,
in the Clerk’s Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New York.

[3]

EIGHTH CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION.

BEGUN AT THE CITY OF WASHINGTON, OCTOBER 17, 1803.

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,—THOMAS JEFFERSON.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE.

LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE SENATE.

New Hampshire.—Simeon Olcott, William Plumer.

Vermont.—S. R. Bradley, Israel Smith.

Massachusetts.—Jonathan Mason, Timothy Pickering.

Rhode Island.—Christopher Ellery, Samuel I. Potter.

Connecticut.—James Hillhouse, Uriah Tracy.

New York.—De Witt Clinton, Theodorus Bailey.

New Jersey.—Jonathan Dayton, John Condit.

Pennsylvania.—George Logan, Samuel Maclay.

Delaware.—William H. Wells, Samuel White.

Maryland.—Robert Wright, Samuel Smith.

Virginia.—Wilson C. Nicholas, John Taylor.

North Carolina.—Jesse Franklin, David Stone.

South Carolina.—Pierce Butler, Thomas Sumter.

Georgia.—A. Baldwin, James Jackson.

Tennessee.—William Cocke, Joseph Anderson.

Kentucky.—John Breckenridge, John Browne.

Ohio.—Thomas Worthington, John Smith.

Monday, October 17, 1803.

The first session of the eighth Congress, conformably to the Constitution of the United States, commenced at the city of Washington, agreeably to the Proclamation of the President of the United States for that purpose; and the Senate assembled on this day.

PRESENT:

Simeon Olcott and William Plumer, from New Hampshire;

Timothy Pickering, from Massachusetts;

James Hillhouse and Uriah Tracy, from Connecticut;

Christopher Ellery and Samuel I. Potter, from Rhode Island;

Stephen R. Bradley and Israel Smith, from Vermont;

De Witt Clinton and Theodorus Bailey, from New York;

Jonathan Dayton and John Condit, from New Jersey;

George Logan and Samuel Maclay, from Pennsylvania;

William Hill Wells and Samuel White, from Delaware;

Robert Wright and Samuel Smith, from Maryland;

John Taylor and Wilson Carey Nicholas, from Virginia;

John Brown and John Breckenridge, from Kentucky;

Jesse Franklin and David Stone, from North Carolina;

Joseph Anderson and William Cocke, from Tennessee;

Abraham Baldwin, from Georgia; and

Thomas Worthington, from Ohio.

The Vice President being absent, the Senate proceeded to the election of a President, pro tem., as the constitution provides, and the ballots being collected and counted, the whole number was found to be twenty-nine, of which fifteen make a majority. Mr. Brown had 24, Mr. Baldwin 2, Mr. Dayton 2, and Mr. Pickering 1.

Consequently, the Honorable John Brown was elected President of the Senate, pro tempore.

The credentials of the following Senators were severally read, to wit:

Of Joseph Anderson, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Tennessee; of Theodorus Bailey, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of New York; of James Hillhouse, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Connecticut; of Samuel Maclay, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Pennsylvania; of Samuel I. Potter, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Rhode Island; of Israel Smith, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Vermont; of Samuel White, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Delaware; for the term of six years from and after the third day of March last, respectively: also, of Thomas Worthington, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Ohio; of John Condit, appointed a Senator by the Executive of the State of New Jersey; of John Taylor, appointed a Senator by the Executive of the State of Virginia, in place of S. T. Mason, deceased; of Timothy Pickering, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Massachusetts, in the place of Dwight Foster, resigned; and the oath required by law was, by the President, administered to them respectively.

The oath was also administered to Samuel[4] Smith, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Maryland, for the term of six years from and after the third day of March last.

Ordered, That the Secretary wait on the President of the United States and acquaint him that a quorum of the Senate is assembled, and that, in the absence of the Vice President, they have elected the Hon. John Brown President of the Senate, pro tempore.

The Secretary was directed to give a similar notice to the House of Representatives.

Resolved, That James Mathers, Sergeant-at-Arms and Doorkeeper to the Senate, be, and he is hereby, authorized to employ one additional assistant and two horses, for the purpose of performing such services as are usually required by the Doorkeeper to the Senate; and that the sum of twenty-eight dollars be allowed him weekly for that purpose during the session, and for twenty days after.

Resolved, That each Senator be supplied during the present session with three such newspapers, printed in any of the States, as he may choose, provided that the same be furnished at the usual rate for the annual charge of such papers.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that a quorum of the House had assembled, and had elected the Hon. Nathaniel Macon their Speaker, and is ready to proceed to business.

Ordered, That Messrs. Clinton and Breckenridge be a committee on the part of the Senate, together with such committee as the House of Representatives may appoint on their part, to wait on the President of the United States, and notify him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled, and ready to receive any communications that he may be pleased to make to them.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate, that the House agree to the resolution of the Senate for the appointment of a joint committee to wait on the President of the United States, and have appointed a committee on their part.

On motion, Resolved, That two Chaplains, of different denominations, be appointed to Congress for the present session, one by each House, who shall interchange weekly.

Ordered, That the Secretary desire the concurrence of the House of Representatives in this resolution.

The Senate proceeded to the choice of a Chaplain on their part, and the ballots having been collected and counted, the whole number was twenty-eight; of which fifteen make a majority. Mr. Gantt had 15 votes, and Mr. M’Cormick 13.

Consequently, the Rev. Dr. Gantt was elected.

Mr. Clinton reported, from the joint committee appointed for the purpose, that they had waited on the President of the United States, and that he had acquainted them that he would make a communication to the two Houses, by message, immediately.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

The Message was read, and five hundred copies thereof ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate.

[6]

Tuesday, October 18.

Pierce Butler, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of South Carolina, for the unexpired time for which the late John Ewing Colhoun was elected to serve, produced his credentials, which were read, and the oath required by law was administered to him by the President.

James Jackson, from the State of Georgia, attended.

The credentials of Samuel Smith, a Senator from the State of Maryland, were read.

Friday, October 21.

John Quincy Adams, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Massachusetts, for six years, commencing the 4th day of March last, produced his credentials, which were read; and the oath required by law was administered to him by the President.

Mr. Clinton, after a few prefatory observations on the necessity of designating the persons, severally, whom the people should wish to hold the offices of President and Vice-President of the United States, and stating that the State which he represented, as well as others in the Union, had, through the medium of their Legislatures, strongly recommended the adoption of the principle, laid on the table the following motion, which he read; and it was made the order of the day for the next day, and printed.

Mr. Breckenridge gave notice, that he should, to-morrow, ask leave to bring in a bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for other purposes.

Saturday, October 22.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

The Message was read, and, together with the papers therein referred to, ordered to lie for consideration.

Agreeably to notice given yesterday, Mr. Breckenridge had leave to bring in a bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for other purposes; which bill was read, and ordered to the second reading. The bill is in the following words:

Amendment to the Constitution.

The order of the day being called for on Mr. Clinton’s motion of yesterday,

Mr. Clinton said that, as the resolution was but now printed, and laid before the Senate, it might be proper to refer it to Monday for further consideration, but if it was requisite, by the rules of the Senate, that the resolution must have three separate readings, and on three different days, he should call for a second reading on Saturday, that it might be in readiness for a third reading on Monday, and be ultimately acted upon that day, as the Legislatures of Tennessee and Vermont were in session, and probably must be at the trouble of an extra session[7] to act upon the amendment, unless it could be sent to them before they separated.

Mr. Brown, of Kentucky, the President pro tem. of the Senate, said the written rule of the Senate determined that bills should have three readings, and on different days, without unanimous consent to the contrary; but the resolutions were not included; and that he should be glad of the opinion of the Senate upon the subject.

Mr. Tracy of Connecticut said, that there was no written rule which would reach the case, but the Vice President, upon the ground that they came within the reason of the rule, had determined that all resolutions which required a joint vote of both Houses to give them efficacy, should take the same course as bills, and have three readings, and on different days, before a final vote; and as this resolution went to the alteration of the supreme law of the land, as the constitution was declared to be, he thought it highly requisite to give the deliberations all the solemnity which was required in passing bills.

Mr. Bradley, of Vermont, then offered two amendments to the resolution; one went to the form only, and the other makes a majority of votes of the electors requisite for the choice of Vice President, and in case such majority is not obtained, places the choice of Vice President in the Senate.

Mr. Butler, of South Carolina, proposed an amendment by adding a new clause, in substance: “That at the next election of President, no person should be eligible who had served more than eight years, and, in all future elections, no person should be eligible more than four years in any period of eight years.”

Mr. Dayton, of New Jersey, moved to refer the resolution, with all the amendments, to a select committee; he said that it was a subject far too important to be carried in this way. There has been no time to consider it. Something more was due in this instance, than, as it were, offering it one moment, and deciding upon it the next.

Mr. Hillhouse, of Connecticut, supported the motion for referring the question to a select committee. He was opposed to entering now upon the business. Why should this subject be hurried? Why not have taken it up last session? We might in that case have had time to consider it. He had not often known a resolution, of the nature of that before the House, disposed of otherwise, in the first instance, than being referred to a committee. He never knew it refused. In a great and free empire, like the United States, this question is of the highest importance—no less than the choice of the First Magistrate. It is laid upon the table to-day, and we are to determine upon it to-morrow. He hoped not, and as he never knew it refused before, he hoped that it would not be adopted now. He wished it to be referred to a select committee; that it should there be examined, line by line, letter by letter. In the present mode of doing business, it is impossible to act with accuracy. He again trusted and hoped that it would be referred to a select committee.

Mr. Jackson, of Georgia, wished the business to be immediately proceeded upon. He was an admirer of Mr. Jefferson; he was happy, and he trusted all were happy, while he was President. But, continued Mr. J., we know not who may follow him; we may have a Buonaparte, or one who will be equally obnoxious to the people. He hoped the motions would be incorporated and immediately come before the House.

Mr. Wright, of Maryland, spoke for some time against the resolution going to a committee. He was against the amendment proposed by Mr. Butler. A committee might report when they pleased. He therefore thought it necessary to proceed with the question immediately.

Mr. Smith, of Maryland, wished to have some principles fixed. If the motion and amendments were to go to a committee, he would not tack them together, for by this mode they might both be lost. It has been said that the subject might have been entered into last session. There was then a multiplicity of business of importance before the House, yet this subject might have been entered into. As it stands, this is the proper place to make objections. The mover of the resolution does not say that it shall be determined on Monday; he means that it shall then be before the whole House.

After some desultory observations, in which one member observed that he thought it disorderly, the question on Mr. Butler’s amendment was put—ayes 16, nays 15.

A committee was then chosen for the purpose, namely:

Mr. Butler, Mr. Bradley, Mr. Clinton, Mr. Nicholas, and Mr. Smith.

Monday, October 24.

Louisiana Cession.

The bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for other purposes, was read the second time and referred to Messrs. Breckenridge, Dayton, and Baldwin, to consider and report thereon.

Amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. Butler, from the committee, to whom was referred, on the 22d inst., the motion for an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, made report, which was read.

Mr. Dayton moved to strike out all which respected the appointment of a Vice President.

He said the great inducements of the framers of the constitution to admit the office of Vice President was, that, by the mode of choice, the best and most respectable man should be designated; and that the electors of each State should vote for one person at least, living in a different State from themselves; and if the substance of the amendment was adopted, he thought the office had better be abolished. Jealousies were natural between President and[8] Vice President; no heir apparent ever loved the person on the throne. With this resolution for an amendment to the constitution we were left with all the inconveniencies, without a single advantage from the office of Vice President.

Mr. Clinton.—The obvious intention of the amendment proposed by the gentleman from New Jersey, is to put off or get rid of the main question. It would more comport with the candor of the gentleman to meet the question fairly. Can the gentleman suppose that the electors will not vote for a man of respectability for Vice President? True, the qualifications are distinct, and ought not to be confounded; this will stave off the question till the Legislatures of the States of Tennessee and Vermont are out of session, and the object must be very obvious.

Mr. Dayton.—The custom of the gentleman from New York has been of late to arraign motives instead of meeting arguments; on Saturday he accused me of wishing to procrastinate, and now the same is repeated.

The reasons of erecting the office are frustrated by the amendment to the constitution now proposed; it will be preferable, therefore, to abolish the office.

Mr. Clinton.—The charge of the gentleman from New Jersey is totally unfounded that I arraign motives, and do not meet arguments. On Saturday the gentleman accused me of precipitation; I am not in the habit of arraigning motives, as this Senate can witness, and the charge is totally untrue.

Mr. Nicholas.—To secure the United States from the dangers which existed during the last choice of President, the present resolution was introduced. It was impossible to act upon, or pass the amendment offered by the member from New Jersey, with a full view of all its bearings at this time. It ought not to stand in the way of the resolution reported by the committee, for two-thirds or three-quarters of the State Legislatures would be in session in two or three months; the Senate had, therefore, better not admit the amendment, even if convinced that it was correct, because it might jeopardize the main amendment of discriminating.

Mr. Butler moved a postponement until Wednesday, because the amendment was important, and he had not had sufficient time to make up his mind.

Mr. Worthington said the same.

This motion was seconded.

The question for postponement was taken, and lost—ayes 15, noes 16.

The amendment of Mr. Dayton was now before the Senate.

A motion for adjournment was now made and carried—ayes 16, noes 15.

Tuesday, October 25.

John Smith, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Ohio, attended and produced his credentials, which were read, and the oath required by law was administered to him by the President.

Mr. Breckenridge, from the committee to whom was referred, on the 24th instant, the bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for other purposes, reported it without amendment.

Ordered, That this bill pass to a third reading.

Wednesday, October 26.

Louisiana Treaty.

The bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for other purposes, was read the third time. And, on the question, Shall this bill pass? it was determined in the affirmative—yeas 26, nays 6, as follows:

Saturday, October 29.

Mr. Breckenridge, from the committee of conference on the amendments of the House of Representatives to the bill, entitled “An act[9] to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for the temporary government thereof,” reported, that the Senate recede from their disagreement to the amendments, and agree thereto, with amendments; and a division of the report was called for.

And, on the question to adopt the report, so far as that the Senate recede from their disagreement to the amendments of the House of Representatives, it passed in the affirmative.

And, on the question to adopt the remaining division of the report, it passed in the negative.

So it was Resolved, That the Senate recede from their disagreement to the amendments of the House of Representatives to the said bill, and agree thereto.[3]

Monday, October 31.

On motion, it was,

Resolved, unanimously, That the members of the Senate, from a sincere desire of showing every mark of respect due to the memory of the Hon. Stevens Thompson Mason, deceased, late a member thereof, will go into mourning for him one month, by the usual mode of wearing a crape around the left arm.[4]

Wednesday, November 2.

Louisiana Treaty.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill, entitled “An act authorizing the creation of a stock to the amount of eleven millions two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, for the purpose of carrying into effect the convention of the 30th of April, 1803, between the United States of America and the French Republic, and making provision for the payment of the same;” and having amended the bill—

On the question, Shall the bill pass?

Mr. White rose and made the following remarks:

Mr. President, by the provisions of the bill before us, and which are thus far in conformity with the words of the treaty, we have until three months after the exchange of ratifications and the delivery of possession to pay this money in. Where, then, is the necessity for such haste on this subject? It seems to me to be anticipating our business unnecessarily, and perhaps unwisely; it is showing on our part a degree of anxiety that may be taken advantage of and operate to our injury, and that may serve to retard the accomplishment of the very object that gentlemen seem to have so much at heart. It is not at present altogether certain that we shall ever have occasion to use this stock, and it will be time enough to provide it when the occasion arises, when we see ourselves in the undisturbed possession of this mighty boon, or wherefore are we allowed these three months’ credit after the delivery of possession? The ratifications have been already exchanged; the French officer who is to make the cession is said to be at New Orleans, and previous to the adjournment of Congress we shall know with certainty whether the First Consul will or can carry this treaty faithfully into operation. We have already passed a bill authorizing the President to take possession, for which I voted, and it will be time enough to create this stock and to make the other necessary arrangements when we find ourselves in possession of the territory, or when we ascertain with certainty that it will be given to us.

But, Mr. President, it is now a well-known fact, that Spain considers herself injured by this treaty, and if it should be in her power to prevent it, will not agree to the cession of New Orleans and Louisiana to the United States. She considers herself absolved from her contract with France, in consequence of the latter having neglected to comply with certain stipulations in the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, to be performed on her part, and of having violated her engagement never to transfer this country into other hands. Gentlemen may say this money[10] is to be paid upon the responsibility of the President of the United States, and not until after the delivery of possession to us of the territory; but why cast from ourselves all the responsibility upon this subject, and impose the whole weight upon the President, which may hereafter prove dangerous and embarrassing to him? Why make the President the sole and absolute judge of what shall be a faithful delivery of possession under the treaty? What he may think a delivery of possession sufficient to justify the payment of this money, we might not; and I have no hesitation in saying that if, in acquiring this territory under the treaty, we have to fire a single musket, to charge a bayonet, or to lose a drop of blood, it will not be such a cession on the part of France as should justify to the people of this country the payment of any, and much less so enormous a sum of money. What would the case be, sir? It would be buying of France authority to make war upon Spain; it would be giving the First Consul fifteen millions of dollars to stand aloof until we can settle our differences with His Catholic Majesty. Would honorable gentlemen submit to the degradation of purchasing even his neutrality at so inconvenient a price? We are told that there is in the hands of the French Prefect at New Orleans a royal order of His Catholic Majesty, founded upon the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, for the delivery of possession of this territory to France; but which has never been done—the precedent conditions not having been performed on the part of France. This royal order, it is probable, will be handed over to our Commissioner, or to whoever may be sent down to receive possession. We may then be told that we have the right of France, as she acquired it from Spain, which is all she is bound by her treaty to transfer to us; we may be shown the Spaniards, who yet claim to be the rightful owners of the country, and be told that we have the permission of the First Consul to subdue or drive them out, and, according to the words of the treaty, to take possession. Of our capacity to do so I have no doubt; but this we could have done, sir, six months ago, and with one-sixth of fifteen millions of dollars, when they had wantonly violated the sacred obligations of a treaty, had insulted our Government, and prostrated all the commerce of our Western country. Then we had, indeed, a just cause for chastising them; the laws of nations and of honor authorized it, and all the world would have applauded our conduct. And it is well known that if France had been so disposed she could not have brought a single man or ship to their relief; before the news could have reached Europe, she was blockaded in her own ports by the British fleet. But that time was permitted to go by unimproved, and instead of regretting the past, let us provide for the future.

Admitting then, Mr. President, that His Catholic Majesty is hostile to the cession of this territory to the United States, and no honorable gentleman will deny it, what reasons have we to suppose that the French Prefect, provided the Spaniards should interfere, can give to us peaceable possession of the country? He is acknowledged there in no public character, is clothed with no authority, nor has he a single soldier to enforce his orders. I speak now, sir, from mere probabilities. I wish not to be understood as predicting that the French will not cede to us the actual and quiet possession of the territory. I hope to God they may, for possession of it we must have—I mean of New Orleans, and of such other positions on the Mississippi as may be necessary to secure to us for ever the complete and uninterrupted navigation of that river. This I have ever been in favor of; I think it essential to the peace of the United States, and to the prosperity of our Western country. But as to Louisiana, this new, immense, unbounded world, if it should ever be incorporated into this Union, which I have no idea can be done but by altering the constitution, I believe it will be the greatest curse that could at present befall us; it may be productive of innumerable evils, and especially of one that I fear even to look upon. Gentlemen on all sides, with very few exceptions, agree that the settlement of this country will be highly injurious and dangerous to the United States; but as to what has been suggested of removing the Creeks and other nations of Indians from the eastern to the western banks of the Mississippi, and of making the fertile regions of Louisiana a howling wilderness, never to be trodden by the foot of civilized man, it is impracticable. The gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Cocke) has shown his usual candor on this subject, and I believe with him, to use his strong language, that you had as well pretend to inhibit the fish from swimming in the sea as to prevent the population of that country after its sovereignty shall become ours. To every man acquainted with the adventurous, roving, and enterprising temper of our people, and with the manner in which our Western country has been settled, such an idea must be chimerical. The inducements will be so strong that it will be impossible to restrain our citizens from crossing the river. Louisiana must and will become settled, if we hold it, and with the very population that would otherwise occupy part of our present territory. Thus our citizens will be removed to the immense distance of two or three thousand miles from the capital of the Union, where they will scarcely ever feel the rays of the General Government; their affections will become alienated; they will gradually begin to view us as strangers; they will form other commercial connections, and our interests will become distinct.

These, with other causes that human wisdom may not now foresee, will in time effect a separation, and I fear our bounds will be fixed nearer to our houses than the waters of the Mississippi. We have already territory enough, and when I contemplate the evils that may arise to these States, from this intended incorporation[11] of Louisiana into the Union, I would rather see it given to France, to Spain, or to any other nation of the earth, upon the mere condition that no citizen of the United States should ever settle within its limits, than to see the territory sold for a hundred millions of dollars, and we retain the sovereignty. But however dangerous the possession of Louisiana might prove to us, I do not presume to say that the retention of it would not have been very convenient to France, and we know that at the time of the mission of Mr. Monroe, our Administration had never thought of the purchase of Louisiana, and that nothing short of the fullest conviction on the part of the First Consul that he was on the very eve of a war with England; that this being the most defenceless point of his possessions, if such they could be called, was the one at which the British would first strike, and that it must inevitably fall into their hands, could ever have induced his pride and ambition to make the sale. He judged wisely, that he had better sell it for as much as he could get than lose it entirely. And I do say that under existing circumstances, even supposing that this extent of territory was a desirable acquisition, fifteen millions of dollars was a most enormous sum to give. Our Commissioners were negotiating in Paris—they must have known the relative situation of France and England—they must have known at the moment that a war was unavoidable between the two countries, and they knew the pecuniary necessities of France and the naval power of Great Britain. These imperious circumstances should have been turned to our advantage, and if we were to purchase, should have lessened the consideration. Viewing, Mr. President, this subject in any point of light—either as it regards the territory purchased, the high consideration to be given, the contract itself, or any of the circumstances attending it, I see no necessity for precipitating the passage of this bill; and if this motion for postponement should fail, and the question on the final passage of the bill be taken now, I shall certainly vote against it.

The further consideration of the bill was postponed until to-morrow.

Thursday, November 3.

Louisiana Treaty.

The bill, entitled “An act authorizing the creation of a stock to the amount of eleven millions two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, for the purpose of carrying into effect the Convention of the 30th of April, 1803, between the United States of America and the French Republic, and making provision for the payment of the same,” was read the third time; and, having been amended, on the question, Shall this bill pass as amended?

Mr. Wells said: Mr. President, having always held to the opinion that, when a treaty was duly made under the constituted authorities of the United States, Congress was bound to pass the laws necessary to carry it into effect; and as the vote which I am about to give may not at first seem to conform itself to this opinion, I feel an obligation imposed upon me to state, in as concise a manner as I can, the reasons why I withhold my assent from the passage of this bill.

There are two acts necessary to be performed to carry the present treaty into effect—one by the French Government, the other by our own. They are to deliver us a fair and effectual possession of the ceded territory; and then, and not till then, are we to pay the purchase money. We have already authorized the President to receive possession. This co-operation on our part was requisite to enable the French to comply with the stipulation they had made; they could not deliver unless somebody was appointed to receive. In this view of the subject, the question which presents itself to my mind is, who shall judge whether the French Government does, or does not, faithfully comply with the previous condition? The bill on your table gives to the President this power. I am for our retaining and exercising it ourselves. I may be asked, why not delegate this power to the President? Sir, I answer by inquiring why we should delegate it? To us it properly belongs; and, unless some advantage will be derived to the United States, it shall not be transferred with my consent. Congress will be in session at the time that the delivery of the ceded territory takes place; and if we should then be satisfied that the French have executed with fidelity that part of the treaty which is incumbent upon them first to perform, I pledge myself to vote for the payment of the purchase money. This appears to me, arguing upon general principles, to be the course which ought to be pursued, even supposing there were attending this case no particular difficulties. But in this special case are there not among the archives of the Senate sufficient documents, and which have been withheld from the House of Representatives, to justify an apprehension that the French Government was not invested with the capacity to convey this property to us, and that we shall not receive that kind of possession which is stipulated for by the treaty? I am not permitted, by the order of this body, to make any other than this general reference to those documents. Suffice it to say that they have strongly impressed me with an opinion that, even if possession is rendered to us, the territory will come into our hands without any title to justify our holding it.

Mr. Jackson.—Mr. President: The honorable gentleman (Mr. Wells) has said that the French have no title, and, having no title herself, we can derive none from her. Is not, I ask, the King of Spain’s proclamation, declaring the cession of Louisiana to France, and his orders to his Governor and officers to deliver it to France, a title? Do nations give any other? I believe the honorable gentleman can find no solitary instance of feofment or conveyance between[12] States. The treaty of St. Ildefonso was the groundwork of the cession, and whatever might have been the terms to be performed by France, the King of Spain’s proclamation and orders have declared to all the world that they were complied with. The honorable gentleman, however, insists that there is no consideration expressed in the treaty, and therefore it must be void; if the honorable gentleman will but look attentively at the ninth article, I am persuaded he will perceive one: the conventions are made part of the treaty; they are declared to have execution in the same manner, as if they had been inserted in the treaty; they are to be ratified in the same form, and at the same time, so that the one shall not be distinct from the other. What inference can possibly be drawn, but that the payments to be made by them were full consideration for Louisiana? But the honorable gentleman lays stress on that part of the treaty which declares that “the First Consul of the French Republic, desiring to give to the United States a strong proof of his friendship, doth hereby cede to the United States the territory,” &c.; inferring from thence that our title rests on the friendship of Buonaparte alone. Sir, let my opinion of the present Government of France be what it may, and I confess it is not very favorable, Buonaparte, by the consent of the nation, is placed at its head; he is the organ through which the will of the nation is expressed, and is and must be respected as such by all other Powers. No nation has a right to interfere with the rule or police of another. It is enough that the nation wills it, and Buonaparte’s act is the act of the whole nation, which cannot recall it, even if Buonaparte should cease to govern and another form of government be adopted. Last session we were impressed with the necessity of taking immediate possession of the island of New Orleans in the face of two nations, and now we entertain doubts if we can combat the weakest of those Powers; and we are further told we are going to sacrifice the immense sum of fifteen millions of dollars, and have to go to war with Spain for the country afterwards; when, last session, war was to take place at all events, and no costs were equal to the object. Gentlemen seem to be displeased, because we have procured it peaceably, and at probably ten times less expense than it would have cost us had we taken forcible possession of New Orleans alone, which, I am persuaded, would have involved us in a war which would have saddled us with a debt of from one to two hundred millions, and perhaps have lost New Orleans, and the right of deposit, after all. I again repeat, sir, that I do not believe that Spain will venture war with the United States. I believe she dare not; if she does, she will pay the costs. The Floridas will be immediately ours; they will almost take themselves. The inhabitants pant for the blessings of your equal and wise Government; they ardently long to become a part of the United States. An officer, duly authorized, and armed with the bare proclamation of the President, would go near to take them; the inhabitants by hundreds would flock to his standard, the very Spanish force itself would assist in their reduction; it is composed principally of the Irish brigade and Creoles—the former disaffected, and the latter the dregs of mankind. With two or three squadrons of dragoons, and the same number of companies of infantry, not a doubt ought to exist of the total conquest of East Florida by an officer of tolerable talents. Exclusive, however, of the loss of the Floridas, to use the language of a late member of Congress, the road to Mexico is now open to us, which, if Spain acts in an amicable way, I wish may, and hope will, be shut, as respects the United States, for ever. For these reasons, I think, sir, Spain will avoid a war, in which she has nothing to gain and every thing to lose.

Mr. President, the honorable gentleman appears to be extremely apprehensive of vesting the powers delegated by the bill, now on its passage, in the President, and wishes to retain it in the Legislature. Is this a Legislative or an Executive business? Assuredly, in my mind, of the latter nature. The President gave instructions for, and, with our consent, ratified the treaty. We have given him the power to take possession, which his officers are at this moment doing; and surely, as the ostensible party, the representative of the sovereignty to whom France will alone look, he ought to possess the power of fulfilling our part of the contract. Gentlemen, indeed, had doubted, on a former occasion, the propriety of giving the President the power of taking possession and organizing a temporary government, which every inferior officer, in case of conquest or cession, from the general to the subaltern, if commanding, has a right to do; but I little expected these doubts after we had gone so far. For my part, sir, I have none of those fears. I believe the President will be as cautious as ourselves, and the bill is as carefully worded as possible; for the money is not to be paid until after Louisiana shall be placed in our possession.

Mr. Wright.—Mr. President, I presumed from the observations of the honorable gentleman from Delaware, (Mr. Wells,) that he had not minutely attended to the provisions of this bill, on which the transfer of this stock is made expressly to depend. The treaty has in the most guarded manner secured us in the possession of the ceded territory, as a condition precedent to the payment of the purchase money, and this bill has expressly provided that no part of the stock shall be transferred till the possession stipulated by the treaty shall have been obtained. Not such a possession as the gentleman has said the President may be satisfied with—“the delivery of a twig and turf, or the knocker of a door.” The treaty has defined the possession intended: it is the possession of Louisiana, the island and city of New Orleans, with the forts and arsenals, the troops having been withdrawn from thence. But, sir, from his remarks, it would seem that[13] his objections to this bill had been predicated on his want of confidence in the Executive, as he has expressed his fears that the stock would be transferred, before the prerequisite conditions had been performed. He says, we ought to be satisfied that the possession stipulated by the treaty shall have been delivered up before we pass this bill. Has he forgot that, by the constitution, the President is to superintend the execution of the law? Or has he forgot that treaties are the supreme law of the land? Or why, while he professes to respect this constitution, does he oppose the commission of the execution of this law to that organ of the Government to which it has been assigned by the constitution? Why, I ask, does he distrust the President? Has he not been, throughout the whole of this business, very much alive to the peaceful acquisition of this immense territory, and the invaluable waters of the Mississippi? a property which, but the other day, we were told was all-important, and so necessary to our political existence that if it was not obtained the Western people would sever themselves from the Union. This property, for which countless millions were then proposed to be expended, and the best blood of our citizens to be shed, and which then was to be had at all hazards, per fas aut per nefas, seems now to have lost its worth, and it would seem as if some gentlemen could not be satisfied with the purchase, because our title was not recorded in the blood of its inhabitants. But that this is not the wish of the American people, has been unequivocally declared by their immediate representatives in Congress, as well as by this House, who had each expressed their approbation of the peaceful title we had acquired, by majorities I thought not to be misunderstood. And the gentleman, although he voted for the ratification of the treaty, now again calls on us to investigate the title. It is certainly too late.

Mr. Pickering said, if he entertained the opinion just now expressed by the gentleman from Delaware, (Mr. Wells,) of the binding force of all treaties made by the President and Senate, he should think it to be his duty to vote for the bill now under consideration. “The constitution, and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.”—But a treaty to be thus obligatory, must not contravene the constitution, nor contain any stipulations which transcend the powers therein given to the President and Senate. The treaty between the United States and the French Republic, professing to cede Louisiana to the United States, appeared to him to contain such an exceptionable stipulation—a stipulation which cannot be executed by any authority now existing. It is declared in the third article, that “the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States.” But neither the President and Senate, nor the President and Congress, are competent to such an act of incorporation. He believed that our Administration admitted that this incorporation could not be effected without an amendment of the constitution; and he conceived that this necessary amendment could not be made in the ordinary mode by the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, and the ratification by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States. He believed the assent of each individual State to be necessary for the admission of a foreign country as an associate in the Union; in like manner as in a commercial house, the consent of each member would be necessary to admit a new partner into the company; and whether the assent of every State to such an indispensable amendment were attainable, was uncertain. But the articles of a treaty were necessarily related to each other; the stipulation in one article being the consideration for another. If, therefore, in respect to the Louisiana Treaty, the United States fail to execute, and within a reasonable time, the engagement in the third article, (to incorporate that territory into the Union,) the French Government will have a right to declare the whole treaty void. We must then abandon the country, or go to war to maintain our possession. But it was to prevent war that the pacific measures of the last winter were adopted—they were to “lay the foundation for future peace.”

Mr. P. had never doubted the right of the United States to acquire new territory, either by purchase or by conquest, and to govern the territory so acquired as a dependent province; and in this way might Louisiana have become a territory of the United States, and have received a form of government infinitely preferable to that to which its inhabitants are now subject.

Mr. Dayton.—As the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts has quoted what was suggested by me in a former debate, to deduce from it an inference which the information I gave can by no means warrant, I must be allowed the liberty of correcting him. When I said that there existed an essential difference between the French and Spanish officers at New Orleans as to the real boundaries of the province of Louisiana, I did not mean to insinuate that this disagreement extended so far as an opposition to the French taking possession. It was a question of limits only, varying, however, so much in extent as would have produced a serious altercation between those two countries, although closely allied.

The Spanish Governor had taken it upon himself to proclaim that the province lately ceded and about to be given over to France would be confined on the east of the Mississippi to the river Iberville, and the lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, or in other words to the island of New Orleans; but the French Prefect on the contrary declared that he neither had nor would give his assent to the establishment of those limits, which would be regarded no longer than until the arrival of their troops.

The same gentleman (Mr. Pickering) has said that the advocates of this measure seem to[14] rely much more upon their power than upon their right, and in this assertion I am compelled to say that he has done us very great injustice. The title of the French is founded upon the often quoted treaty of St Ildefonso, confirmed by the royal order signed by the King of Spain himself, so lately as the 15th October, 1802, directing the delivery of the “colony of Louisiana and its dependencies as well as of the city and island of New Orleans, without any exception, to General Victor, or other officer duly authorized by that Republic to take charge of the said delivery.”

When at New Orleans in July last, I obtained from the best source a translated copy of that royal order, and can aver that it absolutely directs possession to be given without reservation or condition. It is not, and cannot be, denied that the lately ratified treaty of Paris transfers to us completely all the title acquired by France in virtue of the first treaty and order alluded to. We have, then, most incontestably, the right of possession, and our object now is, by passing the bill before us to obtain the possession itself, which we can certainly never effect, consistently with good faith, if the reasonings and objections of my honorable friends from Delaware and Massachusetts should prevail. We are asked by the same gentlemen what will be the consequence if it shall appear that the royal order has been revoked? I answer, first, that it is not in the least degree probable, for neither of them pretend to have heard of such revocation, nor is it intimated in the confidential communications before the Senate. But admitting for argument’s sake that it were revoked, of what avail could it be against a third party, who had in the mean time become a bona fide purchaser? Shall one nation give to another a written, formal evidence of transfer of territory, and revoke it at pleasure, especially after a third shall have been tempted and induced by that very evidence of title to contract for the purchase of it? Would an act so fraudulent be countenanced between individuals in a court of equity? Could it be justified between nations in a high court of honor? The honorable gentleman from Delaware has taken a more delicate ground of objection. He has insinuated that there exists in the knowledge of the Senate, the evidence of a serious opposition to our possessing that country, which, if known to the other branch of the Legislature, would probably have defeated this bill in its progress there. Allusions artfully made in this manner to documents communicated under the injunction of secrecy, place us in an embarrassing situation. Forbidden by our rules to expose the papers referred to, even in argument, we can only declare what impressions they have made upon ourselves. Every Senator must understand him, every one must have heard and read, and weighed deliberately the contents of those documents, and, for myself, I am free to avow my belief, that, if known to every member of the other House, they would have had no effect against this bill, but would rather have quickened and ensured its progress, for such is the influence they have upon me.

Mr. Taylor.—There have been, Mr. President, two objections made against the treaty; one that the United States cannot constitutionally acquire territory; the other, that the treaty stipulates for the admission of a new State into the Union; a stipulation which the treaty-making power is unable to comply with. To these objections I shall endeavor to give answers not heretofore urged.

Before a confederation, each State in the Union possessed a right, as attached to sovereignty, of acquiring territory, by war, purchase, or treaty. This right must be either still possessed, or forbidden both to each State and to the General Government, or transferred to the General Government. It is not possessed by the States separately, because war and compacts with foreign powers and with each other are prohibited to a separate State; and no other means of acquiring territory exist. By depriving every State of the means of exercising the right of acquiring territory, the constitution has deprived each separate State of the right itself. Neither the means nor the right of acquiring territory are forbidden to the United States; on the contrary, in the fourth article of the constitution, Congress is empowered “to dispose of and regulate the territory belonging to the United States.” This recognizes the right of the United States to hold territory. The means of acquiring territory consist of war and compact; both are expressly surrendered to Congress and forbidden to the several States; and no right in a separate State to hold territory without its limits is recognized by the constitution, nor any mode of effecting it possible, consistent with it. The means of acquiring and the right of holding territory, being both given to the United States, and prohibited to each State, it follows that these attributes of sovereignty once held by each State are thus transferred to the United States; and that, if the means of acquiring and the right of holding, are equivalent to the right of acquiring territory, then this right merged from the separate States to the United States, as indispensably annexed to the treaty-making power, and the power of making war; or, indeed, is literally given to the General Government by the constitution.

Having proved, sir, that the United States may constitutionally acquire, hold, dispose of, and regulate territory, the other objection to be considered is, whether the third article of the treaty does stipulate that Louisiana shall be erected into a State? It is conceded that the treaty-making power cannot, by treaty, erect a new State, however they may stipulate for it. I premise, that in the construction of this article, it is proper to recollect that the negotiators must be supposed to have understood our constitution. It became very particularly their duty to do so, because, in this article itself, they have recited “the principles of the constitution”[15] as their guide. Hence, it is obvious, they did not intend to infringe, but to adhere to those principles; and therefore, if the article will admit of a construction consistent with this presumable knowledge and intention of the negotiators, the probability of its accuracy will be greater than one formed in a supposition that the negotiators were either ignorant of that which they ought to have known, or that they fraudulently professed a purpose which they really intended to defeat. The following construction is reconcilable with what the negotiators ought to have known, and with what they professed to intend.

Recollect, sir, that it has been proved that the United States may acquire territory. Territory, so acquired, becomes from the acquisition itself a portion of the territories of the United States, or may be united with their territories without being erected into a State. A union of territory is one thing; of States, another. Both are exemplified by an actual existence. The United States possess territory, comprised in the union of territory, and not in the union of States. Congress is empowered to regulate or dispose of territorial sections of the Union, and have exercised the power; but it is not empowered to regulate or dispose of State sections of the Union. The citizens of these territorial sections are citizens of the United States, and they have all the rights of citizens of the United States; but such rights do not include those political rights arising from State compacts or governments, which are dissimilar in different States. Supposing the General Government or treaty-making power have no right to add or unite States and State citizens to the Union, yet they have a power of adding or uniting to it territory and territorial citizens of the United States.

The territory is ceded by the first article of the treaty. It will no longer be denied that the United States may constitutionally acquire territory. The third article declares that “the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States.” And these words are said to require the territory to be erected into a State. This they do not express, and the words are literally satisfied by incorporating them into the Union as a Territory, and not as a State. The constitution recognizes and the practice warrants an incorporation of a Territory and its inhabitants into the Union, without admitting either as a State. And this construction of the first member of the article is necessary to shield its two other members from a charge of surplusage, and even absurdity. For if the words “the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States” intended that Louisiana and its inhabitants should become a State in the Union of States, there existed no reason for proceeding to stipulate that these same inhabitants should be made “citizens as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution.” Their admission into the Union of States would have made them citizens of the United States. Is it not then absurd to suppose that the first member of this third article intended to admit Louisiana into the Union as a State, which would instantly entitle the inhabitants to the benefit of the article of the constitution declaring, that “the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,” and yet to have gone on to stipulate for citizenship, under the limitation “as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution,” after it had been bestowed without limitation? Again, the concluding member of the article is to bestow “protection in the mean time;” incorporating this stipulation, and the stipulation for citizenship, with the construction which accuses the treaty of unconstitutionality, the article altogether must be understood thus: “The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be taken into the Union of States, which will instantly give them all the rights of citizenship, after which they shall be made citizens as soon as possible; and after they are taken into the Union of States, they shall be protected in the interim between becoming a State in the Union, and being made citizens, in their liberty, property, and religion.”

By supposing the first member of the article to require that the inhabitants and their territory shall be incorporated in the Union, in the known and recognized political character of a Territory, these inconsistencies are avoided, and the article reconciled to the constitution, as understood by the opposers of the bill; the stipulation also for citizenship “as soon as possible” according to the principles of the constitution, and the delay meditated by these words, and the subsequent words “in the mean time,” so utterly inconsistent with the instantaneous citizenship, which would follow an admission into the Union as a State, are both fully explained. Being incorporated in the Union as a Territory, and not as a State, a stipulation for citizenship became necessary; whereas it would have been unnecessary had the inhabitants been incorporated as a State, and not as a Territory. And as they were not to be invested with citizenship by becoming a State, the delay which would occur between the incorporation of the Territory into the Union and the arrival of the inhabitants to citizenship according to the principles of the constitution, under some uniform rule of naturalization, exhibited an interim which demanded the concluding stipulation, for “protection in the mean time for liberty, property, and religion.” As a State of the Union, they would not have needed a stipulation for the safety of their “liberty, property and religion;” as a Territory, this stipulation would govern and restrain the undefined power of Congress to make “rules and regulations for Territories.”

Mr. Tracy.—Mr. President: I shall vote against this bill, and will give some of the reasons which govern my vote in this case.

It is well known that this bill is introduced[16] to carry into effect the treaty between the United States and France, which has been lately ratified. If that treaty be an unconstitutional compact, such a one as the President and Senate had no rightful authority to make, the conclusion is easy, that it creates no obligation on any branch or member of the Government to vote for this bill, or any other, which is calculated to carry into effect such unconstitutional compact.

The third and seventh articles of the treaty are, in my opinion, unconstitutional.

The third article is in the following words:

The obvious meaning of this article is, that the inhabitants of Louisiana are incorporated, by it, into the Union, upon the same footing that the Territorial Governments are, and, like them, the Territory, when the population is sufficiently numerous, must be admitted as a State, with every right of any other State.

Have the President and Senate a constitutional right to do all this?

When we advert to the constitution, we shall find that the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, may make treaties. Now, say gentlemen, this power is undefined, and one gentleman says, it is unlimited.

True, there is no definition in words of the extent and nature of the treaty-making power. Two modes of ascertaining its extent have been mentioned: one is, by ascertaining the extent of the same power among the monarchs of Europe, and making that the standard of the treaty-making power here; and the other is, to limit the power of the President and Senate, in respect to treaties, by the constitution and the nature and principles of our Government.

Upon the first criterion, it is obvious that we cannot obtain any satisfactory definition of the treaty-making power, as applicable to our Government.

The paragraph in the constitution, which says that “new States may be admitted by Congress into this Union,” has been quoted to justify this treaty. To this, two answers may be given, either of which are conclusive in my favor. First, if Congress have the power collectively of admitting Louisiana, it cannot be vested in the President and Senate alone. Secondly, Congress have no power to admit new foreign States into the Union, without the consent of the old partners. The article of the constitution, if any person will take the trouble to examine it, refers to domestic States only, and not at all to foreign States; and it is unreasonable to suppose that Congress should, by a majority only, admit new foreign States, and swallow up, by it, the old partners, when two-thirds of all the members are made requisite for the least alteration in the constitution. The words of the constitution are completely satisfied by a construction which shall include only the admission of domestic States, who were all parties to the Revolutionary war, and to the compact; and the spirit of the association seems to embrace no other. But I repeat it, if the Congress collectively has this power, the President and Senate cannot, of course, have it exclusively.

I think, sir, that, from a fair construction of the constitution, and an impartial view of the nature and principles of our association, the President and Senate have not the power of thus obtruding upon us Louisiana.

The seventh article admits for twelve years the ships of France and Spain into the ceded territory, free of foreign duty. This is giving a commercial preference to those ports over the other ports of the United States; because it is well known that a duty of forty-four cents on tonnage, and ten per cent. on duties, are paid by all foreign ships or vessels in all the ports of the United States. If it be said we must repeal those laws, and then the preference will cease, the answer is, that this seventh article gives the exclusive right of entering the ports of Louisiana to the ships of France and Spain, and if our discriminating duties were repealed this day, the preference would be given to the ports of the United States against those of Louisiana, so that the preference, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, which the constitution expressly prohibits from being given to the ports of one State over those of another, would be given by this treaty, in violation of the constitution. I acknowledge, if Louisiana is not admitted into the Union, and that if there is no promise to admit her, then this part of our argument will not apply; but, in declaring these to be facts, my opponents are driven to acknowledge that the third article of this treaty is void, which answers every purpose which I wish to establish, that this treaty is unconstitutional and void, and that I have, consequently, a right to withhold my vote from any bill which shall be introduced to carry it into effect. I acknowledge, sir, that my opinion ever has been, and still is, that when a treaty is ratified by the constituted authorities, and is a constitutional treaty, every member of the community is bound by it, as a law of the land; but not so by a treaty which is unconstitutional. The terms of this treaty may be extravagant and unwise, yet, in my legislative capacity, that can form no excuse for an opposition; we may have no title, we may have given an enormous sum, we may have made a silly attempt to destroy the discriminating duties, yet, if the treaty be not unconstitutional, every member of the Government is bound to carry it into effect.

Mr. Breckenridge observed, that he little expected a proceeding so much out of order would have been attempted, as a re-discussion of the merits of the treaty on the passage of this[17] bill; but as the gentlemen in the opposition had urged it, he would, exhausted as the subject was, claim the indulgence of the Senate in replying to some of their remarks.

No gentleman, continued he, has yet ventured to deny, that it is incumbent on the United States to secure to the citizens of the western waters, the uninterrupted use of the Mississippi. Under this impression of duty, what has been the conduct of the General Government, and particularly of the gentlemen now in the opposition, for the last eight months? When the right of deposit was violated by a Spanish officer without authority from his Government, these gentlemen considered our national honor so deeply implicated, and the rights of the western people so wantonly violated, that no atonement or redress was admissible, except through the medium of the bayonet. Negotiation was scouted at. It was deemed pusillanimous, and was said to exhibit a want of fellow-feeling for the western people, and a disregard to their essential rights. Fortunately for their country, the counsel of these gentlemen was rejected, and their war measures negatived. The so much scouted process of negotiation was, however, persisted in, and instead of restoring the right of deposit, and securing more effectually for the future our right to navigate the Mississippi, the Mississippi itself was acquired, and every thing which appertained to it. I did suppose that those gentlemen, who at the last session so strongly urged war measures for the attainment of this object, upon an avowal that it was too important to trust to the tardy and less effectual process of negotiation, would have stood foremost in carrying the treaty into effect, and that the peaceful mode by which it was acquired would not lessen with them the importance of the acquisition. But it seems to me, sir, that the opinions of a certain portion of the United States with respect to this ill-fated Mississippi, have varied as often as the fashions. [Here Mr. B. made some remarks on the attempts which were made in the old Congress, and which had nearly proved successful, to cede this river to Spain for twenty-five years.] But, I trust, continued he, these opinions, schemes, and projects will for ever be silenced and crushed by the vote which we are this evening about to pass.

Permit me to examine some of the principal reasons which are deemed so powerful by gentlemen as to induce them to vote for the destruction of this treaty. Unfortunately for the gentlemen, no two of them can agree on the same set of objections; and what is still more unfortunate, I believe there are no two of them concur in any one objection. In one thing only they seem to agree, and that is to vote against the bill. An honorable gentleman from Delaware (Mr. White) considered the price to be enormous. An honorable gentleman from Connecticut, who has just sat down, (Mr. Tracy,) says he has no objection whatever to the price; it is, he supposes, not too much. An honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Pickering) says that France acquired no title from Spain, and therefore our title is bad. The same gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Tracy) says he has no objection to the title from France; he thinks it a good one. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Pickering) contends that the United States cannot under the constitution acquire foreign territory. The gentleman from Connecticut is of a different opinion, and has no doubt but that the United States can acquire and hold foreign territory; but that Congress alone have the power of incorporating that territory into the Union. What weight, therefore, ought all their lesser objections to be entitled to, when they are at war among themselves on the greater one?

The same gentleman has told us, that this acquisition will, from its extent, soon prove destructive to the confederacy.

This, continued Mr. B., is an old and hackneyed doctrine; that a republic ought not to be too extensive. But the gentleman has assumed two facts, and then reasoned from them. First, that the extent is too great; and secondly, that the country will be soon populated. I would ask, sir, what is his standard extent for a republic? How does he come at that standard? Our boundary is already extensive. Would his standard extent be violated by including the island of Orleans and the Floridas? I presume not, as all parties seem to think their acquisition, in part or in whole, essential. Why not then acquire territory on the west, as well as on the east side of the Mississippi? Is the Goddess of Liberty restrained by water courses? Is she governed by geographical limits? Is her dominion on this continent confined to the east side of the Mississippi? So far from believing in the doctrine that a republic ought to be confined within narrow limits, I believe, on the contrary, that the more extensive its dominion the more safe and more durable it will be. In proportion to the number of hands you intrust the precious blessings of a free government to, in the same proportion do you multiply the chances for their preservation. I entertain, therefore, no fears for the confederacy on account of its extent.

I had hoped, sir, that the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Tracy,) from the trouble he was so good as to give himself yesterday in assisting to amend this bill, would have voted for it; but it seems he is constrained to vote to-day against it. He asks, if the United States have power to acquire and add new States to the Union, can they not also cede States? Can they not, for example, cede Connecticut to France? I answer they cannot; but for none of the reasons assigned by him. The Government of the United States cannot cede Connecticut, because, first, it would be annihilating part of that sovereignty of the nation which is whole and entire, and upon which the Government of the United States is dependent for its existence; and secondly, because the fourth section of the fourth article of the constitution forbids it. But how[18] does it follow as a consequence, that because the United States cannot cede an existing State, they cannot acquire a new State? He admits explicitly that Congress may acquire territory and hold it as a territory, but cannot incorporate it into the Union. By this construction he admits the power to acquire territory, a modification infinitely more dangerous than the unconditional admission of a new State; for by his construction, territories and citizens are considered and held as the property of the Government of the United States, and may consequently be used as dangerous engines in the hands of the Government against the States and people.

Could we not, says the same gentleman, incorporate in the Union some foreign nation containing ten millions of inhabitants—Africa, for instance—and thereby destroy our Government? Certainly the thing would be possible if Congress would do it, and the people consent to it; but it is supposing so extreme a case and is so barely possible, that it does not merit serious refutation. It is also possible and equally probable that republicanism itself may one day or other become unfashionable, (for I believe it is not without its enemies,) and that the people of America may call for a king. From such hypotheses it is impossible to deduce any thing for or against the construction contended for. The true construction must depend on the manifest import of the instrument and the good sense of the community.

The same gentleman, in reply to the observations which fell from the gentleman from South Carolina, as to the admission of new States, observes, that although Congress may admit new States, the President and Senate, who are but a component part, cannot. Apply this doctrine to the case before us. How could Congress by any mode of legislation admit this country into the Union until it was acquired? And how can this acquisition be made except through the treaty-making power? Could the gentleman rise in his place and move for leave to bring in a bill for the purchase of Louisiana and its admission into the Union? I take it that no transaction of this or any other kind with a foreign power can take place except through the Executive Department, and that in the form of a treaty, agreement, or convention. When the acquisition is made, Congress can then make such disposition of it as may be expedient.

Mr. Adams.—It is not my intention to trespass long upon the patience of the Senate, on a subject which has already been debated almost to satiety; but, as objections on constitutional grounds have been raised against the bill under discussion, I wish to say a very few words in justification of the vote which I think it my duty to give.

The objections against the passage of the bill, as far as my recollection serves me, are two: the first, started by the honorable gentleman from Delaware who opened this debate; the second, urged by several of the other members who have spoken upon the question.

The gentleman from Delaware admits the necessity of making the provision for carrying into execution, on our part, the treaty which has been duly ratified by the Senate, provided we can obtain complete and undoubted possession of the territory ceded us by France, in that treaty. But he observes, that the term possession is indefinite; that it may mean nothing more than the delivery of a twig, or of the knob of a door. That, from sources of the authenticity of which we have no reason to doubt, we are informed that Spain is very far from acquiescing in the cession of this territory to us; that probably the Spanish officers will not deliver peaceable possession; and that we ought not to put out of our own hands the power of withholding the payment of this money, until it shall be ascertained, beyond all question, that the territory, for which it is the consideration, is in our hands. But, sir, admitting that the word possession were of itself not sufficiently precise, I think, with the gentleman last up, that the fourth and fifth articles of the treaty, read by him, render it so in this instance. The fourth, stipulating that the French commissary shall do every act necessary to receive the country from the Spanish officers, and transmit it to the agent of the United States—and the fifth, providing, not only that all the military posts shall be delivered to us, and that the troops, whether of France or Spain, shall cease to occupy them, but that those troops shall all be embarked within three months after the ratification of the treaty. Now, when the country has been formally surrendered to us, when all the military posts are in our hands, and when all the troops, French or Spanish, have been embarked, what possible adverse possession can there be to contend against ours? Until all these conditions shall have been fulfilled on the part of France, neither the convention nor the bill before us requires the payment of money on ours; and we may safely trust the execution of the law to the discretion of the President of the United States. For, even if I could see any reason for distrusting him in the exercise of such a power, under different circumstances, which I certainly do not, still, in the present case, his own interest, and the weight of responsibility resting upon him, are ample security to us, against any undue precipitation on his part, in the payment of the money. On the other hand, I am extremely solicitous that every tittle of the engagements on our part in these conventions should be performed with the most scrupulous good faith, and I see no purpose of utility that can be answered by postponing the determination on the passage of this bill.

But it has been argued that the bill ought not to pass, because the treaty itself is unconstitutional, or, to use the words of the gentleman from Connecticut, an extra-constitutional act; because it contains engagements which the powers of the Senate were not competent to ratify, the powers of Congress not competent to confirm, and, as two of the gentlemen have[19] contended, not even the Legislatures of the number of States requisite to effect an amendment of the constitution are adequate to sanction. It is therefore, say they, a nullity; we cannot fulfil our part of its conditions, and on our failure in the performance of any one stipulation, France may consider herself as absolved from the obligations of the whole treaty on her. I do not conceive it necessary to enter into the merits of the treaty at this time. The proper occasion for that discussion is past. But, allowing even that this is a case for which the constitution has not provided, it does not in my mind follow, that the treaty is a nullity, or that its obligations, either on us or on France, must necessarily be cancelled. For my own part, I am free to confess, that the third article, and more especially the seventh, contain engagements placing us in a dilemma, from which I see no possible mode of extricating ourselves but by an amendment, or rather an addition to the constitution. The gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Tracy,) both on a former occasion, and in this day’s debate, appears to me to have shown this to demonstration. But what is this more than saying, that the President and Senate have bound the nation to engagements which require the co-operation of more extensive powers than theirs, to carry them into execution? Nothing is more common, in the negotiations between nation and nation, than for a minister to agree to and sign articles beyond the extent of his powers. This is what your ministers, in the very case before you, have confessedly done. It is well known that their powers did not authorize them to conclude this treaty; but they acted for the benefit of their country, and this House by a large majority has advised to the ratification of their proceedings. Suppose then, not only that the ministers who signed, but the President and Senate who ratified this compact, have exceeded their powers. Suppose that the other House of Congress, who have given their assent by passing this and other bills for the fulfilment of the obligations it imposes on us, have exceeded their powers. Nay, suppose even that the majority of States competent to amend the constitution in other cases, could not amend it in this, without exceeding their powers—and this is the extremest point to which any gentleman on this floor has extended his scruples—suppose all this, and there still remains in the country a power competent to adopt and sanction every part of our engagements, and to carry them entirely into execution. For, notwithstanding the objections and apprehensions of many individuals, of many wise, able and excellent men, in various parts of the Union, yet such is the public favor attending the transaction which commenced by the negotiation of this treaty, and which I hope will terminate in our full, undisturbed and undisputed possession of the ceded territory, that I firmly believe if an amendment to the constitution, amply sufficient for the accomplishment of every thing for which we have contracted, shall be proposed, as I think it ought, it will be adopted by the Legislature of every State in the Union. We can therefore fulfil our part of the conventions, and this is all that France has a right to require of us.

Mr. Nicholas.—Mr. President: The gentlemen on the other side differ among themselves. The two gentlemen from Delaware say, that if peaceable possession is given of Louisiana this bill ought to pass; the other gentlemen who have spoken in opposition to it have declared, that if they believed the constitution was not violated by the treaty, they should think themselves bound to vote for the bill. To this Senate it cannot be necessary to answer arguments denying the power of the Government to make such a treaty; it has already been affirmed, so far as we could affirm it, by two-thirds of this body; it is then only now necessary to show that we ought to pass the bill at this time. In addition to the reasons which have been so ably and forcibly urged by my friends, I will remark, that the treaty-making power of this Government is so limited, that engagements to pay money cannot be carried into effect without the consent and co-operation of Congress. This was solemnly decided, after a long discussion of several weeks, by the House of Representatives, which made the appropriations for carrying the British treaty into effect, and such I believe is the understanding of nine-tenths of the American people, as to the construction of their constitution. This decision must be also known to foreigners, and if not, they are bound to know the extent of the powers of the Government with which they treat. If this bill should be rejected, I ask gentlemen whether they believe, that France would or ought to execute the treaty on her part? It is known to the French Government that the President and Senate cannot create stock, nor provide for the payment of either principal or interest of stock; and if that Government should be informed that a bill, authorizing the issue of stock to pay for the purchase, “after possession shall be delivered,” had been rejected by the only department of our Government competent to the execution of that part of the treaty, they would have strong ground to suspect that we did not mean to execute the treaty on our part; particularly when they are informed, that the arguments most pressed in opposition to the bill were grounded upon a belief that the Government of the United States had not a constitutional power to execute the treaty. Of one thing I am confident, that if they have the distrust of us which some gentlemen have this day expressed of them, the country will not be delivered to the agents of our Government should this bill be rejected.

The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Tracy) muse consider the grant of power to the Legislature as a limitation of the treaty-making power, for he says, “that the power to admit new States and to make citizens is given to Congress, and not to the treaty-making power;” therefore an engagement in a treaty to do either[20] of these things is unconstitutional. I cannot help expressing my surprise at that gentleman’s giving that opinion, and I think myself justifiable in saying, that if it is now his opinion, it was not always so. The contrary opinion is the only justification of that gentleman’s approbation of the British treaty, and of his vote for carrying it into effect. By that treaty a great number of persons had a right to become American citizens immediately; not only without a law, but contrary to an existing law. And by that treaty many of the powers specially given to Congress were exercised by the treaty-making power. It is for gentlemen who supported that treaty, to reconcile the construction given by them to the constitution in its application to that instrument, with their exposition of it at this time.

If the third article of the treaty is an engagement to incorporate the Territory of Louisiana into the Union of the United States, and to make it a State, it cannot be considered as an unconstitutional exercise of the treaty-making power; for it will not be asserted by any rational man that the territory is incorporated as a State by the treaty itself, when it is expressly declared that “the inhabitants shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution.” Evidently referring the question of incorporation, in whatever character it was to take place, to the competent authority; and leaving to that authority to do it, at such time, and in such manner, as they may think proper. If, as some gentlemen suppose, Congress possess this power, they are free to exercise it in the manner that they may think most conducive to the public good. If it can only be done by an amendment to the constitution, it is a matter of discretion with the States whether they will do it or not; for it cannot be done “according to the principles of the Federal Constitution,” if the Congress or the States are deprived of that discretion, which is given to the first, and secured to the last, by the constitution. In the third section of the fourth article of the constitution it is said, “New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.” If Congress have the power, it is derived from this source; for there are no other words in the constitution that can, by any construction that can be given to them, be considered as conveying this power. If Congress have not this power, the constitutional mode would be by an amendment to the constitution. If it should be conceded then that the admission of this territory into the Union, as a State, was in the contemplation of the contracting parties, it must be understood with a reservation of the right of this Congress or of the States to do it, or not; the words “admitted as soon as possible,” must refer to the voluntary admission in one of the two modes that I have mentioned; for in no other way can a State be admitted into this Union.

The question was then taken on the passage of the bill, and carried in the affirmative—yeas 26, nays 5, as follows:

Yeas—Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Butler, Cocke, Condit, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Olcott, Plumer, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, Stone, Taylor, Worthington, and Wright.

Nays—Messrs. Hillhouse, Pickering, Tracy, Wells, and White.

Friday, November 4.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

The Message and papers therein referred to were read and ordered to lie for consideration.

Thursday, November 10.

The credentials of John Condit, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of New Jersey, for the time limited in the Constitution of the United States, were presented and read.

Ordered, That they lie on file.

Friday, November 11.

The President communicated a letter from De Witt Clinton, late a Senator from the State of New York, stating that he had resigned his seat in the Senate.

Monday, November 14.

The President administered the oath required by law to Mr. Condit, a Senator from the State of New Jersey.

Tuesday, November 15.

Mr. Worthington presented the petition of a number of the inhabitants of the Indiana Territory,[21] praying to be set off into a separate district, for reasons therein stated.

Ordered, That it be referred to Mr. Bradley and others, the committee to whom were referred on the 7th instant, petitions on the same subject, to consider and report thereon to the Senate.

Wednesday, November 23.

Amendment to the Constitution.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the report of the committee to whom was referred the motion for an amendment to the constitution in the mode of electing the President and the Vice President of the United States; whereupon, the President pro tem. (Mr. Brown) submitted to the consideration of the Senate the following question of order:

[A debate took place on this proposition, tedious, intricate, and desultory, which it was very difficult to follow, and often to comprehend.]

The proposition offered by the President was then called up for decision, whether two-thirds were necessary—ayes 13, noes 18.

Mr. Butler desired to know from the President if the question now decided did not require a majority of two-thirds?

The President said, according to the rule of the House, the question required only a principal majority to decide.

Mr. Dayton’s motion for striking out what related to the Vice President was called for, and the question taken on striking out—ayes 12, noes 19.

The report of the committee at large being then under consideration,

Mr. Nicholas moved to strike out all following the seventh line of the report, to the end, for the purpose of inserting the following:

Mr. Adams objected to the number “three” instead of five, and wished five to be restored, as the House of Representatives had already agreed to it. He asked for a division of the question; which was not agreed to.

Upon the question for striking out being put, it was carried without a dissenting voice, and the amendment of Mr. Nicholas adopted in the report, leaving the number blank.

Mr. Dayton moved to fill up the blank with the number five; upon the question being put, it was lost—only eleven rose in the affirmative.

Mr. Anderson moved to strike out the word “two” in the nineteenth line—ayes 6. Lost.

Mr. S. Smith then moved to fill the blank with the word “three;” which was carried—ayes 18, noes 13.

Mr. Adams suggested an objection to the amendment as it stood, which appeared to arise out of the treaty of cession of Louisiana. His original idea was adverse to the limitation to natural-born citizens, as superfluous; but, as it stood, the terms upon which Louisiana was acquired had rendered a change necessary, for it appeared to him that there was no alternative, but to admit those born in Louisiana as well as those born in the United States to the right of being chosen for President and Vice President.

Mr. Butler said that, if there was a numerous portion of those who were already citizens of the United States who can never aspire to, nor be eligible for, those situations under the constitution, he did not see how this supposed alternative could be upheld. The people of Louisiana, under the treaty and under the constitution, will clearly come under the description of naturalized citizens. While he was up, he would take the opportunity of speaking to the question at large, and to examine the motives which produced this amendment; the principal cause of solicitude, on this subject, he understood to be the base intrigues which were said to have been carried on at the Presidential election.

Mr. Wright called to order; and a short altercation on the point of order took place.

Mr. Butler proceeded. He had on a former day asked if he might, in this stage of the discussion, take a view of the whole subject; the House had decided in the affirmative. When the proposition was first laid before the House, he had felt a disposition in favor of it; his mind had been shocked by those base intrigues, which had taken place at the late Presidential election, and he was hurried by indignation into a temper which a little cool reflection and some observation on a particular mode of action in that House, had checked and corrected, and finally convinced him that much caution was required in a proceeding of that nature, and that, in all human probability, such a scene of intrigue may never occur again; that it became questionable whether any steps whatever were necessary. Upon a careful review of the subject, it appeared to him that an alteration might make matters worse; for though at present there has been[22] afforded, by a course of accidents and oversights, room for intrigue, it would be preferable to leave it to the care and discretion of the States at large to prevent the recurrence of the danger, than put into the hands of four of the large States the perpetual choice of President, to the exclusion of the other thirteen States. It was a reasonable principle that every State should, in turn, have the choice of the Chief Magistrate made from among its citizens. The jealousy of the small States was natural; and he would not tire the House by bringing to their ears arguments from the history of Greece, because the subject must be familiar to every member of that House, and, indeed, to every school-boy. He would not weary them with the painful history of the conflicts of Athens and Sparta, for the supremacy of Greece, and the fatal effects of their quarrels and ambition on the smaller States of that inveterate confederacy of Republics. Their history is that of all nations in similar circumstances; for man is man in every clime, and passion mingles in all his actions. If the smaller States were to agree to this amendment, it would fix for ever the combination of the larger States, and they would not only choose the President but the Vice President also in spite of the smaller States. It would ill become him who had been a member of that convention which had the honor of forming the present constitution to let a measure such as the present pass without the most deliberate investigation of its effects. Before the present constitution was adopted all the States held an equal vote on all national questions; by the constitution their sovereignty was guarantied, and the instrument of guarantee and right, he had subscribed his name to as a Representative from South Carolina, and had used all the zeal and influence of which he was possessed to promote its adoption. To give his assent to any violation of it, or any unnecessary innovation on its principles, would be a deviation from morality.

The question was immediately taken on the report and carried—yeas 20, nays 11.

Mr. Adams said, that though he had voted for the amendment, he disapproved of the alteration from five to three. He felt, however, though a representative of a large State, a deep interest in this question. Was there no champion of the small States to stand up in that House and vindicate their rights?

Mr. Dayton was not here as champion of the small States; but, as the representative of one of them, he was ready to enter his protest against being delivered over bound hand and foot to four or five of the large States. The gentleman from South Carolina had offered arguments on the subject irrefutable. The little portion of influence left us he has demonstrated to be now about to be taken away, and the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Adams,) after aiding the effort with his vote, has taken mercy upon us, and after he has helped to knock us down, asks us why we do not stand up for ourselves.

Mr. S. Smith was not surprised to find those who were members of the old Congress, in which the subject of large and small States was frequently agitated, familiar with the subject of those days. Under the present constitution he had been ten years in Congress and had never heard the subject agitated, nor the least ground given for any apprehension on this subject; he had seen the small States possess all the advantages secured to them without even a moment’s jealousy. The State he represented was once considered a large State; the increase of others in population, however, had rendered it properly belonging to neither class; it was an intermediate State; but from the natural progression of the Union it must be ranked among the small States. In this view then he could speak dispassionately, and the small States could not with reason be apprehensive that a State, which must speedily take rank among them, could be indifferent to their rights if there were the least cause for apprehension.

He had moved for the insertion of three instead of five, with this precise and special intention, that the people themselves should have the power of electing the President and Vice President; and that intrigues should be thereby for ever frustrated. The intention of the convention was that the election of the chief officers of the Government should come as immediately from the people as was practicable, and that the Legislature should possess the power only in such an exigency as accident might give birth to, but which they had considered as likely to occur. Had it not been for these considerations, the large States never would have given up the advantages which they held in point of numbers. If the number five were to be continued, and the House of Representatives made the last resort, he would undertake to say, that four times out of five the choice would devolve upon them.

Mr. Hillhouse.—In avoiding rocks he feared we were steering for quicksands. The evils that are past we know; those that may arrive we know not. The object proposed is to provide against a storm, a phenomenon not rare or unfrequent in republics. You are called upon to act upon a calculation that all the States in the Union will vote for the same persons, or that each of two parties opposed in politics will have an individual candidate. Suppose the two candidates who had the highest votes on the late election had been the champions of two opposite parties, and that neither would recede, what then would be the consequence; according to the gentleman from Maryland, a civil war! When men are bent on a favorite pursuit, they are too apt to shut out all consequences which do not bear out their object. Thus gentlemen can very well discover the danger they have escaped, but they do not perceive that the opposition of two powerful candidates gives, besides the hazard of civil war, the hazard of placing one of them on a permanent throne. The First Magistracy of this nation[23] is an object capable of exciting ambition; and no doubt it would one day or other be sought after by dangerous and enterprising men. It was to place a check upon this ambition that the constitution provided a competitor for the Chief Magistrate, and declared that both should not be chosen from the same State. Here also was a guard against State pride, and this guard you wish to take away; and what will be the consequence? Instead of two or three or five, you will have as many candidates as there are States in the Union. By voting for two persons without designation, the States stood a double chance of a majority, besides the chance of a majority of all the States in the House of Representatives. For once or twice there may be such an organization of party as will secure for a conspicuous character the majority of votes. But that character cannot live always. The evil of the last election will recur, and be greater, because the whole field will be to range in.

He hoped this amendment would not be hastily adopted. The subsisting mode was the result of much deliberation and solemn compromise, after having long agitated the convention. It is now attacked by party, whatever gentlemen may say to the contrary; the gentleman from South Carolina has confessed it. If gentlemen will suffer themselves to look forward without passion, great good may come from the present mode; men of each of the parties may hold the two principal offices of the Government; they will be checks upon each other; our Government is composed of checks; and let us preserve it from party spirit, which has been tyrannical in all ages. These checks take off the fiery edge of persecution. Would not one of a different party placed in that chair tend to check and preserve in temper the overheated zeal of party? he would conduct himself with firmness because of the minor party; he would take care that the majority should have justice, but he would also guard the minority from oppression. If we cannot destroy party we ought to place every check upon it. If the present amendment pass, nine out of ten times the election will go to the other House, and then the only difference will be that you had a comedy the last time, and you’ll have a tragedy the next. Though it was impossible to prevent party altogether, much more when population and luxury increase, and corruption and vice with them, it was prudent to preserve as many checks against it as was practicable. He had been long in Congress and saw the conflicting interests of large and small States operate; the time may not be remote when party will adopt new designations; federal and republican parties have had their day, their designations will not last long, and the ground of difference between parties will not be the same that it has been; new names and new views will be taken; it has been the course in all nations. There has not yet been a rotation of offices in which the small States could look for their share, but the time may, it will come when the small will wrestle with the large States for their rights. Each State has felt that though its limits were not so extensive as others, its rights were not disregarded. Suffer this confidence to be done away, and you may bid adieu to it; three or four large States will take upon them in rotation to nominate the Executive, and the second officer also. This will be felt. A fanciful difference in politics is the bugbear of party now, because no other, no real cause of difference has subsisted. But remedy will create a real disease. States like individuals may say we will be of no party, and whenever this shall happen blood will follow.

Mr. Bradley moved an adjournment. The motion was agreed to.

Thursday, November 24.

Amendment to the Constitution.

The consideration of the report on the amendment to the constitution being taken up, the amendment as directed to be printed on the preceding day, was taken up, and read, as follows:

Mr. Bradley did not approve of the amendment as it now stood; he could not see why the Vice President should not be chosen by a majority, as well as the President. He considered the possibility of the Vice President becoming President by any casualty, as a good reason for both being chosen by the same ratio of numbers. If it should be carried as the amendment now stands, the office of Vice President would be hawked about at market, and given as change for votes for the Presidency.[24] And what would be the effect?—that it might so happen that a citizen chosen only for the office of Vice President, might by the death of the President, though chosen only by a plurality, become President, and hold the office for three years eleven months and thirty days. He did not approve of many arguments which he had heard on the preceding day, and however disposed to concur in the principle of designation for the two offices, he could not give it his vote in the present shape. He would, in order to render the report more congenial with his wishes, move to strike out the following words beginning with the words shall, in the thirteenth line, to constitution, in the eighteenth. The motion was seconded.

Mr. Tracy opposed the striking out, as not in order, it being an amendment to an amendment already received by the House. He thought, however, it would be in order to reconcile the whole, and then any part might be amended.

The President said that the motion for amending the amendment was not in order; but if the member from Vermont, or any other gentleman of the majority on the question yesterday chose to move for a recommittal, or even to refer the report to a select committee, it would be in order.

Mr. Bradley then renewed his motion as before, for striking out and inserting after the 13th line; this amendment he thought of great importance, as under the constitution as it now stands the Vice President must be a person of the highest respectability, well known, and of established reputation throughout the United States; but if the discriminating principle prevails without some precautions such as the amendment proposed, that assurance would be lost; and he should not be surprised to hear of as many candidates for Vice President as there are States, as the votes for President would be offered in truck for votes for Vice President, and an enterprising character might employ his emissaries through all the States to purchase them, and your amendment lays the foundation for intrigues. He was desirous that he who is to be set up as candidate for the Vice President should as at present be equally respectable, or that there should be none—that at least he should be the second man in the nation; adopt the designating principle, without the most guarded precautions, and you lose that assurance.

Mr. Hillhouse accorded with the gentleman’s amendment, as it naturally grows out of the principles of the report. There was not a word in the constitution about voting for the Vice President, no vote in fact is given for such an office; the alteration to designation alters the whole thing; and as the gentleman has expressed, will send the Vice President’s office into market to be handed about as change for the candidate supported by larger States; he would prefer leaving the choice of President and Vice President at once to the larger States than take it in this way. In calm times any government may work well, but he wished in calm times to provide against storm. If we designate any, then designate both and on equal terms.

Mr. Jackson said, that though coming from a small State he had not been instructed, and was therefore at perfect liberty to act according to the best of his judgment; though his State was now, in regard to population, small, and though it were to remain so, he could have but one opinion on this subject. He saw abundance of reason for preferring three to five. The constitution under the present form has directed the choice to be made from five. But the reason of this was consistent with the result to be produced; the electors were to vote for two persons indiscriminately, but with the restriction of voting for one only belonging to the State where the vote was given. The voting for two would necessarily bring forward four candidates, and a fifth possibly, for we saw in the two elections before the last that there was one more than the four, though in each case the fifth had but one vote; he alluded to the vote for Mr. Jay. In the amendment proposed you are called upon to designate for each office, and there can be little apprehension of having more than two or three principal candidates; and for twenty years to come he had no apprehension of a greater number of candidates if this amendment prevails.

Mr. Wright.—We need not be told in this house, that the constitution was the result of a compromise, or that care was taken to guard the rights of each State; these things we must be very ignorant, indeed, not to know. But does it therefore follow that it is not susceptible of amendment or correction under experience? Does it follow, because, for mutual interest and security, this compromise was made, that we are precluded from effecting any greater good? No man would accuse him of a wish to see the interest of any State impaired. But we can preserve the spirit and intention of the constitution in full vigor, without impairing any interests. And this is to be done, by the discriminating principle; it fulfills the intention, and it forefends the recurrence of that danger from which you have once escaped. By this principle, each elector may name his man for each office, and this can be done whether the number be three or five. For the latter number he was disposed; because already adopted by the other House, and he did not wish to delay its progress. If we were to form a constitution, he would provide that there should be only two candidates presented to the House. But he did not rely on any number so much as on the discriminating principle.

Mr. Nicholas.—Several gentlemen profess much reluctance to make any change in the constitution; he would make no such profession; and though he should be as jealous of improper alterations, or the introduction of principles incompatible with Republican Government,[25] he would not hesitate to make any alteration calculated to promote, or secure the public liberty upon a firmer basis; nay, if it could be made better he would expunge the whole book. Gentlemen who are for adhering so closely to the constitution, appear not to consider that a choice of President from the number three, is more in the spirit of the constitution than from five; and preserves the relation that the election of two persons, under the present form, holds to the number five. A reason equally forcible with him was, that, by taking the number three instead of five, you place the choice with more certainty in the people at large, and render the choice more consonant to their wishes. With him, also, it was a most powerful reason for preferring three, that it would render the Chief Magistrate dependent only on the people at large, and independent of any party or any State interest. The people held the sovereign power, and it was intended by the constitution that they should have the election of the Chief Magistrate. It was never contemplated as a case likely to occur, but in an extreme case, that the election should go to the House of Representatives. What, he asked, would have been the effect, had Mr. Jay been elected when he had only one vote? What, he would ask, would be the impression made upon our own people, and upon foreign nations, had Mr. Aaron Burr been chosen at the last election, when the universal sentiment was to place the present Chief Magistrate in that station? He did not mean any thing disrespectful or invidious towards the Vice President, he barely stated the fact, so well known, and asked, what would be the effect? Where would be the bond of attachment to that constitution which could admit of an investiture in a case so important, in known opposition to the wishes of the people? The effect would be fatal to the constitution itself; it would weaken public attachment to it, and the affectation, if alone for the small States, would not have been heard of in the deep murmur of discontent.

An adjournment was now called for and carried.

Tuesday, November 29.

Amendment to the Constitution.

The order of the day being called up on the amendments to the constitution, a considerable time elapsed, when

Mr. Dayton rose and said, that since no other gentleman thought proper to address the Chair, although laboring himself under a very severe cold, which rendered speaking painful, he could not suffer the question to pass without an effort to arrest it in its progress; and should consider his last breath well expended in endeavoring to prevent the degradation which the State he represented would suffer if the amendment were to prevail.

As to the question immediately before the Senate for filling the blank with five, he felt himself indebted to the member from Tennessee for renewing the subject. He was grateful, also, to the member from Maryland (Mr. Wright) for declaring he would support it, as well as for giving the assurance that he was disposed to consider and spare the interests of the small States as far as possible, consistently with the great object of discrimination.

Every member who had spoken on this subject seemed to have admitted, by the very course and pointing of their arguments, even though they may have denied it in words, that this was really a question between great and small States, and disguise it as they would, the question would be so considered out of doors. The privilege given by the constitution extended to five, out of which the choice of President should be made; and why should the smaller, for whose benefit and security that number was given, now wantonly throw it away without an equivalent? As to the Vice President, his election had no influence upon the number, because the choice of President in the House of Representatives was as free and unqualified as if that subordinate office did not exist. Nay, he said, he would venture to assert that, even if the number five were continued, and the Vice Presidency entirely abolished, there would not be as great a latitude of choice as under the present mode, because those five out of whom the choice must eventually be made, were much more likely hereafter to be nominated by the great States, inasmuch as their electors would no longer be compelled to vote for a man of a different State. The honorable gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Smith) has said, he was not surprised that those who had seats in the old Congress, should perplex themselves with the distinctions; but he could tell that gentleman, that it was not in the old Congress he had learnt them, for there he had seen all the votes of the States equal, and had known the comparatively little State of Maryland controlling the will of the Ancient Dominion. It was in the Federal Convention that distinction was made and acknowledged; and he defied that member to do, what had been before requested of the honorable gentleman of Virginia, viz: to open the constitution, and point out a single article, if he could, that had not evidently been framed upon a presumption of diversity (he had almost said, adversity) of interest between the great and small States.

Mr. Adams in a former debate had stated that he had not a wish to avoid or seek for the yeas and nays on any question; on the present occasion, however, he would, when the question was taken, call for the yeas and nays. But his own vote on the final question would be governed by the decision of the number five, and he wished to have some record of his vote, that he might be hereafter able to defend himself against any charge of inconsistency. On the principle of the amendment he had formed his opinion, and he was free to confess, that notwithstanding the many able productions which he had seen against it, he thought it calculated to produce more good[26] than evil. He was not, however, influenced in this opinion by the instructions which had been read in a preceding debate from a former Legislature of Massachusetts to their Senators; he presumed these were not read by way of intimidation. To the instructions of those to whom he owed his seat in that House he would pay every respect that was due, but he did not think that the resolutions of a Legislature passed in March 1799 or 1800 ought to have the same weight. Since that time four total and complete changes had taken place, and probably not one third of those who gave those instructions now remained. He held a seat in the Legislature himself three years since, but did not perceive any particular anxiety on the subject, and he did not think that the present Legislature would be extremely offended if he were to give a direct vote against what was recommended four years ago.

The constitution was a combination of federative and popular principles. When you argue upon, or wish to change any of its federative principles, you must use analogies as arguments; popular arguments will not apply to federative principles. The House of Representatives was founded on popular principles; in this House the representation is federative, and not popular; it is in its nature aristocratic. The foundation of all popular representation is equality of votes; but even the ratio of representation is different in different States; the numbers in Massachusetts and Virginia, in Vermont and Delaware, are different in their proportions; but still an equality of representation is preserved, and the only difference is in the details. But if you argue upon the principles of the Senate, this equality of popular representation, or by an equal or relatively equal number, will not apply; you must discuss it upon another species of equality, of sovereignties, and the independence of several States federatively connected. Applying principles then to the election of President, if you reduce the number from which the House of Representatives is authorized to choose, do you not attack the principles of the federal compact, rather than the rights of the small States? The Executive, it had been said, is the man of the people; true, and he is also, as was said, though upon different grounds, the man of the Legislature—it was here a combined principle, federative and popular. Virginia had in that House twenty-two popular representatives, in this she has two federative; Delaware has one popular and two federative representatives. And even in the operation of election in the popular branch of Congress, the federative principle is pursued, and the State which has only one popular representative has an equal voice in that instance with the State that has twenty-two popular representatives. It was therefore evident that the attempt to alter the number from five to three, is an attack upon the federative principle, and not upon the small States.

Mr. S. Smith, when he made the motion for filling up the blank with three, did it after the most deliberate consideration of the theory and the principles of the constitution; which, if he understood it right, intended that the election of the Executive should be in the people, or as nearly as was possible, consistent with public order and security to the right of suffrage. The provision admitting the choice by the House of Representatives, was itself intended only for an extreme case, where great inconvenience might result from sending a defective election back to the people, as is customary in Massachusetts, where, if the majority is deficient, a new election is required. Our object in the amendment is or should be to make the election more certain by the people. This was to be done most effectually by leaving it to them to designate the persons whom they preferred for each office. As under the present form there was an extreme case, so there might be when the change of number should take place; for, although even with the number three, there was a possibility of the choice devolving on the House of Representatives, yet the adoption of the designating principle and the number three, would render the case less probable. It never was the intention of the framers of the constitution that the election should go to the House of Representatives but in the extreme case; nor was it ever contemplated that about one-fifth of the people should choose a President for the rest, which certainly would be the case if what some gentlemen contended for were to take place. When gentlemen contend for such a power as would transfer the choice from the people, and place it in the hands of a minority so small, how happens it that gentlemen will not bear to hear of the efforts which such arguments or such measures would produce on the larger States? It was not the interest of the small States to combine against the large. Suppose it were possible that the four large States should combine—and a combination of the small States alone could produce such an effect—nine States in the Union have but thirty-two votes out of one hundred and forty-two, yet nine States, with one vote each, make a majority of seventeen, though in relation to population they contain only about one-fifth of the whole; and by such a proceeding the one-fifth might choose a President and Vice President in defiance of the other four-fifths. What would be the consequence of such an election? At a subsequent election the large States would combine, and by the use of their votes they would frustrate every object which the small States might use their efforts to accomplish.

Notwithstanding what had been said concerning the jealousy of States, he could see nothing in it but the leaven of the old Congress, thrown in to work up feelings that had been long still. It was the forlorn hope, the last stratagem of party; and he was the more disposed to think so, when he saw gentlemen from the large States coming forward as the champions of the small—this might, to be sure, be magnanimity; but if his discernment did not deceive him, it[27] was a stratagem to divide the friends of the amendment. Why was not the same jealousy entertained of the power of thirteen out of seventeen combining and giving absolute law to the other four? Why have gentlemen paid no regard to the experience which they have had from the last election, when less than one third of the members harassed the public mind, kept the Union in agitation, and Congress engrossed to the exclusion of nearly all other business for two weeks? Suppose that the House had been as accessible to corruption as the diets of other nations have been, and that three men, having in their power the votes of three States, had been seized upon, and the election made contrary to the wishes of the people. What would be the effect—on the minds of the people—on the administration of the Government—and on the attachment which the people feel for the constitution itself? He need not attempt to describe the effects. But it is our duty to prevent the return of such dangers, by keeping the election out of that House. And the most effectual mode is to fix the selection from the number three.

Mr. Pickering had not intended to have spoken on this question so far as it concerned the numbers; but as he should probably vote differently from his colleague, he conceived it proper to give his motives for his vote. His wishes for the entire preservation of the constitution were so strong, that he regretted any change was contemplated to be made in it, and he wished if an alteration was made to keep as near as possible to the spirit of the constitution as it now is, and it appeared to him that the number three conformed more to that spirit than the number five. He believed it to be the intention of the constitution, that the people should elect. As to what gentlemen said concerning the will of the people, he paid but little regard to it. The will of the people! he did not know how the will of the people could be known—how gentlemen came by it; it would not be asserted that it was to be found in the newspapers, or in private society; in truth he believed it never had been fairly expressed on the subject. We have seen an amendment brought forward from New York, but was that an expression of the public opinion? if it was, it was a very remarkable one, for it contained an absurdity—visible to every one. He wished to avoid innovations on the constitution, and to preserve the combined operation of federative and popular principles upon which it rested unimpaired.

Mr. Worthington hoped the number three would be adopted in preference to five. Nevertheless he approved so much of the principle of designation in the election of the President and Vice President, that rather than lose it he would vote for it with either number.

The yeas and nays being called for on filling up the blank with the largest number according to order; the votes were—yeas 12, nays 19, as follows:

The question on the number three being inserted was then put, and the yeas and nays being demanded by one fifth of the members present; they were, yeas 21, nays 10, as follows:

The House then adjourned.

Friday, December 2.

Mr. White, of Delaware, rose and addressed the chair as follows:

Mr. President: It may be expected that we, who oppose the present measure, and especially those of us who belong to the smaller States, and who think the interests of those States will be most injuriously affected by its adoption, shall assign some reasons for our opinion, and for the resistance we give it: I will for myself endeavor to do so. I know well the prejudices of many in favor of this proposed amendment to the constitution; I know too, and acknowledge with pleasure, the weight of abilities on the other side of the House by which those prejudices, if I may so be permitted to call them, will be sustained; this might perhaps be sufficient to create embarrassment or even silence on my part, but for the consciousness I feel in the rectitude of my views, and my full reliance on the talents of those with whom I have the honor generally to think and act. Upon a subject of the nature and importance of the one before us a great diversity of sentiment must be expected, and is perhaps necessary to the due and proper investigation of it. Without detaining the Senate with further preliminary remarks, presuming upon that patience and polite indulgence that are at all times extended by this honorable body to gentlemen who claim their attention, I will proceed immediately to the subject of the resolution; barely premising that notwithstanding the opinions of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Taylor) and the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. Jackson,) whose opinions I highly respect, I must yet think with my honorable friend from New Jersey (Mr. Dayton) that the Constitution of the United States bears upon the face of it the strongest marks of its having been made under the influence of State classifications. It was a work of compromise, though not formed, as stated by the gentleman from Virginia, by the large States[28] yielding most, but by the smaller States yielding much more to the general good.

It will be recollected that, previous to the adoption of the constitution, on all legislative subjects, in fact, on every measure of the constitution, each State had an equal voice; but very different is the case now, when, in the popular branch of your Government, you see one State represented by twenty-two members, and another by but one, voting according to numbers. So that, notwithstanding the ideas of those gentlemen, and the declaration of an honorable member from Maryland, on my right, (Mr. Smith,) that, during his ten years’ service in Congress, he had never seen anything like State jealousies, State divisions, or State classification, I must be permitted to predicate part of my argument upon this business. Should any gentleman be able to show that the foundation is unsound, the superstructure of course will be easily demolished. Admitting, then, sir, for the sake of argument, that there were no very great objections to this proposed alteration in the mode of electing a President and Vice President, and that it were now part of the constitution, it might be unwise to strike it out, unless much stronger arguments had been urged against than I have heard in favor of it; yet I would not now vote for its adoption.

The United States are now divided, and will probably continue so, into two great political parties; whenever, under this amendment, a Presidential election shall come round, and the four rival candidates be proposed, two of them only will be voted for as President—one of these two must be the man; the chances in favor of each will be equal. Will not this increased probability of success afford more than double the inducement to those candidates, and their friends, to tamper with the Electors, to exercise intrigue, bribery, and corruption, as in an election upon the present plan, where the whole four would be voted for alike, where the chances against each are as three to one, and it is totally uncertain which of the gentlemen may succeed to the high office? And there must, indeed, be a great scarcity of character in the United States, when, in so extensive and populous a country, four citizens cannot be found, either of them worthy even of the Chief Magistracy of the nation. But, Mr. President, I have never yet seen the great inconvenience that has been so much clamored about, and that will be provided against in future by substituting this amendment. There was, indeed, a time when it became necessary for the House of Representatives to elect, by ballot, a President of the United States from the two highest in vote, and they were engaged here some days, as I have been told, in a very good-humored way, in the exercise of that constitutional right. They at length decided; and what was the consequence? The people were satisfied, and here the thing ended. What does this prove? that the constitution is defective? No, sir, but rather the wisdom and efficiency of the very provision intended to be stricken out, and that the people are acquainted with the nature of their Government; and give me leave to say, if fortune had smiled upon another man, and that election had eventuated in another way, the consequence would have been precisely the same; the great mass of the people would have been content and quiet; and those factious, restless disorganizers, that are the eternal disturbers of all well administered Governments, and who then talked of resistance, would have had too much prudence to hazard their necks in so dangerous an enterprise. I will not undertake to say that there was no danger apprehended on that occasion. I know many of the friends of the constitution had their fears; the experiment however proved them groundless; but what was the danger apprehended pending the election in the House of Representatives? Was it that they might choose Colonel Burr or Mr. Jefferson President? Not at all; they had, notwithstanding what had been said on this subject by the gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. Wright,) a clear constitutional right to choose either of them, as much so as the Electors in the several States had to vote for them in the first instance; the particular man was a consideration of but secondary importance to the country; the only ground of alarm was, lest the House should separate without making any choice, and the Government be without a head, the consequences of which no man could well calculate.

It has of late, Mr. President, become fashionable to attach very little importance to the office of Vice President, to consider it a matter but of small consequence who the man may be; to view his post merely as an idle post of honor, and the incumbent as a cipher in the Government; or according to the idea expressed by an honorable member from Georgia, (Mr. Jackson,) quoting, I believe, the language of some Eastern politician, as a fifth wheel to a coach; but in my humble opinion this doctrine is both incorrect and dangerous. The Vice President is not only the second officer of Government in point of rank, but of importance, and should be a man possessing and worthy of the confidence of the nation. I grant, sir, should this designating mode of election succeed, it will go very far to destroy, not the certain or contingent duties of the office, for the latter by this resolution are considerably extended, but what may be much more dangerous, the personal consequence and worth of the officer; by rendering the Electors more indifferent about the reputation and qualification of the candidate, seeing they vote for him but as a secondary character; and which may occasion this high and important trust to be deposited in very unsafe hands. By a provision in the first section of the second article of the constitution, “in case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President”—and he is constitutionally the President, not until another[29] can be made only, but of the residue of the term, which may be nearly four years; and this is not to be supposed a remote or improbable case. In the State to which I have the honor to belong, within a few years past, two instances have happened of the place of Governor becoming vacant, and the duties of the office, according to the constitution of that State, devolving upon the Speaker of the Senate. We know well too, generally speaking, that before any man can acquire a sufficient share of the public confidence to be elected President, the people must have long been acquainted with his character and his merit; he must have proved himself a good and faithful servant, and will of course be far advanced in years, when the chances of life will be much against him. It may indeed, owing to popular infatuation, or some other extraordinary causes, be the ill fate of our country, that an unworthy designing man, grown old and gray in the ways of vice and hypocrisy, shall for a time dishonor the Presidential chair, or it may be the fortune of some young man to be elected, but those will rarely happen. The convention in constructing this part of the constitution, in settling the first and second offices of the Government, and pointing out the mode of filling, aware of the probability of the Vice President succeeding to the office of President, endeavored to attach as much importance and respectability to his office as possible, by making it uncertain at the time of voting, which of the persons voted for should be President, and which Vice President; so as to secure the election of the best men in the country, or at least those in whom the people reposed the highest confidence, to the two offices—thus filling the office of Vice President with one of our most distinguished citizens, who would give respectability to the Government, and in case of the Presidency becoming vacant, having at his post a man constitutionally entitled to succeed, who had been honored with the second largest number of the suffrages of the people for the same office, and who of consequence would be probably worthy of the place, and competent to its duties. Let us now, Mr. President, examine for a moment the certain effect of the change about to be made, or what must be the operation of this designating principle, if you introduce it into the constitution. Now the Elector cannot designate, but must vote for two persons as President, leaving it to circumstances not within his power to control which shall be the man: of course he will select two characters, each suitable for that office, and the second highest in vote must be the Vice President; but upon this designating plan the public attention will be entirely engrossed in the election of the President, in making one great man. The eyes of each contending party will be fixed exclusively upon their candidate for this first and highest office; no surrounding object can be viewed at the same time, they will be lost in his disc. The office of President is, in point of honor, profit, trust, and influential patronage, so infinitely superior to any other place attainable in this Government, that, in the pursuit and disposal of it, all minor considerations will be forgotten, every thing will be made to bend, in order to subserve the ambitious views of the candidates and their friends. In this angry conflict of parties, amidst the heat and anxiety of this political warfare, the Vice Presidency will either be left to chance, or what will be much worse, prostituted to the basest purposes; character, talents, virtue, and merit, will not be sought after in the candidate. The question will not be asked, is he capable? is he honest? But can he by his name, by his connections, by his wealth, by his local situation, by his influence or his intrigues, best promote the election of a President? He will be made a mere stepping-stone of ambition. Thus, by the death or other constitutional inability of the President to do the duties of the office, you may find at the head of your Government, as First Magistrate of the nation, a man who has either smuggled or bought himself into office; who, not having the confidence of the people, or feeling the constitutional responsibility of his place, but attributing his elevation merely to accident, and conscious of the superior claims of others, will be without restraint upon his conduct, without that strong inducement to consult the wishes of the people, and to pursue the true interests of the nation, that the hope of popular applause, and the prospect of re-election, would offer. Such a state of things might be productive of incalculable evils; for it is, as I fear time will show, in the power of a President of the United States to bring this Government into contempt, and this country to disgrace, if not to ruin.

Mr. Plumer said that he had generally contented himself with expressing his opinion by a silent vote, but on a question which affected the rights of the smaller States, (one of which he had the honor to represent,) he requested the indulgence of the Senate to a few observations.

He said the constitution had provided only two methods for obtaining amendments, and both are granted with great caution. If two-thirds of the several State Legislatures apply, Congress shall call a convention who are to propose amendments, which, when ratified by the conventions of three-fourths of the States, will be valid. If this mode is adopted, Congress have nothing to do but to ascertain the fact, whether the necessary number of States require a convention. If they do, a convention must be called. The State Legislatures are only to apply for a convention. They can neither propose nor decide the amendments.

The other mode is, if two-thirds of both Houses of Congress deem it necessary to propose amendments, and three-fourths of the State Legislatures ratify them, they are valid. This is the present mode. The State Legislatures have nothing to do till after Congress has proposed the amendments, and then it is their[30] exclusive province either to ratify or reject them. But they have no authority to direct or even request Congress to propose particular amendments for themselves to ratify. Instructions on this subject are therefore improper. It is an assumption of power, not the exercise of a right. It is an attempt to create an undue influence over Congress. It is prejudging the question before it is proposed by the only authority that has the constitutional right to move it. If these instructions are obligatory, our votes must be governed, not by the convictions of our own judgments, or the propriety and fitness of the measure, but by the mandates of other Legislatures. This would destroy one of the checks that the constitution has provided against innovation. State Legislatures may, on some subjects, instruct their Senators; but on this, their instructions ought not to influence, much less bind us, to propose amendments, unless we ourselves deem them necessary.

The Senate consists of two members from each State; and in this case, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Senate are necessary. A majority of the Senate constitutes a quorum to do business, but that quorum is a majority of all the Senators that all the States are entitled to elect. This applies with equal force to the term “two-thirds of the Senate.” But in cases where from necessity a speedy decision is requisite, and where the concurrence of two-thirds is required, the constitution is explicit in confining that two-thirds to the members present, as in cases of treaties and impeachments; and also a fifth of the members present requesting the yeas and nays. If amendments can be constitutionally proposed by two-thirds of the Senate present, it will follow that twelve Senators, when only a quorum is present, may propose them against the will of twenty-two Senators.

This amendment affects the relative interest and importance of the smaller States. The constitution requires the Electors of each State to vote for two men, one of whom to be President of the United States. This affords a degree of security to the small States against the views and ambition of the large States. It gives them weight and influence in the choice. By destroying this complex mode of choice, and introducing the simple principle of designation, the large States can with more ease elect their candidate. This amendment will enable the Electors from four States and a half to choose a President, against the will of the remaining twelve States and a half. Can such a change tend to conciliate and strengthen the Union?

This amendment has a tendency to render the Vice President less respectable. He will be voted for not as President of the United States, but as President of the Senate, elected to preside over forms in this House. In electing a subordinate officer the Electors will not require those qualifications requisite for supreme command. The office of Vice President will be a sinecure. It will be brought to market and exposed to sale to procure votes for the President. Will the ambitious, aspiring candidate for the Presidency, will his friends and favorites promote the election of a man of talents, probity, and popularity for Vice President, and who may prove his rival? No! They will seek a man of moderate talents, whose ambition is bounded by that office, and whose influence will aid them in electing the President. This mode of election is calculated to increase corruption, promote intrigue, and aid inordinate ambition. The Vice President will be selected from some of the large States; he will have a casting vote in this House; and feeble indeed must his talents be, if his influence will not be equal to that of a member. This will, in fact, be giving to that State a third Senator.

In the Southern States the blacks are considered as property, and the States in which they live are thereby entitled to eighteen additional Electors and Representatives—a number equal to all the Electors and Representatives that four States and a half are entitled to elect. Will you, by this amendment, lessen the weight and influence of the Eastern States in the election of your first officers, and still retain this unequal article in your constitution? Shall property in one part of the Union give an increase of Electors, and be wholly excluded in other States? Can this be right? Will it strengthen the Union?

Mr. Tracy.—I shall attempt to prove, sir, that the resolution before us contains principles which have a manifest tendency to deprive the small States of an important right, secured to them by a solemn and constitutional compact, and to vest an overwhelming power in the great States. And, further, I shall attempt to show that, in many other points, the resolution is objectionable, and, for a variety of causes, ought not to be adopted.

As I shall be obliged, in delineating the main features of this resolution, to mention the great States in the Union as objects of jealousy, I wish it to be understood that no special stigma is intended. “Man is man,” was the maxim expressed in an early part of this debate, by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Butler,) and in application to the subject of government, the maxim is worthy to be written in letters of gold. Yes, sir, “man is man,” and the melancholy truth that he is always imperfect and frequently wicked, induces us to fear his power, and guard against his rapacity, by the establishment and preservation of laws, and well-regulated constitutions of government. Man, when connected with very many of his fellow-men, in a great State, derives power from the circumstance of this numerous combination; and from every circumstance which clothes him with additional power, he will generally derive some additional force to his passions.

Having premised this, I shall not deem it requisite to make any apology, when I attempt to excite the attention, the vigilance, and even[31] the jealousy of the small, in reference to the conduct of the great States. The caution is meant to apply against the imperfections and passions of man, generally, and not against any State, or description of men, particularly.

It may be proper, in this place, to explain my meaning, when I make use of the words “small” and “great,” as applicable to States.

Massachusetts has been usually called a great State; but, in respect to all the operations of this resolution, she must, I think, be ranked among the small States. The district of Maine is increasing rapidly, and must, in the nature of things, soon become a State. To which event, its location, being divided from what was the ancient Colony of Massachusetts, by the intervention of New Hampshire, will very much contribute. I believe there is a legislative provision of some years’ standing, authorizing a division at the option of Maine. When this event shall occur, Massachusetts, although, in comparison with Connecticut and Rhode Island, she will not be a small State, yet, in comparison with many others, must be so considered. I think myself justifiable, then, for my present purposes, in calling Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Vermont, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina, small States. They are limited in point of territory, and cannot reasonably expect any great increase of population for many years, not, indeed, until the other States shall become so populous as to discourage emigration, with agricultural views; which may retain the population of the small States as seamen or manufacturers. This event, if it ever arrives, must be distant. A possible exception only may exist in favor of Maine; but, when we consider its climate, and a variety of other circumstances, it is believed to form no solid exception to this statement.

By the same rule of deciding, the residue of the States must be called great; for although Georgia and several others are not sufficiently populous, at this time, to be considered relatively great States, yet their prospect of increase, with other circumstances, fairly bring them within the description, in respect to the operation of the measure now under consideration.

It will be recollected that, in the various turns which the debate has taken, gentlemen have repeatedly said that the constitution was formed for the people; that the good of the whole was its object; that nothing was discernible in it like a contest of States, nothing like jealousy of small States against the great; and although such distinctions and jealousies might have existed under the first confederation, yet they could have no existence under the last. And one gentleman (Mr. Smith, of Maryland) has said that he has been a member of this Government ten years, and has heard nothing of great and small States, as in the least affecting the operations of Government, or the feelings of those who administer it.

Propriety, therefore, requires that we attentively examine the constitution itself, not only to obtain correct ideas upon these observations, so repeatedly urged, but to place in the proper light the operations and effects of the resolution in debate. If we attend to the constitution, we shall immediately find evident marks of concession and compromise, and that the parties to these concessions were the great and small States. And the members of the convention who formed the instrument have, in private information and public communications, united in the declaration, that the constitution was the result of concession and compromise between the great and small States. In this examination of the constitution it will be impossible to keep out of view our political relations under the first confederation. We primarily united upon the footing of complete State equality—each State had one, and no State had more than one vote in the Federal Council or Congress. With such a confederation we successfully waged war, and became an independent nation. When we were relieved from the pressure of war, that confederation, both in structure and power, was found inadequate to the purposes for which it was established. Under these circumstances, the States, by their convention, entered into a new agreement, upon principles better adapted to promote their mutual security and happiness. But this last agreement, or constitution, under which we are now united, was manifestly carved out of the first confederation. The small States adhered tenaciously to the principles of State equality; and gave up only a part of that federative principle, complete State equality, and that with evident caution and reluctance. To this federative principle they were attached by habit; and their attachment was sanctioned and corroborated by the example of most if not all the ancient and the modern confederacies. And when the great States claimed a weight in the councils of the nation proportionate to their numbers and wealth, the novelty of the claim, as well as its obvious tendency to reduce the sovereignty of the small States, must have produced serious obstacles to its admission. Hence it is, that we find in the constitution but one entire departure from the federal principle. The House of Representatives is established upon the popular principle, and given to numbers and wealth, or to the great States, which, in this view of the subject, are synonymous. It was thought, by the convention, that a consolidation of the States into one simple Republic would be improper. And the local feelings and jealousies of all, but more especially of the small States, rendered a consolidation impracticable.

The Senate, who have the power of a legislative check upon the House of Representatives, and many other extensive and important powers, is preserved as an entire federative feature of Government as it was enjoyed by the small States, under the first confederacy.

In the article which obliges the Electors of[32] President to vote for one person not an inhabitant of the same State with themselves, is discovered State jealousy. In the majorities required for many purposes by the constitution, although there were other motives for the regulations, yet the jealousy of the small States is clearly discernible. Indeed, sir, if we peruse the constitution with attention, we shall find the small States are perpetually guarding the federative principle, that is, State equality. And this, in every part of it, except in the choice of the House of Representatives, and in their ordinary legislative proceedings. They go so far as to prohibit any amendment which may affect the equality of States in the Senate.

This is guarding against almost an impossibility, because the Senators of small States must be criminally remiss in their attendance, and the Legislatures extremely off their guard, if they permit such alterations, which aim at their own existence. But lest some accident, some unaccountable blindness or perfidy should put in jeopardy the federative principle in the Senate, they totally and for ever prohibit all attempts at such a measure. In the choice of President, the mutual caution and concession of the great and small States is, if possible, more conspicuous than in any other part of the constitution.

He is to be chosen by Electors appointed as the State Legislatures shall direct, not according to numbers entirely, but adding two Electors in each State as representatives of State sovereignty. Thus Delaware obtains three votes for President, whereas she could have but one in right of numbers. Yet, mixed as this mode of choice is, with both popular and federative principles, we see the small States watching its motions and circumscribing it to one attempt only, and, on failure of an Electoral choice, they instantly seize upon the right of a federal election, and select from the candidates a President by States and not by numbers. In confirmation of my assertion, that this part of the constitution was peculiarly the effect of compromise between the great and small States, permit me to quote an authority which will certainly have great weight, not only in the Senate, but through the Union, I mean that of the present Secretary of State, (Mr. Madison,) who was a leading member of the Federal Convention who formed, and of the Virginia Convention who adopted the constitution.

In the Debates of the Virginia Convention, volume 3, page 77, Mr. Madison says, speaking of the mode of electing the President:

After this view of the constitution, let us inquire, what is the direct object of the proposed alteration in the choice of President?

To render more practicable and certain the choice by Electors—and for this reason: that the people at large, or in other words, that the great States, ought to have more weight and influence in the choice. That it should be brought nearer to the popular and carried further from the federative principle. This claim we find was made at the formation of the constitution. The great States naturally wished for a popular choice of First Magistrate. This mode was sanctioned by the example of many of the States in the choice of Governor. The small States claimed a choice on the federative principle, by the Legislatures, and to vote by States; analogies and examples were not wanting to sanction this mode of election. A consideration of the weight and influence of a President of this Union, must have multiplied the difficulties of agreeing upon the mode of choice. But as I have before said, by mutual concession, they agreed upon the present mode, combining both principles and dividing between the two parties, thus mutually jealous, as they could, this important privilege of electing a Chief Magistrate.

This mode then became established, and the right of the small States to elect upon the federative principle, or by States, in case of the contingency of electoral failure of choice, cannot with reason and fairness be taken from them, without their consent, and on a full understanding of its operation; since it was meant to be secured to them by the constitution, and was one of the terms upon which they became members of the present confederacy; and for which privilege they gave an equivalent to the great States in sacrificing so much of the federative principle, or State equality.

The constitution is nicely balanced, with the federative and popular principles; the Senate are the guardians of the former, and the House of Representatives of the latter; and any attempts to destroy this balance, under whatever specious names or pretences they may be presented, should be watched with a jealous eye. Perhaps a fair definition of the constitutional powers of amending is, that you may upon experiment so modify the constitution in its practice and operation, as to give it, upon its own principles, a more complete effect. But this is an attack upon a fundamental principle established after a long deliberation, and by mutual concession, a principle of essential importance to the instrument itself, and an attempt to wrest from the small States a vested right, and by it, to increase the power and influence of the large States. I shall not pretend, sir, that the parties to this constitutional compact cannot alter its original essential principles, and that such alterations may not be effected under the name of amendment; but, let a proposal of that kind come forward in its own proper and undisguised shape; let it be fairly stated to Congress, to the[33] State Legislatures, to the people at large, that the intention is to change an important federative feature in the constitution, which change in itself and all its consequences, will tend to a consolidation of this Union into a simple republic; let it be fairly stated, that the small States have too much agency in the important article of electing a Chief Magistrate, and that the great States claim the choice; and we shall then have a fair decision. If the Senators of the small States, and if their State Legislatures, will then quietly part with the right they have, no person can reasonably complain.

Nothing can be more obvious, than the intention of the plan adopted by our constitution for choosing a President. The Electors are to nominate two persons, of whom they cannot know which will be President; this circumstance not only induces them to select both from the best men; but gives a direct advantage into the hands of the small States even in the electoral choice. For they can always select from the two candidates set up by the Electors of large States, by throwing their votes upon their favorite, and of course giving him a majority; or, if the Electors of the large States should, to prevent this effect, scatter their votes for one candidate, then the Electors of the small States would have it in their power to elect a Vice President. So that, in any event, the small States will have a considerable agency in the election. But if the discriminating or designating principle is carried, as contained in this resolution, the whole, or nearly the whole right and agency of the small States, in the electoral choice of Chief Magistrate, is destroyed, and their chance of obtaining a federative choice by States, if not destroyed, is very much diminished.

The whole power of election is now vested in the two parties; numbers and States, or, great and small States; and it is demonstration itself, if you increase the power of the one, in just such proportion you diminish that of the other. Do the gentlemen suppose that the public will, when constitutionally expressed by a majority of States, in pursuance of the federative principle of our Government, is of less validity, or less binding upon the community at large, than the public will expressed by a popular majority? The framers of your constitution, the people who adopted it, meant, that the public will, in the choice of a President, should be expressed by Electors, if they could agree, and if not, the public will should be expressed by a majority of the States, acting in their federative capacity, and that in both cases the expression of the public will should be equally binding.

It is pretended that the public will can never properly or constitutionally be expressed by a majority of numbers of the people, or of the House of Representatives. This may be a pleasing doctrine enough to great States; but it is certainly incorrect. Our constitution has given the expression of the public will, in a variety of instances, other than that of the choice of President, into very different hands from either House of Representatives or the people at large. The President and Senate, and in many cases the President alone, can express the public will, in appointments of high trust and responsibility, and it cannot be forgotten that the President sometimes expresses the public will by removals. Treaties, highly important expressions of the public will, are made by the President and Senate; and they are the supreme law of the land. In the several States, many great offices are filled, and even the Chief Magistracy, by various modes of election. The public will is sometimes expressed by pluralities instead of majorities, sometimes by both branches of the Legislatures, and sometimes by one, and in certain contingencies, elections are settled by lot. The people have adopted constitutions containing such regulations, and experience has proved that they are well calculated to preserve their liberties and promote their happiness. From what good or even pardonable motive, then, can it be urged that the present mode of electing our President has a tendency to counteract the public will? Do gentlemen intend to destroy every federal feature in this constitution? And is this resolution a precursor to a complete consolidation of the Union, and to the establishment of a simple republic?—Or will it suffice to break down every federative feature which secures to one portion of the Union, to the small States, their rights?

Mr. Taylor.—The opposition to this discriminating amendment to the constitution is condensed into a single stratagem, namely: an effort to excite the passion of jealousy in various forms. Endeavors have been made to excite geographical jealousies—a jealousy of the smaller against the larger States—a jealousy in the people against the idea of amending the constitution; and even a jealousy against individual members of this House. Sir, is this passion a good medium through which to discern truth, or is it a mirror calculated to reflect error? Will it enlighten or deceive? Is it planted in good or in evil—in moral or in vicious principles? Wherefore, then, do gentlemen endeavor to blow it up? Is it because they distrust the strength of their arguments, that they resort to this furious and erring passion? Is it because they know that

So far as these efforts have been directed towards a geographical demarcation of the interests of the Union into North and South, in order to excite a jealousy of one division against another; and, so far as they have been used to create suspicions of individuals, they have been either so feeble, inapplicable, or frivolous, as to bear but lightly upon the question, and to merit but little attention. But the attempts to array States against States because they differ in size, and to prejudice the people against the idea of[34] amending their constitution, bear a more formidable aspect, and ought to be repelled, because they are founded on principles the most mischievous and inimical to the constitution, and, could they be successful, are replete with great mischiefs.

Towards exciting this jealousy of smaller States against larger States, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Tracy) had labored to prove that the federal principle of the constitution of the United States was founded in the idea of minority invested with operative power. That, in pursuance of this principle, it was contemplated and intended that the election of a President should frequently come into the House of Representatives, and to divert it from thence by this amendment would trench upon the federal principle of our constitution, and diminish the rights of the smaller States, bestowed by this principle upon them. This was the scope of his argument to excite their jealousy, and is the amount also of several other arguments delivered by gentlemen on the same side of the question. He did not question the words, but the ideas of gentlemen. Words, selected from their comrades, are easily asserted to misrepresent opinions, as he had himself experienced during the discussion on the subject.

This idea of federalism ought to be well discussed by the smaller States, before they will suffer it to produce the intended effect—that of exciting their jealousy against the larger. To him it appeared to be evidently incorrect. Two principles sustain our constitution: one a majority of the people, the other a majority of the States; the first was necessary to preserve the liberty or sovereignty of the people; the last, to preserve the liberty or sovereignty of the States. But both are founded in the principle of majority; and the effort of the constitution is to preserve this principle in relation both to the people and the States, so that neither species of sovereignty or independence should be able to destroy the other. Many illustrations might be adduced. That of amending the constitution will suffice. Three-fourths of the States must concur in this object, because a less number or a majority of States might not contain a majority of people; therefore, the constitution is not amendable by a majority of States, lest a species of State sovereignty might, under color of amending the constitution, infringe the right of the people. On the other hand, a majority of the people residing in the large States cannot amend the constitution, lest they should diminish or destroy the sovereignty of the small States, the federal Union, or federalism itself. Hence a concurrence of the States to amend the constitution became necessary, not because federalism was founded in the idea of minority, but for a reason the very reverse of that idea—that is, to cover the will both of a majority of the people and a majority of States, so as to preserve the great element of self-government, as it regarded State sovereignty, and also as it regarded the sovereignty of the people.

For this great purpose certain political functions are assigned to be performed, under the auspices of the State or federal principle, and certain others under the popular principle. It was the intention of the constitution that these functions should be performed in conformity to its principle. If that principle is in fact a government of a minority, then these functions ought to be performed by a minority. When the federal principle is performing a function, according to this idea, a majority of the States ought to decide. And, by the same mode of reasoning, when the popular principle is performing a function, then a minority of the people ought to decide. This brings us precisely to the question of the amendment. It is the intention of the constitution that the popular principle shall operate in the election of a President and Vice President. It is also the intention of the constitution that the popular principle, in discharging the functions committed to it by the constitution, should operate by a majority and not by a minority. That the majority of the people should be driven, by an unforeseen state of parties, to the necessity of relinquishing their will in the election of one or the other of these officers, or that the principle of majority, in a function confided to the popular will, should be deprived of half its rights, and be laid under a necessity of violating its duty to preserve the other half, is not the intention of the constitution.

But the gentleman from Connecticut has leaped over all this ground, and gotten into the House of Representatives, without considering the principles of the constitution, as applicable to the election of President and Vice President by Electors, and distinguishing them from an election by the House of Representatives. And by mingling and interweaving the two modes of electing together, a considerable degree of complexity has been produced. If, however, it is admitted that in an election of a President and Vice President by Electors, the will of the electing majority ought fairly to operate, and that an election by the will of a minority would be an abuse or corruption of the principles of the constitution, then it follows that an amendment, to avoid this abuse, accords with, and is necessary to save these principles. In like manner, had an abuse crept into the same election, whenever it was to be made under the federal principle by the House of Representatives, enabling a minority of States to carry the election, it would not have violated the intention of the constitution to have corrected this abuse, also, by an amendment. For, sir, I must suppose it to have been the intention of the constitution that both the federal principle and the popular principle should operate in those functions respectively assigned to them, perfectly and not imperfectly—that is, the former by a majority of States, and the latter by a majority of the people.

Under this view of the subject, the amendment [35]ought to be considered. Then the question will be, whether it is calculated or not to cause the popular principle, applied by the constitution in the first instance, to operate perfectly, and to prevent the abuse of an election by a minority? If it is, it corresponds with the intention, diminishes nothing of the rights of the smaller States, and, of course, affords them no cause of jealousy.

Sir, it could never have been the intention of the constitution to produce a state of things by which a majority of the popular principle should be under the necessity of voting against its judgment to secure a President, and by which a minor faction should acquire a power capable of defeating the majority in the election of President, or of electing a Vice President contrary to the will of the electing principle. To permit this abuse would be a fraudulent mode of defeating the operation of the popular principle in this election, in order to transfer it to the federal principle—to disinherit the people for the sake of endowing the House of Representatives; whereas it was an accidental and not an artificial disappointment in the election of a President, against which the constitution intended to provide. A fair and not an unfair attempt to elect was previously to be made by the popular principle, before the election was to go into the House of Representatives. And if the people of all the States, both large and small, should, by an abuse of the real design of the constitution, be bubbled out of the election of executive power, by leaving to them the nominal right of an abortive effort, and transferring to the House of Representatives the substantial right of a real election, nothing will remain but to corrupt the election in that House by some of those abuses of which elections by diets are susceptible, to bestow upon executive power an aspect both formidable and inconsistent with the principles by which the constitution intended to mould it.

The great check imposed upon executive power was a popular mode of election; and the true object of jealousy, which ought to attract the attention of the people of every State, is any circumstance tending to diminish or destroy that check. It was also a primary intention of the constitution to keep executive power independent of legislative; and although a provision was made for its election by the House of Representatives in a possible case, that possible case never was intended to be converted into the active rule, so as to destroy in a degree the line of separation and independency between the executive and legislative power. The controversy is not therefore between larger and smaller States, but between the people of every State and the House of Representatives. Is it better that the people—a fair majority of the popular principle—should elect executive power; or, that a minor faction should be enabled to embarrass and defeat the judgment and will of this majority, and throw the election into the House of Representatives? This is the question. If this amendment should enable the popular principle to elect executive power, and thus keep it separate and distinct from legislation, the intention of the constitution, the interest of the people, and the principles of our policy, will be preserved; and if so, it is as I have often endeavored to prove in this debate, the interest of the smaller States themselves, that the amendment should prevail. For, sir, is an exposure of their Representatives to bribery and corruption (a thing which may possibly happen at some future day, when men lose that public virtue which now governs them) an acquisition more desirable than all those great objects best (if not exclusively) attainable by the election of executive power by the popular principle of the Federal Government, as the constitution itself meditates and prefers?

So far, then, the amendment strictly coincides with the constitution and with the interests of the people of every State in the Union. But suppose by some rare accident the election should still be sent into the House of Representatives, does not the amendment then afford cause of jealousy to the smaller States? Sir, each State has but one vote, whether it is large or small; and the President and Vice President are still to be chosen out of five persons. Such is the constitution in both respects now. To have enlarged the number of nominees, would have increased the occurrence of an election by the House of Representatives; and if, as I have endeavored to prove, it is for the interest of every State, that the election should be made by the popular principle of Government and not by that House, then it follows, that whatever would have a tendency to draw the election into that House, is against the interest of every State in the Union; and that every State in the Union is interested to avoid an enlargement of the nominees, if it would have such a tendency.

To illustrate this argument, I will repeat a position which I lately advanced, namely, that the substance of a constitution may be effectually destroyed, and yet its form may remain unaltered. England illustrates it. The Government of that country took its present form in the thirteenth century; but its aspect in substance has been extremely different at different periods, under the same form. Without taking time to mark the changes in substance which have taken place under the form of Kings, Lords, and Commons, it will suffice to cast our eyes upon the present state of that Government. What are now its chief and substantial energies? Armies, debt, executive patronage, penal laws, and corporations. These are the modern energies or substance of the English monarchy; to the ancient English monarchy they were unknown. Of the ancient, they were substantial abuses; for, whether these modern energies are good or bad, they overturned the ancient monarchy substantially, without altering its form. Under every change of Administration these abuses proceeded. The outs were clamorous for preserving the constitution, as they called it; for, though divorced from its administration,[36] the hope of getting in again caused them to maintain abuses, by which their avarice or ambition might be gratified upon the next turn of the wheel; just as in Prussia, where divorces are common, nothing is more usual than for late husbands to affect a violent passion for a former wife, if she carried off from him a good estate! And the ins, fearing the national jealousy, and the prepossession against amending the form of Government, and meeting new abuses by new remedies, brought no relief to the nation. So that under every change of men abuses proceeded.

The solution of this effect exists in the species of political craft similar to priestcraft. Mankind were anciently deprived of their religious liberty by a dissemination of a fanatical zeal for some idol; in times of ignorance, this idol was of physical structure; and when that fraud was detected, a metaphysical idol in the shape of a tenet or dogma was substituted for it, infinitely more pernicious in its effects, because infinitely more difficult of detection. The same system has been pursued by political craft. It has ever labored to excite the same species of idolatry and superstition for the same reason, namely, to conceal its own frauds and vices. Sometimes it sets up a physical, at others a metaphysical idol, as the object of vulgar superstition. Of one, the former “Grand Monarch of France;” of the other, the present “Church and State” tenet of England is an evidence. And if our constitution is to be made like the “Church and State” tenet of England, a metaphysical political idol, which it will be sacrilege to amend, even for the sake of saving both that and the national liberty; and if, like that tenet, it is to be exposed to all the means which centuries may suggest to vicious men for its substantial destruction, it is not hard to imagine that it also may become a monument of the inefficacy of unalterable forms of political law to correct avarice and ambition in the new and multifarious shapes they are for ever assuming.

It has been urged, sir, by the gentlemen in opposition, in a mode, as if they supposed we wished to conceal or deny it, that one object of this amendment is to bestow upon the majority a power to elect a Vice President. Sir, I avow it to be so. This is one object of the amendment; and the other, as to which I have heretofore expressed my sentiments, is to enable the Electors, by perfecting the election of a President, to keep it out of the House of Representatives. Are not both objects correct, if, as I have endeavored to prove, the constitution, in all cases where it refers elections to the popular principle, intended that principle to act by majorities? Did the constitution intend that any minor faction should elect a Vice President? If not, then an amendment to prevent it accords with, and is representative of, the constitution. Permit me here again to illustrate by an historical case. England, in the time of Charles the Second, was divided into two parties—Protestants and Papists—and the heir to the throne was a Papist. The Protestants, constituting the majority of the nation, passed an exclusion bill, but it was defeated, and the minor Papist faction, in the person of the Duke of York, got possession of executive power. The consequences were, domestic oppressions and rebellions, foreign wars occasionally for almost a century, and the foundation of a national debt, under which the nation has been ever since groaning, and under which the Government will finally expire.

Had the majority carried and executed the proposed exclusion of James II. from executive power, the English would have escaped all these calamities. Such precisely may be our case. I beg again that it may be understood that, in this application, I speak prospectively and not retrospectively.

But it is far from being improbable, that in place of these religious parties, political parties may arise of equal zeal and animosity. We may at some future day see our country divided into a republican party and a monarchical party. Is it wise, or according to the intention of the constitution, that a minor monarchical faction should, by any means, acquire the power of electing a Vice President, the possible successor to executive power? Ought a republican majority to stake the national liberty upon the frail life of one man? Will not a monarchical Executive overturn the system of a republican Executive? And ought the United States to shut their eyes upon this possible danger until the case shall happen, when it may be too late to open them?

Sir, let us contemplate the dreadful evils which the English nation have suffered from the cause of investing executive power in a man hostile to the national opinion, and avoid them. They suffered, because their exclusion bill was abortive. Election is our exclusion bill. Its efficacy depends upon its being exercised by a majority. It is only a minority which can render election insufficient to exclude monarchical principles from executive power. It is against minority that election is intended to operate, because minority is the author of monarchy and aristocracy.

Shall we, sir, be so injudicious as to make election destroy the principle of election by adhering to a mode of exercising it, now seen to be capable of bestowing upon a minority the choice of a Vice President? Shall we make election, invented to exclude monarchy, a handmaid for its introduction? Or shall we, if we do not see monarchy at this day assailing our republican system, conclude that it never will; although we know that this system has but two foes, of whom monarchy is one? No, sir, let us rather draw instruction from the prophetic observations of a member of the English House of Commons, whilst the bill for excluding James II. was depending, who said:

Instead of shutting the door, the English left it open; tyranny got in; and the evils produced by its expulsion, to that nation, may possibly have been equal to those which submission would have produced.

The question was called for loudly at half-past nine, and put—the yeas and nays being taken, were:

Upon the President declaring the question carried by two-thirds—

Mr. Tracy said he denied that the question was fairly decided. He took it to be the intention of the constitution, that there should be two-thirds of the whole number of Senators elected, which would make the number necessary to its passage 23.

It was moved to adjourn to Monday.

Mr. Taylor said that since it was proposed to adjourn to Monday, when he should be disqualified to sit in that House, he hoped the Senate would not rise without deciding the question definitively on the gentleman’s objections.

Mr. Tracy said he certainly would avail himself of the principle to oppose its passage through the State Legislatures.

The President declared the question had passed the Senate by the majority required, and conformable to the constitution and former usage.

The amendment, as adopted, is as follows:

Ordered, That the Secretary request the concurrence of the House of Representatives in this resolution.

Monday, December 5.

Impressment of Seamen.

The following messages were received from the President of the United States:

The Messages and papers therein respectively referred to, were read.

Ordered, That they severally lie for consideration.

Wednesday, December 7.

Aaron Burr, Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate, attended.

John Armstrong, appointed a Senator by the Executive of the State of New York, in the room of De Witt Clinton, resigned, attended.

Thursday, December 8.

The credentials of Mr. Armstrong were read, and the oath was administered to him by the Vice President as the law provides.

Monday, December 12.

Amendment of the Constitution.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the last resolution reported by the committee appointed on the 22d of October last, to consider the motion for an amendment to the constitution in the mode of electing the President and Vice President of the United States; which is as follows:

On the question to agree to this resolution, it passed in the negative—yeas 4, nays 25, as follows:

Tuesday, December 13.

Abraham B. Venable, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Virginia on the 7th instant, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the Senate.

Repeal of Bankrupt Act.

The bill, entitled, “An act to repeal an act, entitled ‘An act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States,’” was read the third time; and, on motion, that the further consideration of this bill be postponed to the second Monday in December next, it passed in the negative—yeas 13, nays, 17, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Adams, Armstrong, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Brown, Condit, Jackson, Israel Smith, Samuel Smith, Tracy, White, and Wright.

Nays.—Messrs. Anderson, Breckenridge, Butler, Cocke, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Hillhouse, Logan, Maclay, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Potter, John Smith, Venable, and Worthington.

On the question, “Shall this bill pass?” it was determined in the affirmative—yeas 17, nays 12, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Breckenridge, Butler, Cocke, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Hillhouse, Logan, Maclay, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Potter, John Smith, Venable, and Worthington.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Armstrong, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Brown, Condit, Israel Smith, Samuel Smith, Tracy, White, and Wright.

So it was Resolved, That this bill do pass.[5]

Thursday, December 15.

Classification of Senators.

On motion, the Senate proceeded to ascertain the classes in which the Senators of the State of Ohio should be inserted, as the constitution and rule heretofore adopted prescribe; and it was ordered, that two lots, No. 2 and a blank, be by the Secretary rolled up and put in the ballot box; and it was understood that the Senator who should draw the lot No. 2 should be inserted in the class of Senators whose terms of service respectively expire in four years from and after the third day of March, 1803, in order to equalize the classes.

Accordingly, Mr. Worthington drew lot No. 2, and Mr. John Smith drew the blank.

It was then agreed that two lots, Nos. 1 and[39] 3, should be by the Secretary rolled up and put into the ballot-box, and one of these be drawn by Mr. John Smith, the Senator from the State of Ohio, not classed; and it was understood that, if he should draw lot No. 1, he should be inserted in the class of Senators whose terms of service will respectively expire in two years from and after the third day of March, 1803; but, if he should draw lot No. 3, it was understood that he should be inserted in the class of Senators whose terms respectively expire in six years from and after the third day of March, 1803. Mr. John Smith drew lot No. 3, and is classed accordingly.

Friday, December 16.

Importation of Slaves.

The Senate took into consideration the motion made yesterday, that a committee be appointed to inquire whether any, and, if any, what amendments ought to be made in the act, entitled “An act to prevent the importation of certain persons into certain States, by the laws whereof their admission is prohibited,” and that the committee have leave to report by bill or otherwise; and the motion was adopted; and

Ordered, That Messrs. Franklin, Venable, and I. Smith, be this committee.

Monday, December 19.

Admissions on the Floor.

The Senate took into consideration the motion made on the 16th instant, that no person be admitted on the floor of the Senate Chamber except members of the House of Representatives, foreign ministers, and the Heads of Departments, unless introduced by a member of the Senate.

On motion, it was agreed to strike out the words “unless introduced by a member of the Senate;” and on motion, it was agreed to subjoin, after the word “Departments,” “and Judges of the Supreme and District Courts of the United States.”

On motion to insert after the word “States,” “and the ladies,” it passed in the negative—yeas 12, nays 16, as follows:

On motion to insert after the word “States,” “the Governors and Councillors of the respective States, and the Representatives of the State Legislatures,” it passed in the negative—yeas 13, nays 15, as follows:

On motion to agree to the resolution amended as follows:

It was determined in the negative—yeas 7, nays 21, as follows:

Friday, December 30.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

Mr. Breckenridge, from the committee appointed, on the 5th instant, for that purpose, reported a bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof; and the bill was read, and ordered to the second reading.

Tuesday, January 3, 1804.

Erection of Contingent Fund.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

The Message and account therein referred to were read, and ordered to lie on file.

Monday, January 16.

The Vice President communicated a letter of this date from the Hon. Theodorus Bailey, resigning his seat in the Senate; which was read, and

Ordered, That the Vice President be requested to notify the Executive of the State of New York accordingly.

Transfer of Louisiana.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

The Message and papers therein referred to were read.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof.

On motion to amend the fourth section of the bill, by inserting the following words at the end thereof:

It passed in the negative—yeas 12, nays 18, as follows:

On motion to strike out the fourth section of the bill, as follows:

It passed in the negative—yeas 12, nays 18, as follows:

Tuesday, January 17.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof; and on the question to amend the following clause of the fifth section:

“In all criminal prosecutions which are capital, the trial shall be by a jury of twelve good and lawful men of the vicinage,” by striking out the words “which are capital.”

It passed in the negative—yeas 11, nays 16, as follows:

And after progress, on motion,

Ordered, That the consideration of this bill be further postponed.

After the adjournment of the High Court of Impeachments, the Senate adjourned.

Monday, January 23.

The Vice President being absent on account of the ill state of his health, the Senate proceeded to the election of a President pro tempore,[41] as the constitution provides; and the ballots having been collected and counted, a majority thereof was for the Honorable John Brown, who was accordingly elected President of the Senate pro tempore.

Mr. Logan presented the memorial of the American Convention for promoting the abolition of slavery, and improving the condition of the African race, signed Matthew Franklin, president, praying that such laws may be enacted as shall prohibit the introduction of slaves into the Territory of Louisiana, lately ceded to the United States; and the petition was read.

Tuesday, January 24.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof; and on motion to strike out of the fourth section, from the word “annually,” line fourth, to the words “United States,” line seventh, the words, “by the Governor, from among those holding real estate therein, and who shall have resided one year, at least, in the said Territory, and hold no office of profit under the Territory or the United States,” for the purpose of inserting the words following:

On this, a division on the question was called for, and that it be taken on striking out.

Whereupon, the yeas and nays being required by one-fifth of the Senators present, on striking out, it passed in the negative—yeas 15, nays 14, as follows:

Thursday, January 26.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof; and a motion was made to amend the bill, by inserting the following as section eighth:

Whereupon, a motion was made to amend the amendment by striking out, after the words “port or place,” the words “without the limits of the United States,” and insert in lieu thereof, “for sale.”

A division of the question was called for, and that it be taken on striking out; and, on the question, Shall the words be struck out? it passed in the negative,—yeas 6, nays 22, as follows:

On motion to agree to the original amendment, it passed in the affirmative—yeas 21, nays 6, as follows:

Monday, January 30.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof; and a motion was made to amend the bill, by adding the following to the new section, adopted as section eighth:

It passed in the negative—yeas 11, nays 17, as follows:

A motion was made to amend the bill, by adding to the end of section eighth, last adopted, the following:

And a division was called for, and that the question be taken on the first proposition, ending with the words, “sue for the same:” and, on the question to agree to this first division of the amendment, it passed in the affirmative—yeas 21, nays 7, as follows:

A motion was made to strike out all that follows the word “and,” in the second division of the amendment, for the purpose of a further amendment; and after debate, the consideration of the subject was postponed.

Tuesday, January 31.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof; and a motion was made to strike out the last division of the amendment proposed yesterday, to wit:

And a division on the question was called for, and that it be taken on striking out; and, on the question, Shall the words be stricken out? it passed in the negative—yeas 13, nays 15, as follows:

Wednesday, February 1.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof; and on motion, to agree to the last division of the amendment proposed on the 30th ultimo, amended as follows:

It passed in the affirmative—yeas 18, nays 11, as follows:

[43]

Yeas.—Messrs. Armstrong, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Franklin, Hillhouse, Logan, Maclay, Olcott, Plumer, Potter, S. Smith, Wells, White, Worthington, and Wright.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Baldwin, Dayton, Ellery, Jackson, Nicholas, Pickering, J. Smith, Stone, and Venable.

Thursday, February 2.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and making provision for the temporary government thereof; and on motion to strike out the eighth section of the original bill, amended as follows:

It passed in the affirmative—yeas 16, nays 9, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Armstrong, Breckenridge, Cocke, Condit, Franklin, Hillhouse, Maclay, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, J. Smith, Stone, Venable, and Worthington.

Nays.—Messrs. Baldwin, Brown, Dayton, Ellery, Jackson, Nicholas, Potter, S. Smith, and Wright.

Tuesday, February 7.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and making provision for the temporary government thereof, and agreed to sundry amendments; and on motion to agree to a further amendment, as follows:

A motion was made to strike out from the beginning, to the words “and they,” inclusive, for the purpose of inserting, “persons to serve as grand and petit jurors in the courts of the said Territory.”

A division of the question was called for, and that it first be taken on striking out; and on the question, Shall these words be struck out? it was passed in the negative—yeas 10, nays 18, as follows:

On the question to agree to the original motion, it passed in the affirmative—yeas 21, nays 7, as follows:

Friday, February 17.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the third reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and making provision for the temporary government thereof; and on motion to amend the bill, by striking out of section 10th, the words:

It passed in the negative—yeas 9, nays 19, as follows:

On motion to expunge from the same section, after the word “slaves,” the words “and every slave imported or brought into said Territory, contrary to the provisions of this act, shall thereupon be entitled to and receive his or her freedom:”

It passed in the negative—yeas 11, nays 17, as follows:

[44]

On motion to insert, in the same section, line 3d, after the word “States,” the words “or from any State authorizing the importation of slaves from any foreign port or place:”

It passed in the negative—yeas 8, nays 13, as follows:

And having further amended the bill, and filled the blanks, it was agreed that the question on its final passage be postponed until to-morrow.

Saturday, February 18.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the third reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and making provision for the temporary government thereof; and on the question to agree to the final passage of this bill, it was determined in the affirmative—yeas 20, nays 5, as follows:

So it was Resolved, That this bill pass, that it be engrossed, and that the title thereof be “An act erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and making provision for the temporary government thereof.”[6]

Thursday, February 23.

John Smith, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of New York, in the room of De Witt Clinton, took his seat in the Senate, and his credentials were read, and the oath prescribed by law was administered to him by the President.

Friday, February 24.

Agreeably to the resolution of yesterday, the Senate proceeded to elect a doorkeeper, or assistant to James Mathers, Sergeant-at-Arms; and Henry Timms was appointed.

Saturday, February 25.

John Armstrong, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of New York, in the room of Theodorus Bailey, took his seat in the Senate, and his credentials were read, and the oath prescribed by law was administered to him by the President.

Saturday, March 10.

Election of President of the Senate, pro tem.

The Vice President being absent, the Senate proceeded to the election of a President pro tempore, as the constitution prescribes, and the ballots having been collected and counted, a majority thereof was for the Honorable Jesse Franklin, who was accordingly elected President of the Senate pro tempore.

Ordered, That the Secretary wait on the President of the United States, and acquaint him that the Senate have, in the absence of the Vice President, elected the honorable Jesse Franklin President of the Senate pro tempore.

[45]

Ordered, That the Secretary make a like communication to the House of Representatives.

Tuesday, March 13.

Impeachment of Judge Chase.

A message from the House of Representatives, by Messrs. J. Randolph and Early, two of their members, was received, as follows:

“Mr. President: We are ordered, in the name of the House of Representatives and of all the People of the United States, to impeach Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors; and to acquaint the Senate that the House of Representatives will, in due time, exhibit particular articles of impeachment against him, and make good the same.

“We are also ordered to demand that the Senate take order for the appearance of the said Samuel Chase, to answer to the said impeachment.”

Turnpike Road to the Ohio.

The Senate took into consideration the amendment reported by the committee to the bill, entitled “An act authorizing the appointment of Commissioners to explore the routes most eligible for opening certain public roads;” and on the question to agree to the said amendment, as follows:

Strike out, in the first section, after the word “proceed,” in the fourth line, to the word “and,” in the seventh line, and insert, “to explore and designate the most eligible route for a turnpike road, to lead from Fort Cumberland, on the Potomac, to Wheeling, on the Ohio.”

It passed in the negative—yeas 13, nays 15, as follows:

Ordered, That the bill be recommitted, and that Messrs. Nicholas, Worthington, and Dayton be the committee further to consider and report thereon to the Senate.

Wednesday, March 14.

Impeachment of Judge Chase.

Mr. Baldwin, from the committee to whom yesterday was referred the message from the House of Representatives relative to the impeachment of Samuel Chase, made report; which was read and adopted, as follows:

Monday, March 19.

Post Roads in States.

The Senate resumed the third reading of the bill, entitled “An act to alter and establish certain post roads.”

On motion, to add the following after section third:

It passed in the affirmative—yeas 17, nays 10, as follows:

And, sundry other amendments having been agreed to,

Resolved, That this bill do pass as amended.

Seat of Government.

The bill for the temporary removal of the seat of Government of the United States to the city of Baltimore was taken up for its second reading.

[The debate which took place on this occasion, had progressed to some length before the reporter entered the House. Mr. Wright was then on the floor, and had made a motion to postpone the further consideration of the bill until the first Monday in May.]

Mr. W. assigned as reasons for this motion, that it was not his intention in presenting the bill, that it should pass; but that it had been offered with the view of acting as a spur to the inhabitants of Washington to effect a more complete accommodation of Congress. He trusted and believed it would have that effect; and the operation of the postponement would, by hanging the bill over their heads, most powerfully tend to produce the desirable result of a concentration of the city, and an augmentation of accommodation.

Mr. Jackson followed, and, in terms of appropriate[46] energy, condemned the proposition of removal. He said he should not have believed, but for the express declaration of the gentleman from Maryland, that he would have brought forward a bill the sole object of which was to frighten the women and children of Washington. So far from the measure having the desired effect avowed by the gentleman, if it had any effect whatever, it would be to shake all confidence in the Government, to repress the very accommodation desired.

Mr. J. denied the moral right of Congress to remove the seat of Government; it had been fixed under the constitution, and without its violation could not be changed.

Such a measure would indicate a prostration of plighted faith; would destroy all confidence in the Government, from one end of the continent to the other.

Gentlemen, in favor of this measure, should know its cost. Already had the present seat of Government, in its origination and consequences, cost the nation the assumption of the State debts to the amount of twenty-one millions, and between one and two millions for public accommodation. Would gentlemen be willing not only to lose all that had been expended, but likewise to indemnify the proprietors in the city, whose assessed property amounted to two and a half millions of dollars, and the proprietors of property in the whole District, the amount of which he was unable to state?

Mr. J. concluded by saying, he should vote against the postponement, under the expectation that the Senate would take up the bill and reject it by a majority so great, that no similar proposition should ever again be brought before them.

Mr. Anderson declared himself hostile to the postponement, as he was in favor of the passage of the bill, under certain modifications. He considered Congress possessed the constitutional power of altering the seat of Government; and he believed, from an experience of the inconveniences attending the existing seat, it was their duty to change it. He allowed that, in such an event, an obligation would arise to indemnify the proprietors for the losses they would thereby sustain. This, however, he considered the lesser evil; as the sum required to make an indemnity would be less than that required for the improvements contemplated, and which are necessary to accommodate the Government.

Mr. Cocke declared himself decidedly inimical to the bill. The permanent seat of Government was fixed under the constitution, and the power did not belong to Congress to alter it.

Mr. Adams strenuously contended against the right of Congress to remove the seat of Government. To do so, would be to prostrate the national faith, and to shake the confidence of the nation in the Government. He considered the proposed measure as inexpedient as it was unconstitutional; as it tended directly to defeat the object of the mover.

Mr. S. Smith said, he should vote in favor of the postponement, because he believed, if the bill were not postponed, it would consume more time than could, at this late period of the session, be spared, without a serious neglect of important business before Congress. He expressed his regret at its introduction.

The question was then taken on the motion of postponement, and decided in the negative—yeas 3, nays 24, as follows:

The bill was then read a second time.

Mr. Dayton said, he had been instructed by the Legislature of New Jersey, in case any prospect presented itself of a removal of the seat of Government, to offer, in their name, the public buildings in Trenton for their accommodation. He, therefore, gave notice that, in case the bill went to a third reading, he should produce his instructions, and move the substitution of Trenton in the room of Baltimore. At the same time, he was free to declare his opinion of the impolicy of the proposed measure. The provision of the constitution had arisen from an experience of the necessity of establishing a permanent seat for the Government. To avert the evils arising from a perpetual state of mutation, and from the agitation of the public mind whenever it is discussed, the constitution had wisely provided for the establishment of a permanent seat, vesting in Congress exclusive legislation over it. While he declared this as his creed, he begged it to be understood that there were, in his opinion, some rightful grounds of removal. There were four such, two of which were the following: if the place should be found a grave-yard for those who resided in it, or if the inconveniences of conducting the machine of government should be so great as to prevent the due transaction of the public business. For the existence of these, no fault could be attached to the District. If, therefore, a removal took place on their account, Congress were bound to indemnify the proprietors. There were two other grounds of removal, which would justify a removal without indemnity, as they would be the effect of the misconduct of the inhabitants of the District. These were, the evidence of a turbulent spirit, endangering the safety of Congress, and of a determined resolution, arising from a dissatisfaction which the Government or Congress expressed in favor of a recession.

When he stated these grounds for removal, Mr. D. said, it was not from any apprehension of their occurrence. On the contrary, he believed the Government in perfect safety, and he was convinced, if any hostile arm should be raised against it, the inhabitants of Columbia would be ready to shed their blood in its defence.

[47]

Nothing could exceed his surprise at the motives expressed by the gentleman from Maryland for bringing forward this measure. He should have expected, if the gentleman wished to promote the interests of the city, he would have imitated the example of the Athenians, who, in order to make a particular fund devoted to theatrical exhibitions sacred, had passed a law punishing with death any man who should move to divert it from its allotted purpose; and that the honorable gentleman, instead of bringing forward this bill, would have introduced one punishing with death the man who should move a change of the seat of Government; so that he who made the attempt might know that he did it with a halter around his neck.

Mr. Maclay moved to strike out the words “Baltimore,” and “Maryland,” in the first section.

Motion agreed to—ayes 14, noes 10.

Mr. M. then observed, that he would concisely state the ideas which influenced him on this subject. For the existing inconveniences of this place, and the want of accommodation to which Congress was exposed, he did not consider the inhabitants of Washington in the least to blame. The causes from which these flowed, it was not in their power to control. They arose, in a great measure, from the city being surrounded by seats of trade, which naturally repressed its rise here. Those inconveniences were, he believed, of a nature not to be cured by time, and, if there was no constitutional obstacle, it would be the best policy to remove immediately. He contended that no constitutional obstacle did exist. On the contrary, he was of opinion that it was the duty of the Legislature, in case the public good required it, to remove the seat of Government. He believed that this place would not long remain the seat. The members of the Government will become tired of remaining here, when they are convinced that the inconveniences which they experience will not promote the advantage even of their posterity. The single question then is, whether less inconvenience will be produced by an immediate or a protracted removal. He was clearly of opinion that the inconvenience of removing, at this time, would be less than at a future day. He concluded by saying, that he should not, himself, have brought forward this measure at the present time. He would have waited for more conclusive proofs of the insuperable inconveniences attending a residence at this place, when opinions, at present variant, would be more united.

Mr. Jackson said, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Maclay) had picked a hole in the bill, and what effect it would produce, he could not pretend to say. If the word “Baltimore” had been suffered to remain, it would have been rejected by a large majority.

Mr. J. then went at some length into a view of the unconstitutionality of a removal, and the happy situation of Washington for the seat of the Government. He said that he was far from being friendly, in the first instance, to this measure, which might be called the hobby-horse of, perhaps, the most illustrious man that ever lived. But, once adopted, it became sacred in his eyes; and nothing short of an act of God, in the shape of an earthquake, a plague, or some other fatal scourge, would justify a removal; and, he trusted, that unless some such act occurred, this would be the last time the measure was proposed.

The time would come, though he hoped to God neither his children nor his children’s children would live to see it, when the population on this side of the Mississippi would pass that river, and when the seat of Government would be translated to its banks. Centuries would, however, elapse before that period arrived.

Mr. Anderson said, there was no such word in the constitution as “permanent,” applied to the seat of Government; nor did the constitution prohibit the removal of it when the public interest should require it. Believing that such would be the experience of the inconveniences of the place, that Congress would certainly remove within five years, he was for taking that step now. The ill accommodation of the place was manifest to every man; nor did he believe that time would cure the evil. Such losses, however, as should be sustained by the proprietors, he was ready to remunerate. This was the least expensive course which could be pursued, as to make the necessary improvements in this place will require at least the annual sum of fifty thousand dollars for twenty years to come, and at least thirty thousand dollars a year to keep the public buildings in a state of repair. In addition to this immense expense was to be added, the great loss of time which arose from the inconvenient arrangements of the place, and the consequent expenditure of public money. For these reasons, Mr. A. said, he should give a decided vote in favor of the bill.

Mr. Jackson remarked, that the gentleman from Tennessee ought, in forming his opinion of the constitutionality of removing the seat of Government, to attend as well to the laws passed by Congress on the subject, as to the provisions of the constitution itself. [Mr. J. here read the article of the constitution on the subject.] He said that, according to the rigid construction of this provision, it excluded altogether a temporary seat, after this part of the constitution was carried into effect. Under this constitutional provision, Congress passed an act on the 6th of July, 1790, not more than a year and a half after the first meeting of the Legislature, and when many of the members of that body had been members of the convention, and might, therefore, be presumed to be the best acquainted with the true meaning of the constitution. This act fixed a temporary and a permanent seat of Government. [Mr. J. read it.] He then asked, can any thing be more clear and explicit? Does it not show, in terms of unequivocal meaning, that it was the opinion of the men best qualified[48] to decide, that the seat of Government, once fixed under the provision of the constitution, must be permanent? It was not then imagined that the Government ought to be travelling about from post to pillar, according to the prevalence of this or that party or faction. All the ideas of that day were hostile to this wheelbarrow kind of Government.

Mr. Wright contended that, while the constitution had sacredly and irrevocably fixed the permanent seat of Government in this place, Congress might make some other place the temporary seat.

Mr. Anderson said, that all that the law passed by Congress proved was, that Congress, and not the constitution, had declared this place the permanent seat. This law, like other laws, was subject to repeal.

Mr. Adams wished, on this subject, to be explicit. He asked what was the meaning of the article of the constitution on this point, and all the laws of Congress passed under it? From the formation of the constitution until the removal of the Government to this place, but one sentiment had existed, which was, that the seat of the Government once fixed under the constitution, became the permanent seat. As to the idea of the gentleman from Maryland, who says this is the permanent seat while Congress are going from one place to another, he could not understand it. The constitution says, the place fixed on by Congress, on the cession of jurisdiction by the States, shall be the seat of Government. The idea of a temporary seat implies, necessarily, two seats of Government. But the expression in the constitution is “seat,” and that implies only one seat. The reason of this provision of the constitution is obvious. As the gentleman from Georgia has very justly observed, the Government had been driven from post to pillar. The question, what place should be the seat of Government, had never presented itself without enkindling violent feelings; and it was supposed that the question would continue to distract our public councils, until some permanent seat of Government was fixed. To carry this into effect, the constitution interposed, and said, ten miles square shall be given to Congress, where their power shall be sovereign, and that shall be the seat of Government. Why give this exclusive legislation, if their residence is not to be permanent? Would it not be the acme of the ridiculous, for Congress to go to Philadelphia, and still continue to exercise exclusive legislation here? Let us now turn to the acts of Congress, and the proceedings had under them. [Mr. A. here read the act of Congress fixing the seat of Government.] It will appear that it was the intention of Congress that this should be the permanent seat of the Government, from the public buildings erected. Thus much as to the understanding of the Government. Now, as to the meaning of Maryland and Virginia, who gave up the territory, and also gave considerable sums of money for its improvement. Could this have possibly been done under the contemplation that Congress would come here, and, after staying three or four years, run off to different quarters of the Union?

Now then, after this uniform opinion, entertained by Congress, by the States of Maryland and Virginia, and by every man who has expressed an opinion on the subject, until within a few years past, are we to be told that it is possible to give a different construction to the constitution? If any thing can fix a meaning to words, every thing which has occurred to this day, unites to decide this the permanent seat of the Government. These, said Mr. A., are my ideas. On the ground of expediency, if it were admitted as applicable to the present question, I would not undertake to say whether this is the most proper place for the residence of the Government. Nor will I say that Congress could not, consistently, remove in consequence of an act of God; that implies force, to which all human institutions must give way. But, say gentlemen, if we remove, we must indemnify the proprietors. But why indemnify if the constitution does not make this the permanent seat of Government, as it has been understood to be by every body until this day? Where is the propriety of indemnifying the holders of property here, if this is not the permanent seat, more than proprietors in Philadelphia or New York, where Congress formerly met? This very argument, urged by the advocates of the bill, shows that the constitution has made this the permanent seat. As to the idea of some gentlemen, of granting millions for an indemnity, the thing is impossible; it cannot be done; the people will not suffer it.

Mr. Dayton replied to some of the remarks made in the course of the debate, principally for the purpose of explaining his previous observations.

When the question was taken, on ordering the bill to a third reading, and passed in the negative—yeas 9, nays 19, as follows:

So the bill was lost.

Tuesday, March 20.

Wreck and Capture of the Frigate Philadelphia.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

The Message and papers therein referred to were read, and ordered to lie for consideration.

Tuesday, March 27.

Adjournment.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that the House, having finished the business before them, are about to adjourn to the first Monday in November next.

The President then adjourned the Senate to the first Monday in November next.

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EIGHTH CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION.
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES.

New Hampshire.—Silas Betton, Clifton Claggett, David Hough, Samuel Hunt, Samuel Tenney.

Vermont.—William Chamberlain, M. Chittenden, James Elliot, Gideon Olin.

Massachusetts.—Phanuel Bishop, Jacob Crowninshield, Manasseh Cutler, Richard Cutts, Thomas Dwight, William Eustis, Seth Hastings, Simeon Larned, Silas Lee, Nahum Mitchell, Eben. Seaver, Tompson J. Skinner, William Stedman, Samuel Taggart, Samuel Thatcher, Joseph B. Varnum, P. Wadsworth, Lemuel Williams.

Rhode Island.—Nehemiah Knight, Joseph Stanton.

Connecticut.—Simeon Baldwin, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, Calvin Goddard, Roger Griswold, John C. Smith, Benjamin Tallmadge.

New York.—George Clinton, George Griswold, Josiah Hasbrouck, H. W. Livingston, Andrew McCord, Samuel L. Mitchill, Beriah Palmer, John Patterson, Oliver Phelps, Samuel Riker, Erastus Root, Peter Sailly, Thomas Sammons, Joshua Sands, David Thomas, George Tibbits, Philip Van Cortlandt, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Daniel C. Verplanck.

New Jersey.—Adam Boyd, Ebenezer Elmer, William Helms, James Mott, James Sloan, Henry Southard.

Pennsylvania.—Isaac Anderson, David Bard, Robt. Brown, Thomas Bonde, Joseph Clay, Frederick Conrad, Wm. Findlay, Andrew Gregg, John A. Hanna, Joseph Heister, John Hoge, Michael Leib, John B. Lucas, Jno. Rea, Jacob Richards, John Smilie, John Stewart, Isaac Van Horne, John Whitehill.

Delaware.—Cæsar A. Rodney.

Maryland.—John Archer, Walter Bowie, John Campbell, John Dennis, William McCreery, Nicholas E. Moore, Joseph H. Nicholson, Thomas Plater.

Virginia.—Thomas Claiborne, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, John Dawson, John W. Eppes, Edwin Gray, Thomas Griffin, David Holmes, John Geo. Jackson, Walter Jones, Joseph Lewis, Andrew Moore, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, John Randolph, Thomas M. Randolph, John Smith, James Stephenson, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, Alexander Wilson.

North Carolina.—N. Alexander, Willis Alston, jr., Wm. S. Blackledge, James Gillespie, James Holland, William Kennedy, Nathaniel Macon, Samuel D. Purviance, Richard Stanford, Marmaduke Williams, Joseph Winston, Thomas Wynns.

South Carolina.—William Butler, Levi Casey, John B. Earle, Wade Hampton, Benjamin Huger, Thomas Lowndes, Thomas Moore, Richard Wynn.

Georgia.—Joseph Bryan, Peter Early, Samuel Hammond, Daniel Meriwether.

Mississippi.—William Lattimore.

Tennessee.—G. W. Campbell, Wm. Dickson, John Rhea.

Kentucky.—Geo. M. Bedinger, John Boyle, John Fowler, Matthew Lyon, Thomas Sanford, Matthew Walton.

Ohio.—Jeremiah Morrow.

Monday, October 17, 1803.

This being the day appointed by a Proclamation of the President of the United States, of the sixteenth of July last, for the meeting of Congress, the following members of the House of Representatives appeared, produced their credentials, and took their seats, to wit:

And a quorum, consisting of a majority of the whole number, being present, the House proceeded, by ballot, to the choice of a Speaker; and upon examining the ballots, a majority of the votes of the whole House was found to be in favor of Nathaniel Macon, one of the Representatives from the State of North Carolina: Whereupon, Mr. Macon was conducted to the chair, from whence he made his acknowledgments to the House, as follows:

The House proceeded, in the same manner, to the appointment of a Clerk; and upon examining the ballots, a majority of the votes of the whole House was found in favor of John Beckley.

The oath to support the Constitution of the United States, as prescribed by the act entitled “An act to regulate the time and manner of administering certain oaths,” was administered by Mr. Nicholson, one of the Representatives from the State of Maryland, to the Speaker; and then the same oath or affirmation was administered by Mr. Speaker to all the members present.

William Lattimore having also appeared, as the Delegate from the Mississippi Territory, the said oath was administered to him by the Speaker.

The same oath, together with the oath of office prescribed by the said recited act, was also administered by Mr. Speaker to the Clerk.

Ordered, That a message be sent to the Senate, to inform them that a quorum of this House is assembled, and have elected Nathaniel Macon, one of the Representatives for North Carolina, their Speaker; and that the Clerk of this House do go with the said message.

A message from the Senate informed the House that a quorum of the Senate is assembled, and ready to proceed to business; and that, in the absence of the Vice President of the United States, the Senate have elected the Honorable John Brown their President, pro tempore.

Resolved, That Mr. J. Randolph, jun., Mr. R. Griswold, and Mr. Nicholson, be appointed a committee on the part of this House, jointly, with such committee as may be appointed on the part of the Senate, to wait on the President of the United States, and inform him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled, and ready to receive any communications he may be pleased to make to them.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have appointed a committee on their part, jointly, with the committee appointed on the part of this House, to wait on the President of the United States, and inform him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled, and ready to receive any communications he may be pleased to make to them.

Resolved, That unless otherwise ordered, the daily hour to which the House shall stand adjourned, during the present session, be eleven o’clock in the forenoon.

Mr. John Randolph, Jr., from the joint committee appointed to wait on the President of the United States, and notify him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled, and ready to receive any communication he may be pleased to make to them, reported that the committee had performed that service, and that the President had signified to them that he would make a communication to this House, to-day, in writing.

A communication was received from the President of the United States to the two Houses of Congress. The said communication was read, and referred to the committee of the whole House on the state of the Union. [See Senate proceedings of this date, for the Message, ante page 4.]

Tuesday, October 18.

Several other members, to wit: from Pennsylvania, John B. C. Lucas; from Maryland, Daniel Heister; from Virginia, John Clopton, and John Trigg; from North Carolina, Samuel D. Purviance; and from Georgia, David Meriwether, appeared, produced their credentials, were qualified, and took their seats in the House;

President’s Message.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union; and, after some time spent therein, the Committee rose and reported the following resolutions:

The House proceeded to consider the said resolutions, and the same being again read, were agreed to by the House.

Ordered, That Mr. John Randolph, jr., Mr.[52] Nicholas R. Moore, Mr. Gaylord Griswold, Mr. Crowninshield, Mr. Blackledge, Mr. Rodney, and Mr. John Rhea, of Tennessee, be appointed a committee pursuant to the first resolution.

Wednesday, October 19.

Another member, to wit, Peter Early, from Georgia, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Mourning for Samuel Adams.

Mr. J. Randolph observed that it had lately been announced to the public that one of the earliest patriots of the Revolution had paid his last debt to nature. He had hoped that some other gentleman, better qualified for the task, would have undertaken to call the attention of the House to this interesting event. It could not, indeed, be a matter of deep regret that one of the first statesmen of our country has descended to the grave full of years and full of honors; that his character and fame were put beyond the reach of that time and chance to which every thing mortal is exposed; but it became the House to cherish a sentiment of veneration for such men—since such men are rare—and to keep alive the spirit to which they owed the constitution under which they were then deliberating. This great man, the associate of Hancock, shared with him the honor of being proscribed by a flagitious ministry, whose object was to triumph over the liberties of their country, by trampling on those of her colonies. With his great compatriot he made an early and decided stand against British encroachment, whilst souls more timid were trembling and irresolute. It is the glorious privilege of minds of this stamp to give an impulse to a people and fix the destiny of nations.

Mr. R. said, that he felt himself every way unequal to the attempt of doing justice to the merits of their departed countryman. Called upon by the occasion to say something, he could not have said less. He would not, by any poor eulogium of his, enfeeble the sentiment which pervaded the House, but content himself with moving the following resolution:

Mr. Elliott spoke as follows:

Mr. Speaker: If any apology could be necessary for a new member, unversed in Parliamentary proceedings, to offer for rising so early in the session, it would be, that the topic which arrests his attention is connected with the illustrious and ever memorable name of Samuel Adams. The eloquence of the gentleman from Virginia I shall not attempt to rival; his remarks were peculiarly impressive, and the more so from his remarking that he was unable to do justice to the subject. I have been extremely affected by his calling the attention of the House to the circumstance that the name of that patriot was united with that of John Hancock, in an exemption from the general pardon which the British Government offered to those American revolutionists, whom they dared to style rebels. The longer I should address the House upon this subject, the more feeble would be my language, as the greater would be my sensibility. I shall, therefore, only further observe, that I shall most cordially support the motion of the gentleman from Virginia.

The question was then taken up on Mr. Randolph’s motion: which was agreed to unanimously.

Mr. Nicholson observed that, on occasions like the present, it had been usual for the House to adjourn. He, therefore, moved an adjournment; which was carried.

Thursday, October 20.

Several other members, to wit: from Massachusetts, Samuel Thatcher; from New York, John Smith; and from Maryland, John Archer, appeared, produced their credentials, were qualified, and took their seats in the House.

The House then proceeded, by ballot, to the appointment of a Chaplain to Congress, on the part of this House; and, upon examining the ballots, a majority of the votes of the whole House was found in favor of the Rev. William Parkinson.

Friday, October 21.

Two other members, to wit: from New York, John Patterson and Erastus Root, appeared, produced their credentials, and took their seats in the House.

Resolved, That the resolution of the tenth of December, one thousand eight hundred and one, authorizing Thomas Claxton to employ an additional assistant, two servants, and two horses, be, and the same is hereby, continued in force during this and the next session: and that the said Thomas Claxton be allowed a further sum of one dollar and twenty-five cents, to be paid in like manner, to enable him to increase the number of his attendants.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have appointed the Rev. Dr. Gantt, a Chaplain to Congress, on their part.

Saturday, October 22.

Appropriation for the Louisiana Treaty.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

Mr. Huger hoped the reading of the treaty and conventions would be dispensed with, and that they would be printed for the use of the members.

Mr. Randolph hoped they would be read.

The reading of course was proceeded with, which being finished,

Mr. Randolph moved a reference of the Message, and of the documents accompanying it, to the whole House on Monday; which motion was agreed to without a division.

Mr. Randolph begged leave to submit a resolution, arising out of the Message, which he hoped would be considered at that time, for the purpose of referring it to the same committee to whom had been just referred the Message:

Referred to the same committee, without a division.

Monday, October 24.

The Louisiana Treaty.

Mr. Griswold moved the following resolution:

Mr. Griswold said that, by adverting to the Message of the President respecting the treaty and conventions lately concluded between the United States and the French Government, he found that the President, speaking on the subject, observes: “As permanent arrangements for this object require time and deliberation, it is for your consideration whether you will not forthwith make such temporary provisions for the preservation, in the meanwhile, of order and tranquillity in the country, as the case may require.” He recommends to the immediate attention of Congress the passage of some temporary laws. This being the case, and the subject being about to be brought before the House, it became important that they should know distinctly what they had obtained by the treaty; and whether there were any territory belonging to the United States to take possession of, or any new subjects to govern. Inasmuch as if no new territory or subjects were acquired, it was perfectly idle to pass even temporary laws for the occupation of the one, or the government of the other.

In the treaty lately concluded with France, the treaty between France and Spain is referred to; only a part of it is copied. The treaty referred to must be a public treaty. In the nature of things it must be the title-deed for the province of Louisiana. The Government must have a copy of it. As there is but a part recited, it is evidently imperfect. It becomes therefore necessary to be furnished with the whole, in order to ascertain the conditions relative to the Duke of Parma; it also becomes necessary to get the deed of cession; for the promise to cede is no cession. This deed of cession, Mr. G. also presumed, was in the possession of Government. It was also important to know under what circumstances Louisiana is to be taken possession of, and whether with the consent of Spain, as she is still possessed of it. If it is to be taken possession of with her consent, the possession will be peaceable and one kind of provision will be necessary; but if it is to be taken possession of in opposition to Spain, a different provision may be necessary. From these considerations he thought it proper in the House to call upon the Executive for information on this point. Other important documents may, perhaps, likewise be in the hands of the President.

Mr. Randolph hoped the resolution would not be agreed to. He was well apprized of the aspect which it was in the power of ingenuity to give to a refusal, on the part of that House, to require any information which gentlemen might think fit to demand of the Executive, however remotely connected with subjects before them. But the dread of imputations which he knew to be groundless should never induce him to swerve from that line of conduct which his most sober judgment approved. Did he indeed conceive that the nation, or the House, entertained[54] a doubt of our having acquired new territory and people to govern; could he for a moment believe that even a minority, respectable as to numbers, required any other evidence of this fact than the extract from the treaty which had just been read, he would readily concur with the gentleman from Connecticut in asking of the Executive, whether indeed we had a new accession of territory and of citizens, or, as that gentleman had been pleased to express himself, subjects to govern. He hoped the gentleman would excuse a small variation from his own phraseology, since, notwithstanding the predilection which some Governments and some gentlemen manifested for this form, Mr. R. asked for himself the use of such as were more familiar to American ears and American constitutions.

The Executive has laid before this House an instrument, which he tells us has been duly ratified, conveying to the United States the country known under the appellation of Louisiana. The first article affirms the right of France, to the sovereignty of this territory, to be derived under the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, which it quotes. The third article makes provision for the future government, by the United States, of its inhabitants; and the fourth provides the manner in which this territory and these inhabitants are to be transferred by France to us. There has been negotiated a convention, between us and the French Republic, stating, in the most unequivocal terms, that there does exist on her part a right to the country in question, which is supported by the strongest possible evidence, and pledging herself to put us in possession of that right, so soon as we shall have performed those stipulations, on our part, in consideration of which France has conveyed to us her sovereignty over this country and people. From the nature of our Government, these stipulations can only be fulfilled by laws to the passing of which the Legislature alone is competent. And when these laws are about to be passed, endeavors are made to impede, or frustrate, the measure, by setting on foot inquiries which mean nothing, or are unconnected with the subject, and this is done by those who have always contended that there was no discretion vested in this House by the constitution, as to carrying treaties into effect. If, sir, gentlemen believe that we must eventually do that which rests with us, towards effecting this object, to what purpose is this inquiry? Mr. R. begged the House not to impute to him any disposition to countenance this monstrous doctrine, whose advocates now found it so difficult to practise. On the contrary, he held in the highest veneration the principle established in the case of the British Treaty, and the men by whom it was established, that, in all matters requiring legislative aid, it was the right and duty of this House to deliberate, and upon such deliberation, to afford, or refuse, that aid, as in their judgments the public good might require. And he held it to be equally the right of the House to demand such information from the Executive, as to them appeared necessary to enable them to form a sound conclusion on subjects submitted, by that department, to their consideration. But those who then contended that this House possessed no discretion on the subject, that they were bound implicitly to conform to the stipulations, however odious and extravagant, into which the treaty-making power might have plunged the nation—those who then said that we cannot deliberate, are now instituting inquiries to serve as the basis of deliberation—(for if we are not to deliberate upon the result, why institute any inquiry at all?)—inquiries, which are in their very nature deliberation itself. But whilst he arraigned the consistency of other gentlemen, Mr. R. said that it behoved him to assert his own. Information on subjects of the nature of that which they were then discussing, might be required for two objects: to enable the House to determine whether it were expedient to approve a measure which on the face of it carried proof of its impolicy; or to punish ministers who may have departed from their instructions—who may have betrayed the interest confided by the nation to their care.

To illustrate this remark, let us advert to the case of the Treaty of London, generally known as Mr. Jay’s treaty. That instrument had excited the public abhorrence. The objections to carrying it into effect were believed insuperable. This sentiment pervaded the House of Representatives, and when they demanded information from the Executive, they virtually held this language: “Sir, we detest your treaty—we feel an almost invincible repugnance to giving it our sanction—but if, by the exhibition of any information in possession of the Executive, we can be convinced that the interests of the United States have been supported to the utmost extent;—that, wretched as this instrument is, the terms are as good as were attainable; and that, bad as those terms are, it is politic under existing circumstances to accept them, we will, however reluctantly, pass the laws for carrying it into effect. The present case, if he understood any thing of the general sentiment, was, happily, of a different nature. The treaty which they were then called upon to sanction, had been hailed by the acclamations of the nation. It was not difficult to foresee, from the opinions manifested in every quarter, that it would receive the cordial approbation of a triumphant majority of that House. If such be the general opinion—if we are not barely satisfied with the terms of this treaty, but lost in astonishment at the all-important benefits which we have so cheaply acquired, to what purpose do we ask information respecting the detail of the negotiation? Has any one ventured to hint disapprobation of the conduct of the ministers who have effected this negotiation? Has any one insinuated that our interests have been betrayed? If, then, we are satisfied as to the terms of this[55] treaty, and with the conduct of our ministers abroad, let us pass the laws necessary for carrying it into effect. To refuse—to delay, upon the plea now offered, is to jeopardize the best interests of the Union. Shall we take exception to our own title? Shall we refuse the offered possession? Shall this refusal proceed from those who so lately affirmed that we ought to pursue this very object at every national hazard? I should rather suppose the eagerness of gentlemen would be ready to outstrip the forms of law in making themselves masters of this country, than that, now, when it is offered to our grasp, they should display an unwillingness, or at least an indifference, for that which so lately was all-important to them. After the message which the President has sent us, to demand, if indeed we have acquired any new subjects, as the gentleman expresses it, which renders the exercise of our legislative functions necessary, would be nothing less than a mockery of him, of this solemn business, and of ourselves. Cautionary provisions may be introduced into the laws for securing us against every hazard, although, from the nature of our stipulations, we are exposed to none. We retain in our own hands the consideration money, even after we have possession.”

Mr. R. expressed himself averse to demand the Spanish correspondence. The reasons must be obvious to all. The possession of Louisiana by us, will necessarily give rise to negotiations between the United States and Spain, relative to its boundaries. These have probably commenced, and are now pending. He hoped, therefore, the House would go into committee on the Message of the President, and after resolving to pass the requisite laws, if further information shall be wanting in relation to the mode of taking possession, or any other object of detail, the Executive might be called upon to furnish it.

Mr. Goddard did not intend to enter upon a long discussion of the resolution; but it seemed to him that the reasons of the gentleman from Virginia for opposing it were very erroneous. On what ground was the opposition made? Altogether on the ground that Spain had actually made the cession to France. Mr. G. apprehended no such impression had been made on the House by the information before them. In the first article of the treaty they learned what the title of France was. The treaty says,

Mr. Goddard asked whether the conclusion followed that France had an incontestable title to Louisiana? There was no such evidence. If in virtue of this treaty we purchase a promise on the part of His Catholic Majesty to cede, and not an incontestable title, he would ask if the promise constituted a title? France only says, we cede all our title. This, and this only, is the language of the instrument. If this is the case, is it not proper to inquire whether there are other acts by which Spain has ceded Louisiana to France? Such acts may exist. Certain stipulations were made by France to Spain, on which the cession depended. Do we not then wish to know whether these stipulations have been fulfilled and whether they are binding, or whether Spain has waived them? Are there in existence any documents to that effect? It has been hinted that such documents exist in the newspapers; but are we, in an affair of this magnitude, to be referred to the dictum of a newspaper? He apprehended that this was a novel mode of legislation.

Mr. Randolph said, if the gentleman from Connecticut would confine his motion to the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, he should be ready to acquiesce in it, though he did not believe that instrument would throw any new light on the subject.

Mr. Gregg said his wish was that the resolution should be divided, and that the Treaty of St. Ildefonso only should be requested. It had been conceded that it might be of some use in ascertaining the limits of the cession. To the other members of the resolution he was opposed. He therefore moved a division of the question.

Mr. Griswold remarked that it would be more orderly to move the striking out of the last paragraph.

Mr. Thatcher said, gentlemen objecting to this resolution had taken different grounds. Some oppose it as inconsistent with the sentiments that prevailed in the case of the British Treaty; others, because it is premature, and others, because it is unnecessary. He did not expect the first objection from any member on that floor; much less did he expect it from the quarter in which it originated. The advocates of the motion were charged with inconsistency. He was not a member of the House at the time of the British Treaty, but, on referring to the Journal, it would be perceived that the object[56] of gentlemen who then called for papers was to go into the merits of the British Treaty. It would not be denied that the ground then taken by gentlemen on the other side was, that the House had a right to examine the merits of the treaty, and to the assertion of that right it was that the President answered. We now say that it is not necessary for us to act in our legislative capacity, intending, if it shall appear to be necessary, not to withhold acting. Mr. T. therefore conceived that they exhibited no inconsistency, as they did not purpose at this time to go into the merits of the treaty, and as they acknowledged the treaty, if constitutionally made, to be binding. But they wanted information on subjects of legislation.

Mr. Nicholson was extremely glad to find that gentlemen on the other side of the House had at length abandoned the ground which they had taken some years ago. He was rejoiced that they were now willing to acknowledge, what they had heretofore most strenuously denied, that the House of Representatives had a constitutional right, not only to call for papers, but to use their discretion in carrying any treaty into effect. That it must now be their impression was evident, or their conduct was surely unaccountable. Why else do they call for papers, why inquire into our title to the province of Louisiana? If the doctrine of a former day was still to be adhered to, why urge this inquiry? If gentlemen are consistent with themselves, if they have not forgot the lessons which they inculcated upon the ratification of the British Treaty, this House has no right to call for papers, no right to make inquiry, no right to deliberate, but must carry this treaty into effect, be it good or bad; must vote for all the necessary measures, whether they are calculated to promote the interests of the United States or not. The doctrines of old times, however, are now given up, the ground formerly taken is abandoned. We shall no longer hear that the Executive is omnipotent, and that the representatives of the people are bound to vote, blindfolded, for carrying into effect all treaties which the President and the Senate may think proper to make and ratify. He thanked the gentlemen for the admission, and hoped that the country would profit by it hereafter.

He was happy to say that this was not now, nor ever was, the doctrine of himself and his friends. They meant to deliberate, they meant to use their discretion in voting away the treasure of the nation. He agreed with gentlemen, that if a majority of the House entertained any doubt as to the validity of the title we have acquired, they ought to call for papers; and he had no doubt, if there was any dissatisfaction, they would call. He himself should have no objection to vote for the resolution if it was confined to proper objects, not indeed to satisfy himself, for he was already fully satisfied, but to satisfy other gentlemen; to satisfy the American people, that the insinuations thrown out about the title, are totally without foundation. The resolution in its present shape, however, was highly improper; it looked to extrinsic circumstances, and contemplated an inquiry into subjects totally unconnected with the treaty with France. What, said Mr. N., has Spain to do in this business? Gentlemen ask if she has acquiesced in our purchase, and call for her correspondence with our Government. What is the acquiescence of Spain to us? If the House is satisfied, from the information laid on the table, that Spain had ceded Louisiana to France, and that France had since ceded it to the United States, what more do they require? Are we not an independent nation? Have we not a right to make treaties for ourselves without asking leave of Spain? What is it to us whether she acquiesces or not? She is no party to the treaty of cession, she has no claim to the ceded territory. Are we to pause till Spain thinks proper to consent, or are we to inquire, whether, like a cross child, she has thrown away her rattle, and cries for it afterwards?

With regard to the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, Mr. N. said, he should have no objection to its being laid before the House, if it was in the possession of the Executive. In all probability, however, this was not the case, as it was known to be a secret treaty on other subjects of great importance between France and Spain. As to the deed of cession spoken of, he really did not understand what was meant, for he imagined it was not expected a formal deed of bargain and sale had been executed between two civilized nations, who negotiated by means of ambassadors. If there were any other papers which could give gentlemen more information, he had no objection, either, that these should be laid before them. Not indeed for his own satisfaction, but for that of those who were not already satisfied, if there were any of that description. One very important paper, he knew from high authority, was certainly in existence, and possibly might be in the power of the Executive. This was a formal order, under the royal signature of Spain, commanding the Spanish officers at Orleans to deliver the province to the French Prefect, which he considered equal, perhaps superior to any deed of cession; for it was equal to an express recognition on the part of Spain, that France had performed all the conditions referred to in the Treaty of St. Ildefonso. It was an acknowledgment that Spain had no further claims upon Louisiana, and would show that any interference on her part ought to have no influence on the American Government.

Mr. Mitchell said he rose to express his sentiments against the whole body of the resolution under debate. But his disinclination to adopt it did not arise from any doubt of the right which the House possessed to call upon the Executive for information. He had no hesitation to ask the President for papers whenever it was necessary to obtain them. And it was equally clear to him that whenever that dignified officer was properly applied to, he would[57] comply cheerfully with the request of Congress, or of either branch of it. He owned that in some cases it would be the duty of the House to pursue this mode of inquiry, and equally would it be the duty of the head of the Executive Department to give his aid and countenance.

In the present stage of the proceedings respecting the treaty and conventions with France concerning Louisiana, he deemed it improper to embarrass the business by an unseasonable call upon the Executive for papers. The President had already communicated various information on this subject, in his Message on the first day of the session. Additional information was given in his Message of the 21st, wherein he told the House that the ratification and exchanges had been made. This was accompanied with instruments of cession and covenant concluded at Paris between our ministers and the agents of the French Republic. All this information we had already on our tables. This the President had put the House in possession of from his own sense of duty. This obligation was imposed on him by the constitution, which declares that he shall, from time to time, give to Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. Mr. M. said he had a firm belief that the President had complied with this constitutional injunction. He had communicated such intelligence as he had received; and if he was possessed of any thing else needful for the deliberation of the House, he was willing to think the Chief Magistrate of the Union would have spontaneously imparted it.

The question was taken on agreeing to the first member of the resolution, as follows:

The House divided—ayes 59, noes 59. The Speaker declaring himself in the affirmative, the motion was carried.

Mr. Rodney suggested an alteration in the second member of the resolution, so as to read “instrument,” instead of “deed.”

Mr. Griswold had no objection to the modification.

The second member, so modified, was read as follows:

Mr. Huger confessed his impressions to be favorable to the treaty, though the arguments urged that day, certainly possessed great weight. He was rather of opinion that no such instrument as that referred to in the resolution existed. But if it did exist, its publication would certainly be satisfactory to the people and the House. He declared himself ready to vote for carrying the treaty into effect.

Mr. Nicholson did not know whether his remarks had been correctly understood. He did not know whether the document he alluded to could strictly be called the instrument of cession. He had drawn an amendment to this part of the resolution, which he would propose, if in order, to wit:

The Speaker said, the House having agreed to insert the word “instrument,” it was not in order to receive a substitute.

Mr. Huger moved to reconsider the vote of the House in favor of the insertion of the word “instrument.”

Motion lost—ayes 24.

The question was then taken on the second member, as above stated, and lost—ayes 34.

The question was then taken on the third member, viz:

And lost—ayes 34.

The question was then taken on the last member of the motion, and lost, without a division, viz:

The question recurring on the whole of the resolution, as amended,

Mr. Nicholson moved to amend the second member by adding to the end thereof;

Agreed to—ayes 64.

The question was then taken by yeas and nays on the whole of the original motion, amended as follows:

And lost—yeas 57, nays 59.

Amendment to the Constitution.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the report of a select committee on propositions of amendment to the constitution.

[58]

The report was read, as follows:

Mr. Dawson observed, that at the time of the adoption of the constitution, that part of it which related to the election of a President and Vice President had been objected to; and evils likely to occur had been foreseen by some gentlemen at that day. Experience had shown that they were not mistaken. Every gentleman in that House knew the situation in which the country had been placed by the controverted election of a Chief Magistrate; it was one which he trusted never would return. It had been a subject much reflected on by the people, and by the State Legislatures, several of which had declared their approbation of the principle contained in the resolution reported by the committee. The House had two years since ratified a similar amendment by a constitutional majority of two-thirds. At that time no objections were made to the principle of the amendment. All the objection then made was on account of the lateness of the day and thinness of the House. Mr. D. considered it unnecessary to make any further remarks at that time, as he could not anticipate any objections that might be urged. He moved that the Committee should rise and report the resolution without amendment.

Mr. J. Clay, though in favor of the principle of the amendment, was of opinion that, as to some of its parts, it required alteration. He therefore moved:

Mr. Van Cortlandt thought the amendment liable to objection.

Mr. G. W. Campbell was in favor of the principle contained in the amendment. He considered it to be the duty of this House, in introducing an amendment to the constitution on this point, to secure to the people the benefits of choosing the President, so as to prevent a contravention of their will as expressed by Electors chosen by them; resorting to legislative interposition only in extraordinary cases: and when this should be rendered necessary, so guarding the exercise of legislative power, that those only should be capable of legislative election who possessed a strong evidence of enjoying the confidence of the people. This was the true spirit and principle of the constitution, whose object was, through the several organs of the Government, faithfully to express the public opinion. For this reason he was in favor of the proposed amendment. By it we shall make a less innovation on the spirit of the constitution than by rejecting it, and adopting the report of the select committee. There were obvious reasons why the persons from whom a choice may be made should be fewer in case of a designation of the office than heretofore. At present the whole number of electoral votes is one hundred and seventy-six. As the constitution now stands, four candidates might have an equal number of votes, or three might have a majority, viz: one hundred and seventeen each. According to the proposed amendment, but one can have a majority, and if two persons should be equal and highest, it is not probable that the third candidate will have many votes.

Mr. Griswold said it was very difficult to ascertain the precise import of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania by barely hearing it read from the Chair. In the meaning therefore which he gave it, he might perhaps be mistaken. If not mistaken, it involved a principle and implied a change, which he had never before heard suggested on that floor, or in the part of the country from which he came. It is well known to every member, that under the constitution as it at present stands, the votes given for a President in this House are by States, and not according to the majority of the members of the whole body. The amendment, as reported by the select committee, preserves this original feature of the constitution by prescribing that the election shall be proceeded with as pointed out by the constitution. But the present amendment varies this mode, according to which it is to be made without respect to States. Of course a majority of the members are to decide. He submitted it to gentlemen whether they were[59] willing in this way to sacrifice the interests and rights of the smaller States. If this be the intention of gentlemen, we ought to have time to deliberate on the subject before it is pressed to a decision. The gentleman from Pennsylvania will explain whether this is his intention.

Mr. J. Clay begged leave explicitly to state, for the satisfaction of the gentleman from Connecticut, that it was not his intention to change that part of the constitution which prescribed that the votes should be by States; and if it would induce the gentleman to vote for the resolution he had moved, he would add the words of the constitution, viz:

These words were accordingly added.

Mr. Dawson observed that this proposition had been submitted to the select committee, who had considered it more objectionable than that reported. Their object was to innovate as little as possible on the constitution. A great part of it referred to cases so extremely remote as were not likely to happen. The only material change it made was to reduce the number of persons from whom a choice should be made from three to two. At present the election for a President and Vice President was made from the five highest on the list. As, according to the proposed amendment, a designation of the persons voted for as President and Vice President was to be made, it was considered that by giving the three highest to the House of Representatives, from which to choose a President, and the two highest to the Senate, from which to choose a Vice President, the spirit of the constitution would not be changed. He hoped therefore the report of the committee would be agreed to. He believed it comprehended all cases which were probable; and he further believed that if they spent a month they would not devise an amendment that would provide for all possible cases that may happen.

Mr. Clopton said he rose to express his approbation of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Clay.) He said that indeed the amendment could not but be acceptable to him, inasmuch as it corresponded with the ideas he had the honor to express to the committee on this subject the other day. He begged leave now to make a few remarks in addition to those which he had then stated. He said, if any thing is to be lamented as a defect in the fundamental principles of our Government, that defect perhaps consists in a departure from the plain and simple modes of immediate election by the people as to some of the branches of the Government. He did not mean however now to discuss, nor did he know that he ever should discuss, this point. The Constitution of the United States having established a different principle in respect to the election of the several departments of the Government, except that branch of the Legislature which this House composes; and the object of the proposed amendment to the constitution not being the transmutation of a fundamental principle, but merely an alteration in the mode heretofore directed of electing one branch of the Government according to the principle already established, his business and his object was to state to this committee those ideas which occurred to him on this occasion as suited to the subject as it now stands before the committee.

Mr. C. said that most seriously considering the principles of the Government in such a point of view as he had the honor to state to the committee, he was irresistibly impressed with the opinion that a legislative election of President or Vice President, whenever resorted to, should be restrained to the smallest number above a unit, or to those persons who have equal electoral votes. He considered it as a position clearly and unquestionably true, that if the field of election, when not decided by the voice of the people themselves, should be left too wide, more chances will there always be for the introduction of abuses in determining on a choice, if those whose province it shall be to decide, should be actuated by a spirit adverse to the public sentiment. Results ungrateful to the public feeling might indeed become sources of discontent truly to be lamented. The demon of discord might be called forth, and stalking over our land, might unfortunately produce a state of things very different from that peaceful, tranquil state, which would follow a decision more conformable to the will of the people. Such a decision he believed would be ensured were the election to be confined to those two persons only who had received the most ample testimony of the public confidence, or to those who had been stamped with equal testimonials of that confidence.

Mr. Smilie would wish one principle altered in the report of the select committee, viz: that which confined the election of the President to the three highest persons voted for. It was impossible for human wisdom to provide for all cases that might occur. Their time was not well spent in providing for cases extremely remote. He had but one object in view, the designation of office; and the more simple the proposition, the more likely they were to obtain this object. It should be recollected that the constitution was the act of the people, and ought not to be altered till inconveniences actually arise under it. He believed, though particular parts might be defective in theory, they ought not to be changed till practical inconveniences had been experienced. No such inconvenience had yet been felt from choosing the President from the five highest on the list. Is it, then, prudent to embarrass the great principle, in which they generally concurred, with incidental propositions, when there was no necessity for them? This amendment was to obtain[60] the assent of thirteen legislative bodies before it would be binding. The simpler, then, the proposition, the more likely it was to succeed. His idea, therefore, was to leave the constitution as it now stood, so far as it related to a choice being made from the five highest, and only so far to change it as related to a designation of the office.

Mr. Sanford said the great object of the amendment ought to be to prevent persons voted for as Vice President from becoming President. If the amendment effected this, it was sufficient. All other innovation upon the constitution was improper; and no danger could arise from extending the right of the House of Representatives to making a choice from the five highest.

Mr. Rodney said that in the select committee he had been in favor of the number stated in the constitution. He was not for innovating on the constitution one tittle more than was absolutely necessary. As to the mere designation of office, the people looked for and expected it; and if that were obtained, they would be satisfied. He well knew that if amendments to this simple proposition were multiplied, objections to the whole would also be increased. Having been originally in favor of five, and thinking the inconveniences apprehended by some gentlemen not likely to occur, he should vote in favor of the amendment of the gentleman from Maryland, principally for the reason assigned by the gentleman from Connecticut, that it would allow to the smaller States a larger scope of choice.

Mr. Elliot hoped the amendment of the gentleman from Maryland would not prevail; and coming, as he did himself, from a small State, he trusted the House would pardon him for assigning his reasons for that hope. He felt as much confidence in the House of Representatives as the gentleman from Connecticut; but he was of opinion that their discretion ought to be limited. The amendment will give the House of Representatives the unqualified power of electing from the whole number on the list of persons voted for as President, and on that ground he opposed it. It was said to be a question of larger and smaller States, and those who represent the smaller States were called upon to check the usurpation of the larger States. Our system was undoubtedly federative, and there might be danger of a usurpation of the large States if the small ones were not protected by the constitution. His wish was that they might be so guarded.

Mr. G. W. Campbell said he, too, represented a small State, and was anxious to preserve the rights of the small States. But in a great constitutional question, while these rights were not lost sight of, principle ought also to be regarded. This he conceived to be his duty, whatever effect it might have upon the State he represented. For this reason he considered it proper to express his opinions on the present occasion. It was a vital principle to preserve the constitution as pure as possible. This rendered it necessary to show that the proposition of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Clay) came nearer to the principle of the constitution than that offered by the gentleman from Maryland. He had already observed that, there being at present no designation, four was the smallest possible number from which a choice could be made: to this number but one was added, making, altogether, five. In future elections there will be one hundred and seventy-six Electors, and if there be a designation of office, but one person can have a majority. To confine the choice to two persons will, therefore, in principle, approach as near as possible to the original principle of the constitution.

Mr. C. was in favor of preserving that part of the constitution which directed the election to be made by States, wishing as little innovation as possible on the principles of the constitution. He did not, however, conceive a mere change of words dangerous, but the establishment of a principle that deprived the people of the power of electing those who possessed the largest share of their confidence. He was decidedly in favor of whatever had this effect, as according with the true spirit of the constitution; and he was, therefore, opposed to the amendment of the gentleman from Maryland. His own opinion, too, was that it was best to express in one article whatever related to the election of President and Vice President, than refer to the constitution; by which the provisions on that subject would be rendered much clearer.

The question was then taken on Mr. Nicholson’s amendment, and lost—ayes, 29, noes 77.

Mr. Randolph said he came to the House under the impression that another subject would have occupied their attention on account of its primary importance, not meaning, however, to disparage the importance of an amendment to the constitution. But on a subject which must be discussed in a few days, if at all, it was improper that time should be lost. The proposed amendment to the constitution was not, he believed, so extremely pressing as to require immediate attention. The subject to which Mr. R. had expected the attention of the House would have been first directed, was the Treaty with France. Hoping that the committee would have decided on the amendment at an early hour, he had refrained from any motion. But perceiving that a decision was not likely soon to be made, he would move that the committee should rise, for the purpose of taking up the treaty respecting Louisiana.

Mr. Dawson opposed the rising of the committee.

The question was taken on Mr. Randolph’s motion, and carried—yeas 60, nays 55. When the committee rose.

And on motion, the House adjourned.

[61]

Tuesday, October 25.

Louisiana Treaty.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the Message from the President of the United States, of the twenty-first instant, enclosing a treaty and conventions entered into and ratified by the United States and the French Republic; to which Committee of the whole House was also referred a motion for carrying the same into effect.

Mr. G. Griswold said he had hoped that some gentleman, in favor of the resolution under consideration, would have risen to assign his reasons in favor of it. But no gentleman friendly to its adoption having risen, and feeling himself embarrassed, he would take the liberty of suggesting his doubts as to the propriety of the resolution. He hoped the committee would have the candor to believe that, in stating those doubts which hung upon his mind, his object was not to delay the progress of the measures contemplated, but to gain information.

In reflecting, for the short time during which the subject had been before him, he had not been able to pursue it in all its bearings, nor to solve all the difficulties it presented. He had first asked himself where was to be found the constitutional power of the Government to incorporate the territory, with the inhabitants thereof, in the Union of the United States, with the privileges of citizens of the United States—is there any such power? And if there is, where is it lodged? In giving his opinion on the constitutional right of making treaties, he would say that it was vested in the President and Senate, and that a treaty made by them on a subject constitutionally in their treaty-making power, was valid without the assent of this House. This House had, to be sure, the physical power of refusing the necessary means to carry treaties into effect; but this power was essentially different from that conferred by the constitution. But if the treaty-making power should be exceeded, if it should be undertaken to make it operate upon subjects not constitutionally vested, he had a right to say that it was his duty not to carry it into effect. Even should its provisions be highly beneficial, it was no less their constitutional duty to resist it. He would not undertake to say that his mind was perfectly fixed, but he entertained doubts—serious doubts; and he hoped gentlemen would candidly give them answers.

Mr. Randolph rose for the purpose of satisfying, so far as was in his power, the doubts expressed by the gentleman from New York (Mr. G. Griswold). He had listened with great pleasure to the candid exposition which the gentleman had given of his objections, and from the temper which he had manifested, Mr. R. relied on being able to satisfy some of his scruples on this subject. The objections which have been urged to the motion before the committee, resolved themselves into arguments against the constitutionality, and arguments against the expediency of the treaty proposed to be carried into effect. As it would be needless to repel objections of this last kind, unless those of the first description could be satisfactorily answered, he should first reply to the observations which had been made on the constitutional doctrine.

He understood the gentleman from New York as denying that there existed in the United States, as such, a capacity to acquire territory; that, by the constitution, they were restricted to the limits which existed at the time of its adoption. If this position be correct, it undeniably follows that those limits must have been accurately defined and generally known at the time when the Government took effect. Either they have been particularly described in the constitutional compact, or are referred to as settled beyond dispute, and universally acknowledged. But this was not the fact, in either case. The constitution not only did not describe any particular boundary, beyond which the United States could not extend, but our boundary was unsettled on our north-eastern, southern, and north-western frontier, at the time of its adoption. But perhaps we shall be told, that, although our limits were in dispute with our English and Spanish neighbors, still there were certain boundaries specified in the Treaty of Paris, of 1783, which were the actual boundaries of the United States. It was, however, a well attested fact—one of which we possessed official information from the Executive—that the limits assigned us by that treaty were incapable of being established. A line running west, from the Lake of the Woods, not touching the Mississippi at all—it followed that the United States were without limits beyond the source of the Mississippi. It will not be denied, that, among the powers which the Government possesses under the constitution, there exists that of settling disputes concerning our limits with the neighboring nations. This power was not only necessary in relation to the disputed boundaries on the side of Canada and Florida, but was indispensable to a government over a country of indefinite extent. The existence of this power will not be denied: it has been exercised in ascertaining our north-eastern and southern frontier, and it involves in it the power of extending the limits of the Confederacy. Let us suppose that the Commissioners, under the Treaty of London, had determined the river St. John or St. Lawrence to be the true St. Croix—would not that part of the province of New Brunswick or Quebec which lies on this side of those rivers at this time have been a part of the United States? Suppose the northern boundary of Florida had been fixed, under the Treaty of San Lorenzo, to extend from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf; would not all the country north of this line and east of the Mississippi—part of the very country conveyed by the treaty lately negotiated, and which gentlemen conceived we could not constitutionally hold—would not that country, at this time,[62] compose a part of the United States? That the constitution should tie us down to particular limits, without expressing those limits; that we should be restrained to the then boundaries of the United States, when it is in proof to the committee that no such bounds existed, or do now exist, was altogether incomprehensible and inadmissible. For, if the constitution meant the practical limits of the United States, the extent of country which we then possessed—our recent acquisitions, on the side of Canada and the Natchez, could not be defended. But, sir, said Mr. R., my position is not only maintainable by the reason of the constitution, but by the practice under it. Congress have expressed, in their own acts, a solemn recognition of the principle, that the United States, in their federative capacity, may acquire, and have acquired, territory. It will be recollected, that adverse claims once existed between the United States and the State of Georgia, in relation to a certain tract of country between the northern boundary of the Spanish possessions and what we contended was the southern limit of Georgia—the United States asserting that the country in question was the property of the United States, in their confederate capacity, and the State of Georgia claiming it as hers. Although I have always advocated the claim of that State, it never was on the principle of an incapacity in the United States to acquire territory, or any other which affects the question now before us. It is true, sir, we appointed commissioners to settle the matter in dispute, amicably, with Georgia; but in the mean time we assumed the jurisdiction, erected a government over the country, and thereby established the principle that the United States, as such, could acquire territory; the country in question, as we contended, never having been included within the limits of any particular States, and being ceded to the Confederacy by the Treaty of 1783. But perhaps it may be answered, that this acquisition, being made anterior to the date of the present constitution, cannot affect any limitation or restriction, which it may have provided in relation to this subject; and that to prove that the old confederation could acquire territory, is not to prove the same capacity in the present system of Government. To this I reply, that the constitution contains no such expressed limitation, nor can any be fairly inferred from it: and that if the old confederation—a mere government of States—a loosely connected league—all of whose powers, with many more, are possessed by the present Federal Government—if this mere alliance of States could rightfully acquire territory in their allied capacity, much more is the existing Government competent to make such an acquisition. To me the inference is irresistible.

But the gentleman does not rest himself on this ground alone. He does not embark his whole treasure in a single bottom. Granting that the United States are not destitute of capacity to acquire territory, he denies that this acquisition has been made in a regular way—Congress, says he, alone is competent to such an act. In this transaction he scents at a distance Executive encroachment, and we are called upon to assert our rights, and to repel it. If any usurpation of the privileges of Congress, or of this House, be made to appear, I pledge myself to that gentleman to join him in resisting it. But let us inquire into the fact. No gentleman will deny the right of the President to initiate business here, by message, recommending particular subjects to our attention. If the Government of the United States possess the constitutional power to acquire territory from foreign States, the Executive, as the organ by which we communicate with such States, must be the prime agent in negotiating such an acquisition. Conceding, then, that the power of confirming this act, and annexing to the United States the territory thus acquired, ultimately rests with Congress, where has been the invasion of the privileges of that body? Does not the President of the United States submit this subject to Congress for their sanction? Does he not recognize the principle, which I trust we will never give up, that no treaty is binding until we pass the laws for executing it—that the powers conferred by the constitution on Congress cannot be modified, or abridged, by any treaty whatever—that the subjects of which they have cognizance cannot be taken, in any way, out of their jurisdiction? In this procedure nothing is to be seen but a respect, on the part of the Executive, for our rights; a recognition of a discretion on our part to accord or refuse our sanction. Where, then, is the violation of our rights? As to the initiative, in a matter like this, it necessarily devolved on the Executive.

Mr. R. said, that he would not dilate upon the importance of the navigation of the Mississippi, which had been the theme of every tongue, which we now possessed unfettered by the equal claim of the nation holding the west bank, a fruitful source of quarrel; but he would call the attention of the committee to a report which had been made at the last session and to which publicity had lately been given.

I am not surprised, Mr. Chairman, that in a performance so replete with information, a single error should be discovered, especially as it does not affect the soundness of its conclusion. As long ago as the year 1673, the inhabitants of the French province of Canada explored the country on the Mississippi. A few years afterwards (1685) La Salle, with emigrants from old France, made a settlement on the Bay of St. Bernard, and at the close of the 17th century, previous to the existence of Pensacola, another French settlement was made by the Governor, D’Ibberville, at Mobile, and on the Isle Dauphin, or Massacre, at the mouth of that bay. In 1712, a short time previous to the peace of Utrecht, Louis XIV. described the extent of the colony of Louisiana (by the settlements) in his grant of its exclusive commerce to Crozat.[63] Three years subsequent to this, the Spanish establishment at Pensacola was formed, as well as the settlement of the Adais on the river Mexicana. After various conflicting efforts, on both sides, the bay and river Perdido was established, (from the peace of 1719,) as the boundary between the French province of Louisiana on the one side and the Spanish province of Florida on the other: this river being nearly equi-distant between Mobile and Pensacola. Near the close of the war between England and France, rendered memorable for the unexampled success with which it was conducted by that unrivalled statesman, the great Lord Chatham, Spain became a party on the side of France. The loss of the Havana, and other important dependencies, was the immediate consequence. In 1762, France, by a secret treaty of cotemporaneous date with the preliminary Treaty of Peace, relinquished Louisiana to Spain, as an indemnity for her losses, sustained by advocating the cause of France. By the definitive Treaty of 1763, France ceded to England all that part of Louisiana which lies east of the Mississippi, except the island of New Orleans—the rest of the province to Spain. It is to be observed that although France ostensibly ceded this country to England, virtually the cession was on the part of Spain; because France was no longer interested in the business, but as the friend of Spain, (having previously relinquished the whole to her,) and because in 1783 restitution was made by England, not to France, but to Spain, England having acquired this portion of Louisiana, together with the Spanish province of Florida, annexed to the former that part of Florida which lies west of the Apalachicola and east of the Perdido; thereby forming the province of West Florida.

It is only in English geography, and during this period, from 1763 to 1783, that such a country as West Florida is known. For Spain, having acquired both the Floridas in 1783, re-annexed to Louisiana the country west of the Perdido subject to the government of New Orleans, and established the ancient boundaries of Florida; the country between the Perdido and Apalachicola being subject to the Governor of St. Augustine. By the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, Spain cedes to France “the province of Louisiana with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain:” viz: to the Perdido, “and that it had when France possessed it to the Perdido—and such as it should be after treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other powers;” that is, saving to the United States the country given up by the Treaty of San Lorenzo. We have succeeded to all the right of France. If the navigation of the Mississippi alone were of sufficient importance to justify war, surely the possession of every drop of water which runs into it—the exclusion of European nations from its banks, who would have with us the same causes of quarrel, did we possess New Orleans only, which we have had with the former possessors of that key of the river; the entire command of the Mobile and its widely extended branches, scarcely inferior in consequence to the Mississippi itself—watering the finest country and affording the best navigation in the United States—surely these would be acknowledged to be inestimably valuable.

Mr. Purviance.—I am clearly and decidedly in favor of the resolution on your table, premising the appropriations for carrying the treaty between France and this country into effect; and I sincerely regret, that in doing so, I shall act adversely to the general sentiment of the gentlemen with whom it is my pleasure and my pride to confess I have hitherto politically officiated.

It is true I am, and always have been, opposed to the general tenor of the present Administration. It has not appeared to me to possess that bold commanding aspect—that erect and resolute front—which ought to be assumed by the Executive of a free people, when claiming satisfaction for a wrong sustained. It has not shown that strong, muscular, athletic shape, which is calculated to intimidate aggression, or which is enabled to resist it; nor do I think that it has manifested that firm, dignified, manly tone of virtue and of spirit, which, resting on the love of a free people, and conscious of their strength, can ask for the prompt, direct, and unequivocal satisfaction to which it is entitled, and, being denied, can take it. It has not appeared like the veteran chief, ready to gird his loins in defence of his country’s rights; but, if I may be allowed to use the magna componere parvis, it has, to my mind, somewhat resembled a militia subaltern, who, in time of war, directed his men not to fire on the enemy, lest the enemy might fire again.

Under such an Administration, I have thought that it would be better to have the ceded territory on any terms than not to have it at all. If we have not the spirit or the means of doing ourselves justice, would it not be better that we bribe those who might be in a situation to molest us, and thus put it out of their power to do us any injury, which we cannot or which we will not avenge? There are but two ways of maintaining our national independence—men and money. Since we did not use the first, we must have recourse to the last. One of these two we should be compelled to resort to if France gained possession of Louisiana, and we had better resort to it now. I deny that they have as yet gained possession: they have not received a delivery of the four redoubts which garrison and command the country, nor have they a single armed soldier there, except those which are particularly attached to the equipage of the Colonial Prefect. If, sir, we were obliged to resort to the necessity of purchasing their friendship, after they had procured an establishment, it would not be confined to one instance of humiliation and acknowledgment on our part, or one instance of insult only on theirs. If we purchase this friendship once, we should[64] be compelled to make annual contributions to their avarice, and be annually subjected to their insolence. Repeated concessions would only produce a repetition of injury, and, at last, when we had completely compromitted our national dignity, and offered up our last cent as an oblation to Gallic rapacity, we would then be further from conciliation than ever. The spirit of universal domination, instead of being allayed by those measures which had been intended for its abatement, would rage with redoubled fury. Elated by those sacrifices which had been intended to appease it, it would still grow more fierce; it would soon stride across the Mississippi, and every encroachment which conquest or cunning could effect might be expected. The tomahawk of the savage and the knife of the negro would confederate in the league, and there would be no interval of peace, until we should either be able to drive them from their location altogether, or else offer up our sovereignty as a homage of our respect, and permit the name of our country to be blotted out of the list of nations for ever.

I confess there are many gentlemen of that nation for whom I entertain the sincerest esteem; but although I love some of them as friends, they will pardon me when I say that I do not like all of them as neighbors. Blood, havoc, and devastation, have for some years past encircled their proximity, and circumstances equally disastrous and equally improbable have already taken place. Do we want any evidences of this? We can find them in Switzerland, in Italy, in Egypt, in Hanover, in France itself. We have seen the ancient throne of the Capets tumbled from its base; we have seen the tide of succession which had flowed on uninterruptedly for ages dammed up for ever; we have seen the sources of the life blood royal drained dry. And by whom? By the pert younglings of the day.

We have afterwards seen these puny upstarts, when their hands had been reddened in the slaughter pens of Paris, kicked from their seats, and a Corsican soldier embellished with the majesty of the Bourbons. We have seen one half of the Old World subjected to his dominion, and the other half alarmed at his power. And is it thought, sir, that America alone, with an army scarcely sufficient to defend our garrisons, with a navy scarcely sufficient to punish a Bashaw, with a treasury incommensurate to our engagements, and an Executive unwilling to strain our energies—is it, I say sir, for America alone, under these circumstances, singly to withstand that gigantic nation, fighting on her own ground, fed from her own granaries, and furnished from her own arsenals? The time once was, indeed, when we could have redressed our own wrongs, and had an opportunity of doing so; but that necessity and that opportunity, I take it sir, have now both passed away.

Yes, thank God! We have now a treaty, signed by themselves, in which they have voluntarily passed away the only means of annoyance which they possessed. But I do not thank the honorable gentleman who is at the head of our Executive. At the time this negotiation was commenced there could not be the smallest hope of its being carried into effect. The French Consul had obtained it perhaps for the express purpose of carrying into effect his favorite scheme of universal domination; it might give him the chance of injuring the British, controlling the Spaniards, and dismembering America. Compared with these objects a handful of bank stock was of no more consequence to him than a handful of sand. His fleet and army were ready to sail, and his colonial prefect had already arrived. But, mark! The King of Great Britain, who at this crisis I take to have been by far the most able negotiator we had, declares war. The scene is now changed. That which France had refused to our intercessions, she was now compelled to grant from mere necessity. A state of warfare took place about the last of March, and the treaty was signed soon afterwards. As long as I retain the small stock of understanding which it has pleased God to give me, I shall never be induced to believe, that it was owing in the smallest degree to the efficacy of diplomatic representation. The mind of that great man (Buonaparte) is not made of such soft materials as to receive an impress from the collision of every gentle hand. Stern, collected, and inflexible, he laughs to scorn the toying arts of persuasion; his soul is a stupendous rock, which the rushing of mighty waters cannot shake from its place. No, sir; had it not been for this happy coincidence of circumstances, the personal solicitations of our ministers would have been regarded with as listless an ear as if they had been whispered across the ocean.

Mr. Elliot.—Mr. Chairman, although in the short time since I have had the honor of a seat on this floor, I have several times risen in debate, that circumstance scarcely diminishes my diffidence at the present moment. Uneducated in the schools, and unpractised in the arts, of parliamentary eloquence, it is with no inconsiderable degree of diffidence that I rise upon the present occasion. There are occasions, however, where even the eye of timidity should sparkle with confidence; and there are questions in the discussion of which the finger should be removed from the lip of silence herself. And such is every occasion and every question involving the existence, the infraction, or even the correct and just construction of that constitution which is the palladium of our privileges, and the temple of our glory. If I might be permitted to borrow a metaphorical expression from one of the most celebrated commanders of antiquity, who declared that he intended to spread all his sails on the ocean of war, I would say that it is with fear and trembling I presume to launch my little feeble bark on the vast ocean of eloquence[65] and literature (pointing to the federal members) by which I am surrounded. If, however, the remark be just, that it is even sweet and glorious to die for one’s country, surely the humbler sacrifice of native diffidence may with propriety be expected and exacted from a juvenile American Representative.

Whatever minuter shades or minor differences of opinion may exist among the American people, there is one point in which we shall all meet with cordial unanimity. We all unite in an ardent devotion to the constitution. He who is not devoted to it is unworthy of the honorable name of an American. I lament that it is necessary to speak particularly of myself; but duty, not only to myself, but to my constituents, a numerous and respectable section of the American people, demands it. It may be objected to me, and with truth, that there was a time when I professed sentiments hostile to some of the most important provisions in the constitution. It was not, however, at the time when the constitution was submitted to the people. I was then in infancy and obscurity, deprived of the means, and even of the hopes of education. I had yet read much and reflected more. My ardent and excursive eye had wandered rapidly over the wide field of ancient history; I thought I beheld my country, like the Roman Republic in the age of Cato, the sport of every wind and of every wave. As far as I understood the constitution, I admired it and wished for its adoption. But when an elegant anonymous writer predicted, as the consequence of its adoption, that “liberty would be but a name, to adorn the short historic page of the halcyon days of America,” I trembled and shuddered for the possible consequences. If in the plenitude of juvenile self-sufficiency (and who has not been young?) I have since fancied that I could form a more perfect constitution, that dream of the imagination has long been past. I have long been sincerely and ardently attached to the constitution.

The treaty before us is of an immense consequence, and my attention was early turned to the subject. From the moment of my election, I have devoted many studious and laborious hours to the subjects connected with it, and I have anticipated all the objections against it; none of those presented this day by the gentleman from New York, who opened the debate, or by the gentlemen who followed him on the same side, have struck my mind as novel. The question of the constitutionality of the treaty first presents itself. It is said to be unconstitutional, because it enlarges the territory of the United States. To reduce the arguments of gentlemen on this head to syllogistic form, they would not strike the mind with great force. The constitution is silent on the subject of the acquisition of territory. By the treaty we acquire territory; therefore the treaty is unconstitutional. It has been well remarked by an eminent civilian, that those are not the most correct and conclusive reasoners who are very expert at their quicquids, their atquis, and their ergos; but those, who, from correct premises, by just reasoning, deduce correct conclusions. This question is not to be determined from a mere view of the constitution itself, although it may be considered as admitted that it does not prohibit, in express terms, the acquisition of territory. It is a rule of law, that in order to ascertain the import of a contract, the evident intention of the parties, at the time of forming it, is principally to be regarded. This rule will apply, as it respects the present question, to our constitution, of which it may be said, as the great Dr. Johnson said of the science of the law, that it is the last result of human wisdom acting upon human experience. The constitution is a compact between the American people for certain great objects expressed in the preamble, [Mr. E. here read the preamble,] in language to which eloquence and learning can add no force or weight. Previous to the formation of this constitution there existed certain principles of the law of nature and nations, consecrated by time and experience, in conformity to which the constitution was formed. The question before us, I have always believed, must be decided upon the laws of nations alone; and under this impression I have examined the works of the most celebrated authors on that subject.

I recollect a time, sir, when a foreign minister in this country, at a moment when genius, fancy, and ardent patriotism, were lords of the ascendant over learning, wisdom, and experience, spoke of the law of nations and its principles as mere worm eaten authorities, and aphorisms of Vattel and others. I also recollect that the illustrious man who is now President of the United States was then Secretary of State, and that he delivered the unanimous sentiments of the American people when, in his reply to that minister, he observed that something more than mere sarcasms of that kind was necessary to disprove those authorities and principles; and that, until they were disproved, the American nation would hold itself bound by them. This is the man, sir, who has been so injuriously calumniated within these walls this morning, and upon whom such a torrent of bitter eloquence has been poured by the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Purviance;) a gentleman who is himself a model of eloquence, uniting all the excellencies of Cicero and Demosthenes, and all other orators, ancient and modern.

The American people, in forming their constitution, had an eye to that law of nations, which is deducible by natural reason and established by common consent, to regulate the intercourse and concerns of nations. With a view to this law the treaty-making power was constituted, and by virtue of this law, the Government and the people of the United States, in common with all other nations, possess the power and right of making acquisitions of territory by conquest, cession, or purchase. Indeed the gentlemen who deny us the right of acquiring by purchase, would probably allow us to[66] keep the territory, were it obtained by conquest.

Colonies, or provinces, are a part of the eminent domain of the nation possessing them, and of course are national property; colonial territory may be transferred from one nation to another by purchase; this purchase can be effected by treaty alone, as nations do not, like individuals, execute deeds, and cause them to be recorded in public offices; that department of the Government of the nation purchasing, which possesses the treaty-making power generally, is competent to make treaties for that purpose. These positions are established by the laws of nations, and are applicable to the case before us. [Here Mr. E. read a variety of extracts from Vattel to establish these positions, and observed that they were corroborated by Grotius, Puffendorf, and other eminent writers on the law of nature and nations, whose works he had consulted.]

A mere recapitulation, and that not a tedious one, of these principles and authorities, will now answer the present purpose. Colonies have always been considered as national property, although the law or practice of nations, in this instance, may not conform to the law of nature. Greece treated her colonies with peculiar indulgence: Rome considered any privileges which hers were suffered to possess, as mere matters of grace, not of right. The one was a natural and tender parent, the other a cruel stepmother. Yet I have no recollection that the Grecian colonies in Asia Minor, Italy, or even at Ionia, were represented in the Amphyctionic Council, the General Assembly of the States of Greece. The claim of the British Colonies, which now constitute the United States, to be represented in that body by which they were taxed, though just in itself, was novel and unwarranted by the practice of nations. Thank God the claim was successful, and in consequence of it, we are now here as the representatives of the American people, deliberating upon their most important interests. It is unnecessary to reiterate the other positions; they are undeniable in themselves, and their applicability to the present case will hardly be disputed. If the treaty be extremely pernicious, or has not been made by sufficient authority, or has been made for unjust purposes, it is void by the laws of nations.

The expediency of the treaty is another question, and an important one. I once hoped that the interests of our country would never require an extension of its limits, and I regret even that that necessity now exists. Evils and dangers may be apprehended from this source, and great evils and dangers may possibly result. But the regions of possibility are illimitable; those of probability are marked by certain well-defined boundaries, obvious to all men of reason and reflection, and, in the language of the poet,

If we cannot find, in the peculiar principles of our form of government, and in the virtue and intelligence of our citizens, a sufficient security against the dangers from a widely extended territory, in vain shall we seek it elsewhere. There is no magical quality in a degree of latitude or longitude, a river or a mountain. And it has been well remarked, that every danger from this quarter might have been apprehended before the acquisition of this territory. The Roman Empire, or that of Alexander in the zenith of its glory, was scarcely capable of containing a greater population than the territory of the United States; and men conversant with history do not wonder at the transient existence and rapid ruin of those empires. I repeat it, Mr. Chairman, we must look for our security in principles and circumstances inapplicable to the ancient nations. With the present question of expediency, I confess, sir, are naturally intermingled many considerations, infinitely interesting to the future peace, prosperity, felicity, and glory of our beloved country. The physical strength of a nation depends upon an aggregation of circumstances, amongst which, compactness of population, as well as territory, may be reckoned; our population may become too scattered; but this too is only a possible event. These possible evils ought not to be put in competition with the certain advantage which we derive from the acquisition.

But a gentleman tells us that the Administration hold out to us an Eden of the western world, a land flowing with milk and honey, while they have obtained nothing but a dreary and barren wilderness. Perhaps, if the gentleman be correct, the acquisition is scarcely the less important. To demonstrate the advantages of this purchase, it is not necessary to describe Louisiana as an Elysian region—to describe it as Homer does the Fortunate Islands, a region, on whose auspicious climate even winter smiles, where no bleak wind blows from its mountains, and no gale is felt but the zephyr, diffusing health and pleasure. But from geographical information, defective as it is, and from reasonable analogies, we may conclude that, with the exception of some considerable tracts, it is a country fertile and salubrious. Geography points us to China, Persia, India, Arabia Felix, and Japan, countries situated in corresponding latitudes, which, though always overshadowed by the horrid gloom of despotism, are always productive, and teach us by analogy that Louisiana, in natural fertility, is probably equal to those beautiful oriental regions.

The gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Purviance) says, he shall vote for carrying the treaty into effect, because the possession of the territory is important, and the Administration not having, as it ought to have done, made use of men to obtain it, he will consent to make use of money. He has applied many curious epithets to the Administration. He wishes for an Administration athletic and muscular, meaning, I suppose, like the wrestlers in the Grecian[67] circus, or the gladiators in that of Rome. When I came within these walls, sir, I ardently hoped that the voice of party would be silent during the discussion of this subject, and I did not expect to hear the Administration attacked in the language of vulgarity, malignity, and factious fury. When it is thus assailed, shall its defenders be silent? During the last session of Congress, an extraordinary degree of agitation was produced in the public mind by an egregious violation of our rights by an officer of the Spanish Government. Neither the people nor the Government were deficient in that spirit which the gentleman extols, but they were not governed by false ideas of national honor, and they were acquainted with the law of nations; they knew that we had no right to make the denunciatio belli precede the repetitio rerum—a declaration of war precede a demand for justice.

Mr. Sanford did not rise to make a display of his talents. Those who had confided to him the representation of their interests could have no such expectations, as they had unfortunately selected a plain Western farmer. He was sorry to see so much time wasted. He begged the House would recollect the time within which it was necessary to pass laws for carrying the treaty into effect. Much has been said of a breach of the constitution; but has any man shown it? The constitution does not prohibit the powers exercised on this occasion; and not having prohibited them, they must be considered as possessed by Government. In his opinion, it was necessary to carry the treaty into immediate effect. This done, other measures would require attention which would afford an ample harvest for the talents and eloquence of gentlemen with which, on any other occasion, he would be highly pleased.

Mr. Thatcher was sorry to be obliged, at this late hour, to state his reasons for voting against the resolution; but he should not discharge his duty to his constituents, were he to refrain from expressing his ideas. These reasons he should state as briefly as possible. This resolution is general, and contemplates two objects; it calls for the occupation and government of Louisiana, and for an appropriation of fifteen millions of dollars. He had hoped that, on a question of such national importance, they would have been allowed the papers necessary for its elucidation. But gentlemen have denied us this privilege. As the question, whether the treaty should be carried into effect, is a great constitutional question, I shall, in my remarks, confine myself to the constitutional objections against the treaty. Two objections have been made arising from the 3d and 7th articles of the treaty.

The third provides that “the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States; and in the mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the free, enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess.”

I conceive, said Mr. T., that the only sound doctrine is, not that which has been stated by the gentleman from Kentucky, (Mr. Sanford,) that whatever power is not prohibited by the constitution is agreeable to it, but that such powers as are not given are still held by the States or the people. No arguments have been addressed to prove that the constitution delegates such a power. The gentleman from Vermont, (Mr. Elliot,) who has gratified us with so long and flowery a speech, and who has ransacked Vattel, and various other eminent authors on the laws of nations, has proved that where the United States have a right to make a treaty, a treaty may be made. But these authorities do not apply unless he prove that the constitution gives the powers exercised in the present instance. The confederation under which we now live is a partnership of States, and it is not competent to it to admit a new partner but with the consent of all the partners. If such power exist, it does not reside in the President and Senate. The constitution says new States may be admitted by Congress. If this article of the constitution authorizes the exercise of power under the treaty, it must reside with the Legislature, and not with the President and Senate.

The gentleman from Virginia says, the principle contained in the third article of the treaty has been already recognized by Congress, and has instanced our treaties with Spain and Great Britain respecting the adjustment of our limits. By adverting to these treaties, it will be seen that there was then no pretence that we had acquired new territory. They only establish our lines agreeably to the Treaty of Peace. Certainly then the facts are not similar, and there exists no analogy of reasoning between the two cases. The gentleman from Virginia asks whether we could not purchase the right of deposit at New Orleans? But the argument meant to be conveyed in this question does not apply. We had the right before this treaty was formed; nor did we, in consequence of that right, undertake to admit the people of New Orleans into the Union.

Mr. Crowninshield.—Mr. Chairman: I rise, sir, to correct the gentleman from North Carolina in one particular; he has stated that the First Consul of France signed the treaty ceding Louisiana to the United States after the declaration of war by Great Britain against France. I believe he is mistaken, sir, for the Louisiana treaties were signed the 30th April, and Great Britain issued a declaration of war against France on the 17th of May. If I am right, the gentleman might have spared himself the trouble of detracting from the merits of the Executive on this great occasion.

Now I am up, I beg leave to state to the committee some of the reasons why I shall give my vote in favor of the treaties.

[68]

A resolution is on the table which recommends that provision ought to be made to carry into effect the late treaties with France, which cede Louisiana to the United States. Feeling as I do that we have acquired this country at a cheap price, that it is a necessary barrier in the Southern and Western quarters of the Union, that it offers immense advantages to us as an agricultural and commercial nation, I am highly in favor of the acquisition, and I shall most cordially give my vote in approbation of the resolution.

What, sir, shall we let slip this golden opportunity of acquiring New Orleans and the whole of Louisiana for the trifling sum of fifteen millions of dollars, when one-quarter part of the purchase money will be paid to our own citizens, the remainder in public stock, which we are not obliged to redeem under fifteen years? I trust, sir, we shall not omit to seize the only means now left to us for getting a peaceable possession of the finest country in the world. The bargain is a good one, and considering it merely in that light, we ought not to relinquish it. I have no doubt that the country acquired is richly worth fifty millions of dollars, and it is my opinion that we ought not to hesitate a moment in passing the resolution on the table.

We have now an opening for a free trade to New Orleans and Louisiana, which we never had before, and I hope we shall embrace it. Let us ratify the treaties, with all their provisions, and we shall see that in less than three years we have gained the greatest advantages in our commerce. I wish we may immediately proceed to adopt the resolution before the committee.

Mr. Mitchill rose and said, he entreated the indulgence of the committee for rising at so late a stage of the debate, when seven hours have already been employed in the sitting of the day. And the reason of his request was, that such extraordinary doctrines have been advanced against carrying into effect the treaty with France which cedes Louisiana to our nation, and such repeated allusions have been made to the sentiments which he submitted to the House during the debate of yesterday, that he felt himself called upon to attempt a reply, and therein to show that the grounds taken by the gentlemen of the opposition are neither strong nor tenable. Although the subject is ample and copious, he should endeavor to condense his remarks, to so moderate a compass, as not to trespass long upon the patience of the committee.

My colleague, said Mr. M., who opened the debate this morning, (Mr. G. Griswold,) displayed in his speech the objections raised against the resolution on the table, so fully, that he almost exhausted the subject. For, in listening attentively to the reasoning of the gentleman from Virginia, who followed him, (Mr. J. Lewis,) and of the other gentleman from Virginia, who spoke next, (Mr. Griffin,) he could not discern that any new or additional matter of much consequence had been urged. Nor did he discover much more than a repetition in substance of his colleague’s reasoning, in what had been urged by the gentleman from Mass., (Mr. Thatcher,) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Griswold;) though the statement of their objections had received a form and coloring diversified according to the skill and ingenuity of each.

The gentlemen, Mr. Chairman, who resist the provisions necessary to the completion of this treaty, do so because they say it has been ratified by the President and Senate in open violation of the constitution of the United States, and is, therefore, no treaty, but a nullity, an instrument void ab initio, not a part of the supreme law of the land, and consequently not binding upon Congress or the nation. They draw this bold and extraordinary conclusion from the style and meaning of the 3d and 7th articles of the treaty. The former of these, they say, is unconstitutional, because it proposes to annex a new territory, with its inhabitants, to our present dominion; the latter, because it abolishes for a term of years the discriminating duties of tonnage and impost within the ceded territory, giving a preference there to France and Spain, and leaving those duties unaltered in all the ports of the Union.

By the third article, it is agreed that the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, and be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of the citizens of the United States; and in the mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess.

On expounding this article, my colleague has declared that the President and Senate have no power to acquire new territory by treaty, and he argues that our people are to be for ever confined to their present limits. This is an assertion directly contrary to the powers inherent in independent nations, and contradictory to the frequent and allowed exercise of that power in our own nation. We are constantly in the practice of receiving territory by cession from the red men of the West, the aborigines of our country. The very treaty mentioned in the President’s Message, with the Kaskaskias Indians, whereby we have acquired a large extent of land, would, according to this doctrine, be unconstitutional; and so would all the treaties which add to the size of our statute book, with the numerous tribes of the natives on our frontiers. According to this construction, all our negotiations so happily concluded with those people, whom we ever have uniformly acknowledged as the sovereigns of the soil, are nugatory, and to be holden for naught. He said, he was perfectly aware of the answer which would be made, that we held all our national domain, under Great Britain, by virtue of the treaty concluded at Paris in 1783. What, after all, was the amount of[69] that cession by England? Certainly not a conveyance of a country which never was theirs, but rightfully belonged to the Indian natives; for it was, in its true construction, merely a quit claim of the pretensions or title of the land which the English had obtained by conquest and treaty from the French. By that negotiation, the United States obtained a bare relinquishment of the claims and possessions of those two powerful nations. But the paramount title of the original inhabitants was not affected by this. However contemptuously the rights of these rude and feeble tribes had been regarded by the Europeans, their descendants in these States had considered them with recognition and respect. Until the Indians sold their lands for an equivalent, the humane and just principles of the American Government acknowledged them to be the only legitimate owners. And the sovereignty acquired by treaty or purchase to our Government was derived from the title which the natives transferred to them as grantees in a fair bargain and sale. Such, Mr. M. argued, were the rules of true construction, and these rules admitted and acted upon by the Federal Government; and yet, according to the novel doctrine of this day, every treaty with the natives for parcels of their country, although hitherto deemed lawful, would be an unconstitutional act. According to this notion, every treaty for lands, held with the aborigines since the organization of the Government, was a violation of the constitution. And thus this invaluable instrument, this bulwark of our liberties, had been violated perhaps twenty times or more, since we began to buy the surplusage of their hunting grounds. The Indian tribes are as much aliens as any other foreign nations. Their lands are as much foreign dominion as the soil of France or Spain. Yet we have gone on to annex the territories which they sold us, to our present territory, from the time we acquired independence, and no mortal, until this debate arose, Mr. Chairman, has so much as thought that thereby a breach of the constitution was made. My colleague is surely entitled to great credit for his perspicuity in finding out that all our great and wise predecessors in administering this Government have been plunderers and constitution-breakers. But, sir, the just judgment on this subject is, that the Presidents and Senate of the United States have heretofore acted constitutionally in acquiring by purchase foreign dominions from the alien Indians. And by a parity of reasoning, they have acted not only constitutionally, but eminently for the interest of the country, in buying Louisiana from the white men, its present sovereigns.

But, independent of correct principles and steady precedent in favor of the acquirement of new territory, it may be worth while to mention a few of the strange consequences which flow from the doctrine which the gentlemen of the other side of the House contend for. According to their reasoning, if by any force of the currents of the ocean, or any conflicts of the winds and the waves, a new surface of earth should emerge from the neighborhood of Cape Hatteras, it would be unconstitutional to take possession of it. Yet it appears to me, sir, very like an absurdity to say the United States would break their bond of union by erecting a light-house on it. Suppose that, by volcanic action, islands should be suddenly elevated from the bottom of the neighboring Atlantic, as they have repeatedly risen from the depths of the Mediterranean, would it be unconstitutional to take possession of them? So far from it, there would on the other hand be a duty in the Government to assume the dominion of all adjacent islands. Again; suppose for a moment that our present limits were full of people, would it be unconstitutional to purchase additional territory for them to settle upon? Must the hive always contain its present numbers, and no swarm ever go forth? At this rate we should, before a great lapse of time, arrive at a plenum of inhabitants, and if no new settlement could be obtained for them, the Chinese custom of infanticide must be tolerated to get rid of those tender little beings for whom food enough could not be procured, to rear them to manhood. And thus, when this maximum of population shall have arrived, there would be no constitutional power to purchase and possess any of the waste lands on this or the other side of the Mississippi, for them to spread and thrive upon. A doctrine against which, he confessed, his understanding revolted.

Our Government having in this manner the right of acquiring additional territory, had very often exercised that right by actual purchases and by possessions and settlements afterwards. The whole of the recent State of Ohio and of the Indiana Territory was obtained and peopled in this manner. And in the settlement of limits both on the side of Florida and Nova Scotia, the principle had again and again been acted upon; and, strange to tell, nobody, until this eventful time, had possessed acuteness enough to find out the error.

But the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Chairman, (Mr. Griswold,) contends that even if we had a right to purchase soil, we have no business with the inhabitants. His words, however, are very select; for he said, and often repeated it, that the treaty-making power did not extend to the admission of foreign nations into this confederacy. To this it may be replied that the President and Senate have not attempted to admit foreign nations into our confederacy. They have bought a tract of land, out of their regard to the good of our people and their welfare. And this land, Congress are called upon to pay for. Unfortunately for the bargain, this region contains civilized and Christian inhabitants; and their existence there, it is alleged, nullifies the treaty. The gentleman construed the Constitution of the United States very differently from the manner in which Mr. M. himself did. By the third section of the third article of that instrument, it is declared, that Congress[70] shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property of the United States, and nothing therein contained shall be construed so as to prejudice any claim of the United States, or of any particular State.

In the case of Louisiana no injury is done either to the nation or to any State belonging to that great body politic. There was nothing compulsory upon the inhabitants of Louisiana to make them stay and submit to our Government. But if they chose to remain, it had been most kindly and wisely provided, that until they should be admitted to the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, they shall be maintained and protected in the enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess. What would the gentleman propose that we shall do with them? Send them away to the Spanish provinces, or turn them loose in the wilderness? No, sir, it is our purpose to pursue a much more dignified system of measures. It is intended, first, to extend to this newly acquired people the blessings of law and social order. To protect them from rapacity, violence, and anarchy. To make them secure in their lives, limbs, and property, reputation, and civil privileges. To make them safe in the rights of conscience. In this way they are to be trained up in a knowledge of our own laws and institutions. They are thus to serve an apprenticeship to liberty; they are to be taught the lessons of freedom; and by degrees they are to be raised to the enjoyment and practice of independence. All this is to be done as soon as possible; that is, as soon as the nature of the case will permit; and according to the principles of the federal constitution. Strange! that proceedings declared on the face of them to be constitutional, should be inveighed against as violations of the constitution! Secondly, after they shall have been a sufficient length of time in this probationary condition, they shall, as soon as the principles of the constitution permit, and conformably thereto, be declared citizens of the United States. Congress will judge of the time, manner, and expediency of this. The act we are now about to perform will not confer on them this elevated character. They will thereby gain no admission into this House, nor into the other House of Congress. There will be no alien influence thereby introduced into our councils. By degrees, however, they will pass on from the childhood of republicanism, through the improving period of youth, and arrive at the mature experience of manhood. And then, they may be admitted to the full privileges which their merit and station will entitle them to.

Mr. J. Randolph said that a sense of duty alone could have induced him to rise at that late hour. He wished to call the attention of the committee to a stipulation in the Treaty of London. [Here Mr. R. read an extract from the third article of that treaty, whereby the United States are pledged not to impose on imports in British vessels from their territories in America, adjacent to the United States, any higher duties than would be paid upon such imports, if brought into our Atlantic ports in American bottoms.] In this case, he said, gentlemen could not avail themselves of the distinction taken by his friend from Maryland (Mr. Nicholson) between a Territory and a State, even if they were so disposed—since the ports in question were ports of a State. The ports of New York, on the Lakes, were as much ports of that State, as the city of New York itself; they had their custom-house officers, were governed by the same regulations as other ports,—duties were exacted at them; and yet, under the article of the British Treaty which had been just read, British bottoms could and did enter them subject to no higher duties than were paid by American bottoms in the Atlantic ports. Mr. R. said that he did not mean to affirm that this exemption made by the Treaty of London was constitutional, so long as a distinction prevailed between American and British bottoms in other ports. He had never given a vote to carry that treaty into effect—but he hoped the gentlemen from Connecticut—both of whom he believed had done so; one of whom, at least, he knew had been a conspicuous advocate of that treaty—he hoped that gentleman (Mr. Griswold) would inform the committee how he got over the constitutional objection to this article of the Treaty of London, which he had endeavored to urge against that under discussion. How could the gentleman, with the opinion which he now holds, agree to admit British bottoms into certain ports, on the same terms on which American bottoms were admitted into American ports, generally? thereby making that very difference,—giving that very preference to those particular ports of certain States, which he tells us cannot constitutionally be given to the port of New Orleans—although that port is not within any State, and, if his (Mr. Griswold’s) doctrine be correct, not even within the United States!

The gentleman from Connecticut professed a wish that this important discussion should be conducted with moderation and candor. In this sentiment he concurred. He was therefore altogether unprepared, after this preamble, to hear the gentleman from Connecticut represent the treaty in question as conceding the most valuable commercial privileges to France and Spain, and thereby sapping the very foundation of our own carrying trade. In the spirit of candor the stipulations in question would be viewed, not as conceding advantages in trade to those nations, but as securing them to ourselves. The article in question did indeed profess to grant, for a limited time, to French and Spanish vessels, laden with the products of their respective countries, admission into the ports of the ceded territory, on equal terms with our own ships. But, although nominally an advantage has been conceded to these nations, substantially their situation was changed for the[71] worse, and the benefit in fact conferred on us. For what were our rights in these ports, and what were theirs, setting aside the treaty? The treaty then had rendered our situation more eligible and theirs less so. How then could gentlemen declare that it was calculated to injure our carrying trade? when by it our trade was put on the footing of absolute security, while that of France and Spain was admitted under considerable restrictions, enjoying in but one particular, and for twelve years only, an equality with ours. Their trade, before on so superior a footing, had descended from its pre-eminence in privilege, and given way to ours; and yet gentlemen warn us of the destruction of our carrying trade, and commercial prosperity, from the very source which has enlarged and secured both. The enemies of the treaty, therefore, are the advocates of the trade of France and Spain, and the enemies so far of our own; since, by retaining things in their present posture, they would continue to those nations the superior advantages which they now enjoy in the ports of Louisiana, they would continue the restrictions which heretofore have fettered our commerce to that country, and they would refuse to put our trade on a footing superior to that of France and Spain.

On the subject of expediency, the gentleman had undervalued the country west of the Mississippi, and had declared that he considered the barren province of Florida as more important to us. Mr. R. asked if the country west of the Mississippi were not valuable, according to the gentleman’s own statement, since it afforded the means of acquiring Florida, which he prized so highly, from Spain? He had no doubt of the readiness of that power to relinquish Florida, in itself a dead expense to her—only valuable as an out-work to her other possessions, and now insulated by those of the United States—for a very small portion of the country which we claimed in virtue of the treaty under discussion.

He denied the correctness of the doctrine advanced by the same gentleman, that the stipulation entered into by France, in time of war, to raise the Duke of Parma to the throne of Etruria, bound her to obtain a recognition of that King from every power of Europe. All which concerned us in that treaty had been recited in ours with France. By the Treaty of St. Ildefonso His Catholic Majesty stipulates “to redeliver (retroceder) to the French Republic, six months after the full and entire execution of the conditions and stipulations herein relative to His Royal Highness the Duke of Parma, the colony or province of Louisiana.” What these stipulations were is certainly known only to the parties themselves, for they never were officially made public, although we are at no loss to conjecture them. Nor are we at all concerned whether France has or has not complied with them. Because in a treaty executed at Madrid, six months after, in March, 1801, they show that they consider the former treaty as having passed the title to the country to France. The fifth article is as follows:

Spain, therefore, being satisfied as to the stipulations entered into by France in the Treaty of San Ildefonso, declares herself in the second treaty ready to redeliver the country to her whenever she was ready to receive it, and Mr. R. said, he had it from high authority that the royal mandate to that effect was in the hands of the Minister of the French Republic near the United States, and would be forwarded to the existing Government of Louisiana so soon as the treaty should be confirmed on our part.

Having departed considerably from the particular point on which he wished to be satisfied by the gentleman from Connecticut, who had spoken first, (Mr. Griswold,) he would again recall the attention of that gentleman to the third article of the Treaty of London, and request that he would reconcile its provisions to the doctrine which he had advanced on the seventh article of the treaty then before the committee.

The committee now rose. Mr. Speaker resumed the Chair, and Mr. Dawson reported that the committee had, according to order, had the said message, treaty, conventions, and motion, under consideration, and come to several resolutions thereupon; which he delivered in at the Clerk’s table, where the same were read, as follows:

The House proceeded to consider the said resolutions at the Clerk’s table: Whereupon the first resolution being again read, was, on the question put thereupon, agreed to by the House—yeas 90, nays 25, as follows:

The second resolution being again read, and amended at the Clerk’s table, was, on the question put thereupon, agreed to by the House, as follows:

Ordered, That Mr. John Randolph, jr., Mr. John Rhea, of Tennessee, Mr. Hoge, Mr. Gaylord Griswold, and Mr. Bedinger, be appointed a committee, pursuant to the said resolution.

The third resolution reported from the Committee of the whole House, being again read, was agreed to by the House.

Thursday, October 27.

Another member, to-wit, Abram Trigg, from Virginia, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Louisiana Treaty.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill from the Senate, entitled, “An act to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the thirtieth of April last, and for other purposes.”

The bill having been read, by paragraphs, as follows:

Mr. J. Randolph said he was apprised that the bill was of such a nature as seemed to delegate to the President of the United States a power, the exercise of which was intended to have but a short duration; he was also aware, that some such power was necessary to be vested in the Executive, to enable him to take possession of the country ceded by France. But he could conceive no cause for giving a latitude, as to time, so extensive as that allowed by the second section, which says, that “until Congress shall have made provision for the temporary government of the said territories, all the military, civil, and judicial powers, exercised by the officers of the existing government of the same, shall be vested in such person or persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct.” If we give this power out of our hands, it may be irrevocable until Congress shall have made legislative provision; that is, a single branch of the Government, the Executive branch, with a small minority of either House, may prevent its resumption. He did not believe that, under any circumstances, it was proper to delegate to the Executive a power so extensive; but if proper under certain circumstances, he was sure it was improper under present circumstances. As he conceived it proper to deal out power to the Executive with as sparing a hand as was consistent with the public good, he should move an amendment to substitute in the place of the words “Congress shall have made provision for the temporary government of the said territories”—these words, “the expiration of the present session of Congress, unless provision for the temporary government of the said territories be sooner made by Congress.” So that if Congress[73] shall make provision for the government of the territory at any time during the session, the power of the President will cease, and at any rate at the expiration of the session. In other words, this amendment will compel Congress to take early measures for reducing this enormous power, delegated to the Executive, by the establishment of a government for the people of Louisiana.

Mr. R. Griswold moved to strike out the whole of the second section, which would supersede the motion of the gentleman from Virginia. He made this motion to obtain an explanation respecting the nature and extent of the delegated power. That section provides “that until Congress shall have made provision for the temporary government of the said territories, all the military, civil, and judicial powers, exercised by the officers of the existing government of the same, shall be vested in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct.” I wish to know, said Mr. Griswold, whether any gentleman can inform me what the military, civil, and judicial powers, exercised by the officers of the existing province are; for we are about to confirm them, and direct their execution by the authorities of the United States.

It is probable that some of them may be inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States. We have certain restrictions on powers exercised under it. For instance, that the habeas corpus shall not be suspended in cases of invasion or rebellion, and a variety of other restraints. It is for this reason that I think we ought to have some knowledge of the powers exercised in Louisiana, before we confirm them in the lump; and in order to obtain this information, I move to strike out the section.

Mr. Elliot rose to second the motion of the gentleman from Connecticut, and to express his coincidence in the sentiments of that gentleman on this subject. He would never consent to delegate, for a single moment, such extensive powers to the President, even over a Territory. Such a delegation of power was unconstitutional. If such a provision as that contemplated by the section were necessary, it became Congress itself to enter upon the task of legislation.

Mr. J. Randolph had hoped that some other member would have given the gentleman from Connecticut the satisfaction he asked in relation to the provisions of the section proposed to be stricken out. No one having risen, he would do it himself as well as he was able. That gentleman asks whether we know the civil, military, and judicial powers that subsist in Louisiana; and contends that it is necessary we should know them before they are transferred to the Executive of the United States. If the section were to stand as it now does, Mr. R. said he would be as unwilling as the gentleman from Connecticut to agree to it. But, with the proposed limitation, he saw no substantial objection to it. He was one of those who did not know with precision what the subsisting civil, military, and judicial powers exercised in Louisiana were; and yet he saw not the difficulty which the gentleman had stated, as to the temporary transfer of the powers to the Executive with the limitation proposed—and wherefore? Because, in the nature of things, it was almost impossible to take possession of the country without the exercise of such powers at some point of time, and if they should be exercised but for a single moment, such exercise would be as hostile to the principles of the gentleman as the exercise of them for a whole year.

I ask, said Mr. R., whether if the country should be taken possession of on the principles advocated by the gentleman on a former day, these powers would not all have attached to the Executive? Suppose, instead of assuming the civil government of the territory, it had been taken possession of by storm, by an army of 40 or 50,000 soldiers—will the gentleman contend, that under such circumstances, the privilege of the habeas corpus or trial by jury would have been invaded? Undoubtedly not. If the gentleman will advert with precision to the first section, he will perceive that it is contemplated to take possession in such a manner as will give the United States security in that possession. For though we might not doubt the disposition of the Government of France to give us a secure possession, or apprehend difficulty from any other quarter, yet it would be recollected that there were citizens or subjects in the territory requiring some government. It was not impossible that on taking possession there may be some turbulent spirits, who, having at heart the advancement of personal schemes, may be disposed to resist. It would be unwise then in Congress to delay making the requisite provision, until necessity claimed it, and until, perhaps, after Congress had adjourned.

Gentlemen will see the absolute necessity of the path chalked out by the Senate. They will see the necessity of the United States taking possession of the country in the capacity of sovereigns, in the same extent as that of the existing government of the province. After having taken possession, and being in the secure enjoyment of the country, it will be extremely proper to guard against any apprehended Executive invasion of right. This step will then be politic, and it will be observed that the section as amended enjoins this duty upon Congress. If, however, the gentleman from Connecticut will show us any way in which the country may be taken possession of, with security, and by which the people may enjoy all the rights and franchises of citizens of the United States immediately, I shall be happy to give it the sanction of my vote. But to my mind this appears impossible.

Mr. Griswold thought it extraordinary that the gentleman from Virginia should call upon him to propose a plan for avoiding the difficulties that would apparently result from the system proposed by the bill, when it had only that day been laid upon their tables, and had been yesterday refused to be referred to a select committee;[74] and of consequence, no time for reflection had been allowed. Under these circumstances, it was indeed extraordinary that he should be expected to propose a plan. He confessed he was unable to offer any. To do it would doubtless require time and deliberation. It was sufficient for him that the bill infringed the constitution. By the second section it is proposed to transfer to the President of the United States all the powers, civil, military, and judicial, exercised at present in that province. What are those powers? No gentleman is able to inform me. It may be presumed that they are legislative; the President, therefore, is to be made the legislator of that country; that they are judicial, the President, therefore, is to be made judge; that they are executive, and so far they constitutionally devolve on the President. Hence, we are about making the President the legislator, the judge, and the executive of this territory. I do not, said Mr. G., understand that, according to the constitution, we have a right to make him legislator, judge, and executive, in any territory belonging to the United States. Though, therefore, on this occasion, I feel no jealousy of the abuse of the powers conferred on the President, yet I cannot agree to them, because I consider them repugnant to the constitution.

The argument that the powers are necessary, though unconstitutional, is no argument with me. If gentlemen can so explain the section, as to show to the satisfaction of the committee that it is competent to this House to transfer to the President all these powers, I shall have no objection to the section; but until this is done, it is my duty to vote for striking it out. And though it is impossible for me, at this moment, to devise a plan for overcoming these difficulties, yet I trust, if time be allowed, there will be found wisdom enough in the committee to devise one. To the first section, authorizing the taking possession of the country, so far as I can understand it, I can see no objection.

Mr. Nicholson was opposed to striking out the second section, as he did not perceive the evils contemplated by the gentleman from Connecticut. The question is, whether we shall take immediate possession of this country, or wait till this body shall have time to form such a government as shall be hereafter likely to render the people happy, under laws according to the provisions of the constitution? I think, said Mr. N., it will be injudicious to delay taking the possession, until such a government shall be formed. The only question then that can be started is, whether the second section of this bill violates the constitution. On this point I differ entirely from the gentleman from Connecticut. I do not see in it any violation of the constitution. The gentleman supposes that by adopting the provisions of the second section we shall vest all the civil, military, and judicial powers of the existing Government of Louisiana in the President. But it clearly is not so. We vest in him the appointment of the persons who shall exercise these powers, but we do not delegate to him the exercise of the powers themselves. Is there any difference between this, and the provisions of the ordinance of 1787, which relates to territorial governments? By that ordinance, and I have never heard its constitutionality questioned, all the civil, military, and judicial powers are vested in such persons as the President may appoint.

Mr. Mitchill expressed his wish that the section of the bill might stand. To strike it out would be to make void all the proceedings respecting the province of Louisiana, on which Congress had been engaged with so much care and diligence. We had purchased the country, and made arrangements to pay for it; and now, with the consent of France, possession is to be taken; when behold! an objection is made to that part of the intended statute which confers on the President the power to occupy and hold it peaceably for the nation.

But, let it be examined fairly what Congress are meditating to do. The third section of the fourth article of the constitution contemplates that territory and other property may belong to the United States. By a treaty with France the nation has lately acquired title to a new territory, with various kinds of public property on it or annexed to it. By the same section of the constitution, Congress is clothed with the power to dispose of such territory and property, and to make all needful rules and regulations respecting it. This is as fair an exercise of constitutional authority as that by which we assemble and hold our seats in this House. To the title thus obtained, we wish now to add the possession; and it is proposed that for this important purpose the President shall be duly empowered. There is no person in the nation to whom this can be so properly confided as to the President.

Mr. Dana said if the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania were inserted, it might imply that we may pass laws that were unconstitutional; it was, therefore, superfluous. It is objected to the scope of the second section, that it is unconstitutional; insert the amendment and it nullifies it. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Mitchill) has referred to a subject with which he is well conversant. He is correct in stating that the formal style of the English acts is in the name of the King. In the formal style of the acts of Parliament, the King is legislator; but will it be inferred from this circumstance that he is the real legislator? The gentleman is too well acquainted with the constitution and laws of that country, not to know that the King, though nominally the dispenser of justice, cannot himself sit upon the bench, and that this has been the case since the act of settlement. He might, in support of this position, refer to the declaration of a celebrated Chief Justice of England, who had said that the honor of the Crown had nothing to do with the courts of justice.

The gentleman is equally unfortunate in his[75] remarks on the power of Congress to make rules for the government of a Territory. It is objected to this, that in this case you make no laws at all. Is it to make laws, to say a man may do as he pleases? The proposed government is not even provisional or circumscribed. Insufficient also is any argument deducible from the ordinance establishing territorial governments. He presumed the ordinance alluded to was that of 1787. Under that ordinance the President is authorized to appoint the judges of the Territory; but once appointed, they hold their offices during good behavior. Who, under that ordinance, make the laws? Neither the judges nor the President. No laws can be accepted but such as have received the sanction of a representative body. What is proposed by the bill? That all powers, military, civil, and judicial, exercised by the officers of the existing government, shall be vested in such persons, and shall be exercised in such manner as the President shall direct. He may, under this authority, establish the whole code of Spanish laws, however contrary to our own; appoint whomsoever he pleases as judges, and remove them according to his pleasure; thus uniting in himself all the power, legislative, executive, and judicial. This, though a complete despotism, gentlemen may perhaps say is necessary. If so, let the military power be exercised by the President as commander-in-chief of the armies.

Mr. Eustis said it was possible the bill under consideration might in its details be objectionable, but in principle it was certainly sound. The Government of the United States has a constitutional right to acquire territory, and they have consequently a right to take possession of it when acquired. The taking possession of it was not only the right, but the duty of the Government. And how is this to be effected? Will any gentleman venture to propose a delay until Congress shall have passed a new code of laws? Are gentlemen, at this late day, to be informed that this would be to throw away one of the most valuable acquisitions made by our country since the adoption of the constitution, or the Declaration of Independence? As the gentleman, last speaking, rightly observes, the entire government of Spain ceases on our taking possession. Are we then to abandon the people to anarchy?

As to the extent of the power vested in the Executive, it arises from necessity. This is a new case altogether. There is no doubt that on many particular subordinate points, respecting the secure possession of this country, difficulties may present themselves. But Mr. E. presumed and expected that the same wisdom that acquired it, would preside over the councils of the nation to meet and overcome those difficulties. The second section of the bill contemplates the transfer to officers of the United States, of the same powers now exercised. It may be that the exercise of all these powers will not be necessary; while it is possible that others may be necessary. There may be difficulties of various kinds. He should name none. But as they arise, it will be the duty of the Government to be prepared to meet them. He would, therefore, wish this act rather to increase than curtail them; and that the President should be authorized not only to continue all necessary existing powers, but to institute such other powers as may be necessary for the well-being of the Territory. Till when? Until this House and the other branch of the Legislature shall make the necessary laws. The powers delegated by the bill are imposed by the imperious circumstances of the case. What if forcible possession shall prove necessary, and the innocent inhabitants should be slaughtered, through a want of the powers necessary to preserve tranquillity and good order; whose will, under such circumstances, will be the governing one? Will not the President, in such event, have all the powers now given him?

Mr. R. Griswold.—The powers proposed to be conferred by the gentleman are without limits. It may be necessary for the welfare of the people, to secure their religion. The President may be, therefore, constituted grand inquisitor, he may also be made a king, and likewise a judge, for the good of the people. I am not, said Mr. G., willing myself to give him such extensive powers. I can, however, well account for certain gentlemen urging on this occasion the old French argument of “imperious necessity.” But such a pretext can never justify me in giving a vote that will violate the constitution. I can, in truth, see no such necessity, as provision can be made for admitting these people to the enjoyment of all the privileges stipulated by the treaty, without involving a violation of the constitution. Gentlemen may criminate, as they please, the motives of those who are for restraining this extension of executive power; but I trust, whatever may be the feelings of gentlemen, that the committee will not be impressed with the same opinion entertained by them; but that if they consider this delegation of power as repugnant to the constitution, they will not agree to it, or, in other words, to the investiture of the President with absolute power over this province. If, on the other hand, they think the delegation is constitutional, they will feel no repugnance to agreeing to it; because, as I observed before, the power will be of short duration, and will not, probably, be abused.

As to the idea of some gentlemen, that this territory, not being a part of the United States, but a colony, and that therefore we may do as we please with it, it is not correct. If we acquire a colony by conquest or purchase—and I believe we may do both—it is not consistent with the constitution to delegate to the President, even over a colony thus acquired, all power, legislative, executive, and judicial; for this would make him the despot of the colony. Mr. G. concluded his remarks by observing that he had no jealousy of the abuse of this power[76] by the President; but not being, in his opinion, authorized by the constitution, he could not agree to vote for it.

Mr. Smilie said, this subject struck him differently from other gentlemen. If it appeared clear to him that the constitutional right to delegate the powers contemplated by the second section did not exist, he should vote against it. But he entertained no doubt on this point. He knew that it had been doubted whether the constitution authorized the Government of the United States to acquire territory; but those doubts were this day abandoned. He agreed in opinion with the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Varnum,) that the Constitution of the United States did not extend to this territory any further than they were bound by the compact between the ceding power and the people. On this principle they had a right, viewing it in the light of a colony, to give it such government as the Government of the United States might think proper, without thereby violating the constitution; when incorporated into the Union, the inhabitants must enjoy all the rights of citizens. He would thank gentlemen to show any part of the constitution that extends either legislative, executive, or judicial power, over this territory. If none such could be shown, it must rest with the discretion of the Government to give it such a system as they may think best for it. At the same time, Mr. S. said, he would pledge himself to be among the first to incorporate the territory in the Union, and to admit the people to all the rights of citizens of the United States.

Mr. Rodney.—When a constitutional question is made, and constitutional objections urged by a respectable member of this House, they shall always receive from me a respectful attention. On this occasion I shall endeavor to answer the objections, and remove the doubts entertained by some gentlemen. I believe we shall find that, by adopting the second section of the bill under consideration, we shall not infringe the constitution in the remotest degree. No person is more opposed to the extreme of absolute and unlimited power, or to vesting in any man that authority which, by not being circumscribed within known bounds, may be easily abused. No man can be more opposed to the exercise by the President of powers exercised by the Spanish inquisition, and authorized by other Governments. But cases may occur where, for a moment, powers to which, without an absolute necessity, no one would agree, become necessary to be vested in some department of the Government; and I am in favor of this section for the reasons assigned by my friend from Virginia, to wit, that the exercise of the powers delegated will be confined to a short space, and will be of no further duration than shall be necessary to obtain the end of a secure possession of the Territory.

The United States, it is acknowledged, have a right to extend their territory beyond that which they possessed when the constitution was formed. If, then, there exist the right to acquire territory, there is a consequence of the laws that pervade all civilized nations, which will show not only the constitutionality but the propriety also of this section. It is a received principle of the law of nations, that, when territory is ceded, the people who inhabit it have a right to the laws they formerly lived under, embracing the whole civil and criminal code, until they are altered or amended by the country to whom the cession is made. This is the received principle of the law of nations, and operates wherever the right to acquire territory is previously given. I will put a plain case, on the ground so commonly of late resorted to, that of acquiring territory by war. The right to make war is vested by the constitution in the Government of the United States. Suppose we had gone down the Mississippi, and favored the wishes of some of our citizens. Would not gentlemen, in that case, have acknowledged that we should have possessed the right of laying contributions? Should we not have had the right of saying to those who exercised the powers of government in that country, “Begone! We will make new arrangements; the powers of government shall be exercised by such particular organs as we like. Your laws and your religion shall be preserved; but your officers shall be replaced by ours.” Under the laws of nations we should have enjoyed all these powers.

But, independent of this power conferred by the law of nations, I am inclined to think the provisions of the constitution apply to this case. There is a wide distinction between States and Territories, and the constitution appears clearly to indicate it. By examining the constitution accurately, it will be found that the provision relied upon by the gentleman from Connecticut will not avail to support his argument. It will appear that it is to operate in the case of States only. By the third section of the fourth article of the constitution, it is declared that “the Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States or any particular State.”

This provision does not limit or restrain the authority of Congress with respect to Territories, but vests them with full and complete power to exercise a sound discretion generally on the subject. Let us not be told this power, from its greatness, is liable to abuse. If arguments are drawn from the abuse against the use of power, I know no power which may not be abused, and it will follow that the same arguments that are urged against the use of this power may be urged against the use of all power.

We may be told that, in the government of the North-western Territory, there are certain fixed rules established. But by a recurrence to[77] the ordinance for the government of that Territory, and to the laws of Congress subsequently made, it will be seen that Congress have conceived themselves to be possessed of the right, and have actually exercised the power, to alter the Territory, by adding to or taking from it as they thought proper, and by making rules variant from those under which it was originally organized.

In the Territories of the United States, under the ordinances of Congress, the governor and the judges have a right to make laws. Could this be done in a State? I presume not. It shows that Congress have a power in the Territories, which they cannot exercise in States; and that the limitations of power, found in the constitution, are applicable to States and not to Territories.

The question was then put on striking out the second section, and lost—ayes 30.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading to-morrow.

Friday, October 28.

Louisiana Treaty.

The bill sent from the Senate, entitled “An act to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the thirtieth of April last, and for the temporary government thereof,” together with the amendments agreed to yesterday, was read the second time, as follows:

On the question, Shall the bill pass? the yeas and nays were required, and stood—yeas 89, nays 23, as follows:

Saturday, October 29.

Mourning for Edmund Pendleton.

Mr. Eustis rose and observed, that within a few days past the House were called upon to take notice of an event which, perhaps, would be more interesting to posterity than to the present generation; the death of one of those illustrious patriots who, by a life devoted to his country, had bequeathed a name and an example to posterity which he would not attempt to describe. He had information that another of these sages, Edmund Pendleton, of Virginia, had paid the last tribute to nature.

On this occasion he begged leave to offer to the House the following resolution:

The resolution was immediately taken up, and agreed to—ayes 77.

[78]

Wednesday, November 2.

Road to Natchez and New Orleans.

Mr. Mitchill called the attention of the House to a subject of considerable importance, growing out of our possessions on the Mississippi. He stated that the mail to Natchez was at present transported by a route circuitous and difficult of performance. The Cherokee country, which constituted a part of it, was so destitute of water and articles of subsistence, as to render it necessary for the conveyor of the mail to carry whatever himself or his horses required. Even the water used was carried in goat skins. A great portion of the country was likewise infested with robbers. The measure he proposed was to inquire by what means the carriage of the mail to the Natchez and New Orleans could be facilitated, so as to abridge the time now consumed, and lessen the dangers and difficulties attending the transportation. Mr. M. believed a route might be pursued whereby four hundred miles could be saved in the present distance to the Natchez. Mr. M. desired such an inquiry to be made into the means of accomplishing this important object, as should, while it tended to promote the great political and commercial interests of the country, convince the Indian tribes that our object was not to invade their rights. He further observed, that the usual voyage to New Orleans was about thirty days. If the route by land should be improved, that place might be probably reached in ten days. He therefore offered the following resolution:

Agreed to without a division.

Monday, November 7.

Another member, to wit, Oliver Phelps, from New York, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Thursday, November 10.

Another member, to wit, James Gillespie, from North Carolina, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Monday, November 14.

A petition of Andrew Moore, of the State of Virginia, was presented to the House and read, complaining of an undue election and return of Thomas Lewis, to serve as a member in this House, for the district composed of the counties of Greenbrier, Kenawha, Monroe, Botetourt, and Rockbridge, in the said State.

Ordered, That the said petition be referred to the Committee of Elections.

Tuesday, November 15.

Another member, to wit, George Tibbits, from New York, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Thursday, November 17.

Postage of Newspapers.

Mr. G. W. Campbell.—There is a subject to which I wish to draw the attention of the House. It is, sir, the postage charged on the transportation of newspapers in the mail. This subject I conceive of sufficient importance to meet the attention of this House, as it affects the means of acquiring political information in the different parts of the Union.

I presume it will not be denied, that the most effectual way of rendering the people at large useful citizens, and of securing to them their liberties and independence, would be to increase the sources of information, make them well acquainted with their political rights, and also with the proceedings of their Government. So long as they are informed on those subjects, so long they will be disposed to acquiesce in, and support such measures as may be calculated to promote the general good, but will be prepared to resist any attempts that may be made to infringe their rights by those in power. It is believed that newspapers are the most general and effectual means of disseminating political information among the citizens at large; and it ought therefore to be the object of Government to facilitate their circulation as much as possible. I conceive, sir, the most direct way to attain this object would be to cause them to be transported in the mail free of postage.

The moneys arising from the postage on newspapers cannot certainly be such an object to Government, as would justify the principle of laying a tax on information, or pursuing any measures that would have a tendency to diminish, in the least degree, the means by which it may be acquired. It seems to be admitted by all those who have considered the subject, that the Post Office establishment was never intended as a paramount source of revenue; and therefore we find that the moneys arising therefrom have not generally been taken into the calculation, in the estimates of our finances. The whole amount of the postage on newspapers I believe to be very inconsiderable, as an item of revenue; and a great proportion of it, as I am informed, is given to the deputy postmasters for keeping the accounts of such postage, and for collecting the same: and if information is to be relied upon, many of those deputy postmasters, who are allowed about fifty per cent on the amount of postage thus collected, are of opinion that the labor of keeping those accounts and of collection, exceeds this compensation; and they would be well satisfied that no such postage existed. If this statement be correct, it will go a great way to prove the measure impolitic.

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But perhaps it may be said that the postage to be collected on newspapers, has a tendency to ensure their arrival at the places of destination, and the delivery of them to those to whom they are directed. This, upon investigation, will, I believe, be found not to be the case. It is made the duty of the postmasters, by law, to forward and deliver newspapers, as well as letters,—they act upon oath, and if a sense of propriety in their conduct, and the obligation of an oath, would not induce them to perform their duty in this respect, it cannot be expected that the paltry emolument accruing to them from their part of one cent, or one and a half cents on each newspaper, would have that effect; and even this sum must be still less relied upon, as an inducement, when it is considered, as already stated, that the labor required in keeping accounts for this purpose and in collection, is not in reality compensated by the sum received. In order, therefore, to bring this subject fairly before the House, I move that the House come to the following resolution:

Ordered to lie on the table.

Friday, November 18.

Two other members, to wit: Joseph Bryan, and Samuel Hammond, from Georgia, appeared, presented their credentials, were qualified, and took their seats in the House.

Monday, November 21.

Two other members, to wit: Simeon Baldwin and Benjamin Tallmadge, from Connecticut, appeared, produced their credentials, were qualified, and took their seats in the House.

Wednesday, November 23.

Repeal of the Bankrupt Law.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the resolution, offered by Mr. Newton, for repealing the Bankrupt law.

The resolution was advocated by Messrs. Newton, Elliot, Smilie, Hastings, Stanford, and Randolph; and opposed by Messrs. Jackson, Early, Skinner, and Eustis.

The advocates of repeal observed that though the resolution had lain on the table for a considerable time, purposely with a view to collect public opinion, no remonstrance hostile to it had been received from any part of the Union, and that this circumstance indicated the unfavorable sentiment entertained of the bankrupt system; and that even among those most materially interested in its provisions, a dead silence prevailed. Some gentlemen were averse to the repeal, inasmuch as the law would expire by its own limitation, in a few years; but the House should recollect that in the mean time they were responsible for all its evils and iniquities. If, too, it should be suffered to die a natural death, the inevitable effect would be that those who are now struggling to avoid bankruptcy will precipitate themselves into such a situation as to avail themselves of its benefit.

With regard to the principle of the present bankrupt system, and probably of any other bankrupt system that could be devised, it was unjust, inasmuch as it favored one class of citizens, the merchants, at the expense of all other classes; to advance the interest of the first it sacrificed the interests of all the other members of the community. To prove this, it was only necessary to illustrate it by the common case of a merchant availing himself of the benefits of bankruptcy, and thereby cancelling the demands of the mechanic or the farmer who might be his creditor; and of the same individual mechanic or farmer, the debtors of another merchant, remaining his debtor with their property subject at any period of their life to his seizure. In the case of the insolvent merchant his debts were totally discharged; whereas in the case of the insolvent mechanic and farmer, they were of eternal obligation. The preferable system was that established by the several States, which existed before the bankrupt system, and which still existed, extending to all insolvent debtors the same relief.

It was contended that the partial operation of the bankrupt system had the most mischievous influence on the morals of the mercantile world. That it operated as an impunity to fraud and negligence; that it created extensive credits, and excited a spirit of the most prodigal expenditure; that although the American merchants were probably the most honest and certainly the most able and enterprising in the world, the facility with which credits were obtained, and the impunity with which risks were incurred, had, under the auspices of this law, introduced into their private expenditures a ruinous extravagance; and that nothing was more common than to see a merchant, of but small capital, living at an expense superior to that of the European trader who had realized his plum, and at an expense which shamed the frugal disbursements of the affluent planter. What were the effects? The scene of luxury and splendor was enjoyed for a few years, and was succeeded by a failure. Did it become the Legislature to encourage, or repress this spirit?

The principle of the bankrupt system was inequitable as it regarded the relation of debtor and creditor. However it might be averred to the contrary, it was a truth that its provisions operated to the advantage of the debtor, and of course to the detriment of the creditor. There was no weight in the remark that the commission was taken out at the instance of the creditor, as that was merely a nominal act, a creditor usually being made use of who was the friend of the bankrupt. That it operated to the benefit of the debtor was clear from its liberating all his future acquisitions, after availing himself[80] of the benefit of a commission, from seizure: whereas, under an insolvent law, the person alone was released. That hence sprang up a ten-fold temptation to fraud under this act, over that which existed under the common insolvent laws. For that under the latter an insolvent debtor, if guilty of a fraudulent concealment of property, could at any future period be called upon to satisfy the claims of his creditors by a delivery of his visible property; while, under this law, the bankrupt may live in the greatest splendor, even ostentatiously displaying his property, without rendering it liable to seizure. Fraud once successfully perpetrated and concealed, every restraint is removed; and so deleterious had this effect been that it had manifestly inflicted a deep wound upon the confidence of man with man in the ordinary transactions of life.

It was further contended, that while justice and humanity dictated the liberation from arrest of the body of the unfortunate debtor, justice inhibited the exoneration of property from going to satisfy just debts; that the obligation, wherever the ability existed, to pay just debts, was eternal, and that this law, in having a retro-active effect, was unjust. Evils infinitely greater had been inflicted by inconsiderate and fraudulent debtors taking refuge in the provisions of the bankrupt law than from all the inhumanity exercised by merciless creditors over unfortunate debtors. That the principle of the bankrupt law was also retro-active, inasmuch as it destroyed the grade of dignity existing in many of the States, by which a bonded debt obtained a preference over an open account; that it absolutely impaired the subsisting contract between the person holding and the person signing the bond.

It was remarked that the principle of the bankrupt law, however good in theory, could never be carried into effect, as had been proved by a long course of British experience, without a recurrence to those sanguinary laws which they had introduced for the prevention and punishment of fraud, but which were so abhorrent to our code of laws that public opinion could not tolerate them.

The expenses of going through the forms of bankruptcy constituted no inconsiderable objection to the system. The appointment of a Commissioner was understood to be in no small degree lucrative, and the various processes through which the bankrupt was compelled to go, in practice, reduced the little property he had left to a state still less. Indeed, from the practical effects of the system, it would appear that it had been made more for the emolument of the Commissioner than for the benefit of the creditor.[7]

However necessary this system might be in England, who owed almost the whole of her prosperity to trade, it became not a nation, the leading feature of whose character was agriculture, to tread in her footsteps; but, on the contrary, to avert rather than to hasten the period when such a system would be rendered necessary; that, in truth, the spirit of trade in this country was sufficiently vigorous, and only required the common protection given to all other occupations, to prosper to every beneficial purpose.

In the commercial world, the honest, though unfortunate merchant, had nothing to fear from his creditors. A long experience had shown that the mercantile world felt with sympathy and acted with magnanimity to the unfortunate. In addition to these objections, it was urged that the bankrupt law was injurious, as it enlarged the sphere of the Federal courts. The constitution was a system of compromise. Many powers were given without a view to their immediate exercise. It did not, therefore, follow that, because the power given to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy was given, it must now be exercised. The powers of the General Government, if not too great, were sufficiently great. It became Congress, therefore, neither to take from nor add to the powers of the State courts. To increase the powers of the Federal courts, through the operation of the bankrupt system, was to derogate from the powers of the State courts. The State tribunals were weak enough, without thus trenching upon them.

The authorities under this law not only went to enlarge the powers of the Federal Government generally, but particularly to the extension of executive power. The appointment of Commissioners of Bankruptcy was an additional weight thrown into the scale of executive patronage. The power of that department ought to be viewed with an eye of jealousy, and the House, however willing to allow to it the enjoyment of all fair and necessary power, ought vigilantly to guard against its undue increase. It might be answered that this evil might be removed by placing the appointment of the Commissioners in the hands of the courts. But this would not be the effect. The Judicial Department, in the aspect of its political weight, was not to be contemned. So long as it remains, as fixed by the constitution, it will rest for support somewhere—it will naturally ally itself to some other department of the Government, and the inducements to such alliance will be most naturally held out by the Executive; but however peculiar circumstances might at this time indicate otherwise, such a tendency was a kind of political gravity, which, however it might for a time be checked, would eventually exert its influence.

On the other hand, the opponents of the repeal observed that the silence of the public on the subject indicated neither hostility nor opposition to the present system of bankruptcy;[81] if it indicated any prevailing sentiment, it was that of confidence in the judgment of their representatives. If the system really was so unpopular as some gentlemen had represented it to be, their tables would ere this have been covered with memorials for its repeal, whereas not a single petition to that effect had been presented during the session.

They contended that it would be true policy to suffer the act to expire by its own limitation. Little more than two years would elapse before the arrival of that period. This conduct was dictated by the undisputed fact that the present system had been adopted as an experiment. Hence the limitation of the act. This experiment was now in a fair course of trial. Little more than three years had elapsed since its commencement, and sufficient time had not yet passed to test the goodness or the badness of the principle it involved. It was a fact that the distresses of the commercial world called forth such a system when it was formed in the year 1800; it was a fact that it had done much good; and it might be that a system of bankruptcy, improved to the extent of which it was susceptible, would be of permanent utility. Amendments, radical amendments, the system certainly required; and should the House determine not to destroy it, the amendments could and doubtless would be made.

It was believed that the general sentiment of the nation concurred in the propriety of affording some relief to the distresses of the commercial world. On the form and extent of that relief great contrariety of opinion existed. It was the opinion of well-informed merchants and of the best writers, that a greater relief should be afforded to the misfortunes of men engaged in trade than in other occupations. To the argument that the proper relief to be extended should be left to the determination of the States, the objection that the laws of the different States were on this point various and contradictory, was conclusive. Trade, of all human occupations, embraced the widest range. Its operations were confined to no particular State or climate, but pervaded the whole world. It was of great importance then, if practicable, that laws in relation to it should be equally wide with this extensive range. Though this was utterly impracticable, yet it was practicable to make the same laws pervade a whole nation. Of this opinion were the venerable patriots of 1789, who framed the constitution; such was the spirit of the constitution itself; and such its language in speaking of uniform laws respecting imports, bankruptcies, and intercourse between the several States. Not that the power to pass such laws was imperative: but they manifested the sense of that body and the spirit of the instrument, that all laws on those subjects should be uniform throughout the United States.

To the argument, that the exoneration of property from the payment of just debts was a violation of justice, it was replied, that however correct the principle might be in ordinary cases, it did not hold in commercial concerns. In other employments an inability to comply with contracts was generally the result of idleness or imprudence; but so great and inevitable were the risks attendant on commerce, that no human prudence could guard against them.

Of trade, credit was the life; without it, it could not exist. In this country, too, it was the great source of revenue. How impolitic then was it, in a country where the whole of the revenue, and much of the wealth of its citizens, depended upon trade, to adopt regulations which would repress mercantile exertion and enterprise.

It was contended, that it was not true that the principle of a bankrupt law operated in favor of the debtor; the reverse was the case, and constituted one of the strongest arguments of its superiority to insolvent laws, under which the time of surrender was left to the option of the debtor; whereas, under a bankrupt law, the creditor, whenever he had reason to apprehend the fraud or failure of his debtor, could take out a commission under the bankrupt law; the creditor may arrest the prodigal or unjust career of the debtor; while, under the insolvent law, the debtor rarely surrenders his property, until he has squandered nearly the whole, or until he has made a fraudulent transfer of it. Such was the operation of the principle of a good bankrupt system; with regard to the present it was admitted that its provisions were unfair, and operated frequently the other way.

A leading argument in favor of a bankrupt system was that it multiplied checks against fraud; there would of course be less temptation to commit fraud, as the chances of concealing it diminished. In most countries the terrors of an awful punishment awaited the commission of fraud under this act, even the terrors of death. Though it might not be sound policy in this country to make punishments so terrible, yet it was always within the power of the Legislature to make transgressions so penal, as to guard against the apprehended evils.

It was contended that one great object of the constitution in bestowing this power on the General Government was the establishment of national credit upon the broad principles of justice; such was the effect of the system of bankruptcy by which the same obligations were imposed upon the merchants of all States in their relation to each other, and towards foreigners. Remove this system, and you virtually re-enact the partial and varying laws of the different States. In Virginia, for instance, the person only of the debtor is liberated, while in Maryland both person and property are liberated. Will not the citizen of one State acquire advantages over the citizen of another, and will not foreigners have reference in their dealings to the laws of the States, and prefer dealing with the citizens of that State where there shall exist the greatest security for the recovery of their debts? Will not the citizen of one State remove into another, and evade the operation of the laws of the States where contracts were[82] made? The friends of the repeal say the bankrupt system is retrospective in its operation. That was true, inasmuch as it changed the relations of debtor and creditor. But what will the repeal do? Contracts have been made under the contemplated existence of the act for a fixed period. By repealing it before that period arrives, you likewise change again the relations of debtor and creditor.

About four o’clock, the debate being closed, the question on the resolution to repeal, was taken and carried in the affirmative, ayes 94.

The Committee rose, and the House immediately took up their report, on agreeing to which the yeas and nays were required, and were, yeas 99, nays 13, as follows:

Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in, pursuant to the said resolution; and that Mr. Newton, Mr. Hammond, Mr. Tallmadge, Mr. Van Cortlandt, and Mr. Marmaduke Williams, do prepare and bring in the same.

Thursday, November 24.

Amy Dardin.

On the motion of Mr. Claiborne, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the report of the Committee of Claims on the petition of Amy Dardin. The report is unfavorable to the prayer of the petitioner.

On agreeing to this report, a discussion took place which occupied the greater part of the day. Messrs. J. C. Smith, Gregg, and Macon supported, and Messrs. Claiborne, Smilie, and Elliot opposed the report; when the question was taken on agreeing to the report of the Committee of Claims and lost—ayes 32.

Mr. Claiborne then moved a resolution, “that the prayer of Amy Dardin is reasonable and ought to be granted.”

Messrs. Claiborne and Nicholson supported and Messrs. Griswold and Gregg opposed this resolution, which, on the question being taken, was carried—ayes 61, nays 38.

The committee then rose, and reported their agreement to the resolution.

Mr. Gregg moved an amendment directing the proper accounting officer of the Treasury to settle the claim of Amy Dardin, on the same principle with similar cases, the statute of limitations notwithstanding.

Messrs. Griswold and Gregg supported, Messrs. Nicholson and Claiborne opposed the amendment.

A concurrence in the report was then agreed to, and the Committee of Claims instructed to bring in a bill.

Friday, November 25.

Ordered, That the petition of Memucan Hunt, William Polk, and Pleasant Henderson, for themselves and others, addressed to the General Assembly of the State of North Carolina; also, sundry resolutions of the said Assembly, respecting a claim for the value of certain lands in the State of Tennessee, presented to this House on the nineteenth of January, one thousand eight hundred and two, and the report of a select committee thereon, made the twenty-fourth of March, in the same year, be referred to the committee this day appointed on the memorial of the Legislature of Tennessee.

Bankrupt Law.

Mr. Newton called for the order of the day on the bill to repeal an act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States; and the House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the said bill.

Mr. Varnum moved an amendment, extending the period of repeal to the first of January, 1804, instead of from the passage of the act; and afterwards varied the motion, so as to leave the period of repeal blank.

This motion was supported by Messrs. R. Griswold, Early, and Skinner; and opposed by Messrs. Smilie, Newton, Rodney, and Hastings. Lost—ayes 25.

On motion of Mr. R. Griswold, an amendment was introduced, directing the completion of all proceedings under commissions taken out previous to the repeal.

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The committee then rose and reported the bill with the above amendment, in which the House immediately concurred, and ordered, without a division, the bill to be engrossed for a third reading on Monday.

[The bill is concise, and is confined to repealing the bankrupt act, saving cases where commissions have been taken out previously to the passage of the act, at which time the repeal takes effect.]

Monday, November 28.

Public Roads.

On the call of Mr. Jackson, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the following resolution:

Mr. Jackson called for the reading of the acts of Congress which were referred to in the resolution, which was done: he then moved that the committee rise and report their agreement.

Mr. Varnum said he hoped the question would be taken separately on the resolution.

Mr. Jackson hoped that gentlemen opposed to the resolution would rise at that time and express their opinions.

Mr. Nicholson was opposed to the resolution, but was prevented from indisposition from expressing his sentiments; he would do it at a future period.

Mr. J. Randolph was sorry that the indisposition of his friend from Maryland should prevent him from delivering his sentiments on this occasion. He was himself unprepared to speak on this question, but it appeared to him, from a complete view of the subject some time since, that the resolutions contravened one of the provisions of the law to which it was referred; by reverting to that law, it would be found that in one of the propositions offered by Congress to the State of Ohio, it was provided that one-twentieth part of the net proceeds, arising from the sale of lands in that State, should be laid out in roads to and from it, and laid out under the direction of Congress. The State of Ohio agreed to adopt the propositions if Congress would make an amendment, (which he read.) He wished to call the attention of the committee to the facts, and wished them to attend to the different propositions. He should not have troubled the committee but from an apprehension that when gentlemen had taken up an opinion, they were loth to abandon it. One of the propositions of Congress was, that one-twentieth part of the net proceeds arising from the sale of lands in the State of Ohio should be laid out under the direction of Congress in the making of roads from the Atlantic to that State. The State of Ohio agrees to the proposition with this amendment, that not less than three per cent. should be laid out exclusively in that State, under the direction of their Legislature. He conceived that the last proposition was only a modification of the former, and that the three per cent. was a part of the five, and not an additional allowance; if the latter had been intended, why, he asked, was it not so expressed? There were several other propositions and they were stated to be amendments. He considered Congress never intended to grant more than five per cent. and should therefore vote against the resolutions.

Mr. R. Griswold apprehended there could be no doubt as to the construction which Congress gave to the law in question; there might be some doubt whether that construction was a sound one; he, however, thought it perfectly so. In the year 1801, Congress provided that one-twentieth part of the net proceeds arising from the sale of lands in the State of Ohio, should be applied to making roads to that State, under the direction of Congress. The proposition was laid before the State of Ohio. The Convention of Ohio agreed to it, provided Congress would consent to a modification of it; they wished some part of the five per cent. to be laid out exclusively in their own State and under the direction of their own Legislature; they therefore proposed that three per cent. should be laid out in the State, and under the direction of the Legislature of Ohio. If the State of Ohio had intended that the three per cent. was to be added to the five, they would have stated it (as in the other propositions) to be in addition to it. The committee which were on the subject last session, gave the law the same construction which he did, and the House concurred in that construction. He thought they were under no obligation to lay out more money than they had agreed to do, and if the committee would attend to the subject, they could be under no difficulty to determine the construction. We had an appropriation of two per cent. to make, and perhaps it might be necessary to pass a law to that effect; but he could not consent to give any more.

Mr. G. W. Campbell would beg the indulgence of the committee while he said a few words on the subject before them. As he should vote in favor of the resolution on the table, he conceived that when they were about to determine on the construction of a law, they were only to refer to the face of it, and not to[84] inquire what the framers of it meant. He begged leave to read the law on the subject, and said that the law of Congress concerning five per cent. was in force, unless repealed by another law; and the subsequent law, which provided for the laying out of three per cent. in roads, was either in addition to or a repeal of it; he believed that it was an addition to it. It could not be the intention of the Convention of Ohio to accept of three per cent. to be laid out in their own State, and under the direction of their own Legislature, in lieu of five per cent. to be laid out under the direction of Congress. He should, considering the appropriations to be distinct ones, vote in favor of the resolutions.

Mr. Rodney deemed it necessary to make but few observations after the able arguments of his friend from Virginia, (Mr. Randolph,) and the luminous observations of the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Griswold,) against the resolutions. The question to be determined, was, whether the five per cent. was to be given exclusive of the three? It had been said that they ought not to consider the intention of those who framed the law, but he conceived it to be proper, in order to give a right construction. When they reverted to the propositions themselves, they would find one of them was, that provided the State of Ohio would not for a limited time tax the lands of the United States, that then one-twentieth part of the net proceeds arising from the sale of lands in that State should be laid out in making roads to the State of Ohio, the same to be laid out under the direction of Congress. When this proposition came before the Convention of Ohio, they said that three per cent. ought to be laid out exclusively in their own State and under the direction of their Legislature. This could only be intended as a modification of the law. He did not think there was any difficulty in determining the construction of the law, and should vote against the resolution.

Mr. Varnum conceived that the construction given to the law by the gentlemen from Virginia, Connecticut, and Delaware, was perfectly correct. He did not know whether it would be necessary to make an appropriation of the remaining two per cent. during this session, but in order to try the principle, he moved to strike out of the resolution the words one-twentieth and insert one-fiftieth.

Mr. Sanford had not intended to have troubled the committee on this occasion, but being a representative from the West, it might be expected that he might be in favor of the resolution. But he did not conceive that more than five per cent. was ever intended to be given, and this was not a question of expediency. He did not believe that the Convention of Ohio intended that the three per cent. should be given in addition to the five, nor had they any reason to expect it. This ought not to be an Eastern and a Western question. If the five per cent. was now given, Mr. S. asked whether it would not operate for the benefit of the rest of the States as well as the State of Ohio? But, as they must determine, not what Congress ought to give, but what they meant to give, and he conceived that three per cent. was a part of the five, he should therefore vote against the resolution.

Mr. Lyon spoke in favor of the resolution at some length.

Mr. Macon did not think it necessary to say any thing on the construction of the law, because he conceived the arguments of the two first gentlemen who opposed the resolution (Messrs. J. Randolph and R. Griswold) to be unanswerable; but as the question appeared to be made an Eastern and a Western one, he would say a few words. He considered the whole United States concerned in it, and not merely the State of Ohio. He believed that the arguments of gentlemen, that they had not done justice to the State of Ohio, were groundless. There was no State in the Union which has been so much favored as that State. He was sorry gentlemen had used threats on the occasion, that if they did not grant this, they might not be attached to the Union; but he believed that the State of Ohio would be the greatest loser by it. He was willing to leave it to the Western people themselves to determine, whether Congress had not done them justice, and he was certain they would answer in the affirmative.

Mr. Boyle did not consider this a question of party or of expediency; nor what Congress ought to give, but what they had given. If the construction of the law was difficult to determine, it ought to be taken against the United States and favorable to the State of Ohio, because Congress was the grantor and that State the grantee. This was the manner in which private contracts were always construed, and he thought it a sound one. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. John Randolph) had said that the three per cent. was not intended to be given in addition to the five, because it was not so expressed; but Mr. B. said, the last law was not said to be a modification, the construction was therefore doubtful and ought to be taken favorable to the State of Ohio.

Mr. Goddard did not think they were under any difficulty in determining the true construction of the law in question. He considered it to admit of but one construction; this appeared to him to be a negotiation between Congress and the State of Ohio. It was proposed by the former, that if the latter would not tax their lands for a limited time, the one-twentieth part of the net proceeds should be laid out in making roads for that state under the direction of Congress; the State of Ohio acceded to it, provided three per cent. should be laid out exclusively in that State, and Congress agreed to it; this appeared to him to be the true state of the case.

Mr. Morrow would beg the indulgence of the committee while he made a few observations on the subject. He was sorry this was made a[85] party question. He read the report of the committee of Congress and the propositions of Congress to the State of Ohio; and observed that when the propositions came before the convention, they were pleased with them, but did not consider that the five per cent., which was to be laid out in roads, was an equivalent for what they asked: which was, that the State of Ohio should not for a limited time tax the lands of Congress. How, said Mr. M., gentlemen would ask, was this known? He would answer, by an estimate of the value of both; therefore they agreed to the propositions, provided Congress would make an amendment, and allow them an additional three per cent. to be laid out exclusively in their own State and under the direction of their Legislature: to this Congress agreed. He conceived the question for them to determine, whether the three was in addition to or in lieu of the five; he believed it could not be the latter, because it would go to defeat the original design, which was facilitating the communication between the Eastern and Western States. He was in favor of the resolution, believing that it was the intention of the Convention of Ohio, at the time they agreed to the propositions, that the three per cent. was to be given in addition to the five.

The question was taken on Mr. Varnum’s motion to strike out one-twentieth and insert one-fiftieth, and carried—yeas 75.

The question was then taken on the resolution as amended, and carried without a division.

Tuesday, November 29.

Amy Dardin.

Mr. Claiborne called for the order of the day on the bill for the relief of Amy Dardin.

The motion of Mr. Dawson being lost, there being only thirty-two ayes in favor of it, Mr. Claiborne’s motion was taken up.

Mr. Sanford moved to postpone the order of the day on the bill for the relief of Amy Dardin till to-morrow, in order to introduce a resolution for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the expediency of extending the time for adjusting the claims of individuals for supplies furnished and services rendered during the Revolutionary war, with the view of trying previously to the granting individual relief the general principle, whether Congress would repeal the statutes of limitation.

After a debate of considerable length, the motion to postpone was lost.

The House then went into a Committee of the Whole on the bill, which was so amended as to allow Amy Dardin two thousand five hundred dollars for the horse Romulus, being the estimated value thereof, not including interest.

The Committee reported the bill so amended.

The question was then taken on two thousand five hundred dollars, and decided in the negative by the vote of the Speaker.

Mr. Nicholson moved to fill the blank with two thousand three hundred and twenty dollars, being the amount of principal and interest on the value of the horse.

Mr. Sanford moved to fill it with one thousand dollars.

The House agreed to Mr. Nicholson’s motion—ayes 58, noes 43.

The yeas and nays were then taken on the engrossing of the bill for a third reading—yeas 57, nays 49.

Ordered, That the said bill be read the third time to-morrow.

Wednesday, November 30.

The Speaker laid before the House sundry depositions and other papers, transmitted from the counties of Greenbriar and Rockbridge, in the State of Virginia, respecting the contested election of Thomas Lewis, one of the members returned to serve in this House for the said State; which were ordered to be referred to the Committee of Elections.

Amy Dardin.

An engrossed bill for the relief of the legal representatives of David Dardin, deceased, was read the third time; and on the question that the said bill do pass, there appeared—yeas 58, nays 57. And Mr. Speaker having declared himself with the nays, the said question was, in conformity with the rules of the House, decided in the negative. And so the said bill was rejected.

Monday, December 19.

A memorial of the House of Representatives of the Mississippi Territory of the United States, signed by William Dunbar, their Speaker pro tempore, and attested by Richard S. Wheatly, their Clerk, was presented to the House and read, stating certain disadvantages to which the inhabitants of the settlement on the Tombigbee and Alabama rivers have been and are now subjected, in consequence of their remote situation from the other inhabited parts of the said Territory; and praying that a line of separation may be drawn between the settlements on the Mississippi river, and those of Washington District, or that judges, learned in the law, may be appointed to reside within the said district, for the benefit and convenience of the inhabitants thereof.

Ordered, That the said memorial be referred to the committee appointed, on the 25th ultimo, on the petition and memorial of sundry inhabitants of the District of Washington, situate on the Mobile, Tombigbee, and Alabama rivers, in the said Mississippi Territory; to examine and report their opinion thereupon to the House.

Mail Routes.

The House went into a Committee of the Whole on the following report of the Post Office Committee:

Mr. Stanford moved the insertion of the following words:

His object being to designate the intermediate points of the route between the seat of Government and New Orleans and Natchez.

This motion was supported by Messrs. Stanford, J. Randolph, Early, Earle, and Macon, on the principle that it was proper that Congress should designate the route, and on the ground that the route contemplated by the amendment would be the fittest.

On the other hand, the motion was opposed by Messrs. Thomas, Smilie, Holland, Claiborne, S. L. Mitchill, and G. W. Campbell, on the ground that a discretionary power should be reposed in the Postmaster General to designate the route; and on the ground that, if Congress should undertake to designate the route, the one fixed by the amendment was not an eligible one.

Mr. Dennis declared himself in favor of the House exercising the power of designating the route, but was not sufficiently informed to vote on any particular line.

Mr. R. Griswold moved that the Committee of the Whole should rise and ask leave to sit again, with the view that leave should be refused, and the report recommitted to the Post Office Committee, in order to obtain from them a detailed report, that would furnish the House with satisfactory information.

This motion was supported by Mr. Gregg, and opposed by Mr. Thomas, and carried—yeas 70.

The House then refused leave to the Committee of the Whole to sit again—yeas 19, and recommitted the report to the Post Office Committee.

Friday, December 30.

Three other members, to wit: Ebenezer Elmer, John Sloan, and Henry Southard, from New Jersey, appeared, produced their credentials, were qualified, and took their seats in the House.

Tuesday, January 3, 1804.

Light-House Duties.

Mr. Mitchill observed, that there had been some conversation in the House during the last session, concerning the sums of money paid by our merchants on foreign voyages. He wished to renew that subject, as well worthy of the attention of Government.

Foreign nations levy money upon our vessels, which frequent their ports, for the purpose of supporting their light-houses. The sums paid by our merchants in compliance with these exactions are very considerable. The contribution which strangers are thus obliged to make, constitutes a fund, that goes a great way towards defraying the expense of those establishments, to the great relief of their own subjects.

The average amount of light-money paid by every vessel that enters a British port, is about four pence sterling the ton, for every light she may have passed inwards, or that she may be[87] expected to pass outwards. Calculating by this rule, an American ship of two hundred and eighty-four tons, entering the port of London, is charged with duties for the maintenance of the following lights, all along up the British channel, to wit: Scilly, Longships, Lizard, Eddystone, Portland, Caskets, Needles, Owers, Dungenness, Foreland, Goodwin, and the Nore. They amount to thirty-four pounds sterling, and the stamped paper for the receipt four pence more. Besides this, the duties of the Trinity House, for such a ship, amount to nine pounds seven shillings and eight pence. In addition to which there is demanded and paid by virtue of an act of George III. for the maintenance and improvement of the harbor of Ramsgate, seven pounds and two shillings. So that the amount of these impositions for light-money and Ramsgate harbor money, on a ship under three hundred tons, for a single voyage to London, amounts to fifty pounds and ten shillings sterling, which is equal to two hundred and twenty-two dollars, independent of her tonnage, duties on merchandise, pilotage and other expenses.

An American vessel entering the harbor of Hull, the lights are charged as before, viz: Scilly, Longships, Lizard, Eddystone, Portland, Caskets, Needles, Owers, Dungenness, Foreland, and Goodwin; and to these are added the lights on the Eastern coast of England, such as Sunk, Harwich, Gatt, Lowestoft, Harbro, Winterton, Oxford, Shawl, Dudgeon, Faulness, and the Spurn. The amount of these demands for light-money on an American ship of two hundred and forty-five tons, is thirty-seven pounds and six shillings sterling. At Hull, the collector enforces payment of Ramsgate harbor duties to the amount of £6 2s. 6d., and of Dover harbor dues to the amount of £3 1s. 3d. The demand for supporting lights, few of which perhaps were seen on the passage, and for improving harbors which were not entered by the ship, amounts to forty-six pounds nine shillings and nine pence sterling on a burthen less than two hundred and fifty tons; an amount of demand exceeding two hundred and four dollars.

An American ship goes to Liverpool, she is charged for the light up St. George’s Channel. A ship of three hundred and fourteen tons is made to pay for supporting the lights at Milford, that called the Smalls, and another known by the name of Skerries. These several demands, with the price of stamps, come to £15 14s. 2d. sterling on a vessel of that burthen for one voyage, or more than sixty-three dollars for light-money alone. For each of these three light-houses the charge is exactly four pence sterling the ton.

Light-houses have been established by the Government of the United States on many parts of our extensive coast. Many parts of it are admirably illuminated. And the whole expense of these valuable establishments is defrayed from the Treasury out of the ordinary income. Foreigners who visit our ports participate the security and advantage of these guides to mariners, as fully as our own citizens; but they pay nothing for this privilege of directing themselves by our lights. Foreign nations have acknowledged the principle that duties ought to be collected from their commercial visiters, for supporting light-houses, and they compel our merchants to pay them. It is a correct principle of distributive justice, that we should cause our commercial visiters to pay something also for the establishment and improvement of our light-houses. A duty of tonnage, for this express purpose, could easily be laid and collected from foreign vessels, and would add materially to our means of keeping them in good repair and attendance. A sum, for example, of six or seven cents per ton upon every foreign vessel for every light-house she shall have passed, will make a valuable fund for the humane and excellent institution of light-houses. To the intent that this interesting subject may be investigated and that our Government may avail itself of its own proper rights and resources, I move the following resolution:

Wednesday, January 4.

Addition to the Navy.

A debate of some length ensued on the motion of Mr. Macon to strike out the second section.

Messrs. Smilie and J. Randolph supported the motion. They contended that no necessity existed in the present situation of the United States for an augmentation of the Navy; that it remained in the same state it had been fixed in during March, 1801, with the addition of four small vessels for the Mediterranean service; that it had heretofore proved fully competent to the protection of commerce, even when the complexion of our affairs was less pacific than at present; that the Mediterranean service had evinced that large vessels produced in that quarter more decisive effects than small ones, and that of the former description of vessels we had a sufficient number unemployed; that one great occasion for small vessels was removed by the permission of the State of South Carolina to import slaves, which superseded the necessity of any additional force to restrain their illegal admission into the United States; that this addition to our marine force did not appear to be necessary, inasmuch as the President, whose constitutional duty it was to give information to Congress of the state of the Union, and who directed the armed force of the nation, had not intimated his opinion of its necessity; and that Congress might be sure, if he thought it necessary, he would not hesitate to apprize them of[88] it; that in adopting this provision of the bill the House was acting altogether in the dark, as no estimates of the expense had been furnished, and not even a committee appointed to examine either the propriety or expense of the measure. It was alleged that it became the Legislature, in the present posture of the national finances, to be uncommonly circumspect. New and heavy pecuniary obligations had been incurred, and time alone could show whether the present resources would be more than commensurate to meet them. That the Secretary of the Treasury, at the opening of the session, had spoken of the competency of our resources with a caution which ought to impress the House with the necessity of exercising strict economy, unless disposed to vote new taxes. To this point this measure manifestly tended, and it became those who were hostile to new taxes, to hesitate before they adopted a measure that promised to lead to it.

The motion was, on the other hand, opposed by Messrs. Nicholson, Eustis, R. Griswold, and Huger. They observed that the bill under consideration had received the sanction of the Senate, and it might be rationally presumed that they had previously to its passage received satisfactory proof of its necessity; that the first section authorized the sale of the frigate General Greene, in the lieu whereof it was contemplated to build or purchase two small ships; that this measure therefore constituted no increase of the Navy beyond its present strength; that so far as related to expense, whatever the temporary cost, arising from the building or purchase might be, the permanent expense of two small vessels would be greatly inferior to that of one large one; that the annual expense of a forty-four gun frigate was $104,000, while that of a vessel of sixteen guns was only $36,000; that with regard to the argument of gentlemen drawn from a want of estimates, it was idle, as estimates had been furnished at the last session, as the basis of adding four small vessels for the Mediterranean service, which amounted to $96,000, which sum appeared to be sufficient. If, therefore, four vessels cost $96,000, two would not cost more than $50,000; that with regard to the necessity of these ships, Congress were the proper and constitutional judges; that it was their special duty to provide and maintain a navy, and to provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; and that the absolute dependence placed by gentlemen on Executive mandates was unprecedented, anti-republican, and unconstitutional; that it became the Legislature to judge for themselves as to the propriety of the measure; that from the knowledge they possessed of the state of the country, and the extended sphere of commerce, abundant evidence was presented of its necessity. It was a fact well ascertained that, for Barbary warfare, these small ships were eminently useful, and that service required relief; for in case of a disaster occurring to one of our present small vessels, it was proper to be provided with others that might promptly make good the deficiency. That the acquisition of Louisiana would undoubtedly require some naval force to ensure the collection of the revenue in that quarter; and that the state of the West Indies absolutely demanded an addition of some small vessels to protect our trade from the barges that were fitted out by the brigands for the purposes of depredation; that it was a fact that if the Executive, at this moment, possessed one of these ships, it would be immediately sent to the West Indies; that there were other important purposes for which these vessels were wanted. The Government had frequent occasion to send special Envoys, on points of vast importance, to the two great powers in Europe. Was it then safe, or becoming the dignity of the nation, to send such characters in a private merchantman, subject to the search or capture of any armed vessel of Europe?

Before a question was taken on the motion to strike out the section, Mr. Jackson moved that the committee should rise. If they rose he would oppose their having leave to sit again, with the intention of referring the bill to the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures.

The committee agreed to rise—ayes 63.

Leave having been refused to them to sit again, Mr. J. Randolph moved that a committee be appointed to inquire whether any, and what, further additions may be necessary to the Naval Establishment of the United States,

Mr. Alston moved to amend the motion by striking out “a committee be appointed,” and inserting “the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures be instructed.” Messrs. Alston, Nicholson, and Eustis supported, and Mr. J. Randolph opposed this amendment. Carried—yeas 51, nays 46.

The motion thus amended was supported by Messrs. Huger and Elmer, and opposed by Messrs. Varnum and Smilie. Carried—yeas 57, nays 44.

Mr. Jackson then moved the reference of the bill to the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures. Agreed to without a division.

Thursday, January 5.

Official Conduct of Judge Chase.

Mr. J. Randolph said, that no people were more fully impressed with the importance of preserving unpolluted the fountain of justice than the citizens of these States. With this view the Constitution of the United States, and of many of the States also, had rendered the magistrates who decided judicially between the State and its offending citizens, and between man and man, more independent than those of any other country in the world, in the hope that every inducement whether of intimidation or seduction which could cause them to swerve from the duty assigned to them might be removed. But such was the frailty of human nature that there was no precaution by which our integrity and honor could be preserved, in case[89] we were deficient in that duty which we owed to ourselves. In consequence, sir, of this unfortunate condition of man, we have been obliged, but yesterday, to prefer an accusation against a judge of the United States who has been found wanting in his duty to himself and his country. At the last session of Congress a gentleman from Pennsylvania did, in his place, (on the bill to amend the Judicial system of the United States,) state certain facts in relation to the official conduct of an eminent judicial character, which I then thought, and still think, the House bound to notice. But the lateness of the session (for we had, if I mistake not, scarce a fortnight remaining) precluding all possibility of bringing the subject to any efficient result, I did not then think proper to take any steps in the business. Finding my attention, however, thus drawn to a consideration of the character of the officer in question, I made it my business, considering it my duty, as well to myself as to those whom I represent, to investigate the charges then made, and the official character of the judge, in general. The result having convinced me that there exists ground of impeachment against this officer, I demand an inquiry into his conduct, and therefore submit to the House the following resolution:

After the motion made by Mr. J. Randolph had been read from the Chair,

Mr. Mitchill said, before the question was taken, he should be glad, from the novelty and serious nature of the proposed measure, to hear a statement by his friend from Virginia of the reasons in detail on which it was founded.

Mr. J. Randolph observed, that when he was up before he had stated that the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Smilie) had, in his place, at the last session of Congress, given a description of the official conduct of the officer to whom the resolution referred, which he considered the House bound to notice. It could not be conceived that the gentleman would have laid before the House a statement, the facts of which were not supported by his own knowledge, or by evidence on which he could place the utmost reliance. He did not conceive this to be a time to decide whether the information exhibited by the gentleman from Pennsylvania was or was not correct. At present an inquiry alone was proposed. If it should be made, it must result either that the conduct of the judge would be found to be such as not to warrant any further proceedings on the part of the House, or such as would require the interposition of that authority, which, as the immediate representatives of the people, they alone possessed. If on inquiry the committee shall be persuaded that the judge has not exceeded his duty, they will so report; if, on the contrary, they find it such as to require the interposition of the House, they will recommend that course of proceeding to which the House alone is competent. With respect to the facts which had come to his knowledge, Mr. R. said that they were such as he did not wish to state. He preferred its being done by witnesses, who were most competent to do it correctly.

Mr. Elliot said, I am as deeply convinced as the gentleman from Virginia that the streams of justice should be preserved pure and unsullied. I am also sensible that the Judicial Department ought to attach to itself a degree of independence. I am of opinion that this House possesses no censorial power over the Judicial Department generally, or over any judge in particular. They have alone the power of impeaching them; and when a judge shall be charged with flagrant misconduct, and when facts are stated which shall induce them to believe those charges true, I shall be at all times prepared to carry the provisions of the constitution into effect, in virtue of which great transgressors are punishable for their crimes. The basis of this resolution is, that a gentleman from Pennsylvania, at the last session, stated that the judge named in it had been guilty of improper conduct. Of these charges I am uninformed, and every new member must be uninformed. It is astonishing to me that we are called upon to vote for an inquiry into the character of a judge without any facts being adduced to show that such an inquiry should be made. If the resolution pass in its present form, it appears to me that we shall thereby pass a vote of censure on this judge, which neither the constitution nor laws authorize. If the judge be guilty, I should suppose the first step proper to be taken would be for some person aggrieved, or for members having personal knowledge, to exhibit facts on which the House may act. I can never consent, because the gentleman from Virginia, or any other gentleman, says that there are facts which have come to his knowledge that induce him to think an inquiry ought to be instituted, to vote for it, unless those facts are first stated. I can never agree to any act which shall in this manner, without the exhibition of proof, impose censure or suspicion on a judge. This course may be perfectly Parliamentary; but it strikes me as altogether unprecedented. I shall, therefore, until some facts are adduced, resist every attempt to impose a censure upon the conduct of any public officer.

Mr. Smilie.—If the gentleman from Vermont had commanded a little patience, he would have perceived the remarks which he has just made to have been altogether unnecessary. He would have perceived the necessity imposed upon me by the observations of the gentleman from Virginia of stating those facts to which that gentleman alluded. It must be seen that these proceedings contemplate the possibility of an impeachment. It will be recollected by gentlemen who were in Congress at the last session,[90] that I was then led to give a statement of facts respecting the conduct of Judge Chase on a particular occasion. That statement was not made with a view to impeachment. A bill had been introduced to change the districts of the circuit courts of the United States; when I discovered that Mr. Chase was assigned to the district of Pennsylvania, I felt interested in having him transferred to another district, considering that his previous conduct had rendered him obnoxious to the people of that State. These circumstances I stated to the House, and was in consequence called upon to assign my reasons why Judge Chase was obnoxious to the people of Pennsylvania. This is the history of the business so far. I am now called upon to state the facts which I mentioned on that occasion. This I shall do briefly.

A man of the name of Fries was prosecuted for treason in the State of Pennsylvania. Two of the first counsel at that bar, Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas, without fee or reward, undertook his defence. I mention their names to show that there could have been no party prejudices that influenced them. When the trial came on, the judge behaved in such a manner that Mr. Lewis declared that he would not so far degrade his profession as to plead under the circumstances imposed upon him. Mr. Dallas declared that the rights of the bar were as well established as those of the bench; that he considered the conduct of the judge as a violation of those rights, and refused to plead. The facts were these: The judge told the jury and the counsel that the court had made up their minds on what constituted treason; that they had committed their opinion to writing, and that the counsel must therefore confine themselves to the facts in the case before the court. The counsel replied that they did not dispute the facts, but that they were able to show that they did not constitute treason. The end of the affair was, that the counsel retired from court, and the man was tried without counsel, convicted, and sentenced to death.

After this the Attorney General wrote a letter to Messrs. Dallas and Lewis, requesting them to furnish their notes and opinions for the use of the President. They drew up an answer, in which they stated that the acts charged against Fries did not amount to treason, but were only sedition; and that they were so considered in the British courts. This letter was read to me by Mr. Dallas. After receiving the letter the President pardoned the man.

Mr. J. Clay.—This debate appears to me to arise from causes the most extraordinary, and such as we are not accustomed to hear assigned on this floor. The gentleman from Virginia has made a motion justified by his own knowledge as well as that of my colleague; and this motion is opposed in a most extraordinary manner. I believe this is the first instance in which a motion to appoint a committee of inquiry into the official conduct of a public officer has been opposed. We are told by the gentleman from Vermont that this House has no right to pass a censure on a judge, and that judges should be highly independent. I am afraid that unless great care be taken the doctrine of judicial independence will be carried so far as to become dangerous to the liberties of the country. This motion does not, however, affect the character of the judge. Let it also be recollected, that if the reputation of the judge be at stake, the reputation of this House also is implicated. I consider this House as the constitutional guardians of the morality of the Judiciary. Whenever even suspicion exists as to that morality, a committee of inquiry should be appointed. For the pure administration of justice is surely more important than the reputation of any particular judge. I am sorry my colleague thought it necessary to make any statement of facts to the House. I believe that more important facts than he has mentioned will be stated by witnesses. I believe likewise the reputation of the judge will be better preserved by the appointment of a committee than by assertions made on this floor by particular members, not responsible elsewhere for what they allege.

With regard to my opinions in this case, whatever my political impressions may be, they are entirely unbiassed. I have heard facts stated, but I cannot say that they have been satisfactorily proved to my mind. There are other charges equally reprehensible. Under these circumstances, I ask if the character of the judge is not more implicated by a discussion of his official conduct on this floor than by appointing a committee to obtain facts. If he is guilty of the facts alleged against him, no gentleman will say that he is not impeachable. If he is only suspected of them, there ought to be a committee, that if guilty he may be impeached, and if innocent, be freed from the imputation thrown upon him.

Mr. R. Griswold.—Gentlemen will acknowledge that this is a subject of great importance and delicacy. No one will doubt but that we ought to execute our duty so as to preserve the fountains of justice pure, and that we ought at the same time to treat the important character of a judge, or of any other high officer, with respect. I do not know but that this mode of procedure is warranted by precedent. But if it is, it is unknown to me. As the resolution now stands, I do not think it perfectly correct. The honorable gentleman from Virginia says he is acquainted with facts that warrant the proposed inquiry. The question is whether the House ought to be governed by the opinions of any one member. We know not what those facts are; the gentleman declines stating them. I do think, as the subject now strikes me, that the conviction of any one member of the propriety of this measure cannot warrant the interposition of the House. Instead of taking the individual opinion of a member, it ought to be stated that certain facts exist, which, if proved, will justify an impeachment. I do not know whether these ideas are not incorrect, having[91] never before contemplated, or had a suspicion that such a motion would be made.

As to the remarks of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, I do not consider them as entitled to much weight. If the facts stated by him were of his personal knowledge, they would undoubtedly merit attention. But he merely states that which he has received from others, and which amounts to nothing more than that the judge refused liberty to the counsel to argue a point of law after it was decided, and confined their argument to facts. In so doing the judge may have erred, but it was an error of judgment, for which he cannot be impeached. No lawyer will perhaps say that it was not the province of the judge to decide the law, and that he has not the right to prevent counsel from arguing it after his mind is made up. But this information is not of the knowledge of the gentleman. Are we then to institute an inquiry into the conduct of a high officer of the Government merely on hearsay? This has never been done under our Government. In the late case of Judge Pickering proof was furnished by the affidavits of witnesses testifying certain facts. I do not therefore consider it correct to proceed to inquire on the opinion of any gentleman. The proper course is first to have proofs which will justify ourselves to our own consciences in making the inquiry—for we ought not to touch the character of a judge, unless we are satisfied from facts that there is good reason for an investigation into his conduct. Gentlemen will not say that making an inquiry into the official conduct of a judge does not touch his character.

Gentlemen say if this committee find the conduct of the judge to have been correct, they will make a report to that effect; but it does not follow that the report will contain all the evidence adduced, and suspicion may still rest on the character of the judge, and that some facts may not be stated, which, if stated, would show his misconduct. Whereas, if the business be brought generally before the House, on the exhibition of certain facts, the public will be enabled to decide whether they warrant impeachment or even suspicion. With this view of the subject, I am of opinion that it will be best to delay acting in this affair until facts shall be disclosed which will justify the step now proposed to be taken. I have as high a respect for the opinion of the gentleman from Virginia as for that of any other member on this floor; but I doubt whether we can justify our votes on the opinion of any single member; facts alone ought to govern our opinions. I, therefore, for the purpose of considering the course most proper to be pursued, move a postponement of the further consideration of the motion until to-morrow.

Mr. J. Randolph.—Were I the personal enemy of the gentleman who is the object of this resolution, I should take precisely that course which, on this occasion, the gentleman from Connecticut seems more than half inclined to take. That gentleman wishes the resolution to lay until to-morrow, in order that he may have time to consider whether he can bring himself to refuse the inquiry altogether. He says that he cannot, or rather (for he speaks doubtingly) he thinks he cannot see the propriety of instituting an inquiry without evidence. What evidence? Nothing short of legal proof—testimony on oath. And what is the object of the resolution? To acquire that very evidence. If we had the evidence, to what purpose make inquiry? As, however, the evidence cannot be had without inquiry, and the gentleman will not grant the inquiry but upon the evidence, it is plain that if we take the course which he recommends, we must go without both. Will gentlemen offer objections against inquiry which are applicable only to impeachment? If an impeachment were moved, they would have a right to call for evidence. But what is the object of the present motion? Merely to inquire whether there exists evidence which will justify an impeachment. But this inquiry we are told cannot be instituted on mere hearsay, although we have the declaration of a member in his place. What would be said of a grand jury, who being informed by one of their body that A or B could testify to the fact of a murder being committed within their jurisdiction, should refuse an application to the court to have them summoned, and because they could not find a bill of indictment unsupported by evidence, should reject that evidence which might be within their reach? I profess not that tenderness of conscience which has been displayed by the gentleman from Connecticut. My conscience teaches me to accuse no man wrongfully, but to deny inquiry into the official conduct of no one, however exalted his station; and I had supposed, from his practice, that the gentleman held the same opinion. For it will be recollected that on the eve of the close of the last session he had himself instituted an inquiry which went to impeach the conduct of some of the first officers of the Government. No one on that occasion stepped in between the demand for an inquiry and those officers implicated in it. No inquiry was made, and it precluded any further proceeding on the part of the House, since the charges which had been attempted to be brought forward would not bear examination. Mr. R. concluded by calling for the yeas and nays.

Mr. Gregg said he should vote against the postponement, and in favor of the resolution. The case was somewhat new, but he perceived no impropriety in giving it the same direction with all the other business originated in the House. What is this committee to be appointed for? To investigate facts and report them to the House. Was it not most proper that gentlemen whose characters were implicated should have, in the first instance, facts stated privately before a committee, than that parts of their character should be immediately brought into view before the House? He recollected one fact not yet alluded to in debate. In 1792,[92] after the army under the command of General St. Clair was defeated, great dissatisfaction arose, and the character of the commander was implicated. The idea was that the expedition had not been conducted with propriety. The business was brought before Congress. It was understood at that time, whether justly or not, Mr. G. would not pretend to say, that the commander-in-chief could not be tried by a court martial. Congress therefore took up the business, and appointed a committee of inquiry, who went through a lengthy examination of the subject. Mr. G. mentioned this precedent that gentlemen might turn their attention to it.

Mr. R. Griswold said—I had hoped that the language used by me, when I was up before, would not have led gentlemen to suppose that I was acting as the friend or the enemy of Judge Chase. I am acting in neither capacity. I am acting only as a member of this House, who ought to be anxious on an occasion of such importance to take that course which is most consistent with propriety; that course which results from the duty this House owes the nation, and that duty which they owe the character of a judge. It did appear to me that it was not correct to call the character of a public officer into question unless some necessity should first appear. No facts are presented on this occasion. The gentleman from Virginia has said that he is in possession of facts, or of something which makes him believe that an inquiry is proper, but he does not choose to communicate those facts. The gentleman from Pennsylvania has given us his information. The question is, whether it is proper on these light suggestions to institute a solemn inquiry into the character of this judge. It appears to me that we ought not to throw any imputation on the character of any officer without evidence that such an inquiry is necessary. The case mentioned by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gregg) does not apply. Dissatisfaction existed in the country and in this House on the events of a campaign; an inquiry was instituted; but what was its object? The committee were appointed to inquire into the general causes of the failure of the expedition; they were not instructed to inquire into the character of a particular officer.

The gentleman from Virginia has referred to another case, when he says that we were ready enough to institute an inquiry, and has left it to be inferred that the inquiry was made without any previous proofs of its necessity. But certainly on that occasion inquiry was not made without proof. I suppose the inquiry alluded to was that which related to the conduct of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund. It was instituted on a report made by them, and which we thought was not satisfactory. The resolution offered was adopted, and inquiry was made, the result of which is well known to every gentleman. It follows, therefore, that there are no precedents adduced which apply to the present case.

It is my wish that the proceedings of this House may on this occasion be perfectly correct, and that we may not be precipitated into the adoption of this resolution without due consideration. If it is correct to vote an inquiry in all cases where a member rises on this floor and desires it, it is correct to vote it in this case. In this case a gentleman rises and says that he is satisfied an inquiry ought to take place. The question is, whether it is proper to inquire on the suggestion of a member? If it is proper, without facts being adduced, then it will be always proper to inquire whenever any member requires it, and it will be also proper whenever any individual citizen requires it. This course I have never thought correct. On the contrary, I think some facts ought to be previously presented to establish the necessity of an inquiry before it is voted. In the case of Judge Pickering a very different course has been pursued. The appointment of a committee of inquiry originated from a Message of the President. We find in February, 1803, the House received the following Message:

This Message was referred to a committee, with the accompanying papers, furnishing evidence of the necessity of an inquiry. But the course pursued to-day is very different. A gentleman gets up and moves an inquiry into the conduct of Judge Chase, and says that he is of the opinion that it ought to be made. The course, I think, is incorrect. Some facts ought first to be adduced. I repeat it, I am on this occasion neither the friend nor the enemy of Judge Chase. I am the friend of this House; I wish its proceedings to be correct, and I hope they will not do hastily what they may hereafter regret.

Mr. Dennis.—The only question now before the House is, whether they will postpone the consideration of the motion on the table. I cannot but express my surprise that the gentleman from Virginia should oppose this motion, when several have declared that they are not prepared to vote on this resolution. Gentlemen ought to recollect that, according to our rules, on all motions which require the concurrence of the two Houses, one day’s delay is necessary. Although this resolution is not of this kind, yet it surely is not of inferior importance.

I believe that the gentleman alluded to by the motion would rather court than shrink from an investigation of his official conduct. I believe, also, that it has become necessary, from the discussion of this day, that an investigation should take place. I am not, therefore, prepared at this time to say whether I shall not ultimately vote for an inquiry. But it appears to me that the course proposed is inverting the natural order of things, inasmuch as it institutes an inquiry not growing out of facts, but for facts. I believe also that the facts stated, if authenticated,[93] will furnish no ground for an impeachment. Circumstances attending this motion show that the gentleman from Virginia does not consider them as a sufficient ground for an impeachment. The refusal to hear the point of law discussed was the act of the court. Mr. Chase did not sit alone on the bench. Another judge must have been associated with and have concurred with him. If so, why does not the resolution allude to the other judge? Why select one judge, when both are equally implicated in the charges?

I believe the most parliamentary way would be for a gentleman to state, in the form of a resolution, the grounds of impeachment, and then to refer such a resolution to a select committee for investigation. In this mode the House may correctly institute an inquiry, and send for persons and papers. This is the only parliamentary mode of proceeding. In every case where impeachments have been made, the facts have been stated in a resolution, concluding with a motion for an impeachment. The House possesses no censorial power over the judges, except as incidental to the power of impeachment. If gentlemen are possessed of facts, why not state them in the form of a resolution, and move an impeachment? Then, if the facts appeared to me to warrant an impeachment, I would not object to their going to a select committee, though I believe the most proper course would be for the House to send for persons and papers, and to examine for themselves. But it is extremely novel and unprecedented for the House, without facts, to institute an inquiry into the character of a high officer of the Government.

May they not, in the same way, extend their inquiry into the conduct of every judge in the United States, without stating any facts on which the inquiry is founded? For these reasons I shall vote for postponing the further consideration of this resolution for one day, on account of the importance and delicacy of the subject, and the serious deliberation it is entitled to. I do not know whether, if sufficient time is allowed for consideration, and I shall be convinced that this course is consistent with parliamentary usage, I shall not be in favor of an investigation.

Mr. Elliot.—When the yeas and nays are called, I shall on every occasion rise in favor of taking them. I wish the votes I give in this House entered on the Journal, and known to every citizen of America. The more I contemplate the course pursued on this occasion, the more extraordinary and unprecedented it appears to me. The gentleman from Virginia rose, and, after an elegant exordium, stating that the streams of justice should be preserved pure, and other fine things, told us that he had received information of facts that convinced his mind that an inquiry ought to be made into the conduct of a judge. Suppose the gentleman, on facts known to himself, had stated his opinion, that an inquiry ought to be made into the conduct of the President of the United States; we have the same right to impeach the President as a judge. If the inquiry would be improper in the one instance, without facts being adduced, it would be equally so in the other. For we possess no censorial or inquisitorial powers over the conduct of the judges of the Supreme Court. If Judge Chase has been guilty of misconduct, let it be stated. If that misconduct be of a private nature, let the House assume the character of a grand jury, hold private sittings, receive evidence, and determine whether the judge shall be impeached or not. The gentleman asks whether a grand jury in the case of a charge of murder can send for persons. Undoubtedly they can. But did gentlemen ever hear of their appointing a committee to inquire whether a man charged with a partial offence ought to be indicted? We are called on as the grand inquisitors of the nation, to appoint an inquisitorial committee to get evidence; for it is granted that as yet we have none. I believe that no committee of this nature ought to be constituted, without previously ascertaining facts that will warrant the delegation of such great power. No accusation, even, is before us; but we are called upon to appoint a committee to look one up—a committee to be invested with power to send for persons and papers—a committee to inquire in private. I will never consent to the appointment of such a committee, until facts that will justify the inquiry are stated.

The facts adduced by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, if proved, could not induce me to believe that the judge is impeachable. I may suspect that his conduct was erroneous and improper, but I cannot conceive it proper to impeach a single judge for the act of the court. Believing, therefore, this conduct unprecedented, unparliamentary, and replete with improprieties; believing it novel; believing that, in an affair of so much consequence, we ought not to proceed with precipitation; believing that we are entitled to demand one day to reflect upon it—I am proud, on this occasion, to record my vote in favor of the postponement until to-morrow; and if it were for a week, I should with equal pride and pleasure vote for it.

Mr. Holland moved an adjournment.

Mr. J. Randolph said, that considering a motion to adjourn equivalent to a postponement for a day, he moved the taking the yeas and nays upon it.

Mr. Holland moved an adjournment, on which the question was taken—yeas 52, nays 62.

The question of postponement recurring,

Mr. Huger considered the course contemplated by the resolution as improper, unparliamentary, and unprecedented. To make up his mind on the course proper to be pursued, he was in favor of the postponement.

Mr. Holland observed that he had moved an adjournment to allow those gentlemen time for reflection who had not yet made up their minds on the propriety of the motion. He was himself of this number. Having been allowed no time for reflection, he did not feel perfectly satisfied with the appointment of a committee of inquiry before any facts had been substantiated. Desiring further time to form his judgment, and seeing no occasion for precipitation, he should vote in favor of a postponement.

Mr. G. W. Campbell.—I will not, at this late hour, detain the House with the expression of my ideas in detail. I am as desirous as any member of this House that the streams of justice should flow pure and unsullied, as on their purity depend the safety and liberties of the people of the United States. But when we are about to enter into measures for preserving them clear, we owe it to ourselves to preserve order in our conduct, and to act in such a manner as we shall be able to justify to our constituents. Every member of this House, on such an occasion, ought to be as cautious in his proceeding as a judge in delivering his opinions, lest, while we are condemning the conduct of the judge, we ourselves go astray from our duty. For this reason, I am against the adoption of a measure which may throw a censure on a character invested by the United States with high authority, until I am convinced we have sufficient grounds for doing so. The resolution on the table can have but one object, to wit: the direction of an inquiry whether sufficient evidence can be procured to authorize an impeachment. I conceive that this House cannot proceed in any other way. I am therefore of opinion, that, before the vote for an inquiry, there ought to be probable grounds that facts exist that authorize an impeachment, and that evidence can be procured of their existence. I am not prepared to say, from any thing which has been adduced, that such evidence does exist. I conceive that until probable grounds are shown, we ought not to authorize such a procedure, inasmuch as it may establish a precedent that we may hereafter regret—a precedent which will put it in the power of any member to move and obtain an inquiry into the conduct of the President, a judge, or any other officer under the Government. Under these circumstances, I am not prepared to say this is the regular course of proceeding. I do not profess to have much knowledge of parliamentary proceedings, and have therefore waited, before I expressed my opinions, to hear such precedents as gentlemen could adduce. Having heard none, I conclude none exist.

I conceive that the act of this House, in voting for a committee of inquiry, is equivalent to the expression of the opinion that they have evidence of the probable grounds of the guilt of the judge. The gentleman from Virginia has told us that the powers of this House are, in some degree, like those of a grand jury. I agree that they have all the powers of a grand jury, and it is on this ground that I deny the power now contended for. I say that a grand jury has no right to send for testimony: they have only a right to receive testimony from any one of their body, and to receive such witnesses as the court may send them. If, then, there be evidence in the present case, let us act upon it, even though it be ex parte, and although that might, perhaps, be going too far.

I repeat it, I have heard no statement satisfactory to my mind that there are probable grounds for proceeding in this business. It is true, the gentleman from Pennsylvania has made a statement, but that statement appears to me to depend not so much on facts as on opinions; and it is not my wish to decide on the propriety of the conduct of the judge until the facts are before us. It is certain that a judge has a right to control counsel, and to say when his mind is made up, while it is also his duty to hear the allegations that shall be made.

In addition to these reasons for a postponement, I am also in favor of it, because, whenever a sincere desire exists to gain information, which can only be done by allowing further time, I shall always be in favor of it, when no material injury can result from the indulgence.

Mr. Mott.—I am in favor of the postponement, because I wish time for consideration, and because I am against the resolution itself. I think it is improper to go into such an inquiry before specific charges are laid before the House, when it will be proper for the House to consider whether those charges are sufficient to sustain an impeachment; then it will be proper to proceed, and not till then. No charges have yet[95] been laid before the House: we have only been told by one member that he is satisfied sufficient grounds exist.

Mr. J. Randolph was sorry to be obliged to trespass again on the patience of the House, but the direct application made to him by the gentlemen from Tennessee and South Carolina, imposed upon him the necessity of stating his reasons for proceeding in what they were pleased to term so precipitate a manner. They ask, why not have laid the resolution on the table by way of notice to the House? Because, sir, I cannot in a matter of extreme delicacy make the opinions of other gentlemen the standard of my own actions. I should have conceived the character implicated in the resolution as having just cause of complaint against me, had I not been ready to decide in a moment on it, and did I not press its immediate decision. I should have deemed it an act of cruel injustice to have hung the inquiry over his head even for a day. I should have expected the reproach of setting suspicions afloat whilst I avoided examination into them; for I should have deserved it, had I pursued the course which gentlemen wish to adopt. I can see no difference between hanging up this motion for a day or a year but the mere difference of time. What is the object to be obtained? Do we wait for evidence, or any information, which will assist us in forming a correct opinion? Not at all. To-morrow the question will recur upon us—“Is it proper, from what has already appeared, to institute an inquiry into the conduct of this officer?” And this we are as competent to decide at this moment as at any future day. When, however, gentlemen consider a resolution to make inquiry the same as an inquiry already had, I am not surprised at finding myself opposed to them in opinion. I repeat that all their arguments are applicable to a motion of impeachment only. But it seems that no precedents have been adduced, and time is wanted to hunt them up. Gentlemen should recollect that but two cases of impeachment have taken place under this Government; one of a Senator from Tennessee, the other of a district judge of New Hampshire. By what precedents were the proceedings in these cases regulated? How is it possible in a Government hardly in its teens, where new cases must daily occur, as its various functions are called into exercise, to find precedents? It did so happen, in the case of the Senator from Tennessee, that the information on which his impeachment was grounded came from the Executive. But suppose that information had not been communicated by the Executive? Would that have precluded all inquiry? Suppose, too, in the case of Mr. Pickering, that no information had been received from the Executive, and that a gentleman from New Hampshire had risen and said, “However painful the task, I deem it my duty to state that the conduct of the judge of the district in which I reside, has been such as renders him unfit for the important station which he holds, and I therefore move for an inquiry into his conduct.” Would the House have denied the inquiry? Will they rely altogether on the attorney of the district, whose interest it is to be well with the judge, and whose patience must be worn out with his misconduct before he will undertake to call the attention of Government to it? Are gentlemen aware of the delicate situation in which those officers are placed? Suppose information had been given to a member of the malfeasance of a judge by a person who should say: “It is not pleasant to originate accusations; those who come forward in these cases undertake an invidious task; while therefore I wish my name not to be mentioned, I shall be ready, when called upon by proper authority, to give my testimony.” This is a hypothetical case, but one by no means improbable. Would it not be a point of honor not to expose the name of the informant?

But, say gentlemen, the charge is of a general nature. While I do not admit the force of this remark, supposing it to be correct, I deny that it is a general charge. The inquiry is general, but it is founded on a statement made by the gentleman from Pennsylvania. I made no other statement. I have said that I believed there existed grounds of impeachment. What they are I shall not state here. They may be those exhibited by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, or they may be others. Will gentlemen assert that the statement of facts made by the gentleman from Pennsylvania will not, if true, warrant an impeachment? What does it amount to? A person under a criminal prosecution, having a constitutional right to the aid of counsel in his defence, has, by the arbitrary and vexatious conduct of the court, been denied this right. Such is the nature of the charge. Has it come to this, that an unrighteous judge may condemn whom he pleases to an ignominious death, without a hearing, in the teeth of the constitution and laws, and that such proceedings should find advocates here? Shall we be told that judges have certain rights, and, whatever the constitution or laws may declare to the contrary, we must continue to travel in the go-cart of precedent, and the injured remain unredressed? No, sir, let us throw aside these leading-strings and crutches of precedent, and march with a firm step to the object before us.

As to the motion of postponement, Mr. R. said it was of little consequence to him whether it prevailed or not. On a charge of specific malfeasance, he thought it impossible to refuse an inquiry. Whatever should be the result, he should rest satisfied with having discharged his duty to the House and to the nation. Believing the circumstances to demand inquiry, he had made it. Without circulating whispers of reproach, he had given the person implicated that opportunity of vindicating his character which he himself should require if he stood in the same unfortunate situation.

The committee rose, and the House adjourned.

[96]

Friday, January 6.

Importation of Slaves.

Mr. Bard.—For many reasons this House must have been justly surprised by a recent measure of one of the Southern States. The impressions, however, which that measure gave my mind, were deep and painful. Had I been informed that some formidable foreign power had invaded our country, I would not, I ought not, to be more alarmed than on hearing that South Carolina had repealed her law prohibiting the importation of slaves.

In the one case we would know what to do. The emergency itself would inspire exertion, and suggest suitable means of repelling the attack. But here we are nonplussed, and find ourselves without resource. Our hands are tied, and we are obliged to stand confounded, while we see the flood-gate opened, and pouring incalculable miseries into our country. By the repeal of that law, fresh activity is given to the horrid traffic, which has been long since seriously regretted by the wise and humane, but none have been able to devise an adequate remedy to its dreadful consequences.

Congress has but little power, or rather they have no power to prevent the growth of the evil. To impose a tax on imported slaves is the extent of their power; but every one must see that it is infinitely disproportionate to what the morality, the interest, the peace, and safety, of individuals, and of the public, at this moment, demand. And though in regard to their present case the power of the General Government may be insufficient to check the mischief, yet I hope they are disposed to discourage it, as far as they are authorized by the constitution. Therefore I beg leave to offer the House the following resolution:

Ordered to lie on the table.

Official conduct of Judge Chase.

The House resumed the consideration of the motion of the fifth instant, “for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the official conduct of Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States,” and the said motion, as originally proposed, being again read, in the words following, to wit:

A motion was made and seconded to amend the same, by inserting, after the words “one of the Associate Justices of the United States,” the following words, “and of Richard Peters, District Judge of the district of Pennsylvania.”

Mr. Smilie.—When the motion now under consideration was made yesterday, I should have felt surprised at the course which the debate took, had I not often witnessed such things in former times. It seems to be considered as improper that a gentleman should bring forward a motion for an inquiry into the official conduct of a public officer, and expect the House to comply with his request, unless he should at the same time produce such evidence as shall prove the facts charged. If this course of proceeding be correct, I have ever been in error. What does the gentleman from Virginia ask? Suppose he has taken exception to the conduct of the judge from some facts which have come to his own knowledge. Under such circumstances it will be allowed that it is the duty of the House to make the inquiry. When the question shall be whether an impeachment shall be preferred, it will be proper that evidence should be produced. But now only a committee is asked to receive evidence, and to determine whether it be such as in their opinion will afford grounds for an impeachment. It is impossible for me to conceive any way that can be pursued which will be more favorable to the person whose character is implicated, than that which is proposed. It is merely to inquire whether such facts can be sustained as will afford grounds for an impeachment. Certainly in this stage of the business it is not necessary to produce evidence to the House, as the House are not competent to receive testimony, which a committee is. It is a rule of this House that so much respect is due to a member, that if he states that he possesses information proper to be communicated to the House, but which in his opinion ought not to be done but with closed doors, that, in such case, the doors shall be shut without any vote of the House.

Surely, then, on the request of a member for a committee of inquiry, that measure ought to be adopted. This, in my opinion, is the best course that can be pursued for the person implicated. There is, it is true, thereby expressed an opinion of some one member that this judge has done wrong. So far his character is implicated; this is the only possible way in which it is implicated. The committee are to inquire whether there are grounds for an impeachment or not. If they report that there are not grounds, the accusation will be dismissed; and if the report is that there are grounds, the House will at once perceive the necessity of taking this step to ascertain their existence.

Another ground of resistance is taken. It is said there are precedents for this proceeding. I believe that all precedents must have an origin; and that one person has as good a right to establish them as another. Our Government is young, and only two cases of impeachment have occurred under it. Most of our precedents respecting parliamentary proceedings are borrowed from England, and, if precedents are necessary in this affair, we must resort to that country for them. My opinion is that they are not necessary, and that common sense and the[97] reason of the thing are all that are necessary to guide our decision in this case. There is, however, in the British annals, no deficiency of precedents. The first I shall mention is to be found in the case of the Earl of Strafford. I may be told that this precedent was established in turbulent times: I may also be told of the improper mode of proceeding. I do not pretend to vindicate the whole course of procedure. I think it was wrong. But with regard to the first stages of the business, I believe them to have been correct. It will be seen that, in that instance, a more direct mode was pursued than is proposed in the present case.

The precedent I allude to will be found in Hume’s History, vol. 2, page 249. That historian says,—“A concerted attack was made upon the Earl of Strafford in the House of Commons. It was led by Pym, who, after expatiating on a long list of popular grievances, added, ‘we must inquire from what fountain these waters of bitterness flow; and though, doubtless, many evil councillors will be found to have contributed their endeavors, yet is there one who challenges the infamous pre-eminence, and who, by his courage, enterprise, and capacity, is entitled to the first place among these betrayers of their country. He is the Earl of Strafford, the Lieutenant of Ireland, and President of the Council of York, who, in both places, and in all other provinces where he has been intrusted with authority, has raised ample monuments of tyranny, and will appear, from a survey of his actions, to be the chief promoter of every arbitrary council.’ Many others entered into the same topics, and it was moved that Strafford should be impeached. Lord Falkland alone, though the known enemy of Strafford, entreated the House not to act with precipitation. But Pym replied that delay would blast all their hopes; without further debate the impeachment was voted, and Pym was chosen to carry it up to the Lords.”

In this case it does not appear that any evidence was called for; a member of the House of Commons got up and declared his opinion of that officer, and the same session an impeachment was voted. This course of proceeding is very different from that now proposed. I will now refer to a more modern precedent which at the time does not appear to have been objected to. It occurred in the reign of George I., and will be found stated in Russel’s “Modern Europe,” vol. 4, page 398.

“A new Parliament was called in which the interest of the Whigs predominated, and a secret committee, chosen by ballot, was appointed to examine all the papers, and inquire into all the negotiations relative to the late peace, as well as the cessation of arms by which it was preceded. The Committee of Secrecy prosecuted their inquiry with the greatest eagerness, and, in consequence of their report, the Commons resolved to impeach Lord Bolingbroke, the Earl of Oxford, and the Duke of Ormond, of high treason.”

One circumstance is worthy of attention. A cause of dissatisfaction at the conduct of the judge has undoubtedly prevailed. Whether he is wrongfully accused I will not say; but the dissatisfaction is manifest; for the representatives of two respectable States lately came forward and opposed his being assigned to circuits which embraced their States. This single fact ought to make an impression on the House.

It is alleged that there is no proof before the House; but one thing is notorious—is universally known. It is this, that this man (Fries) was tried before that judge for his life, and was tried without being heard. This fact cannot be disputed. When we consider the importance of the life of a citizen, and know that such an event has taken place, is it not the duty of the only body competent to inquire into the fact? With other gentlemen, I believe that the fountains of justice ought to be kept pure; I believe also that the judges are like other men, and that like them they are subject to the common frailties of human nature; and I do believe that when the frailties of human nature produce such effects, the House cannot be justified to themselves or their country without making an inquiry. Our duty to our country calls for it; our duty to the man who is implicated also calls for it. If innocent, a proper regard to his character claims it; and his friend from Maryland informs us that he will rejoice at this opportunity of coming forward and vindicating himself. If, then, the inquiry be equally necessary for placing the character of the man upon its proper footing, and for preserving the purity of justice, how can the House resist it?

Mr. Dennis said he had only expressed an opinion that such an investigation would be rather solicited than avoided by Judge Chase.

Mr. Leib.—I am by no means an enemy to inquiry, but I am not a friend to the partiality of this resolution. We are told that it is grounded on the misconduct of the Circuit Court in Philadelphia on the trial of Fries. If one judge of that court was guilty of misconduct, the other attending judge must have been equally guilty. The conduct complained of was the act of the court, and not of an individual judge. This resolution ought therefore to embrace both the attending judges. My opinion is that both are criminal, and ought to be brought to the bar of justice. I therefore move an amendment of the resolution by introducing the name of Richard Peters, so as to embrace an inquiry into the conduct of both judges, and call for the yeas and nays on the amendment.

Mr. J. Randolph.—I wish to state for the information of those gentlemen who were not in the last Congress, that the gentleman from Pennsylvania, whose statement, thus made, is the groundwork of the present inquiry, did not offer any matter which tended to impeach the conduct of Mr. Peters, while there was a specific charge of misconduct brought against the other judge. In consequence of this charge I conceived it my duty to make an inquiry into the[98] official conduct of Judge Chase. I mention this circumstance to show that however the charge of partiality may apply to the resolution, it cannot apply to the mover.

Mr. Leib.—I do not charge the mover with partiality, but the resolution with embracing one judge instead of two. Judge Peters was on the bench at the time. This outrage upon justice was the act of the court. How the conduct, therefore, of one judge shall claim investigation, while that of the other is passed over in silence, to me is mysterious. I think impartial justice calls for an investigation into the conduct of both.

Mr. Smilie said there could be no doubt that if the court was agreed, Judge Peters had been equally guilty of misconduct. On the trial of Fries, Mr. Chase presided, and Mr. Peters attended. If Judge Peters concurred in the decision, he was equally culpable.

Mr. Nicholson.—This resolution is grounded upon a statement made during the last session, by a member from Pennsylvania, implicating the character of one of the justices of the Supreme Court. Upon information thus given, my friend from Virginia has thought himself bound to bring the business before the House, that an inquiry may be made into his conduct. For myself I will never hesitate, I care not who the person implicated may be, and however exalted his station, to give my vote for inquiring into his official conduct, when a member of this House rises in his place, and states that, in his opinion, he has been guilty of misconduct. For this reason I shall vote for the amendment; it having been stated by a member that Judge Peters was on the bench and did concur with Judge Chase.

And on the question that the House do agree on the said amendment, it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 79, nays 37, as follows:

Mr. Lowndes.—Were I to be governed by considerations other than those resulting from a sense of duty, I should vote for this resolution, as I believe it would afford the character implicated the readiest mode of vindication. But I do not feel so high a respect for the opinion of any one member as to give up my opinion to his, as to the course most proper to be pursued on this occasion. The gentleman who has offered this resolution says, that the facts on which it is founded are within his own knowledge. Let the gentleman then lay them before the House. Otherwise we shall legislate, not on the facts before us, but merely on the opinion of a single member, on facts only known to himself. We are told that this motion is founded on the statement of an honorable gentleman from Pennsylvania. What is that statement? That one of the counsel in the trial of Fries informed him that the judge declared the counsel had no right to argue a point of law after the mind of the court was made up. I ask if any gentleman is prepared to say that the judge was wrong? I am not prepared to say so. While, too, I am unwilling to detract from the respect due to the statement of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, I am equally unwilling to subscribe to his opinions. He may have misconceived the information communicated to him. It is said that it is necessary to preserve pure the streams of justice. I agree in this remark, and I say that the resolution on the table goes to destroy the independence of the judges, and of consequence to pollute the streams of justice; to make the judges the flexible tools of this House. It is impossible that under such circumstances men of talents and integrity will take seats on the bench, when their character shall be liable to be scrutinized without any facts being previously adduced.

I think it absolutely necessary that this resolution should not pass. For if it passes, it will establish a precedent that any member may procure an investigating committee to inquire into the conduct of any executive or judicial officer merely upon his opinion, unsupported by facts, that such an inquiry is necessary. Suppose parties to be nearly equally divided; a member has only to propose an inquiry into the conduct of any officer to whom he may feel inimical, and thereby throw a cloud upon his character, and[99] render him the object of suspicion. Thus do I fear that this precedent will furnish the instrument of vengeance of one party against another. The price we pay for our liberties is the existence of parties among us; but it becomes us rather to restrain than to invigorate their passions. If we establish this precedent we shall render impeachment so easy, as greatly to facilitate the means of oppression.

Mr. Lowndes concluded by saying, that in this affair he threw party considerations entirely out of view. He was personally unacquainted with Judge Chase, and if there was a single affidavit of his misconduct, the appointment of the committee of inquiry should have his vote; but that, under the circumstances attending it, he considered the measure improper in every point of view in which he could consider it.

Mr. Findlay observed, that though the abstract right of the members to move for an inquiry into the conduct of public officers, in order to find whether presumptions against their character afforded ground for impeachment, was not expressly denied, yet the manner in which the opposition to the present resolution was conducted was equal to denying the right. He trusted, however, that the House would support this right, as it was one of the most important of any with which they were vested. It grew out of the power of impeachment, and it was necessary for the exercise of that power, and was justified by precedents. By the rules of the House any member has a right to have the doors shut, in order to move such a resolution as he thinks proper. This has been usual in cases of impeachment in Britain, from which we derive the forms of impeachment. There it has been common to shut the doors, and for a member to move for an impeachment of a public officer, and to procure the officer impeached to be taken into custody before there was time or opportunity to take any other testimony than the information stated by the member who moved the resolution, probably supported by public fame. Taking the party into custody was necessary to the circumstances of that country and the extent of punishment, which might not only affect the liberty and property, but even the life of the party found guilty. It was necessary, because of the influence of the powerful nobility, who might have it in their power to stand in their defence; but, as all the penalties in the power of this Government to inflict by impeachment only affect the official trust and character, taking into custody is unnecessary.

He observed, that the arguments in opposition to the resolution turned chiefly on the ground of expediency and of precedent.

In his opinion, it appeared not only expedient but necessary, from the notoriety of facts on which the resolution was founded; that they were publicly known and had impaired confidence in these judges, could not be denied. That it was known to Congress during the last session was acknowledged. It was not only known, but Congress acted on it. A bill was in progress before this House, appointing the attendance of judges to particular districts—the members of two respectable States, in which, by the bill, Judge Chase was appointed to attend, objected unanimously to that appointment, because they had not confidence in him; and the facts on which the resolution is founded were stated on the floor, upon which the House altered the bill and appointed another judge to that district. This was a strong testimony that Congress believed that this open expression of want of confidence in that gentleman was justified by the facts that had been stated. He said, that though he had not at that time a seat in the House, he had expected an inquiry to be made into the causes of this want of confidence at that time. Perhaps it was prevented by the shortness of the session.

It is expedient for the character of the gentlemen and for the public good; for the gentlemen themselves, if they are innocent or have acted on justifiable ground; it is necessary that their characters may be vindicated, and confidence in their public conduct restored. It is expedient for the public good, because if the judges are guilty in the manner stated—if they have justly lost the confidence of the people and of Congress, as it appears, by the transaction of last session, one of them has done, the case ought to be examined and the citizens protected; for if he was unfit to preside on the bench for one district, he is unfit to preside in another. It is expedient, in order to secure the confidence of the citizens in the Government itself.

But precedents are called for by the gentlemen opposed to the resolution, and several of them contend that such special facts should be stated as would be unexceptionable ground of impeachment, before the inquiry is gone into. A gentleman from Vermont, (Mr. Elliot,) who argued yesterday in favor of postponement for further information on the subject, in the same argument said that he never would agree to the appointment of a committee of inquiry, until the charges were first stated and proved to his satisfaction. Mr. F. said he was astonished at this inconsistency. If the facts were first stated and established, appointing a committee of inquiry would be an absurdity. What would they inquire after but what they already knew? That gentleman and others, in order to defeat the resolution, gave the object of it an odious designation: they called it an inquisition, and spoke of it in such terms as if it was the well-known Spanish law of that name. The character of that court was too well known to the members of this House to require definition; it was sufficient to say that in it witnesses were examined without the knowledge of the party accused; that it compelled the accused to give testimony against themselves, and had authority to pass sentence of the most dreadful kind, without appeal. The gentlemen knew that no such thing was intended by the resolution. The character of the judges had been impeached in public opinion by numerous citizens of all descriptions. Congress[100] on that account gave a decisive testimony of want of confidence in one of them. The object of the resolution was to inquire whether there was a real foundation for this want of confidence and ill fame. If Congress did not make inquiry in such cases, who was to do it? It did not by the constitution belong to any other authority; every other method of proceeding would be as ingeniously objected to as the one proposed, by those who wished to prevent further proceedings in the case; denying the means of bringing forward impeachment, had the same effect as if the power of impeachment was renounced.

The power of this House has been asserted to be similar to that of a grand jury; this seems to be conceded on both sides, but though it bears a resemblance, it was not strictly so—it was more extensive. Grand juries were authorized to present such indictments or such complaint or information as were submitted to them by the Attorney General, or which they knew of their own knowledge. The attorney also inquires if there is probable ground for the complaint, and brings the witnesses before the jury, who examine them to establish the facts alleged; but this House has no officers authorized to make inquiry and bring forward the business in due form; therefore the House possess both the power of the Attorney General and the grand jury, with relation to impeachment; for where a power of decision is given, all the powers necessary to carry that decision into effect are implied. The making inquiry, procuring witnesses, or other testimony, and preparing the case in due form, is the object of the resolution; and if the House does not do it in this or some other such method, there is no other agent authorized to do it.

With respect to precedent and parliamentary usage, Mr. F. said he had formerly examined many, but was not prepared to state them at this time, and did not think them necessary on this occasion. In all the examples of impeachment by the British Parliament, from the reign of Henry VIII., when parliamentary power was reduced to a mere shadow, till the present time, when the parliamentary power has been amply enlarged and established, and their proceedings become more uniform, there will be shades of difference found in all of them, arising from various circumstances; we have few precedents of our own, and of these few none of them apply to the present case. It is the constitutional duty of this House to impeach, when impeachment is necessary, and of the Senate to decide on impeachments; but with respect to the manner in which each House should proceed, they are not trammelled by forms nor entangled in precedents.

There are, however, examples of proceedings both with the British Parliament and with us, as similar to the method now proposed as the various cases would admit. With ourselves, the case of the unfortunate Western expedition mentioned by my colleague (Mr. Gregg) yesterday, was much more to the purpose than the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Griswold) was willing to admit. Mr. F. said he had the honor to be one of the committee of inquiry which sat on that subject a great proportion of two sessions. The expedition was too late in setting out to the Indian country; they were said to have been illy provided with necessaries, and long detained for want of them; a large proportion of the army were killed or taken by the savages, and all the stores with the army left. The citizens were discontented, and numerous complaints were heard, but none knew with certainty whom to blame; a committee was appointed to examine witnesses and report the testimony to the House, in order to discover the party who had been to blame. Some had charged it on the commanding General, others on the Secretary of War, and others on the Commissary of Military Stores, and these last endeavored to wrest the blame from themselves and fix it on the General. It was certain that a great misfortune had happened, but it was not certain that any officer was to blame; no charge had been made to Congress against any officer, yet Congress thought proper to make an inquiry, and it was not opposed on account of want of form, or want of precedents, by any of the friends of the parties. Towards the close of the first session, the committee made a concise report, referring to a great amount of testimonies. Some of the parties implicated by the report thought themselves injured by it, and it was alleged that other witnesses ought to be examined. Consequently, at the next session, the business was recommitted to the same committee, and as it was near the close of the last session of that Congress, before all the witnesses were procured and examined, and the parties heard by the committee, each of the parties wrote and delivered to the committee a large book of explanations and defence. The committee reported a large wooden box full of testimony, of original letters and instructions, and the three books of explanations and defence accompanied with some observations. It was not possible for that Congress to enter on the business, and the cause being of a transient nature, and the parties who applied for the second inquiry not wishing a disclosure of the testimony, the business was not afterwards entered on; but the mass of testimony, &c., is yet in possession of Congress. This, it is presumed, applies well in favor of the present resolution.

Gentlemen object to the resolution because of the indelicacy of implicating the character of a judge. They seem to believe the character of a judge to be sacred and immaculate. But are not judges men? Are they not men subject to like passions and like feelings as other men? Judges and other official characters voluntarily surrender a part of the rights they enjoyed in common with other citizens, in return for the honors and emoluments of office; others have a right to the privilege of trial by jury, in the decision of all charges against them; but public officers, by accepting of office, subject themselves under this Government, to trial by impeachment.[101] Subjecting judges to impeachment, indicates, unequivocally, a constitutional opinion that judges would be even more liable to transgress than other citizens, and might transgress in a more aggravated manner than mere citizens. This mode of trial, however, in this country, is become almost a harmless thing; it is deprived of more than half its terrors. It does not reach life or property, but only the official character.

Mr. F. said he was a friend to the independence of judges, but that all independence in all Governments had its limits and restraints. It was not provided for the aggrandizement of the judges, but for the protection of the citizens. So far as it is applicable to this purpose, it is necessary, but any further, it is injurious and subjected to restraint. Under no Government with which we are acquainted are the judges rendered so independent as that of the United States. In Britain, from which we have derived the mode of our judiciary, the judges were appointed during pleasure; till, little more than a century ago, they were rendered independent by the Revolution Parliament for the security of the people against the encroachments of the Monarch, and the overbearing influence of a very powerful nobility; and for this purpose it was not only salutary, but absolutely necessary. But even with that boasted independence, that Judiciary is subjected to restraints and modes of correction not provided in the Federal Constitution. The judges are liable to be removed from office by the vote of both Houses of Parliament, without trial. They are liable to be removed, or their standing changed by act of Parliament. That Parliament, on whose act their independence depends, can repeal the act; the two Houses of Parliament can make and unmake their Kings. They are also liable, by an act of attainder, not only to lose their office, but their estate, the honor of their families, and even their lives.

The Judiciaries in all the States of the Union are rendered less or more independent; some are appointed for shorter and some for longer periods. In New Jersey, they are appointed for seven years; they were so in Pennsylvania formerly; since the revision of the constitution they are appointed during good behavior; they are, however, subjected not only to removal by impeachment, but also by the vote of two-thirds of each House, for any cause which the House do not think a sufficient cause of impeachment; but in the Federal Government there is no method provided for removing them for the most scandalous indiscretions or incapacity, as even when they may unfortunately be under mental derangement, except by impeachment, which is inapplicable to official crimes, and conducted with tedious forms. The power of impeaching being the only shield provided by the Government for the protection of the citizens from judicial oppression, and this House being the only constitutional organ for obtaining information of official excesses, and bringing forward articles of impeachment, ought not to bind up their own hands from doing their duty, and this they will do if they reject the resolution now on the table.

But while the gentlemen consider the character of these judges so sacred that their conduct cannot be inquired into, notwithstanding such proofs of want of confidence in them, and that as a gentleman near me from South Carolina (Mr. Lowndes) has said that he is afraid of impeachment, and grounds his fears on the incapacity or the unfitness of the members of this House, or because the members of this House may abuse the power; Mr. F. asked, were not the members of this House selected and qualified for the discharge of this necessary duty? Were they not appointed by a respectable authority as the judges? Were they not under a solemn oath of office for the faithful discharge of this as well as every part of their high trust? And were they not protected by special privileges and protection during the discharge of their trust equally with the judges, and their stations as respectable as the judges’? They are not only protected from civil actions, but are not subjected to impeachment for misbehavior in office as the judges are. They are, in their official capacity, subjected only to the censure of public opinion. If this is true, it is improper, it is impolitic, for the members of this House to degrade their own character: it amounts to saying they are not capable of discharging the trust they are solemnly bound to discharge, and ought not to have been invested with. He knew, however, that this was only introduced as an excuse for unwillingness. But the same gentleman adds, as a reason for opposing the resolution, that he is not acquainted with the history of the business. That is probably the case with him and others, especially such as had not a seat in the last session of Congress, or who resided at a great distance from the scene alluded to in the resolution. Admitting this to be true, the best and the only regular way to become acquainted with the history of the case, is to carry the resolution into effect—to have a committee appointed with such power as would enable them to procure such information as that gentleman and every other member could depend on. The gentleman’s objection, in fact, is one of the strongest arguments in favor of the resolution. The gentleman from South Carolina has, however, offered one other objection to the resolution, which merits some notice. He has said that if a committee is appointed for the object proposed by the resolution, men of character and talents will not accept of appointments in the Judiciary. The solidity of this objection will be best examined by the test of observation and experience. It has been already mentioned that several States have appointed their supreme judges for short periods, and that others have vested the Legislature with the power of removing judges from office without impeachment, merely on their own opinion. Can the gentleman[102] from South Carolina say—can any member on this floor, where all the States are represented, say—that these States are deficient in judges of respectability and talents? They cannot say so—there is no such complaint. The Judiciary of New Jersey, where the judges are chosen but for seven years, is as respectable, and the application of her laws as well brought home to the security and happiness of her citizens as they are in the States where judges are appointed for life. The same may be asserted with confidence of the State of Pennsylvania before the revision of her constitution, as they are since. There is this difference, however: where they have been appointed for limited periods there have been no impeachments or removals, and generally, if not always, the judges were reappointed, and justice was well administered; but since they have been appointed for good behavior, there have, at least in Pennsylvania, been both, and more complaints of inattention, expense, and delays, in the administration of justice than had been formerly. Many of the judges, however, are very respectable, and enjoy a high degree of confidence, but not more confidence than they did before the change of the constitution. There has been no attempt to remove or impeach the judges of the Supreme Court of that State.

To inquire into the conduct of the judges when confidence is evidently wanting, is the only true way to secure the respectability of the Judiciary. If that necessary confidence is withdrawn without cause, an official inquiry will restore confidence and the usefulness of the judges. This observation is supported by precedent and parliamentary usage. In that country from which precedents are so frequently sought, one precedent offers itself to recollection. In the year 1730, a committee of the British House of Commons was appointed to examine the jails. In the course of examination, the committee discovered that Sir Robert Eyres, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, a judge of very respectable character, was suspected, not of tyranny on the bench, or of putting any man’s life in jeopardy, but of having held an improper correspondence with a person confined for crime or misdemeanor, and this suspicion chiefly supported by anonymous letters. A committee of the House of Commons were appointed to make inquiry, and it was found, to the satisfaction of the committee and of the people, that the allegations on which the suspicion was founded were false, and the judge’s character was vindicated and restored.

Mr. F. said this precedent applied well to the present case. If the judges mentioned in the resolution had done their duty, their characters would be vindicated by the inquiry, and the public confidence in their integrity restored; if they were guilty, and not entitled to confidence, they ought to be removed from office, and neither the one nor the other could be done unless the inquiry proposed was authorized.

He said that the inquiry was necessary to secure the purity, honor, and usefulness of the Judiciary Department. If that House refused or neglected to exert the powers vested therein for securing public confidence in the Judiciary, unprincipled men would find means of recommending themselves to appointments, and would vitiate the streams where justice is expected to flow, and the citizens would be oppressed without the means or hopes of redress, and would feel the effects of tyrannical power in the administration of a government which, in its other departments, was the greatest and best of any in the world. Let proper inquiries be made where they are necessary; let the character of judges unjustly charged be vindicated, and the vicious and unworthy be removed, and improper characters will cease to intrude themselves; their friends will not dare to recommend, and Congress will have confidence that the laws which they pass will be applied agreeably to their genuine principles, to the protection and ease of the citizens; if we do not provide for this, we had better cease to make laws.

If virtuous men are appointed and the vicious discouraged, Congress may, from particular circumstances, be called on to make inquiries, but very rarely indeed to be employed in impeachments, (no men of real virtue and talents would refuse a seat on the bench for fear of inquiry or impeachment.) He said that the judges of the Supreme Court in the State he had the honor of representing, though they differed in political opinions, administered justice with such purity and diligence, that though some of them had been long in office, they enjoyed the confidence of the citizens, were in no danger of impeachment or removal by vote, and he believed would not shrink from inquiry if necessary. The more extensive the confidence of the citizens that was reposed in the Judiciary, the easier it would be to supply vacancies with men of character and talents. He said that among several other observations which occurred to his mind, with offering which he would not now detain the House, he had once thought of stating other charges against the official conduct of these judges, of which he had been well informed, but on due reflection he declined mentioning them, and thought it most for the public good to insist on the appointment demanded by a member on the responsibility of his own official character, and as a matter of right, and would do nothing that would impair the weight of the precedent that he hoped would be set by agreeing to the resolution as it stood.

Mr. F. said that having so long engaged the attention of the House he would conclude by observing, that as the case now stood it is proper for all the members to vote for the resolution; those that believed as he did, that there was a want of necessary confidence in those judges, and that this want of confidence was occasioned by their unauthorized and oppressive conduct, were obliged in conscience to vote for the inquiry; and every member who believed the judges to have done their duty, and that the[103] public confidence is withdrawn from them without cause, are bound in duty to vote for the resolution, in order that the judges may have an opportunity to vindicate their character, that confidence in them being restored they may become useful to the public; therefore, in every light he could view it, he was convinced it was his duty to vote for the resolution, and would act accordingly.

Mr. Jackson.—As, Mr. Speaker, this subject is novel in its nature, and may be important in its consequences, I presume there exists a disposition to hear the reasoning which any gentleman may be disposed to offer upon it. It is with this view that I rise to express my opinion in favor of creating a committee of inquiry. I consider this House as the grand inquest of the nation, whose duty it is to inquire, on a proper representation, into the conduct of every official character under the Government. Like a grand jury, we ought, in my opinion, at the instance of any member, to send for all persons possessed of information calculated to throw light upon the conduct of any individual inculpated. A contrary doctrine would lead to the most unfortunate consequences. It would lead to this, that a minority would never be able to inquire into the conduct of a State offender, unless such inquiry were favored by the majority. As it is now contended that the inquiry is not a matter of right which any member may demand, but a matter of favor, to be granted according to the pleasure of the majority, it may be said that, if a majority favor an individual, he will always escape without an impeachment. But I believe otherwise; and that the Senate, like a virtuous judge, will not suffer an atom of prejudice or partiality to fall into the scales of justice.

But, say gentlemen, though it may be the duty of the House to impeach an officer, it is necessary that facts, warranting such an impeachment, should be first presented. This is not the course pursued in cases where a grand jury is called upon to act. If a murder is committed, it is their duty to inquire, and diligently inquire, who is guilty of the act, and to send for all persons capable of giving information respecting it. Such is the practice. If it shall be required to furnish facts, as is urged by gentlemen, the consequence will be that offences of the highest nature will be committed with impunity. It has been observed that it is odious to undertake the task of a public informer. But what the constitution and laws make our duty, so far from being odious, is honorable; because we thereby discharge a duty imposed upon us by our oaths, and because we show ourselves unawed by the vicious conduct of bad men. If the character of a public informer be odious, are we to expect that private individuals will come forward with affidavits? In such a case, to say the least of it, the duty would be of an unpleasant nature.

We have, in the course of this debate, been frequently called upon for precedents, and been told, that, when found, they ought to be adhered to. In a country from which we are accustomed to draw precedents—England—common report has been considered as a sufficient authority for similar inquiries. We do not, however, ask for an inquiry in this case on common report, but on the declaration of a member of this House, made in his place. Suppose there was no such declaration, has not a common report, from Maine to Georgia, condemned the conduct of the judge in the case of Fries and others, at Philadelphia, in the case of a grand jury in Delaware, whom he directed to inquire for seditious practices, and in the case of Callender, in Virginia? Has not the general sentiment of the country charged him with having, in these cases, abused his powers as a judge by tyrannizing over those who were brought before him? If we possess the right to inquire, on common report, surely we ought to institute this inquiry on the prevalence of so general a sentiment. To such an inquiry I would unhesitatingly agree, if the character of the President were implicated, the opinion of the gentleman from Vermont to the contrary notwithstanding. I would likewise agree to make the same inquiry in any other case; because the inquiry would redound to the honor of the individual implicated, if innocent; and because, if guilty, he ought to be punished.

I am sorry my friend from Pennsylvania stated any facts, as I do not consider it necessary that the House should be acquainted with any facts to make this inquiry; and because I think the facts, stated as grounds of impeachment, are not such as will warrant an impeachment. I have always understood that it was the right of a judge to expound the law, and I have known frequent instances where the court have refused the counsel the liberty of discussing the law on points on which they have made up their minds. While I am free to declare that the conduct of the court in the trial of Fries is not, in my opinion, such as to require an impeachment, yet I am in favor of instituting the inquiry. But, say gentlemen, by the passage of this resolution, we shall censure the judge. I believe not. If I believed so, I would first require testimony; for I hold it a good principle, that no man ought to be condemned until he has been heard. In my opinion, this resolution will have no such tendency; as, if the judge has not been guilty of misconduct, the inquiry will redound to his honor, and as it is the duty of a virtuous man to demand an inquiry whenever charged with an offence.

Gentlemen, in opposition to this measure, say they wish to guard against suspicion. But suspicion has long since gone forth; has been heard and re-echoed from every part of the Union; and the only way of defeating it, if ill-founded, is to institute an inquiry, and if the character of the judge be innocent, to pronounce it so. I am surprised to find gentlemen, who profess a friendship for the character of one of the persons implicated, opposed to this inquiry, when they[104] believe him innocent. I should suppose it their peculiar duty to call for the inquiry, that the accused might have an opportunity of proving to the world that his character has been assailed without cause.

Mr. R. Griswold.—After what has passed on this floor, there can be no doubt that the gentlemen whose characters are implicated by this resolution will ardently desire an investigation of their conduct; and if, on this floor, we were merely to consult our own wishes, we should unanimously agree on an investigation. But this is not our duty; our duty is to take on this, as well as on all other occasions, a correct course; to take those steps only which are warranted. It is because I doubt, after considerable deliberation, whether this course is warranted, that I am opposed to it. What, I ask, is the nature of the resolution on the table? It contains no charges against the judges implicated; it only proposes to raise a committee to inquire whether their official conduct has been such as to justify the interposition of the constitutional power of this House. If a committee of inquiry is raised, what will be their powers? One thing will certainly follow. They will be clothed with a power to send for persons, and probably for papers. Is it consistent with principle to appoint a committee, which, from its nature, must be secret, with power to ransack the country in the first instance for accusations against the judges, and then for proofs to support them? Is this correct? Are gentlemen prepared to say so? to seek for accusations, and then for proofs to support those accusations, against high officers of the Government? For one, I believe that this course is not correct. I believe it to be dangerous. I agree with the gentleman from Vermont, that it operates in the nature of an inquisition. A committee will be raised to act in secret, first to find an accusation, and next to prove it. If there is now any accusation against the judges, let it be made; let it be made on this floor; and, as the gentleman from New Jersey has observed, let us ascertain, if true, whether it will be a sufficient ground for an impeachment. This will be a correct course, and it will be the only safe course. If, on the contrary, we proceed in the manner proposed, it will be attended with this consequence: at the commencement of every session we shall raise a secret committee, to compose an inquisition, to ascertain whether there are not charges against some public officer, and to search for proofs to justify them. Is the Government of this country founded on this principle? I know that this secret course of procedure is practised by the Spanish Government, and by some others, but I never thought that it would be the practice of this Government. When a charge is made against a public officer, it ought to be boldly made. It ought to be made here, and should be committed to writing. Instead of this being done, there is no charge made. The resolution contains none. It is merely calculated to raise a secret committee. Why? Because the gentleman from Virginia is of opinion that it is proper. Is his opinion, or the opinion of any other gentleman, to govern this House? Are we brought to this? I trust this is not the case. I trust that gentlemen will think it necessary not only to consider his opinion, but to form their own. What can gentlemen say, if they agree to this resolution? That they voted to investigate the conduct of two judges. Why? Because the gentleman from Virginia says it is necessary to investigate. Why investigate? Because the gentleman demands it. This is the language of that gentleman yesterday. Because a gentleman of this House gives his opinion of the course proper to be pursued on this occasion, it does not follow that we are to be governed by it. We may respect it; but we must respect our own opinions still more, if we faithfully discharge our duty. I am sensible that some facts have been mentioned by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, or rather, that that gentleman has heard a story; but it is mere hearsay.

I ask, also, how this formidable charge has rested to this day? When and where did the transaction, on which it is founded, happen? In Philadelphia, and in the winter of the year 1800, when Congress were in session within twenty rods of the place where the court was held. The gentleman from Virginia, as well as other members on this floor, were then in the House. The case being, I believe, the only one in which there was a charge of treason, excited, in a considerable degree, the attention of members, many of whom attended the trial. How comes it, then, that this charge was not then made? If it shall be said the House did not interfere at that time because the criminal was lying under sentence of death, it will be recollected that, in 1801, Fries was pardoned. Why was not the inquiry then made? If it shall be said that it would have been imprudent to make it on account of the party then in power, why was it not made in the seventh Congress, when a change of men took place? How can gentlemen reconcile this great delay with the high regard they profess for the purity of the streams of justice, and for justice itself? For such is the respect they entertain for justice, that they have determined to bring to conviction this unjust and criminal judge. Gentlemen ought to account for this culpable neglect. It is impossible that they should have been ignorant of the trial of this man. It was not a sudden or a hidden thing, done in a corner; it was done in public, in the face of the Legislature, and yet it has slept to the present day. Under such circumstances, I submit it to the House, whether much respect ought to be paid to the hearsay of the gentleman from Pennsylvania. The very delay, and other circumstances attending this transaction, show that it is not of the serious nature contended. I therefore think that, if properly brought before the House, and suffered to rest upon proof, it would constitute no ground for impeachment.[105] As to the proposed form of proceeding, if we examine precedents, we shall find that it is not warranted by them. None mentioned compare with the case under consideration. The precedent in the case of Lord Bolingbroke does not compare with that. In that case the House of Commons raised a secret committee to examine the negotiations made for a peace. The committee was not raised to impeach Lord Bolingbroke, but to investigate the negotiations of the Ministry; and on the disclosure of facts, which took place on that occasion, the impeachment was grounded. Such, also, was the case in the instance of the Western expedition. The House appointed a committee vested with general powers to inquire into the causes of its failure, without particular reference to the conduct of any person.

If we turn our attention to British precedents, we shall find that a committee has never failed to investigate the official conduct of any person contemplated to be impeached. In the case of Hastings, Mr. Burke came forward and moved an impeachment directly. In all cases this course has been pursued in the British House of Commons. So far as we have precedents in this country, a similar course has been pursued. In the instance of Governor Blount, the Executive transmitted documents to this House, which contained, as it was supposed, evidence of his guilt; they were referred to a committee to examine them, and also to determine whether it was proper to print them. The committee reported that, in their opinion, they contained evidence of his guilt, and he was impeached. In the case of Judge Pickering, the same course has been pursued. The Executive transmitted documents to the House which contained, as it was supposed, proofs of misconduct, and the House proceeded to an impeachment. These precedents confirm the principle of those drawn from the practice of the British House of Commons. What course is now proposed? Without any charge against the judges, without any man saying they are guilty of any misconduct, we are about to appoint a secret committee, to determine whether any charges can be made, and whether any proofs to support them can be found. Although I am willing that the conduct of these gentlemen shall be investigated, for I am sure they must desire it, and although I have no objection to impeach them, if gentlemen wish it, and exhibit proper proofs on which to ground it, yet I cannot consent to pursue a course so improper as that now proposed. For this reason I am against the resolution, not because I am hostile to an investigation, but because I cannot consent to the appointment of a secret committee to search, in the first instance, for an accusation, and to look for proofs to justify it.

Mr. Findlay rose to explain. He said it was not the object of the House, in their investigation of the causes of the failure of the Western expedition, to make new arrangements, but to inquire into the conduct of certain officers who had directed it, viz: the Secretary of War, the Commander-in-chief, and the Commissary.

Mr. Nicholson said, he happened not to be in the House yesterday at the moment when the resolution under consideration was introduced; and when he entered he found the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. R. Griswold) on the floor, who concluded his remarks by moving a postponement. Mr. N. did not think it then correct to offer remarks upon the main question, but as the resolution itself was now under consideration, and the subject of no common nature, he could not think of passing a silent vote upon it.

When he rose to-day, for a few moments, on the motion to amend, by inserting the name of Judge Peters, he had then declared, and he now begged leave to repeat it, that whenever any member of the House should rise in his place and state that any officer of the Government had been guilty of official misconduct, he had no hesitation in saying, that he would consent to an inquiry. He cared not how exalted his station, or how far he was raised above the rest of the community; the very circumstance of his superior elevation would prove an additional incitement. Such, he said, was the nature of the Government, and so important the duty in this respect devolved upon the House of Representatives, that the conduct of the Chief Magistrate himself, as far as his vote could effect it, should be subjected to an inquiry whenever it was demanded by a member. The greater responsibility, the more easy and more simple should be the means of investigation. Were he, indeed, the friend, personal or political, of the officer charged, and he believed that impeachment would be the result of inquiry, it was possible that his feelings as a man might induce him to forget his duty as a Representative, and urge him to resist the inquiry; but, were he convinced of his innocence, he would do all in his power to promote it, in order that he might stand justified to the nation and to the world.

Upon the present occasion, he begged that he might not be understood to say that the offence with which these judges were charged, was such as would warrant an impeachment. But, while he meant not to commit himself on a question of such high moment, he could not avoid expressing his astonishment that the conduct stated should not only be defended upon the floor of the House, but entirely approved; that gentlemen should venture to declare that the court acted strictly in the line of their duty, in refusing to hear counsel on a point of law which involved the guilt or the innocence of the prisoner. A man was charged with the highest offence against the Government, and, if guilty, was subject to the severest and most ignominious punishment recognized by our laws. High treason was the crime, and death the penalty. The constitution declared that treason against the United States should consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies,[106] giving them aid and comfort. The framers of the constitution intended to be as precise as possible in their definition of treason; they were anxious that no room should be left for doubt afterwards. They had seen to what an infinite variety of objects the crime of treason had been extended in England, and wisely confined it here to the only two offences which could be said to strike at the existence of the Government. The laws of the United States had declared that resistance to the execution of a law should only be considered as sedition, and had provided the punishment of fine and imprisonment. Fries was charged with resisting the execution of a law, and this offence the court determined to be treason, without hearing his counsel, and refused to permit them to address the jury on the subject, although the jury were the judges as well of the law as the fact. A resistance to the execution of a law, they construed to be treason, in the face of the act of Congress, which declared it to be a misdemeanor only, punishable with fine and imprisonment. These constructive treasons, he said, had been reprobated by the wise and good in all ages, and at a very early period in the history of English jurisprudence had received the pointed disapprobation of the Parliament. He adverted to what he called a wise and humane provision in the statute of Edward III., by which the judges were prohibited from declaring any thing to be treason not so expressly defined by the letter of the statute. That the court had given such an opinion, was not now, however, the point of charge against them; that they extended the doctrine of treason beyond both the letter and spirit of the constitution, was not now the foundation of the present motion. The accusation was that, in a case involving the life or death of a freeman, the party was condemned without a hearing; that he was denied the assistance of counsel, which was secured to him by the constitution of his country; that the right of the jury to decide both the law and the fact was refused; for it amounted to a refusal when the court would not permit the jury to be assisted by the arguments of counsel. He asked if gentlemen would consider it correct in a court, upon an indictment for murder, to prohibit the prisoner’s counsel from contending before the jury, that the offence charged amounted to manslaughter only? Surely not. The question, in the case of Fries was, whether the act of which he had been guilty amounted to treason, or to a misdemeanor? and this the court refused to suffer the jury to have an argument upon. He declared that, in all criminal prosecutions, the jury had a clear, undoubted right to decide, as well the law as the fact; they were not bound by the direction of the court; and that, in capital cases, it was a right which they ought always to exercise. But, in Fries’s case, the law was not permitted to be brought into the view of the jury by his counsel; the court denied to the prisoner the assistance of counsel, which was secured to him by the constitution, and he was condemned to an ignominious death, which he must have suffered but for the subsequent interference of the Executive. Mr. N. said, he had thought proper to make these remarks in answer to those gentlemen who had undertaken to pronounce the conduct of the court to be strictly correct. Although he did not mean to commit himself by declaring that this afforded sufficient ground for impeachment, yet he could not avoid saying, that the refusal to hear counsel in defence of the prisoner, did not meet his approbation.

The gentleman from Connecticut had doubted whether the present proceeding was conformable to principle. He thought that we ought to have the proof before we take any steps to procure it. Mr. N. begged leave to ask how proof was to be procured before inquiry was made? In what manner information was to be obtained before it was sought for? If a member had stated upon oath that a judge had been guilty of improper conduct, which would warrant an impeachment, the motion would not be, in the first instance, to inquire, but to impeach. If information was necessary, how was it to be procured? By sitting here, and writing for depositions to be sent in? Surely not. If a person was in the lobby, acquainted with all the facts, how were they to be communicated to the House? Was he to come to the bar, and offer a voluntary affidavit, or would it be correct to introduce him without any previous proceeding? In that case, would it not be necessary to declare, by a prior resolution, that we would commence an inquiry before testimony could be offered at the bar? If a member should state that a witness was at hand who could prove official misconduct in a judge, the correct course would be to introduce a resolution, declaring that the House would inquire, and it could not be resisted. What, he asked, was the proposed course? Instead of making the inquiry in the House, it was requested that it might be made by a committee. Instead of using our power to bring witnesses before us, it is proposed to authorize a committee to examine them. This would be more convenient and more proper. To bring them before the House would be attended with inconvenience, and unnecessary delay. He could not tell what the mode of proceeding before the House of Representatives would be, but, generally, he believed, it was the practice for a member to propound the question to the Speaker; the Speaker then to propound it to the witness; the answer to be made to the Speaker, and by him reverberated back again to the House. He asked, if the House would consent to this? If they would agree to a course of proceedings so tedious, so procrastinating, so evidently embarrassing? And yet this must be the course, unless that proposed was adopted.

It was said by a gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. R. Griswold,) that we were about to appoint a committee to ransack the country for an accusation, and afterwards to search for proof[107] to support it. He complains that no accusation is made. Mr. N. averred that an accusation was made; it was made during the last session, and again repeated during the present. He asked, if it was no charge to declare that a judge had condemned a man to the most ignominious death, without a hearing; without allowing him those benefits which he claimed under the constitution? Was it a trivial circumstance for a member of this House to declare that a freeman had been indicted for a high capital offence; that he appeared at the bar and pleaded not guilty; that his counsel were ready to prove the truth of the plea, but that the presiding judge had refused to hear them? If this was not a charge, and a charge, too, of a most solemn nature, he did not understand the meaning of the words. It was brought forward as boldly as the gentleman from Connecticut could wish, and the only question now was, in what manner shall we inquire into the truth of it? Shall we appoint a committee to make the inquiry by calling witnesses before them, or shall we dismiss it without investigation? Shall we give it the go-by, and suffer the character of the judges to rest under an imputation so heavy? Shall we proclaim our own dishonor, by publishing abroad that a heavy charge had been made, in the face of this House, against one of the highest judicial officers of the Government, and that we were too pusillanimous to notice it?

What the gentleman meant by comparing the proposed committee to the Spanish Inquisition, Mr. N. did not really understand. Did the gentleman wish to make a false impression upon the public mind? Was he anxious to cast an odium upon the proceeding by calling it an inquisitorial committee, and affecting to believe that it was to be clothed with the powers of the Holy Inquisition? The Inquisition had the power to seize the person of the party, to deny him all access to his friends, to confine him in a cell, and refuse him all assistance whatever; to stretch him on the wheel, and rack and torture him into confession. Does the gentleman wish to induce a belief that this committee is to be clothed with the same powers? All committees appointed to inquire, might, to be sure, be called Inquisitorial, because they were to make inquiry, but the epithet of Spanish Inquisition was intended to convey an idea totally incorrect.

The gentleman had asked why this charge had been suffered to rest so long? The facts upon which it was made were said to have taken place in 1800. Mr. N. thought it would be fair to reply to the gentleman that, possibly, he himself had, in some measure, accounted for the delay; the proper time had not before arrived. But if the act upon which the charge was grounded was criminal at that day, was it less so now? If Justice had slept so long, did it follow that she was dead? He hoped and trusted not. Though she had lain dormant till she was almost trampled to death, she was again roused to her accustomed vigilance, would pursue her victims, and drag them to punishment. The day of retribution, he hoped, was at hand.

The gentleman from Connecticut had declared that the proposed course was not warranted by precedent. He had noticed, but had not explained away, the precedents introduced by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Findlay.) His own precedent, derived from the impeachment of Mr. Hastings, instead of being in his favor, was directly against him.

In that case it was not pretended that the proof was before the House of Commons. Mr. Burke had derived his information from certain papers relative to Indian affairs, which some years before had been produced and referred to a select committee. In the year 1786, Mr. Burke rose in his place, not as a member of that committee, and charged Warren Hastings with high crimes and misdemeanors. About the same time he presented a written paper containing a specification of these charges. But this was not the impeachment. The written paper stated that as Governor General of Bengal he had disobeyed the instructions of the court of directors; that he had acknowledged himself perfectly acquainted with their wishes, but instead of obeying, had used his utmost endeavors to defeat them; and much more of an important nature. This he moved might be referred to a Committee of the whole House, in order that an inquiry might be made; and there was not a single dissenting voice. He did not adduce the proofs in the first instance, but stated his opinions that Mr. Hastings’s conduct had been criminal, and demanded an inquiry. The Commons of England did not hesitate—they instantly resolved to inquire. No one was heard to declare that there was no charge, because there was no proof. Witnesses were brought to the bar and there examined by a Committee of the Whole, in support of the charges; nor was there a motion to impeach until the testimony was gone through. On the contrary, the facts proved were reported by the Committee of the Whole, who likewise expressed an opinion that Warren Hastings had been guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors, and ought to be impeached. The impeachment therefore was not upon the motion of Mr. Burke, but upon the report of a committee, who under the instruction of the House had made an inquiry.

What then, Mr. N. asked, was the course now proposed? His friend from Virginia had called the attention of the House to certain alleged misconduct of a judge, which had been stated by a member in his place during the last session. That statement had again been repeated in the House yesterday, not in writing, indeed, but in language so clear and in terms so unequivocal that none were so stupid as not to understand it. Like Mr. Burke, he asked that a committee should be appointed to inquire into the truth of the charge. The House of Commons had referred the subject before them to a Committee of the Whole, and the House of Representatives[108] were moved to refer the subject before them to a select committee. A select committee was proposed, because it would be more convenient and more expeditious. If the subject might with propriety be referred to a Committee of the Whole, with equal propriety might it be referred to a select committee.

He had noticed this precedent, not because he thought it necessary to cross the Atlantic for authorities, but because the gentleman had introduced it as favoring his own doctrines. If there was already no precedent, in his opinion the House ought to make one; but he believed their own journals would furnish them with one. At the first session of the seventh Congress, in a very few days after the House met, Mr. N. said he had risen in his place, and stated that he had seen in the public prints, during the preceding summer, charges of a serious nature against an individual who had filled one of the highest stations under the Government, that he had misapplied considerable sums of public money, and was a defaulter to a very large amount. Upon this vague rumor, he had moved that the accounts of the former Secretary of State should be laid before the House. No gentleman then declared that it was necessary to have proof before an inquiry took place. No one dreamt that information as to facts was to be had, before it was sought for. Some indeed had asked how far the motion was to extend; whether it was to embrace all the other Secretaries of State? Others desired that the accounts from all the departments should be called for, and finally it was determined to let the resolution lie for a short time. In a few days after, on the 14th of December, he modified the resolution, in conformity with the wishes of several gentlemen, and it passed directing that “a committee should be appointed to inquire and report, whether moneys drawn from the Treasury had been faithfully applied to the objects for which they had been appropriated, and whether they had been regularly accounted for,” &c. A precedent more in point he thought could not be desired. The inquiry was produced, not upon proof, not even upon the suggestion of a member, but because a report as to the misapplication of public money had circulated through the public prints of the day. He might be told perhaps that this was an inquiry of a general nature. But general as it might be, it was directed at the conduct of individuals, and under other circumstances might have furnished materials for an impeachment. The gentleman from Connecticut was a member of that committee, and Mr. N. asked him if he would pretend to say that it was a secret committee, as he had called that now asked for? Or was this only another attempt to impose upon the public?

Another precedent, he thought, might be furnished from the Journal, but he was unwilling to refer to it.

It had been said, too, that impeachments would be cheap if they were to be made upon the suggestion of a member. It appeared to him that the motion to inquire had been constantly mistaken for a motion to impeach. Did gentlemen suppose that an impeachment must necessarily follow an inquiry? It would seem as if they entertained a poor opinion of those whose conduct was the subject of discussion. But they ought to recollect that the impeachment could not be the act of any individual, nor of the committee, but of the House; and this, too, after all the facts were collected and presented, with the evidence to support them. If this mode was not to be adopted, he did not know any other manner in which an impeachment could be instituted, unless where the President thought the peace of the country or the revenue were endangered, and gave the information himself, as in the case of Governor Blount and Judge Pickering. Nor did he think this could affect the independency of judges, unless they were to be made independent of the laws, the constitution, and the people.

Had it not been for the debate which had taken place on this subject, he should have imagined that the friends to the judge would have been the first to promote the inquiry after it was moved for. If he was innocent, the inquiry ought to be wished for: after passing through the ordeal, he would come out like pure gold from the crucible. If guilty, no man ought to feel a disposition to screen him from punishment. Mr. N. could not avoid on this occasion alluding to the recent conduct of a judge in a neighboring State, upon whose character an imputation of the blackest nature had been thrown by a miscreant. That judge, conscious of his own rectitude, and disdaining to shelter himself from inquiry, demanded an investigation of the charge, and the consequence was an entire and honorable acquittal.

Mr. Elliot.—When, in the course of a late debate in this House, it was observed that a member had advanced an anti-republican sentiment, the supposed imputation was repelled by the remark, that the gentleman to whom allusion had been made, had passed a political ordeal which few had experienced, and which ought to place his character as a republican above the reach of suspicion. I have myself suffered an ordeal of that description, under circumstances of gloom and depression which have fallen to the lot of but few young men of this country; and I am far from being confident that one ordeal only will fill up the measure of my humble fortune. A more anti-republican resolution than the one upon your table, sir, I think I never saw. Reflection has confirmed me in the opinion which I expressed yesterday, that it is unprecedented, unparliamentary, and tends to the assumption, on the part of this House, of a censorial and inquisitorial power over the Judiciary, unwarranted by the constitution. The intention and object of the mover, however, must have been extremely different; the motive is pure and the object meritorious; but that honorable gentleman, with all his talents and discernment, has, in my opinion,[109] fallen into an error. I believe it a sound principle, that no official measures should be taken to censure or criminate the conduct of a public officer, until facts shall be stated which amount to a specific and definite charge of misconduct. In the present instance we have no written allegations, and what is the amount of the verbal information with which we are furnished? A gentleman from Pennsylvania has stated in his place that he has heard that some one of the judges, whose name appears in the resolution, was guilty of improper and oppressive conduct, in the exercise of his judicial functions, on a trial for treason some years since. And a gentleman from Virginia has stated that he has received information which induces him to believe that the inquiry he demands will lead to an impeachment. Is it our duty to act upon the vague rumors of common fame, or the opinions of individual members?

The resolution under consideration has been materially altered this morning, and I gave my vote for the alteration, because I believed that the misconduct of a court ought not to be attributed to a single judge.

I feel it my duty, Mr. Speaker, to remark, that the information which is possessed by the members of this House, respecting the conduct of those judges, is extremely contradictory. No gentleman has told us that he possesses personal knowledge of the misconduct imputed to those officers; and I possess information on the subject, derived soon after the transaction, from a source which I considered as authentic, and which produced so deep an impression upon my mind, that I should scarcely abandon my belief of its authenticity, even from the general recollection of persons who were present at the scene. I understand that the judges did nothing more or less than decide a legal question in a legal manner. They did not interdict the counsel for the prisoner from examining a question of law, but they restricted them to what they considered as their legal and constitutional limits. They told them that the constitution of our country had clearly and explicitly defined the crime of treason, and confined them to the plain field of the constitution, inhibiting them from a resort to British authorities to prove that to be treason which the constitution of our country had not made treason, or to prove that what our constitution had made treason, was not recognized as such by foreign precedents. This statement may be incorrect, and, if it be correct, the conduct of the judges may have been improper and severe, but it cannot justify an impeachment. And if the court went farther, interrupted the counsel for the prisoner, informed them that it was the province of the court to determine points of law, declared that their opinion was fixed upon those points, and even forbade the counsel to prolong their arguments upon them, it might still be questionable whether the conduct of the court rendered its members liable to impeachment. A venerable gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Findlay,) who has long been in the service of his country, has been incorrect in stating that I had observed that I would never go into the inquiry without evidence; that incorrectness must have been unintentional; if I used an expression of that description, it was a lapsus linguæ: but I am confident that I said, and I am certain that I intended to say, that I thought it improper to institute the inquiry until some fact or facts should be stated as a ground of accusation. A gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Jackson) has told us that common fame is sufficient ground for impeachment in Great Britain. That gentleman has not adduced his authorities for this proposition, and, had he adduced them, I am confident they would not have answered his purpose, when contemplated in all their bearings, when examined with all their qualifications. The same gentleman also observed, if I understood him correctly, that were he satisfied that the conduct of the judges, in the case alluded to, was legal and correct, he would still vote for the inquiry. To me this declaration appears extraordinary. Why vote for an inquiry when satisfied that no criminality existed?

A gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Smilie,) who contends that there is no necessity for precedent in the present instance, as we are competent to form precedents for ourselves, has yet thought proper to explore the books for precedents, and has presented us with the result of his labors. To guide our conduct on the present occasion, we are referred to the case of the Earl of Strafford, over whose tomb genius and virtue love to mourn, and will mourn in future ages! It cannot be possible that that gentleman wishes to recommend for our imitation that flagrant perversion of every principle of law and justice, that cruel catastrophe! A gloomy and terrible precedent, one of the most dark and disgraceful in the British annals, and utterly unsusceptible of application to the principles of a Republican form of Government. The gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. Nicholson,) to whom I listened with peculiar pleasure, and who has certainly displayed ingenuity, has been equally unfortunate in his selection of precedents, and in his application of them to the case under consideration. He has cited cases, which, by his own statement, militate against the principles he assumes. We are first presented with the celebrated case of Warren Hastings. In that case, a member rose in his place, and, after accusing Hastings of high crimes and misdemeanors, exhibited specific charges of malconduct, in consequence of which an inquiry was instituted. Here is a solid basis, and the very basis which is wanting on the present occasion, upon which to erect the superstructure of impeachment. That gentleman has also mentioned a resolution introduced by himself in a former Congress, which was expressed in general terms, and directed to general objects, and of course was perfectly dissimilar to the present one.

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Allusions have repeatedly been made to a remark of mine in the debate of yesterday, that this House is the grand inquest of the nation. It has been asked, if a grand jury were informed that a murder has been committed, would they not send for evidence to ascertain the fact? We are the grand inquest of the nation, and our practice ought, in many respects, to be analogous to that of grand juries; but in becoming that inquest, we do not entirely lose our deliberative and legislative character. I believe it would be descending from the dignity of our station, to listen to the murmurs of general rumor, and seek for guilt. I have heard that one of the judges whom we are called upon to censure, when in the exercise of his judicial functions, inquired of a jury, “Is there no sedition here? Are there no seditious newspapers within your jurisdiction?” I am ignorant whether this report be or be not founded on fact. But if it be true, let me ask, shall we not pursue a similar course by adopting the present resolution? Shall we not authorize a committee to inquire, Is there no judicial guilt abroad in our land? Is there no latent inquiry in some unexplored corner of our country? A grand jury is sworn diligently to inquire, and true presentment make, of all such offences against the laws of the land, as shall come to their knowledge. Have we taken such an oath? Are we under such obligations? And are we not about to attach to ourselves that character which gentlemen tell us is so odious, the character of common informers? I am under no fears that the stream of justice, which ought to be so pure, will become turbid, from a want of accusers, when our judges shall be guilty of crimes. When our courts shall become corrupt and despotic, patriotic motives will induce our citizens to bring forward accusations. I am also sensible of the propriety and force of the observation of the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. R. Griswold,) that the trial in question was a transaction of great publicity, and all its circumstances must have been known to thousands of our citizens. This induces me to believe that the conduct of the court was not so oppressive and despotic as is now represented. Why has this awful charge slumbered so long?

One or two remarks upon the allusions that have been made to my observation, that we are about to assume censorial and inquisitorial powers, and I will dismiss the subject. What is the language of the resolution? Without the allegation of a single fact, it constitutes a committee to inquire whether the judges have not so acted in their official capacity as to render necessary the interposition of the constitutional powers of this House. The expression is unequivocal; the allusion to the power of impeachment is perfectly obvious. This is what is called a petitio principii; it takes for granted, at least in some degree, what remains to be proved, that the conduct of the judges has been improper and illegal. Else why adopt a language which implies suspicion and censure? But gentlemen are alarmed at the epithet inquisitorial, and imagination teems with the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition. If the creation of this committee be an unauthorized act, if in creating it we transcend those limits which we ought, by a reasonable construction of the constitution, to set to our own powers, it instantly becomes inquisitorial in its nature and in its operation. We must delegate to it more than general powers. We must authorize it to send for persons, and probably for papers and records. The proposition is hostile to republican principles, and, as a republican, I cannot give my vote in its favor.

Mr. Holland.—When I before addressed the House on this subject, I had no doubt of the charge being sufficiently explicit to found an inquiry into the conduct of the judges. My only doubt was whether it was proper to proceed without affidavit. Since yesterday I have reflected on the course pursued in similar cases; and I will state to the House the proceedings adopted in two or three cases in the Legislature of which I was a member. In the year 1796, a charge was preferred against certain judges of the State of North Carolina for illegally extending their power. A committee was appointed to inquire into their conduct, and the result was, that the judges had exiled certain persons from the State. The proceedings did not go so far as an impeachment; for the judges wrote an explanatory letter, which gave satisfaction, and they were acquitted with honor. The other charge, to which I have alluded, was against the board of army accounts; that also was referred to a committee. The last case is the most recent. A suspicion existed that the Secretary of State had been guilty of misconduct. A letter had been received by the Governor from some citizens to that effect; in consequence of which, and of other corroborating circumstances, the Legislature appointed a committee of inquiry, of which I had the honor to be a member. That committee was empowered to send for persons and papers. There was no specific charge, but an impeachment was contemplated, if the officer should appear to be guilty. The Secretary was brought before the committee, who examined him on oath, and reported the existence of frauds much more extensive than had been imagined; in consequence of which the land office was shut up, and the Secretary notified that articles of impeachment would be exhibited against him. But the late period of the session not then admitting of a trial, it was postponed to the next General Assembly. At the succeeding Assembly the officer resigned, and superseded the necessity of an impeachment. He was afterwards indicted at common law. These precedents, drawn from the proceedings of the Legislature of the State which I have the honor to represent, induce me to think that the course proposed is proper; and I shall, accordingly, vote for the appointment of a committee of inquiry.

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Mr. Dennis said, he did not rise for the purpose of entering into an investigation of the merits of the question, but principally for the purpose of stating, in a few words, what appeared to be the difference between the friends and the opponents of the resolution. He had never experienced, on any occasion, a stronger conflict between inclination and duty than in the present instance. On the one hand, he was confident that, after the official conduct of the judges had been thus publicly implicated, it must be desirable to them that an investigation of the facts charged against them should take place, and it seemed to be a duty due to those gentlemen, that they should have an opportunity of being confronted with their accusers. On the other hand, we owe to the laws and constitution, as well as to those considerations which must always govern in the establishment of important precedents, a paramount duty, which appeared in this case irreconcilable with the indulgence of individual considerations. The true difference between the advocates and the opponents of the resolution appeared to be this: That the one thought it a proper procedure to raise an inquisitorial committee, without any definite or assignable object, and without stating in the resolution any specific charge. The other did not demand, as it had been supposed, the production of all the evidence in the outset of the proceeding, which might be necessary in the ulterior stages of the transaction, nor that precise and technical specification of the charges which might be proper in articles of impeachment, but only required that some fact should be stated, or charge alleged, as the basis on which to erect a committee. He believed, to create a committee by resolution, with general inquisitorial powers, without specifying any charge, or stating any reason in the resolution for the proceeding, was without precedent, and might become an engine of oppression. In order to satisfy the friends of the resolution on that, he did not wish to avoid that investigation which might be founded on proper principles, and which he believed, after what has been said, is rather courted than avoided by the judges in question. He would beg leave to read, in his place, the form of a resolution, such as he supposed ought to be the groundwork of a procedure like this:

He said he read this by way of argument, to show that the present resolution ought to be rejected, and though he would not offer it himself, in case the resolution before them should be rejected, yet he would pledge himself to vote for such a one, if the gentleman from Virginia or any other member would offer it. The resolution which has been read, embraces all the facts stated by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, which contains the only charge that has been exhibited. But if any gentleman possesses a knowledge of any other facts or charges, let him specify them, and he would be willing to vote for an extension of the powers of the committee to them also; for he did not wish to confine the inquiry to the specific charge stated by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, if other gentlemen had charges to exhibit, and would state them in the resolution. If they would specify a charge or charges of a serious nature, and give us any reason to believe them true, although originating from hearsay evidence, he would vote for the inquiry proposed; and he begged that he should be understood as objecting rather on the ground that no charge had been specified, than on the ground of incompetent evidence. The vague charges verbally communicated by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, and none of which are reduced to writing, give no grounds of procedure; not only because, if true, they constitute no cause for impeachment, but because they are not specified in the resolution.

The motion was then further amended to read as follows:

Mr. Speaker stated the question, that the House do agree to the said motion, as so amended, when an adjournment was called for and carried—yeas 61, nays 43.

Saturday, January 7.

Mr. Nicholson, from the committee appointed on the memorial of Alexander Moultrie, agent for the South Carolina Yazoo Company, and of William Cowan, agent of the Virginia Yazoo Company, made a report, going considerably into detail, and concluding with a resolution adverse to the prayer of the memorialist. Referred to a Committee of the Whole on Monday.

Official Conduct of Judge Chase.

The House resumed the consideration of the question depending yesterday, at the time of adjournment,[112] “that the House do agree to the motion of the fifth instant, as amended by the House, for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the official conduct of Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and of Richard Peters, district judge of the district of Pennsylvania.”

Mr. J. Randolph expressed his regret that the attempt which he had made yesterday to reply to the very personal allusions of a gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Griswold,) whom he was sorry not to see in his place, had, by the adjournment, proved abortive. Such was his regard for the opinions of the House, that he should always, when called upon from a respectable quarter, justify any conduct which he deemed it proper to pursue in its deliberations. He felt it due to the respect in which he held the Chair and those around it, to reply to the remarks of the gentleman from Connecticut, and this consideration alone could have induced him to offer any thing in addition to what he had already advanced in favor of the motion. He should otherwise have left the resolution to its fate. In that fate he did not feel himself personally implicated. If it should be rejected, he would be satisfied in having done his duty, and the House, he supposed, would feel equally satisfied in having discharged theirs. It was asked, where was the mover of this resolution at the time when the alleged misconduct took place? Did it not, said the gentleman, pass under their own eyes? Were not their deliberations held on the very spot? and why had the motion slept until this day? He hoped he should be permitted to say that it did not pass under his eyes; although he knew, at the time of the condemnation in question, he did not become acquainted with the circumstances under which it took place until long after their occurrence. It was true that the deliberations of Congress were then held in Philadelphia, the scene of this alleged iniquity, but, with other members he was employed in discharging his duties to his constituents, not in witnessing, in any court, the triumph of his principles. He could not have been so employed. It would be recollected, that the information given by the gentleman from Pennsylvania formed the groundwork of his proceedings, and he asked whether it was more the duty of the mover of the resolution to have brought it forward than every other member of the House who was a witness of the statement made by that gentleman? This information, of an official nature, given by a member in his place, of a transaction in open court, and which it was the duty of them all to have noticed, had been called a story related on hearsay; a rumor of an affair which had happened in a corner; and the House was asked if they would take such evidence as ground of proceeding, on the dictum of any one member, however great their confidence in him might be? If he really felt that respect for the House which the gentleman from Connecticut had professed, he would not have insulted their understandings by such language. He would not have stood up, as amicus curiæ, to prevent their being precipitated into absurdity and injustice by an influential member of their body. That, however, was the station which the gentleman had assumed, and he hoped the duties of it would be discharged with the fidelity which they required. After clothing himself with this character, Mr. R. said he expected to have seen him at his post—he regretted that he did not see him there, and that his duty did not permit him to withhold the observations which he was compelled to make. Whilst, however, the gentleman was engaged in discharging the new and important function with which he stood self-invested, he seemed cautious of replying to the masterly statement of his venerable friend from Pennsylvania, and which he believed had remained unanswered because it was unanswerable. It must, said Mr. R., be a subject of high gratification to us all, and I congratulate this House upon it, that age has not yet dimmed the lustre of those talents which have so long presided in the councils of this country. And if the time shall come when we are to resign our understandings, and place ourselves under the direction of an individual, I hope to be permitted to range myself under the banners of that tried patriot, and not under those of the gentleman from Connecticut. In the same spirit with which he challenged the confidence of the House, as a friend unwilling to see them led into error and absurdity, that gentleman had endeavored to alarm their pride by representing the motion as a demand made upon them. It was so. It was (if he might so express it) a writ of right, not of favor—and as such he demanded it, as such he urged it. But an objection was taken that no act of misconduct had been alleged. With his friend from Maryland he would say, that a fact of the first importance had been adduced, on which he was sorry his friend had not dwelled longer. It could not receive too much attention. On a trial for life and death, the jury, who were the constitutional judges both of the law and fact, were deprived of the right of a discussion of the point of law, “what constitutes treason?” The rights of the jury and of the accused were equally invaded. It was conduct not dissimilar to this, in a case of libel, which drew forth from the English Parliament the famous declaratory bill of Mr. Fox. Lord Mansfield had laid down the doctrine that the jury had a right to decide only upon the bare facts of printing and publishing, and not upon the question of guilt, which was compounded of the law and the fact. This produced the declaratory act which passed a strong censure on the practices of courts—since it did not amend or alter the law, but declared what the law was—and established the point resisted by the court, that the jury was the judge both of the fact and of the law. If, then, on a question of criminal law, where the punishment was only fine and imprisonment, the conduct of a judge was deemed[113] highly reprehensible in encroaching upon the rights of the jury, what shall we say of him who usurps those rights in a case of life and death, in a case of treason? This denial to the prisoner and the jury of the right of having the point of law discussed, seemed to be the first step towards assuming those powers in cases of treason, the exercise of which, in cases of libel, had drawn down upon the English courts the censure of their Parliament. Would the gentleman say this was nothing? Would he affirm that if a man were under trial for murder, the court would be justified in saying to his counsel, You may, if you can, disprove the fact with which the prisoner stands charged, but you shall not endeavor to show that it does not amount to the crime with which he stands charged? If you admit the killing, you shall not argue the point that such killing does not constitute murder. Would the gentleman contend that treason is better defined than murder? What is murder? Killing with malice aforethought; can any definition be clearer? What is burglary? Breaking in during the night. What is treason? The constitution defines it as levying war against the United States; adhering to their enemies; giving them aid and comfort. But what had definitions to do with the case? Because murder was defined, had counsel ever been stopped in an attempt to show that the killing with which their client stood charged was not a killing with prepensive malice, a killing which constituted murder? What was more common than to see the facts admitted, and the crime not only denied, but disproved to the satisfaction of the jury; and upon what principle shall counsel be arrested in the attempt to show that the facts charged in an indictment for treason do not amount to such a levying of war, or an adherence or aid to such enemies as would constitute treason? Mr. R. said that the fact mentioned by the gentleman from Pennsylvania was of a remarkable nature. He had never heard of a similar proceeding, and he rejoiced that another instance of so black a nature could not probably be furnished by any tribunal in this country.

The gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. Dennis,) however, had entirely abandoned the ground taken by his friend. He agrees that there is a charge of an important nature exhibited, and if it was incorporated into the resolution, and the inquiry confined to that subject only, he would vote for it. The object of the one gentleman was only to confine the inquiry, whilst that of his friend was to deny it altogether. He could not thank the gentleman for his liberality. He would have what he asked or nothing. He would never consent to confine the inquiry; if it could not be full and free, let it be denied.

The gentleman from Maryland had, with very little dexterity, endeavored to confound the resolution of inquiry with the articles of impeachment which may follow from it, and said that if the House would consent to confine the inquiry to any particular charge he would vote for it. It was true that after articles of impeachment should have been exhibited against the accused, the House would not be permitted to prefer any new accusation, or to adduce testimony to prove any guilt other than that which was charged in those articles. In the same manner as when a criminal was indicted, evidence would not be suffered to be brought forward to prove any act of criminality not contained in some one of the counts of the indictment. But would gentlemen persist in confounding things so entirely different, as to confine an incipient inquiry by the same rigid rules which would govern a criminal trial? It was trifling with the judgment of the House. The gentleman was eager for inquiring, but the charge must be incorporated into the resolution, and the inquiry confined to a specific point, before he could be brought to consent to it. Whatever other misdemeanors might come to the knowledge of the committee in the course of the investigation, he would not agree to have them reported to the House. And at the same time he told them of the struggle between his inclination and his sense of duty—his inclination as a friend of the accused to grant the inquiry, his duty as a member of the House and a friend of justice to refuse it. Mr. R. was sorry to find the gentleman in this awkward predicament; he regretted that it was out of his power to gratify him by narrowing the inquiry. This his duty would not suffer him to do. He hoped, however, the strength of the gentleman’s constitution would carry him through the arduous struggle in which he was involved, by his wishes on the one hand, and his principles on the other.

Whilst so much was said on the subject of precedent, he hoped he might offer a few cases to their consideration. He did not come to the House armed with precedents. Neither his health nor leisure permitted him to search for them. Gentlemen of greater industry, and who attached more importance to them than himself, had furnished him with them. For his part he thought precedents had nothing to do with the case, but for the sake of those who thought differently, he would show the course which he advocated was not destitute even of their support. Here Mr. R. referred to Mr. Hatsell’s precedents. “On the 21st of April, 1626, Mr. Glanvylee, from the select committee appointed to consider of the charges against the Duke of Buckingham, reports that they desire the House will resolve whether common fame is a ground for this House to proceed upon?” It is resolved to consider this the next day. After a long debate the House resolve that, “common fame is good ground of proceeding of this House, either to inquire of here, or to transmit the complaint, if the House find cause, to the King or Lords.”

Mr. R. begged to call the attention of the House to the opinion of a gentleman, delivered during the debate, to which he must be permitted to attach more importance than to that of the gentleman from Connecticut. When he mentioned the name of Selden, he believed he should stand justified in the opinion of the[114] gentleman himself, and in that of his warmest admirers. “These cases (said Mr. Selden) are to be ruled by the law of Parliament and not by the common or civil law.” Mr. Littleton says, “this is not a House for definitive judgment, but for information, denunciation, or presentment, for which common fame is sufficient.” Mr. Noy says, “There are two questions—first, Whether a common fame? Second, Whether this fame be true? We will not transmit without the first inquiry: but without the second we may; for peradventure we cannot come by the witnesses; as if the witnesses be in the Lords’ House.”

Again, on the 16th October, 1667, the House being informed “that there have been some innovations of late in the trials of men for their lives and deaths, and in some particular cases restraints have been put upon juries, the matter is referred to a committee.” This case (Mr. R. said) was precisely in point. “On the 18th of November, this committee are empowered ‘to receive information against the Lord Chief Justice Keeling, for any other misdemeanors besides those concerning juries.’” Thus on a particular fact, innovation in trials for life and death, a committee was raised, and yet they were not confined to the examination of that single charge, but empowered to inquire generally into the misconduct of the judge. A stronger or more pointed precedent could not be conceived.

By the constitution, Mr. Randolph said, that House was vested with the sole power of impeachment. How this power was to be exercised must depend on their discretion, and on no other law or principle whatever: for “these cases are not to be ruled by the common or civil law, but by the law of Parliament.” That law of Parliament it remained with them to establish. It could not be matter of surprise that he, one of the leading principles of whose politics it was to support the weight of that branch of the Government, and to be jealous of executive influence—it could not surprise any one, that he should exert himself in behalf of the constitutional rights of that House. When he saw the importance which was attached to precedent, he was more than ever solicitous for that which they were then about to establish. He trusted that they would not consent to abridge the power with which the constitution had invested them—to reduce it below the standard which the English House of Commons had fixed as the measure of their own power in similar cases. A time might come when a wicked President and his flagitious ministers might so conduct themselves in office, as to make every man regret the proceedings of that day, in case they should suffer their power to sleep. The refusing to exercise it, then, would hereafter be adduced as a denial of its existence. Such might be the circumstances of the times, that no private man would dare to step forward with a specific charge against the Executive. If they should deny an inquiry without a specific charge, they would do all in their power to screen such a President and such ministers at a future day. It had been remarked that, in this government, an officer found guilty, on an impeachment, could not be punished capitally. The sentence could only remove him from office, and disqualify him, for ever after, from holding one under the United States. If, in a country where the accused may be brought to the block, free, unfettered inquiry is warranted against any rank however exalted—would it be denied here, where the punishment was comparatively light? Should they hold the other departments of the Government more inviolable than they were considered even in England? Would they afford to a criminal, Executive or Judiciary, a shelter denied by the law of that government? He hoped they would not. He trusted that they would give an example of their readiness to bring every offender to justice, however great might be his station.

Mr. Griffin.—I had hoped that no subject would have been agitated during this session which should have interrupted the tranquillity or disturbed the harmony of this House, so necessary to the faithful and correct discharge of our public duties; but, sir, I perceive, from the turn which the debate upon the resolution now before the House has taken, that sensations have been excited which I fear it will be difficult to allay.

The proposition now before the House, nursed with so much secrecy, and forced on us so suddenly and unexpectedly, comes in such a questionable shape, that I must beg the attention of the House for a few moments while “I speak to it.”

What, sir, does the resolution demand of us? That a committee be appointed to inquire into the official conduct of Samuel Chase and Richard Peters, &c. But how is this inquiry to be conducted? Are there any data by which the committee are to be guided? Is there any specific charge to which their attention or inquiries are to be directed? None. And who, sir, before this enlightened day ever heard of a committee of inquiry being raised, without possession of a single subject to direct or guide the inquiry? What, sir, erect an inquiring committee vested with all the rights of a Star Chamber, and yet assign them no specific objects of their duty! But, sir, the official conduct of these judges has given offence—and are we now, sir, to probe and search the whole judicial lives of these gentlemen, for causes of complaint and censure? Are the records of the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania now to be ransacked, for evidences of their guilt and cause of impeachment? I never have and never shall deny the right of this House to inquire into the conduct of public officers—but, sir, if the honorable mover of the resolution is serious——

[Here Mr. Randolph interrupted, and desired the gentleman to explain his meaning by the word serious.]

Mr. Griffin continued. I will answer the gentleman: my meaning is, that if the gentleman believes there are just grounds for impeachment—if he is in possession of information or facts, let him declare them, and if they appear[115] to my mind to be sufficient whereon to ground an impeachment, let him demand it and I will join with him. Let him specify the instances of malfeasance of which these judges have been guilty, and I will unite with him—let him declare the malconduct of these public functionaries, and I will cordially co-operate with him. If these judges have travelled beyond the line of their duty, if they have wantonly exceeded the limits of their power, I will aid in the infliction of such punishment as they may merit; but, sir, I cannot, I will not, in this indirect manner, wound the feelings or censure the characters of men, holding high responsible offices under your Government. Could I induce myself to believe that the course now proposed to be pursued is correct, I will gladly give it my assent; but for reasons very different from those the advocates of this measure adduce: could I deem it correct, I would support the resolution because I believe the characters implicated therein will safely pass the ordeal preparing for them, and that the inquiry will redound to their honor. I would cheerfully support the resolution, because, by the impeachment which I predict will follow, an opportunity will be offered to remove the load of unmerited calumny under which the Federal Judiciary of the United States have too long labored, and with which our public prints have been long filled. But the course is incorrect—the measure in its present shape appears to me to be fraught with incalculable mischief to our country, and I never will assist in the establishment of a precedent which may at some future day be made an engine of persecution, as “wicked as intolerant.” Mr. Speaker, let me ask of you, sir, to remember the consequences which may flow from the adoption of this resolution—let me conjure this House to reflect upon the dreadful effects which must arise to us, if, upon the bare assertion of a single gentleman, unsupported by any direct allegation, a committee of this nature shall be raised, a precedent of this kind established, what public character will be safe? nay, sir, how soon may not we ourselves feel its baneful influence? Far be it from me, sir, to impute to the honorable mover of the resolution any impurity of motives. I believe his conduct has proceeded from a consciousness of duty, and from a similar consciousness of duty I must oppose the measure. I cannot deny the power of this House to adopt the resolution upon your table, but I beg of you to pause ere you take the fatal step, and do not, because “dressed with a little brief authority, play such fantastic tricks before high heaven as make e’en angels weep.”

Sir, I have endeavored to discharge what I conceived to be my duty upon this occasion, and when experience shall fatally convince us of the dreadful effects of the precedent we are now about to establish, I shall derive consolation from the reflection, that I lent my feeble aid to check the overwhelming torrent.

Mr. Eustis said, he did not view this subject in the same light with the gentleman last up; he did not see those awful consequences which he had pointed out. He hoped the time would never come, when an inquiry into the conduct of an officer of the Government should be deemed a subject of alarm in that House. It was the first principle of the constitution, that every man was amenable to the constitution and laws of his country; and however elevated any one might be, that he could not be raised above the reach of inquiry. The observations of the gentleman who had last spoken, and of others who had preceded him, were predicated on a principle that was not correct. If the resolution on the table was to impeach the judge, those observations would be relevant, but they were incorrect on the preliminary motion to inquire.

In making up, said Mr. E., my judgment on this subject, I have endeavored altogether to avoid the inquiry, whether the officer implicated in this resolution, has so conducted himself as to require impeachment by this House. I have not accepted the opinion of the mover of the resolution, and I have excluded all the other information adduced in the debate; because I consider it as alone applicable to the question of impeachment, which is not now before the House. The question before the House is a very different one, and, in my opinion, it is plain and simple. What is it? It is that a committee be raised to inquire into the official conduct of a certain public officer. When a member of this House, under the obligations of honor, and the additional obligations of an oath, rises and takes upon himself the responsibility of moving an inquiry into the official conduct of a public officer, which can only be effected in virtue of the impeaching power of this House, which power it exclusively possesses, I view the request for an inquiry in the nature of an information laid before the House as the grand inquest of the nation.

When this proposition was made, the mind of every gentleman was naturally cast about for the situation of the officers in question. If it shall be the opinion of the House that their conduct is such as to afford grounds for an impeachment, it will be granted that it is an indispensable duty to make the inquiry. If, on the other hand, the House are of opinion that no testimony can be produced which will lead to an impeachment, then it is due to the officers to institute an inquiry. The object of an inquiry is two-fold—arising from the duty to the people, and that due to the officer whose conduct is impeached. If gentlemen are of opinion that, in this case, there are no grounds for impeachment, then it is clear that the conduct and character of the officer ought to be vindicated, and the inquiry instituted to afford him the means. If they are of opinion that there are grounds for an impeachment, then the duty they owe to the people urges them to the inquiry. In the constitution I find no excuse, no justification, on which to ground a refusal to[116] institute an inquiry into the conduct of any public officer charged with misbehavior.

To such an inquiry, what is objected? That the power may be abused. Indeed, the objection is, that it is abused in this instance. How abused? To argue from abuse of the power against the use of it, is no argument at all. If the House believe either alternative I have mentioned, and one or the other you must believe, it is their duty to make the inquiry. But it is said that the committee are to be clothed with power to send for persons and papers. Granted. That power is indispensably necessary. It is said their powers are to be inquisitorial. This is not true. Will not the committee be accessible by every member of the House, and what are their ulterior powers but to collect facts, and to express an opinion whether they afford grounds for an impeachment? That opinion they will eventually submit to the House, and, without its approbation, it will be settled.

It is further said that no specific charge is adduced, and if there were, gentlemen say they would vote for the inquiry. But if a specific charge were made, I ask if any member would be enabled to give a more enlightened vote than on the present resolution? I consider the general power to inquire as most important, and that it is the duty of the House, on such occasions as the present, to enlarge rather than to narrow the field of inquiry.

It is further said that this course of proceeding will discourage respectable men from accepting the offices of Government. But certainly every officer, from the President to the most menial, knows that he holds his office subject to inquiry, to impeachment, and to punishment, in case of criminality.

If the House do not pursue the present course, from what quarter are they to expect the origination of an inquiry? Is it to be supposed that it will come from the citizen, when his life and fortune are probably at the disposal of particular officers charged with misconduct. This line of inquiry ought, in my opinion, to be courted and encouraged; more especially in this instance, after the course which the debate has taken, and after specific charges have been adduced. The debate has given an importance to the inquiry, which its original merits may not, perhaps, have entitled it to.

When this subject was first introduced, it appeared to me novel, and that there were no precedents in point under the Federal Government. It is time that this precedent should be established. It is time that every officer should know that this House is ready at any time to inquire into his official conduct, if charged with misbehavior; and instead of declining the inquiry, in this instance, from a false delicacy to the officer, it becomes the House to embrace the resolution and make the inquiry. If evidence shall be collected, and it appears that there are no grounds for impeachment, the officer will be restored to the public confidence, and will be acquitted. If, on the other hand, it appears that he has been guilty of malfeasance in office, a duty will be imposed upon the House, from which they cannot recede, to bring him to trial.

Mr. Thatcher.—As gentlemen seem to consider the decision of the court in the trial of Fries as unprecedented, I beg leave to refer them to the cases of the United States versus Vigol, and the same versus Mitchell, 2 Dallas’s Reports, 346 to 357. They will find that the decision of the court, in the case of Fries, was exactly conformable to cases adjudged in 1795. Without troubling the House with the whole of those cases, I beg leave to read the decision of the court in the last case. “The charge of the court, says the reporter, was delivered to the jury in substance as follows. Patterson justice. ‘The first question to be considered is, what was the general object of the insurrection? If its object was to suppress the excise offices, and to prevent the execution of an act of Congress, by force and intimidation, the offence, in legal estimation, is high treason: it is a usurpation of the authority of Government; it is high treason by levying of war.’” The decision, sir, is also conformable to the English authorities. The charge then against Judge Chase and Judge Peters, after divesting it of the coloring which imagination has given it, amounts to this—that, in the trial of Fries for treason, the court prevented the counsel from arguing to the jury against a point of law long settled by that and other courts of the United States. I have attended closely to the statement made by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Smilie,) and I believe I am correct.

The very point which the counsel of Fries would have argued to the jury, was that which had long before been settled by the courts of the United States. I contend, sir, that this court did no more than they had a right to do—no more than is practised by every well regulated court. They prevented counsel from arguing law in the face of the authorities, and of the opinion of the court. That this is usual, I appeal to gentlemen of the law who are present. This, sir, is the only fact stated to the House upon which the motion is founded.

The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) has said, that he has been informed of facts, which convince him that an inquiry ought to be made. But that gentleman has not stated to the House what those facts are.

It has been contended, that where a member of this House shall state that he is convinced that an inquiry ought to be made, the House ought to institute such an inquiry. Precedents have been adduced to prove that this has been done in the British Parliament. There certainly has been no case cited where an inquiry has been commenced upon the motion without stating his facts or his evidence. But whatever may have been the practice in England I can never consent to vote upon any impressions or convictions but my own.

If the official conduct of the judges upon the trial of Fries was such as to require the interposition[117] of this House why, (as the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Griswold, has asked,) why was not this inquiry sooner announced? This trial, I am told, was in February, 1800. It took place within the hearing of Congress. It was the subject of universal attention. Why has it slept four years? Upon what ground shall we invest a committee with power to ransack the country for charges against our judges? Shall we, upon the motion of a member—shall we, upon the statement of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Smilie,) commence an inquiry, troublesome and expensive—an inquiry, which must attach suspicion to the official conduct of the judges? Sir, I respect the conduct of the gentlemen who attempt to remove obstructions from the stream of justice, but I must be convinced that obstructions now exist, before I can vote for this resolution.

Mr. Early.—Like other gentlemen who have gone before me in this discussion, I do not consider myself at liberty to vote against the resolution on the table. Like them, I deem myself bound to vote for an inquiry into the conduct of any public officer, when that inquiry is demanded by a member of this House. After the view taken of the merits of this measure by the gentlemen from Pennsylvania and Virginia, I did expect that all further opposition to it would have ceased. In this expectation I have been disappointed.

I feel constrained to vote in favor of this resolution, because I believe that the inquiry it contemplates is an act of justice due to the people of the United States on one hand, and to the characters of the individuals charged, on the other. A charge of high crimes and misdemeanors has been made on this floor against two individuals, and two members of this House have demanded an inquiry into their official conduct. To this demand may be added the weight of public opinion. I am apprized of the delicacy of this ground, and when I resort to it, it is my wish to be understood as meaning that when charges of a high nature are instituted and reiterated from one end of the Union to the other, so as to create a general belief, so as to destroy confidence in the principle and integrity of those who administer justice, and to beget a suspicion that justice cannot be obtained equally by all men; under such circumstances the public voice demands an inquiry into the truth of the charges. Is this a fact, or is it not, in relation to the officers implicated in this resolution? I presume that it is the fact to a great extent will not be denied. Every gentleman on this floor, in the habit of reading the public prints, must have had so forcible an impression made on his mind on this subject, as not to have lost a recollection of the conduct charged upon one of the judges named in this resolution, in the case of Fries, Cooper, and Callender. I cannot, therefore, refuse my assent to the inquiry, because I believe it due to the public, as well as to the individuals charged with the improper conduct, and who, if they were on the spot, would undoubtedly memorialize us for an inquiry. Indeed one of the officers referred to in the resolution, if conscious of his innocence, ought, in my opinion, long since, to have demanded an inquiry into his official conduct, when he witnessed the strong and numerous charges against him in the public prints from one end of the continent to the other.

It is objected to this resolution that no proof has been adduced to the House of the truth of the allegations preferred. In my mind there is all the difference that can be imagined between an inquiry and an impeachment; and almost all the arguments urged on this occasion apply exclusively to an impeachment. A strong proof of this has been given by the gentleman who has just sat down. That gentleman (Mr. R. Griswold) has taken this remarkable ground, that this House ought not to inquire without proof. I suppose he meant, by proof, the depositions of witnesses; this is, in other words, saying that we, whose constitutional duty it is to inquire, may omit to do it, because they whose duty it is not to inquire, have not done it.

The present resolution is nothing more than this: A certain officer of the Government is charged, in the face of the nation, with malfeasance in office, and a committee appointed to inquire into the truth of the charge. Gentlemen allege that the committee is to be appointed to inquire what accusations can be found, and then for testimony to sustain them. But this is not so. The accusations have been long since made, and they are not of a day, but of a year’s standing.

The analogy between the functions of this House and a grand jury, is correct and forcible. Before a grand jury, it is the right of any individual to apply for and demand an inquiry into the conduct of any person within their cognizance; and it is more especially the right of any member of the jury to make such a demand; and it is their bounden duty, according to their oaths, to make the inquiry when so demanded.

The official conduct of the judges I view as more delicate and important than that of any other description of officers; for, on their impartiality the whole people of the United States depend for obtaining justice in ordinary cases, and individuals depend, in the last resort, for the preservation of their lives. Their official conduct should, therefore, not only be correct, but likewise free from suspicion. Simply to be charged ought to produce an inquiry; and I must confess that a recent case, in which the integrity of a judicial officer was impeached, excited my warmest approbation. I mean the case of a judge (Judge Tucker) in a neighboring State, who, on a suggestion believed by no man, deemed it a duty to himself and his country to demand an inquiry into his conduct.

Another view, by no means unimportant, which may be taken, is, that the reputation of the Government, of which the judges are a component part, demands the inquiry in question. Will any gentleman pretend to say that reputation[118] is not at stake,—that it is not affected at home or abroad by the charges which have been so long and so loudly made? I presume not. Whether those charges are true or not, is not the question; for, whether true or not, so long as they are generally believed, the reputation of the Government is affected; its reputation for impartial justice is affected, and deeply too. To refuse this inquiry would be to give weight to this impression abroad—to add to the suspicion, at home and abroad, that impartial justice is not done to all men. Let us, then, make the inquiry, and restore the reputation of the Government, by inflicting a proper punishment upon these officers, if guilty, and, if innocent, by proving the charges against them calumnies.

Mr. Eppes.—If, in adopting the resolution before us, we were to attach odium to the characters in question, I should feel no surprise at the course pursued by the gentlemen who oppose this inquiry. In this country the official conduct of every man is, and ought to be, subject to examination. It is not the examination, but the result of that examination, which attaches merit or demerit to a public character. In a Government like ours no principle ought to be cherished with greater care than a free inquiry into the conduct of public officers. So friendly am I to this principle in its fullest extent, so necessary do I believe it to be to the preservation of that purity in public officers essential to a republic, that it will always be sufficient for me to vote an inquiry, for a member to declare he considers an inquiry necessary. A proper regard to his own reputation will always, I am certain, prevent any member of this House from calling on us to exercise this important duty on light or trivial grounds. As to the extensive field of inquiry to which this doctrine may lead, I care not; and whenever a member of this House shall rise in his place and declare that he considers an inquiry into the conduct of a public officer or officers necessary, I shall be ready to pass the whole circle in review, to begin with the first and end with the last, to vote an inquiry into the conduct of each, and even to go further, to vote an impeachment if necessary. I shall on every such occasion consider it a duty I owe to the individual accused, and to the community in whose behalf the accusation is made, to vote an inquiry.

Thus much for the general principle which would induce me to vote for this resolution, if no specific charge had been made. In the present case, however, a specific charge of a serious kind has been made by a member from Pennsylvania; and, however gentlemen may have attempted to weaken the force of this charge, it does substantially amount to this: that, by the opinion of a judge, a citizen of the United States was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel, when arraigned for his life. I will not, however, dwell on this charge. It has been placed by a gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Nicholson) in a point of view satisfactory to myself, and, I believe, to the House. I consider it, however, my duty on this occasion to mention a trial which took place in the Commonwealth of Virginia, which affords another specific charge against Judge Chase. I was not present at this trial, and am not personally acquainted with the circumstances. I believe, however, that in the Commonwealth of Virginia but one sentiment prevails as to the conduct of Judge Chase on this occasion, viz: that it was indecent and tyrannical. In the course of the trial he refused to allow a witness on the part of the prisoner to be examined, because the witness could prove the truth of a part only, and not the whole of the words laid in the indictment. By a system of conduct peculiar to himself, he deprived the prisoner of the aid of Mr. George Hay, as counsel, a man, who, although not as generally known as some others in our State, is inferior to none in his profession. I do not mention these circumstances as hearsay evidence, but as facts, which I am induced to believe can be established by legal testimony. If, on this statement, there is any gentleman who can refuse an inquiry, I am willing to leave him in the enjoyment of his opinion. For my own part, I shall be always ready, on the demand of any member of this House, to exercise my constitutional right of inquiry, and, without partiality or prejudice, pursue the course pointed out by my duty, whether it shall lead to impeachment or an honorable acquittal.

Mr. Nicholson rose for the purpose of calling the attention of the House to precedents. When he yesterday addressed them he had thought it unnecessary to introduce authorities from foreign nations; but as they had been insisted on by the opponents to the resolution, he would refer to two or three; and he was more solicitous to do so at the present moment, as he saw a gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Dana) about to rise, and he wished to call the gentleman’s attention to them, in order that he might remark on them, and show, if it was to be done, that they did not apply to the case under consideration. If gentlemen would refer to the powers exercised by the Commons of England, for time almost immemorial, and to those exercised by the several State Legislatures, he believed that precedents innumerable would be furnished. The Commons of England were the grand inquest of the nation. As such it was their duty to inquire into the official conduct of all those intrusted with the powers of Government. Every officer in the realm was liable to impeachment by them. The same principle would be found to run through the constitutions of most of the States, and it was wisely introduced into the Constitution of the United States. The power to impeach is admitted to be in the House of Representatives, and the only question is, as to the manner in which this power shall be exercised. The proposed method is called a loose one, and we are asked to show some precedent for it. The House of Commons at the commencement of every session appoint what is there called a committee of grievances and courts of justice.[119] Many of the State Legislatures appoint a similar committee annually, and, in the State from which he came, the House of Delegates always appoint a committee of grievances and courts of justice. It was one of their standing committees, and the appointment was as regular and as usual as the appointment of a committee of claims in this House. What then he inquired was the duty, what the authority of this committee? In England, in Maryland, and in every other State where it exists, it is their duty to inquire into the conduct of every officer of the Government, to call witnesses before them to prove official misconduct, to report offences to the House from which their powers are derived, and recommend the proper measures to be adopted.

This House, like the Commons of England, and the most numerous branch in the State Legislatures, is the grand inquest of the nation; they are to inquire into crimes and bring offenders to justice. It had not, he said, heretofore been customary for this House to appoint a committee of grievances and courts of justice, but he believed no man would deny the power, and when appointed they would not only have the authority proposed to be in this committee, but one infinitely more extensive. They would have the right to inquire into the conduct of all civil officers, and to report such facts as might come to their knowledge. If, then, we could with propriety, and agreeably to precedent, authorize an inquiry into the conduct of several hundred officers, could it be denied that the same precedent would warrant an inquiry into the conduct of two only? In 5th Comyn’s Digest, page 204, it would be found that a committee of grievances and justice was one of their standing committees, and in page 205 it was declared that they might “summon any judges and examine them in person upon complaint of any misdemeanor in office.” He presumed it had not been thought necessary heretofore to appoint a general committee of this kind, but at present the necessity was apparent, as a complaint had been made to the House of the official misconduct of two judges. Again, in the same book, page 209, it is said, “The Commons are the general inquisitors of the realm, and therefore if a Lord, spiritual or temporal, commit oppression, bribery, extortion, &c., the Commons shall inquire of it, and if, by the vote of the House, the crime appears to have been committed, they transmit it, with the evidence, to the Lords.” This, he said, would clearly show, what indeed he thought common sense would teach every man, that the inquiry should be made before proof was exhibited upon which an impeachment was to be grounded. In the same page it would be seen that “common fame is a sufficient ground of a proceeding in the House of Commons by inquiry, or by a complaint, if need be, to the King or Lords.” And Rushworth’s Historical Collection, page 217, is cited, it is said, by some of the ablest lawyers of that day that “if common fame were not to be admitted as public accusers, great men would be the only safe ones, as no private man would venture to complain of them.” Mr. N. referred to these authorities at that particular stage of the discussion, as he was desirous of giving gentlemen an opportunity of commenting upon them. As he had no wish to prolong the debate, he would not multiply observations upon that point, but could not sit down without noticing what had fallen from a gentleman from Massachusetts, in which he had again attempted to vindicate the conduct of the judges upon the trial of Fries.

The gentleman had referred to a case in Dallas’s Reports, respecting the Western Insurrection, in which he says the point of law determined upon the trial of Fries, had been previously settled by one of the federal courts, and from thence infers that Mr. Chase and Mr. Peters were justified in preventing counsel from arguing it a second time. That such conduct might be perhaps excusable in a civil cause he was not prepared to deny; but, in a case of criminal jurisdiction, involving the guilt or innocence of a man whose life was to be the forfeit, he held it totally unjustifiable.

All men, he said, were acquainted with the circumstances of what was generally called the Western Insurrection. Some of the Western counties of Pennsylvania were opposed to the excise law. A considerable majority of the people had resolved to oppose its execution, and took strong measures to prevent individuals from accepting offices under it, and compelled some of them to resign the places to which they had been appointed. While they professed an attachment to the Government of the Union they resolved to resist the execution of one of its laws. Among these was a man by the name of Mitchell, and he was charged with high treason before the circuit of Pennsylvania in which Judge Paterson then presided. A doubt existed whether the resistance to the execution of a law, even by force of arms, was such a levying of war within the meaning of the constitution, as amounted to treason. What was the conduct of the judge on that occasion? He had no disposition to preclude inquiry. He had no wish to keep the jury in ignorance by forbidding fair and open argument. On the contrary, it appeared from a note on page 348 that he called the attention of the prisoner’s counsel to the point, and requested that they would notice it in their observations. This was done before the defence was opened, and he said he should beg leave to read a part of the argument made in favor of the prisoner.

Such, he said, was the opinion of two gentlemen ranking high in their profession, and who would not be charged with having any feeling toward the offence or the offender inconsistent with the rights or interests of the Government. The whole argument was too lengthy to be read to the House, but he considered it well worth the perusal of every American. Able as it was, however, it had not the wished for weight with the court. Judge Paterson gave the following charge to the jury: “The first question is, what was the general object of the insurrection? If its object was to suppress the excise offices, and to prevent the execution of an act of Congress, by force and intimidation, the offence, in legal estimation, is high treason; it is a usurpation of the authority of Government; it is high treason by levying of war.” Sir, said Mr. N., this opinion of the court may have been honest; I mean not to impeach the purity of motive which dictated it, but I mean to show that the offence with which Mitchell was charged, the resistance to the execution of a law, was not considered as treason by the highest existing authority of this country. Mitchell was pardoned by the President of the United States, and Congress, not long after, expressed their opinion on the subject in the most ample manner.

The trial of Mitchell which I have just quoted took place in 1795, and in 1798 the subject was taken up by Congress, who, by the act of the 14th of July, 1798, provided that the resistance to the execution of a law should be considered a high misdemeanor only, punishable by fine and imprisonment. The act is in these words: “If any persons shall unlawfully combine or conspire together, with intent to oppose any measure or measures of the Government of the United States which are, or may be directed by proper authority, or to impede the operation of any law of the United States, or to intimidate or prevent any person holding a place or office in or under the Government of the United States, from undertaking, performing, or executing his trust or duty, he or they shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and on conviction before any court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000 and by imprisonment during a term not less than six months nor exceeding five years.” Here, sir, the resistance to the execution of a law is declared to be a high misdemeanor only, punishable by fine and imprisonment. Fries was tried in 1800, two years after the passage of this law. The offence of which he had been guilty was rescuing prisoners from the marshal by force, thereby, in the language of the act, “preventing an officer of the United States from performing and executing his duty,” and it was to show that he was punishable under this act by fine and imprisonment only, that his counsel were desirous of bringing the law before the jury. This, however, the court refused; the man was convicted of high treason, and was sentenced to a most ignominious death. Let such conduct be vindicated where and by whom it may, I must declare that it can never meet my approbation.

Mr. Dana.—It is to be regretted, Mr. Speaker, that a resolution so novel and of so much importance as that on the table was not postponed, at least for one day after it was presented to the House. Had this been done, gentlemen might have had some opportunity deliberately to examine the subject, before they were required to make a decision. But as the resolution was moved without giving any previous notice, and has been pressed upon us immediately after it was moved, I do not feel myself prepared, as I could have wished to be on such a question, before attempting to deliver my sentiments in this House. Unprepared, however, as I am, I request your indulgence while I offer a few remarks.

I will first attend to some precedents mentioned by the gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. Nicholson.) He has stated that it has been usual in the English House of Commons to appoint a committee for courts of justice, with power to inquire into the proceedings of courts, and for this purpose to call persons before them for examination. But, sir, is not such a committee appointed for general purposes, not directed against any individual, and therefore not affecting the character of any magistrate? Their powers relate to the judicial system generally, and do not implicate any one of the judicial officers. Does the resolution on the table propose a committee of this kind? On the contrary, it is explicitly directed against two of the judges. If gentlemen would justify their proceedings by the practice of the British House of Commons, let the resolution be made to have a general reference to all the courts, instead of being pointed, as it now is, against particular persons. In its present form it departs essentially from the principle of the case mentioned by the gentleman from Maryland, and therefore cannot be warranted by that precedent.

The gentleman has also stated that a committee was appointed by the last Congress to investigate the accounts of the officers of Government, merely upon common report. But it should be remembered that those officers were officers of the Executive Departments. It is the acknowledged duty of such officers—it is made their duty by law to give information to Congress, whenever required, upon any of their public[121] transactions. And it is the peculiar right of the House of Representatives, as guardians of the Treasury, at any time, to inquire into the expenditures of public money. But are the judges of the United States placed in the same situation with the Executive officers? Are they to be under the same control, and equally dependent? You may indeed impeach the judges, if guilty of impeachable offence. But what other power over them is given you by the constitution? It should further be remembered, that the resolution for appointing the investigating committee did not criminate any particular officer. At first it was proposed to examine only the accounts of the former Secretary of State. But upon its being suggested by a gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Eustis,) who has been so strenuous an advocate for the present resolution, that it would be improper in that manner to attack the character of a particular officer, the resolution was made general, and extended to the accounts of all the Executive Departments.

Upon the like principle, the resolution now on the table is improper. My objection to it is, that it points out two particular officers as objects of suspicion, and proposes a committee for inquiring into their conduct without assigning any cause, and without specifying any subject of inquiry. Gentlemen have expressed a dissatisfaction that such a committee should be compared to the Star Chamber or the Inquisition. If they do not perfectly resemble the Star Chamber, formerly known in England, or the Inquisition of Spain, the proposed powers of the committee are certainly indefinite and inquisitorial. Perhaps, if a comparison was necessary, they might more properly be compared to the State inquisitors of Venice, who are well known to have formed one of the most detestable tyrannies ever tolerated in a country pretending to freedom.

If charges were specified in the resolution, a member of this House on moving it might then have a right to demand an inquiry. But are the House bound to investigate the conduct of a particular officer, without any charge against him? Gentlemen have said much about the general right of this House to inquire into the conduct of public officers, as if this were the point in dispute. But who has denied the right of inquiry as incident to the power of impeachment? When any officer is charged with an impeachable offence, it is admitted to be, and from the nature of the thing it might be, the right of the House to inquire into the truth of such charge. I trust no gentleman in opposition to the present resolution can be found so ignorant of the true principle on which it is opposed, as to deny the responsibility of the public officers, or the right of the House to inquire into their conduct. But, the right being admitted, the question is made as to the exercise of that right in the manner now proposed. When this House is called upon to direct the whole force of its influence against a particular judge, is it not reasonable, is it not just, that some charge should first be stated against him? This is but a decent respect to judicial character. It is but a decent respect to the character which becomes the assembled Representatives of a nation. The person implicated might then be enabled to meet the inquiry and obviate unfounded suspicion. Our power with respect to the judges is the power of impeachment; but we are not, therefore, justified in wantonly assailing their characters and sporting with their sensibility to reputation. The right of inquiry relates to impeachable offences. Shall we, then, inquire where no offence is stated? So far is the resolution from stating what would warrant an impeachment, that it does not mention any offence, or refer to any transaction.

The gentleman from Virginia, who moved the resolution, (Mr. J. Randolph,) has, indeed, declared his own conviction, that the judicial officer in question had done wrong. Might not other gentlemen also have their opinions and exercise their own judgments in forming them? They ask for the reasons of his conviction before they vote for his resolution. His information, he says, was received in such a manner that he does not choose to disclose it. If any person has communicated any thing to him confidentially, he is not desired to name his informant. The gentleman shall not be desired by me to make any disclosure which would offend against the most delicate sense of honor. But can it be improper for him to state the general nature of the offence which he believes to have been committed? Will this violate any honorary confidence? He is desired to make such a statement that other members of the House may have an opportunity of judging whether the believed offence will warrant a vote of impeachment. In cases of this kind, is any member to be deemed infallible? When a gentleman, in his place, states a fact as of his own knowledge, his veracity is regarded as unquestionable; but his infallibility is not supposed to extend to matters of mere opinion. Upon the principle of its being possible for the gentleman from Virginia to err in opinion, and its being equally the right of the other members to judge what conduct amounts to an impeachable offence, it might have been reasonably thought that he would at least state to the House the nature of the facts on which he relies as the basis of his resolution. If he, or any other member, declaring his conviction that a judge has misdemeaned himself in office, will exhibit to the House a statement of any fact, or series of facts, which would warrant an impeachment, I will be ready instantly to vote for an inquiry. But nothing of this kind is exhibited, and therefore the resolution on the table is now opposed. Before you agree to oppress a judge with all that weight of suspicion which may be imposed by a vote of this House, let him be permitted to know what part of his conduct is supposed to be exceptionable, that opportunity may be had in the progress of any inquiry to vindicate himself against unmerited reproaches! Instead of a course of proceeding[122] so fair and obviously just, the resolution on the table marks two of the judges for public suspicion, without specifying any supposed misconduct. It marks them as public objects of suspicion throughout the whole of their judicial life, and, without naming any thing, invites private enemies to accuse them of every thing.

To support such a resolution, common fame has been mentioned in the course of debate, as a sufficient ground of proceeding; and this idea is supposed to be authorized by English precedent. Whatever may have been done formerly, and in a period of rudeness or violence, the more improved system of modern jurisprudence should discard such a doctrine if it ever prevailed. But even that doctrine, if admitted, would not justify you in adopting the present resolution. You cannot thence infer the propriety of proceeding against a person who is not accused of any thing punishable. Will it be pretended that the common fame, which is to be a ground of proceeding, does not refer to any offence or to any transaction? Common fame, if admitted for proof, must be supposed to apply to some subject of complaint. On the principle even of this very questionable doctrine, a statement of some charge is requisite. What, then, in the present case, is the accusation which could be supported by common fame? If there be any such, let it be stated.

The gentlemen who advocate the resolution in its present form fail in their efforts to support it, notwithstanding all the aid which they have sought from “the leading-strings and crutches of precedents,” (to use the language of the gentleman from Virginia.) On general principles, on the broad basis of universal right, the resolution is condemned; and no precedent is adduced which can justify it. I do not wish to shield any public officers, whether judges or others, who may merit impeachment, but I wish the House, when acting as public accusers, to proceed in such a manner as not to do injury to any individual. Justice is due to the individual as well as to the public. No public duty can require this House to adopt a resolution of general reproach, yet stating no public offence. And it but illy accords with the principles of justice to subject the judicial officers of the Union to all the inconvenience, vexation, and expense, of being obliged to vindicate themselves against secret accusations, which it may be more difficult to discover than to overthrow.

You will observe, sir, that I do not enter into any particular examination of the case referred to by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Smilie,) whether there was a controversy as to prerogative and privilege between the court and the bar, in which the pride of professional rank appeared in opposition to judicial authority. Whether the judge very properly refused to yield to the counsel, or whether the court committed an error in pronouncing the law, these are topics which I think it needless to examine in considering the resolution now on the table; for the resolution itself states nothing, and there is no case before us for examination.

On so grave a subject as the present, when we are called upon to aid in the administration of justice, it was to be desired that the advocates of the resolution should so far regard their own exhortations as to refrain from attempting to enkindle the animosity of party. The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Smilie) seems to have thought himself at liberty to pursue a different course. But, considering the nature of the question on which our votes are to be given, I hope to be excused if I deem it not proper in this debate to reply to him on the various topics of party discussion which he has chosen to mention, although the task might be easy indeed to repel his charges against the former Administration. A single observation, however, may be proper on a law to which he has alluded in the language of censure. There was at least one prominent feature which might recommend it to the friends of truth. It expressly declared that the truth might be given in evidence.

Mr. Dennis observed that in the course of the remarks which he had the honor of making yesterday, he had declared himself in favor of the proposed investigation, provided it were made on proper principles; and, in order the more clearly to illustrate his ideas and evince his sincerity, he had read in his place a resolution embracing all the facts which had been suggested to the House as the foundation of this proceeding. He had then said he would not pledge himself to offer a resolution such as he then read, but would vote for it if offered by others. As the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) had not accepted his overtures, and in the course of his observations had done him the honor of noticing some of his ideas expressed in yesterday’s debate, he rose principally for the purpose of offering an amendment, and partly for the purpose of replying to one or two of the gentleman’s remarks. He was not a little surprised at the animated strain in which that gentleman had addressed the House in the course of this morning, nor did any thing appear to have fallen from any gentleman, in the course of the discussion, which appeared to him calculated to produce so much excitement as he had manifested. But as he did not claim to set up his own feelings or his own conduct as the standard by which the feelings or actions of others ought to be guided, and as the gentleman had applied his observations without implicating motives, he had not at all interrupted the equanimity of his disposition. He had exercised a right which he should always be disposed to accord to that gentleman, and every other member—the right of placing the observations of his opponents in the most ludicrous point of view of which they were susceptible. In this right he would also indulge himself whenever the subject required it.

The gentleman from Virginia, in replying to[123] some of his observations, had said that he had conceived the charge exhibited was of a very serious nature, but did not appear to comprehend in what respect he considered it so, and therefore he wished to explain in what manner he considered it as such. He considered it as serious, inasmuch as it was calculated to excite suspicion and asperse the official conduct of the gentlemen in question; but did not mean to insinuate, but on the contrary repelled the idea of its being serious as regarded its sufficiency, if true, as a foundation of impeachment. In order to show that the conduct of the judges had not been so highly censurable even as the statement of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Smilie,) or his colleague and the gentleman from Virginia, seemed to suppose, he begged leave to state his ideas as to the rectitude of their conduct. Here he might use the observation of the gentleman from Virginia, applied to one of his own remarks, and say that gentleman had with no great dexterity confounded two principles as distant from each other as the northern and the southern pole. He seemed to assimilate the case in which the court have arbitrarily withdrawn the question of law entirely from the jury, to the conduct of the court in this case, which only went to restrict the counsel from arguing before the jury a case already settled in the minds of the court, by a train of judicial determinations in similar cases, and in which they left both law and fact to the determination of the jury; directing them as to the law upon the subject. He was warranted in his opinion, because the gentleman from Virginia, in illustrating some of his positions, had cited the case of libel as decided by Lord Mansfield, and Mr. Fox’s celebrated declaratory bill, which grew out of that decision. What analogy has that case to the case in question? Lord Mansfield decided that in the case of a libel, all the jury had to do was to find the fact of publication or not, and that whether when published it were criminal or not, they had no right to determine, and thus withdrew the question of law altogether from their decision. This was justly regarded as a gross violation of that principle of the criminal law of that country, which invests the jury with the right to decide as well on the law as on the fact. This principle I fully acknowledge, and if the court in the case of Fries had deprived the jury of that right, and withdrawn the question of law from them, there might be some foundation for this resolution. But, according to the statement of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, the question of law and fact were both submitted to the jury, with the instructions of the court on the legal question. He had always been taught to believe that the court were the proper organ through which the law was to be communicated to the jury, though he did not deny but the jury had the right which they should cautiously exercise, but which they would always exercise, when they discover an inclination in the court to oppress the citizen or exculpate the guilty, to reject the direction of the court and decide for themselves.

But the complaint is, that the court denied to the counsel the privilege of arguing the law before the jury. Mr. Dennis said he believed the court possessed a power of this nature, to be regulated by a sound discretion. If the court should believe that a question had been put at rest by a long train of judicial decisions, such as was the case in this instance, they not only have the right, but it becomes their duty to prevent a useless consumption of time, and to prohibit the counsel from agitating the question. Indeed it is indelicate in the counsel to impress on the jury an opinion of law contrary to the known opinion of the court; nor is there any court who will not take on themselves the right of checking counsel, in an attempt to mislead the jury on a question of law. Such was the practice of the courts in Maryland, and in that country from which we derive all our notions of jurisprudence.

But though he did not conceive that there was any ground for impeachment in the statement of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, yet he knew that this discussion would produce a vague and undefined censure, which he believed the judges in question ought to have an opportunity of repelling. He therefore moved the following amendment, by way of preamble to the resolution:

This amendment embraces all the facts stated by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, points out a specific charge as the foundation of the proceeding, and yet, when attached to the resolution, gives to the committee the power of general inquiry.

We are told that the facts have been stated[124] by a member on the floor, and there is no reason for stating them in the resolution. Will the statement of the gentleman from Pennsylvania appear on your journals, and how will it hereafter be known that any fact was stated as the foundation on which to erect a committee with general inquisitorial powers? Posterity will only see the resolution, and to them it will be a precedent which will justify the creation of a committee of inquiry into the official conduct of any officer, without the allegation of a single fact, whenever a member may choose to be of opinion that a vexatious and expensive proceeding shall be instituted. It was therefore that he wished to resist the principle, and for that purpose moved the amendment.

Mr. Huger said he had before stated, and he now repeated, that he was not averse to an investigation; but he did not consider himself bound to vote for a resolution so general and vague. If the amendment of the gentleman from Maryland were adopted, he should vote for the resolution.

Mr. Nicholson moved to amend the amendment, by striking out the whole of it after the word “Whereas,” and by inserting—

Mr. Huger had no objection to the insertion of the last amendment, but he had to striking out the first. He therefore called for the yeas and nays upon striking out.

The question was then taken by yeas and nays upon striking out, and carried—yeas 79, nays 41, as follows:

The question was now taken on inserting the amendment of Mr. Nicholson, and carried.

The question was then put upon agreeing to the amendment thus amended.

Mr. Purviance said he could not vote for it because it did not state the fact. It declared that members of the House had stated that they had heard of official acts of misconduct of both the judges, when but one act had been charged against Judge Peters.

Mr. J. Randolph observed that he perceived no reason for the preamble. He hoped therefore it would not be agreed to. General inquiry was his object, and, as going to limit it, he was against the preamble.

Mr. Elliot said that, had the amendment of the gentleman from Connecticut prevailed, he might have reconciled it to his mind to vote for the resolution thus amended. But as it stood, he could not.

Mr. Nicholson remarked that when he offered the amendment, the incorrectness suggested by the gentleman from North Carolina had not occurred to him. To obviate this incorrectness he would move to amend the amendment by saying “a certain act of Richard Peters.”

The Speaker said this amendment was not in order.

Mr. Nicholson said that under such circumstances he must vote against the whole amendment.

The question being taken, the amendment as amended was lost without a division.

When the resolution for appointing a committee of inquiry was carried—yeas 81, nays 40, as follows:

Ordered, That Messrs. John Randolph, jun., Nicholson, Joseph Clay, Early, Roger Griswold, Huger, and Boyle, be appointed a committee pursuant to the said resolution.

Monday, January 9.

Another member, to wit, William Helms, from New Jersey, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Wednesday, January 11.

Virginia Yazoo Company.

On a motion made and seconded,

The question was taken thereupon, and resolved in the affirmative—yeas 61, nays 49.

On a motion made and seconded that the House do come to the following resolution:

And the said motion being twice read at the Clerk’s table, a motion was made and seconded to amend the same, by striking out all the words from the word “Resolved,” in the first line, to the end of the motion, and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following words: “That this House will, on Monday next, hear all the agents of the different companies claiming lands south of the State of Tennessee, who may choose to speak at the bar of this House.”

And on the question that the House do agree to the said amendment, it passed in the negative. And the main question being taken that the House do agree to the said motion, as originally proposed, it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 67, nays 46.

Friday, February 3.

Georgia Militia Claims.

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the report of the Committee of Claims, on the petition of John M. Randolph and Randolph McGillis, which is unfavorable to the prayer of the petitioners.

The petitioners claim their pay as militiamen, called out in the State of Georgia for the protection of that State against the Indians. They allege, that, being called out under the authority of the Government of the United States, the General Government is bound to compensate them and the other men called out for their services.

The Committee of Claims report that the petitioners are to look for compensation to the State of Georgia, who, by the articles of cession recently concluded, had agreed to receive one million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, in full for all demands for military service.

[This debate, though nominally on a private claim, retains a surviving interest from its historic details, its connection with the Georgia cession, its references to the Yazoo speculation, and its dependence upon the question of protection between the Federal Government and a State.]

Mr. Early.—Mr. Chairman: I cannot but be sensible of the difficulty which opposes itself to the present claim after an unfavorable report from the committee to which it was referred. And it is impossible not to discern that this difficulty is increased by the opinion of the Attorney General upon the construction of the articles of cession from Georgia to the United States. But as to that opinion, it may not be improper to observe, that so far as it applies to the case of the claimant, it is repelled by the positive certificates of two of the Georgia Commissioners, gentlemen of veracity and legal talents equal with himself. To give to the opinions, or rather the “private ideas and recollections” of that officer, the weight and authority which have been thereunto attached by the Committee of Claims, would be to adopt in practice a principle at war with the maxims of all free Governments; it would be to constitute the framer of an instrument the judge of its construction. This is the essence of despotism. But I apprehend that neither the principle laid down in that opinion nor the facts therein stated do bear upon the case; but that the facts do negatively prove that the claims now under discussion were not included in the compensation stipulated to Georgia in the articles of cession and agreement. The principles are, that the term “territory,” as used in the instrument, meant not[126] only the territory ceded, but that retained. Now, Mr. Chairman, as I cannot possibly comprehend what bearing this has upon the question before us, I must be excused if I leave the Attorney General in the undisturbed enjoyment of his premises and pursue the discussion.

So early as the year 1787 the State of Georgia, being sorely distressed by the violence of the Indians, passed a law directing the establishment of two regiments of troops, to serve until a restoration of peace could be secured. But the enlistments not having been completed, in the following year a law was passed holding out additional inducement, and in the year 1789 the present federal constitution having gone into operation, and the rights of peace and war thereby vested exclusively in the General Government, the Legislature of Georgia passed a law discharging the troops which had been enlisted, and declaring the rate of pay which they should receive. For this pay certificates were directed to be issued, and these certificates constitute a debt unredeemed to this day. [Mr. E. turned to the several laws above referred to, and read from each extracts as proofs of his statement.] Here, Mr. Chairman, you have unfolded a debt, which, without the least violence to construction, fills up the description given in the articles of cession. Here are expenses incurred by the State totally distinct from and unconnected with the claims now under discussion. It is important also to observe, that every attempt made by the State of Georgia prior to the cession to dispose of her vacant territory, appears from the face of the acts to have been dictated by a view of discharging the public obligations to those troops. No less than three attempts at a disposition of her territory were made prior to the cession. The first was an offer to cede to the General Government, in 1788, provided Congress would pay the expenses which had then accrued in defending the frontiers, and would yield the wonted protection in future at their own expense. This was rejected. In the following year a law passed for disposing of a part of the territory to companies, notoriously with a view to raise money wherewith to meet the same engagements. This also failed, for causes which have been amply unfolded to the House on another occasion. The next attempt was in the year 1795, which, in the very title of the law, is expressed to be made to meet the particular engagements to the same soldiery. Of the result of this transaction the House is also possessed. The last attempt was by the articles of cession. Thus it appears that in no instance were the present claims ever thought of as a debt to be met by the State of Georgia out of the proceeds of her unlocated lands, but that the expenses incurred by, and the engagements made to the troops in the years 1787, 1788, and 1789, were uniformly the moving cause toward a disposition of her territory.

The Committee of Claims however, sir, notwithstanding they have throughout their report endeavored to rest upon the Attorney General the responsibility of the construction given to the cession, have at the same time erected a pillar of their own to support it, where they saw it must fall. They well perceived that all reasoning upon the subject was idle, unless one principle could be established; this they have boldly advanced to, and, instead of proving, have assumed as the groundwork of their whole superstructure. It is, that the State was bound in the first instance to compensate the soldiery, notwithstanding the ulterior responsibility of the General Government. From this they infer that the State had a right and by the cession did exercise the right of exonerating the latter Government. Now, Mr. Chairman, grant to the Committee their premises and there is an end to the question between us; their consequences must result. But, sir, I must supplicate their pardon if I refuse my assent to their position until my judgment is convinced. And I must be pardoned for saying that the reasoning to which they have resorted for the purpose of proving it, strikes my mind as the reverse of sound; that it proves too much to prove any thing. It is, that the State Government is in the first instance liable, because the troops were called into the field by the State Executive. This reasoning, Mr. Chairman, would go to prove that in every instance in which militia have been called into the service of the General Government, the States from which they were drafted were in the first instance liable for their compensation, because, in every case which has taken place, they were called into the field by State Executives. The truth is, sir, that in every case the orders have issued from the Executive of the General Government to that of the State Government, and that orders have from the latter issued in consequence thereof, for making the requisite drafts; so that the troops engaged in service under the immediate directions of the State, but under the mediate directions of the United States. This was the course pursued in both the insurrections in the State of Pennsylvania; it was the course in the State of South Carolina in relation to Indian invasion, at the same period at which the services were performed in Georgia for which we are now claiming compensation. It was the same course the other day with the troops ordered down the Mississippi to occupy New Orleans and its dependency. In all these cases the troops were compensated by the General Government in the first instance. It never entered the heart of any man that the States from which the drafts were made, were in the first instance liable, and that resort must afterwards be had by the State Government against the United States. I have always been taught that precedents established principles, but it now seems that the Committee of Claims in the profoundness of their researches have discovered that by assuming premises, principles may be established in the face of a uniform current of precedents.

There are, Mr. Chairman, two modes marked[127] out in the constitution in which the militia may be called into service. The first is a case where from necessity the war attribute of sovereignty is left in the individual States. It is the case of invasion or such imminent danger thereof as will not admit of delay. The other mode is that of issuing orders from the Executive of the General, to the officers of the State Governments. This is the usual method by which the militia of the States are drawn into the service of the United States. And it is of importance to observe here, that the act of Congress which was intended to give effect to the constitutional powers of the General Government to “call forth the militia,” authorizes the President “to issue his orders for that purpose to such officer or officers of the militia as he shall think proper.” For, inasmuch as there can be no other difference in a military point of view, and for military purposes, between the Governor of a State and the next highest military officer, than the difference of rank, the one being first, the other second, in command, it must follow that if the militia are to resort for pay to the State Governments because their orders have passed through the Governor, they must also resort to the same source in case their orders should pass through the second or third in command; the principles upon which the committee found their reasoning apply equally to both cases. The soundness of conclusions drawn by the committee is, therefore, not merely questionable, but to me it appears not difficult to prove that the conclusions themselves are at war with the most obvious principles of justice.

I hold it, sir, accordant with the most common rules by which individuals are regulated in a state of society, that when service is performed the party for whom it was performed is the only one responsible for the compensation. The rule applies with equal force to the case of Governments, who are moral agents. Happily, Mr. Chairman, there is no difficulty in ascertaining the party for whom the service was performed in the case under discussion. Fortunately for the States in general, it is made the constitutional duty of the General Government to “protect each of them against invasion.” And fortunately for the State of Georgia in the present instance, there is the recorded sanction of the Executive of the Union, couched in the following words—“If the information which you may receive, shall substantiate clearly any hostile designs of the Creeks against the frontiers of Georgia, you will be pleased to take the most effectual measures for the defence thereof, as may be in your power, and which the occasion may require.” If, therefore, the principles and reasoning of the committee be correct, it must follow that troops engaged in performing the constitutional duty of the United States must resort for their compensation in the first place to the States. To premises leading to such conclusions, I will not, cannot yield assent.

Mr. Chairman: It is recollected that when this subject was under discussion at the last session of Congress, a distinction was taken between the situation of troops called into the field by order from the General Government, and those called out by the State Executive in virtue of authority given by the former. But, sir, I humbly apprehend that such a distinction is one of words, and not of principles. And I must here profess to the honorable Committee of Claims my profound acknowledgment, for furnishing me with an idea, and a mode of phraseology most suited to my purpose. They, in their report, have told the House that the “manner of exhibiting” the demand assuredly cannot change its nature. Now, sir, I repeat, in nearly their own words, that the manner of calling out the troops, cannot change the nature of the service. It cannot change the United States service into State service. And indeed the Committee of Claims themselves have given us the strongest proofs, that with them the distinction had no weight. For of claims which have been so contradistinguished in the reports from the War Department, there were committed to them both descriptions; but they draw no difference. Indeed, their principles would admit of none.

But, sir, if a difference in principle did exist between claims of the two kinds, it would prove nothing in the present case, because the difference does not here appear in fact; and I cannot but consider it as one of the unfortunate circumstances attendant upon our claims, that the epithet unauthorized, has, without foundation, been attached to them, because, as was supposed, they were founded upon services not specially ordered. The fact is, Mr. Chairman, that they were not only authorized, but they were ordered, by the General Government. I beg leave to compare the tenor of the orders for drafting the militia in Georgia, with the orders issued in other cases, about which no difficulty ever occurred. The words used in the Georgia case are, “you will be pleased to take the most effectual measures for the defence thereof,” &c. What are the words used in the orders issued to the governors of four States, to march militia to quell the insurrection in the Western counties of Pennsylvania? “I have to request your Excellency,” &c. The words are the same in every other instance in which militia have been ordered into the service of the United States. They are the same which were used for enlisting the one hundred horse and one hundred foot to serve upon the frontiers of Georgia, about whose compensation there never has, until the present moment, been any difficulty; they are the same under which several corps were raised in the same quarter, whose services have long since been remunerated.

Let us here pause for a moment, and view the extent to which we shall be led by adopting the report. Sir, the principles of that report, and the application therein made of those principles, lead to a conclusion from which, if I mistake not, every gentleman upon this floor will revolt.[128] Sure I am, every State in the Union will reject it with horror. What, sir! has the great, the all-important right of peace and war been yielded up by the States to the General Government, and yet the States bound to compensate for war services? It is no reply to this conclusion to be told that the States are only liable in the first instance; for it is then completely within the power of the General Government, by withholding, to make them bear the burden altogether. And to that may be added, that the expenditure might frequently be of such magnitude as to create extreme oppression in the imposition of taxes, and, in some States, might produce general ruin and bankruptcy.

Mr. J. C. Smith observed that the Committee of Claims, in submitting to the House the reports then before them, had not been influenced by the magnitude of the sum claimed for services. The simple question considered by them, was whether compensation had, or had not been rendered for those services. The decision of this question depended on another question, whether from the nature of our Government, the State of Georgia was to be considered as, in the first instance, liable for the satisfaction of these claims. If this should be admitted, he thought the proper construction to be placed on the articles of cession was extremely plain. There are two ways in which the militia of a State may be called out by the Executive of the United States. The first is by a direct detachment of any portion of the militia. It was not necessary, in any instance, for the Government of the United States to call on the Executive of a State for this purpose. It was in their power directly to call into the public service a brigade or other division. This is one course, which may be pursued, and in this case it is admitted that the soldiers are soldiers of the United States, and that for their compensation they are to look to no other Government than that of the United States, in the first instance. The other course is that where a requisition is made by the General Government on the Executive of a State. What is the state of things in this case? It must be presumed that the citizens of a State, thus called into service, are to look to their own State for compensation in the first instance, though he admitted that the General Government was in the last resort responsible. They are to look, in the first instance, to the State Government, for this obvious reason: The Governor of a State is not amenable to the General Government; and he consequently cannot be punished for exceeding their orders. Is that Government then bound at all events to pay the expenses incurred in consequence of the orders of the State Executive, when they may be in direct violation of the orders of the General Government? It is a clear position then, that when the militia are called out by the Executive of a State they are to look to the State in the first instance. Application may be made to the General Government in the first instance, and if there shall have been no disobedience to its orders it may make payment; but, put the case of the orders of the General Government being disobeyed, will it be contended that it will be obliged to remunerate services rendered in opposition to its commands?

Contemplating the subject in this view, it must be admitted that the militia are in the first instance to look to the State Government, which may make a compromise with the General Government.

The second question is, what is the nature of the compromise made in this case? The articles of cession purport to be [Mr. Smith here quoted the beginning of these articles.]

It may here be proper to premise that Georgia is the first State in the Union that has ever received a compensation for her territory transferred to the United States. That territory was acquired by the joint exertions and blood of the citizens of all the States. Under such circumstances it becomes necessary to inquire into the compensation stipulated to be given by the United States to the State of Georgia; a compensation not given for the land, but for expenses incurred by Georgia in relation to it. The Attorney General tells us that these expenses were incurred for the portion surrendered to the United States, as well as for the whole State.

It behooves the gentleman from Georgia to show the precise expenses incurred. Were this once proved it would remove all doubt. The Commissioners who formed the articles of cession, it may be presumed, had before them the whole materials; and it must be inferred that the claims now made were fully considered by them, and were, so far as they are just, included in the settlement. Mr. S. concluded his remarks by saying he felt no uncommon tenacity or zeal against the claims; but that he would be very willing to allow them in case it should be satisfactorily shown that they were not already compensated.

Mr. Meriwether and Mr. Holland opposed the report, when a vote was passed against the claims—yeas 73, nays 28; when the House, on the motion of Mr. J. Clay, postponed the further consideration of the subject till Monday next.

Monday, February 13.

Public Roads.

On motion of Mr. Jackson, the House took up the bill making provision for the application of the money heretofore appropriated to the laying out and making public roads leading from the navigable waters emptying into the Atlantic to the Ohio river.

Mr. J. Clay moved to postpone the bill to the 1st Monday of December. Lost—yeas 41, nays 40.

Mr. R. Griswold moved so to amend the first section, as to vest the President with a general power to appoint three Commissioners to designate a route, to be reported to Congress for their ultimate decision; which motion, after a short conversation, was agreed to by a considerable majority.

[129]

Mr. Lyon offered a motion for empowering the President to designate the routes. Lost, without a division.

The committee rose and reported the bill with several amendments, in which the House concurred, and ordered the bill to a third reading on Wednesday.

Tuesday, February 14.

Importation of Slaves.

The following motion, offered by Mr. Bard, was taken into consideration in Committee of the Whole:

On motion of Mr. Jackson, it was agreed to add after the words United States, “or their territories.”

Mr. Lowndes.—I will trespass but a very short time upon the attention of the House at this stage of the business, but as I have objections to the resolution, it may be proper that I should state them now. I will do so briefly, reserving to myself the privilege of giving my opinion more at length when the bill is before the House, should the resolution be adopted, and a bill brought in. I am sorry, Mr. Speaker, to find that the conduct of the Legislature of the State of South Carolina, in repealing its law prohibitory of the importation of negroes, has excited so much dissatisfaction and resentment as I find it has done with the far greater part of this House. If gentlemen will take a dispassionate review of the circumstances under which this repeal was made, I think this dissatisfaction and resentment will be removed, and I should indulge the hope that this contemplated tax will not be imposed. Antecedent to the adoption of the constitution under which we now act, the Legislature of South Carolina passed an act prohibiting the importation of negroes from Africa, sanctioned by severe penalties. I speak from recollection, but I believe not less than the forfeiture of the negro and a hundred pounds sterling for each brought into the State; and this act has been continued in force until it was repealed by the Legislature at its last session. This long interdiction, I think, manifests, on the part of the government of the State, a disinclination to the trade, and, had we received the aid from Congress which was necessary to enforce the act, the repeal which is now complained of would never, in my opinion, have taken place. But, Mr. Speaker, the State was unable to enforce its laws. It had given up to the Government of the United States all revenues derived from foreign imposts, and was, therefore, necessarily divested of the means of preventing the introduction into the country from sea of whatever the excitements to gain might allure it into. The geographical situation of our country is not unknown. With navigable rivers running into the heart of it, it was impossible, with our means, to prevent our Eastern brethren, who, in some parts of the Union, in defiance of the authority of the General Government, have been engaged in this trade, from introducing them into the country. The law was completely evaded, and for the last year or two, Africans were introduced into the country in numbers little short, I believe, of what they would have been had the trade been a legal one. Under these circumstances, sir, it appears to me to have been the duty of the Legislature to repeal the law, and remove from the eyes of the people the spectacle of its authority being daily violated.

I beg, sir, that from what I have said, it may not be inferred that I am friendly to a continuation of the slave trade. So far from it that, without adverting to considerations by which I know other gentlemen are influenced, I think the period has passed when the interests of the country required, and her policy dictated, that an end should be put to it. I wish the time had arrived when Congress could legislate conclusively upon the subject. I should then have the satisfaction of uniting with the gentleman from Pennsylvania, who moved the resolution. Whenever it does arrive, should I then have a seat in this House, I will assure him I will cordially support him in obtaining his object. But, Mr. Speaker, I cannot vote for this resolution, because I am sure it is not calculated to promote the object which it has in view. I am convinced that the tax of ten dollars will not prevent the introduction into the country of a single slave. Gentlemen must be sensible of the truth of this observation, when they are informed, and the fact is too notorious even to be doubted, that, notwithstanding the expense and risk which attend an illicit trade, they have been introduced in very great numbers. Was I friendly to the trade, I should, without any hesitation, embrace the proposition contained in the resolution, and I should consider it a point gained of no small importance, that the Legislature of the General Government had given a sanction to it—for I can regard the Government deriving a revenue from it in no other light than a sanction. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, and those who think with him, ought, above all others, to deprecate the passing of this resolution. It appears to me to be directly calculated to defeat their own object—to give to what they wish to discountenance a legislative sanction; and, further, an interest to the Government in permitting this trade after the period when it might constitutionally terminate it. When I say that I am myself unfriendly to it, I do not wish, Mr. Speaker, to be misunderstood; I do not mean to convey the idea that the people of the Southern States are universally opposed to it—I know the fact to be otherwise. Many of the people in the Southern States feel an interest in it, and will yield it with reluctance. Their interest will be strengthened by the immense accession of territory to the United States by the cession of Louisiana. Gentlemen cannot foresee what the situation of the country[130] will be when the period arrives when Congress may constitutionally interdict the trade. The finances of the country, and the exigences of the times, may be such as to prevent the Government from dispensing with any part of its revenue. The tax, if imposed, will undoubtedly produce a revenue, and in proportion to the amount of this revenue will be the interest of the Government in the trade. But, Mr. Speaker, my greatest objection to this tax is, that it will fall exclusively upon the agriculture of the State of which I am one of the representatives. However odious it may be to some gentlemen, and however desirous they may be of discountenancing it, I think it must be evident that this tax will not effect their object; that it will not be a discouragement to the trade, nor will the introduction of a single African into the country be prevented. The only result will be, that it will produce a revenue to the Government. I trust that no gentleman is desirous of establishing this tax with a view to revenue. The State of South Carolina contributes as largely to the revenue of the United States, for its population and wealth, as any State in the Union. To impose a tax falling exclusively on her agriculture would be the height of injustice, and I hope that the Representatives of the landed interest of the nation will resist every measure, however general in its appearance, a tendency of which is to lay a partial and unequal tax on agriculture.

Mr. Bedinger observed, that the gentleman from South Carolina had so fully expressed the opinions he entertained, that he should say but little. Every body who knew his opinions on slavery might think strange of the vote he should give against the resolution. There was not a member on the floor more inimical to slavery than he was, still he was of opinion that the effect of the present resolution, if adopted, would be injurious. He should, therefore, vote against it.

Mr. Bard.—It was my wish that the question before the committee might be taken without discussion, but, as the gentleman from South Carolina has preferred a different course, I beg permission to offer a few thoughts on the subject.

As to the constitutionality of the measure, I believe there can be but one opinion. It is pretty well understood that the union of the States was a matter of compromise; and, indeed, the language of the constitution suggests the idea that the convention which formed that instrument, must have had the emancipation of slaves under their consideration. They had achieved liberty, and their object was to transmit it to posterity; and we cannot permit ourselves to suppose that men whose minds were so enriched with liberal sentiments, and who had so often reiterated the sacred truth, “That all men were born equally free”—I say we cannot suppose that they would consider slavery to be a subject unworthy their discussion; and it appears to be equally suggested that the convention were not all agreed to an absolute prohibition of the slave trade, but yielded so far that a duty or tax might be imposed on the future importation of that description of people. The question, then, is only on the policy of laying this tax; and it appears that there can be no doubt on this question.

The slave trade, in terms, makes African men mere articles of traffic, and of course they must be as much a subject of commercial regulation as any other species of foreign manufactures. The tax will be high or low, in proportion to the price the article will bring. And if my information is correct, a slave will bring four hundred dollars; the tax, then, is but two and-a-half per cent., which is many degrees lower than any other imported article pays. The tax is a general one; no State in the Union is exempted; it will operate wherever its object can be found. It may be that some States will pay more and some less, but it will be at the option of any State how much, or whether it will pay any of this tax; for it will be just as the State shall please to deal in this article of commerce. And, on the score of uniformity, no objection can lie against the tax—the slaves have already been the object of direct taxation, and Vermont paid none of that tax, because she had none of that kind of taxable property; and yet I never heard it complained of as not being uniform. It is said the tax is impolitic, because it will not prevent the importation of Africans into our country. This may, indeed, be the case; and I believe it will be but a feeble check to the trade if not aided by nobler motives. However, if any of the States engage in the trade, the tax will have two effects—it will add something to the revenue, and it will show to the world that the General Government are opposed to slavery, and willing to improve their power, as far as it will go, for preventing it. Both these ends are valuable; but I deem the latter to be the more important one, for we owe it indispensably to ourselves and to the world, whose eyes are on our Government, to maintain its republican character. Every thing compared to a good name is “trash;” and it rests with us whether we will preserve or destroy it. If our Government will respect power only, and justify whatever it may be able to do, then will our hands be against every man, and every man’s hand against us; and Americans will become the scorn of mankind.

On what principles, whether moral or political, I do not know; but so it was, that about the close of the Revolutionary war, the Quaker society in South Carolina brought the slave trade, or perhaps slavery itself, under their serious consideration, and declared it to be unjustifiable. They afterwards, in 1796 or 1797, addressed Congress on the subject; but failed in their object, and for no other reason, probably, than that the powers of Congress did not reach it.

Some years ago the States, even those in which slaves abound most, loudly exclaimed against the further importation of that class of[131] people, and by their laws prohibited their traffic. Either they did this on moral principles or considerations of policy. In 1802, Congress stretched out her arm to aid the State Governments against the evil they so much deprecated, and passed a law inflicting fines and forfeitures on every man who should be found importing slaves into the United States. What might have been the issue of these combined exertions, or how far they might ultimately secure their end, I cannot tell; but, as to South Carolina, they have become nugatory; by repealing her prohibitory law she has rejected the interference of Congress. Why that State has done so; why she has abandoned a measure which, the other day, was considered so much her interest, I know not, nor is it for me to offer any conjectures. South Carolina is a sovereign State, and has a right to consult and pursue her own interest, so far as the general good will permit; for hitherto she may come, and no further. Every State has a right to import slaves if it so chooses, and Congress has a right to tax all the slaves imported; but when the powers of a State, though constitutional, operate against the general interest, then the exercise of those powers is politically wrong, because it is contrary to the fundamental principle of society, the public good, which is paramount to law and the constitution itself. And, in my opinion, the importation of slaves is hostile to the United States: to import slaves is to import enemies into our country; it is to import men who must be our natural enemies, if such there can be. Their circumstances, their barbarism, their reflections, their hopes and fears, render them an enemy of the worst description.

Gentlemen tell us, though I can hardly think them serious, that the people of this description can never systematize a rebellion. I will not mention facts, it is sufficient to say that experience speaks a different language—the rigor of the laws, and the impatience of the slaves, will mutually increase each other, until the artifices of the one are exhausted, and until, on the other hand, human nature sinks under its wrongs, or obtains the restoration of its rights. The negroes are in every family; they are waiting on every table; they are present on numerous occasions when the conversation turns on political subjects, and cannot fail to catch ideas that will excite discontentment with their condition. And what is to be expected from the people of this description, but that they will some day, and especially if their importation continues, produce a disturbance that may not be easily quieted, or kindle a flame that may not be readily extinguished. If ten thousand of them have been, as it is said, smuggled into the United States, in the course of a year or two past, and if ten or fifteen thousand of them may now be legally brought annually into our country, for four years to come, it will hardly be imagined that the general interest will be unaffected by such an importation.

If they are ignorant, they are, however, susceptible of instruction, and capable of becoming proficients in the art of war. To be convinced of this we have only to look at St. Domingo.

There the negroes felt their wrongs, and have avenged them; they learned the rights of man, and asserted them; they have wrested the power from their oppressors, and have become masters of the island. If they are unarmed, they may be armed; European powers have armed the Indians against us, and why may they not arm the negroes? And if they are already as numerous as is consistent with safety, it must be extreme impolicy to import more; it is to accelerate an event which we cannot contemplate without pain.

Slavery is not only impolitic as it affects the strength and tranquillity of the United States, but as it prevents their wealth, which can only grow out of society where the arts, sciences, and manufactures, are cultivated and improved. But, sir, I despise to argue on the advantages or disadvantages of what is contrary to the genius of our Government; what is radically unjust, and violates the principles of morality.

The Americans boast of being the most enlightened people in the world—they certainly enjoy the greatest share of liberty, and understand the principles of rational government more generally than any other nation on earth. They have denounced tyranny and oppression; they have declared their country to be an asylum for the oppressed of all nations. But will foreigners concede this high character to us, when they examine our census and find that we hold a million of men in the most degraded slavery? This is nearly one-fifth of our whole population; in some of the States nearly the half. Here, then, is a fact that must have weight to sink our national character, in spite of volumes to support it. It is a fact, from which foreigners will infer, that we possess the principles of tyranny, but want the power to carry them into operation, except against the untutored and defenceless African. If, then, we hold a consistency of national character in any estimation, we will give every discouragement in our power to the importation of slaves. It is in this view that the tax contemplated by the resolution is principally to be considered, and only incidentally as matter of revenue.

But, sir, I presume, on permission, to say, that the importation of slaves is in direct contradiction to the principles of morality. On these principles the Constitution of the United States is founded; on them every law ought to be founded; otherwise legislation will progress in the dark, and every step deviate still more from its true direction. “Do unto others as you would that others should do unto you,” is a law paramount to all human institutions; it is the fundamental law of human nature, of Christianity, and of every rational Government; it is a law which we wish all men to respect in their dealings with us; and it is a law which every man confesses he ought to observe, and, in spite of all the sophistry of depravity, must acknowledge[132] himself subject to its cognizance. I need not, nor will I, ask if we have observed this law as to the Africans; for it must be obvious to every man that it is not possible to violate it in a greater degree than we have done towards that unfortunate and wretched people.

But, notwithstanding all the information our country enjoys, numbers in the Eastern States have been embarked, for some years past, in the cruel traffic of slaves, and smuggling them into other States. And it is to be feared that many of them are, at this moment, preparing means to stimulate the barbarous tribes of Africa to war against each other; mutually to torture every human feeling; to violate the strongest ties of nature and affection; to tear the husband from the wife, and the wife from the husband; the parent from the child, and the child from the parent; and are coolly and deliberately forging irons, that they may have the infernal pleasure of coolly and deliberately riveting them on the unfortunate men, women, and children, who may fall into their hands. Such an enterprise, such a traffic as this, must affect our national character; it is self-evidently wrong, and, at first view, must receive the disapprobation of every disinterested man. The genius of our constitution, the mildness of its administration, and the prevailing sentiment of the nation, must sanction every measure to discourage the further admission of a people whose numbers already excite most painful sensations. In a word, the tax is constitutional; no article can bear a tax better than the one here proposed; it is a uniform tax, and justified on the ground of sound policy; and so far as it tends to discourage the slave-trade, it is supported by every principle of virtue. If I have uttered a word offensive to any member of the House, it will not be attributable to design, but to an honest solicitude to promote the honor and interest of our country.

Mr. Bedinger said he differed widely, as to the effects of this motion, from the gentleman who had just spoken. He was as hostile to the slave-trade as any man in the Union; and if he could believe that the imposition of a tax of ten dollars upon every imported negro would check the importation, he would vote for it. But he believed the resolution would have a different effect, and would rather sanction than discourage the trade. In point of revenue, the tax was of little consideration. Suppose a thousand slaves to be imported monthly, the amount of the tax would be about $100,000 a year; which in four years, at the expiration of which Congress would have power to prohibit the trade altogether, would amount to $400,000—a sum too trifling to be put into competition with the adoption of any measure that went to sanction such a trade.

Mr. Macon (the Speaker) believed the resolution was not founded in good policy. All the declamation and appeal to the passions urged in its behalf appeared to him unnecessary and irrelevant. The avowed object of the proposed tax was to show the hostility of Congress to the principle of importing slaves. How could this opposition of Congress be manifested, when it would become the duty of the armed ships of the United States, as soon as the tax was imposed, to protect this trade, as well as all other trade on which taxes were laid? He asked whether vessels engaged in this trade would not, under such circumstances, possess the same right to the protection of the Government as any other vessels engaged in any other kind of trade? Can this House tax this trade, and refuse it the same protection that is extended to all other trade? The question is not whether we shall prohibit the slave trade, but simply whether we shall tax it. Gentlemen are of opinion that the State of South Carolina has done wrong in permitting the importation of slaves. Suppose that this is the case. May not this measure be wrong also? Will it not look like an attempt in the General Government to correct a State for the undisputed exercise of its constitutional powers? It appeared to him to be something like putting a State to the ban of the empire. It will operate as a censure thrown on the State. To this, said Mr. M., I can never consent. As far as the law that may be founded upon this resolution can go, it will hold forth an evidence of the opinion entertained by Congress of the act of the Legislature of South Carolina. I know that these ideas may be unpopular in some parts of the Union, but I, notwithstanding, consider them just. There does not appear to me to be any necessity for our interposition, as, since the adoption of the constitution, no slaves have, I believe, been permitted to be imported, and as only four years are yet to run before Congress will be possessed of the constitutional right of prohibiting such importation altogether. And the simple question now is, whether for a trifling revenue, we will undertake to protect this trade. My idea is, that those who at present go into the traffic, have no right to claim your protection; but once legalize it by taxing it, and they will acquire the right thereto, and will demand it. All that has been said on the circumstances connected with the slave trade either here or in England, and on its morality or immorality, are in my opinion foreign to the true point involved in this debate, which is, Is the measure contemplated by the resolution politic, or is it not? In my opinion it is impolitic, for the reasons I have assigned, and for many others which might be added. I shall therefore, on this ground, vote against it.

Mr. Findlay was of opinion that the policy of the measure embraced by the resolution, and nothing else, was before them. Gentlemen seemed all to unite in their abhorrence of the slave trade; they differed only about the means of preventing it. It was well understood that a large majority of the Federal Convention were inimical to the slave trade. That convention had only acted upon it in a commercial point of view. As they considered imported slaves an article of commerce, the House possessed the same liberty of acting with regard to them, as with regard to[133] other articles of trade. In some of these articles, Congress had the right of exercising unlimited taxation; in this case, their power was limited to a certain amount. Imported goods, on an average, were subjected to a duty of about 20 per cent. On this subject, a difference of opinion exists as to the propriety of making imported slaves an article of revenue. This is the true question, and not whether we shall cast a censure upon any particular State. It does not follow, that, because we lay a particular tax, we censure those who pay it. Considering this, then, as an article of trade, the tax might have been long since laid, had not all the States prohibited the traffic. Under those circumstances, it could not be taken up as a subject of revenue.

Mr. F. observed, that, though it might be unbecoming in the House to be influenced by resentment against the State of South Carolina, yet it was proper that they should be influenced by the policy of the case. As a profitable article of commerce, it appeared as eligible a subject of taxation as could be found, and as justly liable to taxation as any other. As to the disgrace, which some gentlemen were of opinion would arise from taxing it, that arose from the existence of the slave trade. In laying the tax, we shall do all we can to discourage it; and if we do not like to use the money derived from taxing it in the common way, we may apply it to special objects—to ameliorate the state of slavery, or to any other object.

Mr. F. concluded his remarks by observing, that this question being brought forward, he could not justify himself in neglecting to embrace the opportunity it presented of discountenancing the importation of slaves. He considered it proper that Congress should take up the subject as the constitution presented it to them. At a certain period they would possess the right of prohibiting it altogether, and until then they enjoyed the power of taxation. This being the only constitutional power they did possess, he trusted they would exert it.

Mr. S. L. Mitchill declared his wish that the proposition of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Bard) should be considered merely as a subject of political economy. In the remarks which he proposed to offer upon it, he should, therefore, confine himself to that object. He would, therefore, say nothing on the immorality of a trade which deprived a large portion of the human species of their rights. He should pass over, in silence, every thing that might be urged to exhibit it as impious and irreligious; and he would not utter a word on its repugnance to the principles of our equal jurisprudence, and the spirit of our free Government. The slavery of a portion of our species was a copious theme, when viewed in either of these aspects; but, on the present occasion, he was willing to waive them all. The proposition was to be considered only in its commercial, economical, and fiscal relations; and on each of these it would be proper to make a few observations.

It was much to be regretted that the severe and pointed statute against the slave trade had been so little regarded. In defiance of its forbiddance and its penalties, it was well known that citizens and vessels of the United States were still engaged in that traffic. During the present session, memorials had been presented to Congress praying for exoneration from the exportation bonds, which had been given to one of the collectors of the customs, to ensure the landing of a cargo of New England rum in Africa, which it was not pretended to be denied was bartered away for slaves. These voyages were said to be carried on under the flag of a foreign nation; and the common practice, as was alleged, was, to go to the island of St. Croix and procure Danish papers and colors. Under this cover, the voyages were performed. To prevent the confiscation of the vessels under the law, on conviction of being engaged in the slave trade, it had been customary to sell that article of property in a foreign port.

Mr. M. observed that the extent of this shocking commerce was very considerable at this time. Some time ago, he had seen a list of the American vessels then known to be hovering on the coast of Guinea in quest of captive negroes. They were numerous and active, and so fatally busy as to excite the apprehensions of the benevolent Sierra Leone Company. In various parts of the nation, outfits were made for slave-voyages, without secrecy, shame, or apprehension. The construction of the ships, the shackles for confining the wretched passengers, and all the dismal apparatus of cruelty, were attended to with the systematic coolness of an ordinary adventure. Regardless of legal prohibitions, these merciless men, as greedy as the sharks of the element on which they sailed, collected their slaves along the shores, and at the factories of Negroland, from the river Senegal to the countries of Congo and Angola. Countenanced by their fellow-citizens at home, who were as ready to buy as they themselves were to collect and to bring to market, they approached our Southern harbors and inlets, and clandestinely disembarked the sooty offspring of the Eastern, upon the ill-fated soil of the Western hemisphere. In this way, it had been computed that, during the last twelve months, twenty thousand enslaved negroes had been transported from Guinea, and, by smuggling, added to the plantation stock of Georgia and South Carolina.

So little respect seems to have been paid to the existing prohibitory statute, that it may almost be considered as disregarded by common consent. And, therefore, as was observed by a gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Huger,) the Legislature of that State had lately repealed their restrictive law, and legitimated a trade which neither that regulation of their common wealth, nor the concurrent authority of the nation, could prevent. And it may be received as a correct general idea on this subject, that the citizens of the navigating States bring negroes from Africa, and sell them to the inhabitants[134] of those States which are more distinguished for their plantations.

Thus in spite of the spirit of our republican institutions, and the letter of our laws, a commerce in slaves is carried on to an alarming extent—a species of slavery peculiar in its form and character, and unlike that which was practised in ancient or modern Europe—a kind of servitude unheard of by the civilized world, until it was made known among the discoveries of the Portuguese along the western coast of that continent which reaches from Ceuta to the Cape of Good Hope. There it seems to have been extant from time immemorial, among the barbarous powers of a country who have eradicated all the tender relations of society, and established in their place the forceful and ferocious distinctions of MASTER and SLAVE. From those rude and uncivilized tribes, did Christian people learn the lessons of negro slavery. Under such instructors, and with such examples before them, have the Europeans and their descendants carried those savage customs of Africans into the New World, and most unfortunately tainted with them the manners and ordinances of a more refined race of men. For a delineation of this peculiar state of society, in its native regions, the world is much indebted to the undaunted enterprise of Mr. Parke; as, for its baneful effects upon the white nations who have adopted it, they will long remember the disclosures of Mr. Wilberforce, and the researches of Mr. Clarkson.

This doleful traffic it was not in the power of Congress to prevent by any present regulations. By the 9th section of the first article of the constitution the power of admitting such persons as they please is reserved to the States, until the year 1808. South Carolina has authorized the importation of negro slaves from Africa. This Congress can neither prohibit nor punish. But the National Legislature can exercise the authority granted by the same paragraph of the constitution, “of imposing on such importation a tax or duty not exceeding ten dollars for each person.”

There could be no doubt of the power of Congress to declare and levy such an impost on imported slaves for four years to come. The only question therefore was, whether it would be good policy to do so? Mr. Mitchill contended that it would. On this point he replied to a gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Lowndes,) who had argued that such a tax would discourage agriculture. He contrasted the cultivation of lands by the labor of freemen, with the more expensive management of them by slaves. He compared the husbandry of the Northern and Middle States, with the rural economy of the South. He examined in detail the moderate profits of a plantation on which bread, corn, grass, and live stock, were raised, and the enormous income derived to the proprietor of an estate employed in the culture of tobacco, rice, cotton, and sugar. He examined the smaller expense of feeding, clothing, and housing laborers in warm than in cold climates. It has been computed by men of observation, that a working slave on a cotton plantation would, besides supporting himself, clear for his master a net sum of two hundred dollars a year. On the average course of crops, where the plants were not attacked by the cherille, this estimate was considerably below the mark. And on this conviction he believed there was no important article whatever that would bear an impost so well.

Mr. M. then replied to an argument of the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. Macon,) that the imposition of the tax would be a recognition of the right to trade in slaves, and bind the nation to protect it with the force of the navy. He considered slavery already recognized in many of the States, and permitted by the constitution. It was a fact that it did exist, and Congress could not put an end to it. But this body might interpose its authority, and discountenance it as far as possible; and by laying the duty as high as the constitution permitted, a very desirable addition would be made to the revenue. Two hundred thousand dollars might be computed to be derived from this sort of merchandise imported into the country. Nor would Congress be bound to protect the African commerce on the high seas; the existing statute would be in force against it; the trade would still be unlawful as far as the power of Congress extended. And under the proposition now under debate, this species of traffic would be so far from receiving encouragement, that it would be punished in cases where Congress could punish it, and taxed in the cases to which the power to punish it did not extend.

He then delineated the wretched condition of a man subdued by fraud or force, deprived of the exercise of his will and judgment, subjected to the dominion and caprice of another, robbed of his rights and privileges, divested of moral power and agency, degraded from the rank of a human being, and brutalized into a chattel—a thing—and divested of the character of a person. In this point of view, such articles, bought and sold publicly in the market, were to be considered as mere merchandise, as working machines, or animals of labor? Distressing as the recollection was to every sympathizing or patriotic heart, it was useless to dwell upon it, as it was beyond our reach to grant relief. He would therefore treat it strictly as a case of foreign merchandise heretofore admitted free, but upon which it was now intended to impose a duty. For his own part, he should be glad if it could be laid, ad valorem, upon the price of the article. But, as the matter was circumstanced, there was no other method that could be adopted than to impose it, per capita, upon the individual persons imported. By laying the tax, he would imitate the ways of Divine Providence, and endeavor to extract good out of evil.

Concluding thus that the tax was constitutional, that the subject would bear it, and that[135] it would be a seasonable and proper expression of the Congressional sentiment on the subject. Mr. M. proceeded to show what an abundance of excellent purposes could be answered by $200,000 collected annually for four years.

In the course of his remarks, Mr. M. said, he had endeavored to avoid all harshness of expression on a topic of a peculiarly delicate nature, and prone to excite much sensibility in debate, but considered it strictly as a matter of political economy. In his attempt to state his reasoning to the committee, not as an abstract speculator, but as a man of business, he hoped he had given no offence to any gentleman by any severity of animadversion. He looked upon negro slavery as a dark spot on some of the members of the national body, which was spreading wider, turning blacker, and threatening a gangrene all around—and he felt a confidence that all friends to the health of this body would take warning by its fatal progress in a neighboring island—which had so mortified in St. Domingo, as to make that extreme part rot and drop off from the system to which it once belonged.

Mr. Sloan said he rose to observe, in a few words, that however afflicting it might be to contemplate a certain part of the creation used as articles of traffic, imported and exported the same as cattle, he did not consider the morality or immorality of the practice before the House. We must take the constitution as we find it, and as it is not in our power to prohibit the importation, the only question to be considered is, whether we shall most encourage the traffic, by letting the articles imported remain free of duty or by imposing a tax upon them. This view, he believed, presented to the mind the true question, and believing himself that a tax would, in some degree, discourage the importation, he should vote for the resolution.

Mr. T. Moore.—I am astonished to hear gentlemen, who advocate the resolution now under consideration, reprobate a traffic as horrid and infamous, and yet wish to draw a revenue from infamy, if it is an infamy.

I differ very widely in opinion from the honorable gentleman from Pennsylvania, who thinks that a tax of ten dollars per head will operate as a check to the growth of this horrid traffic. If I thought it would have that effect I would cheerfully vote for the resolution. I believe a tax of ten dollars will not prevent the importation of a single person of this description.

The gentleman told us that he hoped the General Government were disposed to discourage this traffic as far as they are authorized by the constitution. I hope this House will discourage this impolitic act of the Legislature of one of the Southern States—not by imposing a tax on those unfortunate people imported into the United States, but by passing a resolution expressive of its disapprobation of all acts permitting the importation of certain people into the United States. As the General Government cannot prohibit this traffic before the year 1808, I hope this House will reject the resolution under consideration, and totally disapprove every measure which attempts to draw revenue from an act that rivets the chains of slavery on any of the human race.

Mr. Huger regretted that he could not see the subject in the same light with other gentlemen who had taken a part in the debate. He had no hesitation in saying that he had always been hostile to the importation of slaves. Nor had he any hesitation in saying that if he had the power he would prohibit the importation. But the situation in which they were now placed was very different from that in which they would find themselves in the year 1808, when they would possess the constitutional power to prohibit the introduction of slaves. The constitution was known to be the offspring of concession and compromise, and in no part of it was this feature more apparent than in that which related to this subject. When the Southern States were admitted into the Union, they were in the habit of carrying on this species of trade, and they, by the express language of the constitution, retained the right of continuing it until the year 1808. Under this constitution the State of South Carolina enjoyed the exclusive right of judging of the propriety of allowing the trade or of prohibiting it. Had he had the honor of a seat in the Legislature of that State, Mr. H. certainly would have opposed the passage of this law. But he was only one of that community, standing here as their Representative, and after the State had exercised their undoubted right, however he might dislike the measure, it was his duty to defend the right which they had to adopt it. That State had in truth done no more than she possessed a constitutional right to do, and he believed there was in that State as much true compassion as in any other in the Union. He said he could not therefore but feel sensibly the attempt to single out this particular State to censure her for doing that which she had an undisputed right to do.

This was not, as contended by some gentlemen, a mere question of revenue; but it was a question whether the Government of the Union should come forward and condemn the act of a State, which she was fully authorized to pass. If it is necessary to increase the revenue, let us meet that subject fairly and fully, and not single out a particular resource of a particular State. It is on this ground that I principally object to this measure. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Mitchill) has endeavored to prove that because in the Southern States the article of slaves produces a great profit, it is therefore proper to make it the subject of taxation. I ask if there should be a profitable species of trade carried on in any other part of the Union, would it be deemed politic or just on that account to lay an additional tax upon it? The fair principle of taxation is, that every part of the Union should contribute equally. When[136] any branch of trade is profitable in New York, I, though a Southern man, rejoice at it. When the fisheries of the Eastern States prosper, I feel highly gratified—not because those whom I represent are particularly interested in them, but because I consider myself as a part of the whole, and that whatever advances the interests of any part of this Union must promote the interests of every part of it.

With regard to the moral principle involved in the slave trade, we have nothing to do with it. On this point the Union ought to be silent. On this subject can any thing be more pointed than the provisions of the constitution, which, contrary to most of the other provisions, cannot be altered but with the consent of every State in the Union. Why then shall we cry over what we cannot prevent, like a school boy? Each State, so long as she confines herself within the limits of her constitutional powers, must be the exclusive judge of her own conduct; and it becomes not one State, influenced by different feelings, habits, and interests, to pronounce upon the conduct of another. All, so far as regards themselves, are judges of right and wrong. We, too, have as strong a conviction of the propriety of our measures as those who differ from us in sentiment on this subject. We may perhaps think it more blamable to make slaves of white people than of the blacks.

I confess I have not been able clearly to understand the ideas of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Mitchill.) A few days since that gentleman offered a report, the object of which was to free raw materials from duty. Will the State of South Carolina profit by this? No. It will conduce to the benefit of other parts of the Union; but we shall bear the burden: and still, on this occasion, because we derive a certain profit from a particular description of trade, the gentleman contends for taxing it.

Let gentlemen also consider that we are not to be hurried away by our feelings or passions. We are sent here to attend to the business of the nation, and, to do that as it ought to be done, we must yield to a spirit of mutual deference and compromise, we must act fairly and impartially. All we ask in the present case is, to do as we would be done by. We permit the Eastern States to import German redemptioners and others. Let them then permit us to enjoy our constitutional right of importing slaves, especially when that right will exist but for a short time.

We do not pretend to advocate the act, but the right of our State to pass this law. It is not to be inferred that we are friendly to the importation. I believe, on the contrary, every Representative of the State on this floor is hostile to it. But how can gentlemen expect that we will disregard the voice of our own State, and especially when the measure may have been dictated by good and substantial reasons. One good reason may be that the importation could not be prevented, and that the restraining law was extensively broken. This we know was the fact. If so, may it not have been sound policy in the State to repeal it? There may have been another reason for the measure. It may have been conceived to have been better to import slaves directly from Africa than to be indebted for them to New York and other States, in which they may have been surreptitiously introduced.

The gentleman from New York (Mr. Mitchill) observes that it is demonstrable that, even in a pecuniary point of view, slaves are an evil; and that they impoverish those who hold them. What does this show, but that in the North they kept slaves as long as their interest dictated, and then got rid of them; and that because it is a misfortune to have them, we must be punished for our poverty. Though young, I am happy to state that I have seen the evil decreasing in the State I have the honor to represent. Let us alone, and we will pursue the best means the nature of the case admits of. Interfere and you will only increase the evil; for, whenever the Government of the Union interferes in the peculiar concerns of a State, it must excite jealousy and a spirit of resistance.

I beg gentlemen to lay aside, on this occasion, the prejudices to which local circumstances and peculiar State interests and feelings expose them. When I see the lowest of the animal tribe tortured, I feel for them; but does it follow that my interference will mitigate their pain? Do we not all know, that by interfering between a man and his wife, we only aggravate the difference; and do we not likewise know that any interference between a master and his slave induces the former to be more severe. I believe the State of South Carolina has as great an inclination as any State similarly circumstanced, to do away this evil. But they must, and ought to take their own course. It is a circumstance well known, that the people to the North, who make the most noise on this subject, are those, who, when they go to the South, first hire, then buy, and last of all turn out the severest masters among us.

Mr. Lucas observed that, though much had been said on the merits of the resolution, he would take the liberty of adding a few remarks. It was a maxim that, to justify the raising of a revenue, a Government ought previously to stand in need of money. The pecuniary wants of a Government were absolute and relative. The fit objects of taxation were likewise various. Some objects bore taxation better than others. When Governments want money to satisfy indispensable demands, taxes must be laid; and even when they are not in immediate want of money for pressing emergencies, there are frequently important purposes that might be answered in case they possessed resources. On this occasion it is said that the Government is not in want of money, that the existing revenue meets the wants of the nation, and that, consequently, a new tax ought not to be laid. This may possibly, strictly speaking, be correct. But to say absolutely that we do not want money,[137] he must deny; for he believed if they had money in the Treasury, not required for pressing exigencies, they could find abundant occasions for spending it to good effect. It was known that there were many claims preferred against the Government, of a meritorious kind, and which had been disallowed, not so much on their intrinsic merits, as from the operation of the statute of limitations. This limitation, said Mr. L., it is my wish should be removed, and one way of effecting that end will be to increase our revenue, as we shall thereby be enabled to discharge all just demands exhibited. The laying out, likewise, of roads was an important object. One is contemplated from this place to New Orleans. Without going further into a view of the various demands on the Government, we shall see the occasion that exists for more money being drawn into our Treasury.

As to the nature of the slave trade, we must, in my opinion, consider slaves imported as so much produce or merchandise. This article ought, in my opinion, likewise to be taxed, because the trade is odious; also, because it affords a great profit to those who carry it on. It was yesterday stated by a gentlemen from New York that a slave employed in the Southern States would pay for himself in two years; that is, that a slave that costs four hundred dollars will give a profit to the owner of two hundred dollars a year. As, therefore, no article imported into the United States gives a greater profit, so no article can better bear a tax. It ought also to be taxed, because the importation of slaves into the United States operates injuriously on the poor whites who draw their subsistence from labor. Their comparative situation in relation to the rich, is reduced; for if you increase the black laborers, so as to make them work for a lower compensation, you virtually reduce the value of the labor of the whites, and proportionally lessen the chance of a poor white man getting employment on favorable terms. It is well understood that competition always reduces the price of an article in the market; and although the blacks may not, in all respects, enter into a competition with the whites, yet, so far as respects labor, the competition will be complete. The rich part of the community will not employ a white man who feels the spirit of a freeman, and who will not submit to be subservient to the caprices of his employer, so long as they can employ a slave whom they can control as they please, and at a smaller expense. The indisputable effect, therefore, of the introduction of additional slaves will be the reduction of the value of labor, and the augmented severity of the lot of the poor white man, who is entirely dependent on his labor for the support of himself and family.

Gentlemen tell us we ought not so closely to scrutinize the conduct of the Legislature of South Carolina. I am, said Mr. L., far from scrutinizing in this instance the conduct of that State. I respect the people of South Carolina. Their situation may, perhaps, be such as in a great measure to justify their conduct, though I am far from saying that I approve it. But when we lay a tax on the importation of slaves, it is a sufficient reply to such remarks to say that the tax is not laid exclusively on slaves admitted into South Carolina. It does not therefore apply to South Carolina alone. That State has an undoubted right to admit the importation; but Congress have also an undoubted right of taxing them. The resolution, therefore, does not encroach on the rights of that State. The United States and South Carolina form two bodies politic, both of which are possessed of constitutional rights. To the one belongs the right of importing, to the other, the right of taxation; and this last right may be exercised without involving any censure of the State of South Carolina. The only necessary inquiry is, whether the proposed tax will be oppressive or unjust. I believe it will be universally agreed that an imported article worth four hundred dollars will not be taxed high compared with other articles, when it pays a duty of ten dollars. As to the constitutionality of the tax not a word need be said; that has not and cannot be disputed.

Wednesday, February 15.

Importation of Slaves.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on Mr. Bard’s resolution to impose a tax of ten dollars on every slave imported into the United States; the debate on which occupied the remainder of the sitting.

Mr. Lucas supported, and Mr. Holland opposed the resolution.

Mr. Earle moved that the committee rise and report progress. His reason for this motion was, that, from information received from South Carolina, on which he placed much reliance, it was expected that the Legislature would meet in April, and would then repeal the act admitting the importation of slaves. Should the committee rise, he would move a postponement of the consideration of the resolution to the first Monday in May.

Mr. Gregg.—I hope the motion for the committee to rise will prevail; and that any further proceeding on this subject will be postponed for the present. It has been said by the gentleman from South Carolina who made the motion, and I have heard it mentioned by others, that a considerable ferment has been excited in that State by the passage of the law authorizing the importation of slaves, and that it is highly probable the Legislature, at its next session, will repeal that law. That session, it is expected, will be held in April, the Governor having it in contemplation to convene the Legislature at that time for the purpose of submitting to their consideration the proposed amendment to the constitution.

Let it not, Mr. Chairman, be inferred, from what I have said, that I am in principle opposed[138] to the effect which I am confident the mover of the resolution expected it would produce. No member of this House is, or can be, more decidedly opposed to slavery than I am. In the State from which I come slavery is scarcely, if at all, known. I do not know whether, at this moment, it has any existence there. However the inhabitants of that State may differ on other points, on the subject of slavery we are all united. All parties have joined in abolishing it. I sincerely wish that Congress possessed a constitutional power to abolish it, or at least to check its further progress in the United States. If they did possess such power, I would most cordially concur in putting it into operation. Instead of ten dollars, I wish the constitution would warrant us in imposing a tax of one hundred, or of five hundred dollars on each imported slave. I would willingly vote for that sum, because it would amount to an entire prohibition of such importation, and effectually destroy the traffic which I consider highly impolitic, as well as contrary to the principles of justice.

When the present constitution was adopted, there were no laws in several States to prohibit the importation of slaves. It is but a few years since such a law was passed by the State of Georgia. During all that period money was much wanted. The revenue was not adequate to the demand. Government was compelled to have recourse to loans, and in some instances had to submit to a heavy interest; yet in all that time the idea, I believe, was never suggested in Congress of supplying the deficiency by imposing a tax on slaves, although numbers were then imported. From this it may be inferred, that at that time the power vested in Congress by the constitution of imposing a tax of ten dollars on each person imported into any of the then existing States, agreeably to its laws, was not considered as given for the purpose of raising revenue. It was given, it may be presumed, for the purpose of being used as a check to the trade, and at the time the constitution was adopted, the exercise of that power might have contributed to produce such effect. The price of slaves was then low; their labor was not so productive to their owners, and, of course, ten dollars in addition to the then current price might, in some measure, have checked the spirit of purchasing. But soon after that period, by the introduction of the cultivation of cotton, the labor of slaves became more valuable, and their price enhanced in proportion. Ten dollars then bore some proportion to the price of a slave, but at this time it is comparatively as a cipher. A planter who can find his advantage in giving four hundred dollars, which is said to be the present current price of a good negro, will think but little of ten additional dollars. In the present state of things, therefore, I take it the proposed tax cannot effect the object contemplated by the mover of the resolution—it can neither prevent nor remedy the evil; and as it has the appearance of giving legal sanction to the trade, and may have an influence on the Legislature of South Carolina, inasmuch as it is an implied attack on their sovereignty, and a censure on them for passing an act which, however important it may be in our view, the constitution certainly did authorize them to pass, I think the further consideration of the subject had better be postponed for the present; perhaps always, until Government may have it in its power to adopt measures calculated to produce an entire prohibition of the trade.

Mr. Huger said the arguments urged by the friends of the motion were two-fold. One class of gentlemen say they are not in favor of this tax for purposes of revenue, but to manifest the opinion of the National Legislature; while another class declares their only reason for laying it is the revenue it will bring into the Treasury. A decision, therefore, by the House, will settle no principle; for supposing that a majority of the members shall be found in favor of the tax, one-half of them will vote for it on one principle and one-half on another. Under these circumstances, he appealed to gentlemen inclined to favor the resolution, whether it would not be the best policy to wait until the Legislature of South Carolina had an opportunity of repealing the obnoxious law. Is it a pleasant thing to any gentleman on this floor to throw a stigma upon a State? And will not gentlemen from the Middle and Eastern States recollect that the situation of South Carolina is very different from that of their States? Let them, then, do as much good as they can at home; but let them, in God’s name, permit us to act for ourselves. It is a very easy thing to make some harsh remarks on the conduct of particular States, even of the State of Pennsylvania, much as that State is deservedly respected. Mr. H. said he did not believe that State stood one iota higher than other States in the Union. For he believed that peculiar interest operated there as well as in other States.

Mr. H. said, from what had been expressed to-day, he did not believe the people of South Carolina friendly to the act admitting the importation of slaves. Every Representative of that State on this floor wished, he believed, that it had never been passed. But as it had passed, they conceived it to be their duty to resist a measure which went to censure the State for the exercise of an undoubted right.

Mr. Stanton.—Mr. Speaker: I am highly gratified to find honorable members in every part of the House who reprobate the infamous traffic of buying and selling the human species. On this occasion but a few remarks are necessary, if morality, humanity, and justice, are conducive to the happiness of society. It is not my duty nor intention to criminate the State of South Carolina, whose late conduct has created serious and well founded alarm. It is a duty I owe to my constituents and myself not to connive at a measure that, in my humble opinion, goes to shake the pillars of public security, and threatens corruption to the morals of our citizens,[139] and tarnishes the American character. Sir, while I deprecate the repeal of the non-importation act of South Carolina, I console myself with the pleasing expectation that the State will retract the error they have recently and unguardedly fallen into, and I cannot doubt but the honorable members from that State, on this floor, will lend their aid to effect so desirable a measure—to enact again the prohibitory statute. We are told if the House adopt the resolution, it will irritate South Carolina, notwithstanding the opposers of the resolution confess the impolitic conduct of South Carolina. I wish not to offend any of our sister States, much less, that important State whose wisdom, virtue, and patriotism, have been conspicuous on every other occasion. The opposers of the resolution inform us its adoption will both encourage and sanction the importation, and that they have a constitutional right to import until 1808. I grant it, but I hope better things of that State; and things that accompany reformation. She has recently, with other States, emancipated herself from tyranny and oppression, and will she sully her fair fame by commencing tyrant herself? Sir, the speakers from the State of South Carolina, and particularly the honorable member who offered a resolution as a substitute for the one under consideration, delivered himself in sentiments of the most admirable humanity, and constitutional love and zeal for his country; and, if he were a member from any other State in the Union, I should have the honor, I make no doubt, of voting with him for the resolution on your table. Sir, I am sensible the General Government cannot prohibit the traffic previous to the year 1808. This is one of the most humiliating concessions made by that venerable convention which framed the constitution, and we are bound by it. I ask, is the policy of the measure embraced by the resolution sound? I believe it is. I consider slaves a luxury—they are considered by the constitution, three-fifths of them, to give a Representative, and I ask why not tax them? It is a sound maxim that representation and taxation should go hand in hand. To lay a tax being the only constitutional power the General Government possesses, I think it good policy to exercise it.

The State of Rhode Island, from whence I came, passed a law declaring negro children born posterior to 1784, as free as white children. Mr. Speaker, I mention this statute merely to obviate the erroneous impression, that otherwise might be made with a view to mislead the public mind, that the citizens of Rhode Island are disposed to favor the villanous traffic. I wish not to egotize, but I can assure the House this traffic has been abhorrent to me upwards of forty years, and if I should live to see 1808—that auspicious period in our national compact which shall be exonerated from the tragic feature that has cast a shade on that valuable instrument—if the important acquisition of Louisiana gave ample cause for festivity, still greater cause shall we have when the glorious period shall arrive of 1808. That shall be my jubilee.

After a few further remarks, by Mr. Huger and Mr. Lucas, the question was taken on the rising of the Committee, and passed in the negative—yeas 58, nays 60. When the resolution was agreed to.

The committee rose and reported their agreement to the resolution, which the House immediately took into consideration.

Mr. Wynn moved to postpone the further consideration of the resolution till the first Monday in January, and required the yeas and nays.

The question was then taken on the postponement, by yeas and nays, and passed in the negative—yeas 54, nays 62, as follows:

And then the main question being taken that the House do agree to the said resolution, as amended to read as follows:

It was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 71.

Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in, pursuant to the said resolution; and that the[140] Committee of Ways and Means do prepare and bring in the same.

Friday, February 17.

Importation of Slaves.

The House resumed the consideration of the unfinished business of yesterday, viz: “What day should be made the order to the Committee of the Whole to consider the bill laying a tax of ten dollars upon every slave imported into the United States.”

Mr. Lowndes moved that the further consideration of the bill should be postponed till the first Monday in December.

Mr. Lowndes.—In moving a postponement of the bill to the first Monday in December next, my object is to get rid of it altogether. Gentlemen have supported the resolution upon which this bill is founded, upon such a variety of, and contradictory grounds, that their arguments are not very susceptible of a reply. I am, however, very glad that it has been conceded by every gentleman who has spoken upon the subject, that this tax, if laid, would not have the effect of diminishing the number of Africans imported into the country. When it was admitted that the object for which the resolution was avowedly brought forward, would not be obtained, I did hope that the resolution itself would not have been persevered in. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Gregg,) to whose arguments I generally listen with pleasure, has told us that he would not for the world give his vote for this tax, for the purpose of raising revenue; but that he would be obliged to vote for the resolution, to show his disapprobation of the trade. The gentleman did, however, manifest a disposition to get rid of the question, without taking a direct vote upon it. Another gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Smilie) has told us, that he too is averse to this tax with a view to revenue, but that he must vote for it, for if he does not, it will be an admission, on his part, that Congress is favorable to the trade. What am I to infer from this observation? Am I to infer that Congress until this time has been favorable to the trade; and am I to infer that the gentleman himself, who has for so long a time been an active member of Congress, has also been favorable to it? This trade has from the adoption of the constitution until a few years ago, when it was first prohibited by Georgia, been carried on; and yet Congress have never exercised their power of imposing any tax, nor have I heard that the gentleman did ever bring forward a resolution for the purpose. There is another description of persons imported into the United States—I mean those bound to serve for a term of years. The comparison I admit is not analogous throughout, but it is to a certain extent. These persons are chiefly introduced into the States of Pennsylvania and New York; none, or at least very few of them, into New England. Were it proposed to embrace them by this tax, would the Representatives from those States be satisfied with the arguments that it was a tax upon merchandise, and a general one, and therefore fair? Their discernment would quickly point out to them, that whatever was the appearance, it was a tax principally falling upon those States, and they would resist.

Entertaining the opinions which I have expressed against the principle of the bill, and wishing to get rid of it in a manner most agreeable to those gentlemen who feel a difficulty of voting directly upon it, I move that the further consideration of the bill be postponed until December next.

Mr. Bedinger said he felt the greatest veneration for the honorable mover of the resolution, as he thought it proceeded from the purest motives. But as he thought the slave trade was but little better than murder, he felt a difficulty in his mind as to the propriety of admitting one shilling of it into the treasury of the United States, lest those traders should think themselves entitled to protection; but as the mover and many others declare their assent towards the appropriation of said tax hereafter to humane purposes, he believed he should vote for a bill, if drawn in correspondence with such principles.

Mr. Findlay observed that it was not his wish to go into a lengthy argument on this subject; but merely to observe that this was the first instance of a law prohibiting the importation of slaves being repealed, and that it might not be the last; and that, therefore, if the argument advanced by gentlemen was good against taking it up in the first instance, it would be equally good against taking it up in case all the States should repeal their prohibitory laws. He also wished gentlemen to consider that the friends of the motion were conscience-bound as well as they, and that they considered it a moral duty to restrain, as far as they could, the continuance of the slave trade. As, however, a question of expediency was involved in this measure, he entertained no desire to hasten its decision; on the contrary, his wish was to allow ample time for considering its merits. He should therefore vote against the postponement to December; but would move a postponement to the 2d Monday of March, not with the view of getting rid of the subject altogether, but to allow an opportunity of considering it fully.

Mr. Huger did not rise with the view of going into the merits of the bill, but to impress the propriety of agreeing to the postponement. It was a painful subject, which necessarily excited unpleasant feelings. He thought, if gentlemen suffered it to lie over to the next session, there was a probability that by giving the Representatives of South Carolina an opportunity of returning home and expressing the sentiments of Congress, the Legislature of that State would repeal the law; whereas, should the tax be laid, it would prevent this desirable effect. Where we differ, said Mr. H., it is proper for us to accommodate—to meet each other half way.

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Mr. Eppes, believing that either motion of postponement would defeat the main measure, said he should vote against both. It was not his wish to erect the Government of the United States into a national tribunal to censure the proceedings of the Legislature of South Carolina, or to wound their feelings; but he was not prepared to say that Congress, in exercising a constitutional right, erected such a tribunal. It was in some respects immaterial whether they interfered or not, so long as the world knew that a Legislature of a respectable State, in the eighteenth century, passed an act allowing the importation of slaves. That Legislature ought not to complain if the United States availed themselves of the measure to raise revenue from it. According to the estimate of some gentlemen, there would probably be an importation of one hundred thousand in four years, which if this tax shall be laid, will produce a revenue of a million of dollars. And yet we are entreated by the gentleman from South Carolina not to molest the trade. Mr. E. said he was not surprised at this anxiety, as, by gaining a delay of one year, that State might be saved from the payment of above one hundred thousand dollars.

Mr. E. said he came from a Southern country, where slaves were as much a subject of taxation as lands; and he did not know that the statute books of Virginia or South Carolina were stained by imposing taxes upon them. He believed them as fair a subject of taxation as any other species of property. He believed it as fair to lay taxes upon them as to make the poor pay a tax upon brown sugar and other articles of the first necessity. For these reasons he was against the postponement either to December or March.

Mr. R. Griswold considered a postponement till December as destructive to the bill. He said he would as soon meet it on its merits, but being prepared, as far as his vote went, to reject the bill, he should vote for what he considered equivalent, a postponement to December. He did not think it proper for the House to go into the measure contemplated by the bill. There were but two principles that would justify the laying a duty on imported articles: the one to discourage the importation of particular articles, and the other with a view to revenue. As to the first principle, under the constitution as it at present stood, Congress had no right to interfere; as the States had an undoubted right to admit the importation of slaves until the year 1808. The constitution, on this point, had gone so far as to restrict the right of the General Government to a tax not exceeding ten dollars upon each slave imported. This would not amount to a prohibition or prevention of the importation. Congress was, therefore, precluded the right of taxing, with this view, until the year 1808. This part of the argument, on which gentlemen support the measure, must be laid, therefore, out of view. The question then recurs, whether we shall lay this tax for purposes of revenue? For one, (said Mr. G.,) I am unwilling to do this. I abhor the slave trade as much as any member on this floor, and therefore I will not consent to give it a legislative sanction. For this measure will certainly be viewed in that light by the people of this country and by the civilized world. It will appear to the world that Congress are raising a revenue from a commerce in slaves. I am not for introducing such a law, calculated to have this impression, on our statute book. Were it in our power to prohibit the trade, there is not, I trust, a member on this floor that would not unite in the prohibition. But on this point our hands are tied.

Mr. Gregg observed, that when this subject was on a former day before the House, he assigned his reasons at some length, in favor of a postponement. The same reasons would influence his vote this day, and he should not trouble the House with a repetition of them. He only rose to suggest to his colleague that, by attending to one consideration, he would be induced, he thought, to change his opinion, and to vote for the most distant day to which it was proposed to postpone this subject. It had been stated by a gentleman from South Carolina, and he believed correctly stated, that by the law lately passed in South Carolina, a considerable ferment had been excited in that State, and that it was probable that the Legislature would, at their next session, repeal it. If it were probable that they would repeal this law in April, it appeared to him improper to pass an act that would operate as a censure upon the conduct of that State.

Mr. Alston was surprised how it was that he and his worthy friend from Virginia (Mr. Eppes) differed so widely upon the present occasion, living, as it were, in the same country, and owning property of the same kind, and pursuing the same means of obtaining a living. My friend advocates the resolution for laying a tax of ten dollars on each slave imported into the United States, because a considerable revenue will be derived from such a tax; it is for that very reason that he opposed it, because he would not consent to pass a law which had for its operation a partial effect. Can it be right to pass a law which will impose a heavy tax upon one part of the community, and not a cent upon the other? No State in the Union would be affected except South Carolina. Gentlemen ought to take care how they acted towards a sister State, and a respectable one too.

Mr. Rodney said, he should not have troubled the House with any remarks on the present occasion, had he not made up his mind to vote differently from the vote which he had before given. He said he had before voted against the postponement of the consideration of this subject; he should now vote in favor of a postponement; and he would, in a few words, assign his reasons. When the resolution for imposing a tax on imported slaves was first laid on the table, he was of opinion that he could[142] not vote for it without sanctioning the practice it was meant to censure. Reflecting further, he afterwards got his own consent to vote for it. First thoughts were frequently best; we sometimes miss the mark by taking sight too long. In this instance, after a more mature consideration, his mind inclined to his original opinions, for reasons which he would assign.

It was agreed, on all hands, that the conduct of the Legislature of South Carolina was such as to merit the disapprobation of the members of that House. On many occasions there were political dissensions within these walls. But he rejoiced that, when questions of this kind presented themselves, they were sure to find us unanimous. Inhumanity was considered as a common enemy, and so inhuman a practice was justly reprobated by all. Every gentleman from the South, as well as the East, deprecated the act and lamented its existence.

After a few additional remarks from several gentlemen, the question was taken by yeas and nays on a postponement to the first Monday in December, and passed in the negative—yeas 55, nays 62.

Mr. Findlay moved a postponement to the second Monday in March; which, after some debate, prevailed—ayes 56, noes 50.

[To prevent an erroneous impression being made on the public by the above proceedings, it is proper to remark that, during the whole discussion, not a single voice was raised in defence of the act of the Legislature of South Carolina, allowing the importation of slaves; but that, on the contrary, while by some of the speakers its immorality and impolicy were severely censured, by all its existence was deprecated. A large number of those who voted for the postponement, advocated it on the express and sole ground that it would give the Legislature of South Carolina an opportunity, which they believed would be embraced, to repeal the act.]

Monday, February 20.

Georgia Claims.

Mr. J. Randolph said, the House would recollect that he had, on a former day, offered a resolution barring any claims derived under any act of the State of Georgia passed in the year 1795, in relation to lands ceded to the United States. It was not his purpose in rising at this time to trespass on the patience of the House; nor did he know that he should in future offer any remarks additional to those he had already made. But he conceived it his duty to place the subject in such a point of light that every eye, however dim, might distinctly see its true merits. For this purpose he withdrew the resolution which he had before offered, and moved the following resolutions:

On considering the resolutions, the House divided—ayes 53. Carried.

Mr. J. Randolph then moved their reference to the Committee of the Whole on the bill providing for the settlement of sundry claims to public lands lying south of the State of Tennessee. Carried—yeas 50, nays 30.

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Wednesday, February 22.

Naval Peace Establishment.

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the bill supplementary to an act providing for a Naval Peace Establishment.

[This is the bill introduced at the instance of Mr. Nicholson, with a view to a more economical and beneficial arrangement in relation to the national ships laid up in ordinary.]

Mr. Leib moved an additional section, virtually abolishing the office of Lieutenant Colonel Commandant of the Marine Corps, and authorizing the President to make such other reductions of the subordinate officers as he may think fit. The object of the bill being a reform of the expenses attending the Naval Establishment, the measure contemplated in the amendment was, in his opinion, a very proper one to be answered by it. The bill, he said, contemplated an annual saving, in the single article of provisions, of $7,000. By abolishing the office of Lieutenant Colonel Commandant, a saving of sixty thousand dollars in addition might be made. This officer made, it appeared, all the contracts, and it would be seen by documents before the House, that while the price of the ration in the War Department was fifteen cents, that fixed by this officer was twenty cents—the difference made the sum of $3,750 a year. It would also be seen that exorbitant sums were expended in postage and fuel. In the single article of postage, $150 had been expended within three months. The amendment was then agreed to—yeas 62.

Mr. Eustis moved a new section, for the allowance to captains, holding themselves in readiness to enter the service, of the same rations they are entitled by law to receive when in actual service. Disagreed to—yeas 37, nays 45.

The committee rose, and the House agreed to the amendment of Mr. Leib without a division.

Mr. Jackson moved a new section, for the allowance to captains, required to hold themselves in readiness for service, of the same rations they are entitled to receive when in actual service.

Mr. Nicholson supported the amendment, to which the House agreed—yeas 44, nays 40; when the bill was ordered to a third reading to-morrow.

On motion, the House adjourned.

Friday, February 24.

Contested Election.

Mr. Findlay, from the Committee of Elections, to whom was referred a memorial of Andrew Moore, of Virginia, respecting the election of Thomas Lewis, a sitting member, made a report, which, after stating the bad votes given for each of the candidates, concludes with the opinion that Thomas Lewis is not, and that Andrew Moore is entitled to a seat in the House. The report is as follows:

Ordered, That the report be committed to a Committee of the whole House on Wednesday next.

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Tuesday, February 28.

Louisiana Territory.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled “An act erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof.”

The fourth section being under consideration, as follows:

Mr. Leib observed that he did not like the provisions of this section, and least of all that which gave the Governor the right of proroguing the Legislative Council. It appeared to him that that body was the most dependent thing of its nature in the United States; and when the power of prorogation vested in the Governor was considered, it seemed to him that the people would do much better without any such body. This was a royal appendage which he did not like. He, therefore, moved to strike out the words “and prorogue.”

Mr. Gregg said he was not only in favor of the motion of his colleague, but against the section generally. It would require much further amendment to induce him to vote for it. He was opposed to the power it gave the President to appoint the members of the Legislative Council. It appeared to him a mere burlesque to say they shall be appointed by the President. How is the President to get information of the qualifications for office? This could only be obtained from the officers appointed by him, and principally from the Governor, who will not fail to recommend to the President the appointment of persons favorable to his own views. Mr. G. said that they would, therefore, rather vest the appointment of the members of the Legislative Council in the Governor; the mode pointed out in the bill was only calculated to rescue the Governor from the responsibility attached to his office, by dividing it among others.

Mr. Leib said his amendment did not in the least interfere with that of his colleague, with whom he fully accorded in sentiment.

Mr. Varnum was of opinion that the section in the bill provided such a kind of Government as had never been known in the United States. He thought sound policy, no less than justice, dictated the propriety of making provision for the election of a legislative body by the people. There was not only the common obligation of justice imposed upon Congress to do this, but they were bound by treaty. The treaty with France expressly says:

The treaty makes it obligatory on the United States to admit the inhabitants of Louisiana, as soon as possible, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States. In order to decide the principle of this section of the bill by an expression of the sense of the committee, he would move that the committee should rise, report progress, and ask leave to sit again, with the view of refusing them leave, and afterwards referring the bill to a select committee to receive a modification in conformity to the opinions of the House.

Mr. Huger trusted the committee would not rise. He knew not the impressions on this subject on the minds of other gentlemen; but the information lately received from Louisiana convinced him of the propriety of proceeding with the bill immediately. In addition to the principles contained in the section under consideration, there were others of great importance. He thought it would be most advisable, in a future stage of discussion, to commit the bill to a select committee, if any material alterations should be made in it. It was best, at present, to deliberate fully on the several provisions of the bill, and for gentlemen to make an interchange of opinions. Were the bill now committed, the report of the committee would not advance the business in the least, as that report might be as objectionable to the House as the bill from the Senate.

Mr. Elliot, for like reasons assigned by the gentleman from South Carolina, and for other reasons, hoped the committee would not rise. He did not believe the section under consideration was, in its present form, consistent either with the spirit of the constitution or the treaty;[145] but he believed that, by the introduction of a small amendment, the section might be rendered perfectly consistent with them, and the passage of the bill be greatly accelerated. He preferred a middle course between the existing section and the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania. Whatever amendments were necessary would be easily offered and discussed at present; whereas no desirable object could be effected by a reference.

Mr. Gregg said it also appeared to him that no valuable purpose would be answered by referring the bill to a select committee. What can such a committee do? There exists no diversity of sentiment in the House on principle. Some are for giving to the people of the Territory, instead of the President, the power of electing members of the Legislative Council. Here, then, are two distinct principles, and unless the House determine which of them it will adopt, a select committee can do nothing. Let us settle the principle of the bill first, and then refer it to a select committee, to modify it in correspondence with them.

Mr. Eustis said this subject was, in his opinion, inferior to no other discussed this session. With regard to the provisions of the section under consideration, it was to be expected that there would be a diversity of opinion. Gentlemen inimical to them had taken different grounds. One gentleman desires the power of the Governor to prorogue the Council to be rescinded; another gentleman wishes an entire change in the formation of the Council; and a third is in favor of the committee rising, that the bill may go to a select committee to report different provisions for the government of the people of Louisiana from those contained in the bill before us. This motion necessarily brings the principle on which the Council is organized by the bill before us.

According to this bill, the Governor and Council are to make the laws. Suppose the Council is in session, and the Governor possess no power to prorogue them. Suppose they should engage in acts subversive of their relation to the United States. Would not this power be of essential utility? It appears to me indispensably necessary that a vein of authority should ascend to the Government of the United States, until the people of the Territory are admitted to the full enjoyment of State rights. From that knowledge of this people which I have been able to acquire, I have formed an opinion that authority should be constantly exercised over them, without severity, but in such a manner as to secure the rights of the United States and the peace of the country.

The government laid down in this bill is certainly a new thing in the United States; but the people of this country differ materially from the citizens of the United States. I speak of the character of the people at the present time. When they shall be better acquainted with the principles of our Government, and shall have become desirous of participating in our privileges, it will be full time to extend to them the elective franchise. Have not the House been informed from an authentic source, since the cession, that the provisions of our institutions are inapplicable to them? If so, why attempt, in pursuit of a vain theory, to extend political institutions to them for which they are not prepared? I am one of those who believe that the principles of civil liberty cannot suddenly be ingrafted on a people accustomed to a regimen of a directly opposite hue. The approach of such a people to liberty must be gradual. I believe them at present totally unqualified to exercise it. If this opinion be erroneous, then the principles of the bill are unfounded. If, on the contrary, this opinion is sound, it results that neither the power given to the President to appoint the members of the Council, nor of the Governor to prorogue them, are unsafe or unnecessary.

Mr. Lucas was against the rising of the committee, inasmuch as the bill under consideration offered the widest field of discussing the subject before them, and inasmuch as it was proper, that the principles of it should be settled by a majority, to enable a select committee to collect the sense of the House. When this decision should have taken place, he should have no objections to a recommitment for the purpose of modifying the bill in consonance with it.

It was known, by the treaty, that the United States are bound to secure to the people of Louisiana as large a portion of liberty and security of rights, as though they remained under the Government of France and Spain; and he trusted the bill as it stood secured to them much more. As an instance, it might be mentioned that the privilege of habeas corpus had never been enjoyed by them while they were connected with either Spain or France. An argument was drawn from the treaty, that these people are to be admitted to the absolute enjoyment of the rights of citizens; but gentlemen would not deny, that the time when, and the circumstances under which this provision of the treaty was to be carried into effect, were submitted to the decision of Congress. It has been remarked, that this bill establishes elementary principles of government never previously introduced in the government of any Territory of the United States. Granting the truth of this observation, it must be allowed that the United States had never before devolved upon them the making provision for the government of people under such circumstances. Governors must not rest on theory, but must raise their political structures on the state of the people for whom they are made. Mr. Lucas said, that without wishing to reflect on the inhabitants of Louisiana, he would say that they are not prepared for a government like that of the United States. Governed by Spanish officers, exercising authority according to their whim, supported by a military force, it could not be said that a people thus inured to despotism, were prepared on a sudden to receive the principles of our Government.[146] It was questionable whether there was a nation in Europe whom these principles would be so advantageous to as they are to us. It would be recollected by gentlemen, who so strenuously advocated the abstract principle of right, that the people of Louisiana have not been consulted in the act of cession to this country, but had been transferred by a bargain made over their heads. It was a proof this act had not been received with approbation by them, that when they saw the American flag hoisted in the room of the French, they shed tears; this was a proof that they were not so friendly to our Government as some gentlemen imagined. He was persuaded the people of the Mississippi Territory would not have acted in this manner. There is no doubt but that after they shall have experienced the blessings of a free Government, they will wonder at their having shed tears on this occasion; but they must, in the first instance, feel these blessings.

Mr. L. said he was fully of opinion with the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Eustis) in the sentiments he had expressed. The United States had it eminently in their power to make these people happy without an extension to them of all our privileges. They will not be gratified from knowing that the theory of liberty is extended to them, but from its practical effects. The people of Louisiana know but little of political theories, but they will feel the just operation of equal laws; and if they can obtain practical justice, though it may not arise from an extension of our elementary political principles, they will not find fault with it.

Mr. L. said he was not among those who considered the bill, in all its provisions, perfect. He considered it susceptible of much amendment; though not in the principle now under review. In this provision, by declaring that the inhabitants of the Territory shall compose the Legislative Council, a great point is gained by the people. For it cannot be supposed that the inhabitants, thus called upon to discharge high duties to society, will so far lose sight of their own permanent interests as to sacrifice them, together with the good of the country, to whim or corruption.

Their election by the President is another important security. Suppose the Governor shall wish to render the Council his puppets. The President will not feel an interest in gratifying his improper views. It is, however, said that his information will be derived from the Governor. But the fact is, he will receive it in part from the Governor, and in part from others; and he will be sagacious enough to judge, not from a part, but from the whole that reaches him.

A valuable effect will flow from composing the Council of the inhabitants of the country; its members will thereby be initiated in the theory of our Government and laws, and this knowledge will hereafter qualify them for higher political trusts; they will acquire much political knowledge; they will return home, and their conversation with their friends will naturally turn on political topics, and on the laws they have passed; thus will a spirit of inquiry and of political discussion spring up in the country. When this effect shall be produced, it will be time, and only then, to give them a government as liberal and free as that contemplated by the amendment.

Mr. Macon (Speaker) observed that he coincided in opinion with the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Varnum,) whose object would, he thought, be better tried by a motion to strike out the section. This motion would bring the principle before the House. If the section should be stricken out, the bill would be recommitted for new modification to a select committee. Mr. M. accordingly moved to strike out the fourth section.

This motion having been stated from the Chair,

Mr. Macon again rose. I will endeavor, said he, to compress my ideas on this point in a few words. My first objection to the principle contained in the section is, that it establishes a species of government unknown to the laws of the United States. We have three descriptions of Government; that of the Union, that of the States, and Territorial governments. I believe the Territorial government, as established by the ordinance of the Old Congress, the best adapted to the circumstances of the people of Louisiana; and that it may be so modified as best to promote their convenience. The people residing in the Mississippi Territory, are now under this kind of government.[8] Is it not likely[147] that the people of Louisiana will expect the same form of government and laws with their neighbors; and is it not desirable for the general peace and happiness that there should be a correspondence between them? If they are as ignorant as some gentlemen represent them, (and of this I know nothing,) will they not expect the same grade of government with the inhabitants of the Mississippi Territory, with whom they will have a constant intercourse? Although they lived previously under the Spanish Government, and although their number did not entitle them, when formed into a Territory, to the second grade of government, no inconvenience resulted. It is said, in reply to this observation, that a large number of inhabitants of that Territory were Americans. It is true that many of them were native Americans, but some also were Spanish.

The simple question is, what kind of government is most fitted to this people? It is extremely difficult to legislate for a people with whose habits and customs we are unacquainted. I, for one, declare myself unacquainted with them; nor would I in fixing the government, unless for the safety of the Union, do an act capable of disgusting the people for whom it is adopted. It will be a wise policy to avoid whatever is calculated to disgust them. My opinion is that they will be better satisfied with an old-established form of government, than with a new one. Why? Because they have seen it established in the adjacent Territory of Mississippi, and know the manner in which it operates. If there are bad men in Louisiana, will any thing be more easy than to disgust the people against the General Government by showing that they have given one kind of government to the people of the Mississippi Territory, and a different kind to them? In my mind, it is sound policy to give them no cause of complaint. We ought to show them that we consider them one people.

I will not pretend to say that the people of Louisiana are prepared for a State government, which differs most materially from a Territorial government. The best way to prepare them for such a government, is to take the system already known to our laws; one grade or the other of the Territorial government. For myself, I would prefer the adoption of the second grade, but I would prefer the first to any new system. For these reasons, I hope the section will be struck out, and the bill referred to a select committee.

Wednesday, February 29.

Government of Louisiana.

The House went again into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for the government of Louisiana.

The fourth section of the bill being under consideration—

Mr. Jackson said: As this section is the corner stone on which the whole superstructure rests, and involves the most important principle of the bill, I will ask the indulgence of the committee to make a few remarks upon it. It presents two important questions; first, whether it is proper on the broad principle of political justice to adopt it? And secondly, whether it is consistent with our treaty with France? Two questions arise out of the first proposition; first, Is the system consonant to the habits of a free people? And, secondly, if not, is it the best calculated to advance the happiness of those who have never tasted the blessings of liberty? The first question requires no discussion; it will be answered in the negative by every section of this Union. Every section has been engaged in forming a constitution, and both the State and Federal constitutions have decided this point in the negative, because neither partake of the aristocratical or monarchical features contained in this section.

It is urged by gentlemen, that we ought to give to this people liberty by degrees. I believe, however, there is no danger of giving them too much of it; and I am unwilling to tarnish the national character by sanctioning the detestable calumny that man is not fitted for freedom. What will the world say if we sanction this principle? They will say we possess the principle of despotism under the garb of Republicans; and that we are insincere, with whatever solemnity we may declare it, in pronouncing all men equal. They will tell us that we have emphatically declared to the American people and to the world, in our first act evincive of emancipation from the tyranny of England, that all men are equal; and that all governments derive their rightful power from the consent of the governed; and that notwithstanding, when the occasion offers, we exercise despotic power, under the pretext that the people are unable to govern themselves.

Mr. Holland.—As my ideas are very different from those of the gentleman who has preceded me, and as I do not believe that either policy or moral obligation recommends the adoption of a system such as he has avowed to be proper, I will, in a few words, state the sentiments I entertain.

Can gentlemen conceive the people of Louisiana, who have just thrown off their chains,[148] qualified to make laws? Under the late system the people had no concern in the government, and it was even criminal for them to concern themselves with it; they were set at a distance from the government, and all required from their hands was, to be passive and obedient. Can it be supposed such a people made the subject of government their study, or can it be presumed they know any thing about the principles of the Constitution of the United States? Would persons thus elected be of any service to the Government? So far from being an assistance, they would be an encumbrance. Why then impose this burden upon them? The object of this bill is to extend the laws of the United States over Louisiana, not to enable the people of Louisiana to make laws. This extension, so far from being an act of despotism, will be an important privilege. If the laws of the United States were founded in injustice they might have some right to complain, but we only apply to them laws by which we ourselves consent to be governed.

The provisions of this section are said to be worse than those of the first grade of Territorial governments; but this is incorrect. This plan is not equal to the second grade, but it is certainly superior to the first grade. The first grade gives the Governor and judges all the powers granted by this section; and this section, in addition to the Governor and judges, contemplates the appointment of thirteen councillors. Is not this preferable to giving the whole power to the Governor and judges?

Mr. Boyle said he should not have risen on this occasion but for the impression that some arguments of weight had been omitted, or had not been sufficiently dwelt on. In the few remarks he purposed to make, he should endeavor to avoid a repetition of ideas already expressed. It was not so much to the novelty, as to the nature of the plan of government contained in the fourth section, that he was opposed. He did not consider the Territorial government proposed to be substituted as perfect, but he believed it infinitely preferable to that contemplated in the bill. Preferring, therefore, either grade to this, said Mr. B., I shall concur in supporting the substitution of the second grade as most fitted to the circumstances of the people of Louisiana. I feel peculiarly hostile to the mode of appointing the Legislative Council. The power of appointing them is unnecessarily vested in the President. Waiving all objection arising from the distance of the President from the men to be appointed; from the necessity of his relying on the representations of others as to their qualifications, and his liability to be deceived by misrepresentations; still one objection remains, which, to my mind, is most important. I am, said Mr. B., unwilling to extend executive patronage beyond the line of irresistible necessity. For, I believe, if ever this country is to follow the destiny of other nations, this destiny will be accelerated by the overwhelming torrent of executive patronage. I feel as high a veneration for the present Chief Magistrate as any man on this floor. Early attached to him, I have retained the full force of my regard for him. But, were he an angel, instead of a man, I would not clothe him with this power; because, in my estimation, the investiture of such high powers is unnecessary. My opinion is, that they will be more properly exercised by the people. To give them to the President is to furnish a dangerous precedent for extending executive power and patronage; and as he has himself said, one precedent in favor of power is stronger than a hundred against it. I am in favor of giving to the people all that portion of self-government and independence which is compatible with the constitution.

Wednesday, March 7.

Georgia Claims.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill providing for the settlement of sundry claims to public lands lying south of the State of Tennessee; to which Committee of the Whole were also referred, on the twentieth ultimo, a motion containing sundry resolutions “respecting claimants to the said lands under an act of the Legislature of the State of Georgia, passed in the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five.”

Mr. J. Randolph called for the reading of sundry resolutions lately offered by him on this subject. The resolutions having been read, Mr. R. said, when he had submitted them, it was with the view of trying the question then before the committee as he thought fairly. It was no part of his intention to embarrass the operations of the friends of the bill, further than to take the sense of the committee and of the House on each specific proposition embraced by the resolutions. His wish, therefore, was, that the sense of the committee, in the first instance, should be taken on the resolutions. If they should be rejected, the vote of rejection would be a virtual admission of the claims of 1795; and gentlemen might then modify the bill in such manner as might best please them to do.

Mr. Mitchill.—These resolutions tend to involve Congress in the proceedings of the State of Georgia. I consider myself as one of those who, by assenting to certain acts heretofore passed by Congress, have consented to a hearing and compromise with the grantees. If this construction be correct, the Committee are precluded from adopting these resolutions; nor is it proper, in my opinion, for Congress to go into a view of the proceedings of Georgia on this occasion. That State is sovereign to a certain extent, and this Government possesses no right to interfere with her sovereignty. Attached to this sovereignty is the right of granting land belonging to her. But it is alleged that Georgia was, in the year 1795, in a disorderly state, and that a certain Legislature in that year did a certain act which a subsequent[149] Legislature declared to be totally unauthorized. This may be so. It is certain the second Legislature declared the act of the first null, under circumstances of a very extraordinary nature. I do not, however, see that it is our duty to give an opinion whether the Legislature of Georgia acted wickedly or uprightly. Whichever course they may have pursued, I do not believe this body to be a constitutional board of censors. We find frequent occasions enough on which, without going out of our way, our duty calls upon us to give our opinions. Believing this to be an occasion on which no opinion is required from us, and one which it is most prudent to pass by without giving such opinion, I wish not to vote for or against the resolutions. I am, therefore, for the committee’s rising and reporting the bill.

Mr. J. Randolph.—I had hoped that when these resolutions were sent from the House to the committee, they would have received the respectful attention to which every such reference is entitled; and that the committee would at least have deemed them worthy of some expression of opinion on them; that they would have deigned to say whether the reasoning or facts contained in them are or are not erroneous and unfounded. The gentleman from New York tells the committee that, by an act passed at a previous session of Congress, a pledge has been given to a certain description of claimants under the act of 1795, to do something in relation to their claims. If so, is this a reason for not acting on the resolutions? No; it is a reason for taking them up and rejecting them. One of those resolutions says, and I am prepared to prove it true, and I call on gentlemen to show its falsehood, “that the claims of persons derived under the act of January first, 1795, are recognized neither by any compact between the United States and the State of Georgia, nor by any act of the Federal Government.” I deny that they are so recognized. If they are, what can be easier than for the learned gentleman to refer to the compact under which they are recognized? This he cannot show, and hence his unwillingness to express an opinion. At an antecedent session we passed a law on this subject. The gentleman may have given his vote for this law under the impression he states, but it does not follow that the Legislature acted under the same impression; on the contrary, I know several gentlemen who voted for it, though hostile to the claims under the act of 1795, because it contained a general provision for claims, and did not particularly recognize those arising under the act of 1795; and now, because Congress have passed an act of a general nature, when it was notorious there are a variety of claims besides those under the act of 1795, and none of which are mentioned either in the compact or treaty with the State of Georgia, it is said we have given a pledge, and we are called upon to fulfil it. And this language is held by gentlemen who, in the same breath, have expressed a disposition to reject another description of claims. Could absurdity speak in stronger language? A general appropriation has been made by Congress for claims; the claims preferred are of two classes—those under the acts of 1789 and 1795. There might have been claims of a hundred other descriptions—for all these Congress have made a general appropriation—and yet we are told by gentlemen hostile to the claims of 1789 that we are pledged to provide for those of 1795. If we are pledged to satisfy one description, are we not equally pledged to the other? But the truth is, we have given no pledge. If we have, nothing is so easy as to refer to the statute book, and to point it out. No such pledge is recognized by our compact with Georgia. While I am up, permit me to say, if the compact with Georgia be construed according to its letter, the appropriation of $5,000,000 ought to be considered as not embracing claims under the act of 1795, for the best reason in the world: the statute book of Georgia shows the reason. But, say gentlemen, we possess the power to satisfy these claims, though such satisfaction may not have been contemplated by our compact with Georgia. There must, say they, have been an understanding between the Commissioners of Georgia and our Commissioners in favor of compromising them, and therefore it is inferred that we ought to be governed more by the quo animo with which the compact was formed than by its strict letter; it is accordingly attempted to be proved, that there was an understanding between our Commissioners and those of Georgia, that relief should be extended to claimants under the act of 1795. I am authorized by the Commissioners to say that this was not the case. Whether, therefore, we are governed by the strict letter of the contract, or by the quo animo, we cannot discover the grounds for this opinion. I have been told, in a way which removes all doubts, by the Commissioners on both sides, at least by a Commissioner of the United States having a great participation in the business, and by the Georgia Commissioners, that the stipulation in the compact was not inserted at the instance of Georgia, but reluctantly inserted by them at the instance of the Commissioners of the United States.

Mr. Macon (Speaker) remarked that this question, like many others which presented themselves, had taken up a long time in discussing the preliminary point that might have been required on the resolutions. To rise and report the bill, without acting on the resolutions, would be a virtual rejection of them; especially as the House had determined to rise on the 19th. For one, Mr. M. said, he was ready to vote on the resolutions. If it were wrong to vote on them, it was certainly proper to vote against their reference. But why not vote on them? We may not all agree; but have we not a right to think for ourselves? Let us then meet them, and vote as we see best. Mr. M. said he was more desirous of meeting the question, as he differed from those with[150] whom he generally coincided in opinion. It may be said the resolutions embrace an abstract question. If so, gentlemen ought not to have allowed their reference. In the present stage of the business, no question could be taken unless in the committee, or on a motion to discharge the committee from their further consideration. Mr. M. said, he thought it the right of every member of a deliberative body to express his sentiments and record his opinion on any subject before it. This had always been the practice. He trusted, therefore, the committee would not rise, but proceed to the discussion of the resolutions.

Mr. J. Randolph.—I little expected to stand on this floor, in the list of persons hostile to State rights—to be charged, as the gentleman before me has expressed himself, with having brought forward propositions subversive of the rights of the States. The sovereignty of the States has ever been the cardinal principle of my political opinions, and in the outset, I enlisted under the banner of State rights in opposition to federal usurpation. The doctrine of exalting the General Government on the ruin of the authority of the States, is at length exploded, and those who have heretofore been most conspicuous in encroaching upon the rights of the States, generally, and upon those of Georgia in particular, are now foremost in displaying their zeal for both. I cannot but rejoice at the acquisition which this cause has made. But to those of its friends who are too new to it to understand its interests as yet, I would recommend, that they would take the conduct of the Georgia delegation as an evidence of the rights and interests of that State. They surely are not so destitute of information or fidelity, as to misunderstand or abandon the rights of the people whom they represent.—So long, however, as I have the honor of concurring with them in opinion, I shall be very easy under any clamor which the new friends of Georgia and of the rights of States may endeavor to excite. If, however, gentlemen are unwilling to rely on the opinions of so few, however respectable men, I refer them to the act of the Legislature of Georgia herself, generally called the rescinding act, passed under circumstances of unparalleled unanimity, and confirmed by the general voice of the people, who subsequently recognized it in, and ingrafted it upon their constitution. If still they remain dissatisfied, I would ask them if the recognition of the claims against Georgia, in the bill which they are so eager to pass, be not equally a violation of the rights of that State, with the rejection of those claims. Does not the bill before you, in pronouncing upon the validity of the act of Georgia, equally involve the principle against which gentlemen protest so loudly, with the resolutions themselves? They have their choice either to pronounce the corrupt act of 1795, or the rescinding act of 1796, invalid. Are not the rights of Georgia as much affected by the one as by the other? and even more, by annulling the act of 1796, since she alone recognizes that to be her own.

Here Mr. R. read the first and second resolutions:

Who will deny it? If Georgia has made a valid contract we must execute it. If invalid, there is no obligation on us to perform it.

I am afraid if we deny this position we have no title to show for our own existence as a nation.

Mr. R. here read the third resolution:

If there be any objection in my mind to this resolution, it is that it does not sufficiently detail what it contains in substance; that the vendors of this iniquitous bargain being at the same time the vendees, the contract was therefore void. On a former occasion, when this position was advanced, we were told that, on the same principle, the sale of our western lands might be set aside, since members of the Legislature speculated in them to a vast amount. However indecorous and reprehensible this may have been in persons in their situation; there was a wide and material difference between the sales made by the United States and a pretended sale like this—not of a few acres, but of millions; not of sections and half sections, but of thousands of square miles; not measured by chains and perches, but by circles of latitude and longitude; not made in the face of day, on public notice, for a reasonable equivalent, and with the general participation of the citizens, but bartered away in the dark by wholesale for the emolument of the partners in the job, for a pretended consideration too paltry to give an air of validity to the contract; and even this sum, pitiful as it was, had since been drawn from the treasury of Georgia by those who had paid it, or others claiming under them by an act yet more infamous and disgraceful if possible than that by which it was deposited there. But it is not my intention at this time to enter into[151] the particulars of this transaction. In the former stages of this bill I have endeavored to give a faithful history of it. Weak and vain, however, must be every effort to do justice to this enormous and atrocious procedure. Some gentlemen indeed will tell you that we have no proof of these facts. The depositions are ex parte, say they, and therefore in strictness of law cannot be considered as evidence. But when was it known that men could not legislate on less than legal evidence? Have we not the same evidence of the fraud that we have of the existence of the claims? Are not the evidences of both in the same report? the same proof of the corruption as of the claims? They both hang together. Do not gentlemen themselves admit the existence of the corruption? On what other principle could they justify their proposition to withhold from these harpies the whole of their glorious booty, and put them off with a comparative pittance? Set aside the evidence of the corruption, and it cannot be denied, that instead of five, they are entitled to fifty millions of acres. I repeat they are entitled to all or nothing. We at least are consistent, we deny their title to anything, and we propose to give them nothing. Gentlemen on the other side can support the claim to the five millions, which they propose to give, only by arguments which justify a claim to ten times that amount.

Mr. R. here read the fourth resolution:

This is another of the resolutions not even substantially embraced in the proffered amendment, which has been rejected by the committee. The evidence of the facts contained in the former part of it is to be found in the act of Georgia, which I hold in my hand, commonly called the rescinding act. The report of our Commissioners furnishes the proof of the withdrawal of the money, with a detailed statement of that nefarious business, which in the former stages of this bill has been amply explained. In the rescinding act the Legislature of Georgia take other objections to the usurpation of 1795, besides those founded on its corruption. They deny the constitutional right of their predecessors to have made such an alienation of the public domain, even with honorable views and for a fair equivalent. They declare that their constitution prescribes a certain mode whereby vacant lands shall be sold and granted, and that the pretended act of 1795 is void, not only from its corruption, but from its contravening those provisions. This is a weighty and vital objection. The slow yet equitable method known to the Constitution of Georgia of laying off new counties, granting out the lands, when they were appropriated and settled, laying off and settling others, was ill-suited to the gigantic rapacity of the Assembly of 1795, and their ravenous accomplices, who grasped at every acre within the nominal limits of the State, whether covered by Indian titles, or whether those claims were extinguished.

I must beg leave, in answer to the objection of some gentlemen here, to repeat what was advanced by me in a former discussion of the subject. Georgia ceded this territory to us subject to certain specified claims, arising under Great Britain, under Spain, and under her Bourbon act, as it is commonly called, which has no relation to any of the Yazoo acts, as they are termed. For these claims we have stipulated to provide, moreover paying her a certain sum out of the first proceeds of the lands, as a consideration for the grant. Besides the above-mentioned claims there were others not recognized by, or provided for, in our compact. In relation to these, Georgia gives a reluctant assent, (which is to be inferred as well from the expressions which are used in the treaty, as from the declaration of the Commissioners on both sides,) that we may apply, not exceeding five millions of acres to quiet other claims, generally, without specifying what they are—the appropriation not to exceed the amount above, and to be made within six months from the ratification of the compact, or to revert back to Georgia. Among the claims of this vague description may be ranked those of the Virginia and South Carolina Yazoo Companies (under the act of Georgia of 1789, and those arising under the corrupt act of 1795.) We are at liberty, therefore, to give these reserved five millions of acres to either, or to both, of those descriptions of conflicting claimants, but we are certainly not bound to bestow an acre on one of them, either by compact with Georgia or by our own act of appropriation. When that act passed it was at the close of our session; there was not time to investigate any of these claims. It was then understood that some of them were equitable, and not founded in corruption. If we had not then made the appropriation, the term within which we were permitted to make it, would have elapsed before the next session of Congress. We therefore made the appropriation in the same general terms of our compact with Georgia, pledging ourselves to none, while we thereby reserved the right of examining and recompensing all, in case they should thereafter be found to deserve it. The day of investigation having arrived, you are invited to decline it altogether, and hold that the reservation of the right to[152] give, is converted by some political magic into a duty, and that too by those who propose to give nothing to the companies of 1789, although their claim is embraced by the general provision of our compact with Georgia, and by the terms of our act of appropriation as much as the claims of the companies of 1795.

Friday, March 9.

Government of Louisiana.

The House went into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for the government of Louisiana. The fifth section being read, as follows:

Mr. G. W. Campbell moved to strike out “which are capital, the trial shall be by a jury of twelve good and lawful men of the vicinage; and in all cases, criminal and civil, in the superior court, the trial shall be by a jury, if either of the parties require it,” and to insert “the trial shall be by jury, and in all civil cases above the value of twenty dollars.”

Mr. C. said he conceived that in legislating for the people of Louisiana, they were bound by the Constitution of the United States, and that they had not a right to establish courts in that Territory on any other terms than they could in any of the States. Wherever courts were established in a Territory, they must be considered as courts of the United States, and of consequence cannot be otherwise constituted than as courts in the States. The constitution expressly declares that, in criminal cases the trial shall be by jury, and in all civil cases where the sum in controversy exceeds the value of twenty dollars, the trial shall be likewise by jury. In the ninth article of the amendments to the constitution, we find the following words: “In suits at common law where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” The eighth article says: “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.”

I will observe that the right of trial given by this section, to wit: “if either of the parties require it,” is a dangerous mode of proceeding, and may tend unwarily to entrap them. The person brought before the court for a misdemeanor, asked if he requires a jury trial, may be ignorant of the evidence, and may not know the benefits of a trial by jury; he must at all events show a want of confidence in the court, or waive a jury trial. If he does the first, he may sour the minds of the court. The party is thus put in a situation which may be worse than if he was deprived altogether of the right of a trial, by the necessity of making a choice which may operate more against him. The bill therefore does not secure the right of a jury trial, as contemplated by the constitution.

Mr. Sloan said a few words in support of the motion, which was lost—yeas 20.

[At this stage of the business we attended the trial of impeachment in the Senate, and cannot with perfect correctness state the further proceedings of the House on the bill. We understand, however, that the new section, sometime since offered by Mr. G. W. Campbell, providing for the election of a Legislature by the people of Louisiana, instead of their being governed according to the bill from the Senate by a council appointed by the President, was disagreed to—yeas 37, nays 43.—Reporter.][9]

Saturday, March 10.

Georgia Claims.

Mr. J. Randolph moved the taking up for consideration the resolution offered by him on the claims under the act of Georgia of 1795.

Mr. Elliot moved the order of the day on the bill for the compromise of those and other claims.

[153]

Mr. Gregg moved to postpone the further consideration of the resolutions till the first day of December next. He was, he said, perfectly prepared to act on the bill for the settlement of the claims, and to give it his decided negative; and should have no objections, but for the lateness of the session, and the great mass of important business that demanded attention.

The Speaker said, the motion to consider the resolutions, being first made, must be first put.

It accordingly was put, and carried—yeas 58.

Mr. Jackson then moved a postponement of the resolutions until the 1st Monday in December.

Mr. Stanford inquired whether the motion of postponement was not susceptible of a division, so as to apply to each resolution separately.

Mr. J. Randolph hoped the question would be so taken.

Mr. Rodney expressed the same wish, and that the yeas and nays might be taken on each division of the question. He was opposed to a postponement. He should not have risen at this late period but for the warm opposition the resolutions had received from various quarters, and but for his desire to avail himself of the opportunity to state his reasons for giving them a firm support.

It is objected to these resolutions that they are abstract propositions. By abstract principles, I understand axioms unapplied. But when they are applied to facts, they cease to be considered in the abstract. In geometry there are certain elementary principles which are the basis of all reasoning on any proposition in that department of science. So in law there are principles in the abstract while they remain unapplied, and which bear in every case where facts admit of their application. So in politics certain principles are held sacred, either in the view of right, or in relation to the constitution of a State. But when these principles are applied to a given state of things, they cease to be abstract. In the Declaration of Independence there are several abstract principles, such as “that all men are free,” &c. But when applied to a certain state of things, they are no longer abstract. I apprehend, therefore, that my worthy friend from Pennsylvania will, on more mature reflection, perceive that the principles contained in the resolutions bearing on facts cease to be abstract; on facts which it is necessary for us to decide, and against examining the consequences of which no reason can be urged. But, says another gentleman, we have no jurisdiction in the case; we have nothing to do with the act of Georgia of 1795; we have no authority over it. I confess myself really surprised to be assured, over and over again, that the act of 1795 which gives the House all this trouble, is the corner stone of the present claims, and without which there would not be a shadow of claim, is not to be considered as blended with our proceedings. What! when we are called upon to compromise claims, are we not to go to the cause, to the fountain source, and decide whether they have, or have not, a foundation in justice? Put the act of 1795 out of the way, and would we have ever heard of this compromise? Remove it, and would we have a single claimant before us soliciting a compromise? I consider the act, to Georgia, as involving the all-important point; as intimately and indissolubly blended with the question before us. That question is whether we will consent to give five millions to effect a compromise of claims, directly emanating from the act of 1795; and then, as an incidental question, we are obliged to look at the act of 1795. If the House have authority over the main question, ex vi termini, they have authority over every question incidental to it; and common sense teaches us that it is absolutely necessary to determine on the validity of the act of 1795, in order to decide the justice or policy of compromising claims arising out of it.

Having settled, as I conceive, these preliminary points, I will call the attention of the House to the great point on which their decision must turn. Either the act of 1795 or of 1796 is in force. If that of 1795 is in force the claimants have a legal title to unascertained millions. If that act is not binding, they have no claim at all. If that act is of no authority, there is an end of their title. The tree is cut up by the roots, and all its branches fall. They have either then a title to fifty millions, or they have no title at all. Their case cannot be compared to a common saying, which declares half a loaf better than no bread.

Now let us compare these facts and reasonings with the resolutions. When I rose I intended to have taken them up in order, but as I have been diverted by the course of the argument, I shall pursue the track I have taken. One of the resolutions states “that a subsequent legislature of an individual State has an undoubted right to repeal any act of a preceding legislature, provided such repeal be not forbidden by the constitution of such State, or of the United States.”

This is, I think, a plain and clear axiom. Both legislatures flow from the same source, and are armed with equal powers. What one legislature can do, another may undo, if the interest of the public prescribes it. I know an ingenious distinction is taken, as to the power of a legislative body, between municipal acts and those constituting contracts. The distinction holds to a certain degree as to expediency, but not as to power. When a legislative body forms a contract, it is a solemn thing, and it ought not to be touched, except when the private evil arising from its being annulled should rather be endured than the public calamity arising from its continuance. But still the position of the resolution is perfectly tenable. What one legislature has done another may undo; what one has enacted, a subsequent one may repeal.

Let us examine whether there is any thing in the rescinding act of Georgia at variance with[154] the constitution of that State, or the Constitution of the United States. The whole course of the business shows the previous act to have been a violation of the Constitution of Georgia. The Constitution of the United States declares that no State “shall pass any ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.” That no contract has been impaired, is evident from attending to the sense of the word. I know of no contract formed, either in a legal or equitable sense. Did the Constitution of Georgia authorize her Representatives to rob the people of their property? Or did it authorize them only to dispose of it for their welfare? If they had a right to dispose of it in a wrongful manner, it knocks up the argument at once. If they were vested with a right to rob and plunder their constituents, I give up the point. But until this is shown I shall remain of opinion that they only had the right of disposing of it for the general good. I am not about to travel through the fruitful wilderness of inquiry disclosed in the progress of this affair. But gentlemen say that we have no evidence of corruption. What do they want more than we possess? The whole business has been referred to a set of Commissioners, whose comprehensive powers embraced an investigation of every claim. They have fully examined the claims under the act of 1795, and they have reported that—

This stubborn fact appears on the face of a report made by persons duly authorized to investigate the whole transaction. The fact is indisputable, and ought to satisfy the most reluctant and unwilling mind of the enormity of the corruption attending this business. It is fully satisfactory to my mind. But it is said that this statement is founded on ex parte depositions, and that no opportunity has been allowed to cross-examine the witnesses. But where were they taken? In Georgia; in probably the same House that witnessed the scene of disgrace; by a tribunal competent to take them and to inquire into facts.

Upon the whole, it appears to me most evident, on referring to the acts of Georgia, the articles of cession, and the laws of Congress, that the claims under the acts of Georgia have no validity. If, therefore, we give any thing, it must be from compassion, and not from the obligations of justice. Let the House, ere it do this, reflect whether there are not objects in the country equally worthy of their compassion. Let them visit the straw shed of the war-worn soldier who bled in the defence of our rights; the comfortless hut of the widow who lost her husband in battle. With but little search we shall find a mountain of claims that overhangs the justice of the country. If, after this view, we shall consider any unfortunate victims of injustice in this transaction entitled to compassion, I will agree to go as far as any man in affording them relief. But were we as rich as Crœsus, I would first administer relief to the Belisariuses of our country. Let us be just to these before we are generous to other descriptions of claimants.

Mr. T. M. Randolph.—Mr. Speaker: I hope the House will not consent to postpone these resolutions. I hope it will, on the contrary, immediately proceed to consider them, and conclude by adopting them, for, taken generally, they meet my warm approbation as to the principles they lay down, and I am anxious to see the last one, which is the fair corollary of the other, incorporated into the bill now before us.

My opinion is, that it will cast a broad stain on the American character, as it must be exhibited in future history, for this body which represents it to grant compensation for their pretended losses, under whatever form ingenuity may invent to disguise it, to any of those adventurers who made the spurious contract with Georgia in the year 1795, for the purchase of her western territory, upon the ground that the fictitious bargain gave the least shadow of title to any part of that territory. This opinion is a conviction irresistibly given to my mind by an impartial investigation, that what were at that time called companies of land adventurers, were, with the exception of one or two misled individuals, whose delusion and consequent implication I lament, no other, in their conduct on this occasion, than shameless bands of sharpers; what was impudently called a contract, was, in reality, a fraud of unprecedented enormity, and what has since been declared an unjust interposition of the primary sovereign authority of the State, to cancel a fair bargain, was no more than the regular and proper application of the only sufficient means which could be used to redress a cheat upon the people of Georgia of unparalleled audacity and magnitude. I am sorry, by entertaining this opinion, to differ with so many on this floor, with whom it is my pride to think; but I am not much surprised at that difference. Very rarely, indeed, have I heard of important questions which did not divide opinions; never have I been at a criminal trial where numbers did not doubt the reality of the crime. Such is the difference in the impression made by the same testimony upon different minds. Were it not for this extraordinary circumstance in our nature, which almost precludes unanimity, and which completely defies explanation upon any general principles of the moral structure of man, there would be but one sentiment in this House upon the question[155] now before it. The information which has satisfied my mind, I have derived from the declarations of the counties of Georgia, in their petitions and remonstrances presented to the convention of that State, which assembled in the month of May, 1795; from the acknowledgment made by that convention of the dignity of those applications, and the respect due to them, in the resolve which referred the matter they contained to the consideration of the succeeding Legislature; from the proceedings of the General Assembly of 1796, upon that matter, and the evidence it collected and recorded relative thereto; and, lastly, from certain declarations and provisions confirming those proceedings, and thereby establishing that evidence, which were made by the convention of 1798, and which exist now in the body of the present Constitution of Georgia. The same means of information are within the reach of all; I ought to say, should be possessed by all; I might say, should be satisfactory to all; since the witnesses are the great body of the people of one of our respectable States, and the testimony is authenticated, confirmed, and preserved, as well by the constitutional as the ordinary code of that State.

It has not been my object in making this inquiry, to learn in what deep sharper’s brain this scheme was first engendered, which of the associates stood most prominent in the development and execution of it, how the price paid for the flagrant treason against posterity was apportioned, or how the spoil obtained by such a stupendous larceny, committed upon the inheritance of the unborn, was divided. I have not desired to know, and it would be unimportant to the House to be informed, which of the associates had no moral sense at all, whose conscience was subdued by his avarice, or who, unthinkingly, gave the control of it into the hands of his friend. I desire not to see any name consigned to infamy; of those which have come to my knowledge, one or two I yet respect; the remainder have not more distinct images annexed to them, in my mind, than those of the men who conceived and executed the South Sea cheat in England, or the Mississippi fraud in France. But, from the investigation I have made, I have learned, as certainly as the actions of men can be known to others than the actual beholders of them, that the Legislature of Georgia, which commenced its session in the autumn of 1794, was assailed by every possible artifice of seduction, to procure from it the act of 7th January, 1795, which constituted what has since been impudently called the Yazoo contract. That it yielded to those artifices, and a considerable majority of its members became treacherous to their constituents, and deaf to the voice of their honor. That bribes were daringly offered and unblushingly received for votes in favor of the land. That the property of the State of Georgia, to the amount of forty millions of dollars, at the most reasonable estimate, was sold by those trustees of the people of Georgia for one half million, and purchased by the sellers themselves in combination with certain abject worshippers of gold, who had artfully infused into them their blind fanaticism. That another offer of four-fifths of a million, made by other men at the same time, was rejected, because the Legislature itself was concerned in the first. That the Chief Magistrate of the State, after one feeble effort of resistance, and a declaration which ought to have bound him to an obstinate opposition, with a conduct which, to my mind, manifests a thorough knowledge of the corrupt views of the Legislature, as well as a want of energy to defeat them, yielded to the impulse, and ratified the fraudulent sale. That the moment his irresolute hand gave the illusive sanction to the vain and ineffectual deed, this ravenous pack of speculators, keen with the hunger of avarice, unkennelled and scoured the whole peopled territory of the Union in quest of their appropriate game—the simple, the credulous, and those who are hoodwinked by the excess of their own cupidity. The most voracious of them sought the great cities, where numbers of the thirsty sons of gain became their prey, while numbers more joined in the promising chase, led the way to the victims, and fattened on their spoil. Many, more fell in their nature, though less keen in their appetites for gold, traversed the tranquil country of New England, scenting the homely purses which hung in the smoky corner of peaceful cottages, into which the solitary dollar had been dropped with religious punctuality every week, perhaps every month only, by the hand of the provident father, from the time when the first birth under his roof gladdened his heart. Great numbers of these receptacles of hard-earned gain, with all their rusty treasure, the fruit of long continued industry and frugality, destined to ensure to many of the rising race the innocent joys of a life of wholesome exertion in their own fields, were devoured by them, and that happy destiny in a moment changed for a short period of certain pain, and, too probable, vice, in the moving prisons of the ocean.

The promulgation of the law produced one general murmur of indignation throughout the State of Georgia. The crime committed by the Representatives of the people was strongly denounced by the grand juries of all the succeeding courts. An assembly of special Representatives, which had been summoned for constitutional purposes, meeting in the succeeding spring, was addressed by all the counties of the State, and by nearly the whole people of it, with memorials, remonstrances, and petitions, according to the different degrees of excitement, all setting forth in strong terms the nefarious act; complaining with bitterness of the perfidy of the Legislature, requiring, urging, and imploring the convention to proclaim the fact, and annul the fraudulent sale. No laborious investigation into the huge and naked scheme of speculation, no troublesome search after testimony to expose the framer of it was necessary. Nothing was requisite but to receive, condense,[156] and record the decisive evidence voluntarily offered from all quarters. But this legitimate and easy task the convention, naturally enough, thought fit to decline, as many of its members were themselves openly concerned, and many more secretly interested in the purchase. The pack of speculators were then in full cry, the game were falling abundantly into their jaws; it could scarcely be expected that those who had contributed so much to set this chase on foot, who expected to share so largely in its profits, should sound the horn of alarm to the objects of it. It quickly occurred to a majority of this body, that a reference of these addresses to the Legislature of the next year, would not only give time for the continuance of the chase, but might be productive of something like safety in the after possession of the spoils of it; while it promised to afford some shield against the popular discontent and indignation which a total neglect, so desirable to themselves, must inevitably have brought on them. Notwithstanding, before midsummer of the same year, the fraudulency and consequently invalidity of the sale must have been unequivocally known throughout the Union, by the ferment in the State of Georgia. Early in the succeeding year all the records of State relative to this transaction were burned, and all recorded evidences of private contracts which had arisen out of the land were cancelled, destroyed, and forbidden to be renewed or afterwards admitted in the courts by the Legislature acting under the authority to consider the matter, and of course the power to redress the complaint of the petitions, which had been given to it by the convention, and also under the express injunction of the people themselves, laid on the individual members of that body at the elections. But the speed of the sharpers had outstripped the slow step of the State. They had, in a great measure, executed their swindling scheme; a number of their dupes were already, instead of amusing their own credulity, insincerely, and I will say, insolently, accusing the perfidy of Georgia.

The question was then taken by yeas and nays on the postponement, until the first Monday of December, of the following resolution:

And passed in the negative—yeas 51, nays 52.

So much of the said original motion as is contained in the second clause thereof, being again read, in the words following, to wit:

“That, when the Governors of any people shall have betrayed the confidence reposed in them, and shall have exercised that authority with which they have been clothed for the general welfare, to promote their own private ends, under the basest motives, and to the public detriment, it is the inalienable right of a people, so circumstanced, to revoke the authority thus abused, to resume the rights thus attempted to be bartered, and to abrogate the act thus endeavoring to betray them:”

The question was taken that the House do agree to the motion for postponement of the said second clause of the original motion; and resolved in the affirmative—yeas 52, nays 50.

So much of the said original motion as is contained in the third clause thereof, being twice read, in the words following, to wit:

The question was taken that the House do agree to the motion for postponement of the said third clause of the original motion; and resolved in the affirmative—yeas 54, nays 49.

So much of the said original motion as is contained in the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh clauses thereof, being again read, in the words following, to wit:

“That the aforesaid act of the State of Georgia, passed on the thirteenth of February, 1796, was forbidden neither by the constitution of that State, nor by that of the United States.”

“That the claims of persons derived under the aforesaid act of the seventh of January, 1795, are recognized neither by any compact between the United States and the State of Georgia, nor any act of the Federal Government.”

The question was taken that the House do agree to the motion for postponement of the said fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh clauses of the original motion; and resolved in the affirmative—yeas 53, nays 50.

And then the residue of the said original motion, contained in the eighth and last clause[157] thereof, being twice read, in the following words, to wit:

The question was taken that the House do agree to the motion for postponement of the said residue of the original motion; and resolved in the affirmative—yeas 54, nays 51, as follows:

Yeas.—Willis Alston, jun., Simeon Baldwin, Silas Betton, Phanuel Bishop, John Campbell, William Chamberlin, Martin Chittenden, Clifton Claggett, Jacob Crowninshield, Manasseh Cutler, Richard Cutts, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, John Dawson, William Dickson, Thomas Dwight, James Elliot, Ebenezer Elmer, William Eustis, William Findlay, John Fowler, Andrew Gregg, Gaylord Griswold, Roger Griswold, Seth Hastings, William Helms, David Hough, Benjamin Huger, Nehemiah Knight, Henry W. Livingston, Thomas Lowndes, Matthew Lyon, Nahum Mitchell, Samuel L. Mitchill, Jeremiah Morrow, Joseph H. Nicholson, Thomas Plater, Erastus Root, Tompson J. Skinner, John Smilie, John Cotton Smith, Joseph Stanton, William Stedman, James Stephenson, Samuel Taggart, Samuel Tenney, Samuel Thatcher, David Thomas, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Joseph B. Varnum, Daniel C. Verplanck, Peleg Wadsworth, Lemuel Williams, and Marmaduke Williams.

Nays.—Isaac Anderson, David Bard, George Michael Bedinger, William Blackledge, Adam Boyd, Robert Brown, Joseph Bryan, William Butler, Levi Casey, Joseph Clay, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, Frederick Conrad, John B. Earle, James Gillespie, Peterson Goodwyn, Thomas Griffin, Samuel Hammond, John A. Hanna, Josiah Hasbrouck, James Holland, William Kennedy, Michael Leib, Joseph Lewis, jun., Andrew McCord, David Meriwether, Andrew Moore, Nicholas R. Moore, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jun., Gideon Olin, Beriah Palmer, John Randolph, Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, Jacob Richards, Cæsar A. Rodney, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sanford, Ebenezer Seaver, James Sloan, John Smith of Virginia, Henry Southard, Richard Stanford, John Stewart, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, Isaac Van Horne, Matthew Walton, Richard Wynn, and Joseph Winston.[10]

Wednesday, March 14.

Government of Louisiana.

The House went into a Committee of the Whole on the bill from the Senate, providing for the government of Louisiana.

Mr. Sloan moved an amendment, inhibiting the admission of slaves into Louisiana, as well from the United States as from foreign places.

Mr. S. concisely stated his reasons in favor of this provision, when the question was taken, and the amendment agreed to—ayes 40, noes 36. Mr. G. W. Campbell proposed an amendment, withholding from the parties to a civil suit the right of waiving a jury trial. The bill provides a jury trial in all cases in which either party shall require it.

This amendment, after being supported by Mr. G. W. Campbell, and opposed by Messrs. Holland, Southard, and Dana, was negatived—ayes 12.

Mr. G. W. Campbell moved to strike out that part of the bill which renders every person settling on lands of the United States liable to a fine of one thousand dollars, and to one year’s imprisonment.

This produced a debate of some length and more animation, in which the motion to strike out was urged by Messrs. G. W. Campbell, Lyon, and Claiborne; and opposed by Messrs. Gregg, Nicholson, Boyd, Smilie, Macon, Sloan, and Holland.

The question was taken, and the amendment was negatived—ayes 23.

Saturday, March 17.

Government of Louisiana.

The bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof, was read the third time.

Mr. Dawson moved a recommitment of the bill for amendment.

Mr. Alston was against a general recommitment of the bill, but friendly to a recommitment for the purpose of limiting its duration.

Messrs. Nicholson, Smilie, Early, and S. N. Mitchill, opposed the recommitment.

Mr. Bedinger advocated the recommitment.

The motion to recommit was then negatived—ayes 39, noes 43.

Mr. Alston said, if there was no objection, he would move the insertion of a clause to limit the period of the bill, on account principally of the great powers conferred on the Executive.

This motion being objected to, by Mr. Lyon, was declared out of order.

The question was then put on the passage of the bill.

Messrs. Lyon, Sloan, Jackson, and Bedinger opposed, and Mr. Smilie supported its passage.

Mr. Varnum moved to recommit, for amendment, that part of the bill that vests equity powers in the courts of Louisiana.

Motion negatived—ayes 39, noes 44.

A motion was made to recommit the fourth section, which was lost—ayes 15.

Mr. Bedinger moved to recommit the last section for the purpose of obtaining a limitation to the act.

Motion carried—ayes 52.

The House went into a Committee of the Whole on the last section,

When Mr. Nicholson moved an amendment limiting the act to two years, and to the end of the next session thereafter.

Mr. Bedinger said, he would like its limitation to one year better, but would, if it were[158] the sense of the House, be satisfied with two years.

Mr. Nicholson’s motion was agreed to without a division.

The House agreed to the amendment; when the final question was put on the passage of the bill, and carried in the affirmative by yeas and nays—yeas 66, nays 21, as follows:

Wednesday, March 21.

Tripolitan War and Mediterranean Fund.

Mr. Nicholson, from the Committee of Ways and Means, presented a bill further to protect the commerce and seamen of the United States against the Barbary Powers.

[The bill provides that an additional duty of two and a half per centum be laid upon all imported goods at present charged with a duty ad valorem, and an additional duty of ten per cent. on all such duties payable on goods imported in foreign vessels. The proceeds of these duties are to constitute a fund to be called the Mediterranean fund. The duties to cease within three months after a peace with Tripoli, in case the United States are not engaged in war with some other of the Barbary Powers, in which case they are to cease within three months after a peace with such powers. The President is authorized to cause to be purchased or built two vessels of war, to carry sixteen guns each, and as many gunboats as he may think proper. One million of dollars, additional to the sum heretofore appropriated, is placed under the direction of the President for the naval service, which sum he is authorized to borrow at a rate of interest not exceeding six per cent.]

Mr. Nicholson moved that this bill should be made the order for this day.

Mr. R. Griswold moved to-morrow.

The question on “to-morrow” was lost—yeas 33, nays 50, when Mr. Nicholson’s motion prevailed.

Duties on Imports.

The bill laying more specific duties on certain articles, and imposing light-money on foreign vessels entering the ports of the United States, was read the third time.

Mr. Huger moved its postponement to the first Monday of December, under the impression that its merits, and the principles it contained, had not received that full and deliberate examination to which they were entitled.

Mr. J. Clay observed that a postponement would be virtually a rejection of the bill.

Mr. Mitchill concisely advocated the principles of the bill.

Mr. Blackledge also defended it.

Mr. R. Griswold opposed it, principally on the ground that it increased the existing rate of duties.

Mr. J. Clay replied, and allowed that the duties imposed by the bill would produce more revenue than that heretofore received, but contended that this would arise from the fraudulent practice heretofore in use of making out invoices of articles subject at present to ad valorem duties. In removing this evil, the necessary effect would be an increase of revenue, not exceeding, however, the probable receipt in case the invoices were fairly made out.

Mr. Huger followed, in a speech of considerable length, in which he contended that the operation of the bill would be to promote the manufactures of the Eastern and Middle States, to the great detriment of the Southern States. Principally, though not entirely on this ground, he declared himself hostile to the bill.

After a few remarks from Mr. Boyd in defence, and of Mr. Claiborne against the bill, the question of postponement was taken by yeas and nays, and lost—yeas 40, nays 68.

Mr. Kennedy moved a recommitment of the motion imposing a specific duty on printed calicoes and lime.

Motion rejected—yeas 34.

The question was then taken on the passage of the bill, and carried in the affirmative by yeas and nays—yeas 65, nays 41.[12]

Thursday, March 22.

Protection against the Barbary Powers.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill further to protect the[159] commerce and seamen of the United States against the Barbary Powers.

Mr. Griswold moved to strike out the first section, which is as follows:

Mr. G. said, that it was much to be regretted that gentlemen had thought proper, upon this occasion, to connect with the great and ostensible object of the bill, any provisions which should produce a disunion in the House. The unfortunate event in the Mediterranean called loudly for vigorous and decisive measures, and he trusted there would not exist on the floor a difference of opinion on that point. For himself, he was disposed to clothe the President with all the power, and to furnish him with all the means which were necessary to bring the war with Tripoli to a successful and speedy termination. And when this was done, to make him, as he ought to be, responsible for the event.

It is always improper, said Mr. G., to connect in the same bill two subjects which are in their natures distinct; and much more improper upon this occasion, to tack to the provisions for the Mediterranean service, upon which there could be no difference of opinion, a new tax, in respect to which gentlemen could not agree.

The first section of the bill, which he had moved to strike out, imposed a new tax of two and a half per centum ad valorem on all goods now liable by law to an ad valorem duty. Goods paying at this time an ad valorem duty were divided into three classes—the first class was liable to a duty of twelve and a half per cent.; the second, to a duty of fifteen per cent.; and the third, to a duty of twenty per cent.

The addition of two and a half per cent. now proposed, would increase the duties to fifteen, seventeen and a half, and twenty-two and a half per cent., when the goods were imported in American bottoms; and if they were imported in foreign bottoms, the duties would be further increased by the addition of ten per cent.

This view of the import, said Mr. G., will satisfy gentlemen that the duties are already high, and that the proposed addition will render them enormous. This step, therefore, ought not to be hazarded, unless the necessities of the Government are absolutely imperious, and no other means can be resorted to for obtaining the money.

The proposed tax, if fairly collected, would produce at least $750,000 per annum. This result might be seen from a view of the imports into the United States of goods now liable to an ad valorem duty. From the last official report, it appeared that the importation of goods of that description, amounted in that year to about forty millions of dollars—the two and a half per cent. on the whole sum would, of course, produce one million, but, allowing for the drawback of duties on goods exported, the net revenue could not be less than $750,000. Why, then, impose a tax of seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars to meet an expenditure which will not probably exceed four or five hundred thousand dollars?

Mr. Nicholson.—We are now about to authorize a greater expense than usual, and the Legislature are called upon to provide means for its discharge. For one, said Mr. N., I can never consent to add to the public debt, while the resources of the country are adequate to its wants. These are my ideas; and I feel somewhat surprised at the calculation of the gentleman from Connecticut, on the expense about to be incurred. He estimates this expense at $388,000; though yesterday when this subject was laid before the Committee of Ways and Means, and it was contemplated to provide $750,000, he moved to strike out $750,000, and insert $1,000,000. And yet he now tells us that only $388,000 are required. As to the specie in the Treasury, the gentleman states that on the 1st of October there were $5,000,000. But with what disbursements is this chargeable? Out of it there are to be paid American citizens for French spoliations the sum of $3,750,000 in cash, which must remain in the Treasury, that just claims may be paid as soon as presented. Under the British Convention there is to be paid $800,000; and there is likewise to be paid the interest on Louisiana stock, amounting to $685,000; the aggregate of which sums is $5,235,000. Not having made this calculation until the gentleman made his observation, it is possible it may not be perfectly correct.

When the loss of the Philadelphia was announced, my first inquiry of the Secretary of the Treasury was what money could be spared from the Treasury for the prosecution of vigorous measures. His answer was, that the greatest[160] sum which could be spared would not exceed $150,000. I did not, like the gentleman, go to the clerks or to the navy yard; but I got the best information I could.

The gentleman from Connecticut, who appears willing to incur an expense of a million of dollars, while he is unwilling to provide the means of meeting it, objects to the mode of raising revenue proposed by the Committee of Ways and Means, without proposing any other. He objects to the laying additional duties on imported goods. In his remarks he has made an erroneous statement of the quantity of goods on which ad valorem duties are paid. His error has arisen from not deducting the amount of drawbacks. By an official statement made this session, it will be found that during the year 1802, goods paying ad valorem duties were as follows:

The average duty on goods charged ad valorem is about thirteen and a half per cent. Let us consider the duties paid by other articles. The gentleman says in laying duties there is a point beyond which we cannot go in safety on account of the temptation to smuggling. This is true. But of all goods imported those chargeable with ad valorem duties are the most difficult to smuggle. The invoices are made out in the country from which they are imported. These must be authenticated, and presented at the custom-house and sworn to. If the collector has any reason to suspect that there are goods on board of a vessel, not in the entry, he is to make a thorough examination of the vessel. If he sees a bale in which he suspects there are goods not stated in the invoice, it is in his power to have it examined. I believe there is but little smuggling at this time; but that the articles on which there is most smuggling are rum and coffee. If the gentleman allows that the duty on articles charged specifically is not so high as to encourage smuggling to any great or dangerous extent, he will allow the same in the case of articles charged ad valorem. The great articles from which revenue is obtained, are

Spirits, which pay an average duty of twenty-nine and two-tenth cents, and which produce $2,253,496, and cost the importer from twenty-five to fifty cents per gallon. Spirits which pay twenty-five cents a gallon do not cost the importer more than fifty cents, and consequently pay a duty of fifty per cent. on the price of the article. Spirits of the third proof pay twenty-eight cents, and do not cost more than fifty-six cents a gallon, which is equal to a duty of fifty per cent. So with spirits of higher proof. From this article is derived more than a fifth of our revenue, and yet I never heard the amount of the duty complained of, until a few days since a petition was presented from the merchants of Connecticut. It is certain that Congress have never considered it so high as to encourage smuggling.

Of imported sugars 39,443,814 lbs. are consumed within the United States, which pay, on an average, a duty of two and a half cents per pound. The price of brown sugar to the importer is about five or six dollars the hundred. The duty is therefore between forty-five and fifty per cent. Is this duty considered so high as to encourage smuggling? If not, shall gentlemen complain when we are about to lay an additional duty of two and a half per cent. upon articles now chargeable with duties of from twelve and a half to twenty per cent.?

Of salt there is consumed 3,244,309 bushels in the United States. It pays a duty of twenty cents a bushel. In many instances this is equal to the first cost; and amounts therefore to one hundred per cent.

The consumption of wines amounts to 1,912,274 gallons, and the average duty is thirty-three cents. The duty on Madeira wine is fifty-eight cents, and it costs the importer one dollar and twenty-five cents. The duty therefore amounts to near fifty per cent. If the cost be taken at one dollar and fifty cents, the duty will be thirty-three and a third per cent. And yet it is not complained that it encourages smuggling.

The greater part of goods charged ad valorem are woollens, linens, manufactures of steel, brass, and articles of a similar kind, and muslins. In a muslin gown the additional duty will make a difference of about five cents. India muslins cost about fifteen cents a yard, and English about twenty-five cents. The additional duty will therefore be about three-eighths of a cent on India, and about three-fourths of a cent on English muslins. This I consider a burden which no one can feel. The additional duty on linens will be equally unfelt. In a bale of osnaburgs, which costs twenty cents, the additional duty on a hundred yards will not exceed fifty cents. So as to Irish linens and woollens. The difference in a coarse suit of clothes for a common man will not be more than twenty-five cents, and that of a better kind will not exceed one dollar and twenty-five cents. I am surprised, after taking this view of the operation of the proposed duty, that gentlemen should dwell upon the great burden it will impose, when it can, in truth, scarcely be felt by the poorest man in the country. It is indeed of no consideration but on account of the money raised by it, which I have estimated at about $750,000.

The gentleman from Connecticut thinks he has discovered in the second section a design that is not avowed, to wit: to liberate the present resources from their application to the support of the Navy. I wonder, however, that the gentleman, before he made this unguarded remark, did not read the section through. He would then have seen that the fund established[161] by this act is to exist no longer than three months after the discontinuance of war in the Mediterranean. Nor is it true that the whole expenses of the Navy are in the Mediterranean. It is true, that at this time they are principally there. But there is likewise considerable expense incurred here in the navy yard on the ships, and on the half-pay of officers not in actual service. Whence the gentleman deduces the inference, when the bill itself declares that the new duties shall cease three months after the end of the war, I am altogether at a loss to comprehend. The duties are to cease with the occasion which produced them. When we shall no longer be at war, the war duties will be at an end.

Mr. Dana.—The gentleman from Maryland must surely have committed a mistake, when he said that there is no measure proposed on his side of the House which does not meet with opposition. When the President considered vigorous measures necessary against the Emperor of Morocco, the Journal will show that we entered into them unanimously. Nor is the objection now urged in any way an objection to the general measure contemplated. The only objection is to the imposition of unnecessary taxes. If the force necessary to be sent into the Mediterranean will not exceed an expense of $380,000, the necessity of the imposition of the proposed taxes surely does not exist. I admit that, after the force is raised, the President, in virtue of his authority as commander-in-chief, is to have its whole direction; but it is perfectly novel to me to learn that we are not previously to be informed of the extent to which it is proposed to carry it. If to the present number of vessels in service we add two frigates and five smaller vessels, they will require only an additional appropriation of $354,000. This, I believe, is the full extent of the additional force contemplated. As to raising money to that amount, I make no objection. Though I dislike laying duties thus in gross, yet I do not know that there can be any great objection to it. The sum proposed to be raised will give $750,000, which is more than double the sum necessary.

Is it proper thus to raise these duties, and hold forth to the nation that the commerce of the Mediterranean is so expensive? The late disaster in the Mediterranean is not of itself an adequate cause for the measure. I object to this measure, because it goes to give an improper impression of the causes of the bill.

Mr. Nicholson said, the gentleman from Connecticut seemed to consider the object too general; he would, in case the committee refused to strike out the first section, move to limit the application of the fund “to protect the commerce and seamen of the United States in the Mediterranean.”

The question was then taken on striking out the first section, and passed in the negative—ayes 26.

Mr. N. then offered the amendment just stated.

Mr. Eustis hoped the gentleman from Maryland would withdraw his amendment, as in a subsequent part of the bill the object is distinctly specified. It is altogether unnecessary; and if agreed to, it will be necessary to add, “or adjacent seas.”

Mr. Nicholson said, he considered the amendment as unnecessary; but as he had promised to make it, he could not withdraw it.

Mr. J. Randolph said he would suggest one reason why it ought not to obtain. One of the Barbary Powers possessed a coast out of the Mediterranean. If the misfortune of the United States should dispose this power, (Morocco,) already predisposed to hostility, to war upon the United States, it would not be in our power to block up the port of Sallee, and several other ports out of the Mediterranean.

The question was taken on the amendment, which was lost without a division.

The committee then rose and reported the bill without amendment.

The House immediately took it up—when Mr. R. Griswold renewed his motion to strike out the first section.

The question on striking out the first section was taken by yeas and nays—yeas 28, nays 77.

Friday, March 23.

District of Columbia.

Mr. Dawson moved that the House should resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole on the resolutions offered by him, for the recession of the District of Columbia.

Mr. Huger said this point had been fully and ably investigated the last session. He did not expect, after the decision then made, that the House would have been again called upon to discuss it. He believed the mind of every member was made up respecting it. He hoped, therefore, the House would not agree to go into committee.

Mr. J. Lewis said he should vote against the House resolving itself into a Committee of the Whole, and should that motion be negatived, he would move to discharge the Committee of the Whole from all further consideration of the resolutions. The question was taken on going into committee, and lost—yeas 20.

Mr. J. Lewis then moved to discharge the committee. This motion was carried without debate—yeas 53, embracing a great majority of the members present.

Monday, March 26.

Impeachment of Judge Chase.

Mr. John Randolph, from the committee appointed on the thirteenth instant, to prepare and report articles of impeachment against Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, made a report thereon, which was read.

Ordered, That the said report be printed for the use of the members of both Houses; and[162] that the Clerk of this House be directed to transmit to each of the members of the two Houses of Congress, a copy of the said report, as soon as the same shall be printed.

Ordered, That there be a call of the House to-morrow morning at eleven o’clock.

The House adjourned until four o’clock, post meridian.

Four o’clock, p. m.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have passed a resolution, that the resolution of the two Houses authorizing the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives to adjourn their respective Houses on this day, be rescinded; and that the said President and Speaker of the House of Representatives be authorized to close the present session, by adjourning their respective Houses on Tuesday, the 27th of this month; to which they desire the concurrence of this House. The Senate adhere to their amendment, disagreed to by this House, to the bill, entitled “An act supplementary to the act, entitled ‘An act providing for a Naval Peace Establishment, and for other purposes.’”

The House proceeded to consider the resolution of the Senate to rescind the resolution of both Houses, of the thirteenth instant, for an adjournment of the two Houses of Congress, on this day; and authorizing the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives, to close the present session, by adjourning their respective Houses on Tuesday the 27th of the present month: whereupon,

Resolved, That this House doth agree to the said resolution of the Senate—yeas 49, nays 44.

The House proceeded to reconsider the amendment disagreed to by this House, and adhered to by the Senate, to the bill, entitled “An act supplementary to the act, entitled ‘An act providing for a Naval Peace Establishment, and for other purposes,’” whereupon,

Resolved, That this House doth recede from their disagreement to the said amendment.

Tuesday, March 27.

Specific Duties.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have passed the bill, entitled “An act for imposing more specific duties on the importation of certain articles, with amendments, and also for levying and collecting light-money on foreign ships or vessels.”

The House proceeded to consider the amendments proposed by the Senate to the bill, entitled “An act for imposing more specific duties on the importation of certain articles, and also for levying and collecting light-money on foreign ships or vessels,” whereupon,

Resolved, That this House doth agree to the said amendments.

Half-past four o’clock, p. m.

Mr. John Randolph, from the committee appointed on the part of this House, jointly with the committee appointed on the part of the Senate, to wait on the President of the United States and notify him of the proposed recess of Congress, reported that the committee had performed that service; and that the President signified to them he had no farther communication to make during the present session.

Ordered, That a message be sent to the Senate to inform them that this House, having completed the business before them, are now about to adjourn until the first Monday in November next; and that the Clerk of this House do go with the said message.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate, having completed the Legislative business before them, are now ready to adjourn. Whereupon the Speaker adjourned the House until the first Monday in November next.

[163]

EIGHTH CONGRESS.—SECOND SESSION.

BEGUN AT THE CITY OF WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 5, 1804.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE.

Monday, November 5, 1804.

The second session of the Eighth Congress, conformably to the act passed at the last session, entitled, “An act altering the time for the next meeting of Congress,” commenced this day; and the Senate assembled at the City of Washington.

PRESENT:

Aaron Burr, Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate.

Simeon Olcott and William Plumer, from New Hampshire.

John Quincy Adams, from Massachusetts.

Uriah Tracy, from Connecticut.

Christopher Ellery, from Rhode Island.

Stephen R. Bradley and Israel Smith, from Vermont.

John Condit, from New Jersey.

Samuel White, from Delaware.

Samuel Smith, from Maryland.

Abraham Baldwin, from Georgia; and

Thomas Worthington, from Ohio.

William B. Giles, appointed a Senator by the Executive of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in place of Abraham B. Venable, resigned, took his seat, and his credentials were read.

The Vice President gave notice that he had received a letter from William Hill Wells, a Senator from the State of Delaware, resigning his seat in the Senate.

The number of Senators present not being sufficient to constitute a quorum, the Senate adjourned.

Tuesday, November 6.

Jesse Franklin, from the State of North Carolina, George Logan, from the State of Pennsylvania, and Timothy Pickering, from the State of Massachusetts, severally attended.

Andrew Moore, appointed a Senator by the Executive of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in place of Wilson C. Nicholas, resigned, took his seat, and his credentials were read.

The President administered the oath to Mr. Giles and Mr. Moore, as the law prescribes.

Ordered—That the President be requested to notify the Executive of the State of Delaware of the resignation of Mr. Wells.

No quorum being present, the Senate adjourned.

Wednesday, November 7.

Robert Wright, from the State of Maryland, attended.

Ordered, That the Secretary notify the House of Representatives that a quorum of the Senate is assembled and ready to proceed to business.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that a quorum of the House of Representatives is assembled and ready to proceed to business. The House of Representatives have appointed a committee on their part, jointly, with such committee as the Senate may appoint, to wait on the President of the United States, and notify him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled and ready to receive any communications that he may be pleased to make to them. The House of Representatives have also passed a resolution that two chaplains, of different denominations, be appointed to Congress for the present session, one by each House, who shall interchange weekly; in which several resolutions they desire the concurrence of the Senate.

The Senate took into consideration the resolution of the House of Representatives for the appointment of a joint committee to wait on the President of the United States, and notify him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled; and concurred therein, and Messrs. Samuel Smith and Baldwin were appointed the committee on the part of the Senate.

The Senate took into consideration the Resolution of the House of Representatives for the appointment of two chaplains to Congress during the present session, and, having agreed thereto, proceeded to the choice of a chaplain on their part; and the Rev. Mr. McCormick was duly elected.

Mr. Samuel Smith reported, from the joint committee, that they had waited on the President of the United States, agreeably to the resolution of this day, and that the President[164] of the United States had informed the committee that he would make a communication to the two Houses to-morrow at 12 o’clock.

Thursday, November 8.

Jonathan Dayton, from the State of New Jersey, and James Hillhouse, from the State of Connecticut, severally attended.

The following message was received from the President of the United States:—

[165]

The message was read, and with the documents therein referred to, ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate.

Friday, November 9.

Thomas Sumter, from the State of South Carolina, attended.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that the House have appointed the Rev. William Bentley a chaplain to Congress on their part during the present session.

Monday, November 12.

William Cocke, from the State of Tennessee, and David Stone, from the State of North Carolina, severally attended.

Thursday, November 15.

Samuel Maclay, from the State of Pennsylvania, and John Smith, from the State of New York, severally attended.

Tuesday, November 20.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that the House have passed a “resolution expressive of the sense of Congress of the gallant conduct of Captain Stephen Decatur, the officers and crew of the United States ketch Intrepid, in attacking in the harbor of Tripoli, and destroying a Tripolitan frigate of forty-four guns,” in which they desire the concurrence of the Senate.

The resolution last mentioned was read and passed to the second reading.

Thursday, November 22.

The resolution of the House of Representatives expressive of the sense of Congress of the gallant conduct of Capt. Stephen Decatur, the officers and crew of the United States ketch Intrepid, was read the second time, and referred to Messrs. Bradley, Baldwin, and Giles, to consider and report thereon to the Senate.

Friday, November 23.

The President laid before the Senate the credentials of James A. Bayard, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Delaware, in place of William Hill Wells, resigned, and the credentials were read.

Samuel L. Mitchill, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of New York, in place of John Armstrong, whose seat has become vacant by his mission to France, took his seat in the Senate, and produced his credentials, which were read, and the oath was administered to him by the President, as the law prescribes.

Friday, November 30.

John Smith, from the State of Ohio, and John Breckenridge, from the State of Kentucky, severally attended.

Monday, December 3.

Benjamin Howland, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Rhode Island, in the place of Samuel J. Potter, deceased, took his seat and produced his credentials; which were read, and the oath was administered to him by the President, as the law prescribes.

Tuesday, December 4.

James Jackson, from the State of Georgia, attended.

Thursday, December 6.

Joseph Anderson, from the State of Tennessee, attended.

Monday, December 17.

The credentials of William B. Giles, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in the room of Wilson C. Nicholas, resigned, and the credentials of Andrew Moore, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in the room of Abraham B. Venable, resigned, were severally read, and the oath was administered to them, respectively, as the law prescribes.

Wednesday, December 26.

John Brown, from the State of Kentucky, attended.

Monday, January 7, 1805.

The letter of Pierce Butler, Esq., announcing the resignation of his seat in the Senate, was read.

Monday, January 14.

Mourning for the Honorable Mr. Potter.

On motion, it was

Resolved, That the members of the Senate, from a sincere desire of showing every mark of respect to the Honorable Samuel J. Potter, deceased, late a member thereof, will go into mourning for him one month, by the usual mode of wearing a crape round the left arm.[13]

Tuesday, January 15.

The Vice President being absent, the Senate proceeded to the choice of a President pro tempore, as the constitution provides, and the Honorable Joseph Anderson was elected.

Ordered, That the Secretary wait on the President of the United States and acquaint him that, the Vice-President being absent, the Senate have elected the Honorable Joseph Anderson President of the Senate pro tempore.

Ordered, That the Secretary make a like communication to the House of Representatives.

[166]

James A. Bayard, from the State of Delaware, attended. His credentials having been presented and read on the 23d of November last, the oath was administered to him by the President, as the law prescribes, and he took his seat in the Senate.

Thursday, January 17.

General Moses Hazen.

The bill entitled “An act for the relief of Charlotte Hazen, widow and relict of the late Brigadier General Moses Hazen,” was read the third time, further amended, and the blank filled with the words “two hundred;” and on the question, Shall this bill pass as amended? it was determined in the affirmative—yeas 20, nays 8, as follows:

So it was Resolved, That this bill do pass as amended.

Monday, January 21.

African Slavery.

Mr. Logan presented a petition signed Thomas Morris, clerk, on behalf of the meeting of the representatives of the people called Quakers, in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, &c., stating that the petitioners, from a sense of religious duty, had again come forward, to plead the cause of their oppressed and degraded fellow-men of the African race; and on the question, Shall this petition be received? it passed in the affirmative—yeas 19, nays 9, as follows:

So the petition was read.

Tuesday, January 29.

Government of the Territory of Orleans.

Mr. Giles, from the committee to whom was referred, on the 4th instant, the petition of the merchants, planters, and other inhabitants of Louisiana, reported a bill further providing for the government of the Territory of Orleans; and the bill was read, and ordered to the second reading.

The bill is as follows:

Wednesday, January 30.

Army Uniform.

The President laid before the Senate the petition of Andrew Jackson, Major General, and sundry other militia officers and other citizens of the State of Tennessee, praying Congress to amend the articles and rules for the future government of the army, in respect to certain parts of their dress and uniform; and, on the question, Shall this petition be referred to the committee appointed on the 25th instant, who have under consideration the bill, entitled “An act for establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States?” it passed in the affirmative—yeas 16, nays 15, as follows:

Thursday, January 31.

John Gaillard, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of South Carolina, in the room of Pierce Butler, resigned, took his seat in the Senate, and the oath prescribed was administered to him by the President.[14]

Tuesday, February 12.

Opening and Counting Votes for President and Vice President.

Resolved, That the Senate will be ready to receive the House of Representatives in the Senate Chamber, on Wednesday the 13th instant, February, at noon, for the purpose of being present at the opening and counting the votes for President and Vice President of the United States. That one person be appointed a teller on the part of the Senate, to make a list of the votes for President and Vice President of the United States, as they shall be declared, and that the result shall be delivered to the President of the Senate, who shall announce the state of the vote, which shall be entered on the Journals, and, if it shall appear that a choice hath been made agreeably to the constitution, such entry on the Journals shall be deemed a sufficient declaration thereof.

Ordered, That the Secretary do carry this resolution to the House of Representatives.

Wednesday, February 13.

Counting of Electoral Votes for President and Vice President.

About twelve o’clock the Senators took their seats; and immediately after the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives entered; the Speaker and Clerk occupying seats on the floor on the right side of the President of the Senate, and the members of the House being seated in front.

Mr. Samuel Smith, teller on the part of the Senate, and Mr. Joseph Clay, and Mr. Roger Griswold, tellers on the part of the House, took seats at a table placed in front of the Chair, in the area between the Senate and House.

The Secretary of the Senate read the resolutions of the two Houses, previously agreed to.

The President (Mr. Burr) stated that, pursuant to law, there had been transmitted to him several packets, which, from the endorsements upon them, appeared to be the votes of the Electors of a President and Vice President; that the returns forwarded by the mail, as well as the duplicates sent by special messengers, had been received by him in due time. You will now proceed, gentlemen, said he, to count the votes as the constitution and laws direct; adding that, perceiving no cause for preference in the order of opening the returns, he would pursue a geographical arrangement, beginning with the Northern States.

The President then proceeded to break the seals of the respective returns, handing each return, and its accompanying duplicate, as the seals of each were broken, to the tellers through, the Secretary; Mr. S. Smith reading aloud the returns, and the attestations of the appointment[168] of the Electors, and Mr. J. Clay and Mr. R. Griswold comparing them with the duplicate return lying before them.

According to which enumeration, the following appeared to be the result.