As for the first decree, which is so general as to
include all, for treating of the commerce of the islands, which is
essential to their preservation: this point, which in the memorial that
I have cited is argued at length, can be reduced to an argument of
three infallible propositions, of which, when two are proved, the third
cannot be denied; and they are in this form.
The Philipinas Islands are absolutely necessary: first, to increase
the preaching of the gospel; second, to maintain the authority,
grandeur, and reputation of this crown; third, to defend the Moluco
Islands and their trade; fourth, to support Eastern India; fifth, to
relieve the Western Indias from their enemies; sixth, to aid the two
crowns of Castilla and Portugal2 in breaking down the power of
the Dutch; seventh, to protect for both crowns the commerce of China.
In order to support the islands, the commerce [28]with
Nueva España is requisite and necessary; for by no other means
can their defense, or means for supporting it, be provided. It
immediately follows that it is also requisite and necessary to grant
this commerce to the islands, or, by abandoning them, to lose all the
advantages which result from their preservation, as here
represented.
The first proposition of this argument consists of eight fundamental
reasons, which are stated therein; but it seems as if they ought to be
proved, in order that their force and cogency may be fully understood.
Accordingly, I will run through them as briefly as possible.
The first one is the increase of the preaching and promulgation of
the holy gospel. This was the principal object which the Catholic
sovereigns of Castilla had in carrying on the discovery of the Western
Indias, and in colonizing and supporting them—and, consequently,
in doing the same for all the islands adjacent to them, among the
number of which are the Philipinas; and although the richness of those
provinces greatly aided their efforts, this was a secondary object with
the sovereigns, and a fulfilment of what is promised in the gospel,
that we must seek first the kingdom of God, and that all the rest which
the world possesses and esteems shall be gathered and added to us.
Therefore, since their intention was the conversion of all the infidels
who inhabit that opposite hemisphere, He who became flesh in order to
redeem them chose that this undertaking should gain, as a secondary
result, the infinite riches which the Indias have given and are giving
to España. Such a reason is not lacking in the Philipinas
Islands. Their first discovery and settlement [29]were
solely for extending the Catholic faith; for then it was not known that
those islands would be rich—as indeed they are not of
themselves—nor that there could be any further result than the
conversion of their natives to the gospel law, and the opening of a
gate by which the preaching of the gospel could be carried to other
provinces and kingdoms of Asia. That enterprise was prosecuted very
successfully, as is publicly known; and it is now very evident that all
those islands are today in the bosom of the Church—for they
contain an archbishopric and three episcopal sees, and very many
convents and hospitals; and there may be seen the Christian religion as
pure, as valued, and as venerated as it is in España. And this
rouses all the more admiration because the location of the colony is so
remote, and so surrounded by heathens, Moors, and heretics; and that,
in spite of all, the power and revenues of this crown are able to
maintain it. But for this result, which was the main one, what was the
second, and in what was seen fulfilled the promise of the gospel? It
was, that God has placed in those seas a firm column, on which He could
found, and by which they could support themselves, Eastern India, the
Molucas Islands, their commerce, and that of China; and which shall
prove for the enemies of this crown—heretics, Moors, and
heathens—a check upon their advance, a resistance to their
intentions, and a strong rock on which they shall be broken, or at
least their success may be checked and their machinations prevented.
Such are the Philipinas Islands, and this rank they acquired after the
preaching of the gospel entered them; and it seems as if it were a
providence of Heaven to make them so necessary from the human
[30]standpoint, in order that the divine influences
might not be lacking in them. For if sometimes the attainment of the
first result might not be sufficient for maintaining them (which the
piety of the kings of Castilla renders incredible), that of the second
result would suffice, because even the divine needs to be maintained in
the world by human protection. This is an axiom which, in lands newly
converted, is generally accepted in the Indias; and it has been
thoroughly proved by experience that the gospel is more effective among
the barbarians when it is under the royal banners and standards than
when it goes without them. Accordingly, it pleased God to ordain that
these standards should be necessary in the Philipinas, in order that
the preaching of the gospel, which was the motive for their going
thither, might be established in their shelter. It is therefore
established by a well-grounded proposition that, even if no more is
looked for than this aim of converting the heathen, it is now
impossible to give up the preservation of the Philipinas, as being so
important a part of the Catholic church. And if the kings of Castilla,
in order not to permit liberty of conscience in Flandes, have during
more than seventy years maintained in those states (and, through them,
in all Europa) the most tedious and costly war that any monarchy in the
world has waged: how can it be denied that by abandoning so vast a
number of Catholics as there are in those islands, who have been
instructed by the Christian zeal of Spaniards, there will, if we leave
them now, be introduced among them liberty of conscience? not to
mention a mingling of schismatic heretics, Moors, Jews, and heathens of
various sects, as is seen in Bantan (which [31]is the
Oriental Ginebra [i.e., Geneva]), and in all other places where
the Dutch find entrance; and they would soon enter those islands [if we
abandon them]. Even if they caused great expenses to this crown (which
they do not), they ought to be supported and preserved.
The second reason is, that in these islands are involved the
authority, grandeur, and reputation of this crown. [My statement in
regard to] the authority is proved by various methods, which may be
found in the memorial that I have cited—of which I will only
notice here the power which is exercised by the governor who rules the
islands in the name of his Majesty. So great is this that it may be
affirmed with truth that in all his kingdoms and seigniories (although
the viceroyalties are classed as superior to that government) the king
does not appoint to an office of greater authority. If this is not
evident, let it be noticed how many crowned kings render homage to that
governor, and recognize him as their superior; how they respect him and
fear his arms; how they desire his friendship, and, if they violate it,
receive punishment. The king of Ternate died a prisoner in Manila; and
he of Sian made, by force of arms, satisfaction for a reprisal which he
had committed. Those of Siao and Tidore are our subjects, and that of
Camboxa is our ally. The ruler of Great China is our friend, and the
emperor of Japòn was such until the Dutch alienated him; and
although the failure of the Japanese trade causes us loss, we have not
feared to declare that ruler our enemy—as are those of Champa,
Sian, and Mindanao; and, more than all, the Dutch, who keep those seas
so infested. And it ought to be considered [32]that the
governor of Philipinas sends ambassadors to all those kings, with gifts
to present to them, and receives those that they send to him in return;
he makes peace and declares war, and does whatever seems to him
expedient; and all this on his own responsibility, without waiting for
a decision of the matter from España, because the excessive
distance renders him the entire master in these acts. This is a
preëminence of so great authority that no governor or viceroy in
Europe exercises it. The grandeur which this monarchy preserves in
those islands is widely known. In its material aspect, that domain
extends through a circuit of 1,400 leguas, in which are included the
two archipelagos of San Lazaro and Moluco: the latter composed of five
especially important islands, which their own kings govern, with more
than seventy others adjacent; the latter, of those which are properly
called Philipinas, forty in number—some of them larger than all
España, some as large as this country, and others somewhat
smaller. This does not mention the islands that are small and
uninhabited, which are without number. Among all these is [foremost]
the island of Luzon, in which is the distinguished and ever loyal city
of Manila, which is the precious stone of this setting, and which alone
is enough to prove the grandeur of España—by its location,
its splendor, its buildings, its sky, and its soil. In its citizens are
resplendent the religious faith, the loyalty, and the courage which
gave origin to that colony. Since Manila is, as some say, the antipodes
of Sevilla, it seems as if it tried to imitate that city in its
characteristics, and in being a military center and an emporium of
commerce for that hemisphere. If one considers higher things, the power
of [33]the islands cannot be reduced to the region just
mentioned. Manila may be compared to the city of Goa, the capital of
Eastern India; and it is she who reduces to subjection all the coasts
from the Straits of Sincapura to Japòn, and the islands of the
Ladrones and the Papuas; for her fleets sail through all those seas
with the never conquered and always victorious royal standards of
España. Her ships are admitted into many maritime kingdoms of
Asia, and into numberless islands adjacent to them; they make voyages
so long that no others equal to these are known. They go to China and
Japòn, and by the Southern Sea to Nueva España; and by
way of the Northern Sea—coasting all the Oriental kingdoms,
emerging [from the China Sea] through Sincapura, and doubling the great
Stormy Cape, that of Buena Esperanza—they have reached the bar of
San Lucar, with these two voyages making almost the entire circuit of
the world. And if commerce is regarded as the greatest splendor of
kingdoms (as it certainly is), this greatness is not lacking to the
Philipinas; for they have so rich a commerce that, if they could enjoy
it free, there is no city known to the world that would surpass, or
even equal, Manila. That in that colony resides and is preserved the
reputation of this crown, is evident, if it be noted that the
maintenance of that reputation by the arms of España in
Fuente-Rabia, in Salsas, in Italia, in Flandes, in Alemania, and in
other parts of Europa is not to be wondered at; for if España is
the heart which inspires strength in the mystical body of this
monarchy, it is not much that the members which are nearest and so
closely connected should share most effectively in this influx of
energy. And if his Majesty (whom God preserve!) [34]is the
soul or vital breath of this heart, it cannot be denied that the closer
proximity will cause the greater effect. Besides, the great number of
the troops who go out from the adjoining [European] states prevents the
enemy from seizing any one of those states; but the greatest cause of
reputation for this crown is that, at a distance of three thousand
leguas from the royal person and España, three thousand three
hundred and thirty-six Spaniards, all of them occupied in those islands
in war and in peace, on sea and on land, [accomplish what they do]. It
is the citizens of Manila who are the substance of that diamond, where
the adjoining states are all enemies—barbarians, heretics, Moors,
and heathens. Those Spaniards are without hope of succor in
emergencies, without safety for the unfortunate in the retreat, and
even without the reward due them for their achievements; they are
always inferior in numbers, and continually attacked by Dutch,
Mindanaos, Japanese, Jaos, and other peoples. They are always in
anxiety about the Chinese, or Sangleys, who number more than 30,000 in
Manila; and about the natives, of whom there are more than 80,000. In
that land of many islands they maintain fortified posts, and on the sea
armed fleets of galleons, galleys, and champans—one for the
defense of Manila, another for conveying troops and supplies to
Terrenate, and another for the fort on the island of Hermosa. In this
last island and in those of Moluco, our military posts confront the
Dutch; our people are continually fighting on sea and on land, while
they wage on the frontier a fierce war with the most wary people that
is known, and with tribes who are as cruel as they can be. Yet,
although their soldiers are so few, [35]they meet innumerable
obligations, acquit themselves of all, and cause the Spanish name to
emerge from all gloriously, and the standards of the king our lord
victoriously. Therefore, it is the Philipinas Islands that preserve the
reputation of this crown with the most valor and the least reward, with
the greatest hazard, and with most glory.
The third fundamental reason is, that the Philipinas defend the
islands of Moluco, and the commerce in the cloves that are obtained
from them. The importance of these islands is everywhere known, because
in all the world there are no other islands nor any other region in
which grows this spice or drug, so highly valued. For their discovery
alone Hernando de Magallanes made, by order of the emperor Carlos
Fifth, that celebrated voyage in which he found the strait to which he
gave his name, and passed through it into the Southern Sea; and,
although he was slain while making his claims, his ship sailed around
the world. The lordship of those islands caused troublesome hostilities
between the Castilians and Portuguese, which were ended by this crown
giving them to that of Portugal, in fulfilment of a contract; for it
seemed (and indeed was evident) that Castilla would have much
difficulty in maintaining them when they were so separated from all its
kingdoms and states, while Portugal, by possessing Eastern India, was
less distant from and could better support them. The course of time
showed that even India was very remote from them; for when the Dutch
power entered the Orient and established a military post in
Bantan3—a port nearer to Moluco, [36]and more
advantageously located than was India—it was so obviously
impossible to defend them that in the end they were lost to us, the
enemy getting possession of them all and of their commerce. But as the
Philipinas were by that time quite populous, and so near to the Molucas
that they were superior to Bantan [as a trading post], the task of
restoring the Molucas [to Spanish control] was laid upon the governor,
Don Diego de Acuña—who with his courage and energy, and
the convenience of being so near, regained them and restored them to
this crown. When both Castilla and Portugal recognized the great
expense that India would have to incur in maintaining the Molucas, and
that even with excessive expenditures it would be impossible to do so,
on account of the injury being nearer than the remedy, and the enemy
than the succor, those islands were, by the mutual agreement of the two
crowns, united to the government of the Philipinas as regards their
defense and support. The clove-trade was left to the Portuguese,
because it was so important that, if it were taken from them, India
would perish, or become greatly weakened. It is thus sufficiently
proved that the Philipinas contributed to the restoration of all the
forts in the Orient; and that in their preservation was and still is
involved that of the Molucas, and consequently of all India. Thus they
have been maintained since the year 1603, defending them by force of
arms against the Dutch, who never cease [37]their endeavors to expel
the Castilians from those islands; this has been the cause of many
naval encounters and battles, in which the arms of España have
always remained victorious. Nevertheless, since the military force of
Philipinas is small, the territory that they must defend large, and the
aid which is given to them for this purpose very limited, it has not
been possible to prevent the treachery and persistence of the Dutch
from having some effect; nor to put a stop to their sharing in the
clove trade at some forts which they keep in the Molucas, though at the
cost of many men, armed vessels, and expenses. From all of these
islands are produced each year 2,816,000 libras of cloves, of which the
Dutch secure 1,098,000 libras, and the Portuguese and Castilians
1,718,000—and this latter supply is due to the protection of the
Philipinas; while it is computed that the cloves which the Dutch carry
away amount to three times as much as it will cost them to be absolute
lords of the Molucas, even with the large garrisons and armed fleets
which they keep and maintain for purchasing the spice and transporting
it to Bantan. From this it obviously follows that without the
Philipinas the Molucas would be lost, and their commerce and trade in
cloves would cease—from which would follow two pernicious
results, which would cause the loss of whatever his Majesty possesses
in the Orient. One is, that India would be greatly weakened, for lack
of that commerce; for if that country languishes on account of not
having all of that trade, it may well be understood that she will
perish if it be taken from her. The other is, that the Dutch in that
case would have the entire benefit of the trade, and without much
expense; for if [Holanda] [38]with less than half the
trade—and that at the cost of so many garrisons and
fleets—gains such profits that they are enough to maintain
whatever she has in India; if she were to secure all the cloves and, on
account of the less cost, thus gain a profit of more than a thousand
per cent upon her investments, while the gross amount would be doubled:
it is very plain that India would not remain safe, the Western Indias
would be more effectively harassed, the rebel states in Flandes would
be strengthened, the coasts of España would experience their
invasions, and everywhere the treasure that could be obtained from the
Molucas alone would cause most injurious effects—as may be seen,
with more detailed arguments, in the memorial that I have cited in
behalf of the Philipinas, to which [colony] we owe the only
compensation [that we receive] for all these losses.
The fourth reason is almost the sequence of what has been said in
the third, although it is more general, since it takes notice that the
Dutch fleets have entered the Orient with so strong a force that they
have often placed India in risk of being lost to us; for if they were
aided by the Moorish and heathen kings and the rulers of Persa and
Mogòr4—and sometimes the Dutch are leagued with the
English, who also navigate those seas—their invasion would be
irresistible. What has prevented this danger has been the diversion
furnished by the Philipinas—not only by diminishing their trade
and profits in Moluco (as has been seen), in China, and in other
regions, but by compelling [39]them to divide their forces, and to
maintain in some places very large ones. India is divided into two
parts—[one], from the Cape of Buena Esperanza to the Straits of
Sincapura; the other, from the straits to China and Japòn. The
first is defended by the Portuguese fleets of India, which seldom go
thither through the straits; the second, by the Castilians of
Philipinas, who never come here by way of the straits. For both these,
it is necessary that the Dutch send thither and maintain squadrons; and
therefore it is proved, at this very beginning, that if the fleets of
this crown are deficient in either of those regions, and the enemy can
transfer all of his naval force to the one that remains [without
defense] because there is no diversion [of his forces] in the other, it
will be difficult if not impossible to defend [the one to which he
goes]—an argument which admits no debate in the naval as well as
in the military world. From this it follows that if now the Philipinas
fail us Eastern India will remain without aid, and consequently in
evident danger of being lost [to us]. This is further confirmed by the
fact that, of the two parts into which India is divided, the enemy
expends much more of his energy in the second than in the first. In the
latter he is content with factories and barter, without keeping any
fortified posts; in the former, he maintains the forts of Malayo,
Toloco, Tacubo, Malaca, Tacome, Marieco, Motir, Nofagia, Tafacen,
Tabelole, Bermevelt, Tabori, Gilolo, Amboino, Lagu, Maruco, Mozovia,
Belgio, Bantan, and Hermosa Island. In these nineteen presidios there
were, in the year 1616, 3,000 soldiers; 193 pieces of bronze artillery
and 310 of iron, and 300 stone-mortars [pedreros]; and
thirty war galleons. And all this is [40]solely to defend
themselves from the Philipinas, and to attack the islands so that the
armed fleets of India shall not sail to that region—or, if they
should go thither, it would be easy to stop them at the Strait of
Sincapura. If then, the Philipinas were unable to act, and the Dutch
should abandon those nineteen forts (which now are many more), as being
no longer necessary to them, they would proceed to the coasts of India,
and their galleons to those seas. If even when their energies are
diverted, their forces divided, and their gains diminished as they are
now, they cause so much anxiety, what would it be if, with little if
any opposition, their forces united, and their profits increased, they
should harass India? It is easy to see that they would occasion that
region the utmost distress, and that consequently the Philipinas are an
absolutely necessary defense for it.
The fifth reason has the same ground as the fourth; for, on account
of the diversion of forces and the expense which the enemy now
encounters in the Orient and in the forts of Moluco, he is compelled to
refrain from annoying the Western Indias, and must devote less
attention, military force, and money to that object. And since what he
spends or fails to gain in India enables the Philipinas to oppose or to
embarrass him, it follows that if he there shall gain more and spend
less, he will here take possession of both [the Indias]. And if the
Indias, even with so effective a diversion [of the enemy’s force
as they have now], need the Windward Fleet which is being built there,
and for which a subsidy of 600,000 ducados is granted annually: in
order to dispense with the garrisons, fleets, and expenditures in India
everything would have to be increased, so that in the [41]Indias
more expense would be incurred for their defense than is consumed in
the Philipinas.
The sixth is a reason of honor and profit, for these two admirable
results follow from the victories which the inhabitants of Philipinas
have gained over the Dutch: honor, on account of the glory which the
Catholic arms acquire in those seas, which gains for them the esteem of
the Japanese, Chinese, Sianese, Mindanaos, and innumerable other
peoples, who serve as spectators in the theatre for such exploits; and
profit, since, if the enemy’s forces are weakened it follows
that, besides those that he loses in being conquered, he is compelled
to expend still greater ones in order to keep his foothold. This is the
most notable reason for maintaining powerful squadrons on the sea, in
order that if the pirate undertakes to plunder successfully, he will
have to do it with so great a force that either he will abandon the
prize because he cannot hold it, or he will let it alone because the
profits do not make it worth his while. Of the victories which the
Spaniards have gained in those seas there are extant histories and
accounts; and in the large memorial some of these are mentioned.
The seventh is, that [by the islands] are aided the two crowns of
Castilla and Portugal, who are so united and in so fraternal relations
in the Orient, each possessing its share of the two parts into which
that region is, as we have said, divided. If we are to base our opinion
on experience, the facts are evident in the restoration of Moluco; for
in the time of Governor Don Juan de Sylva the forces of both crowns
were joined, and it is regarded as certain that, if death had not
intercepted his designs, he [42]would have driven from those seas the
arms of Holanda and of Inglaterra, and awakened fear and dread in many
kings who were awaiting the result of so powerful a combination; and,
even though success is not always so immediate, it suffices that it
should be possible to make the enemy fear, and to lead them to believe
that what has occurred sometimes may occur often.
The eighth reason is to protect and preserve the commerce of China
for both crowns. For this argument it is taken for granted that this
commerce is one of the most beneficial and lucrative of those in the
entire Orient; and we can say that there is no other in all the world
that equals it. The Oriental traffic of ancient times, which the Romans
so highly valued, originated in China and in the drugs, fabrics, and
curiosities of that country—although, as they were ignorant of
its real origin, they called it the India trade, since they received it
from that country. In the larger memorial I have already discoursed
upon this at length. Now all the nations in those [Oriental] kingdoms
take part in this commerce, but it is conducted most extensively and
steadily by the Portuguese of India and the Castilians of Manila; we
shall soon relate how important it is to the latter. Of the Portuguese
it suffices to say that they possess in China the city of Macan, and
the privilege of entering that of Canton; and the commerce of these two
cities they maintain through the Strait of Sincapura, though always in
danger from the Dutch. But as the profits are so great, they sail by
that route; it adds much to their safety that they cross through the
seas of Philipinas, and that Macan can find succor in Manila. But if
this should be lacking, Macan could [43]not remain many years without
ruin, nor could India enjoy the commerce with China, which is one of
those which most benefit her; and if the Chinese trade is cut off from
India and Manila, the Dutch alone will be strong enough to carry it on.
Although they are at present shut out from it by the robberies that
they have committed on the Sangleys, they would not find it difficult
to bring the latter to friendship with them; for it is already known
that when money is lacking in Philipinas the Sangleys carry their
merchandise to the Dutch. Therefore, on the preservation of those
islands depends that of the Chinese trade.
These eight fundamental reasons are sufficient to prove the
importance and necessity that exist for maintaining, preserving, and
favoring those islands; for if they were lost the resulting damage
would be great and excessive beyond any possible comparison or
proportion to what the islands now cost us. And because there is seen
in this an error of misapprehension, I will make a statement regarding
it that is worthy of much attention and notice. This is, that it costs
the royal exchequer more to support the island of San Martin5—which is of no use, and has no more effect
than to remove an obstacle to the navigation of the Indias, and take
away a landing-place from the pirates (who already have numberless
others)—than to maintain the Philipinas Islands, which have the
utility and effectiveness which I have stated.
For the proof of this, I avail myself of a summary [44]of the
detailed statements in the larger memorial, regarding the cost of the
Philipinas. For the officials of justice, who govern them, 37,077
pesos; for the entire ecclesiastical estate, 37,277 pesos. In
maintaining friendly relations with neighboring kings, 1,500 pesos. In
the administration of the royal exchequer, 11,550 pesos. For the land
forces at Manila, and in the military posts of all the islands, 229,696
pesos. For wars on land, and the forts in Moluco, 97,128 pesos. For
naval war, shipbuilding, and navy-yards, 283,184 pesos. For supplies
and provisions for all the soldiers and seamen, 153,302 pesos. These
sums amount to 850,734 pesos, which is the expenditure made each year
for the islands—not omitting to reckon wages and salaries, scanty
though they be. This, therefore, is all the charge for their cost which
can be made.
On the credit side of the account, the tributes from the crown
encomiendas are worth each year 53,715 pesos; and the two reals which
are paid to the king by each Indian in the private encomiendas amount
to 21,107 pesos. The licenses which are given to the Sangleys come to
112,000 pesos; and the tributes from these Sangleys, to 8,250. The
fifth and the tenth of gold, 750 pesos. The ecclesiastical tithes,
which are collected by the royal exchequer for the support of the
prelates and clergy, 2,750 pesos. The freight charges in his
Majesty’s ships, 350 pesos. The court fines, 1,000 pesos. The
customs duties, 38,000 pesos. The mesada and half-annats, 6,000. From
these ten sources the income amounts to 243,922 pesos; to this must be
added the imposts, freight dues, and customs duties which are collected
in Nueva España on the merchandise that comes from the
[45]islands—all which amount to 300,000 pesos,
and this is income that results and proceeds from the islands;
accordingly, by a decree of February 19, 1606, it is commanded that
these charges, adding to their amount each year, be remitted to Manila,
and that so much less be sent from the royal exchequer of Mexico. And
if all these goods are sold and traded in Nueva España once, or
two or more times, and pay the customary charges of alcabala,6 if
the rate of two [per cent] which they usually pay was moderated to
30,000 pesos in the larger memorial, the rate on the said [sales] will
certainly amount to 60,000 pesos. With this, the islands now have
593,922 pesos to their credit; so that their [actual] expense cannot be
estimated at more than 256,812 pesos—[and that] without counting
the proceeds of the Crusade, those from intestate property, or the
monopoly of playing-cards.
Another item ought to be placed with these, which is the expense for
the islands of Moluco. These were possessions of the crown of Portugal,
which consumed in supporting and defending them great sums of ducados
and many soldiers; but finally it lost them, and the Dutch gained them.
By agreement of the two crowns, Governor Don Pedro de Acuña
regained possession of them (as I have related); and as it was
[46]evident that the crown of Portugal could not
defend them on account of the great expense required therefor, those
islands were committed, in the year 1607, to the governor of
Philipinas. In this must be considered several things. First, that
these islands of Moluco do not belong to those which are called
Philipinas, nor are they included in that group. Second, that at
present they are the property of the Portuguese crown, but are in
possession of the Castilian crown for the purpose of protecting,
maintaining, and defending them; on this account, the commerce in
cloves is left to India, as it was before. Third, that the Philipinas
and the citizens of Manila do not obtain or possess any advantage or
benefit from Moluco, or anything else besides the continual trouble of
succoring and provisioning its forts; for the clove-trade belongs to
the Portuguese, and there is no other commerce in those islands.
Fourth, that since the day when the governor of Philipinas and the
crown of Castile took charge of Moluco, the crown of Portugal has saved
more than 400,000 pesos, the cost which it would have incurred in
maintaining Moluco, estimated on the basis of what it now costs
Castilla for that—although Manila, which is the place where
provision is made for those islands, is so near them. Fifth, that for
these reasons it is evident and plain that what is spent for the
islands of Moluco should not be charged to the Philipinas; nor even
should the crown of Castilla pay it, but rather that of Portugal, which
is the proprietary owner of Moluco, and has the benefit of the
clove-trade. Consequently, whatever is received from that trade must be
placed to the credit and acquittance of the Philipinas, against the
amount charged to them. Sixth, [47]and last, notice the [items of]
the annual expenses of the Moluco Islands: for salaries, 97,128 pesos;
provisions, considering the total number of people, will average 30,000
pesos a year; for the ecclesiastical ministrations and the management
of the royal treasury, the expense will reach 4,000 pesos; and for
naval affairs and shipyards, 100,000 pesos—since in order to send
every year the usual supplies, and to furnish extraordinary aid when
occasion demands, the armed ships are necessary which are always kept
at Manila. Thus the cost of the islands of Moluco comes to more than
230,000 pesos each year; deducting this from the 256,000 which remain
charged to the Philipinas, only 26,000 pesos. This is an amount
unworthy of consideration, even if the islands were of no more use than
to augment the grandeur of this crown; but granting that they possess
the advantages that I have mentioned, the loss, cost, and expense is
nothing; and it remains abundantly proved how necessary, just,
expedient, and requisite it is to maintain them.
If the Philipinas are to be maintained, it now remains to ascertain
how and in what manner this shall be done, in order to secure their
preservation, and [at the same time] to avoid any considerable injury
to the royal exchequer and to the other kingdoms of this crown. For
this there are but two methods, and these alone; no other can be found
which is adequate and efficacious. The first one is, the method which
is adopted for the island of San Martin, and for all the military posts
which his Majesty maintains in the Indias and in other regions, and for
his fleets and armies; this is, to furnish from the royal treasury all
that shall be necessary for this purpose. Granting that the islands
cost annually [48]850,000 pesos and furnish revenues of 244,000
pesos, his Majesty will have to supply 606,000 pesos. Although this is
a great sum of money, the preservation of those islands is so
desirable, and so much more will have to be lost and spent if the
islands are lost, that, in case there shall be no other way, it will be
necessary and compulsory to accept and carry out the above
method—although even that would not be enough, for the islands
now cost 850,000 pesos [only] because the citizens of Manila give much
aid, and render service with their persons and property. In one year
they have thus given more than 200,000 pesos, as is made evident in the
larger memorial, nos. 59 and 60. Accordingly, this method is
exceedingly costly, and even more so than it would seem, for the reason
that I have stated.
There remains, then, the second method, the only one [available];
this consists in granting commerce to those islands, which would
suffice to secure three results. The first of these is, to preserve the
present revenue of 244,000 pesos that they yield; for that sum, or the
greater part of it, is based on the wealth which the islands obtain
from their commerce, and if this fails them they will produce much
less, and therefore much more will have to be supplied [from without].
The second, to give the royal treasury the benefit of the 606,000 pesos
which (or the greater part of that sum) are deficient for the usual
expense account, as has been shown. The third, to furnish the citizens
with means by which they can, in emergencies, aid the extraordinary
expenses—as they always have done, and still do—by having a
commerce to support them; but without this it will be necessary, as
they would lack the means to render [49]such aid, that the king should
bear these expenses. These three results being granted, the
preservation of those islands readily follows.
The question then remains as to the character, amount, and form of
this commerce, which are three principal topics. As for the character
of this commerce, it is noted in the larger memorial (no. 15) that the
islands have a domestic and a foreign commerce. It has been shown that
this is scanty, except what proceeds from Moluco; but that this might
be very rich, since it is the trade in cloves (as may be seen in nos.
28, 30, 34, and 36 of the said memorial). But, as this trade is
reserved for the Portuguese and prohibited to the Castilians, it is
useless to consider it for this purpose—although it is worth
notice that whatever advantage the crown of Portugal derives from that
trade is due to the Philipinas, and results from their preservation. I
shall soon make some observations on the remaining portion of this
domestic commerce, and what can be obtained from it.
Their foreign commerce is with many regions of the Orient, as is
stated in the said memorial, from no. 20 on; and in no. 37 it is shown
that only the inhabitants of the Philipinas can carry on the commerce
with China, because they have means for this only—exporting that
merchandise to Nueva España, and obtaining the returns from it
in silver, with which to maintain it; for they have no other commodity
which the Chinese crave, as is proved in the said memorial, no. 70.
From this the conclusion is drawn that the islands cannot be preserved
without commerce, and that this must necessarily be conducted with
Nueva España in Chinese merchandise, and in some of their own
products. [50]
As for the second point, the amount of the commerce, this was
formerly without any limitation; and during the time (which was short)
while that condition lasted the islands acquired what strength and
wealth and grandeur they now possess. After a time certain difficulties
arose—which are discussed in the said memorial, nos. 80, 81, 94,
117, and 118—all being to the prejudice of España’s
commerce; on account of these it became expedient to limit the commerce
of the islands, reducing it to a fixed amount of 250,000 pesos’
worth of merchandise and 500,000 pesos in returns. Although the
citizens resented this, and saw that if it were successful they could
[only] preserve their wealth without being able to increase it much,
they went on under this decree from the time when it began to be
executed (in 1605) until 1635—when Don Pedro de Quiroga went [to
Mexico], and by his rigorous measures reduced this permission to terms
so restricted that it was rather taking away the permission entirely
than carrying out its intent. This falling upon the necessity of the
islands that the stated amount of their merchandise be increased, on
account of the many shipwrecks, misfortunes, and expenses which they
had experienced—of which I have made a brief relation in the said
memorial, no. 107—to take away the permission that they had
without granting them a more liberal one, was more than they could
endure; it may readily be seen what results this would cause. And as
divine Providence did not cause these troubles to cease with the death
of him who caused them, it may well be believed that the islands are
today in so miserable a condition that they will either be ruined or
can no longer be reached [51]by the remedy which the kind
attention of the council has begun to furnish them—entrusting its
final application to the inquiry to be made by your illustrious
Lordship, who is well informed of the losses, advantages and
disadvantages, and all the circumstances of which knowledge is
necessary for your decision in a matter so serious as this, on which
depends the preservation of the Philipinas and of all that depends upon
them. Their citizens hope that your decision will be what is expedient
and necessary for those vassals, always so loyal, but always harassed
by enemies, and even by friends.
There remains, then, the third point of the three that I have
stated; that is, the form which must be adopted and followed in this
commerce of the islands with Nueva España. Don Pedro de Quiroga
proceeded in this matter with measures so rigorous and unusual that he
tried to establish regulations different from those which are respected
and observed in all the ports of España, of the Indias, and of
the world. He undertook to open and weigh the bundles and chests, and
to count, weigh, and measure the commodities and wares, without any
preceding denunciation, information, or [even] indication that these
exceeded the registration. He laid an embargo on all, without there
being any guilt on the part of the owners, or prohibition of the
articles; and for only raising this so unjust embargo he extorted from
the commerce 300,000 pesos—excluding from composition 600,000
pesos’ worth besides, which are included in the [right of]
composition by express, clear, and plain provisos [of the ordinances].
He collected the dues on whatever appraisement of the goods it suited
him to make, although it was evident [52]to him that they were
being sold at half that rate in Acapulco, and even in Mexico. He
hindered the return of the proceeds from the merchandise, which is
allowed by the royal decree; and it cannot be denied that he who
carries his goods to sell, [even though] with permission, may not exact
the price that he shall obtain for them. For granting that permission,
he demanded new dues and imposed new burdens; compelled the shippers to
do whatever he wished, and harassed the mariners on that trade-route
until he made them leave it—when it is known (and the islands are
making representations to that effect) that it is for what is most
needed in those islands that the governors in Manila make concessions
to their citizens when the latter ask for these, in order to constrain
them by kindness to what could not be obtained by severity; and the
Council is conferring upon those citizens privileges and distinctions,
in order that many may be encouraged to become mariners and
artillerists. All this was done by Don Pedro de Quiroga under pretext
of serving his Majesty; but it caused his royal exchequer the great
loss which has been experienced in the failure, for two years, of ships
to arrive from Philipinas. By this has been lost, in dues alone,
660,000 pesos, and as much more through the suspension of commerce; and
still greater were the losses to the vassals of his Majesty, to say
nothing of the danger in which those islands were left, and to which
they are still exposed. To speak of the plan which should be
established in this commerce, it seems as if it were sufficient to
place before your illustrious Lordship what Don Pedro de Quiroga did,
and what resulted from that, in order to understand that if by his
proceedings he [53]destroyed and ruined the commerce it is not
expedient to follow his example. Rather should be followed those of
Sevilla, Cartagena, Portovelo, Vera Cruz, and the other ports of the
Indias and of these kingdoms, in which royal laws, decrees, and
ordinances have ordained what shall be observed in these matters; and
since these regulations are not annulled or broken in favor of the
islands, it will not be just if they are broken or annulled to the loss
or injury of that colony. For neither do those vassals merit less than
this, nor is their commerce of different character from the other
commerce that belongs to this crown.
Although representations have been made, with more exaggeration and
less in accordance [with the facts] than would be desirable, of serious
infractions of law that have been committed in this
commerce—which representations I have answered at length and in
detail in the said memorial, from no. 94 to no. 99—it may be
observed that, if there are any (which, if I do not admit, I do not
deny), they are not of greater extent nor of different character than
those which are every year experienced in the fleets and galleons on
the India trade-route. These infractions consist in shipping more
merchandise than what is registered, and different commodities from
what are declared, and in carrying back more silver than is shown by
the registers; and there are not and cannot be on the ships of
Philipinas other infractions than the shipment of more goods and the
return of more silver than appear on the registers. Let, then, the
remedy be ascertained which is applied at Sevilla, Cadiz, and San
Lucar, at Cartagena, Portovelo, Vera Cruz, and Habana, and let the same
be [54]applied at Manila and Acapulco.7 Let guards
be placed, and informers allowed, and goods declared—with rewards
to encourage, and punishments to warn; but it would be a chance success
to ascertain in detail what would be shipped at Sevilla and unloaded in
the ports of the Indias. This would be to establish not order but
disorder in that commerce, as I state in the said memorial, no. 95; and
soon the same thing would be noticed in that of the islands.
[55]
And although it may be represented that the infractions in the
Philipinas trade, considering their amount, cause more loss than those
in the commerce of España, especially in the exportation of the
silver—since that which is brought in the galleons outside of the
kingdom finally comes to Castilla; and that which is carried in the
ships of Philipinas soon finds its way to China, and thus is lost, and
the commerce is taken away from the vassals of this crown—reply
may thus be made. The illegal shipments on the Philipinas route cause
much less loss than do those on the India route, as is incurred when a
galleon laden with silver is lost at sea, as compared with one that is
captured by enemies; in the former case there is only our own loss, but
in the latter is the same loss, and an advantage to our enemies. It
cannot be denied that the silver which goes unregistered in the ships
of Philipinas is lost, but no enemy of this crown benefits thereby; for
that silver comes to a halt in China, from which country it never
emerges—as is stated in the said memorial, no. 72—nor does
it work any harm there, whether it be more or less; for neither do we
wage war with China, nor do the Chinese aid any other nation which
wages war with us. As for the silver which comes [to España]
unregistered in the galleons, those who best understand the subject
consider that it would cause less damage if it remained in the Indias
(and even some extend this idea to its being lost in the sea); because,
under the pretext of its coming concealed, it either does not come into
Sevilla, or, if it does come in, soon goes out again. In both these
cases, it remains in the hands of the French, English, Flemish, and
Portuguese, and most of it is anchored in their ships, by [56]which
Inglaterra, Francia, and Holanda are enriched; while that which goes to
Portugal is carried to India, and there it is shared by the Dutch,
Persians, Arabs, Mogous, and other hostile nations, until it reaches
China, which is its center [of equilibrium]. It may be judged, then,
which is the greater injury; and since the loss caused by the illegal
shipments on the vessels of Philipinas is less, let that be done with
those ships that is done with the galleons. But let it not be proposed
that the commerce be taken from them, or its amount limited, or that
unusual methods and severity be employed in dealing with them, since
these are not used in the commerce of the Indias, and, comparing them
together, one is no less necessary than the other.
From these considerations we draw the final conclusion that if the
Philipinas Islands are, as has been proved, absolutely necessary to
this crown on account of the eminent advantages and benefits which
result to it from them, and that, in order to preserve them, there are
but two methods: one, for his Majesty to support them; the other, to
grant them commerce by which they can sustain themselves—the
first costly and difficult, the second easy and obvious—the
latter ought to be accepted and carried out. [This can be done] by
giving them the commerce which they have hitherto enjoyed with Nueva
España, to the amount that is expedient, and in the usual
manner, without adding conditions that will diminish or render it
difficult; for that will be to withdraw and consequently to destroy and
end it, and with it those islands, which are so important to this
Catholic monarchy. Your illustrious Lordship will make such report on
this point and argument as [his Majesty’s] [57]vassals
there expect and desire from your great ability and zeal.
